

HEADQUARTERS
1ST BATTALION, 5TH CAVALRY
1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)
APO 96490, US FORCES

AVCIA-SC

5 December 1965

SUBJECT: After Action Report

TO: Commanding Officer
2nd Brigade
1st Cavalry Division (Air)
ATTN: S-3
APO 96490, US Forces

1. This report covers two periods: 4 Nov-15 Nov and 15 Nov-26 Nov 1965. Each period of time will be discussed as a separate operation.

- a. Operation HITCHHIKE.
- b. Date of operation: 4-15 Nov 1965.
- c. Location: See FRAG O 29-65 (HITCHHIKE) Hq. 2d Bde.
- d. Command Hqs.: Hq 2d Bde, 1st Air Cavalry Division.
- e. Reporting Officer: Lt. Col Frederic Ackerson.
- f. Task Organization:

ORGANIC

ATTACHED

OPERATIONAL CONTROL

HHC 1/5th Cav
A 1/5th Cav
B 1/5th Cav
C 1/5th Cav
D 1/5th Cav

B 2/5th Cav (4-8 Nov)
Sqd, 545th MP Co.
Two Teams, 54th Inf (PPS-4)
Team, 10th HRU

D 1/9th Cav

g. Supporting Forces: 1/77th Arty was in DS with priority of fires to 1/5th Cav throughout the period. Several airstrikes were utilized on a preplanned basis to interdict enemy targets derived from informants, interrogations and hot spots reported by Infra-red missions. Twelve sorties were flown on 13 and 14 November on the latter type target in grid squares BR6533 and BR6534. No post strike analysis was feasible by elements of this command.

h. Intelligence: The intelligence information gained for the area of operations was timely and adequate. The best source of information on enemy locations and activities was obtained by daily liason between the Battalion S-2 and personnel at the Binh Khe District Headquarters. (See Inclosure 1, Intelligence)

i. Mission:

- (1) Relieve 2/5th Cav in sector NIT 041400 Nov 65.
- (2) Provide security on HWY 19 in sector to include strong points in DEO LANG Pass.
- (3) Coordinate with CO, 1st ROK Regt, concerning security of ROK Base establishment, and conduct patrolling and operations as required to insure ROK units can adequately establish bases and prepare for combat.
- (4) Conduct active patrolling and ambushes on VANHAI WADLEY to include contact patrolling with 10th Camp.
- (5) Maintain communications with E/3d Bde.
- (6) Provide security for operations as required.

j. Concept of operations: 1/5th Cav (reimposed) provided security of Route 19 and check points one thru ten in sector by establishment of strong points along route, guarding bridges in sector, securing elements of 1/77th Arty, and conducting saturation patrolling and ambushes on a continuous basis.

k. Execution: 1/5th Cav moved by air and surface transport to relieve 2/5th Cav in sector on 4 November 1965. Strong points were established along Route 19 with two rifle companies;

(1) Co A 1/5th strongly pointed the eastern approach sector of the DEO MANG mountain range, and was given a daily requirement of conducting a contact patrol to the location of the 1/77th Btry located in VINH THANH Valley.

(2) Co B 1/5th established a company patrol base south of the ROK Bn base at Coordinates BR668398 and conducted saturation patrol operations and night ambushes from this location until 8 Nov when it assumed the mission of security to the artillery unit in Vinh Thanh Valley.

(3) Co C 1/5th was assigned the mission of securing the DEO MANG Pass.

(4) Co D 1/5th operated from the Battalion base (Coordinates BR685417) in general support of operations.

(5) Co B 2/5th secured one Btry of Arty at Coordinates BR632542, and conducted daily contact patrols with the CIDG Camp and platoon size air assault operations in VINH THANH Valley until relieved by Co B 1/5th on 8 Nov.

l. Results: During this period 1/5th Cav captured 54 Viet Cong Suspects, killed 2 VC (Body Count); captured one 57mm recoilless rifle, four rifles and a considerable amount of small arms ammunition. Friendly forces suffered four W.I.A.

m. Administrative Matters: The Battalion was resupplied by both air and surface transport during the operation. No particular problem areas were noted.

n. Commanders Analysis:

(1) Although the overall operation and mission objectives were achieved, the inability of U.S. Armed Forces to require District Chiefs to participate fully in route security was unfortunate. The commander of the local Popular Force Unit at Binh Khe should have been required to assist in the security of bridges at night.

(2) Forward support elements offer an excellent target to the VC since all types of logistical activities occur in this location. In spite of this, there appears to be a lack of interest by such units in security operations.

o. Recommendations:

(1) That all forces along a route be placed under OP CON of a unit given the responsibility of route security.

(2) That Forward Support elements be cautioned concerning organization of Forward Support Elements, location in respect to the local defensive perimeters and coordination of their operations with the security forces in the area of operations.

2. On 15 Nov 65 1/5th Cav was alerted for immediate relief of missions along Route 19 and deployment to Pleiku. This portion of the report is related to the move and subsequent operation thru 261745 Nov 65 when the Battalion returned to An Khe.

a. Operation: Silver Bayonet 3 (PLEIKU - PLEI ME Area)

b. Dates: 15 - 26 Nov 1965.

c. Location: Initial: CATECKA, RVN (ZA197342)
Subsequent: See para 2k below.

d. Command Headquarters: 15 - 20 Nov 65: Hq 3rd Bde
20 - 26 Nov 65: Hq 2d Bde.

e. Reporting Officer: Lt Col Frederic Ackerson.

f. Task Organization:

Organic

HHC 1/5th Cav
A 1/5th Cav
B 1/5th Cav
C 1/5th Cav
D 1/5th Cav

Attached

D Troop 1/9th Cav (15 - 16 Nov only)

g. Supporting Forces: N/A

h. Intelligence: See Inclosure 2.

i. Missions: (Written only. See para 2k for additional oral missions)

- (1) Hq 2d Bde, 15 Nov 65
 - (a) 1/5th Cav relieved of security HWY 19 East of DEO MANG Pass by ROK Cav Regt effective 15 1200 Nov 65.
 - (b) Relieved of security of DEO MANG Pass and VINH THANH Valley NLT 151300 Nov 1965.
 - (c) Move to STADIUM (Vic PLEI ME) by aircraft and truck. Upon arrival attached to 3rd Bde.
- (2) 15 Nov 65 upon arrival STADIUM (Catacka, RVN (ZA197342) Hq 3rd Bde
 - (a) 1/5th Cav: Bde reserve.
 - (b) Provide one (1) Co for Arty security LZ FALCON.
 - (c) Provide one (1) Co for Arty security LZ MACON/COLUMBUS.
 - (d) Patrol in STADIUM area within 35 grid line North, 31 grid line South, 16 grid line West and 22 Grid line East.
 - (e) Recon IA Drang River Valley fr YA810076 to YA860054 for LZs for possible committment as blocking force on 17 or 18 Nov.
- (3) 17 Nov 65, Hq 3rd Bde:
 - (a) Conduct search and destroy operations in area BUICK.
 - (b) Secure Arty in COLUMBUS with one company.
- (4) 19 Nov 65, Hq 3rd Bde:
 - (a) Continue assigned operational missions.
 - (b) Detached 3rd Bde eff 201200 Nov 65.
- (5) 21 Nov 65, Hq 2d Bde: Continue assigned mission.
- (6) 23 Nov 65, Hq 2d Bde:
 - (a) Continue present mission.
 - (b) Be prepared to move one Co to OBJ FAR on 24 Nov to secure Arty if moved into FAR.
- (7) 24 Nov 65, Hq 2d Bde:
 - (a) 1/5th Cav relieved of security of FAR when 1/8th Cav elements depart. Continue security of GOLF.
- (8) 25 Nov 65, Hq 2d Bde: 1/5th Cav move by aircraft from GOLF to CAMP HOLLOWAY; however insure arty is secured until its departure. Provide on Co as Bde reaction force at CAMP HOLLOWAY.

j. Concept of operation: 1/5th Cav was deployed to the Ia Drang River Valley area of operations after the first major action involving 1/7th Cav occurred in LZ X-RAY. This unit was committed for missions involving the security of the forward logistical base, the 3rd Bde Hq complex, LZ's and Arty firing positions. Patrolling was also required on a daily basis as the operation progressed, a series of events changed the initial concepts of establishing a Battalion blocking position along the Ia Drang river.

k. Execution:

15 Nov 65

- (1) Upon receipt of movement orders, 1/5th Cav was relieved of Route 19 security by elements of the 1st Cav Regt, ROKA, and by the 2/12th Cav.
- (2) Co A 1/5th was moved to the STADIUM by CH-47. Initial plans called for immediate deployment of Co A to LZ MACON (YA 935052) to support Arty operations, however due to the lack of hard stand at LZ MACON, another LZ had to be selected. This required Co A to return to the STADIUM until the 3rd Bde Security Platoon and Arty elements had selected a new and suitable location. At approximately 151630 Co A was reloaded on the CH-47 aircraft and dispatched to LZ COLUMBUS (YA 975035) where upon arrival it was attached to 2/7th Cav.
- (3) Additional Arty batteries located at LZ FALCON (ZA025034) also required security and Co C 1/5th Cav was moved by UH-1D aircraft in the late afternoon to secure that LZ and its artillery unit.
- (4) The Bn (-) provided security for the STADIUM with Troop D 1/9th Cav under Op COM 1/5th Cav during the night of 15 November.

16 Nov 65

- (1) In compliance with the Bn mission to recon and be prepared to establish blocking positions between Coordinates YA 810076 and YA 860054, reconnaissance for this contingency was made the following morning.

(2) The Bn (-) began movement to LZ COLUMBUS by UH-1D at 0710 in preparation for further missions. Movement was completed at 0830.

(3) Co A 1/5th (attached to 2/7th Cav) had moved overland with 2/7th Cav (-) at 0500 hours from LZ COLUMBUS to conduct a link-up with elements of 2/7th Cav, 2/5th Cav, and 1/7th Cav located at LZ XRAY.

(4) Co C 1/5th Cav, located at LZ FALCON, dispatched three patrols at 0815. At 0845 one patrol reported finding 2 VC buried at Coordinates ZAO26037.

(5) At 1159 patrols originating from LZ COLUMBUS began reporting results. A patrol from B Co 1/5th made contact with six PAVN at coordinates YA975034 resulting in one PAVN KIA (Body Count). Activity around LZ COLUMBUS remained quiet throughout the afternoon with only minor probes of the Bn perimeter being received throughout the night of 16 November.

17 Nov 65

(1) At 0702 one PAVN entered the northern portion of the Bn perimeter and surrendered to the Recon Platoon.

(2) At 0825 a patrol from Co B made contact at coordinates YA978042 resulting in one PAVN KIA.

(3) At 1138 2/5th Cav closed into LZ COLUMBUS after having moved overland from LZ XRAY, and assumed the responsibility for the defense of the area.

(4) As a result of the contact made by 2/7th Cav in the vic of LZ ALBANY (YA943043), the BN (-) was alerted for possible commitment to ALBANY. At 1440 3rd Bde issued orders to have one company move to coordinates YA946035 to reinforce 2/7th Cav and establish a blocking position ASAP. The Mortar Platoon, Co D was displaced to Coordinates YA959034 to support the reinforcement. Co B was designated as the reinforcing element and crossed the IF on foot at 1442. At 1527 Co B reported reaching a position at Coordinates YA956031, and at 1640 Co B reported link-up with Co A 1/5th Cav had been made. Co B took four WIA in this phase.

(5) At 1825 Co B 1/5th Cav stated "We are together with Company A. Still pinned down and receiving an occasional mortar round. Unable to raise 2/7th on radio. Request confirmation on previous decision to push thru. We have 12 wounded personnel". At this time the decision to hold Companies A and B was relayed from CO 2/7th Cav to CO Company B 1/5th with instructions to conduct a sweep of the area enroute to link up with 2/7th Cav the following morning.

(6) At 2100 3rd Bde inquired if the surgeon for 1/5th Cav was available to be flown into LZ ALBANY since the surgeon was isolated from the rest of the Bn in Co A 1/5th area. The surgeon was made available but was unable to get into LZ ALBANY until the following morning due to the inability to get Med Evac aircraft into LZ ALBANY.

18 Nov 65

(1) At 0030 Co A 1/5th reported that they were unable to get Med Evac aircraft into the LZ because illumination dropped by USAF Flare aircraft blinded the pilots during approach to the LZ. Another attempt by Med Evac Aircraft to land in Co A LZ was unsuccessful at 0125 hrs.

(2) Earlier Co A 1/5th had sent a patrol forward of the perimeter to check on calls from wounded personnel in the area. At 0127 the patrol returned carrying 15 wounded and additional 14 more in the area where the patrol had gone. A medic was left to give treatment throughout the night.

(3) At 0620 Co A 1/5th reported Med Evac was in the process of evacuating 25 WIAs from that location. Evacuation was completed from the area at 0915 and both Companies A and B began movement to complete the link-up with 2/7th Cav. The link-up was completed within an hour and both units conducted other operations to clear the battlefield of US and PAVN dead, wounded and equipment.

(4) At 1420 both companies were returned to the control of 1/5th Cav and began a sweep operation back toward LZ COLUMBUS. The movement was made by foot, without contact, and the units closed into the Bn Base at 1530 hours. Casualties since departure from LZ COLUMBUS stood at 18 KIA and 36 WIA.

(5) At 1530 Co D 1/5th Cav reported sighting one VC (PAVN) at Coordinates YA975045. The enemy was taken under fire with negative results. At 1735 an outpost on the northern portion of the Battalion perimeter engaged the lead elements of a PAVN unit moving into an attack position. This alerted the Battalion and within ten minutes the Battalion (-) at LZ COLUMBUS was under heavy mortar and automatic weapons fire.

(6) Co C had been detained in their turn to LZ COLUMBUS due to the requirement to secure LZ FALCON and load expended artillery brass. When the attack on LZ COLUMBUS occurred, Co C was preparing to move by CH-47. Due to the heavy fire at the Battalion Base, instructions were issued directing C Company to form a tight perimeter and be prepared to move on the morning of the 19th.

(7) One of the first targets hit by the VC was an OH-13 that was parked on the LZ. A CH-47 was in the process of landing when the attack occurred, and the pilot received one small arms round through the leg.

(8) Within twenty minutes after a "Flaming Arrow message" was sent by the Bn FAC, the first air sortie was being employed. A total of twelve FAC air sorties were utilized around the northern half of the Bn perimeter. Most of the strikes within 60 to 100 meters of the foxholes. One bomb was dropped approximately 30 meters inside the perimeter and resulted in 4 WIAs to friendly forces. Aside from this one incident, the close air support was excellent.

(9) A reserve was formed and positioned about 100 meters to the rear of the northern perimeter where it appeared a penetration of the perimeter was most probable and at times imminent.

(10) When the attack had continued past the two hour mark, a request for ammunition resupply was made to Hq 3rd Bde. Among types of ammunition that began to run low were 81mm mortar, M-60, and M-16. Two UH-1D aircraft from Co A, 229th AHB made the delivery, and the aircraft were loaded with wounded for evacuation. In addition one CH-47 was also utilized for medical evacuation.

(11) At approximately 2100 hours the attack lost momentum and subsided into small arms sniper fire that habitually increased when a gap occurred in the flare illumination provided by the USAF flare aircraft.

(12) Communications throughout the engagement were excellent from Battalion to Brigade and within the Battalion.

19 November 1965

(1) After daylight a two minute recon by fire was placed around the perimeter, a search and clear operation forward of the perimeter for approximately 800 meters was then conducted. Results of the search was as follows: 27 (FAVN) KIA (Body count), numerous signs indicating bodies had been dragged out of the area; location of 4 Light MSG, 2 Heavy MG, 7 assault Sub-Machine Guns, 6 carbines and 1 Rocket Launcher. Two abandoned 81mm mortar rounds (made in USA) were found at a mortar position used to support the attack.

(2) At 1031 Co C 1/5th Cav closed into LZ COLUMBUS from LZ FALCON.

(3) The Bn had received orders to occupy LZ GOLF (YA841094) and secure for artillery operations. Movement to the new locations was initiated at 1335 and completed at 1850.

20 - 26 November 1965

(1) During this period of time the 1st Bn, 5th Cav remained at LZ GOLF conducting search and destroy operations in sector, and providing security for two artillery batteries. Contact was made by Co C 1/5th Cav on 201100 Nov while on a company size recon operation to check air strike results on a suspected VC radio site. Results of this engagement were; 1 FAVN KIA, 3 friendly WIA, and the capture of an extremely valuable group of enemy maps and documents.

(2) Other operations throughout the period were routine. Movement to Fleiku was initiated and completed on 25 November, and a move to the Div Base completed on 26 November.

(3) Results: (a) The airstrikes conducted on the night of 18 Nov were screened for results, however, determination of FAVN KIA caused as a result could not be determined. It can be stated that with the exception of the one strike previously mentioned that they were very effective.

(b) During the period 16 Nov to 26 Nov friendly losses due to enemy action were as follows with most occurring on 17 and 18 November:

KIA	25
WIA	79
MIA	0
KBA	0

(c) Known enemy losses were:

KIA	32 (Body count)
WIA	Unknown

m. Administrative Matters:

- (1) Supply methods: Resupply of water to units located in the forward areas with existing resources of containers is unsatisfactory. On several occasions units were out of water due to damage caused to water bladders by small arms fire, loss of control of unit bladder; lack of transport to deliver bladder or insufficient coordination by units at the water point area.
- (2) Supply techniques: Resupply of units under fire during daylight poses problems and night resupply becomes even more critical. A need exist for a delivery technique that can be used to get critical prepalletized loads into a unit engaged in a firefight when the risk of landing helicopters in the LZ is unacceptable. A combination free fall lowlex technique could possibly be developed with the Caribou for use in critical situations. Palletized loads would be packed based on a study of items most rapidly consumed by ground units engaged over a given period of time. Among such items should be medical supplies that habitually become critical due to the limited material available for transport by the Bn medical section on an operation and the frequency with which Med Evac aircraft cannot complete executions under fire.

n. Commander Analysis:

(1) Security of Arty Operations:

(a) It is imperative that the evacuation of expended 105mm Howitzer brass from battery firing positions be accomplished as aircraft deliver ammunition resupply. On two different occasions the extraction of infantry was delayed to EENT while this function was taking place after the Arty unit had displaced. In one instance a company was left on the LZ until the following morning. In another, considerable ammunition and supplies required destruction by TAC Airstrike in order to reach the new psn prior to dark.

(b) The registration of arty in the direct fire role around the perimeter offers additional defensive capability to units when the size of the area or critical terrain requires control forces to extend deployment with close defensive forces. Direct fire registrations should be accomplished prior to EENT and placed 60 to 100 meters forward of the perimeter using either time or impact fuse settings.

(2) Close TAC air strikes at night

(a) One of the last items that should be accomplished prior to darkness in a defensive position is the coordination of visual perimeter marking aids and communications checks to support instructions to mark the perimeter for airstrike.

(b) The FAC $\frac{1}{2}$ ton vehicle is often the primary target in the initial stages of attacks by VC units. Repositioning of the IRC-41 in a separate location, preferably in a foxhole, insures an alternate means of obtaining TAC air if the FAC $\frac{1}{2}$ ton is hit or the small arms and mortar fire is so intense as to preclude use of the vehicle.

(3) Flare illumination vs landing helicopters

(a) The continuous use of flares during a night operation is definitely desirable when under attack, however, when the point is reached where resupply or Med Evac is required a decision must be made as to which is of the most importance. On one hand flares limit the pilot's capability to make an approach into an LZ due to the light defusion that occurs on and through the aircraft windshield. On the other hand when there is a lull in illumination, the intensity of fire habitually increases.

n. Recommendations:

(1) That a net system for use in evacuation of expended 105mm howitzer brass be employed to remove brass from arty positions concurrent with resupply operations.

(2) That direct fire from arty units located in a unit perimeter be employed to increased the effectiveness of defense capabilities.

(3) That emphasis be placed on the habitual employment of arty units in mutually supporting roles. The importance of this aspect of employment was demonstrated on the 18th of Nov when LZ COLUMBUS was out of range of all other supporting arty units.


(4) That action be taken to obtain the IRC 41 radios presently authorized the Bn, but as yet, are unissued. This would afford a backup capability to call and conduct airstrikes if a FAC or FAC equipment is not available.

(5) That a study be conducted to determine the feasibility of

using some tiny directional glide slope light landing zone system for use by aircraft landings at LZs under illumination. Glide slope light would have to be of sufficient intensity to be of distinguishable at a considerable distance under an environment of area illumination by flare.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl
a/s


HAROLD B. ALDRICH III
Captain, Infantry
Adjutant

Copies furnished:

CO, 3rd Brigade
CO, HHC 1/5 Cav
CO, A Co 1/5 Cav
CO, B Co 1/5 Cav
CO, C Co 1/5 Cav
CO, D Co 1/5 Cav

Enclosure 1 (INTELLIGENCE) to ltr, 1st Bn, 5th Cav, Subj: After Action Report (5-15 Nov. 65), Dtd 5 Dec 65

1. GENERAL: Earlier operations in the VINH THANH Valley were beneficial to the battalion in that they provided an opportunity to establish liasion with the District Chief, the Police Chief and other officials of BINH KHE District. These personnel and their informants were able to provide much valuable information about the area and VC activities.

2. SOURCES OF INFORMATION:

a. Photos: None.

b. Infrared: Infrared coverage was requested and used. A mission flown on 5 November disclosed hot spots at BR 605415 and at 605430. A TOT was fired at these hot spots.

c. POW's: A total of 54 VCs were apprehended by elements of this battalion, three of whom admitted to being VC. No information of an Immediate tactical nature was obtained through interrogation of these personnel.

d. Local Villagers: Local villagers appeared willing to pass along information concerning VC activities and sympathizers provided that it appeared that the area would remain under ARVN control and that they would not be subject to reprisal from the VC. Information pertaining to the VC is present and available at all but VC villages. The major problem is one of communication and identification. Each patrol must have an interpreter and a policeman or local official who knows the area. He must be able to identify VC and VC sympathizers. He must also be able to judge the reliability of various informants as well as the credibility of the information they furnish. A patrol operating in a populated area without the services of an interpreter and policeman is operating under a serious handicap and its effectiveness is drastically reduced.

e. Policemen: The BINH KHE District Chief, in coordination with the BINH KHE Police Chief made local policemen available to this Battalion. They proved to be extremely valuable in identifying VC and VC sympathizers. In the final analysis, identification and disposition of VC personnel and equipment is a function of the Vietnamese government; and the entire operation was greatly enhanced and expedited by the deployment of officials of the government (ie: policemen) to the operational element most likely to come in contact with VC personnel and equipment (ie: a US Army patrol).

f. Troops:

(1) Aerial Reconnaissance: Due to the nature of the area of operations, which much more heavily populated than the VINH THANH Valley, and the difference in tactics, foot patrols as opposed to air-assault, the effectiveness of Aerial Reconnaissance along Route 19 was not as effective as it was in the VINH THANH Valley.

(2) Radar (AN/FPS-4): Two teams of Radar (AN/FPS-4) were attached to the battalion for this operation. They proved to be extremely effective in locating targets. These Radar Teams were most effectively employed in conjunction with Search Light Teams and/or illumination from artillery or organic mortars.

(3) Ground Reconnaissance: Ground elements proved to be a major source of information available to the battalion. No other source has the versatility or the ability to react as a soldier on foot.

(4) Intelligence Specialists: An IPW/CI team from the 191st MI Detachment supported the battalion. They screened refugees, VCS, and in conjunction with the battalion S-2 and S-5, established and maintained liasion with local Vietnamese officials. Much of the credit for the intelligence developed during the operation must be given to this team who proved to be extremely effective and professionally competent.

(5) Check Points: D Troop, 1st Reconnaissance Squadron, 9th Cavalry established eight Check Points at bridges along Route 19 in the Bn TAOR. These check points, in addition to their security mission provided information about suspected VC movement in their area of influence.

3. SIGNIFICANT ENEMY CONTACTS:

a. At 061900 Nov 65, an ambush patrol of B Co made contact with an estimated four to seven VC at coordinates BR 654389. In the ensuing fire fight, the VC dropped a 57mm RR, before they fled the scene. No bodies were found.

b. At 101340 Nov 65, the Reconnaissance Platoon located a hut at coordinates 670480. In the hut were an estimated eight to ten VC. In the fire fight that followed, two of the VC were killed (B.C.), and one was wounded but escaped (confirmed). Captured at the scene of the action were one Mauser 98 rifle, one U. S. M-1 rifle, two MAS rifles, one American bayonet, one U.S. M-26 hand grenade, and one Chicom hand grenade, in addition to ammunition, web gear, mess gear and documents.

c. At 111448 Nov 65, during a search of a suspected VC village, coordinates BR 710360, an unknown individual threw a hand grenade injuring four (4) U. S. personnel.

4. OTHER ENEMY CONTACTS:

a. During the period of 4 through 15 November 1965, sporadic sniper fire was received along Route 19 and in other areas of the Bn TAOR. In some cases the fire was returned, either with small arms, mortars, or artillery, with unknown results.

b. Other sightings, ranging from individuals to squad size units, were made both visually and/or by radar. Most occurred in the vicinity of Route 19. When it could be definitely established that the personnel sighted were not members of a friendly element, they were taken under fire. Results of these actions are unknown. Operations of this sort were complicated by the fact that there were friendly forces, not under U.S. control, operating in the area, ie, Popular Forces and ARVN. It was necessary to identify these sightings as enemy before taking them under fire.

5. UNCONFIRMED ENEMY ACTIVITY: On 5 November 1965, information from the BINH KH: District Chief disclosed the following pertaining to VC in the area:

- a. Heavy Weapons Company BR 8238
- b. Rifle Company BR 8638 (South of River)
- c. Heavy Weapons Company (E 300) BR 7945
- d. Company (72d) Br 8151
- e. Company (73rd) Br 8157
- f. Battalion (-) Br 6337
- g. Company (part of f.) Br 6141
- h. Guerilla Squad BR 670340

The above information was unconfirmed by US sources.

1. GENERAL: Intelligence provided to the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry during the PLEI MEI operation from 15 to 26 November, was restricted to combat type intelligence originated by US Agencies. At no time was any information received from sources connected with the government of RVN. During the period of operation, the majority of intelligence information was collected, evaluated and disseminated by US Forces.

2. SOURCES OF INFORMATION:

a. Photos: None.

b. Infrared: During the period of operations numerous "hot spots" were reported. As a result of request initiated by higher headquarters, only one infrared mission was requested by 1/5 Cav to cover the river running from the Cambodian border to OBJECTIVE LIME. As a result of the transferring of Brigade Headquarters, their mission was not completed.

c. POW's: One (1) POW (PAVN) was apprehended by elements of this Battalion. Immediate interrogation did not reveal any information of immediate tactical value but further interrogation of the prisoner by an IPW Team did reveal general information of PAVN deployments, morale, strength and order of battle.

d. Troops:

(1) Aerial Reconnaissance: Information provided by elements of the 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav was limited, primarily due to the thick vegetation surrounding LZ's Columbus and Golf.

(2) Ground Reconnaissance: On two (2) separate occasions ground reconnaissance provided early warning of (PAVN) elements in the Battalion TOAR. On the afternoon of 18 November a LP established by this Battalion observed, what proved to be, the advance elements of a VC unit. At 181745 Nov, the Battalion CP came under attack by the minimum of a reinforced rifle company. On 19 Nov, during movement from Objective Columbus, ground reconnaissance elements once again observed advance elements of a VC unit. No contact was made in that displacement and was accomplished by 191900 November.

e. 10th RRU: On 20 Nov, a spot report was received that a suspected radio station was located vicinity of YA 847077. A company size reconnaissance patrol was dispatched to investigate and verify the spot report. At vicinity YA 842088 a "way station" was found with a large cache of rice and numerous huts. At YA 847077 another series of huts were found. Among these huts numerous maps, classified papers, clothing and food products were found. Translation of classified papers revealed that the 32C (PAVN) Regiment had operated in the Battalion TOAR in late September and early October. Investigation of accompanying maps indicated that they are in most instances in more detail than those used by US Forces. Also found throughout the area of their operation were freshly dug fox holes, usually covering the best avenues of approach.

3. SIGNIFICANT ENEMY CONTACTS:

a. At 181745 Nov, the Battalion (-) while securing two (2) Artillery Batteries in Objective Columbus, was attacked by the minimum of a reinforced rifle company. This attack was intense for a period of four (4) hours, and sporadic fire continued throughout the night. Investigation of the perimeter the following morning disclosed 27 VC (KIA) (BC), (4) Light Machine Guns, (2) Heavy Machine Guns, (7) Assault Sub Machine Guns, (6) Carbines, (1) Rocket Launcher, numerous hand grenades, clothing and other items of equipment.

b. On 21 Nov, Company C conducted a Company size reconnaissance patrol to investigate a suspected VC Radio station located Vicinity YA 847077. While searching the area, Company C was engaged by and estimated (4) to (6) VC

Inclosure 2 (INTELLIGENCE) to ltr, 1st Bn, 5th Cav, Subj: After Action
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snipers. Upon conclusion of the engagement 1 VC (KIA) (BC), (2) weapons and several Hand Grenades were recovered.

4. UNCONFIRMED ENEMY ACTIVITY: During the period from 15 to 26 November it was estimated that elements of the 701st (PAVN) Div and the 320 (PAVN) Regiment were operating in and around Objective Columbus and Golf. The strength of these elements were evaluated at that of a minimum of two (PAVN) Battalions.