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
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HEADQUARTERS 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE) APO 96490

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Reports (RCS: MACV J3-32)

THERU : Commanding General I Field Force Vietnam APO 9624C

TOI

Commanding General U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam ATTN: J343 APO 96243

1. IDENTITY AND TYPE OF OPERATION.

- a. Operation LINCOLN I, II, III Search and destroy.
- b. Operation MOSBY I Reconnaissance in force.

2. DATES OF OPERATION.

a. LINCOLN 250600 Mar - 042400 Apr 66

b. MOSBY I 119600 - 172100 apr 66

3. LOCATION.

a. LINCOLN. The Division area of Operations (40) was located in Le Thanh and Phu Nhon Districts, Pleiku Province and extended Southeast through Phu Thien District, Phu Bon Province to Cheo Rec. Active combat operations centered in the area vicinity Le Thanh District Hqs, Plei Me and Duc Co USSF Camp, and Chu Pong Hill mass. Refer: to Overlay 1.

b. MOSBY I. Operations were conducted in Pleiku and Kontum Provinces. Within the AO active operations were conducted along the Cambodian border. Refer to Overlay 1.

4. COMMAND HEADQUARTERS. Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

REPORTING OFFICER: a. The reporting officer is Major General 5. Harry W. O. Kinnard.

b. Principal 1st Cavalry Division commanders and senior staff officers participating in Operations LINCOLN and MOSBY I were:

> Major General Harry W. O. Kinnard Brigadier General John M. Wright Jr - Lest Division Commander Colonal William A. Beoker Colonel George S. Beatty Jr Colonel John J. Hennessey Colonel Harold G. Moore Colonel William F. Brand Jr Colonel Allen M. Burdett Jr Lt Colonel James C. Smith Lt Colonel Robert M. Shoemaker

- Division Commander - Asst Division Commandar - Chief of Staff - CO, lst Brigade (...bn) - CO, 3d Brigade - CO, -Division Artillery - CO, 11th Aviation Group - CO, Support Command - 00, 1st Sodn, 9th Gevalry AVCOT SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Reports (RCS: MACV J3-32)

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Lt Colonel Robert M. Malley- CO, 8th Ingineer BnLt Colonel John D. White- ACofS, G1Lt Colonel Bobby R. Leng- ACofS, G2Lt Colonel Earl K. Buchan- ACofS, G3Lt Colonel Benjamin S. Silver- ACofS, G4Lt Colonel Monroe Kirkpstrick- ACofS, G5

c. Principal commanders of non-organic units participating in Operation LINCOLN under control or in support of the lat Cavalry Division included:

Colonel Everett A. Stoutner	- CO, 3d Brigade, 25th Inf. Div.
Lt Colonel Charles C. Williams	- GO, 6th Bn, 14th Arty (175mm/8" SP)
Captain Will E. Duffer	- CO, C Troop, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav
Captain Richard R. Russell	- CO, Go B, 1st Bn, 69th Armor

6. TASK ORGANIZATION. a. No organic units were detached from the . Division during LINCOLN-MOSBY I.

b. Major non-organic units attached to this Division remained unchanged during LINCOLM-MOSBY I. Units remaining attached included:

> 3d Ba, 18th Arty (8"/175mm SP) 2d Ba, 17th Arty (105mm Towed) Battery B, 29th Arty (Searchlight) 17th Aviation Company (CV-2) 478th Aviation Company (CH-54) 191et MI Detachment

o. The 10th RHU continued under operational control authority (OCA) of this Division during LINCOLN-MOSBY I.

d. Troop C, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav and Co B, 1st Bn, 69th Armor were attached to the 1st Cav Division effective 250001 Mar and participated in LINCOLN under control of the 1st Brigade. These units returned to control of 3d Bde, 25th Inf Division 30 Mar 66 for participation in LINCOLN II - III.

e. 3d Bde, 25th Inf Division was under OCA, let Cav Division 311200 Mar - 071300 apr for LINCOLN II - III.

f. 6th Bn, 14th arty (175mm/8" SP) was assigned a GS reinforcing mission by Field Force Vietnam I throughout LINCOLN-MOSBY I.

g. Battery A, 1st Bn, 30th Arty (155mm Towed) was attached to 1st Cav Div Arty throughout Operation LINCOLN.

h. Division Task Organisation during LINCOLN and MOSBY I was:

(LINCOLN I 25 - 30 Mar 66)

1st Brigade

1/8 Cav 2/8 Cav 1/12 Cav Co B, 1/69 Armor Troop C, 3/4 Cav 2/19 Arty (+) (DS) Btry, 2/17 Arty Plat Co A, 6th Engr En 2d Brigade - Base Defense & TAOR Ops

1/5 Cav 2/5 Cav (minus 1 Co) 2/12 Cav 1/77 Arty (DS) AVCGT SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Reports (RCS: MACV J3-32) *Plat (-), 545 MP Co 3d Bde - TuOR Operation JIM BOWIE II *Sig Spt Tm, 13th Sig Bn 23 - 28 Mar "Tm 1, IFW/CI, 191 MI Det "Tm 1, 10th RRU 1/7 Cav *Tm 1, 54th Inf Det (Radar) 2/7 Cav Co, 2/5 Car *Tm 1, 24th Wea Det *Im, 41st CL Co 1/21 arty (DS) *Fwd Spt Elm (Spt) Plat, Co C, 8th Engr Bn Water Pt, 8th Engr

- Notes: (1) "These elements are a normal part of brigade task force organization and are not separately listed in the remainder of the report.
 - (2) Co C, 229th Engr Bn, 937th Engr Gp attached to 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav for movement only from Pleiku to Cheo Reo and return to Fleiku 29 - 30 Mar.

(LINCOLN II 31 Mar - 3 Apr 66)

let Brigade

Same as LINCOLN I plus: Co 2 (-), 8th Engr Bn less: Troop C, 3/4 Cav Co B, 1/69 Armor 1/5 Cav 2/5 Cav 2/12 Cav 1/77 Arty (+) (DS) Btry 2/7 Arty

3d Bde, 25th Inf Div

Co B, 1/69 irmor

1/14 Inf

1/35 Inf (1)2/35 Inf

2d Bde - Base Defense and TAOR

3d Brigade

1/7 Cav 2/7 Cav 1/21 Arty (DS) Co C (-), 8th Engr Bn

- Troop C, 3/4 Cav 2/9 wrty D/65 Engr (-) 52d wn Bn (-) Det, 11th wn Gp
- Note: (1) 2/35th Inf performed independent highway security mission on Route 19 from vic Mang Yang Pass to Pleiku commencing 270900 Mar.

(LINCOLN III 4 - 7 Apr 66)

1st Brigade

2d Brigade - Base Defense and TAOR

Plus: Mir Jav Troop, 1/9 Cav

Same as LINCOLN II

Same as LINCOLN II Flus: One Air Cav Trp, 1/9 Cav (OCA) eff 030600

3d Brigade

Same as LINCOLN II Flus: lst Sqdn, 9th Cav (minus two Air Cav Trps)(OCA 030600) Troop C, 3/4 Cav (OCA 030600) 6/14 Arty (Attached for movement only) AVCOT

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3d Bde. 25th Inf Div

Same as LINCOLN II Less: Troop C, 3/4 Cav

(MOSBY I 11 - 17 Apr 66)

let Brigade

2d Bde - Brigade Defanse & TAOR Operations

1/8 Cav 2/8 Cav 2/19 arty (DS) Sot Team (air), 1/9 Cav (Spt) 2 rlat, Co a, 8th Engr En 1 Co (+), CIDG Duo Co

1/5 Cav 2/5 Cav 2/12 Cav 1/77 Arty

3d Brigade

1/7 Cav
2/7 Cav
1/21 Arty (DS)
Sot Tm (Air), 1/9 Cav (Spt)
2 Flat, Co C, 8th Engr En
2 Co CIDG Flei Djereng
2 Co CIDG Flei Mrong

TF 1/9 Car

Co B, 1/12 Cav Btry B, 2/17 arty Det, Spt Omd (Spt) Water 2t, 8th Engr 2 Co CIDG Dak To

Note: Task organization for MOSBY I effective 101200 Apr.

7. <u>SUPPORTING FORCES</u>. a. USLF THC AIR. Tao Air support for LINCOLN-MOSBY I was requested through DASC LLFA (Nha Trang). Preplanned mission requests were submitted by army phone communication. Immediate requests were submitted by USLF radio. One hundred fifty-six close air support sorties were flown during LINCOLN and 36 sorties were flown for MOSBY I. TAC air was credited with 37 KBA (BC) and 51 KBA (Est) during LINCOLN. Close air support missions are summarised in Inclosure 1. USLF flare aircraft support was available on call each night during LINCOLN-MOSBY I and continuous illumination was provided in support of Co A 1/12 Cav in the 30-31 Mar engagement south of Chu Pong. The Division LO supported numerous convoy operations during these operations by providing airborne FaC coverage.

b. USAF cargo aircraft were used to support initial deployment into the LINCOLN area and return movement to An Khe upon completion of MOSBY I. Un 25 Mar 66 the 1/12th Cav and 2/19 arty (105mm) were moved from an Khe to Due Co using 24 sorties of C-130. Thirty-seven sorties of C-130 were used on 16 - 17 april to move elements of the 3d FSE, 8th Engr Bn, Division Headquarters and 1st Brigade to an Khe. Seventeen C-130 sorties used the T-17 membrane covered strip at Casis (Za 115280) without incident.

c. USSF "C" Detachment, Fleiku coordinated participation of USSF/ CIDG units from Duc Co, Flei Djereng, Flei Mrong, and Dak To with division units during MOSBY I. Refer to paragraph 6 - Task Organisation. AVCOT

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8. INTELLIGENCE.

a. Background. In early March 1966 reports filtering in from usually reliable sources, indicated that various aRVN and US installations situated in Western Tleiku Province would be attacked by the Viet Cong at the beginning of the Southwest Monsoon. Enemy units were reportedly conducting sand table exercises for assaults on the Flei Me and Duc Co Special Forces Camps as well as the Le Thanh District Hq. Elements of the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div began search operations vicinity Mewal (AQ 8625) and north to Fleiku Province boundary. This resulted in light contact with elements of 32d R_egt, and moderate contact with elements of the 66th R_egt. The identification of two known regiments in Southern Fleiku and Northern Darlac Provinces gave some credence to reports of impending attacks in this area. The 1st Cav Div was directed to conduct operations in that vicinity in an attempt to avert any enemy offensive in progress or pending in the immediate future.

b. Terrain and Weather.

(1) General: The LINCOLN area of operations is situated on the plateau of the Central Highlands. The area consists mainly of open plains and forest. Two large hill masses, Chu Yong and Chu Coungot, are located on the Western border of the area, close to the Cambodian border. Moving north into the MOSBY I area of operations the terrain is mountainous with elevations rising from 3000 feet AMSL to peaks of over 7000 ft AMSL. The Krong Yo Ko flowing south-westward I into Cambodia; the Ia Drang and Ia Meur are the principal rivers in the AO. With the exception of Highway 14 which runs from north to south through the center of the area and Highway 19 which runs from cast to west terminating at the Cambodian border there are no roads in the AO. The terrain can be categorized into four general types: Open plains, open forest plains, dense forest and mountainous.

(2) V_egetation. In the open plains the vegetation consists primarily of grass, dry crops and scrub. Small forest areas are scattered throughout the open plains area. The open forest plains consist primarily of closely spaced trees with scattered open areas. Dense forest areas are characterized by thick undergrowth with woody vines entwined with the trees. Ground cover in mountainous areas consists mainly of bamboo and tropical broad-leaf forests with evergreens found at the higher elevations.

(3) Observation and fields of fire. In the plains observation ranges from fair to good limited only by high grass or crops and variations in relief. Fields of fire for flat-trajectory weapons are generally good. In the open forest areas observation and fields of fire for flat-trajectory weapons are poor to fair. Good observation exists in the mountains where slopes and crests are free of trees. Fields of fire however are sharply restricted by dense tree growth and sharply broken terrain. ...ir to ground observation conditions were at their best due to the absence of leaves on the trees.

(4) Concealment and Cover. In the plains, cover is virtually non-existent and concealment provided only by tall grass, crops and scattered small forest areas. In the forest plains some cover exists from ground observation. Cover in the densely forested areas is poor to fair while concealment is generally good. The mountainous area provides good cover with its numerous valleys, gullies, and sharply dissected terrain. Irregular terrain and thick vegetation in the mountains provides good concealment.

(5) Obstacles. Streams and rivers in the area are generally fordable at selected points, except after heavy rains. Numerous bridges on Highways 14 and 19 have been destroyed but by-passes have been constructed. Sheer cliffs and steep valley walls in the mountains constitute a AVCGT

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barrier to foot movement as does dense forest. While there are no obstacles, per se, to airmobile operations, the density of forest growth presents a problem in selection of landing zones.

(6) Key Terrain Features. Because of the vastness of the area of operations and the employment of airmobile operations no particular terrain feature is considered to be key.

(7) Weather. In general the weather favored airmobile operations. Sky conditions were predominantly clear with the onset of less favorable weather commencing towards the end of the operational period. Soil conditions were dry with good trafficability except during brief thundershowers, which occurred during the afternoon and evenings. Average temperatures ranged between 68 and 90 degrees.

c. The forecast of enemy forces in the LINCOLN a0 had not changed significantly since the close of the Division's Pleiku Campaign in November. 1965. NVA and VMC as well as Main Force (battalions and companies) and guerrills units had been reported in Pleiku and Darlac Provinces. NVA units identified with the LINCOLN area were the 32d, 33d and 66th NVA Regiments each with three infantry battalions, a transportation company and other technical services such as signal, medical, and engineer troops. These regiments were considered to operate under control of a Field Front (Div). It was expected that these units had not fully recovered their losses from the Pleiku Campaign. No specific enemy units were forecast during the reconnaissance in force operations conducted during MOSBY I. The Division intelligence estimate carried the following units immediately prior to Operation LINCOLN:

(COMMITTED FORCES)

UNIT	ESTIM.TED STRAIGTH	ST_TUS
Field Front Hq	275	robable
32d Regt (NVii)	1350	Confirmed
33d Rogt (NVi)	1750	Confirmed
66th Regt (NV)	1 350	Confirmed
H13 ملى Bn	350	irobable
320TH MF BN+	450	Confirmed
U/I 120mm Mort Bn	45 0	Unconfirmed
Y/I VMC Bn	400	robable
21st Trans Bn	375	.robable
32d MF Bn	400	Unconfirmed
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"NOTE: May be confused with 32d Regt due to use of the same number.

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(REINFORCEMENTS)

UNIT	ESTIMATED STRENGTH		STATUS
H-15 Bn (North of Pleik	u) 350	•	Confirmed
42d Regt (Kontum)	1200	·	Unconfirmed
95th Regt (ihu Yen)	1350		Confirmed
3d VC Regt (ithu Yen)	900		Confirmed

d. VCC's and ralliers identified newly infiltrated units as indicated below. These are accepted in whole or in part as possibly being located in Western Pleiku - Kontum Provinces or adjacent territory in Cambodia.

Units Reported	Remarks	Departed NVN	Arrived SVN
3 Co, 16th Sig Bn	New Unit	Oct 65	2 Mar 66
2 Bn, 4th Regt	rossible whole new Regt	Jan 66	Late Feb 66
2 Bn, 6th Regt	rossible whole new Regt or 18th Regt (New)	26 Dec 65	Mar 66
320th Group (Regt)	Replacements for 32 Regt	10 Jan 66	20 Feb 66
28 Co, 15 Engr Bn	Confirmed new unit	4ug 65	Nov 65
20th Trans Co, 33d Regt	Confirmed old unit		
18th Regt (New)	Confirmed new regt	22 Dec 65	27 Mar 66
56th Regt	Replacements for 33 Regt	2 Nov 65	5 Jan 66
141 Regt	Possible new Regt	6 Jan 66	24 Mar 66
238th Regt	rossible 40th Sig Bn	Jan 66	Mar 66
250 B Regt	Replacements 66 Regt	4 Nov 65	29 Jan 66
303 B Bn	New 18 Regt	22 Dec 65	27 Mar 66
271 Regt	7 Bn, 18 Regt		
432 Regt	Cover Nr for stragglers VCC's from 18th & 141 Regt		

e. Significant intelligence results of Operations LINCOLN-MOSBY I are summarized as follows:

(1) thase I, Operation LINCOLN I, began on 25 March 1966 by the 1st Bde west and south of Duc Co with no significant contact until 27 March when contact was made with an estimated platoon size unit by elements of the 1/12 Cav vic YA 712268. Enemy dead wearing khaki uniforms were identified as NVA. A VCC captured vic YA 713268 stated he was in the first company of three moving south from Kontum at 15 minute intervals. (VCC units 8th Co, 2nd Bn, 141st Regt, 312th Div). Results of the contact was 7 KIA (BC), 8 individual weapons and 2 VCC.

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On 28 March there were several incidents of small arms fire and 2 VC were captured. One captured vic YV 939799 was a member of 5th Co, 5th Bn, 320th Regt (in the past the 32d Regt has used the 320th designation, e.g. attack of Duc Co SF Camp). VCC stated that "morale was low due to sickness and fear. AWOL rate is high, discipline is lax". The Regiment is probably operating in Fleiku and Darlac Province.

No significant contact was made until 30 March 1966 when elements of the 1/9 Cav engaged an unknown size force vic YV 8687. The area contained heavy fortifications, bunkers and forholes. \Box captured VC (NV \bot) stated "there were 1000 VC in the area" (VCC later killed in a helicopter crash). \Box reaction force from the 1/12 Cav relieved the 1/9 and contact continued. Initial results of the action were 78 KI \bot (BC), 117 KI \blacktriangle (EST), 65 WI \bigstar (EST), and 4 VCC. Ground contact and sightings on 31 March of up to company size elements south and east of the Chu Yong Hill Mass led to the conclusion that at least two enemy battalions were there in prepared positions. Company size forces were located at YV 8587, YV 8383, YV 8584 and YV 8886. Final police of the battle area following the 30 March engagement resulted in an additional 119 KI \bigstar (BC), 110 KI \bigstar (EST), 56 WI \bigstar (EST), and 3 VCC.

(2) Thase II: Operation LINCOLN II began on 31 March as a division size operation with the addition of the 3d Ede and the 3d Ede, 25th Inf Div. Ground units continued to locate bodies and material resulting from the 30 March contact. With the exception of an engagement with a company size enemy force, in bunkers, north of the Chu rong (vic YA 8009) on 1 April ground contact was sporadic. a general directive type document headed 18th Regt, 325th Div, captured by 1st Cav elements vic YV 858880 tended to confirm the presence of the 18th Regt plus subordinate units, in or passing through the LINCOLN area of Operation. A general location for the 18th Regt based on this captured document was YV 8986. 1/12 Cav engaged a company size force south of the Chu rong vic YV 860895 on 2 April 1966 by employing air strikes and artillory. This action resulted in 112 VC KLA (BC), and 37 individual and 2 crew served weapons captured. Phase II concluded on 3 April characterized by only light contact.

(3) Thase III: Operation LINCOLN III began on 4 april with the Division elements attacking the Chu Yong massif and meeting only light contact in the southwestern portion of the ΔO (vie YV 827719). Contact was made with an estimated company believed to be part of a battalion moving to the west across the Cambodian Border. The action resulted in 43 VC KLA (BC), and the capture of 10 individual weapons. Contact continued light through 6 april. On 7 april two fairly substantial contacts were reported with estimated VC Company (-) south of the Chu Yong. One contact vic YV 851690 resulted in 7 VC KLA (BC) and 20 VC KLA (EST). The other contact vic YV 893883 resulted in 45 VC KLA (BC) and 3 VCC. The operation terminated on 8 April 1966 with no further enemy contact.

(4) Operation MOGBY was conducted during the period 11 - 16 April with no significant contact being made with enemy forces. The only significant activity was the locating of a six building hospital vio YV 729853 and an ammunition cache including 50 Cal, Chi Com grenades, 82mm mortar and for the first time 120mm mortar ammunition which was evacuated for intelligence exploitation. Intelligence information obtained from VCC during Operation MOSBY I, although not voluminous, was quite significant in helping to develop the intelligence picture. From the 4 VCC interrogated three new possible units were identified. Re-interrogation of VCC and review of other information revealed that the VCC had lied. When they became ill and were left behind, they were given a cover story to tell in an apparent attempt to conceal actual movement of units and give the impression that AVCGT SUBJECT: Combat Operations after Action Reports (RCS: M.CV J3-32)

more units were physically here. Due to the simultaneous movement of units various routes were used during the trip south. Some passed through Laos and Cambodia to vicinity of Pleiku, others followed close to the border and passed through western Kontum Province. In most cases the VCC were ill and stragglers being regrouped. Their units have already completed the infiltration. It is not known how many more units are moving south.

(6) in overlay showing the location of significant facilities and contacts is attached as Inclosure 2.

9. <u>MISSION</u>: a. The Division mission for LINCOLN was announced Field Force Vietnam I OFLAN 12-66 dated 201800 Mar 66. The mission statement as extracted from the Division OFORD issued 211800 Mar 66 was - "Division conducts search and destroy operations vicinity Duc Co (YA 8425), riei Me (ZA 1605) and Le Thanh (ZA 1228); prepared to continue the attack on order; continues offensive operations and secures Hwy 19 in the TAOR." FFORCEV I OFLAN 12-66 specified that the Division commit one brigade (three infantry battalions) for the LINCOLN operation.

b. The Division mission for MOSBY I was "Division commences reconnaissance in force operations in Western Pleiku and Kontum Provinces on or about 11 Apr 66; continues offensive operations in the Div TAUR." FFURCEV I OPLAN 18-66 specified that MOSBY I be conducted as a two brigade operation.

10. CONCERT OF OF PRATION. a. Operation LINCOLN was planned to begin 25 Mar 66 with the 1st Brigade TF (three infantry battalions) conducting search and destroy operations in Western .leiku Province. Instructions from FFURCEV I specified minimum prior reconnaissance and no logistical buildup prior to LINCOLN. Deployment of the 1st Bde TF was to be accomplished by multiple means on 25 March - one battalion was to air assault directly into the AU from An Khe by Division helicopters; one battalion plus the DS artillery battalion was to move to Duc Co by USLF C-130s; one battalion plus brigade headquarters and support elements was to move from in the to vicinity Le Thanh District Headquarters by a 450 vehicle combat convoy. The 1st Brigade centered their initial operation vicinity Le Thanh (Z4 1228), Duc Co (Y. 8425) and vicinity the Cambodian border North of the Chu rong. Due to the absence of reliable reports on enemy locations units were to conduct reconnaissance in force operations oriented on terrain with particular attention to areas providing good concealment and along streams. When a significant target was developed units without contact would be committed in search and destroy operations. Fire support was to be provided through the AU by four 105mm batteries; one 155mm battery; and forward positioning of the 6/14 arty (175mm/8" SL). merial artillery and TLC mir were placed to support initial air assaults prior to positioning of tube artillery. A night interdiction program using artillery and T_C wir was to be developed based on the results of operations. The 3d Brigade, 1st Cav Division continued operation JIM BUWIE NW of the Division Base but was to plan for commitment into the LINCULN area while the 2d Brigade was charged with Base defense and Highway 19 security mission. 3d Brigade, 25th Inf Division was to continue Operation GuR-FIELD south of the LINCOLN AU and prepare for commitment in the LINCOLN AU on order FFURCEV I. Logistical support for LINCULN I was based on a Ground Line of Communication (GLoC) from Qui Mhon through the Pleiku Area Command to the forward log base at Casis (Z4 115275). As a result of significant contact developed by elements of 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry and 1/12 Cav south of Chu Yong (LZ Eagle - YV 854882) on 30 - 31 Mar additional forces were committed and repositioned to continue LINCOLN (Mase II). The 1st Brigade was repositioned south of Chu rong and the 3d Brigade was deployed to liei Me with instructions to commence operations to the west and south commencing 1 pr 66. The 3d Brigade, 25th Inf Division was placed under operational control of the 1st wir Cav Division effective 311200 Mar and vas

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positioned vicinity Duc Co and North of Chu Long. The concept for LINCOLN III was based on the unit disposition in Phase II and involved a coordinated assault into Chu Pong - 1st Brigade from the South; 3d Brigade from the East; and 3d Brigade, 25th Inf Division from the North.

b. Upon termination of LINCULN instructions were received from FFURCEV I to initiate reconnaissance in force operations within the MUSBY I AU (Overlay 1) with a minimum of two brigades commencing 11 Apr 66. The Division concept for MUSBY I assigned sectors adjacent to the Cambodian border to the 1st Brigade, 3d Brigade and TF 1/9 Cav. Within unit sectors operations were to be characterized by small unit patrolling and ambushes along trails known or suspected of being used as infiltration routes. USSF/CIDG forces were integrated into operations within each sector. DS (105mm) artillery was to be positioned within sectors to provide maximum coverage and the 6/14 arty was positioned near rolei Djereng to provide interdiction fires. Division headquarters and a reserve battalion retained under division control were co-located at Kontum. The 1/9 Cav was directed to conduct reconnaissance from Kontum to Flateau Gi (BS 0814) upon completion of work in their primary sector in anticipation of future operations. This reconnaissance was not actually accomplished due to orders received from FFORCEV I and due to the development of operations during MOSBY I. It should be emphasized that MOSBY I was undertaken primarily as an "intelligence" gathering operation and no significant combat units were expected to be encountered in the areas of plimary interest.

11. EXECUTION.

a. LINCOLN 25 Mar - 7 Apr.

(1) Phase I 25 Mar - 30 Mar.

(a) On 25 Mar the 1st Bde TF moved from An Khe into the LINCOLN AO using organic aircraft, USAF C-130s, and a surface convoy. At 0700 the 1/12 Cav and 2/19 Arty moved from An Khe to Duc Co using 24 C-130 sorties. Upon closing the 1/12 moved west by vehicle and helicopters to LZ Pearl (YA 795239 - 1/12 CP, D 1/12 and B 2/19 Arty), LZ Ruby (YA 751234 -Co A and B), and LZ Topaz (YA 785295 - Co C). Co B 1/12 observed 5 VC who fled and later killed one VC vicinity LZ Ruby for the only contact of the day. 1/8 Cav lifted off from an Khe and air assaulted directly into LZ Bear (YA 825161) covered by elements of 2/19 artillery who had landed with 1/12 Cav at Duc Co. C 2/19 Arty was moved from Duc Co to join 1/8 Cav at LZ Bear. 2/8 Cav formed a combat convoy of over 450 vehicles which included the brigade headquarters, Battery B 2/17 arty, Battery a 1/30 arty (155mm towed), and logistical elements. This convoy departed in Khe at 0704 and closed at the brigade base (Oasis - 24. 115275) at 1521 hours. The convoy was ascorted by D 1/9 Cav and with the aerial surveillance and reaction force provided by Troop B 1/9 Cav. In addition TF Pineapple (Co B 1/69 armor and Troop C 3/4 Cav) initiating from Fleiku at 0700 hours secured Hwy 19 from Mang Yang Pass to Pleiku and the route from Pleiku to Oasis. 2/8 Cav, Battery B 2/17 arty, Hqs and Batteries A & B 6/14 arty and TF lineapple were located vicinity the Oasis base during the night of 25 - 26 Mar and Battery 4 1/30 arty continued forward by road to join Battery 1 2/19 inty already at Duc Co. Division Aviation Group and 1st Squadron, 9th Cav elements supporting LINCOLN operated from the Turkey Farm (ZA 235538 - vicinity II Corps Head Larters).

(2) 26 Mar 66. 1st Brigade TF elements continued reconnaissance in force operations within the LINCOLN area without contact. Co B 1/8 conducted an air assault from LZ Bear to LZ Doe (Y4 785214) and later swept to LZ Buck (Y4 781185). Co \pm 1/8 air assaulted to LZ Tiger (Y4 785149) and swept north without contact. \pm platoon of Troop C 3/4 Cav secured

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elements of Co A, 8th Engr Bn who checked the CV-2 strip at Catecka for mines. 1/9 Cav conducted ground and aerial reconnaissance south and west of Oasis without significant results.

(3) Action on 27 Mar was highlighted by 1/12 Cav. Co $\pm 1/12$ conducted saturation patrols from LZ Ruby to the Northwest with one patrol ambushing and killing seven VC vicinity Y \pm 712268 at 1000 hours. The remainder of the company moved to the ambush area and captured two VC during the afternoon. At 1932 hours $\pm 1/12$ made contact with 10 VC in this same area and estimated 4 VC KIA. On the following day one body was recovered in the area of contact. No significant contacts were developed by 1/8 Cav in patrolling conducted from LZ Bear. Co B 1/69 Armor conducted a sweep south of Oasis without incident and Troop C, 3/4 Cav swept north of Catecka (Z \pm 205343) and discovered a platoon size rest area at Z \pm 159399. The Division Forward CP was established at Pleiku opposite the II Corps Headquarters.

(4) Co B and C 1/8 Cav air assaulted into LZ Bobcat (YA 803108) on 28 Mar and swept back to LZ Bear without contact. Sweeps by 2/8 Cav from the brigade base and Troop C, 3/4 Cav south to Flei Me USSF Camp produced no contacts. 1/12 Cav continued intense patrolling near the 27 March ambush site without further contact and conducted company operations near LZ Emerald (YA 676253) and LZ Onyx (YA 675278) with 4 VC KIA and 2 VCC resulting at scattered locations. Best results of the day were obtained by 1/9 Cav when A Troop engaged an unknown number of VC at YA 939788 with 2 VC KIA (BC), 1 KLA (EST), 1 confirmed WIA and 1 estimated WIA, and 2 VCC. B Troop 1/9 Cav uncovered 1 ton of rice at YA 907128 while conducting a ground reconnaissance. At 1700 hours the CO, 1/9 Cav and his chase ship were fired on at Za 160395 and in the ensuing engagement there were 2 VC KIA (BC), 2 VC KIA (EST) and one weapon recovered by one of the aircraft crews.

(5) On 29 March no significant contacts were developed during continued patrolling and sweeps by 1st Brigade elements. Companies 4 and C 1/8 Cav conducted air assaults to LZ PINE (YA 842093), LZ OAK (YA 874127), and LZ DOGWOOD (YA 870180) with negative contact. A trip flare was activated near an ambush site of a 1/12 Cav vicinity YA 718265 during the early morning hours. The ambush party fired into the area and discovered one VC KLA (BC) at first light. After daylight A, B, and C 1/12 swept by ground and converged at LZ Diamond (YA 710265). At 1000 hrs Co A 1/12 replaced Co B 2/8 on the security mission for the aircraft laager area at Fleiku with B 2/8 rejoining the battalion at Oasis. Plans were made to switch 1/12 Cav to Oasis on 30 Mar as the brigade reserve/reaction force and to commit 2/8 Cav to an area south of Hwy 19 and east of 1/8 Cav at LZ Bear. D Troop 1/9 Cav with aerial weapons and curveillance support from Troop A 1/9 Cav escorted Co C, 229th Engr Bn from Pleiku to Cheo Reo without incident. The remainder of the squadron continued reconnaissance without significant contact or sightings.

(6) The tempo of action increased sharply on 30 Mar resulting from sightings and contacts south of Chu Pong by 1/9 Cav elements. 1/8 Cav conducted ground sweeps and consolidated all elements including Btry C 2/19 arty at LZ WALNUT (YA 920147). 2/8 Cav deployed from the brigade base (Dasis) to LZ Typhus (YA 835198), LZ Boil (YA 950255) and LZ Pox (YA 975291). The move to Pox was preceded by a recon in force by Co B 1/69 Armor. Troop C, 3/4 Cav escorted Battery A 1/30 Arty (155mm) from Duc Co to LZ Boil. Upon the arrival of B 2/8 at Boil Troop C, 3/4 Cav was released to rejoin 3d Brigade, 25th Inf Division which was in the process of surface deployment from Operation GARFIELD into the LINCOLN AO. 1/12 Cav moved from their sector to the brigade base at Casis as the brigade reaction force. Troop D 1/9Cav supported by aircraft from Troop α escorted Co C, 229th Engr Bn from Cheo Reo to Pleiku closing by 1200 hours withoutincident. B Troop sighted avcgt

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32 enemy personnel dressed in camouflage uniforms with foxholes and bunkers. Weapons ships and T.C .ir took the target under fire and the 1st Brigade was notified of a possible significant target. The 1st Brigade decided the target should be further developed and at 1530 hours the rifle platoon, A, 1/9 Cav assaulted into the area. The platoon moved quickly toward the target area and by 1535 hours had captured a prisoner who stated "there are 1000 troops in the area". The rifle platoon was instructed to return to the LZ for pick-up when the enemy force commenced firing from well hidden, fortified positions. Troop a weapons aircraft made repeated firing runs to cover the platoon assembly and extraction. During extraction, a lift ship was hit by automatic weapons fire and crashed about 1000 meters east of the LZ with minor injuries except for the VC prisoner who died as a result of the crash. Weapons ships and OH-13's evacuated crash survivors. ""B" Troop UH-1D lifted off with 12 of 15 remaining personnel at 1610 hours but was hit by heavy fire and crashed killing 14 of the 15 persons on board. A second UH-1D crashed as a result of heavy fire approaching the LZ. The third lift ship extracted all remaining personnel from the LZ. Results of this action by 1/9 Cav elements prior to arrival of Co λ 1/12 Cav are summarized as follows:

Friendly	<u>Enemy</u>
KIA 15	KLA (3C) - 58
WIA 13	KL1 (EST) + 65
Acft Shot Down - 4 UH-1D 1 UH-1D recovered	WI.1 (EST) - 30
3 UH-1D destroyed	Кв. – 9

A detailed eye witness account as prepared by a squad leader in the Troop A rifle platoon is attached as Inclosure 3, to indicate the intensity of action in this engagement.

Co A 1/12 Cav was dispatched from the aircraft laager area at Pleiku as a reaction force to assist in the extraction of 1/9 Cav ground elements and closed into the area vicinity YV 855885 (later designated LZ Eagle) about 1700 hrs. At 1930 hours a CH-47 was hit and downed on the LZ. Intense fire that developed as a 1/12 assombled at the LZ caused cancellation of the initial plan to extract this company after the 1/9 Cav elements had been withdrawn. Aerial rocket artillery (aRA) took up constant cover over a 1/12 and placed heavy fires beyond the company perimeter throughout the night. Close air support and illumination support (SMOKEY BELR) were provided throughout the night. At 2300 hours a CV-2 made low level ammunition and ration drop to the unit by parachute delivery. Co A continued to engage the enemy by fire and repulse probes during the night. At 310705 Co A 1/8 and Battery executed a night air assault into LZ CAT (YV 845895) in order to place tube artillery in support of Go A 1/12 and the first rounds were fired at 310310 hours. A personal account of the actions of Co A 1/12 during the night of 30 - 31 March prepared by the platoon leader who was the acting company commander and his artillery forward observer is attached as Inclosure 4. Thase I operations are illustrated on Overlay 2.

b. Thase II - 31 Mar-3 Apr.

(1) The heavy fighting resulting from the commitment of $\pm 1/12$ south of Chu Yong precipitated the movement of 1st Bde TF maneuver elements into the area to relieve the pressure on $\pm 1/12$ and to exploit the contact. The VC broke off their attacks on $\pm 1/12$ prior to sunrise. C 1/12 air assaulted into LZ ELOLE at 0710 and by 0926 the remainder of the battalion followed. C 1/12 moved out North of LZ Eagle and B 1/12 swept South along the Cambo-

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dian border. Throughout the day all elements of the battalion continued to uncover VC dead and equipment which had been abandoned near LZ Eagle. Sporadic contact occurred at several locations with small VC elements that had apparently been separated from their parent unit. The 1/8 Cav plus two batteries 2/19 arty and Battery A 1/30 a_{T} ty (two howitzers) closed into LZ Cat. 2/8 Cav moved from LZs lox and Boil and closed LZ Dime (YV 916815) by 1900 hours. 1/9 Cav sent Troop A to the Division Base and brought Troop C to the LINCOLN AO. No significant contacts were made by 1/9 Cav on 31 Mar. 3d Brigade was ordered to the LINCOLN AO with 1/7 Cav deploying to liei Me and the Brigade headquarters and 2/7 Cav closing at the Turkey Farm (lleiku) with plans to move to Plei Me on 1 Apr. 3d Brigade, 25th Inf Division came under operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division 311200 hours and by 1700 hours had closed at Duc Co. The Division main Cr became operational at Pleiku 311800 hours.

(2) The principal action on 1 april occurred south of Chu Yong as continuation of the 30 - 31 March engagement vicinity LZ Eagle. During the day elements of 1/12 Cav discovered 13 VC bodies at YV 856878; 28 VC bodies at YV 849874; 13 bodies at YV 865825; and 3 VC bodies at YV 870875. The additional tally for the 30 Mar engagement by 1/9 and 1/12 Cav was 119 KIA (BC), 110 KIA (EST) and 56 WIA (EST) plus 3 VCC. 2/8 Cav remained vicinity LZ Dime patrolling in all directions without contact. 1/8 Cav continued local patrolling and security of the 1st Brigade forward Cr at LZ Cat.

The 3d Brigade completed deployment from Pleiku to Plei Me by ground convoy with no contacts.

3d Brigade, 25th Inf Division conducted a heliborne assault into LZ 11 (Y $_{a}$ 803078) with elements of 1/14 Inf and LZ 21 (Y $_{a}$ 944053) with elements of 1/35 Inf. <u>at 1410 hours</u> 1/14 Inf made contact with a company size force along the Cambodian border with 4 VC KI $_{a}$ (BC).

1/9 Cav CF displaced from Fleiku to Oasis. Squadron reconnaissance was concentrated in the Chu Fong area between 1st Brigade and 3d Brigade, 25th Inf Div.

(3) On 2 Lor 66 the primary activity gain centered in the 1/12 Cav (1st Brigade) area south of Chu long. The 1/12 Cav perimeter at LZ Eagle X was probed during the early morning hours and three VC KLa (BC) were found at daylight. At 1257 hours a helicopter scout team from 1/9 Cav reported an undetermined number of NVA troops at YV 860895. A patrol from D 1/12 gained contact with a reinforced energy company at 1308. TaC Air, ARA, artillery and Riot Control Agent aircraft were employed on the withdrawing enemy company. At 1430 hours C 1/12 joined the D Company elements and at 1704 hours Co B 1/12 arrived and the D 1/12 elements returned to LZ Eagle. The VC succeeded in breaking contact at 1925 hours after suffering heavy casualties. 2/8 Cav conducted extensive night and day patrolling centered around LZ Quarter (YV 876766) without contact. 1/8 Cav (-) remained near LZ Cat as the 1st Brigade reaction force.

The 3d Brigade conducted four air assaults from riei Me south along the Ia Tae and Ia Meur rivers without contact.

- 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division consolidated the 1/14Inf and B 1/69 .rmor at LZ 11 with 1/35 Inf operating vicinity LZ 21 without significant contact.

The 1st Squadron, 9th Cav Cr remained at Oasis. There were no significant sightings other than those by helicopter scout teams supporting infantry battalions. 4VCOT

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L total of 68 VC KIA (BC) were reported from all sources for 2 April with the bulk of these accounted for by the 1/12 Cav action vicinity LZ Engle.

(4) 3 Apr 66. The 1st Brigade continued search and destroy operations with 1/8 Cav (-) at LZ Cat as the Brigade reserve; 2/8 Cav conducting night and day sweeps in all directions from LZ Quarter; and 1/12 Cav attempting to regain contact with the enemy force encountered the previous day. Elements of 1/12 Cav counted 37 VC KLA (BC), estimated 20 KLA, and recovered 21 individual and 8 crew served weapons during the day. The 1/12 Car and Btry λ 2/19 Arty displaced to LZ Hawk (YV 888913) as part of the repositioning of forces in preparation for action on 4 Apr 66.

The 3d Brigade continued platoon size reconnaissance operations along the Ia Tae and Ia Meur rivers (2/7 Cav) and conducted air assaults with 1/7 Cav (-) into LZ X-Ray (YA 937010) without contact. 1/9 Cav (-) and Troop C 3/4 Cav were placed under operational control of 3d Brigade for the purpose of moving 6/14 Arty to forward firing positions to support the assault into Chu Pong scheduled to start 4 Apr. The combined air-ground task force made good progress with the 6/14 Arty toward positions Blue and Purple (YA 989999). The lead elements reached the position prior to nightfall and elements not closing were secured by rifle and mechanized elements of the escorting force. These elements closed into Position Blue by 041050 hours with no major problem. This cross-country movement demonstrated that the heavy SP artillery has a good capability to move over broken terrain. No significant contact resulted from 3d Brigade operations.

Four KIA (BC) were registered by 1/35 Inf (3d Bde, 25th Inf Div) in light contact vicinity YA 935113.

Overlay 3 depicts Phase II operations.

c. Phase III 4 - 7 Apr 66. Division OPORD 6611 (LINCOLN III) was issued 292000 Mar to cover assault into the Chu Pong massif. Major forces were positioned during Phase II ready to launch the assault on 4 April. The concept provided for the 1st Brigade to assault from the South, in 3d Brigade from the East, and 3d Brigade, 25th Inf Division from the North. 1/9 Cav was to screen the border areas and operate South of 1st Brigade to interdict enemy forces attempting to withdraw or reinforce. Provision was made for forward positioning of artillery (e.g. 6/14th Arty at Position Blue) to insure ready availability of supporting fires. The Division engineer battalion was tasked to be prepared to construct a fixed wing airstrip south of Chu Pong to assist in providing logistical support in event a major action ensured.

(1) 1st Brigade. 1/8 Cav (-) remained at LZ Cat securing artillery positions and acting as the brigade reaction force throughout this phase. 2/8 Cav air assaulted from LZ Quarter to LZ Cotton (YV 843956) and LZ Cloth (YV 852942) during the morning of 4 Apr. No contact was made other than light fire against the initial lift into LZ Cotton. Blocking positions and CP.'s were established along the border at YV 834983, YV 839973, YV 843962, and YV 855975. The battalion CP displaced to LZ Wool (YV 856962). 2/8 Cav engaged 4 VC capturing one VCC at YV 847938 on 7 upr for their only contact. 1/12 Cav established blocking positions Red (YV 849923), White (YV 843911), and Blue (YV 845892) on 4 Apr. 1/12 Cav engaged several enemy groups of squad size or less getting 7 VC KIA (BC) on 4 Apr and 2 more on 5 Apr. On 6 April C 1/12 engaged an enemy platoon near Position White with 2 VC KIA resulting and the energy withdrawing into Cambodia. On 7 April three VCC were picked up hiding in an abandoned position near LZ Robin (YV 864900) and the bulk of the battalion returned to Hawk. On 8 April elements of 1/12Cav discovered 2 VCC, 12 VC KL. (BC) and 6 weapons on a sweep south of LZ

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Hawk. The 1st Brigade terminated LINCOLN with 2/8 Cav moving to Pleiku (Lake Bien Ho) and other elements returning to Oasis.

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(2) 3d Brigade. On 4 Δ pr 1/7 Cav air assaulted from LZ X-Ray to LZ 1 (YA 918008) and LZ 4 (YA 884082) while 2/7 Cav air assaulted into LZ "H" (YV 912982). Troop C 3/4 Cav moved from artillery Position Blue and linked up with 1/7 Cav (-) at LZ X-Ray without contact and Co C, 8th Engr Bn improved the trail from Plei Me to Position Blue to assist in resupply of 6/14 Arty on 4 Apr. From 5 - 7 April 3d Brigade elements covered their assigned sector of Chu Pong thoroughly without any contact or evidence of extensive fortifications or supply caches noted. 1/9 Cav under operational control of 3d Brigade formed TF N.VE with Troop C 1/9 Cav and Troop C, 3/4 Cav. This air-ground cavalry task force made a sweep from vicinity Position to LZ Albany (YA 948040) which was the scene of heavy action in the Division's Pleiku Campaign in November 65 on 5 apr, remained overnight, and returned to Position Purple (YV 988997) 6 apr. The remains of 4 persons, presumed US MLA from the earlier campaign were discovered and evacuated. This task force proved to be an effective team and on 6 apr escorted 6/14 arty back to Oasis. On 8 apr 2/7 Cav was extracted and moved to Plei Mrong and the Brigade Hqs and 1/7 Cav moved to Plei Me. On 7 apr Brigade Hq and 1/7 closed to Plei Mrong in preparation for MOSBY I.

(3) 3d Brigade, 25th Inf Division. On 4 - 6 Apr 1/14 Inf with B 1/69 Armor conducted tank-infantry sweeps in sector Punch without significant contact. 1/35 Inf conducted airmobile assaults into sector JUDY and w was later joined by a tank platoon. Brigade elements received scattered small arms fire and a few mortar rounds but found no significant force or installations in the sector. ..t 071300 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div terminated participation in LINCOLN and moved to Pleiku by air and ground on 7 apr.

(4) 1st Squadron. 9th Cav operated under control of the 3d Brigade during Phase III but continued to perform reconnaissance throughout the Division sector. One engagement worthy of separate montion occurred on 4 Apr in the 1st Brigade sector when armed helicopter from C 1/9 Cav observed 60 - 70 VC in an open field near YV 827919: Armed helicopters and TAC Air engaged the enemy force as they fled to the west into Cambodia. \vee A total of 43 bodies were counted east of the border and one 75mm RR was recovered. On 5 Apr D Troop 1/9 Cav engaged in convoy security operations between Pleiku-Le Thanh and Plei Me found a stock of 75 x 105mm Howitzer rounds, 25 x 4.2 mortar rounds, and 50 x 81mm mortar rounds at ZA 195195. This was the location the ARVN relief column for Plei Me was ambushed in Oct 65. This material was recovered.

(5) 8th Engineer Bn. The Division engineer battalion provided normal LZ clearing and demolition teams in support of infantry units throughout LINCOLN. In addition the battalion completed a number of airfield and road projects that will be of benefit to future operations by all friendly units in western Pleiku Province: These special projects include:

(a) 4 CV-2 airstrip was completed at Oasis (Zm 115288) in 4 hours on 26 Mar.

(b) \therefore 3500' C-130 airstrip and the first combat tactical airstrip to use T-17 membrane was constructed at Oasis 26 Mar - 2 Apr. 4 total of 787 equipment hours and 96 construction hours were required by Co A (minus one platoon).

(c) On 2 ...pr Co ... began construction of an airstrip at LZ Cat (YV 845895). On 4 April the field was prepared to receive CV-2s and the first C-123 landed at O61400 Apr. Since there were no roads into the area all equipment and personnel had to be brought in by helicopter. One platoon and 2 D6B dozers, a grader, a pneumatic roller, a vibrating compactor AVCGT

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and a 1 ton dump truck were used on this project. As far as is known this is the first combat tactical airstrip constructed with helicopter delivery of all equipment. It is felt that this construction was possible only because of the airmobile sectionalized engineer equipment unique to the Airmobile Division Engineer Battalion.

(d) From 8 - 10 Apr Co 4 plus a platoon from Co C cleared, repaired and improved the highway from Pleiku to Plei Djereng in preparation for displacement of heavy self propelled artillery into that area for NUSBY I.

(6) Operations during LINCOLN III are illustrated on Overlay 4.

d. The results of Operation LINCOLN are included in paragraph 12.

MOSBY I 11 - 17 Apr 66.

a. Division units completed deployment and made preparations to initiate MOSBY I during the period 8 - 10 April. The Division Main CP moved to Kontum on 9 April and the Division reserve for MOSBY I (1/12 Cav (-))co-located at Kontum 10 Apr. Location of major units prior to the start of MOSBY I were:

1st Brigade - Oasis - (2/8 Cav Lake Bien Ho Pleiku)

3d Brigade - Plei Mrong

TF 1/9 Cav - Dak To area (Position Custer) (movement from Oasis and Pleiku accomplished 9 - 10 apr).

Aviation Group laager area - Turkey Farm (Pleiku)

b. The character of operations planned by all maneuver units during MOSBY I were similar. All units analyzed trail systems within their assigned sectors and planned to establish company bases and conduct sustained patrolling and ambushes to locate facilities, caches, and interrupt any infiltration in progress. As events developed during MOSBY I the overall result was development of "negative" intelligence due to the general lack of contact and findings. Reaction forces were maintained at battalion, brigade, and division levels. Artillery was positioned by battery to provide maximum coverage. Helicopter scout sections were attached to both brigades from 1/9 Cav to insure that aerial surveillance was conducted in close coordination with ground operations.

c. 1st Brigade. 1/8 Cav conducted air assaults into LZ Maverick (YA 687417) and LZ Silver (Y. 702455) commencing 110800 apr with negative contact. 1/8 Cav established six platoon ambush sites prior to dark. 2/8 Cav assaulted into LZ may (Y. 693474) and LZ Kim (Y. 663478) commencing C41227 hours. On 12 april 1/8 Cav observed two groups of 5 VC cross the Se San river moving into Cambodia near 12 Maverick (these groups were not engaged in the hope that a larger group was following). ...t 120750 hours a CIDG Co from Duo Co moved by helicopter to LZ Saddle (Ya 730467) and began reconnaiseance in its assigned sector. ... CIDC pletoon working with 2/8 Cav observed 10 VC bathing in the Dak Hodrai river near LZ iny at 121530 apr but the group was able to escape when the point man opened fire prematurely. This same CIDG platoon engraged a group of 3 VMC at XA 654457 on 13 Apr wounding 1 VMC who died before he could be evacuated. On 15 April - 1/8 engaged a group of 3 VC who fied dropping two submachine guns. ...t 151448 hours a 5 man patrol from 2/8 Cav working from LZ Joan discovered a large supply cache at Ya 578593. This cache appeared to have been established for about six months and included: 40 cases of CHICOM grenades, 1 1/2 cases of small arms ammunition; 41 x 82000

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mortar rounds; 40 cases of Cal 50 ammo, 90 rds 75 RR, 30 cases of explosives, 2 modern II radios, and 3 switchboards. This cache also contained 30 rounds of 120mm mortar ammunition. On 16 mpr 1/8 Cav was extracted to the brigade base at Oasis. On 17 mpril the 1st Brigade deployed to an Khe by C-130 and CV-2 aircraft.

d. 34 Brigade. Brigade operations were initiated by 2/7 Cav assaulting into L'ds ender (Y. 655765) and Sierra (Y. 627805), and Victor (Y. 655695) at 040800. The 1/7 Cav landed at LZ King (YL 674830) and LZ Flush (Y. 718868) during the afternoon of 11 upril. Neither battalion encountered contact during initial assaults. On 12 upril C 2/7 contacted 15 VC killing one and capturing one at YL 674705. On 13 upr C 2/7 made light contact with 1 KL and 2 VCC. The 3d Brigade was extracted 14 upr and deployed to un Khe 15 upr.

e. TF 1/9 Cav. At 110800 the Squadron Forward CP, B 2/17 arty, and C 1/9 Cav moved by road from Custer to Position Grape. Later in the day one CIDG Co was moved by air to Grape and a second CIDG Co air assaulted Position Bit. B Co 1/12 Cav remained as TF reaction force at Custer. No contact was made but one man was killed and seven wounded as a result of a grenade accident while dismounting from a helicopter at Position Whip. On 13 apr the CIDG companies returned to Dak To and 1/9 Forward CP, B 2/17 arty, and D 1/9 returned to Custer. At 151500 hrs B 1/12 was positioned at Y. 799969 to conduct day and night patrols and ambushes. No contact was made by B 1/12 and this unit rejoined its parent battalion at Kontum 14 apr. On 15 apr the Troop B rifle platoon reconnoitered a hidden N-S trail running from coordinates ZB 7303 to Y_m 7389. This was the only location within the squadron sector that showed any signs of recent use. On 16 - 17 apr Troop C 1/9 conducted reconnaissance of a special area of operations south of Chu Pong without any significant sighting. On 17 apr Troop B 1/9 and B 2/17 arty executed a show of force mission at the Plei Djereng USSF Camp. On 18 apr 1/9 Cav provided ground escort and aerial weapons cover for Division convoys moving to an Khe.

f. Other operations. .. force of 30 USSF/CIDG personnel from Duc Co on an independent mission outside the Division ..O came under heavy attack near the Cambodian border (Y.. 602073) during the afternoon of 12 apr. Upon notification Division aircraft provided supporting fires and UH-1D lift ships to extract this force. During the period 13 - 16 apr a 105mm artillery battery secured by D 1/12 who emplaced south of Duc Co to support a mulitcompany CIDG recon in force operation which did not develop any significant contact. On 15 apr an artillery survey party returning from Plei Djereng to Pleiku was damaged by a mine and engaged by small arms fire vic YL 993423. Co C 1/12 was committed as a reaction force from the aircraft laager area at Pleiku but failed to gain contact.

g. 8th Engineer Battalion. Engineer battalion resources above that required for participation with infantry units were devoted to airfield construction as a means of enhancing air novement and logistical support during future operations. One platoon of Co C 8th Engineer Bn constructed a C-123 strip at Polei Kleng CIDG Camp 10 - 14 Apr. As was the case at LZ Cat all equipment had to be brought in by helicopter. Co C (-) also extended the 1500 ft strip at Plei Mrong CIDG Camp to 3200 feet 12 - 14 Apr.

h. Unit sectors for MOSBY I are illustrated on Overlay 5. Results of operations are included in paragraph 12.

12. RESULTS.

a. Operation LINCOLN results are summarized as follows:

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FRIENDLY

KLu - 43 (Note 1, 2) WLL - 102 (Note 1) UH-1D - 3 ENEMY

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KI. (BC) - 477 (Note 1)
KL. (EST) - 232
WIA (EST) - 163 (Note 1)
VCC - 12
VCS - 9 (Note 1)
Ralliers - 3
Weapons
   Individual Wpns - 88
   Crew Served Wpns - 18
Ammunition
   Grenades - 73
   Su and MG - 1080
   2.75 inch RL - 13
   82mm Mort - 36
   60mm - 3
   Flares - 1920
Commo Equip
   Radio Parts Box - 11
   Radios - 3
   Code books - 3000
Miscellaneous
  Medical Supplies - 10 1b
   Documents - 1 bag
   82mm bipod - 1
  M4 mortar sight - 3
   60mm Base Plates - 2
```

Note 1 - Includes the following 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div totals:

FRIENDLY

ENEMY

KIA 2 1	KL. (BC) - 13
WI - 22	KL. (BC) - 13 WL. (EST) - 1
	VCS - 9

2 - One ARVN interpreter attached to 1st Squadron, 9th Cav was killed on 20 Mar 66 - not included in the total shown.

ENEMY

b. Results of Operation MOSBY I -

FRIENDLY

KIA - 0 WIA - 19 (Note 1)

KIA (BC) - 3 KL. (EST) - 3 WIA (EST) - 16VCC - 4 Weapons Individual Wpns - 5 ammunition Grenades - 1095 57mm RR - 3 · 75mm RR - 90 50 Cal - 4800 81mm Mort - 136 120mm Mort - 28 TNT - 30 (cases) Commo Equip Radios (-M) = 2Switchboards - 4 Other - Packs - 18

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Note 1 - LCofS, Gl figures for MOSBY I reflect 50 WIA. The smaller operational report of WIA more accurately reflect wounds treated above the company aidman level.

c. USSF/CIDG units participating in Operation MOSBY I did not suffer any losses. USSF/CIDG were credited with one KIA, one VCC and one individual weapon during MOSBY I.

13. ADMINISTRATION MATTERS.

TOOL

a. Supply. Operation LINCOLN was initiated without prior logistical build-up. No problems arose since only one battalion was deployed by air assault directly into an operational area and there was no significant contact during the early stages of the operation. Support was provided by a Ground Line of Communications (GLOC) from Jui Mhon (1st Log Command) to the Pleiku Detachment, 34th QM Bn. From Pleiku supplies were directed to the Division's 1st FSE (Le Thanh) and after the 3d Brigade was deployed to the 3d F3E at Plei Me. MOSBY I was also supported by GLOC from Qui Nhon with throughput to the 1st FSE (Le Thanh) and the 3d FSE (Plei Mrong). Supplies for TF 1/9 Cav were delivered by a combination GLOC/aLOC to a reduced size FSE tailored to meet the requirements of TF 1/9 Cav. During MOSBY I support was rendered by FSEs spread laterally over 115 KM with troops deployed over a lateral distance of 175 KM. With GLOC distances from Qui Whon of 225 KM (Plei Me) and 250 KM (Dak To) it was not possible to effect a one day turn around of supply trucks. This long GLOC disclosed a limitation of Log Command motor transport that should be kept in mind for similar future operations. Within the area from Pleiku to the FSEs Division provided armed escort and communication vehicles and air cover for supply convoys with no losses during the period. Division engineers also repaired secondary roads frm Hwy 14 to Plei Me and Plei Mrong to accept supply vehicle traffic. The following quantities of supplies were delivered to Division FSEs for LINCOLN-MOSBY I:

	LINCOLN		•	MOSBY I		
Class I	289.9	tons		221.0	tons	
Class III-IIL.	2164.0	11		1127.0	17	
Class V	553.4	Ħ		198.0	11	
Class II-IV	30.6	11		9.7	11	

b. Medical Support. No special problems were encountered in medical evacuation. The following medical support procedures were used with favorable results:

(1) Well qualified surgeons were available at the medical company clearing stations. The increased quality and scope of treatment reduced the requirements for evacuation.

(2) Battalion surgeons were able to co-locate with the clearing station. This greatly reduced the number of personnel temporarily "lost" in the medical ovacuation system and was a factor in enabling quick removal of personnel from clearing stations and returned to unit control.

(3) Two man teams of senior medical aidmen with a wider variety of medical supplies than carried by the company aidmen were dispatched to forward areas. These teams were considered particularly useful under conditions in which units operated for extended periods from patrol bases. TDOAT

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c. All 81mm mortar ammunition (C225) with M52 fuze available for use during these operations had been placed in the category "for emergency combat use only". No accidents or malfunctions attributable to ammunition condition occurred during the period covered by this report.

d. As has been previously mentioned in this report an extensive effort was made by Division Engineer units to construct or upgrade fixed wing airstrips. Four new airstrips were constructed and one airstrip was upgraded. This effort will greatly assist future logistical support in western Pleiku and Kontum provinces.

e. Communications. Extensive use was made of the CV-2 aerial relay as in previous Division operations. When the Division CP moved from Pleiku to Kontum a communication problem resulted due to the fact that the signal battalion designated by FFORCEV I to establish telephone and teletype circuits from the Division CP back to the Division base and higher headquarters encountered difficulty and delay in completing the circuits. The Division Signal Battalion was able to alleviate this problem by installing a four channel tactical VHF rig and obtaining temporary loans of circuits from II Corps Advisors and 24th STZ advisors. Division Artillery Headquarters encountered difficulty in maintaining FM communications with their units spread through the Division sector due to the extensive distances involved.

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES.

a. T17 Membrane. The first tactical airstrip to use T17 membrane as a surfacing was constructed by the 8th Engineer Bn during Operation LINCOLN. a 3500 foot C-130 strip was surfaced with 18 hours used for actual installation of the membrane. The condition of this membrane after use by C-130 aircraft on 18 April and subsequent use by CV-2 indicates that the T-17 membrane is a major improvement over the T-15 membrane previously used by the Division Engineer Bn.

b. The construction of C-123 airstrips at LZ Cat (south of Chu Pong) 6 Apr and later construction of a C-123 strip at Polei Kleng CIDG Camp represent the first combat tactical airstrips to be built in which all enginser equipment was delivered by helicopters. Construction of these airstrips under combat conditions within the time limits was possible solely due to the unique sectionalized engineer equipment in the airmobile division engineer battalion TOE.

c. MIO2 Howitzer. Additional use and experience are pointing out the clear superiority of the MIO2 over the MIO1 (105mm) howitzer. The lighter sight allows battery dispalcement with a basic ammunition load with fewer sorties and faster loading time. The ability to move the MIO2 by CV-2 provides valuable flexibility in use of aircraft resources particularly for reaction force contingency planning. Despite the acknowledged superiority of the MIO2 there are a number of minor deficiencies that are being corrected by local modification and submission of Equipment Improvement Reports. Deficiencies noted during Operation LINCOLN-MOSBY I are listed for the general information of readers of this report.

One sight damaged during movement (sling load).

Recoil connector and equilibrator cover broken.

Three base plates cracked during firing.

Dust collected inside the sight (believed due to wind force existing during CH-47 movement).

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Two azimuth counter cranks on the panoramic sight locked.

Prisms on the panoramic sight rotated.

One box trail weld cracked.

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Shear pins on all of the actuator cranks have sheared.

d. E159 CS Cannister. This Division continued to obtain proper functioning of E159 CS cannisters. To date all E159s have been dropped from UH-1B helicopters. The E159 cannister is adapabtale to dropping from the O-1D and this method of delivery will be tried in a future operation.

e. Scout Dog teams on loan from ARVN II Corps were attached to each 1st Brigade infantry battalion during LINCOLN. Due to the violence and intensity of action when contacts were made and the general absence of enemy from the area at other times it was not possible to properly evaluate scout dog effectiveness.

15. PSYCHOLOGICAL WAREARE AND CIVIL AFFAIRS.

a. Psychological Warfare. Psy War support for Operation LINCOLN-MOSBY I was coordinated by the Division Psy Op officer with the Fleiku Detachment, 245th Psy Op Company for leaflet and ground loudspeaker/interpreter teams. The 5th Air Commando Squadron (USAF) provided U-10 aircraft for aerial loudspeaker and small leaflet drops and C-47 aircraft for large leaflet drops. Advice and Vietnamese interpreter support was provided by the JUSPAO representative attached to the 1st Air Cav Division. Psy War activity in support of Operation LINCOLN-MOSBY I follows:

	LINCOLN	MOSBY I
Leaflet missions	55	15
Number of leaflets	4,126,000	1,211,000
Loudspeaker missions	56	11
Loudspeaker hours	70 hrs, 55 min	13 hrs, 30 min
Ground loudspeaker/ interpreter missions at brigade or lower	12	None

Three ralliers were recorded during Operation LINCOLN.

Loudspeaker and leaflet themes used by the 1st wir Cav Division during Operation LINCOLN-MOSBY I included:

> VC Forced Labor NV. Officer Rallies Come from Hiding Rewards Safe Conduct Passes Chieu Hoi

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b. Civil affairs. During Operation LINCOLN-MOSBY I no problems concerning refugees or non-combatant casualties developed due to the absence of civilian communities within areas in which active military operations were conducted. With the exception of 3000 lbs of VC rice evacuated by 1/9 Cav to Dak To district headquarters no significant rice caches were found during operations covered by this report. Principal civic action projects accomplianed by Division units during LINCOLN-MOSBY I weres

(1) 1st Brigade assisted the Than An District Chief and MACV Subsector advisor in improvement of the district headquarters defenseive perimeter, construction of a market place, and providing a pump for the district headquarters well.

(2) Extensive sick call activities were conducted during which 3111 patients were treated on 27 occasions at 11 different locations.

(3) One hundred thirty-five pounds of 7C equipment, medicine, and clothing captured by the 3d Brigade were turned over to Kontum District Headquarters for distribution to PF soldiers and refugees.

(4) Small quantities of blankets, clothing, soap, fabric kits, cooking oil, salt, and powdered milk were distributed through GVN officials to recently resettled refugees.

16. COMMUNDER'S ANALYSIS.

a. Lessons Learned.

(1) Experience during Operation LINCOLN continued to support the Division's earlier experience concerning the desirability of high ground LZ's and attacking from high to low ground. The enemy has a tendency to evoid high ground probably due to the desire to avoid aerial observation and fires and his best bunkers were sited to fire into stream beds and draws.

(2) Enemy units encountered south of Ghu Pong during the period 26 - 31 Mar were noted to be making extensive use of small diameter, well camouflaged "spider hole" positions. These spider holes were barely large enough for their occupants in an upright position and required packs to be concealed outside which was often the clue enabling them to be detected from the air. It appears the enemy is stressing use of these positions as a means of reducing the effectiveness of aerial weapons and artillery.

(3) During LINCOLN-MOSBY I enemy units were observed to move by day as frequently as at night. In addition it became clear that the enemy has a real problem of getting out the "word" concerning friendly ambush sites. During the early days of LINCOLN the 1/12 Cav successfully sprung an ambush north of Duc Co and continued to kill, wound, or capture two or three personnel at the same site over the next 3 days. The effect of this experience on our own operations is to place renewed attention on daylight patrolling and to indicate that the decision as to whether to relocate ambush sites once contact has been made is a matter for individual consideration.

(4) The ability of armor and self-propelled artillery to operate successfuly cross-country in the plateau regions of Pleiku Province was convincingly demonstrated. Track vehicles move from Plei Me to Position Purple (YV 988997) and moved throughout the Ia Drang valley and Chu Pong foothills. The vehicles in Troop C 3/4 Cav and the M48 tanks demonstrated an advantage over the SP artillery in ability to cross obstacles. In engineer platoon should be provided in the task organisation for future cross-country escort and displacements of SP artillery.

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(5) Excellent regults were obtained in operations teaming airmobile and armor units. No difficulties in link up operations, or in ability to resupply armor units by helicopter were noted. The ability of track vehicles to clear LZ's is a bonus to airmobile forces. In one instance 4 M48 tanks cleared an LZ for 6 UH-1Ds in 15 minutes.

(6) The techniques of displacing 105mm artillery with the howitser and ammunition as a double sling load was described in detail in this Division's combat operations after action report for Operation JIM BOWIE (7 - 28 Mar). Favorable results were again obtained with this technique during Operation LINCOIN-MOSBY I.

(7) Infra Red surveillance during LINCOLN-MOSBY I was of limited use due to the large number of natural fires in the operational area in the dry season. This was compensated for by the favorable conditions for visual reconnaissance.

(8) USSF/CIDG units were employed both as integral units under their own advisors and as small teams integrated with Division units. The best results were obtained by employing the CIDG units to accomplish separate unit missions under their USSF advisors.

b. The following significant accomplishments or "firsts" during Operation LINCOLN-MOSBY I are summarized because of their bearing on future operational planning:

(1) Lead elements of the 3d Brigade were working on a barrier clearing and construction mission outside the Base camp. They were recovered, organized, and actually departed for Pleiku in 1 hour and 50 minutes after receiving initial notification from Division.

(2) The 130 KH air assault of 1/8 Cav from An Khe to LZ Bear (YA 825161) was the longest direct air assault conducted by this Division and is believed to be longest conducted by any unit.

(3) A night air assault was planned and successfully executed into an LZ not previously reconnoitered 30 - 31 Mar (A 1/8 Jav and Battery A 2/19 Arty to LZ Cat - YV 845895) resulting in the effective relief of a beleaguered unit.

(4) derial delivery of supplies to a unit in contact at night was successfully accomplished by low level air drop from CV-2 aircraft and $\theta''/175$ mm ammunition was delivered by airdrop for the first time in Vietnam.

c. Conclusions.

(1) Infiltration of energy personnel and units was in progress at the time of Operation LINCOLN-HOSBY I as evidenced by the many unit designations obtained from a small number of prisoners taken. It is felt that the heavy infiltration on routes within the border areas of SVN ceased early in March and that current infiltration has been moved across the border into the safe haven afforded by Cambodia/Laos.

(2) The lack of significant contact with the three known regimental size units (32d, 33d, and 66th) associated with the western delku area is interpreted to mean the threat to friendly installations still exists. With the identification of additional regimental size units (refer to paragraph 6d) the threat to the western and central highlands has increased. AVCGT

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(3) The continued infiltration not only increases the threat to the highland provinces of Darlac and Phu Bon but the southeasterly flow could well influence the coastal provinces of Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa.

(4) Discovery of a map carried by the company commander of an engineer company and subsequent interrogation of 3 VCC from 28th Engr Co, 15th Engr Bn (304th Div?) points out increasing VC interest in the area leading southeast from Chu Pong mountain toward Highway 14 and the Ben Me Thout area. At the time this engineer unit was contacted it was engaged in construction of three 1.5 meter "bicycle" trails leading southeast from Chu Pong capable of being expanded to take truck traffic.

(5) a thorough ground search revealed no indication whatever that Chu Pong mountain is currently used as a secret base or that significant supply caches, caves, or tunnel networks exist.

(6) The favorable results obtained from T17 membrane indicate that this material may be the answer to the requirement for a lightweight, easy to install, all-weather airstrip covering.

d. Recommendations.

(1) additional fixed wing airstrips, preferably C-130 class, should be constructed throughout areas in which this Division is considered for employment. Availability of a fixed wing strip permits initiation of operations with a minimum or no prestock of supplies and allows full use of Division organic aircraft for tactical requirements in forward areas.

(2) 1st air Cav Division and armor units form an effective combination for operations in the western palteau areas.

(3) The 1st Air Cavalry Division is capable of forming a wide variety of Air Cav Task Forces that are light, highly mobile, and capable of effective sustained reconnaissance and surveillance operations over large areas. These Air Cav task forces do not require the mass deployment of infantry, tube artillery, and logistical build-up associated with brigade or larger operations. In established technique is to form Air Cav task forces of appropriate size for reconnaissance missions and the "search" phase of operations where reliable current intelligence of enemy locations are not available.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Hale Phan-

LLCOIM R. BLER Lt Col, AGC Adjutant General

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
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
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
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
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SMALL UNIT ACTION SOUTH OF PHU PONG

INTRODUCTION. This account describes combat action by the Rifle Platoon, Troop A, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry south of Chu Pong mountain on the afternoon of 30 Mar 66. This engagement and the subsequent action by Co A, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry (Inclosure 4 of this after action report) cover the most intensive engagement during Operation LINCOLN. The following personal account was provided by Staff Sergeant Henry J. Shue Jr, Ra 16304463, Troop A, 1st Squadron. 9th Cav who participated in this engagement as a rifle squad leader.

On the afternoon of 30 Mar 66 the Rifle Platoon of Troop 4, 1/9 Cav was located at the Plei Me USSF Camp (Zu 156051). It 1503 hours I and other leaders of the rifle platoon were assembled to receive a field order from Captain Sabine, Rifle Platoon Leader of "4" Troop 1/9 Cav. Our platoon had a mission to conduct ground reconnaissance and capture a prisoner in the vicinity of coordinates YV 869865. Lift off time from Plei Me was at 1530 hours but a little later we were informed by "Scout 35", Captain Blanton, flight officer of the lift UH-1Ds that lift off was 1515 hours and LZ time 1530 hours. As soon as we captured a prisoner we were to be extracted. An earlier report from Squadron Headquarters indicated that Troop B had sighted 22 to 35 uniformed enemy in this area and that TaC Air had made previous runs on the area with napalm. An alternate 2Z was picked north of the suspected positions. A rifle platoon from "B" Troop, 1/9th Cav was on stand-by as a reaction force for us.

Our platoon loaded four UH-1Ds with six men per rifle squad, platoon leader, platoon RTO, platoon medic and the platoon interpreter making a total of 28 men. Once we hit the LZ the platoon SOF was in effect for security. We moved out to the northeast immediately with SSG E6 Grady's squad as point, my squad second in column, SSG rollock bringing up the rear and SSG E6 Riggs' squad securing the LZ. The column halted in a more or less "L" shape clearing (see sketch #1). I moved my squad toward the tree line on the right flank or right front (facing east). I noticed three field packs on bamboo beds in the tree line about 15 or 20 meters away and notified Captain Sabine who came over to my position (still we hadn't seen any positions) and walked about 10 or 15 meters northeast. Captain Sabine said he had found a position and to call the interpreter over. At this time I informed Captain Sabine that I observed a couple of well camouflaged positions immediately to my front. Captain Sabine told the interpreter to yell for them to come out. at this time Captain Sabine was on my right flank with the interpretor to my right rear. Just after the interpreter yelled in Vietnamese, I barely caught a flash of sun on metal to my left rear. It was a NVa soldier coming out of a well concealed position out in the clearing taking aim on my "Bravo" team leader. I fired and hit the NVa who immediately slumped back down in the position out of sight. I took his Chi Com automatic weapon and gave it to the RTO for carrying as Captain Sabine and the RTO were at my position by then. Captain Sabine moved back to his original position on my right. Imost immediately as we were pulling back west we received small arms fire from all around us. Sp4 Smith my "Alpha" team leader was wounded first, then Captain Sabine. I think both were wounded by the same firer as it was automatic fire from the enemy in that area. I had my squad return fire covering the ground and trees for any snipers. I had two men go up and pull Sp4 Smith back behind the firing line while I dragged Captain Sabine back within our line. The platoon medic was there by then. I told him to take a couple of men and get the wounded centrally located for evacuation. I observed a couple of SSG Grady's men putting a NVA POW on one helicopter that had landed. I kept pulling the squad back to the west fighting as we went. As we pulled back I was told that the 4th squad had gotten pushed out of the LZ and later heard it was ordered to join the main body. I also noted that two or three men from the other squads were mixed in with my squad.


I got a headcount of the remaining men, reorganized then and made an anno check. All we could do then was wait for help to reach us or lift ships to come in. By this time we had a secured small perimeter in the southwest section of the "L" shape clearing and were receiving fire from 360 degrees.

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I kept running around checking anno and having the men to make every shot count and not to waste any ammo, and re-supplying them with ammo if they needed it. Finally a lift ship did get on the 12. Captain Sabine or 890 Grady hollered to get on it - that it was the last one. I had to kick Sp4 Wright and arbithnot to make them hear me. Finally all twelve of us were on the ship. The UH-1D started to hover and I realized it was too heavily loaded. I called to SSG Grady to have two or three on the right jump off. I tapped Sgt Davis and Sp4 Harman on the shoulder and told them the ship was too heavy and jumped. Both of them followed me. The helicopter moved out to the North and as soon as we hit the ground the three of us began to fire into the northern tip of the corner of the "L" clearing since this was where most of the fire at the lift ship was coming from. I thought maybe the ship might make it, but it crashed and turned over on its side not over 35 meters from where it lifted off. We could hear men hollering inside of the ship. I told Davis and Harman to try and cover the right side of the ship and I was going to try and get into the helicopter and help get the people out of the ship from the left. I started around the left flank and was pinned down by small arms fire from the left flank of the ship (north) (See sketch #2).

The NVA's started charging the ship and it sounded like someone inside of the ship was firing an M-60 machine gun. I fired on the closest NVus to the ship, hitting two or three, and they withdrew to the woodline. Then they started charging me with 10 to 15 man waves, on a regular skirmish line, hollering and screaming. I hit some of them two or three times with bullets and they would keep on coming at me, stop; turn around then I could see big blood splotches on the backs as they took two or three steps toward the rear toward the tree line and then fall over. As one group would be driven back into the tree line another group would open up on me from the northwest edge of the woodline (see drawing $\frac{1}{2}$). I told Sgt Davis we sould stay and try to get into the helicopter or hold the NVA off until help arrived. The helicopter blew up or rather ammo and grenades inside blew up, I don't know which. FFC Manigault had gotten out of the helicopter and rolled over to Sgt Davis and Sp4 Harmon's position before the helicopter blew up, I had planned on breaking south but with a wounded man it would take two to carry him and one to have the fighting left to him. I wasn't for leaving any wounded behind and the other two agreed. I told them we would form a small triangle and make the NVA pay as much as we could. After what seemed a year Sgt Davis hollered a helicopter was coming in. A helicopter from "B" Troop 1/9th Cav set down under fire. I covered Sgt Davis and Sp4 Harmon while they got PFC Manigault aboard. We dropped FFC Manigault off at Med Evac at the "Oasis" then later returned to our unit.

The NVA were dressed in brownish colored camouflage suits, khaki uniforms, some kind of uniform that was either a GI fatigue or a close resenblance. Some had helmets. some soft caps. On three or four I noticed a net affair draped all the length of their body from head to foot that had fresh foliage in it. When they were charging me they were yelling and even after I hit them they were laughing. Everything they did, even aiming at me while they were in the open themselves was almost like a slow motion film. The positions that were in this area seemed to all be of a small slit trench affair leading to a larger position below ground. The one that tried to kill my 41fa team leader when the fight first started had to come out with his weapon first straight up in the air and turn sideways so he could get his shoulders out of the slit. Their positions didn't seem to have freedom for good field of fire.



SKETCH I

ENGAGEMENT AT. LZ EAGLE

INTRODUCTION. Co A, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry was committed as a reaction force on 30 Mar 66 to cover the extraction of the Rifle Platoon, Troop A, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry from the engagement south of C.u Pong desoribed in Inclosure 3 of this after action report. This summary of action by Co A 1/12 Cav was provided by 2d Lt Daniel J. Kapica, Platoon Leader, 2d Platoon A 1/12 and 2d Lt Larry Hunter, Artillery FO from 2/19 Arty. Lt Kapica served as acting company commander of A 1/12 during this engagement after the company commander was wounded and the executive officer was killed during the initial phase of the action.

Cn 30 March 1966 Company A, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 12th Cavalry assumed the mission of Brigade reaction force. At 1330 hrs, 30 March 1966, Company A (then laagering at the Turkey Farm, Fleiku) was alerted with the mission of reaction force for elements of the 1/9 Cavalry. At 1600 hrs the company was heliborne to aid the beseiged cavalry unit. The only intelligence known at this time was the presence of an estimated 30 VC with weapons dug into fortified positions. Due to the hastiness of the lift Company \pm did not know the exact situation of the beleaguered elements, nor were we informed until enroute that our objective was out of range of any conventional artillery support.

We landed on an LZ approximately 500 meters south of the 1/9 Cavalry and about 1000 meters east of the Cambodian border at 1630 hours. (This LZ was later named LZ Eagle and its location is coordinates YV 855885). The landing was accompanied by suppressive fires from the gun ships, and it was later learned that the lift ships received automatic weapons fire as they departed the LZ.

After landing the platoon assembled at the northern end of LZ Eagle and went into the following formation: 2nd Plat on left flank, company GP group in middle, 1st Plat on right flank, and 3rd Plat in trail of the 2nd Platoon. We then proceeded to sweep and clear the area north of LZ Eagle. Having gone approximately 200 meters we reached a downed helicopter and extracted some members of the 1/9 Cavalry unit who were still securing the burning aircraft. The company then doglegged to the northwest, still in line formation, and continued our sweep.

No enemy contact had been made so far. We were sweeping across a relatively open area bout 150 meters north of the aforementioned aircraft when we encountered our first enemy contact. The company was approximately 10 -30 meters from a woodline when we came under intense enemy automatic weapon fire. The company caught in the open area immediately returned fire and maneuvered into the woodline. The second platoon was well into the treeline and engaging the enemy with hend to hand combat, but the first platoon was having difficulty in their advance. The enemy was extremely good in his fire discipline and camouflage as we did not detect their presence until they opened fire at close range. The time was 1700 hrs, only 30 minutes after our landing.

During this initial assault our company commander was severely wounded and we were taking needless casualties. We then withdrew to more tenable positions to consolidate. During the close-in combat the company's artillery forward observer was calling in aerial rocket artillery directly in front of our company and its effect was tremendous. These fires were then extended to both our flanks when we began to receive enemy fire from these locations during our withdrawal. The disposition by platoons at this time was: weapons platoon still on LZ Eagle, 1st platoon withdrew to defend eastern flank of LZ Eagle, 2nd platoon only 100 meters from enemy treeline, 3rd platoon to left flank of 2nd platoon. The executive officer then came forward to take command of the company.

The 2nd and 3rd platoons then attempted to advance again and recover wounded and dead who were still forward. The enemy fire remained intense from the northern woodline and was increasing on our flanks. During this advance the executive officer was killed and Lt Kapica, 2nd Flatoon Leader, took command. The company retrieved the wounded company commander and a few other casualties and then withdrew to LZ Eagle. Continually aerial rocket artillery was pounding the enemy, and no doubt making any of his attempts to attack quite futile.

The company reached LZ Eagle at 1900 hrs and prepared for a night extraction as directed by the battalion commander. One final (the third) assault was made by the first platoon to retrieve our casualties prior to extraction. Their attempts were slightly hindered by the darkness setting in and by additional casualties they took while moving forward,

The pathfinders had set up a lighted "T" for our extraction and were coordinating air with ground. They were scheduled to be extracted immediately after our company had landed at 1630 hrs, but before they could leave the company became engaged and the pathfinders had a new mission calling in medical evacuation aircraft.

By 1930 hrs the company was organized for extraction and the first airoraft, a CH-47 Chinook, came into the LZ. When it was about 30 feet above the ground the enemy opened fire on it with automatic weapons. The VC had taken advantage of our time spent in retrieving casualties to penetrate our flanks and now they moved in the woodline bordering LZ Eagle.

The CH-47 made an emergency landing and neither the crew chiefs nor pilots were infured. The aircraft was definitely grounded and the night extraction was cancelled. The company forged itself into a tight perimeter around the downed aircraft and prepared to weather out the night. The ARA's continued to pound the woodline around the LZ while we were drawing into our 50 meter wide perimeter.

The company strength was below 100 men at this time, ammunition was critically low, almost all water was gone, and the state of men's minds was depressed to say the least. No extraction could be attempted until the morning, and no friendly reinforcements could reach us during the night.

Lt Kapica and Lt Hunter, the artillery FO, inmediately called on all available ARA and TaC air fires. The plan was to forestall any sizeable enemy attack by pounding the perimeter with fire. Using the lighted "T" which was oriented from North to Southas a reference point, Lt Hunter had the ARA's make passes around the LZ. For example, a pass would be made east of the "T" from north to south or vice versa. Using this "box technique" and the good reference point the aRA's brought devastatingly accurate fires around our perimeter. This fire support began at 1600 hrs and would last until the morning - over 12 hrs of fires on call. More than 1700 rounds of 2.75 inch rockets were expended by the aRa's during the night and credit is given to them in forestalling any enemy penetration of the company perimeter. Five TAC air strikes were also executed during the night on the enemy positions north of LZ Eagle from which the initial fire was received during the late afternoon.

At approximately 0130 hrs, 31 March 1966, a resupply of ammunition and C-rations was air-dropped into the company. A LOLEX extraction (the first night drop for the 1st Cav in Vietnam) was made by a CV-2 Caribou flying at treetop level. The pathfinders coordinated this drop using the lighted "T" as the target. (This "T" was inside our perimeter). The first pass

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was made from south to north and the bundle landed approximately 50 meters outside our perimeter to the north. A second pass dropped a bundle 75 meters to the south of our perimeter. We retrieved the first bundle, which luckily contained the needed ammunition, and left the second bundle until the morning. Incidentally, enemy probes were going on at the time of the LOLEX and the CV-2 was fired at by the VC.

In retrospect, this LOLEX extraction was a crucial time for the company because of the implicit admission given the surrounding enemy, e.g., "We're' low on ammo". This would have been a prime time for the VC to attack. Also when the CH-47 was shot down, the enemy could have capitalized on the darkness and disorganization of troops around the LZ (prior to extraction). Again oredit must be given to the and fires for thwarting any attack.

Enemy probes continued until about 0330 hrs in the morning (31 Mar). But now the company had sufficient ammunition and could withstand a sizeable attack.

Just prior to first light the tight perimeter around the CH-47 was expanded into the surrounding brush and woodlines. This was done to avoid being pinned down in the open when daylight arrived. At 0730, 31 March, Companies B and D of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 12th Cavalry was helilifted into LZ Eagle to reinforce our company. They landed without opposition from the enemy, who had withdrawn during the early morning hours.

Important points and conclusions by participants in looking back at this engagement includeds


- (1) Extremely effective camouflage and fire discipline of the VC
 - (a) When we first made contact
 - (b) Just as the CH-47 was landing

(2) Enemy prone shelters were found on edge of LZ. Fresumably they figured the closer to us they could get, the better their chance of surviving ARA fires.

(3) The enemy will maneuver against us - witness, their tries to outflank us.

(4) ARA fires are highly effective during darkness <u>if</u> a lighted reference point can be used.

(5) The LOLEX drops at night were effective notwithstanding the small drop zone and enemy threat.



SKETCH 2

ARTILLERY PERFORMINCE DATA - OPERATION LINCOLN-MOSBY I

1. Artillery Ammunition Expenditure a. LINCOLN HE ROP ILL BEEHIVE WP SMK 105mm 0 14470 326 226 0 257 155mm 1149 49 42 25 2 0 8" 540 0 0 0 0 0 0 175mm 571 0 0 0 0 2.75 Rkt 6633 Other: E159 CS Dispensers - 8 SS-11 Missile - 1 b. MOSBY I 105mm 4153 227 69 131 0 0 2.75 Rkt 1871 Other: E159 CS - 0 2. Mission Summary LIVE TARGETS GROUND/AIR OTHER PREFARITIONS TOTS LINCOLN 25 35 27/65 3594 MOSBY I 22 0/13 998 5 3. Fuze Action (tube artillery)(percentage) QUICK DELLAY TIME CVT LINCOLN 84.4 8.5 1.4 4.7 MOSBY I 86.0 6.0 6.0 2.0 4. Battery Displacements during LINCOLN: a. Ground displacements/average distance (KM) - 22/42.9 KM b. Air displacements/average distance (KM) - 31/42.5 KM 5. Results credited to artillery -

	(TUBE/àRA)	KLA (EST) (TUBE/ARA)	<u>WL4 (EST)</u> (TUBE/4R4)
LINCOLN	68/138	0/35	0/40
MOSBY I	1/0	11/0	0/0

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ARMY AVIATION PERFORMANCE DATA

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	LINCOLN	MOSBY I
HOURS FLOWN	11,370	7,289
SORTIES	32,196	17,736
ATROPAFT HIT	27	3
CE-13 -CA	1	-
UH-19	12	1
UH-1D	· 9	-
CH-47	3	2
07-1	1	21 -
07-2	1	-
AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN	5	-
Not Recovered - UH-1D	3	-
Recovered Repairable		
TH-1D	1	
CE-47	1	
AIRCRAFT CREW CASUALTIES		
XIA	5	-
WIA	13	-
CARGO CARRIED TONS	4,492	2,512
PASSENCERS	36,336	:26,738
INFANTRY BATTALIONS AIRLIFTED	(Note 1)	34
ARTILLERY BATTERIES AIRLIPPED	(Note 1)	39

NOTE (1) Figures represent combined total for LINCOLN-MOSBY I

TRMY AVIATION PERFORMANCE DATA

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
•	LINCOLN	MOSBY I
HOURS FLOWN	11,370	7,289
Sorties	32,196	17,736
AIRCRAFT HIT	27	3
CH-13	1	-
UH-1B	12	1
UH-1D	· 9	-
CH-47	3	• 2
07-1	.1	. –
CV-2	1	-
AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN	5	-
Not Recovered - UH-1D	3	-
Recovered Repairable		
UL-1D	1	
CH-47	1	
AIRCHAFT CREW CASUALTIES		
KTA .	5	-
WIA .	13	-
CARGO CARRIED TONS	4,492	2,512
PASSENGERS	36,336	226,738
INFANTRY BATTALIONS AIRLIFTED	(Note 1)	34
ARTILLERY BATTERIES AIRLIFTED	(Note 1)	39


NOTE (1) Figures represent combined worl for LINCOLN-MOSEY I


•	LINCOLN	HOSBY I
HOURS FLOWN	11,370	7,289
SORTIES	32,196	17,736
AIRCRAFT HIT	27	3
CH-13	1	-
UH-1B	12	1
UH-1D	· 9	-
CH-47	3	2
07-1	1	-
CV-2	1	
AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN	5	-
Not Recovered - UH-1D	3	-
Recovered Repairable		
UH-1D	1	
CE-47	1	
AIRCHAFT CREW CASUAL/TIES		
KTA	5	-
WIA .	_ 13	-
CARGO CARRIED TONS	4,492	2,512
PLSSENGERS	36,336	:26,738
INFANTRY BATTALIONS AIRLIFTED	(Note 1)	54
ARTILLEAY BATTERIES AIRLIFTED	(Note 1)	39


NOTE (1) Figures represent combined total for LINCOLN-MOSBY I


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






















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
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












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ABOY AVIATION PERFORMANCE DATA

	LINCOLN	MOSBY I
HOURS FLOWN	11,370	7,289
Sorties	32,196	17,736
AIRCRAFT HIT	27	3
OH-13	l	• 🗕
UH-1B	12	1
UH-1D	, 9	-
CH-47	3	2
07-1	1	
CV-2	1	-
AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN	5	-
Not Recovered - UN-1D	3	-
Recovered Repairable		
UH-1D	1	
CH-47	1	
AIRCRAFT CREW CASUALTIES		
KIA	5	-
WIA	13	1 0
CARGO CARRIED TONS	4,492	2,512
PASSENCERS	36,336	226,738
INFANTRY BATTALIONS AIRLIFTED	(Note 1)	34
ARTILLERY BATTERIES AIRLIFTED	(Note 1)	39

NOTE (1) Figures represent combined total for LINCOLN-MOSBY I