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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (12 Apr 67) FOR OT

20 April 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1st Cavalry Division
(Airmobile) (U)

TO: ~~ACSFOR~~
~~SEE DISTRIBUTION~~ 7103262

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 22 November 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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as

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)
APO San Francisco, California 96490

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22 November 1966

AVDAGG

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

TERU: Channels

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. *1193262*
General

a. General Situation. Once again this reporting period, 1 August thru 31 October 1966 saw the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) successfully engage and defeat regular NVA and VC units throughout the II Corps Tactical Area. The division dominated the central highlands, maneuvering throughout the Binh Dinh, Pleiku, Kontum, Darlac, and Phu Yen Provinces. Operations extended from the South China Sea to the Cambodian Border along the axis of Highway 19, from north of Bong Son to Qui Nhon along the South China Sea and from Dak To to Ban Me Thout along the Cambodian Border. Operations were characterized by hard hitting infantry relying extensively on the division's air assault capability. During most of the reporting period two brigades operated away from the division base, while the other brigade conducted offensive operations within the TAOR and improved base security. One battalion Task Force continued to operate in the vicinity of Phan Thiet under control of IFFV. Brigade missions during the period were mostly search and destroy with the emphasis on searching for and finding the enemy. In addition to the major operations which will be discussed herein, various elements participated in squad to multi-company operations in the TAOR, characterized by day patrolling and intensive nighttime ambush activity. Other operations of the division included; support of 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division during Operation JOHN PAUL JONES with one battalion; escort of U.S. and ARVN convoys (Road-runner operations); aerial rocket artillery interdiction missions; security of downed aircraft; reconnaissance by the Cavalry Squadron throughout all areas of known or expected enemy activity; and maintenance of the IFFV reserve/reaction force. A vigorous base development program continued simultaneously with tactical operations.

b. Division organization and key personnel during the reporting period were as follows:

(1) Division Headquarters

Major General John Norton	Commanding General
Brig General William A. Becker	Asst't Div Comdr (A)
Brig General John W. Wright	Asst't Div Comdr (B)
Brig General George S. Blanchard	6 Sep 66
Colonel Herbert E. Wolff	Chief of Staff
Lt Col Ardie E. McClure Jr.	ACofS G1

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Lt Col Bobby R. Lang
Lt Col William B. Ray

ACofS G2
12 Aug 66

Lt Col James H. Mapp
Lt Col James T. Root

ACofS G3
23 Oct 66

Lt Col Robert A. Tolar

ACofS G4

Lt Col Harry J. Phelps

ACofS G5

(2) 1st Brigade (Abn)

Colonel Archie K. Ayle

CO, 1st Bde (Abn)

Lt Col Levin B. Broughton

CO, 1/8 Cav (Abn)

Lt Col William G. ...

9 Aug 66

Lt Col Joan A. Homphall

CO, 2/8 Cav (Abn)

Lt Col Thomas H. Tackberry

30 Jul 66

Lt Col James T. Root

CO, 1/12 Cav (Abn)

Lt Col George D. Eggars

27 Oct 66

(3) 2d Brigade

Colonel Marvin J. Baranzweig

CO, 2d Bde

Colonel George N. Chazy

14 Oct 66

Lt Col William B. Ray

CO, 1/5 Cav

Lt Col Robert Siegrist

25 Jul 66

Lt Col Reginald T. Lombard Jr.

CO, 2/5 Cav

Lt Col Otis C. Lynn

CO, 2/12 Cav

Lt Col Jay A. Hatch

1 Oct 66

(4) 3d Brigade

Colonel Charles D. Daniel

CO, 3d Bde

Lt Col ...

CO, 1/7 Cav

Lt Col Edward ...

30 Jul 66

Lt Col Bill ...

CO, 2/7 Cav

Lt Col Trevor ...

CO, 5/7 Cav

(5) Division Artillery

Colonel William F. Brand

CO, Div Arty

Lt Col Wilbur H. Vinson Jr.

CO, 2/19 Arty

Lt Col ...

CO, 2/20 Arty

Lt Col Lester ...

10 Oct 66

Lt Col William H. Palmer

CO, 1/21 Arty

Lt Col Arthur ...

CO, 1/77 Arty

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(6) 11th Aviation Group

Colonel Howard I. Lukens	CO, 11th Avn Gp
Lt Col A. T. Pumphrey	CO, 227 AHB
Lt Col Robert A. Michaelson	CO, 228 AHB
Lt Col Leo D. Turner	CO, 229 AHB
Major William H. Jarvis	CO, 11th Avn Co.
Lt Col Frank W. Nadeau	5 Sep 66

(7) Support Command

Colonel Jonathan R. Burton	CO, Spt Comd
Lt Col Henry L. Corkill	CO, 15 S&S Bn
Lt Col Juori Syjagintsov	CO, 15 Med Bn
Lt Col Henry A. Leighton	26 Aug 66
Lt Col Keith J. Bauer	CO, 15th TC Bn
Lt Col Shreve D. Squires	CO, 27 Maint Bn
Cpt Earl D. Rawlings	CO, 15 Admin Co.
Cpt Charles Bernstein	2 Aug 66
Cpt Hunter H. Haynes	1 Sep 66

(8) Colonel James C. Smith CO, 1/9 Cav

(9) Lt Col Charles G. Olentine CO, 8 Engr Bn

(10) Lt Col Paul M. Simon CO, 13 Sig Bn
Lt Col Walter J. Bodman Jr. 14 Aug 66

(11) Cpt Gary W. Lawhead CO, 545 MP Co.

(12) Cpt Milton H. Peterson CO, HHC 1st Cav Div

(13) Special Staff

Lt Col James W. Ransome	Surgeon
Lt Col Robert D. Stevenson	IG
Major Norman Moffet	15 Jul 66
Lt Col Wilber G. Jenkins Jr.	22 Sep 66
Major Herman F. Puckhaber	Chem Off
Major Joseph R. Todesashi	12 Sep 66
Cpt John L. Bule	7 Oct 66
Lt Col Emory M. Sneedon	SJA
Lt Col Thomas McGrath	Chaplain
Lt Col Daniel B. Plyler	AG
Major John F. Phillips	IO
Lt Col Wayne C. Campbell	Fin Off
Lt Col Lowell U. Autrey	17 Aug 66

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Lt Col Herbert W. Umland
Lt Col James S. Oliver

FM
2 Aug 66

(14) Attached Units

Lt Col Charles L. Zolner	CO, 3/18 Arty
Lt Col Norman P. Chandler	CO, 2/17 Arty
Cpt Riley J. McVeay	CO, Btry B, 29th Arty
Major Raymond D. Franklin	CO, 17 Avn Co
Major Claudie G. Livingston	26 Aug 66
Major James E. Moore	CO, 478 Avn Co.
Cpt Richard J. Coyne	CO, 586 Sig Co (Spt)
Major Gary D. Collier	CO, 191 MI Det
Lt Col Edward L. Smith	31 Jul 66
Major Peter J. Samulevich	CO, 14 MIL Hlst Det
Cpt Barry D. Ross	CO, 10 BRU
Major Joe H. Machetta	CO, 24 Det 5 Yea Sqdn
1Lt Shirley E. Boselly III	14 Aug 66

(14) Supporting Units

Lt Col Charles E. Leacock	CO, 34 S&S Bn
Lt Col Gerald R. Hasty	17 Aug 66
Lt Col John R. Redmond	CO, 70 Engr Bn
Lt Col Frances C. Dimond Jr.	CO, 2 Surg Hosp
Major Anthony Ballard	5 Oct 66
Lt Col Thomas T. Swergart	CO, 56 Med Det.
Major Harold G. Carter	13 Aug 66
Major Joseph L. Ecoppi	CO, 6/16 Arty
Lt Col Ralph O. Benefield	CO, Btry E 82 Arty
Cpt Benjamin Buckley	CO, 11 Avn Gp Path Co
1Lt Garry E. Harvey	CO, 184 Cnl Plat
Lt James Koller	CO, Det 1, 54 Sig Bn
1Lt Richard L. Careoli	23 Oct 66
Major Billie Faurot	CO, 382 TC Bn
Cpt James C. Hargis	CO, 383 TC Det

2. Personnel

a. Strength: Authorized and assigned strength at the beginning and close of the reporting period were as follows:

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(1) Begin Report Per	OFF	WO	EM	AGG
Authorized	1180	676	14099	15995
Assigned	1667	549	16814	19030
(2) Close Report Per	OFF	WO	EM	AGG
Authorized	1217	676	15041	16934
Assigned	1409	421	17034	18864

b. Replacements. A total of 5754 enlisted replacements were received. During the same period division losses were 1893. Some 215 emergency leaves were processed during the period.

c. Morale and Personnel Services:

(1) Morale throughout the division and attached elements remained excellent.

(2) Decorations awarded:

Distinguished Service Cross	4
Silver Star	41
Distinguished Flying Cross	56
Legion of Merit	23
Soldiers Medal	17
Bronze Star with V Device	189
Bronze Star	416
Air Medal with V Device	90
Air Medal	11797
Army Commendation Medal w/ V Device	62
Army Commendation Medal	711
Purple Heart	801
Certificate of Achievement	9
TOTAL	14216

(3) Combat Badges

Combat Infantry Badge	3195
Combat Medical Badge	498
Aircraft Crewman Badge	129
TOTAL	3822

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d. Promotions. A total of 6618 enlisted personnel were promoted during the reporting period.

e. Reenlistments. 126 reenlistments or extensions elections were completed. The enlistment/extensions breakdown was: First term RA reenlistments 100, AUS reenlistments 8, 14 RA extensions and 4 AUS extensions. Counselors continuously visited units both at base camp and in the field.

f. Postals:

(1) Money Order Sales	\$1,897,128.53
(2) Postal and Parcel Post Fees	\$68,725.00
(3) Incoming Mail	770,982 lbs
Daily Average	8,579 lbs
(4) Outgoing Mail	251,244 lbs
Daily Average	2,827 lbs
(5) Number of incoming mail days	83
(6) Number of outgoing mail days	89

g. Special Services. During the reporting period a total of 82 movies and TV films were circulated throughout the division. Five USO shows played to an estimated attendance of 7000. R&R quotas received were 3,494 out-of-country and 1,220 in-country.

h. Financial Service:

(1) Centralized Automated Military Pay System.

(a) In late October a six man Department of the Army CAMPS evaluation team visited the 1st Cavalry Division. The evaluation approach was to perform a procedural review to gauge compliance with and effectiveness of the CAMPS Procedures Manual by a team from the Finance Center, U.S. Army and to perform a commander and customer reaction survey by representatives from the Office, Chief of Finance and United States Army, Vietnam. The results of this evaluation are currently being staffed.

(b) A CAMPS information sheet was devised and attached to all pay vouchers distributed for August 1966 during the month of September. The information sheet helped to explain the various entries appearing on the CAMPS Earning Statement.

(c) A Pay Discrepancies Survey was conducted during the month of October. The survey technique to be conducted periodically will be used to purify pay accounts, evaluate the overall pay system to include internal controls, and improve finance service to the 1st Cavalry soldier.

(2) Payment of Travel Claims.

(a) During the period August - October 1966, the finance office continued to provide 12 - 18 hour service on all travel claims submitted by division replacements and members returning from TDY. The use of Class "A" Agents temporarily attached to the Finance Office aided in the expeditious payment of newly arrived members and eliminated the requirement for personnel to expend valuable training time traveling

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to and from the Finance Office. In October a system was developed in conjunction with the division training officer to pay all replacements during their stay with the newly formed Training Battalion.

(3) Savings Program:

(a) The finance office conducted a person-to-person U.S. Savings Bonds canvass of all 1st Cavalry replacements during their in-processing phase. The canvass was conducted by the allotment clerk on a personal basis. The results of the canvass:

Replacements interviewed	6573
Those with a B/E1 allotment in effect	5625
Those signing B/E1 allotments as a result of canvass	836
Those refusing to participate in the Savings Bond program	112
Percent of Participation	98.3%

As a result of this canvass the 1st Cavalry Division became eligible for the Minuteman Flag as of 30 September 1966 with an overall participation rate of 91.5%. The Minuteman Flag is the Treasury Department's highest savings award and can be flown from the division's flag pole below the Stars and Stripes.

(4) Payment of Hospitalized Personnel.

(a) During the month of September a system was inaugurated by the finance office that provided for the payment on payday of all 1st Cavalry members confined to hospitals throughout Vietnam. This system provides for the appointment of 2 Class "A" Agents to the finance office. Prior to payday the agents and their guards debark on TDY to visit the various hospitals in-country. Supplied with cash and blank vouchers their mission is to seek out, identify, and pay all members of the 1st Cavalry desiring payment. In addition they act as a liaison between the soldier and the finance office.

(5) Disbursing Activities:

(a) The official Vietnamese Piaster was re-evaluated once more, this time from 79.2 to 80VN\$ to \$1.00. There was no change in the personal Piaster (118 VN\$ to \$1.00).

(b) Tighter controls were placed on exchange of MPC for U.S. currency (green) and the transmission of funds to the United States. A member assigned to the 1st Cavalry can only convert MPC to U.S. dollar instruments in amounts less than or equal to the total amount of money drawn from the finance office during the 30-day period immediately preceding the date of conversion. Additional amounts may be converted with a certificate from the unit commander reporting that the excess funds were obtained from legal sources.

(6) Miscellaneous Activities:

(a) Military Banking Facilities. Became available to all troops in Vietnam with the establishment of branches of the Chase Manhattan and Bank of America in Saigon. Division personnel may make arrangements directly with the banks to establish a checking account. Some of the features of the services provided by the new banking facilities:

- (1) 5% interest paid on checking account balances.
- (2) No service charge on checking accounts.

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(3) Checks written in MPC in Vietnam become negotiable in dollars in the United States.

(4) The finance office is exploring the possibility of receiving and processing applications for checking accounts in both banking facilities.

(b) Uniformed Services Deposit Program. The Uniformed Services Deposit Program replaced the Soldiers Deposit Plan effective 1 September 1966. Outstanding features of the new savings program are:

(1) 10% interest on deposits compounded quarterly.

(2) Commissioned officers and warrant officers may participate.

(3) Plan only available in overseas areas.

(4) Deposits made on or before the 10th of the month earn interest from the 1st of the month.

(5) Monthly deposits cannot exceed unallotted pay and allowances for that month.

i. Chaplain Activities:

DEMOMINATION	NUMBER OF SERVICES	ATTENDANCE
Catholic	761	18,139
Protestant	1332	29,522
Jewish	27	217
Memorial	25	3,948
TOTALS	2145	51,626

j. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order.

(1) A total of 274 incidents were reported to the Provost Marshal's Office during the reporting period.

(2) Military Justice:

(a) General Courts Martial	3
(b) Special Courts Martial	70
(c) Summary Courts Martial	37

k. Inspector General Activities. No significant trends in complaints and/or requests were revealed.

l. Medical:

(1) Disease and Injury Statistical Data:

(a) Injured as a result of hostile action (IRHA)	653
(b) Non-battle injuries	657
(c) Diseases	3820

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1. Malaria total	495
Vivax	36
Falciparum	459
2. Scrub typhus	5
3. Hook worm	0
4. Psychiatric cases	215
(d) Killed in action (KIA)	141
(e) Remaining in hospital (In-country)	562

(2) Discussion of diseases

(a) Malaria Cases: A total of 495 cases of malaria occurred in personnel of this division from 1 August to 31 October 1966 inclusive. Of these, 36 cases were due to plasmodium vivax and were caused in most U.S. Forces by failure to take the weekly chloroquine-primaquine pill.

The malaria incidence is as follows:

UNIT	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER	TOTAL
1st Bde				
HHC	0	0	1	1
1/12	3	26	19	48
1/8	2	42	28	72
2/8	10	18	31	59
2d Bde				
HHC	5	1	3	9
1/5	11	31	13	55
2/5	16	25	12	53
2/12	11	14	12	37
3d Bde				
HHC	0	1	2	3
1/7	8	31	10	49
2/7	8	6	6	20
5/7	0	12	11	23
Div Arty	5	10	9	24
1/9	2	2	5	9
Avn Gp	1	2	5	8
Spt Cnd	0	0	1	1
Sig Bn	0	1	0	1
Engr Bn	1	1	2	4
HHC Div	0	1	2	3
Others	1	9	6	16
GRAND TOTAL	84	233	178	495

1. The incidence rate appears to vary from unit to unit in direct relationship to the area of operation. Relatively stationary units have lower rates of malaria than units which are constantly on the move. This reflects the fact that the more stationary units are better able to take full advantage of protective measures against malaria.

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2. As compared with last reporting period, there has been a marked reduction in the number of malaria cases. The contributing factors are; units operating in low endemic areas; introduction of Dapsone to the drug prophylaxis and strong emphasis on malaria discipline.

3. Being in a hyperendemic area would not be a major factor since much of the time was spent in areas near the Cambodian border where the 1st Cavalry had over 620 cases last April. The month after the malaria discipline was so strongly emphasized and Dapsone was introduced, the number of cases dropped to 84 in August. In September there were 233 cases of malaria but the majority of these came from the same area where the 620 cases were contacted in April. In October, the total dropped to 178 cases. Although the area of operation is very important, the number of cases can be reduced, even in a hyperendemic area by strong command emphasis on malaria discipline.

4. The total for this quarter is 495 cases as opposed to 1177 for the previous reporting period.

(b) Other selected diseases of importance as follows:

Scrub Typhus	5
Immersion Foot	74
Heat Exhaustion	36
Poisoning	0
Animal Bites	51
Hepatitis	11
Dengue Fever	0
Infectious Meningitis	0

(3) Discussion of IRHA, WIA and NBI.

(a) KIA/IRHA ratio 141/653 or 1/4.64 was considerably different from the ratio of 1/4.07 observed in Korea.

(b) Types of IRHA's. During the reporting period 124 punji stake wounds occurred.

(c) NBI: In the CV-2B crash on Hon Gong Mountain 4 October 1966, PFC Daniel R. Madden, was impaled on the barrel of his M-16 rifle. It penetrated his left lower abdomen and exited through the left lower sacroiliac joint. In spite of cutting the left ureter and jejunum, left iliac artery, and spermatic cord, he has done well. In the same accident Major Robert L. Ray, Artillery, severed his mesenteric artery and required resection of 22cc of his bowel - the injuries were due to his seat belt, but this same belt prevented him from becoming an airborne missile. There was skin damage across his mid abdomen due to the seat belt.

m. Information Officer Activities:

(1) The Information Section operated forward press centers during the following operations:

(a) PAUL REVERE II - 1 - 25 Aug 66.

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(b) THAYER I - 13 Sep - 1 Oct 66,

(c) IRVING - 2 - 24 Oct 66,

(d) THAYER II - 25 Oct - 3 Nov 66.

(2) The Information Section began a weekly exchange of taped messages with the citizens of Columbia, South Carolina. Messages received are broadcast over the local radio station.

(3) The Information Section continued:

(a) Publication of the CAVALAIR to include distribution to members of the division hospitalized at the 8th Field Hospital and 85th Evac Hospital.

(b) An article "Men Facing Death", the story of a platoon of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) by military historian S.L.A. Marshall was published in Harper's Magazine in September 1966.

3. Intelligence

a. G2 Organization: Functions of the G2 Section were realigned in order to increase the efficiency of the section and to provide more timely intelligence for the Commanding General and subordinate units. The realignment principally gave the responsibility of intelligence collection to the Commanding Officer, 191st MI Detachment, and the responsibility of the G2 DTOC to the Deputy G2. These functions were previously the responsibility of the G2 Operations Officer in charge of combat intelligence center (CIC). This realignment has improved the division intelligence collection capability and has allowed the CIC to emphasize more the functions of producing and disseminating intelligence.

b. Operations:

(1) Operation PAUL REVERE II was conducted in southwestern Pleiku and northern Dar Lac Provinces from 1 - 25 Aug 66. This operation stemmed directly from intelligence reports indicating large scale VC build-up northeast of the Chu Pong hill masses and impending attacks on Duc Co and Plei Me. During the operation, significant contacts were made by 2d and 3d Brigades, 1st Cav Div and by ROK units in the AO. Battalion size elements from all regiments of the 630th Division were identified and confirmed during the operation.

(2) Operation THAYER I was conducted in eastern Binh Dinh Province during the period 13 Sep to 1 Oct 66. Operation THAYER I was significant in that it initially succeeded in isolating elements of the 610th Division from their sanctuaries in the rugged terrain west of Highway 1. They had left these sanctuaries to harass government troops prior to the election and plunder the rice crop. One significant contact was made by the ARVN Regiment, and several large weapons caches and a mine and grenade factory were discovered by 1st Cav units. Contacts confirmed the presence of the 18th (AKA 12th) NVA Regiment together with other supporting elements of the 610th Division.

(3) Operation IRVING. Operation IRVING was conducted during the period 2 - 24 Oct 66 in essentially the same area as THAYER I in Phu My District, Binh Dinh Province. Initial contacts were made on the coastal plain, and thereafter, in the Kim Son and Suoi Ca Valleys where the enemy attempted to move back into the base area previously denied him. Significant contacts were made during the operation, and large scale caches

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of weapons and medical supplies were found. Of particular note was the high number of Local Force, Guerrillas and VC infrastructures destroyed or captured.

(4) Enemy casualties attributed to the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) during the reporting period:

	KIA	VOC	WEAPONS
August	484	89	128 individual, 27 C/S
September	224	65	102 individual, 21 C/S
October	849	721	218 individual, 20 C/S
TOTALS	1,557	875	448 Individual, 68 C/S

c. Order of Battle:

(1) Order of battle intelligence was collected on two major enemy formations during the reporting period, the Le Loc Division (630th) in Pleiku/Cambodia area and the Sao Vang Division (610th) in Binh Dinh Province.

(2) PAUL REVERE II was an especially profitable operation in respect to Order of Battle intelligence. Over 100 PW's, all NVA, were seized representing the 32, 33d, 66th Regiments and the newly arrived 88th Regiment. Biographic files on these units, and organizational and weapons data were completed through means of special BEI requests to the division IPW section. This was especially important concerning the 88th Regiment, since this was the units first appearance and there was very little known about its organization and composition.

(3) Agricultural Site 10, Dong Truong 10, first appeared during PAUL REVERE II. This previously unreported unit was believed to be a new divisional headquarters, newly arrived in Pleiku-Kontum. Very little information has been collected on this unit, but its discovery by the 1st Air Cavalry was extremely significant to intelligence agencies in II Corps.

(4) During Operation THAYER I and IRVING, 1st Cavalry units captured several significant documents which included:

- (a) Roster of approximately 90% of the 18th Regiment.
- (b) Roster of all the E 210 Battalion (Binh Dinh Province Local forces).
- (c) Sufficient documents to break into the new correspondence numerical codes being used by the Sao Vang Division.
- (d) Sufficient documents to determine letter box number numerical codes for all E 210 Battalion, Binh Dinh, VC administrative elements, and about 30% of the Sao Vang Division.

(5) No new enemy formations were noted in Binh Dinh Province.

d. G2 Air:

(1) Missions flown during reporting period.

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SLAR	55
PHOTO	226
Visual	230

(2) ASTA

(a) IR:

1. The most effective employment of IR is of areas 40-50 square kilometers, preferably having a long rectangular shape (E.G. 4x10 3x15). Units should limit request to 2 such areas, 2 sorties each, per night.

2. Request should be submitted to G2 Air no later than 1600 hours of the day the mission is desired.

(b) SLAR:

1. As previously stated, SLAR is not an effective means of acquiring information, considering the nature of the enemy under present conditions.

2. Tests conducted over lakes (BR9822 and CRO464) showed that SLAR will not detect the boat traffic characteristic of these areas.

(c) Photography:

1. A minimum of 48 hours should be allowed between time of request and delivery of photos. More time may be required depending on weather, size of area, priority of mission, and difficulty of orientation. However, the time required can be reduced under the these conditions; maximum area of 10 square kilometers; scale of 1/4000 or smaller; priority over other missions is justified; contact prints (4.5x4.5) rather than enlargements (9x9) can be used.

2. Whenever possible, request should be for imagery interpretation reports instead of actual photography.

e. Maps:


(1) Monochrome reproduction of captured VC maps (scale 1/100,000) covering the majority of II Corps and portions of I and III Corps have been received and issued to units. It is felt that these maps will be of use in relating interrogation reports, documents and POW information to ground locations, as many place names used by the VC do not coincide with data now on US maps.

(2) Photo maps (scale 1/250,000) have not been used extensively as the coverage presently on hand does not coincide with the areas in which the division has been operating. All maps are on requisition.

f. Det 24, 5th Weather Squadron:

(1) Service furnished the 1st Cavalry Division.

(a) Forecast service (12 and 24 hour forecast, weather warnings, net watch advisories, climatic briefs, safety and orientation briefings, and flight briefings) was provided to operating brigades and the division.



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g. 371st RRC. This unit participated in all combat division operations during the reporting period. Special intelligence items were produced which related directly to enemy activity.

h. 191st MI Detachment:

(1) The IPW section interrogated 4,912 detainees and 841 NVA/AFVC. 769 linear inches of captured enemy documents were translated. Items not translated at this headquarters, were forwarded to I Field Forces, Vietnam, for further exploitation and/or translation. Considerable intelligence was obtained from all sources to include identification of units, unit designations, locations, strength and activities.

(2) CI teams supported brigades and division forward operations by manning forward clearing/screening points, which were established and operated so long as required by operational necessity. These teams consisted of 1 or 2 CI agents with interpreters, and up to six brigades or division locations were operated. The missions performed by these teams consisted of screening documents and refugees, conducting liaison with local RVN government and US agencies to obtain Order of Battle and counter-intelligence information. These CI teams were supplemented frequently by RVN National Police and/or village and hamlet personnel to more effectively screen/interrogate large numbers of refugees and other detainees. This joint effort paid high dividends.

(3) There are no known threats to the internal security of the division.

(4) The Personnel Security Program is adequate; documents security in the division has shown marked improvement.

(5) Special areas showing considerable improvement:

(a) The accountability and destruction of classified defense information, as well as the destruction of non-classified information.

(b) The reduction in the number of incidents of improper destruction of classified documents.

(c) Emphasis is being placed on security of information covering future plans and/or operations to be conducted by the division.

(6) Special problem areas confronting this unit in the performance of its assigned mission:

(a) The An Khe office is very valuable to the division in that it provides a focal point for contact between this unit and local RVN and US agencies for the collection of intelligence information. Personnel to staff this Day Office must be provided by the 191st MI Detachment operations will be expanded eventually to operate on a 24 hour basis.

(b) The Interrogations of Prisoners of War Section provides support to two operational brigades and one assigned to base camp, but must seek augmentation from IPFW to do so.

i. 54th Infantry Detachment. The 54th Inf Det (Ground Surveillance) has been utilized extensively on the barrier around Camp Radcliff and on combat operations. One radar team at HAMMOND Air Strip was instrumental in detecting and breaking up a mortar attack on that installation. At present all AN/TRS-4 radars organic to the 3 Infantry Brigades are under control of the 54th Inf Det.

* All figures reflected are taken from official G2 files.

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4. Operations and Training.

a. Organization:

1. Assignment: The 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry was assigned to the division on 21 August 1966.

2. Attachments and Detachments: During the reporting period one unit was attached to the division. On 1 September 1966 the 53d Aviation Detachment (Provisional) was attached to the division for a period of sixty days. Two units were detached, 3/18 Arty on 1 October 1966 and B Btry, 29th Artillery on 6 October 1966.

3. Modification Tables of Organization and Equipment:

(a) An emergency MTOE submitted in June 1966 for 198 "A" level helicopter mechanics was approved by DA and General Orders issued by USARPAC authorizing the additional spaces. A MTOE was then submitted to add these 198 mechanics and 330 door gunners to the division. It was approved by USARV and forwarded to USARPAC.

(b) The MTOE submitted in late April 1966 recommending division wide changes was returned to the division in September with some sixteen pages of comments/corrections. Currently these MTOE's are being rewritten in proper format and are being updated to include additional changes found necessary since the April change recommendation.

(c) 27th Maintenance Battalion's MTOE 29-86T was approved by USARV and USARPAC. It is now in DA pending approval. This would add another General Supply Detachment and a Detachment Automatic Repair, a total of 37 spaces, to this battalion.

(d) 184th Chemical Platoon's MTOE J-7E was approved by USARV and USARPAC and is also in DA pending approval. This MTOE requests automotive mechanics.

4. Chemical Operations:

(a) During the reporting period numerous Riot Control Agent missions were conducted in support of combat operations. During Operation PAUL REVERE II, the division continued to use a locally fabricated, helicopter mounted, grenade dispenser in addition to E159 CS Canister Clusters. Previous experience has proven the effectiveness of M/A3 grenades to penetrate thick jungle canopy and effectively reduce enemy firing from the area. During Operation PAUL REVERE II, six missions were conducted with the grenade dispenser and three E159s were used. Due to several major deficiencies, the locally fabricated grenade dispensers have been discarded and replaced by a new and relatively sophisticated grenade dispenser, the XM3 system. The three E159 munitions used did not function properly. All three munitions failed to function until contact with the ground, thereby giving very small coverage. Subsequently, two additional E159s were dropped for testing purposes. Neither munition functioned, even upon impact. It is concluded that the munition, the mechanical initiator, or both are subject to weather damage. Additional test are needed to eliminate this deficiency and improve the systems reliability.

(b) Upon completion of Operation PAUL REVERE II, a new type grenade delivery system (XM3 modified) was prepared using discarded 2.75 rocket launcher tubes and a smoke screen adaptation kit developed by the United Warfare Labs. Four sets of dispensers were ready for use by 13 September when Operation THAYER began. Two additional sets were constructed and ready for use shortly thereafter. The XM3 modified system

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has greatly improved the RCA delivery capability of the division. The system provides excellent area coverage in any type vegetation and can be employed quickly. During Operation THAYER I 2352 grenades were dropped on eight separate missions. In Operation IRVING 4032 grenades were dropped on seven different missions. Of notable interest was the dispensing of 1680 grenades from five helicopters within one hour to support a two battalion assault during Operation IRVING.

(c) Several E8 CS cartridge launchers were used on Operations THAYER and IRVING in both offensive and defensive situations. E8 launchers have been used to incapacitate personnel in villages until troops can move in and ferret out the VC. The E8s are also very much in demand for use in defensive perimeters around command posts in areas of operations.

(d) During Operation THAYER several tunnels were encountered and flushed using the M106 M14 Mite blower with CS and smoke grenades. The tunnels were subsequently destroyed by the engineers. Attempts to destroy the tunnels using acetylene generators were unsuccessful due to the rocky terrain and depth of the tunnels. Emplacement of shaped charges at intervals over the tunnel trace was effective but requires a large quantity of explosives.

(e) The M5 Riot Control Agent Dispensers have been used on several occasions to disperse persistent effect CS-1 on selected avenues of approach into the Camp Radcliff area. During the period this division originated a request to higher headquarters for the development of a large area CS-1 delivery capability. This type system, deliverable by Air Force aircraft, would provide a means to contaminate and restrict the enemy use of selected terrain. At the end of the reporting period, experiments were initiated to determine the practicality and effectiveness of dropping CS-1 (mixed with diesel fuel in 55 gallon drums) from the CH-47.

(f) Defoliation of the Camp Radcliff barrier continued throughout the period. Dissemination of herbicides was accomplished through several different techniques to include hand sprayers and a locally developed spray rig which is mounted in either a truck or the UH-1D helicopter. During the period of August and September 9500 gallons of Agent Orange-Diesel Fuel mix was sprayed over an area of approximately 27 hectares.

(g) A spray rig was developed this quarter for use with the CH-47. This system provides a much greater capability than the spray rig used with the UH-1D. On 13 October this spray device was used to disseminate 2500 gallons of Agent Orange-Diesel Fuel mix over an area of approximately 100 hectares. It is estimated that 4000 gallons of mix could be sprayed per day using one bladder or 7000 gallons by placing two 500 gallon bladders in the CH-47. A lesson learned on defoliation is that hand or ground methods for dissemination are extremely inefficient. Experience has shown that it would require 500 man-days and 40,000 gallons of defoliant mix to cover 100 hectares by truck. This would require a low grassy vegetation through which a truck could move. This, as compared to defoliation conducted through use of a CH-47, points up an incredible difference in efficiency. During this period the division has also requested granular herbicides which can be used in areas where liquids create a downwind vapor hazard to friendly Vietnamese crops.

(h) Flame and flame field expedients have not been used to any extent within the division. A program is being initiated at this time to install some flame fougasses into the Camp Radcliff wire barrier defense at selected avenues of approach.

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b. Operations:

(1) During the reporting period the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry became the ninth maneuver battalion to the division, materially increasing our capability to conduct offensive operations. Commitment of battalions during the period is reflected below.

	Bn. Days	Days of Operation	% of Available Time on Operation
Artillery	552	315	57
Infantry	797	527	66
Cavalry Sqdn.	92	76	83

(2) Defense of the base camp was provided by one infantry battalion with supporting artillery, and up to 350 reinforcing personnel from residence units. This mission includes perimeter defense and conduct of offensive operations within the division tactical area of responsibility (TAOR), under the continuous code designation Operation DAZZLEM (formerly Operation BURNING). The type of operations conducted under DAZZLEM included patrolling and ambushing; show of force operations; support of local CIDG actions; pacification and civic action projects.

(3) There was one attack on the division base at Camp Relcliff on 3 September. At approximately 032150H a mortar attack was initiated by the enemy, during which approximately 123 x 62mm mortar rounds fell within the barrier. Reaction included initiation of the artillery quick fire (countermortar concentration) program, fire on suspected enemy positions by aerial rocket artillery and commitment of the brigade reserve/reaction force by air assault into blocking positions outside the barrier. Saturation patrolling continued throughout the night and elements of a second battalion joined the sweep forces at daylight. No contact was reported by any unit.

c. Discussion and analysis of major operations:

(1) In addition to the major operations discussed below, various elements participated in squad to multi-company operations in the TAOR, characterized by day patrolling and extensive ambush activity after dark. Other operations conducted by the division included: support of 1/101st Airborne Division during Operation JOHN PAUL JONES with one battalion; escort of US and ARVN convoys (Roadrunner Operations); aerial rocket artillery interdiction missions; security of downed aircraft; reconnaissance by the Cavalry Squadron throughout Pleiku, Darlac, Kontum and Binh Dinh Provinces; areas of known or suspected enemy activity; and maintenance of the LFPV reserve/reaction force.

* (2) Operation PAUL REVERE II. (1 - 25 Aug in Darlac Province)
On 2 August the division assumed control of the PAUL REVERE AO, and on 7 August the operation was redesignated PAUL REVERE II with an effective date of 1 Aug. Intelligence developed by the 3d Brigade 25th Infantry Division, which had been conducting operations in the area since May, revealed significant build-up of fresh enemy units planning to launch coordinated attacks against US/ARVN installations. The operation followed the now-familiar pattern of extensive search and maneuver followed by brief periods of intense combat. On 8 August 4/17 Cavalry withstood mass attacks by a reinforced battalion for several hours and was subsequently reinforced by two companies of the 1/12 Cavalry, which were diverted while in the air en route to conduct an assault several miles from the 4/17 contact. The result was 168 enemy KIA (BGR). On the night of 9-10 August an NVA battalion attempted to overrun the 9th Company, 3d Battalion, 1st BOK Cavalry Regiment,

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reinforced by the 1st Platoon, B Company, 1/89th Armor. The combination of US firepower and spirit of the NOK soldier proved unbeatable, and the enemy left 197 dead and huge amounts of equipment when he withdrew at dawn on 10 August. On 14 August elements of 1/5 Cav and 2/5 Cav located an estimated regimental CP at hill 534 in the CHEU PONG Mountain complex (IV8895). After two days of heavy combat and saturation by tube artillery, TAC Air and aerial rocket artillery, the enemy withdrew leaving 138 KIA. One innovation during PAUL REVERE II was aerial resupply of artillery units with 6100 rounds of ammunition for 105, 155 and 175 weapons. The operation terminated when reliable information indicated no significant enemy formations remained in the AO.

RESULTS	ENEMY	1st CAV DIV	FWMAP
KIA	861(80)	KIA 78	KIA 97
	574(Poss)	MIA 272	WIA 431
VCC	36	MIA 3	MIA 3
NVAG	83		
Returnees	18		
Ind Wpns	226		
C/S Wpns	59		

Large amounts of enemy military equipment, including 475 packs and 299 canteens, were recovered from areas of contact.

*(3) Operation BYRD (Binh Thuan Province from 26 August, continuing). The 2/7 Cavalry with support elements was placed on OP control to EFFORCEV at the end of operation PAUL REVERE II and committed in Binh Thuan Province to provide support for RVN Revolutionary Development activities.

**Results for the reporting period are shown below.

RESULTS	ENEMY	1ST CAV DIV
KIA	227 (80)	KIA 2
	3 (Poss)	WIA 3
Detainees	312	MIA 0
	29 (PW's)	
	1 (returnee)	
	79 (civilian defenders)	
	203 (Innocent civilians)	
Indiv Wpns	39	
C/S Wpns	0	

*(4) Operation THAYER I (13 September to 1 October in Binh Dinh Province). This search and destroy operation was initiated as a result of enemy build-up in the Kim Son Valley area (BR7480). During the operation the division attacked enemy bases and support facilities with two brigades while squeezing his forces eastward toward the seacoast. In the initial assault five battalions were air assaulted onto high ground landing zones in the Kim Son area, from which they searched the ridge lines and fingers down to the valley floors. Contact was sporadic, but the division encountered intense anti-aircraft fire throughout the AO. On 20 September three Battalions were air assaulted into the valley east of the Kim Son (BR6580) to exploit reports of enemy build-up in that area. On 23 September, the division logistics base at HAMMOND was attacked by the enemy using mortars, recoilless rifles and small arms. Light damage and casualties were sustained. North of the division AO, elements of ARVN 41st Regiment was attacked by two battalions which were subsequently routed by the ARVN counterattack. Also on 23 September

** All figures reflected are taken from IFFV situation report.

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the Capital ROK Infantry Division moved into the Phu Cat mountain in force opening their phase of the Free World effort in Binh Dinh Province.

RESULTS	ENEMY	1ST CAV DIV
KIA	231(BC) 322(Poss)	KIA 33 WIA 248
VCC	72	MIA 2
	Ind Wpns 104 C/S Wpns 20 Documents 293 inches Rice 107 Tons	
VCS	691	

A factory for manufacturing mines and hand grenades was captured with 1377 grenades, 3001 anti-personnel mines, and 119 AF mines.

*(5) Operation IRVING (2 October - 24 October in Binh Dinh Province). Operation IRVING, conducted in conjunction with the ARVN 22d Division and the Capital ROK Infantry Division, was a logical continuation of THAYER to permit complete exploitation of intelligence developed during September. The operation opened with heavy contact on 2 October, as elements of all three Free World Forces established a cordon around the coastal plain which lies between the Nui Mieu Mountains on the north and the Phu Cat Mountains on the south. The encirclement was completed by positioning the ARVN junk fleet and the US Navy in SWIFT boats off shore to prevent escapes by sampans. Two destroyers provided fire support during most of the operation. The heavy contact with elements of the 1/9 Cavalry engaging as estimated platoon, which was reinforced by 200 - 300 enemy who had been in the vicinity. Our contact was exploited throughout the day of elements of two battalions. By noon on 3 October the enemy had lost over 250 KIA or WIA, while US losses were only 3 KIA and 29 WIA. All forces advanced on schedule, gradually decreasing the circumference of the enemy perimeter as the sweep to the sea was completed. As contact diminished on the coast, emphasis shifted to the Suoi Valley and again to the Kim Son Valley, resulting in the discovery of the Hoi San Base area northwest of the Suoi Ca Valley. A series of sharp engagements were fought as the enemy attempted to defend his base and divert the division from the area, but by the end of the operation, enemy units had been forced out of their areas into the hills around the valleys. This operation was significant in several respects. It was one of the most successful conducted by the division in terms of personnel losses to the enemy, resulting in at least 1371 KIA or captured by the 1st Cavalry alone. The loss of supplies will be felt for sometime to come, and the VC infrastructure in eastern Binh Dinh Province has been uprooted and severely damaged, if not destroyed. A large area of rich farm land, and the people who live on it, have been returned to GVN control and are free from VC terrorism for the first time in many years.

RESULTS	ENEMY	1ST CAV DIV
KIA	681 (BC)	KIA 19
VCC	690	WIA 150
VCS	4136	MIA 0
Ind Wpns	191	
C/S Wpns	19	
Documents	460 inches	
Medical Supplies	1/2 Ton	

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Salt	496.2 Tons
Rice	66.6 Tons
SA Ammo	377,417 rounds
Large Cal Ammo	245 Rounds

(6) Operation THAYER II (25 October, continuing, in Binh Vinh Province). This operation began as a two brigade effort to exploit the success of the previous five weeks of almost continuous contact with the enemy in the rich coastal plain and the Kim Son and Sui Ca Valleys to the west. Developments elsewhere in the II CTZ forced a reduction of the forces in the area to one brigade. The operation is continuing with three battalions and supporting forces.

(7) Operation PAUL REVERE IV (31 October, continuing, in Pleiku and Darlac Provinces). Division elements were committed into the western portion of the II CTZ to counter the threat of assault by the regiments we had met and defeated during PAUL REVERE II in August. These units, reorganized and re-equipped, were once again reported in position to threaten key ARVN and US installations.

d. Psychological Operations:

(1) Psyops supported combat and civic action operations in four major operations during the period 1 August - 31 October 1966. Operational areas range from the South China Sea to the Cambodian Border. On 31 October the Division was operating against the 610 Division along the coast in Binh Dinh Province and along the border against the 630th Division.

(2) During these operations several important observations were made:

(a) The returnee rate increases the longer an operation lasts. Military defeats, personal hardships, and continual movement make the VC more susceptible to psywar efforts. The Chieu Hoi appeals become most effective in the latter part of an operation. However, these appeals must be made early in an operation to set the stage for late ralliers.

(b) The use of psyops techniques and equipment (airborne speakers and leaflets) is an effective means of controlling the population, especially in the initial phase of an operation. Close coordination with G5 is essential in directing and controlling refugees.

(c) Immediate message taping by a rallier, VCC or civilian and broadcasting it in the area as soon as possible after receiving the rallier proved effective. In order to quickly hit the rallier's unit, his appeal was relayed from the forward element on the ground to aircraft in the air. Such tapes have high-fidelity and increased psychological impact.

(d) Fast reaction leaflets are possible when printing facilities are located with division Psy Ops.

(e) Artillery leaflet rounds offer an all weather immediate preplanned psyops delivery system. Present techniques for packing and firing are being refined.

(f) Night broadcasts have a greater psychological effect than broadcasts during the day. However, supporting U-10 aircraft were restricted from flying at night by Air Force regulation. C-47 night

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flights were precluded by higher headquarters during IRVING AND THAYER II because of weather.

(g) Target audiences are difficult to identify in a fluid operation over rugged thinly populated areas. In these areas themes must be general in nature and addressed to the enemy as a group. Specific audiences can be hit with loudspeaker messages when they are identified.

(h) The psychological vulnerabilities exceed the psyops resources to develop and deliver exploiting materials. When many ralliers occur from different enemy units, only a few can be exploited. Ralliers often respond to the voices and pictures of other ralliers and POW's with whom they are acquainted.

(i) Part of the solution to the problem of securing more ralliers lies in developing a tactic or means to provide the enemy soldiers momentary relief from the observation of his fellow soldiers. The desire to rally is a prevalent one in enemy ranks, but the security is such that no one dares to mention his desire to anyone else. Paradoxically, the NVA/VC soldiers are captives in their own army.

(j) A leaflet to reduce anti-aircraft fires, secure enemy weapons, increase enemy internal security requirements and promote distrust in enemy ranks by offering high rewards for specific crew served weapon was produced early in THAYER I. Only a limited number were dropped and evaluation was not complete since ground operations did not occur immediately in that area. However, a marked and immediate decrease in anti-aircraft firing was noted by 1/9th Cavalry and in spot reports. It appears that high rewards for specific items of equipment for short periods has a noteworthy effect.

(k) Summary:

1. During this report many of the enemy rank and file were psychologically vulnerable and ready to give up. Repeated interrogations indicate the enemy's tight security measures and the fear of being killed by allied troops prevent defections. No one can discuss the subject of rallying or surrender in the enemy ranks. Actions and psyops themes which reduce the enemy's security and control hold the promise of significantly increasing returnees.

2. Psyops were effective in reducing the fear of death upon capture or when rallying. The large number of prisoners and ralliers indicated the enemies fear of being killed when surrendering or rallying is being overcome.

3. Fast reaction to vulnerabilities needs to be continued and improved using radio relayed messages to loudspeaker aircraft and firing artillery leaflet rounds with contingency leaflets.

c. Training.

(1) Training activities continued under the provisions of Div Cir 350-50. The training program for the division was revised and prepared for publication by the end of the reporting period. The following training highlights were recorded:

(a) Training guidance from Hq, USARV was received and incorporated into the division training program.

(b) The one-week orientation program for incoming senior officers continued through August, with a total of forty-seven colonels and lieutenant colonels attending.

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(c) Training of replacements was consolidated at division level, effective 1 October, under the Replacement Training School. The school, staffed by highly qualified personnel selected from infantry and artillery units within the division, was located in the area of the 15th Admin Company, from which it derived logistics and administrative support. Replacements through the grade of Major were required to complete all or part of the program based on grade and MOS, including orientations; weapons demonstration and zero of individual weapon; air mobility; and tactics, both friendly and enemy. The program was well received and by 31 October 1477 replacements had been processed.

(d) Division Artillery conducted a one day class for representatives of all division units on the techniques of shell/mortar reporting.

(2) Training support from non-divisional sources:

(a) One hundred-one division personnel attended aircraft maintenance training courses on the UH-1 and CH-47 aircraft under the Army Aircraft Mobile Training Assistance Program. The courses varied from two to four weeks in length and were coordinated through the 34th GS Group at Vung Tau, RVN.

(b) Three officers attended the one week civil affairs course conducted in Saigon for MACV/USARV/JUSPAO personnel.

(c) Division personnel continued to fill quotas to the MACV Recon School (formerly the 5th Special Forces Group Long Binh Patrol School) at Nha Trang, RVN. Thirty-four personnel from the infantry brigades and cavalry squadron attended the course during the reporting period, with twenty-nine (85%) being graduated.

(3) Special training programs which received emphasis during the reporting period were aerial suppressive fire training for crew chiefs and door gunners, and DECCA aircraft navigation training, which began late in October.

(4) Outstanding training support was provided by members of the 25th Ordnance Detachment (EOD) during the reporting period. Members of the detachment presented their two-hour orientation of enemy mines and booby traps to a significant number of division personnel, and the course was incorporated into the ROI of the Replacement Training School.

f. Combat Developments:

(1) During the period of this report, combat developments activities were characterized by four major types of actions:

(a) Accepting and evaluating developmental items which were requested by the division over the past 14 months.

(b) Accepting and evaluating developmental items which were not requested by the division.

(c) Submitting follow-up correspondence on developmental items which have not been furnished on a quick reaction basis.

(d) Collecting and forwarding new requirements from the field.

(2) Those items requested by the division and accepted for evaluation were:

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- (a) Electro Luminescent Runway Marker System.
- (b) Night Observation Device, Medium Range.
- (c) Lightweight Equipment for the Individual Soldier.
 - 50 ea ponchos from US Army Natick Lab.
 - 30 ea Ground cloth from US Army Natick Lab.
 - 30 ea Fly tent (Australian)
 - 30 ea Sleeping bag (Australian).
 - 30 ea Mosquito bar (Australian).
 - 30 ea Air mattress (Australian).
- (d) Three styles of jungle hats (300 from US Army Natick Lab)
- (e) SANDIA CORPORATION'S Anti Intrusion Device.
- (f) Jungle canopy platform (LWL)
- (3) Items not requested by the division but accepted for evaluation were:
 - (a) Heliborne illumination system (ACTIV-fabricated in Vietnam).
 - (b) Armored/Armed CH-47A (USAMC sponsored)
 - (c) Forest penetrator rescue seat (LWL).
 - (d) AN/IRC-74 survival radio. (ACTIV)
 - (e) Lightweight survival compass.
 - (f) Collapsible 50 gallon water bags.
 - (g) Aircrew member head protectors (UH-1 seat extensions).
 - (h) Cargo/Personnel lowering devices.
- (4) Follow-up correspondence was initiated on:
 - (a) 4.5 inch rockets for Aerial Artillery.
 - (b) Aircraft bullet detector.
 - (c) Position markers.
 - (d) Chain saws for hardwood.
 - (e) Artillery survey system for 1st Air Cav Div.
 - (f) Silent generators.
 - (g) Countermortar radar and personnel.
 - (h) Modular armor for vehicles.

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(5) New requirements forwarded or declared informally (formal requests being processed) were:

(a) Limited range radio (200 meter range, about 27 cu ins) for field artillery section chiefs, executive post, and local security.

(b) Photogrammetry service which will complement artillery survey with a trig list (accuracy of x y z coordinates estimated less than 1 meter root mean square).

(c) Forward Looking Infra Red Radar (if successful, it will provide a fair weather nighttime target acquisition and intelligence capability for aircraft and semi-permanent observation posts).

(d) Large lite marker balloons with XENON flashing light for CHIEU HOI rallying point.

(e) Waterproof tags for POW's and captured documents.

(f) Fifteen pop-up tents.

(g) Revetment material for aircraft on the golf course.

(h) New lightweight combat pack (resembles CIDG and ARVN packs).

(i) Modified anti-intrusion device for semi-permanent observation posts.

(6) The outstanding events for the period were:

(a) Night observation device, medium range - From HAMMOND CP lights, machinegun fire, small arms fire, and fires not normally visible at night through binoculars or with the naked eye could be seen as far as ten miles away. Performance is somewhat degraded by adverse atmospheric conditions. Artificial lighting appears to extend the range considerably beyond 1500 meters for clear unmistakable detection of moving personnel in open areas. All users were cautioned not to expose the lens in daylight. The lens covers or carrying case must be used, considering the high cost (\$14,000). Conspicuous precautionary instructions are suggested on each device.

(b) The SANBIA Corporation developed an anti-intrusion device under contract with Department of Defense. It consists of a geometer which has adjustable sensitivity to foot movement detecting personnel in a radius of 25 meters. The detected signals are conducted to a transmitter by cable. The transmitter sends the signal to a 1 watt ground receiver which is capable of about 1/2 mile range or to an airborne receiver such as the 25 watt ARC-73 radio which has performed satisfactorily up to 40 miles line-of-sight. The mercury batteries can be expected to last about two weeks in this mode of operation. A command mode of operation can be selected on the emplaced device. This inhibits the "real time" capability but stores all local disturbances until it is interrogated by the ground or airborne transmitters. The response signal indicates the level of activity since the last time it was interrogated. Each device has a maximum activity-level-storage-capability comparable to 64 personnel.

(c) The Jungle Canopy Platform has been demonstrated by the division to units in the IFFV area. It represents a contingency device that can be used for medical evacuation or deployment of troops when time does not permit creation of a landing zone. Two nets are deployed from a net dispenser on a UH-1 aircraft. The two nets are adequate for deployment

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of troops. For rapid retrieval of personnel the platform and its power hoists should be used. This is also deployed by UH-1 aircraft. Removal is easily accomplished; however, the nets may be left in place for future operations, for a retransmission platform, etc. The nets are inexpensive and can be fabricated in the division. It will be extremely difficult to locate the nets from the jungle floor especially over two layers of canopy. Even if found, they are not readily salvageable by the enemy.

d. The Cargo/Personnel lowering device is ideally employed with the jungle canopy platform. It consists of a lightweight aluminum lattice device treaded with a nylon rope for controlled rate descent. Troop reaction was extremely favorable.

(7) Projects/Studies forwarded for comments were:

- 1 Aerial artillery.
- 2 Psywar.
- 3 Trooper ladders vs cage hoists.
- 4 Lightweight water purification unit.

(8) Future plans include the experimentation of a new type of anti-intrusion device. These devices will be allocated to units throughout the division for use and evaluation.

(9) During the past two months the CDB was visited by representatives of US Army Natick Labs, US Army Electronics and, SANDIA Corporation, Limited War Laboratory, and Army Concept Team in Vietnam.

(10) The enthusiastic response of units in accepting and using developmental equipment is acknowledged and considered commendable.

5. (C) Logistics.

a. General.

(1) During the period 1 August through 31 October 1966, support was provided for six major operations: PAUL REVERE II; BYRD; THAYER; IRVING; THAYER II and PAUL REVERE IV.

a. Operation PAUL REVERE II, a division operation, was initiated on 1 August in Pleiku. DISCOM's Forward Support Element supported the 3d Brigade from vicinity of OASIS (ZA1228). The 3d FSE supported the 2d Brigade from a location vicinity of the Lake (AR7558). When 2d Brigade elements were committed south of Oasis, responsibility for their logical support was shifted to the 3d FSE as Oasis, while the 2d FSE displaced to the Turkey Farm (ZA2452) and continued support of division forces remaining in that general area. Primary means of resupply was by a land LOC from the 98th S&S Bn at Pleiku to the 3d FSE at Oasis

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and the 2 FSB at the Lake and subsequently the Turkey Farm. Qui Nhon Support Area Command collected a Forward Support Activity with the 3d FSE and dispatched daily resupply land convoys from Pleiku to Oasis via Highway 19. ~~QNSC~~ forces at Duc Co, and subsequently 3d Brigade, 25th Division elements, were resupplied by an air LOC originating at Pleiku. The air LOC started on 11 August 1966 and continued until the end of the operation. On 25 and 26 July, the major forces of the division moved to An Khe. The 1/7th Cav was placed under the operational control of the 3/25th and, through arrangements, received their logistical support from 3/25th until they deployed to An Khe by truck on 29 August 1966. PAUL REVERE II officially terminated on 25 August and backhaul of supplies from Oasis was completed by QNSC on 27 August 1966.

(b) Operation BYRD, a battalion operation, was initiated on 26 August with the movement of TF 2/7th Cav by C-130 aircraft to Phan Thiet. DISCOM's 3d FSE closed out its operation at Oasis and deployed with the task force. Cam Khan Bay Support Command is supporting the operation with the primary means of resupply being a sea LOC out of Cam Khan Bay and alternate means of resupply by air. CRBSC has collocated a Forward Support Activity with the 3d FSE. The operation continues.

(c) Operation THAYER I, a division operation, was initiated on 13 September 1966 in Binh Dinh Province. Division Support Command provided logistical support for the forces initially from An Khe while the 1st FSE and a portion of the 2d FSE deployed to Hammond (BR881540) and Bong Son (BR846947), respectively. At 130600 September, the 1st FSE, which had moved to Qui Nhon the previous day, deployed to Hammond along with a logistical convoy from Qui Nhon Support Command closing at 0730 hours the same day. Thirty minutes after closure at Hammond a forward refueling and rearming point was established, and by 131130 Sep the 1st FSE became fully operational and assumed responsibility for providing for logistical support for the 1st Brigade. QNSC collected a forward support activity with the 1st FSE and resupplied daily by a land LOC out of Qui Nhon. A portion of the 2d FSE deployed by USAF aircraft to Bong Son on 13 September and provided logistical support for the 2d Brigade. A FSA was not required at Bong Son since the forces in that area were resupplied by an air LOC directly out of An Khe. On 25 September, Highway 1, between Qui Nhon and Bong Son was opened and secured. QNSC dispatched a logistical convoy containing 40,000 gallons of JP-4 to Bong Son without incident. On 27 September the 2d Brigade moved their logistical elements from Bong Son to Hammond and the 1st FSE assumed the additional responsibility for logistical support of the 2d Brigade. The portion of the 2d FSE at Bong Son redeployed to An Khe. Operation THAYER I terminated on 1 October with logistical elements ideally positioned to support Operation IRVING which commenced the next day.

(d) Operation IRVING, a continuation of Operation THAYER I in Binh Dinh Province, commenced on 2 October and terminated on 24 October. The operation was supported by the 1st FSE at Hammond. QNSC FSA which had been located at Hammond during Operation THAYER I, remained at Hammond and supplied the logistical requirements of the division by daily land convoys out of Qui Nhon. On 17 October, a forward refueling and rearming point was established at LZ Uplift (BR918753), fuel and rockets being dispatched as required from the 1st FSE at Hammond. Also on 17 Oct fuel and rockets were stocked at LZ Two Bits (BR846947) for use of the 1/9 Cav operating in that general area. On 23 October Route 1 was subjected to heavy rains and several bypasses were washed out between road junction of Highway 19 and 1, and LZ Two Bits. Superb engineer effort, greatly assisted by an improved pattern, reopened the road to Hammond on the 24th of October. When the operation terminated on 24 October the engineers were in the process of opening Route 1 from RJ 19 & 1 to LZ Two Bits. Operation IRVING was characterized by a lack of supply problems due to the efficiency

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of QNSC and DISCOM's 1st FSE. The operation terminated 242400 October and Operation THAYER II commenced the following day.

(e) Operation THAYER II, a continuation of Operation IRVING, started on 25 October. The logistical situation did not change from that described in Operation IRVING. The road between Hammond and LZ Two Bits was improved to Class 12 on 28 October. However, Route 1 is subject to frequent washouts during rainy weather. On 31 October the 1st Brigade redeployed to An Khe and Operation THAYER II became a one brigade operation. Also on 31 October the fuel and rockets at LZ Uplift were withdrawn to Hammond. The operation continues.

(f) Operation PAUL REVERE IV: On 28 October 2/5 Cav, I FORCEV reserve battalion, was moved from An Khe to Oasis by C-130 aircraft and placed under the operational control of the 4th Inf Div. On 31 October, the division's 2d Brigade and two battalions deployed from An Khe and Hammond to Pleiku and Duc Co. Units arriving at Pleiku were moved overland by trucks to Oasis. 2/5th Cav was attached to 2d Brigade on 31 October. DISCOM's 2d FSE moved to Oasis on 31 October and is providing logistical support for the 2d Brigade. QNSC collocated a FSA with the 2d FSE at Oasis, resupplying the force by a land LOC out of Pleiku. The operation is continuing.

(g) During PAUL REVERE II the marshy terrain in the AO-exposed personnel to the problem of Immersion Foot. To alleviate this situation a daily change of socks for forward elements was initiated. Dry socks were sent forward daily with the rations; and, starting on the second day wet socks were returned to the laundry, washed and placed back into the exchange system. The practice of having dry socks every day was valuable to forward elements in the prevention of Immersion Foot and the exchange system will be continued during subsequent operations as required.

(h) During Operation PAUL REVERE II extensive use was made of USAF air drop of supplies. A total in excess of 185 S/T of artillery ammunition were air dropped to forward artillery units. These airdrops were considered to be responsive to the needs of the division and saved valuable flying hours for organic aircraft.

(i) Division forces received outstanding logistical support from QNSC. Ranging from Operation PAUL REVERE II along the Cambodian Border, to Operation IRVING along the South China Sea, QNSC collocated a FSA with DISCOM's FSE's and provided daily resupply of all classes of supplies on time and in a highly efficient manner.

b. Supply and Services:

(1) Class I: The division has been subsisting on a modified "A" ration. Two brigades were committed for most of the quarter on Operations PAUL REVERE II, THAYER I, IRVING and THAYER II. Class I support of tactical operations by the QNSC was excellent. In August a problem was experienced concerning mechanical refrigeration units at the Class I Point. The 800 cubic foot prefab boxes were inoperational most of the time due to age and lack of parts. In September the division Class I Point was relocated adjacent to the 34th S&S Bn Class I Point and arrangements were made for use of a 1600 cubic foot box already at the location. With the use of this refrigerator and the collocation with the direct support Class I Point which has 24 such refrigeration sets, the Class I Point ceased being a problem. Refrigeration capacity in unit messes is still inadequate; but necessary 65 cubic foot reefers are now arriving in sufficient quantity to be able to anticipate early solution of this problem. During the quarter action was taken to solve the problem of continued receipt of "Not in Stock" for food issues without suitable substitution. Representatives of Hq 1st

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Logistical Command and Hq USA30, Qui Nhon visited the division and a sharp improvement was effected. At present RIS without substitution is only being received on condiments and on occasional item such as chocolate milk. The problem has been brought to the attention of all concerned and it is hoped that this situation will also show marked improvement in the near future. On the positive side, the 34th S&S Bn obtained a limited ice cream production capability and since early October the division has been receiving ice cream once a week. Delivery of potable ice has also been greatly increased. In August the potable water point presented a problem due to inadequate production capacity to handle the demands when all units were back in base camp. The necessary coordination was made with the 34th S&S Bn and they have requested the additional equipment. The problem temporarily alleviated itself with the deployment of two brigades to the field, however, the problem will arise again upon their return if the 34th S&S Bn does not obtain additional equipment.

(2) Class II & IV: This area of supply has shown marked improvement during the last quarter. The most obvious improvement resulted when QWSA began furnishing Class II & IV support to the forward operational units through the FSA and division PSE. This has almost completely eliminated lifeline requisitions back to the base camp which has resulted in division transportation becoming available for use in other areas. The concept of support now employed by Qui Nhon is highly desirable from the division standpoint of supporting operations in the field with Class II & IV items. Problems have continually been experienced through out the reporting period in obtaining adequate quantities of ponchos, mesquite nets, poncho liners and GP medium tentage. As this report is written division units have adequate jungle fatigues on hand; however, the supporting Issue-In-Kind facility is close to zero balance and severe shortages are anticipated within 10 days unless replenishment of stocks is realized. The division has adequate levels of paper plates and 250 gallon water drums. Marked improvement in warehousing techniques with aggressive action to establish a comprehensive documentation section in the DSO has been made. A reconciliation of outstanding requisitions was conducted with Qui Nhon Depot in an effort to establish validity of requisitions. Improvements have been noted but continued emphasis is required in this area by both division and depot. Stockage levels appear to be rising in Qui Nhon and availability of items to the division had definitely increased during this reporting period. Anticipated problem areas over the next reporting period will be the providing of adequate tentage to house incoming units and replentish tents that have worn out. There will be a requirement for 1,469,000 gallons of penegrime for dust control in operational areas and the base camp during the dry months of January thru March. Supply action will have to be effected during the next quarter to assure availability. Large quantities of sandbags will be required for the reversionment program on the base camp heliport. The supply system is aware of the requirements; however, aggressive action will be required by back-up support to insure that adequate quantities are made available on a timely basis.

(3) Class III: Class III operations have continued to function smoothly throughout the reporting period. No problems are anticipated.

(4) Class V: Ammunition continues to be available in adequate quantities and ammunition support has been satisfactory in all respects. At the end of Operation THAYER, USARV policy on ammunition management for the division was changed. After coordination between all concerned headquarters was effected, the necessary adjustments were made to conform to the new USARV policy.

(5) Services provided by the 34th S&S Bn continued to be satisfactory.

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(6) The following supplies were used by the division during the current reporting period.

(a) Class I (S/T).

- 1. A Rations - 1545.0
- 2. B Rations - 2184.4
- 3. C Rations - 735.4

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(b) Class II and IV (S/T)

- 1. Clothing and Equipment - 1041.4
- 2. Fortification and barrier material - 383.4

(c) Class III (Gallons)

- 1. JP-4 - 3,730,900
- 2. Avgas - 821,500
- 3. Mogas - 1,362,800
- 4. Diesel - 563,920

(d) Class V (S/T) 8367.3

c. Transportation:

(1) Significant movements during the period 1 August through 31 October were:

(a) 1-4 August. A total emergency was declared to move 1/7th Cavalry, 3d FSE and supporting artillery from Dak To to Oasis. Due to the condition of the Oasis Airstrip, aircraft were diverted to New Fleiku. Airlift for this move totaled 32 - C-130 sorties, 7 - C-123 sorties and 18 - CV-2B sorties.

(b) 3 August. The 2d Brigade Task Force consisting of 1/5th Cavalry, 2/5th Cavalry, and 2/12th Cavalry, supporting artillery, an engineer company and a portion of the 2d FSE was moved to Fleiku during period 021845 and 031440 August. Thirty nine C-130 sorties were required for the move. The Division Headquarters Company, Brigade Trains, Aviation Group(-) and 2d FSE moved by surface from An Khe to Fleiku (Turkey Farm and Lake Area).

(c) 15 August. 2/8th Cavalry was moved from An Khe to Tuy Hoa. 1/12th Cavalry moved from Fleiku to An Khe. A company of the 3/1 ROK Cavalry Battalion was moved from Duc Co to Fleiku and elements of 3d Brigade 25th Division moved from Fleiku to Duc Co. A total of 16 C-130 sorties, 22 CV-2 sorties and 13 2 1/2 ton trucks were required for the moves.

(d) 20 - 22 August. During this period 3/1 ROK Cavalry Battalion(-) was moved from Duc Co to Fleiku by airlift. A total of 19 C-130 sorties were required.

(e) 25 August. The 2d Brigade consisting of 1/5th Cavalry, 2/5th Cavalry and 1/12th Cavalry redeployed to An Khe. This move required 21 C-123 sorties, 8 CV-2B sorties and 75 2 1/2 ton trucks.

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Last element closed at An Khe at 1840 hours. A tactical emergency was declared for movement of 2/7th Cavalry, supporting artillery, 3d FSB and an air cavalry troop from Pleiku to Phan Thiet. Movement started at 1240 hours 25 August and was completed at 2240 hours 26 August. A total of 975 passengers and 721,765 lbs of cargo was moved during this requiring 46 C-130 sorties.

(f) 26 August. The Division Headquarter Company, 11th Aviation Group and 31 FSB redeployed to An Khe by air and surface. Transportation utilized totaled 13 C-130 sorties, 8 CV-2 sorties and 54 2½ ton trucks.

(g) 1/7th Cavalry moved by truck (47 2½ ton) from Oasis to An Khe on 29 August.

(h) 8 September. 1st Bn, 7th Cavalry with supporting artillery and elements of the 2d FSB were moved from An Khe to Bong Son by C-123 aircraft. Fifty C-123 sorties were required.

(i) 13 September. Air Movements: The 1st Bn 8th Cavalry and 2d Bn 8th Cavalry along with elements of 1st Brigade Headquarters and the 1st FSB were moved from the An Khe Golf Course Airfield to Hammond by C-130 aircraft. Airlift utilized totaled 27 C-130 sorties. Concurrently, elements of 2d Brigade Headquarters and a portion of the 2d FSB move from An Khe to Bong Son requiring 21 C-123 sorties. Ground movements - Elements of the 1st FSB and 1st Brigade Headquarters along with elements of the 8th Engineers and 11th Aviation Group moved from An Khe to Hammond. Vehicles utilized totaled 21 2½ ton trucks.

(j) 21 - 22 September. Elements of the 2d Brigade moved from Bong Son to Hammond. 2d FSB moved from Bong Son to An Khe. 23 C-123 sorties and 18 CV-2B sorties were utilized.

(k) 27 September. 2/12th Cavalry moved by surface from Uplift to An Khe and remaining elements of 2d Brigade Headquarters moved by road from Bong Son to Hammond. Thirty nine 2½ ton trucks were required.

(l) 28 - 29 September. 2/5th Cavalry redeployed from LZ Uplift to An Khe. Elements of 2d Brigade Headquarters moved from Hammond to An Khe. Elements of Division Artillery moved from An Khe to Hammond. A total of 48 2½ ton trucks were required.

(m) 30 September - 1 October. The 3d Brigade Headquarters and 1/7th Cavalry and 5/7th Cavalry moved by surface from An Khe to Hammond during the period. Additionally, the division forward CP displaced from An Khe to Phu Cat on 1 October. Transportation requirements totaled 78 2½ ton trucks.

(n) An air LOC was maintained from An Khe to Bong Son with Air Force aircraft during the period 9 - 16 September. Airlift utilized totaled 62 C-123 sorties.

(o) 29 October, 2/5th Cavalry deployed from An Khe to Oasis using 14 C-130 sorties.

(p) 31 October. 46 C-130 sorties moved 2d Brigade, HHC and two battalions plus supporting forces from An Khe and Hammond to Pleiku and Duc Co. All vehicles of the 2d Brigade, at An Khe, less mules and ½ tons w/MRC-95, moved overland to Oasis. Forces moved to Pleiku by C-130 were moved to Oasis by trucks supplied by 88th S&S Bn.

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(1) 31 October. 1st Brigade NBC, an artillery unit, and 1st Brigade trains moved overland from Hammond to An Khe. Forty two 2 1/2 ton trucks were required.

(2) An air LCC was maintained from Pleiku to Duc Co during the period 11-24 August. 862 tons of cargowere delivered to Duc Co by airlift. Aircraft sorties utilized totaled 63 C-130, 11 C-123 and 20 CV-28.

(3) During the period 12 - 18 August, 5000 rounds of 105mm, 500 rounds of 155mm, 300 rounds of 175mm and 300 rounds of 8 inch ammunition were air dropped to division artillery units. 50 C-123 sorties were required.

(4) Division CV-28 aircraft maintained service to the places indicated for the period indicated.

PLACE	PERIOD	NR. TRIPS DAILY
An Khe to Phu Thiet to Cam Ranh Bay	29 Aug 31 Oct	2
An Khe to Bong Sen to Hammond	1 Sep 21 Sep	3
An Khe to Hammond	28 Sep 31 Oct	3
An Khe to Hammond to Phu Cat	2 Oct 31 Oct	6

(5) Six scheduled C-130 passenger flights and three scheduled C-130 cargo flights served the division at An Khe on a daily basis, weather permitting, throughout the period of this report. Additionally five seats were reserved for division personnel on the USARV CV-28 courier; this aircraft travels from TSN, to Qui Nhon, An Khe, Pleiku and return to TSN daily except Tuesday and Thursday. Approximate daily cargo and passenger traffic during the period was as follows:

INBOUND		OUTBOUND	
Aircraft parts	15,000 lbs	Repairable A/C parts	5,000 lbs
Mail	7,000 lbs	Mail	5,000 lbs
General cargo	20,000 lbs	General cargo	4,000 lbs
Passengers	150	Passengers	150

d. Maintenance.

(1) Ground Maintenance:

(a) Division Support Command conducted a Command Maintenance Management Inspection of Company D, 15th Transportation Bn (AMAS) on 11 August. The inspection resulted in an overall rating of satisfactory.

(b) 555 M60's have been inspected since technical inspection of ground mounted machine guns began in June. 109 M60's were found to be unserviceable. Weapons found unserviceable have been replaced.

(c) Material readiness problem areas have been defined and isolated and procedures have been established to either solve or reduce the problem.

1. The following specific problem areas have been identified.

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- a. Little or no preventive maintenance on any equipment except armament and communications equipment.
- b. No dispatch control of wheel vehicles.
- c. Maintenance personnel not familiar with the Army Equipment Records Procedure (TAERS) and records not being kept up to date.
- d. Shortage of maintenance publications throughout the division.
- e. High percentage of new personnel inexperienced in local maintenance procedure.
- f. Shortages of certain repair parts.
- g. Lack of written procedure for maintenance programs at organizational level.
- h. Failure of units to submit correct and timely requisitions for repair parts.
- i. Lack of collection and analysis of data by G4 for defining problem areas.
- j. Lack of proper maintenance inspections.
- k. Lack of command attention to maintenance management at all echelons.

(2) The following corrective actions have been taken by this headquarters during the period 1 September thru 31 October.

(a) Maintenance and parts supply procedure courses have been prepared and conducted by all units except two brigades. The POI includes maintenance management, TAERS, motor maintenance operations, PLL, preventive maintenance requirements for selected equipment and the Material Readiness Report.

(b) All units have been required to establish a pinpoint distribution account and requisition all required maintenance publications. This headquarters submitted a consolidated request to USARV asking for immediate distribution of the basic maintenance publications for each unit down to company/battery level. AR 735-35, AR 711-16 and TM 38-750 have been received and distributed.

(c) A density report of all generators by size and type has been obtained from all units to assist in establishing a correct ASE for generator repair parts.

(d) A system has been established to transport by air, Red Ball Express repair parts direct from Saigon, rather than being routed thru Con Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon before arriving at An Khe. This has resulted in savings of about 8 days in transit and at least 10% savings in parts lost during shipment.

(e) Arrangements have been made for daily transportation of non-Red Ball repair parts from Qui Nhon to An Khe.

(f) Each unit down to and including company/battery has been required to appoint, on orders, a material readiness officer.

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(g) The division weekly command deadline report has been revised to include virtually all equipment or organic and attached unit and requires more detailed information in defining and reducing maintenance problem areas.

(h) Procedures for the following actions have been developed and distributed requiring completion by each unit on the date indicated.

(i) A complete equipment density report NLT 5 Nov.

(j) All generator operators are to be trained and licensed NLT 19 November (POI and lesson plans were furnished all units).

(k) A command supervised PLL audit NLT 15 November.

(l) A written maintenance SOP for all units maintaining a motor pool NLT 15 November.

(3) Inspections:

(a) Roadside Spot Check Vehicle Inspections have been conducted weekly. Twenty vehicles were inspected each week. The inspection results were forwarded thru command channels and the units replied by indorsement as to action taken to correct noted deficiencies.

(b) Company B, 2/12th Cavalry was inspected on 7 September. The inspection resulted in an overall rating of satisfactory.

(c) Company D, 2/8th Cavalry was inspected on 7 September. The inspection resulted in an overall rating of unsatisfactory. The unsatisfactory rating was based on a satisfactory score in material, an unsatisfactory score in maintenance management techniques and an unsatisfactory score in ammunition.

(d) Three maintenance activities in the forward area were formally inspected. The inspection reports were forwarded thru command channels; units were required to notify this headquarters of action taken to correct noted deficiencies.

(e) Inspections by the CMMI team suspended on 8 September. The team will resume inspections in early November and will be augmented in such strength as necessary to inspect battalion rather than company size units.

(f) The USARV Readiness Assistance Team visited this division during the period 15 September to 7 October, inspecting maintenance management procedures and providing on the spot advice and assistance in all units down to company/battery level. The team chief conducted an exit briefing by unit to the Commanding Officer, 27th Maintenance Battalion and a general briefing to the Assistant Division Commander Bravo, Commanding Officer, Support Command and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G4. A command letter explaining maintenance deficiencies reported by the team chief and necessary corrective action, was prepared and sent to all major units and separate battalion commanders.

(4) The 1st Quarter FY Material Readiness Report (DA Form 2406) was submitted to USARV on 3 October.

(5) Aircraft Maintenance:

(a) Following number of aircraft by type have been

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dropped from accountability during the reporting period.

OH-13	13 ea
UH-1B	17 ea
UH-1D	29 ea
CH-54	1 ea
CH-47	5 ea
O1-D	1 ea
CV-2	1 ea

(b) The following number of aircraft by type have been issued (From depot stock) during the reporting period.

OH-13	7 ea
UH-1B	19 ea
UH-1D	27 ea
CH-47	2 ea

(c) Safety of flight inspections.

1. Reinspection of UH-1B/540 main rotor hubs. All UH-1B/540 aircraft were inspected for defective main rotor hubs. No defective hubs noted. Negative report submitted to 34th General Support Group.

2. Aft rotor blade assemblies CH-47. All CH-47 aircraft were checked for defective aft rotor blades. No defective blades were on hand. One defective blade assembly had been previously returned to CONUS. Information was forwarded to USAAVCOM, St. Louis, Mo.

3. Stabilizer bar assembly UH-1B. All UH-1B aircraft were inspected for possible failure of tube assembly FSN 1560-831-0329. To date there have been no failures noted. This is a continuing inspection and all failure data will be forwarded by this office to 34th General Support Group.

4. Collective link assembly UH-1B/540. All UH-1B/540 aircraft were inspected for defective link assemblies P/N 540-011-453. No defective link assemblies were noted, but this will be a continuing inspection until sub-standard links are replaced with modified assembly. All failure data will be forwarded by this office to 34th General Support Group.

5. Stabilizer bar lever assembly, UH-1D aircraft. All UH-1B aircraft were inspected for defective stabilizer bar level assemblies P/N 204-011-301-1. No defective assemblies noted. This will be a continuing inspection until sub-standard levers are phased out of the system. All failure data will be reported to the Direct Support Unit.

6. Residual stress inspection of aft rotor blades, CH-47 aircraft. This inspection (applicable to all CH-47 aircraft) has been in operation at this station since August. To date a total of 97 blade assemblies have been inspected with a total of 16 blades determined unserviceable. This leaves approximately 59 blades remaining for inspection. This office submits a weekly report to 34th General Support Group advising them as to status of project.

(7) Supply: During a recent assistance inspection conducted by the 34th Gen Spt Gp (Sep 66), it was noted that units within the division are not following the procedure outlined in AR 735-35 pertaining to establishment and operation of proscribed load lists. Coordination has been effected with division support command relative to corrective action, and if deemed necessary an instructional program

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covering repair parts procedures will be initiated.

(8) Technical Assistance Program: Technical assistance at 1st Cavalry Division was screened for additional requirements which might have developed for balance of fiscal year 1967. (Ref msg AVHED 20455, dtd 090215Z Aug 66). No additional requirements were noted. Information was reported to USARV.

(9) Spectrometric Oil Analysis Program: Information was received in September that the spectrometric laboratory in USARYSIS was prepared to absorb the UH-1 engine and transmission requirements for aircraft in RVN. The 1st Cavalry Division was scheduled to join the program in October 1966. All affected units in the division screened maintenance records and related data and compiled listings required for the program. This office consolidated the information and forwarded it to the USARYSIS Spectrometric Oil Analysis Laboratory. Units were notified by field message from this headquarters to submit oil samples directly to USARYSIS Laboratory.

(10) End of reporting statistics:

(a) Aircraft ASL by DSU (% fill)

	Co A	Co B	Co C	Co D	383 DSU
Aircraft	48	67	77	86	87
Armament	65	68	80	72	
Avionics	43	66	87	82	

(b) Average EDP (%) (1 Aug thru 24 Oct)

OH-13S	16.4
UH-1B	8.1
UH-1D	12.6
CH-47	22.8
All Aircraft	12.9

(c) Average EDM (%) (1 Aug thru 24 Oct)

OH-13S	23.0
UH-1B	18.4
UH-1D	20.1
CH-47	29.4
All Aircraft	20.7

(d) Mission ready (%) (1 Aug thru 24 Oct)

OH-13S	61.3
UH-1B	70.9
UH-1D	67.2
CH-47	41.2
All aircraft	63.9

e. Construction and Facilities:

(1) Construction materials: Cement and crushed rock aggregates were available throughout the period in sufficient quantities to fulfill requirements for self-help billet pad construction. Cement issue became the responsibility of the S4, 70th Engr Bn. Materials for prefabrication of 20' x 80' billets are available in sufficient quantity to permit increased billet construction without the interim 20' x 32' tent frames. PSP for revertments (Golf Course) is being reclaimed from

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the An Khe airfield for storage in the barrier materials yard. Pickets and barbed wire necessary for other construction are being reclaimed from the inner barrier.

(2) Base Development: A new program for self help construction was initiated. The 70th Engr Bn is training unit self help construction teams in selected areas. These teams will continue with unit construction with technical supervision from the 70th Engr Bn. The Base Development Officer continues to review and confirm unit base development plans in preparation of an accurate master plan. Major engineer effort is being devoted to the completion of the An Khe airfield runway by 1 December 1966. The An Khe airfield taxi strip is being resurfaced to permit C130 traffic. The 8th Engineer Battalion continues to construct Golf Course ~~collejois~~. The location of the 65,000 barrel tank farm to be installed at An Khe was confirmed as that area in the northeast corner of the division Class V storage area. Arrangements for the locations of the central power distribution generators, the construction crew cantonment area, and the contractor's motor pool and storage area have been selected and coordinated with the Director of Construction, Qui Nhon. The resident OICG has reconnoitered and accepted the sites. The A & AFFRES concession building has been constructed outside the barrier (lane 10). The dial central building reef was replaced by the 937th Engineer Group. The 509th Signal Bn has cleared their area and are constructing billets, mess hall and other facilities. No information has been received concerning cantonment construction for the USAF at An Khe airfield or completion of USARV planned facilities for the airfield.

(3) Pacific Architects and Engineers: Shower latrine units are available in sufficient quantities to fulfill anticipated requirements through January 1967. ADC-B has given permission for PA&E to assist the 70th Engr Bn in prefabrication of 20' x 80' billets. Construction projects under way will provide adequate work for the available labor force for an extended period. Three 2½ ton trucks have been provided to the An Khe PA&E by the Qui Nhon PA&E which has increased their capability to provide prompt and adequate service. These vehicles will be maintained and repaired by PA&E. RAU has assumed responsibility for maintenance and repair of the barrier lighting and no problems are being encountered. PA&E now has local and third country purchase procurement authority. Electrical supplies and refrigerator spare parts remain in very short supply. Termite control facilities are now available through the Post Engineers on a controlled self help program.

6. (C) Civil Affairs

a. General. Civil affairs efforts during the period were directed toward support of combat operations and to civic actions in the vicinity of Camp Radcliff.

b. Support of Combat Operations.

(1) Operation PAUL REVERE II.

(a) Refugees. Operations were conducted in uninhabited or sparsely populated areas; consequently, refugee support and movement was not required. Relief supplies were provided to one destitute Montagnard village. They were given approximately 250 pounds of bulgar and 250 pounds of clothing.

(b) Captured Supplies. Some small caches of rice were located but were inaccessible areas and could not be evacuated. Captured webbing and khaki uniforms were distributed through district headquarters to the PF platoons.

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(c) Medical Treatment. Sick calls were conducted in villages throughout the AO when the situation permitted. Units conducting such activities were the 2nd Brigade, 3rd Brigade, 8th Engineers, and the 1/9th Cavalry. A total of 872 local Vietnamese were treated.

(d) Labor. The 8th Engineer Battalion employed 120 Montagnard laborers for 11 days. These laborers filled sandbags to shore up the shoulders of tactical resupply routes. This labor greatly increased the effectiveness of engineer work.

(e) Civic Action Projects. Projects were not initiated by units since MACV advisor and USSF personnel had working programs in the area and duplication of effort would have resulted.

(2) Operation THAYER.

(a) General. Operations during THAYER were conducted in moderately populated lowlands and sparsely populated mountains. The presence of civilian population created far more civil affairs/civic action activity than had occurred in recent operations.

(b) Organization.

1 Team 6, 41st CA Company was attached to the 1st Brigade throughout the operation.

2 Team 11, 41st CA Company was attached to the 2nd Brigade throughout the operation.

(c) Refugees.

1 Prior to the beginning of Operation THAYER, Hoai An District had 11,522 refugees in temporary refugee camps.

2 Initially, refugee control points were established at LZ FONY by the 1st Brigade and at LZ TWO BITS by the 2nd Brigade. The 2nd Brigade collection point was relocated near Hoai District Headquarters on 20 September 1966. This latter move was necessary to reduce transportation requirements for refugees and to facilitate direct coordination with the Hoai An District officials for refugee control and support.

3 During the operation 884 refugees were evacuated through Brigade collection points to the Hoai An District Headquarters. Evacuation by brigade is as follows:

a 1st Brigade - 375 refugees.

b 2nd Brigade - 509 refugees.

4 Refugee Relief Supplies. Refugees received the following relief supplies through brigade and CA team distribution.

a Bulgar -- 10,400 pounds (Obtained through USAID)

b Cooking Oil -- 60 cans (obtained through USAID)

c Whole Milk -- 23 gallons.

d Meat -- 106 pounds.

e Canned foods -- 700 pounds.

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Dried Beans -- 40 pounds.

E Soap -- 1,000 bars.

h Clothing -- 300 lbs.

(d) Medical Treatment.

1 Sick Calls - During 26 different sick calls conducted in the AO, 2,167 individuals received treatment for minor illnesses and injuries.

2 Twenty sick or injured persons were evacuated to hospitals for further medical attention.

3 At the PSA vicinity of Hammond, Division Reserve (2/5), 8th Engrs and 15th Med Bn conducted daily sick calls at the Phu Cat Dispensary and in close by villages. A total of 1,137 individuals were treated.

(e) GVN Coordination and Cooperation. Brigades S-5's coordinated directly with District Chiefs and MACV Subsector Advisors within the AO to arrange for interrogation/intelligence for subordinate units and to assist in refugee control and movement. The cooperation of local force and District personnel greatly assisted the efforts of tactical units within the AO.

(f) Captured Supplies. Approximately 37,400 pounds of rice were extracted from the AO and turned over to the Hoai An District Headquarters.

(3) Operation IRVING.

(a) General. Operation IRVING provided a different and new situation for Civil Affairs/Civic Action support requirements. The operation was conducted in the densely populated coastal region that is dotted with hamlets which have been under VC control for years. Secondly the area had been identified as the base area for the 2nd VC Regiment. Thus, it was anticipated that VC soldiers and their families were integrated into the social, political, and economic structure of the hamlets and villages.

(b) Population Control. To meet this different situation, the below listed measures were implemented in a Population Control Appendix. (Appendix 4 (Population Control) to Annex E (Civil Affairs - THAYER) to OPORD 6629 (IRVING) (U).

1 Collection points were established in each Brigade forward area.

2 Brigades were augmented with MP, IPW, and CA teams to man and operate the forward collection points.

3 A central collection point was established in the vicinity of Phu My district headquarters under division control.

4 Leaflets and loudspeaker were used to instruct villagers to remain in place until they received specific instructions concerning movement. Curfews were also established by leaflets and loudspeakers throughout the area.

5 Forward ground elements moved methodically through each

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hamlet. Forward units were provided with National Police and former hamlet and village chiefs to assist in identification of VC and VCS.

(6) As the forward elements prepared to search each hamlet, the hamlet occupants were given specific instructions through loudspeakers. They were told to move out of their houses and to collect in a specified place. This total control precluded confusion on the part of the populace and greatly reduced non-combatant casualties.

(7) All males, ages 14 through 60, plus other persons indicated by district representatives, were collected and sent to the forward collecting points for screening.

(8) Collected VC and VCS were evacuated to the division central collection point. Those persons determined as not being VCS were released to return to their homes.

(9) VCS evacuated to central collection point, but classified as possessing little or no information of tactical value were turned over to the district headquarters.

(10) The remaining VC and VCS were evacuated to the division POW cage.

(11) Refugee movement was not induced; however, those villagers who desired to be evacuated were permitted to leave after the hamlet was screened.

(12) Refugees were processed through the collection points; however, they were segregated from the VC and VCS. Refugees were turned over to district headquarters from the central collection point.

(13) Refugees were provided airlift from those areas that could not be evacuated by foot.

(14) Refugee evacuation by foot was done over specified routes that were patrolled by military forces.

(c) Refugees. Prior to Operation IRVING, 8,000 refugees were located in Phu My District. At the close of the operation 10,779 refugees had been evacuated from areas previously under VC control. The Phu My District officials implemented an active program to absorb the refugees. A temporary village was established and future relocation sites were selected along Highway 1, south of Phu My Village.

(d) Refugee Relief Supplies. Civilian supplies were augmented with the following items distributed by divisional elements.

- (1) Food --- 10,073 pounds (included canned meat base, canned beans, juices, flour, and canned beverages).
- (2) Clothing --- 2,175 pounds.
- (3) Soap --- 2,905 bars.
- (4) Medical supplies --- 50 pounds.
- (5) Toys ---- 450 pounds
- (6) Candy ---- 40 pounds

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(5) School paper _____ 50 packages

(e) Medical Treatment. Sick calls were conducted daily in refugee camps, and in villages surrounding forward support and CP areas. Forward units also provided emergency treatment in hamlets undergoing search operations. During the operation, approximately 18,000 Vietnamese received medical treatment from division elements.

(f) Captured supplies. The following supplies were evacuated to Phu My District Headquarters:

- (1) Rice 11,000 lbs
- (2) Salt 20,000 lbs
- (3) Medical supplies 40 lbs
- (4) Cloth 35 bolts

c. Camp Radcliff Civic Action Activities.

(1) Nature of operations. During the reporting period civil affairs/civic action activities were directed toward the general goal of improving the living conditions of the local Vietnamese. A majority of civic activities continued to be directed toward projects that provide long range benefits. This emphasis is so directed to develop a base for continued growth within the An Tho District. Short-range, high impact projects are implemented to alleviate critical conditions of hunger, disease and poverty.

(2) Long Range Projects.

(a) The Cuu An dispensary was completed on 15 October 1966. This is a two-room dispensary constructed by the joint efforts of the 3d Brigade and the Cuu An residents.

(b) The 2d Brigade assisted in digging wells and constructing cement caps for the wells in each of the villages of An Dinh, Thong Cong and Tu Thuy.

(c) The residents of An Dan were assisted by the 11th Aviation Group in digging and capping a well. Cement was provided through USAID.

(d) The 11th Aviation Group assisted the people of An Dan to make and install 100 culverts throughout the village. Transportation to haul sand and technical assistance were provided by the Aviation Group. The cement was provided by USAID and the labor was done by the An Dan residents.

(e) A pig sty with 10 stalls was constructed in An Dan with assistance from the 11th Aviation Group. Material was provided by USAID.

(f) To augment food production in the area, the 1st Brigade helped initiate a rabbit and chicken farm in Song Tan and An Song Villages.

(g) Fish ponds were dug and stocked with the assistance of the 1st Brigade in Song Tan Village and with the assistance of the 2nd Brigade in Thong Cong Village.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

(h) Two pig cooperatives were initiated and stocked with Yorkshire pigs purchased with funds from the division's FVMAF Civic Action Fund. One cooperative was started in An Son with 19 gilts and one boar. The cooperative in An Dan was stocked with 18 gilts and one boar. These cooperatives will return to the division a portion of the first two litters so other cooperatives can be stocked.

(i) In addition to the above, division elements are helping to construct two elementary schools, one secondary school, and three village dispensaries.

(3) Short Range, High Impact Projects.

(a) Public Health.

(1) During the reporting period, 15,071 local Vietnamese have been treated at sick calls held by medics of the division units. The sick calls are held weekly in the ten villages in the vicinity of Camp Radcliff.

(2) The 15th Medical Bn continues to provide support to the An Tuc Dispensary. One doctor and ten medics worked daily with the Vietnamese Medical Chief. Improvements in facilities, potable water, and a shower have been provided through the medical battalion.

(b) Public Welfare. More than 15,201 pounds of food and 2,125 pounds of clothing have been distributed to needy families and war victims.

(c) Economic support has been provided by the division through hiring 135,476 laborers for brush-clearing and activities related to the development of the division base for a cost of 8,242,250 \$VN.

SECTION II (c): Commander's Observations and Recommendations
Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned)

ITEM: The use of Penepriime as a surface treatment.

DISCUSSION: During Operation IRVING, heavy rains eroded the turnarounds on the airfield at HAMMOND. After repairing the erosion damage, two applications of penepriime were placed on the turnaround. The penepriime effectively waterproofed the turnaround areas, and subsequent rains caused no erosion damage. It was thought however, that MC-O would give a better surface than penepriime and a portion of the runway was treated with this asphaltic compound. The MC-O failed to penetrate sufficiently and the surface was distributed even by foot traffic. One application of penepriime was placed on two-thirds of the runway, and has proved to be an effective waterproof surface that is not easily disturbed by aircraft traffic.

OBSERVATION: Although not enough time has elapsed to evaluate the long term durability of penepriime as a surface treatment, it appears that it is an effective compound for waterproofing compacted earth airstrips. Penepriime has served well as a dust palliative for helicopter parking pads.

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SECTION II: Commanders' Analysis and Recommendations

22 November 1966

ITEM: Test firing the M-102 Howitzer on a sandy beach.

DISCUSSION: On 21 October 1966 a M-102 Howitzer was test fired on a wide sandy beach at GRO46743. The sand was hard packed requiring an average of three blows from a sledgehammer to drive in the base plate stakes. The howitzer was tested in both direct and indirect fire. No more than four rounds direct fire, charge 7, could be fired as the recoil displaced the howitzer to the rear and down causing the possibility of bending the platform. 45 mils displacement occurred firing 4 rounds, charge 7, indirect fire.

OBSERVATION: Sandy beaches are not a suitable position for the M-102 Howitzer.

ITEM: Composition of forward observer parties.

DISCUSSION: Wide spread dispersion of companies in RVN requires forward observer parties to fragment into two teams. Each team should consist of a forward observer and a radio-telephone operator.

OBSERVATION: MTOF has been submitted requesting an additional RTO in each FO party.

ITEM: Assault boat operations.

DISCUSSION: During Operation IRVING, assault boats with outboard motors were utilized on rivers leading into Vinh Nuoc Lake by elements of the 3d Brigade. Because of the shallow depths of these waters, the cooling system of the outboard motors became clogged with mud and organic matter, rendering the motors inoperable.

OBSERVATION: The September 1966 issue of the Army Digest indicated that shallow draft boats driven by an aircraft engine and pusher propeller, similar to swamp buggies used in the Everglades are currently being tested at Fort Belvoir. This type of boat should be considered for utilization in shallow waters and should be made available on a mission basis from a centrally controlled location in Vietnam.

ITEM: Hoist operations for patient evacuation.

DISCUSSION: Since rigging of Med Evac helicopters for hoists it has been found necessary to remove gunners and guns during hoist operations due to weight limitations. This decreases the defensive capability of the aircraft during an extremely delicate operation. The density altitude here in the central highlands is such that the weight and balance problem involved limit evacuation to one patient per hoist mission. Multiple extractions means a series of trips to the extraction site.

OBSERVATION: Any hoist mission conducted in an area where fire is expected will require gun ships to accompany Med Evac helicopters to the pick up site. This means more aircraft involved and more coordination. In essence, hoist type evacuation missions should not be used unnecessarily and should be requested only when it is impossible to move the patient to a landing zone or impractical to clear an area for a helicopter.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

ITEM: Use of local VC for security and services to support NVA.

DISCUSSION: The 3d NVA Division has made extensive use of local VC as a means of securing regular force bivouac area's. Moreover they are used as delaying forces to cover main force withdrawal and to lay mines and booby traps. Local VC are also called upon to gather intelligence of combat and logistical importance, to provide guides through familiar terrain, and to assist with manual labor when necessary.

OBSERVATION: This information emphasizes the importance of the destruction of local VC forces in light of the assistance they provide NVA divisions.

ITEM: NVA Main Force local security measures.

DISCUSSION: NVA Main Force security measures are very simple. In mountain/jungle areas during the hours of darkness, each company rotates one guard on an hourly basis. During daylight hours companies send a squad size patrol to screen 300-400 meters out. While bivouaced in a village, M.F. security is conducted by local VC.

OBSERVATION: NVA night security is at a minimum. Small screening forces can be expected 300-400 meters around NVA units.

ITEM: Landing Zone ambushes

DISCUSSION: As an offensive tactic, LZ ambushes are planned using the Spear and Net techniques. In so doing the NVA/VC choose an isolated outpost which can be reinforced only by air as surrounding territory is NVA, VC controlled. The outpost is attacked by a small force NVA/VC. To avoid casualties during LZ preparation from friendly reinforcements, NVA/VC troops withdraw 500-1000 meters. Meanwhile all enemy mortars and other weapons are laid on the LZ or airstrip. Therefore when reinforcements are brought in they are subject to immediate attack by either mortar/RR fire or by large NVA/VC forces held in reserve.

OBSERVATION: Attack on LZ's can be expected after LZ preparatory fires have been lifted and helicopters have entered the area.

ITEM: VC food supply

DISCUSSION: Each VC soldier carries 7-10 rations during operations. VC units have caches for 30 days ordinary supply, and maintain emergency caches for other situations. Reports and interrogations indicate the 2d VC Regiment is down from its normal rice supply. The 18th Regiment is also critically short. Denial of rice to these regiments will force them out of their normal areas of operation, thereby reducing their combat effectiveness, and requiring more personnel to procure provisions.

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OBSERVATIONS: Destruction and confiscation of rice caches will reduce the combat effectiveness of a Main Force VC unit and possibly cause him to withdraw from his current area of operation.

ITEM: Operators of UH-1B helicopters equipped with the 540 rotor head are experiencing unusual vibrations early in the life of the aircraft.

DISCUSSION: The 540 rotor head utilizes teflon bearings. These bearings are failing in the 100 to 150 hour range due to dust and dirt penetration. The bearing as it becomes worn sets up the vibration pattern.

OBSERVATION: All 540 rotor heads are being fitted with dust shields and special seals in an attempt to extend the bearing life.


ITEM: Removal of vertical blade pins from CH-47 aircraft.

DISCUSSION: An unusual number of vertical pins were stuck in the root socket. This resulted in 3/4" broken bars and produced an unsafe condition. Maintenance personnel were forced to assume unnatural positions in order to break the vertical pins loose.

OBSERVATION: A discussion with various maintenance personnel resulted in a locally produced device, with the aid of a 3 to 1 Sweeny wrench. This made a difficult job easy. Boeing mechanic Louis Stahl conceived and manufactured the device. (Sketch Incl)

PART II: Recommendations

NONE



WILLIAM A. BECKER
Brigadier General, USA
Acting Commander

8 Incls

1. Table of Contents
2. Find Fix Fight and Finish
3. Arty Raid
4. Task Org
5. Avn Data
6. Spt Forces
7. Visitors
8. Psychological Operations

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SIDE VIEW OF TOOL DESCRIBED

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1. 2 3/8"
2. 1 1/2"
3. 1 1/8"
4. 2"
5. 2 1/2"
6. 3 1/2"
7. 90 degrees
8. 150 degrees
9. 1 1/8" cold rolled steel
10. 1 1/8" cold rolled steel
11. 1 1/8" cold rolled steel
12. 5 3/4"
13. 3/4" cold rolled steel
14. 3/4" cold rolled steel
15. Area ground out to fit lock-out pin hole snug
16. 1/8" pin driven thru bar with washer welded to pit to prevent bar from damaging lockout mechanism

WELDS

Electrical welded nickel alloy rods for additional strength and depth




Fig 1

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
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ART VIEW OF TOOL DESCRIBED

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- 1. 150 degrees
- 2. 160 degrees



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Fig 2

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FORWARD HEAD INSTALLATION

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1. Tool described
2. Sweeny torque multiplier Model 101
3. Vertol pin puller
4. Blade socket
5. 3/4" drive breaker bar
6. Vertical pin housing
7. Lookout pin hole




Fig 3

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AFT HEAD INSTALLATION

- 1. Tool described
- 2. Sweeny 3-1 torque multiplier Model 101
- 3. Vertol pin puller
- 4. Blade socket
- 5. 3/4" drive breaker bar
- 6. Vertical pin housing
- 7. Lockout pin hole




Fig 4

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FIND FIX FIGHT and FINISH

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The following describes a successful Air Cavalry operation executed on 19 August 1966 by 1st Squadron 9th Cavalry during operation PAUL REVERE II. This action reflects the flexibility of the squadron in conducting harassing and pursuit missions against the enemy. It graphically demonstrates the successful application of "Find, Fix, Fight and Finish", using only squadron resources.

"At 1502 hours, a B Troop scout team (two OH-13s) reported ten NVA personnel in the open along a trail vicinity YV852922. The personnel were attempting to hide in tall grass and short trees in the area. The scout team was ordered to keep them in observation and to pin them down with fire if necessary. Simultaneously, orders were given to launch the B Troop organic rifle platoon. A weapons team (two UH-1B gun ships) on aerial recon in the area of operation were ordered to join the scout team to provide fire power if needed and to also cover the insertion of the rifle platoon. The weapons team was on station, four minutes after notification. The troop commander (who was at the CP when the initial contact was made) arrived at the location approximately 18 minutes after the initial report (15 minutes flying from CP to contact location).

A hasty estimate of the situation was made, and the decision to insert the rifle platoon to make ground contact was made. An LZ was selected and marked by the troop commander. The weapons team married up with the lift element approximately one mile from the LZ and the insertion was made approximately 22 minutes after the initial report at a position approximately 150 meters from the point of contact. During this period, one scout aircraft maintained a low orbit over the NVA personnel keeping them in continuous observation. On two occasions an attempt was made by the NVA personnel to escape. Short bursts of fire from an M-16 fired by the scout observer discouraged any further attempts. The second scout aircraft flew a larger orbit screening the surrounding area. After the insertion, the weapons team orbited at a slightly higher altitude in a position to provide firepower to either the rifle platoon or the scout aircraft.

The rifle platoon was moved rapidly under the control of the troop commander to a point approximately 50 meter short of the NVA personnel. Formation used by the rifle platoon for movement from the LZ to this point was a diamond formation by squads. At this point, control of the rifle platoon was passed to the scout aircraft who was now able to observe both the rifle platoon and the pinned down NVA personnel in sight. The rifle platoon formation was changed at this time to a line, with three squads on line, and one squad as rear security. This was accomplished on the move. Contact was made shortly after, and a fire-fight developed. The rifle platoon continued to move until all resistance was overcome. The scout aircraft continued to orbit low over the platoon, screening both flanks and the front, advising the rifle platoon. After all resistance was overcome the rifle platoon reorganized and re-swept the area.

This contact resulted in sixteen (16) NVA KIA (BC) and nine (9) VCC (2 WIA). Equipment captured: 2 Light machine guns (copy of Russian Degtyarev), 2 RFG rifles, 2 SKS rifles, 2 AK automatic rifles, 2 TNT blocks, 28 grenades, 3,000 rounds of 7.62 mmrc, 4 82mm mortar rounds, 1 75mm recoilless rifle round, 5 82mm mortar fuses, 26 packs and 2 documents.

Two organic aircraft extracted the captured personnel and equipment. Organic lift aircraft then extracted the rifle platoon. One friendly casualty (KIA) was suffered during the engagement. The entire operation was completed in two hours and twenty minutes.

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1st AIR CAVALRY ARTILLERY RAID

On 24 October 1966, A/2/19th Artillery(-) was airlifted from its battery position at LZ UPLIFT(BR926754) to a new battery position vicinity coordinates BR729903 at 1420 hours. The purpose of the displacement was to determine the feasibility of airlifting a battery into the enemy's rear area to conduct a raid by firing on preselected targets. The plan was to move four 105 howitzers with crews, 280 rounds of ammunition, and a skeleton FDC to an area which would allow fires to be placed into an enemy area outside the brigade area of operations; an area which the enemy probably felt was secure. Detailed planning preceded the actual movement beginning with extensive map reconnaissance to find the best terrain with a LZ which could easily be defended. Two days prior to occupation, an aerial reconnaissance was conducted by the Battalion CO, S3, and Battery CO. A list of all possible targets was obtained by the battalion S2 from division artillery headquarters. A detailed target analysis was performed jointly by the S2 and S3 and the six best artillery targets were selected. Each target was then analyzed to determine the best method of attack to include the number of rounds by type and fuze action to be employed. Four hours prior to displacement a precision registration was conducted at the mean range and mean azimuth of fire from the proposed position to the target area. The GFT setting determined from this registration was applied to the precomputed firing data for each target. Firing on all targets was observed by both the S3 and an air observer for surveillance and to determine accuracy of fire. The fire was extremely fortunate landing squarely on target exactly as planned. The LZ was occupied a total of 1 hour and 14 minutes from the time the cavalry troop infantry platoon landed to secure the LZ until they were extracted. The battery required 1 hour to occupy, fire, and displace with 17 minutes of this time being consumed in firing. Coordination was effected with the 1st Brigade to secure the LZ by the Air Cavalry troop for the battery to land. The Cavalry Troop is best suited for this mission with White Teams (Scouts) and Red Teams (Gunships) to provide long range surveillance around the LZ.

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TASK ORGANIZATION FOR MAJOR OPERATIONS

OPERATION:

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PAUL REVERE II (1 AUG - 25 AUG 66)

2d BRIGADE

- 1/5
- 2/5
- 2/12
- 1/77 Arty
- B 8th Engr
- Flat (-) 545 MP
- Tm 2 13th Sig
- Tm 2 191 MI
- 5th Weather Squadron
- 2 FSE (Supt)
- Tm 2 10th RRU
- Water Pt 8th Engr
- 227 Avn Bn (Supt)

3d BRIGADE

- 1/7
- 2/7
- 1/21 Arty
- C 8th Engr
- Flat (-) 545 MP
- 1 Batt 2/20 ARA
- 229 Avn Bn

DIVARTY

- C 6/16
- 2/17
- 3/18
- 2/19
- 2/20
- 1/21
- E 29 (SLT)
- E 82
- A & D 6/14
- C 1/30

OCA 1ST CAV

- 3/25
- 3/1 ROK
- 1/69 Armor
- C 3/4 Cav
- 2/9 Arty

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BYRD (24 AUG - CONTINUING)

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- 2/7
- C 1/9
- C (-) 8th Engr
- A 1/21 Arty
- C (-) 2/20 Arty (ARA)
- Det 226 Avn Bn
- C 229 Avn Bn
- Tm 3 (-) 13th Sig
- Tm 3 IPW/CI Det 191 MI
- 3d Bde CA Det
- 3d FSE

THAYER (13 SEPT - 1 OCT 66)

1st BRIGADE

- 1/8
- 2/8
- 1/12
- 2/19 Arty
- C 6/16 Arty
- Plat (-) 545 MP
- Tm 1 13th Sig
- Tm 1 IPW/CI 191 MI
- Tm 1 371 RRC
- Tm 1 5th Weather Squadron
- Water Pt 8th Engr
- Tm 6 41 CA Co

2d BRIGADE

- 2/12
- 1/5
- 1/77 Arty
- E 3/18 Arty
- B (-) 8th Engr
- 229 Avn Bn
- Plat (-) 545 MP
- 25th Scout Dog Plat
- Tm 2 13th Sig
- Tm 2 IPW/CI 191 MI
- Tm 2 371 RRC
- Tm 2 5th Weather Squadron
- 2 FSE
- Water Pt 8th Engr
- Tm 11 41 CA Co

DIVARTY

- 2/17
- 3/18
- 2/20 (-)
- F 29
- E 82
- C 3/6 OPCON

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IRVING (2 OCT - 24 OCT 66)

1st BRIGADE

- 1/8
- 2/8
- 1/12
- 2/19 Arty
- C 6/16 Arty
- A (-) 8th Engr
- 227 Avn Bn
- Plat (-) 545 MP
- Plat (-) 25th Scout Dog
- Tm 1 13th Sig
- Tm 1 IPW/CI 191 MI
- Tm 1 371 RRC
- Tm 1 5th Weather Squadron
- Tm 1 41 CA Co

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3d BRIGADE

- 1/5
- 1/7
- 5/7
- 1/21 Arty (-)
- E 3/18 Arty
- C (-) 8th Engr
- 229 Avn Bn (-)
- Plat (-) 545 MP
- Section 25 Scout Dog Plat
- Tm 3 371 RRC
- Tm 3 5th Weather Squad
- Tm 11 41 CA Co
- Tm 3 13th Sig
- Tm 3 IPW/CI 191 MI

DIV. HQ

- 2/17
- 3/18
- 2/20
- B 29
- E 82
- C 3/6

THAYER II (25 OCT - CONTINUING)

3d BRIGADE

- 2/8
- 1/7
- 5/7
- 1/9 (-)
- C 6/16
- A 2/17
- A 3/18
- C 2/19
- 229 Avn Bn (-)
- Plat (-) 545 MP
- Section, 25th Sct Dog Plat

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THAYER II ~~Continued~~

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3d BRIGADE

Tm 3 13th Sig
Tm 3 IPW/CI 191 MI
Tm 3 371 RRC
Tm 3 5th Weather Squadron
Tm 11 41 CA Co

PAUL REVERE IV (29 OCT - CONTINUING)

2d BRIGADE

1/5
2/5
2/12
1/77
E 1/9
C 1/30
C 3/8
227 Avn Bn
3 Tms PF
E 8th Engr
Plat (-) 545 MP
Tm 2 13th Sig
Tm 2 IPW/CI 191 MI
Tm 2 371 RRC
Tm 5th Weather Squadron
Sqd, 25th Scout Dog Plat
2d FSE
Water Pt

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 QUARTERLY REPORT
 AVIATION

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AVIATION OPERATIONS: During the reporting period division aircraft flew 74,210 hours and 178,293 Sorties, moving 26,927 tons of cargo and 238,976 troops. In performing these missions, 176 aircraft were hit by hostile fire, eleven being shot down. Of those shot down, six were repairable. During the entire period, ~~nineteen~~ crew members were KIA and 48 WIA as a result of enemy action.

PART I

AIRCRAFT FLIGHT HOURS (MONTHLY)

August 1966	O-1	OV-1	CV-2	OH-13	UH-1B	UH-1D	CH-47	CH-54
11th Avn Group	135	299	0	529	1682	7691	2045	0
1/9th Cavalry Sqdn	0	0	0	1919	2338	1064	0	0
Div Artillery	187	0	0	614	1821	0	0	0
Support Command	0	0	1066	199	0	750	0	187
1st Bde	0	0	0	511	0	334	0	0
2nd Bde	0	0	0	259	0	388	0	0
3rd Bde	0	0	0	377	0	387	0	0
DIVISION TOTALS	322	299	1066	4408	5841	10614	2045	187
TOTAL FLYING HOURS - 24,782		CUMULATIVE - 24,782						

September 1966	O-1	OV-1	CV-2	OH-13	UH-1B	UH-1D	CH-47	CH-54
11th Avn Group	106	318	0	300	1476	7741	1670	0
1/9th Cavalry Sqdn	0	0	0	1879	2322	1130	0	0
Div Artillery	327	0	0	431	2075	0	0	0
Support Command	0	0	1020	238	0	701	30	128
1st Bde	0	0	0	534	0	425	0	0
2nd Bde	0	0	0	530	0	341	0	0
3rd Bde	0	0	0	265	0	281	0	0
DIVISION TOTALS	433	318	1020	4177	5873	10619	1700	128
TOTAL FLYING HOURS - 24,361		CUMULATIVE - 49,143						

*Total & cumulative flying hours include 93 hours flown by the 53rd Avn Det (Prov).

October 1966	O-1	OV-1	CV-2	OH-13	UH-1B	UH-1D	CH-47	CH-54
11th Avn Gp	77	256	0	329	1402	8108	1913	0
1/9th Cavalry Sqdn	0	0	0	2011	2618	1136	0	0
Div Artillery	188	0	0	582	2023	0	0	0
Support Command	0	0	821	32	169	726	0	102
1st Bde	0	0	0	590	0	407	0	0
2nd Bde	0	0	0	413	0	319	0	0
3rd Bde	0	0	0	404	0	317	0	0
DIVISION TOTALS	265	256	821	4361	6212	11013	1913	102
TOTAL FLYING HOURS - 25,067		CUMULATIVE - 74,210						

*Total & Cumulative flying hours include 124 hours flown by the 53rd Avn Det (Prov).

PART II

MAJOR OPERATIONS
 (AUG THRU OCT 1966)

OPERATION	DATES	HRS FLOWN	SORTIES FLOWN	TONS CARGO	PASSENGERS
Paul Revere II	1 Aug- 25 Aug	18,550	38,504	8,441	45,414

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Thayer I	13 Sep -	15,164	40,566	5,507	49,589
	1 Oct				
Trving	2 Oct -	10,744	11,969	3,111	58,311
	24 Oct				

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PART III

SUPPORT RENDERED TO NON - US FORCES

MONTH	UNIT SUPPORTED	CH-47 DAYS	UH-1 DAYS	CV-27ERS	CH54 HRS
Aug 66	Support Special forces with one CH-47	1	0	0	0.0
	Support 101st Div with two CH-47's	24	0	0	0.0
	Support 52nd Airborne with one CH-47	5	0	0	0.0
Sep 66	Support IFFV with one CH-47	3	0	0	0.0
	Support Sitting Bull with 4 UH-1D's	0	1	0	0.0
	Decca System test with one UH-1D at Qui Nhon	0	4	0	0.0
	Support ARVN Troops	0	39	0	0.0
Oct 66	Support CIDG with 28 UH-1D's	0	90	0	0.0
	Support ARVN with 24 UH-1D's	0	48	0	0.0
	Support USAF with one CH-47	1	0	0	0.0
	Support ARVN with 11 CH-47's	99	0	0	0.0
	Support III MAF with one CH-54	0	0	0	15.8
	Support USN, I Corps & USMC, Recovery of F-4B, CH-34 Recovery (USMC) 1 CH-54	0	0	0	6.3
TOTALS		133	182	0	22.6

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PART IV
SUPPORT RENDERED TO NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>UNIT SUPPORTED</u>	<u>CH-47 DAYS</u>	<u>UH-1 DAYS</u>	<u>CV-2 HRS</u>	<u>CH-54 HRS</u>
Aug 66	Support of USMC I Corps with one CH-54				12.6
	Support 3/25 Inf with 3 CH-47's	21	0	0	0.0
	ARVN Airborne with one CH-47	2	0	0	0.0
	Support 4th Inf with one CH-47	1	0	0	0.0
TOTALS		24	0	0	12.6

PART V
SIGNIFICANT AVIATION OPERATIONS
PERFORMED BY ORGANIC AIRCRAFT

1-25 Aug 66	Operation "PAUL REVERE" - PHASE II 32 Infantry Battalions airlifted 24 Artillery batteries airlifted
13 Sep - 1 Oct 66	Operation "THAYER" - PHASE I 29 Infantry battalions airlifted 18 Artillery batteries airlifted
2 Oct - 24 Oct	Operation "IRVING" 14 Infantry battalions airlifted 12 Artillery batteries airlifted

PART VI
MONTHLY AVIATION STATISTICS

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>FLYING HRS</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>TONS CARGO</u>	<u>PASSENGERS</u>
Aug 66	24,782	58,460	11,143	57,870
Sep 66	24,361	53,673	7,930	68,925
Oct 66	25,067	66,160	7,854	112,181
CUMULATIVE	74,210	178,293	26,927	238,976

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PART VII
AIRCRAFT HIT DATA

UNIT	TOTAL	SPR	SRB	SNR	DAG	DEG
11th Avn Sq	58	0	3	1	24	2
1/9th Cav Sqdn	95	3	1	1	27	2
Division Arty	6	0	0	0	15	1
Support Command	8	0	0	0	0	0
1st Brigade	3	0	0	0	0	0
2nd Brigade	4	0	0	0	1	0
3rd Brigade	2	0	0	1	0	0
TOTALS	176	6	4	3	87	5

AVIATION CASUALTIES

UNIT	VIA	VIA	VIA
11th Avn Sq	5	0	0
1/9th Cav Sqdn	3	0	0
Division Arty	3	1	0
Support Command	0	0	0
1st Brigade	0	0	0
2nd Brigade	0	0	0
3rd Brigade	0	0	0
TOTALS	19	1	0

PART VIII

MONTHLY MISSION READ AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY

TYPE AIRCRAFT % AVAILABLE	MONTHS							
	Aug-65	Sep-65	Oct-65	Nov-65	Dec-65	Jan-66	Feb-66	Mar-66
OH-13	68	75	68	41	62	53	61	77
OH-1A	56	40	45	41	72	50	49	62
OH-1B	56	70	45	47	67	48	43	57
CUMULATIVE:	60%	71%	54.6%	43%	67%	50.3%	51%	65.3%

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BENNING AND DAZZLER (base, TACR defense) 1 August - 31 October 1966

Supporting Forces

- 1. US Air Force (Aircraft)
 - a. Missions 109
 - b. Sorties 234
 - c. Bombs 894,000 lbs
 - d. Napalm 50,500 lbs

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PAUL REVERE II

Supporting Forces

- 1. US Air Force (Aircraft)
 - a. Missions 347
 - b. Sorties 597
 - c. Bombs 850,700 lbs
 - d. Napalm 105,500 lbs
 - e. CBU 134
 - f. Rockets 63

THAYER I

Supporting Forces

- 1. US Air Force
 - a. Missions 222
 - b. Sorties 425
 - c. Bombs 464,920 lbs
 - d. Napalm 139,000 lbs
 - e. CBU 54
 - f. Rockets 847
 - g. WP 800 lbs

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Supporting Forces

1. US Air Force (Aircraft)	
a. Missions	357
b. Sorties	701
c. Bombs	976,410 lbs
d. Napalm	153,500 lbs
e. CBU	40
f. Rockets	266
g. WP	400 lbs

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VISITORS

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1 Aug 66	Lt Gen Larsen	CG, IFFV
2 Aug 66	Gen Myers	Dir J4 JCS
3 Aug 66	Maj Gen Ware	Chief Information Officer
	Maj Gen Dayan (Ret)	Working Reporter
4 Aug 66	Lt Col Llana	Deputy G5, IFFV
	Dr. Fisk	Deputy Asst to Sec Defense
	Gen Eifler	CG, 1st LOG Comd
5 Aug 66	Gen Johnson	US Army Chief of Staff
7 Aug 66	Brig Gen Almqvist	ADGSOFS
10 Aug 66	Chaplain Sugg Jr (Col)	Staff Chaplain USARV
	Col Knowlton	MACV SJS
14 Aug 66	Col Beaty	IFFV Engrs
16 Aug 66	Maj Gen Hang	CG 2d LOG Comd
	Lt Gen Engler	Dep CG, USARV
17 Aug 66	Mr. Fruehlund	Washington News
	Arthur Godfrey	USO Show
20 Aug 66	Mr. Hardiman	V/Pres, CBS
21 Aug 66	Gen Westmoreland	CG, MACV
	Chet Huntley	NBC News
23 Aug 66	Lt Gen Momyer	CG, 7th AF
25 Aug 66	Mr. Masumoto	Japan Air Defense
29 Aug 66	Lt Gen Wood	Asst British Military Attache
	Lt Gen Larsen	CG, IFFV
30 Aug 66	Gen Westmoreland	CG, MACV
31 Aug 66	Mr. Beecher	NY Times Reporter
2 Sep 66	Col Myers	Training Director, Off of C of S
	CO Hitchcock	DA PX Officer
	Gen Lincoln	USACONARC
3 Sep 66	Lt Gen Larsen	CG, IFFV
5 Sep 66	Col Cole	USARV G1
	Lt Gen Larsen	CG, IFFV
	Col Aide	US Army Trans School

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6 Sep 66	Col Holmes	DA, Arty
	Maj Gen Lew	CG, 1st Capital HOK Div
	Col Henri	CG, 22d ARVN Div
8 Sep 66	Col Creek	USACONARC
9 Sep 66	Lt Gen Larsen	CG, IFFV
10 Sep 66	Gen Daly	C of S, Australian Army
14 Sep 66	Mr. Loveland	Lycoming Representative
15 Sep 66	Chaplain Prudell (Col)	MACV, Chaplain
	Col Baily	97th Arty Group
	Col Harging	USARV G4, Maint Div
21 Sep 66	Maj Conner	
23 Sep 66	Gen Beach	CINCSARPAC
	Brig Gen Freung	Special Asst MACV
26 Sep 66	Mr. Hand	Dir of Operations ARC, Pacific
	Lt Gen Larsen	CG, IFFV
	Col Murphy	Dental Surgeon, USARPAC
27 Sep 66	Chaplain Marsh (Col)	USARPAC Chaplain
	Brig Gen Terry	USARV Signal Officer
	Brig Gen Senoff	CG, 1st Avn Bde
28 Sep 66	Brig Gen Kuhn	Army Veterinary Corps
	Right Reverend Lewis	Episcopal Church Bishop
	Maj Gen Rossan	Chief of Staff, MACV
29 Sep 66	Col David	AF Red Ball Express
30 Sep 66	Lt Gen Larsen	CG, IFFV
	Col Stanton	USAF
5 Oct 66	Col Jones	Dir Maint Avn Command
	Col McEvoy	CG, United War Lab
	Brig Gen Ploger	CG, 1st Engr Bde
	Col Everett (Ret)	DA Search Light Operations
6 Oct 66	Lt Col Johnson	USARV Psychiatrist
7 Oct 66	Brig Gen Moore	MACV, Provist Marshal
12 Oct 66	Mr. McNamara	Secretary of Defense
13 Oct 66	Lt Gen Dolemen	C of S USARPAC
14 Oct 66	Mr. Goodhart	Minister of British Parliament

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14 Oct 66	Lt Gen Larsen	CG, IFFV
16 Oct 66	Maj Gen Rosson	C of S, MACV
17 Oct 66	Gen Adams	Vice C of S, US Army
	Maj Gen Whiecomb (Ret)	FK System
19 Oct 66	Brig Gen Colo	Dep C of S, USARV
	Col Burchell	CO, 34th Group
21 Oct 66	Lt Gen Larsen	CG, IFFV
23 Oct 66	Col Callahan	Electronics Command
25 Oct 66	Rear Adm Cowan	CINCPAC Medical Officer
27 Oct 66	Maj Kugl	USMC
	Maj Loko	USMC
28 Oct 66	Dr. McRieoch	Dir of Psychiatry, WRGH
30 Oct 66	Mr. HyMoff	Publishing Firm
31 Oct 66	Mr. Berrant	AMC Supply
	Col Crowe	MACV, IG
	Col Petrilli	USARV, IG

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 66

Follow the example of TRAN HING DAO

All the people must unite against the communist.

Save the Fatherland.

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WHERE IS THE ZONE OF LIBERATION

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Actually, you are living in a zone of liberation. The area of forests and impure water, where you must hide out, move secretly at night, is the zone you call "liberated". The regions under VC control no longer exist because a million inhabitants fled the VC-controlled villages to go to live in areas under GVN control.

Your zone - as you well know - has no security. The GVN and Allied forces can carry out a search and destroy operation at will. No spot escapes the bombardment of the Allied Forces. You are short of food. Things will get worse because the Allied soldiers have seized all your reserves in the caches and the inhabitants of remote villages cannot supply you.

Under such miserable circumstances, how can you win? What must you do to survive? There is only one way - - and that is to rally under the CHIEU HOI Program of the GVN, to be warmly welcome, to be well treated and get the chance to build a new life in free South Vietnam.

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Don't run. Don't hide from troops on the ground or from helicopters.

Don't shoot or you will be shot. Stay where you are until you are told what to do by loudspeaker. You will be given instructions by loudspeaker. Obey the instructions and you will not be harmed.

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FRONT:

Do you want to die and be buried in an unmarked grave or come back to your family and enjoy the government's protection.

BACK:

It is your choice, either this or that.

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THESE NVA SOLDIERS WILL HAVE TO SEE THEIR FAMILIES AGAIN

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These NVA soldiers in one of the Republic of Vietnam "Open Arms" centers are living happily and will see their families again. They are no longer killing other Vietnamese. They have left the jungle, hardship and hunger. In the "Open Arms" Centers everyone receives good care. There is plenty of food. There is clothing. There is medical treatment. A warm welcome is offered to all who voluntarily leave the ranks of the Lao Dong Party aggressors.

More than 30,000 VC and NVA soldiers and cadres have accepted this warm welcome. They have chosen to see again their parents, wife, children and friends. You too have this choice! Use the National Safe Conduct Pass to return to the family and the people.

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US Numbered Commands

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1st CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)
APO SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 96490
Operational Report on Lessons Learned

1. General

1

2. Personnel

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- a. Strength
- b. Replacements
- c. Morale and Personnel Services
- d. Promotion
- e. Reenlistments
- f. Postal
- g. Special Services
- h. Financial Service
- i. Chaplain Activities
- j. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order
- k. Inspector General Activities. No significant trends in complaints and/or requests were revealed
- l. medical
- m. Information Officer Activities

3. Intelligence

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- a. G2 Organization
- b. Operations
 - 1. PAUL REVERE II
 - 2. THAYER I
 - 3. IRVING
- c. Order of Battle
- d. G2 Air
- e. Maps
- f. Det 24, 5th Weather Squadron
- g. 371st RRC
- h. 191st HI Detachment
- i. 54th Infantry Detachment

4. Operational Training

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- a. Organizations
- b. Operations
- c. Discussion and analysis of major operations
- d. Psychological Operations
- e. Training
- f. Combat Developments

US Numbered Commands

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1st CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)
APO SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 96490
Operational Report on Lessons Learned

1. General	1
2. Personnel	4
a. Strength	
b. Replacements	
c. Morale and Personnel Services	
d. Promotion	
e. Reenlistments	
f. Postal	
g. Special Services	
h. Financial Service	
i. Chaplain Activities	
j. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order	
k. Inspector General Activities. No significant trends in complaints and/or requests were revealed	
l. medical	
m. Information Officer Activities	
3. Intelligence	11
a. G2 Organization	
b. Operations	
1. PAUL REVERE II	
2. THAYER I	
3. IRVING	
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e. Maps	
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a. General	
b. Supply and Services	
c. Transportation	
d. Maintenance	
e. Construction and Facilities	

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- 6. Civil Affairs 36
 - a. General
 - b. Support of Combat Operations
 - c. Camp Radcliff Civic Action Activities

SECTION II: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 41

OBSERVATIONS (LESSONS LEARNED)

1. The use of Penepime as a surface treatment
2. Test firing the M-102 Howitzer on a sandy beach
3. Composition of forward observer parties
4. Assault boat operations
5. Hoist operations for patient evacuation
6. Use of local VC for security and services to support NVA
7. NVA Main Force local security measures
8. Landing Zone ambushes
9. VC food supply
10. Operators of UH-1B helicopters equipped with the 540 rotor head are experiencing unusual vibrations early in the life of the aircraft
11. Removal of vertical blade pins from CH-47 aircraft