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IN REPLY RKFCR TO
AGAM-P (M) (29 May 67) FOR OT

2 June 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation Davy Crockett conducted
by the 3D Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is a Combat After Action Report for
Operation Davy Crockett. Operation Davy Crockett was conducted by the
3D Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division during the period 3-16 May 1966.
Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate
benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations,
and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS, 3D BRIGADE
1ST AIF CAVALRY DIVISION.
APO San Francisco, California 96490

AVCRD-0

25 May 1966

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (MACV/RCS/J3/32)

TO: Commanding General
1st Air Cavalry Division
ATTN: G-3
APO US Forces 96490

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*DEPT. OF ARMY
OFFICE OF ASST CHIEF OF STAFF
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ATTN: FOR-OT-RP
WASH D.C. 20310*

1. NAME: (OPERATION DAVY CROCKETT)
2. DATES OF OPERATION: 3 May - 16 May 1966
3. LOCATION: BONG SON, HOAI AN, and PHU MY Districts, BINS DINH Province
4. COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: HQ 3d Brigade
5. REPORTING OFFICER: Colonel Harold G. Moore
6. TASK ORGANIZATION: See Annex 1
7. SUPPORTING FORCES:
 - a. Aviation:
 - (1) 298 OH-13S sorties
 - (2) 202 UH-1/B sorties
 - (3) 6022 UH-1/D sorties
 - (4) 626 CH-47 sorties
 - b. Artillery:
 - (1) 2503 tube artillery missions fired using 12778 rounds.
 - (2) 150 aerial rocket missions fired using 7603 2.75 inch¹ rockets.

STATEMENT #2 UNCLASSIFIED

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Suspects were picked up around 8616 and BS 8614 early on the 4th, and interrogation revealed the presence of one NVA Bn, vicinity BS 862150 and BS 862143. Since the 2/7 Cavalry was blocking in the North and the 1/7 Cavalry blocking in the West, with ARVN to the East, it appeared that 1/9 Cavalry pushing North would trap the NVA Bn at RY VAN (2), NINH DE (2), and TIDNG SON (2) by sundown. Our action was completed, however, and a gap was left open toward the south. The North Vietnamese Battalion escaped from the trap after dark and moved toward THANH SON (2) at BS 8511. While it moved along the axis of the road, the Bn suffered numerous casualties from ARVN artillery fire. Interrogation of NVA captives the next morning revealed that it was the 9th Bn, Auyet Tam Regiment. The VC body count as of 1800 hrs on the 5th of May was 32.

It was clear on the 6th of May that the 9th NVA Bn had been routed. Groups of 20, 35, and 60 were hiding in the hamlets vicinity BS 8511 and BS 8611. As a result of the action the night of the 5th to 1800 hours on the 6th one hundred and nineteen NVA's were KIA by body count and all through the night of the 6th several attempts were made by the remainder of the Bn to break out of the trap vicinity BS 8511 and BS 8611.

On the 7th of May, 1/9 Cavalry, 2/7 Cavalry and 1/7 Cavalry continued to search the area pulling some NVA's from holes, hay stacks, and engaging small groups making attempts at a last-ditch defense. ARVN forces to the east engaged a platoon at 1555 hours vicinity BR 892993.

On the 7th the VC KIA body count was 112, the rout was expected to continue on the 8th, and the 3d Brigade units planned to police up the battle area. Actions on the 8th of May resulted in sixteen VC KIA (BC). Only minor contact was made on the 9th and 10th of May which accounted for an additional three VC body count.

A breakdown of 9th Bn NVA captives shows seven from the 92d Rifle Company, six from the 93d Rifle Company, and three from the 94th Weapons Company. Five others were a medic, an ammo bearer, a cook, a messenger, and a supply carrier. Four other NVA captives were WIA and could not be interrogated. ARVN IPW sources stated they had some members of the 92st Company, so it may be concluded that the entire 9th Bn had been engaged and defeated. The most important captive for intelligence purposes was a Sr Lt HO Q5UNG, Political Officer of the 92nd Company.

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b. Phase II, 110330 May 66 to 16 May,

- (1) Weather: The weather during Phase II was similar to that encountered in Phase I. Clouds and rain showers did not affect air assault operations.
- (2) Terrain: The "CROW'S FOOT" is a unique piece of terrain. Eight ridges of the surrounding hills orient toward the center of a 20 x 20 square kilometer area draining off into seven valleys and creating numerous streams and a large fast flowing river. The hills rise to a height of 855 meters at the highest point. They are densely vegetated and provide the enemy forces with cover, concealment, and a sanctuary. The elevations and cross compartmentalized character of the terrain afford enemy forces the means to conduct a mobile defense throughout the entire CRCW 'S FOOT Area.
- (3) Enemy situation: Prior to entry into the "CROWS FOOT" area it was believed that the following units were there:

Hq 2d MF Regt	BR 7675	150 men
Inf Bn	BR 7580	500
Inf Bn	BR 7281	500
Inf Bn	BR 6972	500
Upne Bn	?	500
200th AA Bn	BR 7280	500

It was believed that these units would defend initially and then withdraw. It was also expected that there would be intense AV (AA) fire at aircraft in the assault on objectives BIRD and PONY at BR 7380 and 3R 3084 respectively. The landings were virtually unopposed however, and throughout the day only sporadic fire was encountered.

A surprise target was reported by the HOAI AU District Advisor at 111400 hours May. He claimed that a VC Bn was moving south from vicinity BR 783943 to BR 783943. The 1/9 Cavalry was dispatched to attempt confirmation and their report verified a large force in that area. Several AW's and SA's were fired at gunships and four TAC Air sorties resulted in several estimated VC KBA. At approximately 1900 the 1/5 Cavalry was lifted to vicinity of BR 7599. The VC government was evaluated as a reinforcement in the AC, but later the estimate dropped from one Bn down to 40 NVA troops operating with 25 local guerrillas in vicinity of BR 7794. One MV A captive was a corporal moving from a training area near KIM SON (BR 7878) to rejoin his unit. (7th Bn, Quyet Tam Regt) which was located around HOAI CHAU (BS 8411). The engagement by 1/5 and 1/9 Cavalry with the 65 NVA/VC force on the

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11th and 12th of May vicinity BR 7794 resulted in 38 VC KIA.

As interrogations progressed throughout the day and night, it became clear that main forces units had withdrawn from the CROWS FOOT Area on the 11th of May, leaving snipers and stragglers to harass US troops. Withdrawal was probably toward the south and southwest.

Phase II continued on the 13th of I-Vy with an element of the 1/9 Cavalry and 1/5 Cavalry moving rapidly from the CROC's FOOT Area back to vicinity BS 8613 and BS 8615 in an attempt to exploit agent reports that the 7th and 8th Bns of the Tam Rung had moved back into their old positions. The result of this action was six VC by body counts.

Several VCS and a few VCC were interrogated from 1700 to 1830 hours on the 13th of May and they revealed a movement of large numbers of NV A from BS 8614 and BS 2615 toward the mountains in the west at 1200 hours and 1980 hours 12 May. Some VCC were members of the D-2) Company and local guerrillas covering withdrawal of NV A units.

On 14 May, 1/7 Cavalry raided a suspected VC village vicinity BS 9003, killing three VC and capturing two, while 2/7 Cavalry and 1/9 Cavalry swept through the SUOI OA Valley vic BR 8060. No major enemy force was encountered there; however, 16 VC were killed and some medical supplies and documents were discovered at BR 773682,

SPAR reports in the vicinity of BR 7164 prompted an air strike on the 15th of May which was followed up by 1/9 Cavalry who turned in a negative report.

9. MISSION: The 3d Brigade conducts search and destroy operations in the BONG SON Coastal Plain area beginning on 4 May 1966, pursues the enemy, requests timely adjustments of the area of operations, and secures logistical convoys from PHU CAT (BR 9140) north to the area of operations.

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

- a. Phase I. 3d Brigade moves by helicopter and ground vehicles from AN KHE to BONG (Position DUG). The 2/7 Cavalry (-) moves by 64-ID's from AN KHE to the area of operations landing at H hours, 040615 May 66. The remainder of the Battalion moves by ground convoy from AN KHE to position DOG closing NLT H-1 hours.

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The 1/7 Cavalry (-) moves by a combination of organic air and ground vehicles and is responsible for the security of road convoy departing AN KEE 632200 May 66 arriving at Position DOG prior to Qz+0500 May 66. The 1/7 Cavalry moves from Position Dog to their area of operations at H+ 15 minutes, establishes ambush/blocking positions across most likely avenues of enemy egress to the west, and prepares to attack to the east on order. The 2/7 Cavalry lands in their area of operations at H-hour, secures position SPIKE, BS 878168, for two artillery batteries, establishes ambush/blocking positions across most likely avenues of enemy egress to the north and northwest, and prepares to attack south on order. The 1/9 Cavalry attacks north on order from Position DOG by ground and air, destroys enemy forces in their zone of operations, conducts an aerial screen of the area between Position DOG and 1/7 Cavalry, and secures all logistical convoys between PHU CAT and position DOG throughout the operation in coordination with the 3d FSE. All units prepare to use Hunter-Killer concept beginning 05 May 66 in an enlarged area of operations on order.

Road convoy movement on 03 May will be covered by aerial rocket artillery, RCK'A and ARVN tube artillery along the route. The initial entry of the 2/7 Cavalry at H-hour will be supported as prescribed by the Battalion Commander. The initial entry of the 1/7 Cavalry will be supported as prescribed by the Battalion Commander. The attack of the 179 Cavalry (-) supported by one 105mm battery from position. DOG and two 105mm batteries supported the 1/7 Cavalry and the 2/7 Cavalry from Position Spike. The 1/21 Artillery Battalion (-) moves from AN KJIE to Position SPIKE using 15 CH AL's at H + 15 minutes on order. Priority of fires initially to the 2/7 Cavalry,

using Hunter-Killer techniques. The 1/5 Cavalry prepares to destroy enemy forces in the assigned sector on order after contact has been established by the 1/9 Cavalry.

The 1/7 Cavalry prepares to destroy enemy forces, assigned sector on order after contact has been established by the 1/9 Cavalry. The 2/7 Cavalry attacks at H-hour to seize Position BIRD, BE 7.30802, secures artillery position in BIRD and Position PONY. BR 795442, and conducts Hunter operations in the area of operations beginning at H + 1 hours. When contact is made in either area, Killer forces will be committed while Hunter operations shift to other parts of the area of operations.

Initial entry of the 2/7 Cavalry will be supported by aerial rocket artillery. At H-hour one battery of 105mm artillery and one battery of 155mm artillery begin movement by road from DOG to Position PONY. On order (about H + 1 hour) two batteries of 105mm artillery move by air to Position BIRD. One battery of 105 mm artillery remains at DOG prepared for further employment on order. Priority of fire to the 2/7 Cavalry initially, then to the unit in contact.

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On 13 May 66 a plan was developed to move to an area of operations in the Upper SUOI CA Valley. The 1/9 Cavalry (-) with one company of the 1/5 Cavalry attached planned to secure LZ BULLET, BR 8C 705, for the deployment of one or two batteries of artillery. Subsequently the 1/9 Cavalry was to conduct reconnaissance operations to locate enemy forces in the area. The 1/5 Cavalry (-) and the 2/7 Cavalry were designated reaction forces to be employed to destroy these forces.

11. EXECUTION:

- a. Phase I: Operation DAVY CROCKETT began at 031640 when Companies A & B, 2/7 Cavalry and the Battalion jump lifted off from Camp Radcliff for PHU CAT training camp by UH-1D closing at 031810 hours. The Battalion (-) laagered for the night at PHU CAT. The 3d Brigade Headquarters, the 1/7 Cavalry, and the 1/21 Artillery, the 1/9 Cavalry (-), the 3d FSE, and attached and supporting elements moved from Camp Radcliff to Position DOG. BS 881007, by ground convoy departing at 032200 Lay 66 and closing at Position DOG at 040605 May 66.

Deployment of the Battalion within the Operational area began at 040617 hours when Companies A and B, 2/7 Cavalry, lifted off for LZ's SPIKE, BS 87316S, and DELTA 857171, closing at 040647 hours with no contact. Company C, 1/7 Cavalry lifted off for LZ 4, 844146, at 040705 hours followed by Company B into an LZ at 830127, Companies A and B into LZ 3, 833128, and the Battalion CP into 833129. The Battalion closed toward blocking/ambush positions. In the north the 2/7 Cavalry also established blocking positions. Company C, 2/7 Cavalry arrived at LZ YANKEE, 856157, from Camp Radcliff by UH-ID at 041153 hours. Battery B, 1/21 Artillery was deployed to the ARVN Position at 898091. The Battalion (-) remained at Position DOG.

At 044756 hours Troop D, 1/9 Cavalry with an ARVN ABC and Scout Company attached, launched an attack north from Position DOG west of Hwy 19. Their operation on 04 May 66 was characterized by light, sporadic contact. Large number of ZCS were apprehended by the 1/9 Cavalry, 1/7 Cavalry, and the 2/7 Cavalry for interrogation to learn of the enemy dispositions in the area. The attack of the 1/9 Cavalry advanced north to the general area of the 10 east-west grid line by nightfall, when the attacking elements halted for the night.

The majority of the VC KIA inflicted during the day was a result of aerial rocket artillery and the 1/9 Cavalry gunships. One UH-ID of the 1/9 Cavalry was downed by hostile fire at 868108 at 041720 hours. The aircraft was repaired and flown to Position DOG. Just prior to dark on 04 May 66 the 227 AHB conducted fake landings on the high ground north of the 2/7 Cavalry positions. During the day the 1/9 Cavalry secured logistical convoys moving between PHU CAT and Position DOG.

At 050710 May 66 the 1/9 Cavalry (-) with attachments resumed their attack to the north. During the day the 1/7 Cavalry and the 2/7 Cavalry air lifted small patrols, platoon sized, in their operational areas attempting to locate the enemy forces with no contact. At 051143 the 2/7 Cavalry

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began an attack to the south to seize the village
The Battalion encountered only very light contact
village. At 051350 hours the 1/9 Cavalry began to receive
heavy automatic weapons fire from BS 864138. The squadron
developed the situation and estimated that a VC battalion
was located in the vicinity of BS 864145. The 2/7 Cavalry
was moved to attack the enemy force, however, as darkness
approached the enemy position had not been taken. The 1/7 Cavalry
began air movement at 051810 to join the 2/7 Cavalry and the
1/9 Cavalry in an attempt to encircle the enemy force.
Although heavy losses were known to have been inflicted
upon the enemy force, during the hours of darkness they
eluded the US attackers and escaped the encirclement. During
the day the 1/9 Cavalry continued to secure logistical
convoys between PHU CAT and Position DOG.

at BS 870160.
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Beginning at 060720 May 66 a coordinated attack was
launched against the enemy positions; however, it soon
became apparent that the VC force had escaped. At 060808
hours a UH-ID was shot down at BS 855100 resulting in five
casualties. The 1/9 Cavalry secured the site of the downed
aircraft and came under fire from BS 854113. As the situation
was developed an estimated VC Battalion was fixed in the
village located at BS 854113. The 1/7 Cavalry, 2/7 Cavalry,
and 1/9 Cavalry rapidly moved to surround the enemy force.
Twelve sorties of F4-C fighter bombers were expended on the
force and aerial rocket and tube artillery were employed. The
1/7 Cavalry attacked from the north while the 2/7 Cavalry
blocked to the south and west and the 1/9 Cavalry blocked
to the east. At 061650 hours the 1/7 Cavalry and the 2/7
Cavalry made visual contact although enemy resistance
continued. As nightfall approached the enemy position had not
been breached although he was known to have suffered heavy
losses. Positions were established encircling the VC force.
Throughout the night contact continued with what was esti-
mated to be small exfiltration groups.

The 1/5 Cavalry was ordered to deploy to the
operational area and began arriving at Position DOG by CV-2
at 062143 hours. The Battalion closed Position DOG at
070730 May 66 and was attached to 3d Brigade, At 071025
the Battalion began movement by UH-ID to an area of operations
in the northern Brigade A0. The Battalion closed this area
of operations at 071223 hours.

On 07 May 66 the Brigade concentrated on searching the
area of operations with particular attention to the scene of
battle of the previous day. The 1/9 Cavalry conducted operation;
on the high ground west of the coastal plain in the area of
operations attempting to locate enemy forces and installations.

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On 071600 Company D, 1/5 Cavalry relieved the 2/7 Cavalry of responsibility for the artillery position at SPIKE. At 071655 hours Troop D, 1/9 Cavalry closed into position DOG. Light contact with scattered VC groups was reported during the day.

On 08 May the Brigade continued to search villages in the area of operations. Mine sweepers were used in an attempt to locate hidden weapons. The 1/9 Cavalry continued to seek the enemy on the high ground to the west and escorted logistical convoys from PHU CAT to DOG.

At 082030 LZ SPIKE was subjected to a mortar and automatic weapons attack that lasted about 30 minutes. Direct fire artillery, aerial rocket artillery, and small arms were employed to rout the attackers. At about 082115 hours the 1/5 Cavalry CP received six rounds of mortar fire but no damage was sustained. Only very light contact was reported during the day.

At 090830 May 66 the artillery battery in LZ SPIKE began displacement to Position DOG. At 091057 the reconnaissance platoon, 1/5 Cavalry closed LZ RALPH, BS 855123, where the battalion spent the day resting and maintaining equipment. The 2/7 Cavalry in LZ ZULU BS 854113, and the 1/7 Cavalry in LZ lq BS 863060, also spent the day in rest and maintenance; local security patrols were conducted.

The Brigade spent 10 May 66 preparing for the continuation of Operation DAVY CROCKETT in the CROW'S FOOT Area. At 101400 May 66 the 1/5 Cavalry began movement to Position DOG by CH-47 and UH-1D closing at 101527 hours.

At 110225 May 66 a light probing attack was received by the 2/7 Cavalry in LZ ZULU. Sixteen of the UH-1D aircraft laagered with the 2/7 Cavalry received small arms hits. At 110440 hours all flyable aircraft, with Company B, 2/7 Cavalry aboard, moved from LZ ZULU to position DOG.

- b. Phase II: Phase II of Operation DAVY CROCKETT began at 110330 hours when A Battery, 2/17 Artillery and C Battery, 1/3 Artillery, began a road move to Position PONY, BS 805879, closing at 110530 hours. At 110540 hours the first elements of the 2/7 Cavalry lifted off from Position DOG and landing at Position BIRD, BS 730805, at 110549 hours without opposition. By 110657 hours the objective was considered secure and at 110707 hours Battery B, 1/21 Artillery began movement to Position BIRD closing at 110850 hours. Battery C, 1/21 Artillery moved to Position BIRD beginning at 110900 hours and closing at 111014 hours. Company A, 2/7 Cavalry moved by air at 110715 hours to Position PONY to secure the artillery in that location.

Beginning at 110900 hours the 2/7 Cavalry conducted search

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operations vicinity Positions BIRD and PONY and in an area of operations northeast from BIRD. The Battalion encountered only light contact with small groups of VC during the day. The 1/9 Cavalry conducted an area reconnaissance in the Brigade area of operations on 11 May 66 hunting for VC forces and installations. They encountered only small groups of enemy during the day until 111445 May 66 when the 1/9 Cavalry observed an estimated VC battalion moving south-southwest in the valley vicinity BR 7792. As the situation was developed aerial rocket artillery, tube artillery, and TAC Air was employed against the enemy force, and three rifle platoons of 1/9 Cavalry were landed to block the withdrawal of the enemy force. The 1/5 Cavalry was ordered to deploy to vicinity BR 760904 to develop the situation and fix the enemy force. Company C, 1/5 Cavalry lifted off from Position DOG at 111705 hours and by 111800 the Battalion had closed in the new objective area. Company C, 1/7 Cavalry was lifted to BR 780941, attached to the 1/5 Cavalry, and ordered to block enemy forces moving north. The company closed the blocking position at 112019 hours. After the closure of C Company, 1/7 Cavalry the infantry platoons of 1/9 Cavalry were extracted from the area. Heavy casualties were inflicted upon the enemy force, however, nightfall prevented encirclement of the enemy and during the night contact was lost.

On 12 May 66 the 2/7 Cavalry continued to conduct search operations northeast of Position Bird. One platoon of B Company was landed at LZ MIKE, BR 768768, and searched in a 1000 meter radius of this coordinate with no contact. Other landings were made throughout the day with scattered light contact made with small groups of VC. The 1/9 Cavalry continued reconnaissance in the area of operations with scattered light contact. The 1/5 Cavalry searched the area of the previous day's contact encountering several small groups of VC. At 121504 hours the Battalion began an air move to BR 787950, closing at 121715 hours, where they remained for the night. The 1/7 Cavalry constituted the Brigade ready reaction force on 12 May 66. At 121121 Company C, 1/7 Cavalry, was released from attachment to the 1/5 Cavalry and rejoined the 1/7 Cavalry at Position DOG. At 121310 a platoon of Company A, 1/7 Cavalry landed at BR 888992 to hunt for a sniper who had been firing on aircraft landing at Position DOG. At 121708 hours the platoon returned to Position DOG with three VCS.

On 13 May 66 the 1/5 Cavalry conducted search operations vicinity WILLY, BR 787950 with light contact. 2/7 Cavalry conducted search operations northeast of Position BIRD and vicinity of Position PONY with light contact. The 1/9 Cavalry conducted reconnaissance over the Brigade area of operations with emphasis on the high ground north and northwest of the VINH THANH CIDG Camp with scattered light contact. At 131122 the 1/5 Cavalry began movement by UH-1D aircraft from LZ WILLY to BONG SON CIDG Camp closing 131437 hours.

At 131500 the 1/9 Cavalry with Company B, 1/7 Cavalry and the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1/5 Cavalry, attached, lifted off from Position DOG to investigate agent reports of two VC battalions operating north of Position DOG. Landings were made at BS865167, BS 863145, BS 863134, BS 857123, and BS 858107 with scattered light contact. The squadron was extracted at last light closing Position DOG at about 131830 hours.

On May 66 the 1/7 Cavalry undertook the task of locating an AWOL soldier previously reported killed by the NV north of Position DOG. The Battalion moved out at 140615 hours and searched the area north of DOG on both sides of Highway 1 with no contact. After a day of fruitless search the Battalion returned to Position DOG.

The 1/9 Cavalry landed to secure Position Bullet, vicinity 808603, at 140840, hours with Company B, 1/5 Cavalry as the assault force. There was not contact in Position BULLET; however, scattered light contact was made throughout the day. At 140945 B Battery, 1/21 Artillery began to move into Position BULLET by CH-47 aircraft. Following B Battery, C Battery, 1/2* Artillery also displaced to Position BULLET. At 140817 what was judged to be a company sized force was observed vicinity coordinates 788673. The 2/7 Cavalry was alerted for deployment as a reaction force to block their escape. At 141209 hours Company B, 2/7 Cavalry landed at LZ FOXTROT 773658, with negative contact. At 141220 Company D, 2/7 Cavalry landed at LZ DELTA BR 773698, with negative contact. The 2/7 Cavalry established a blocking position at BR 780683 to prevent enemy escape to the west. The 2/7 Cavalry cleared LZ's PONY and BIRD at 141415, moving the entire Battalion to LZ's FOXTROT and DELTA. At 141727 hours Company A, 1/5 Cavalry lifted off for position BULLET followed by the forward command post. During the remaining hours of daylight the 2/7 Cavalry and the 1/5 Cavalry maneuvered to block the escape of enemy forces in the valley.

On 15 May 66 the Brigade began movement to Camp Radcliff except for the 2/7 Cavalry and the 1/9 Cavalry (■). The 1/7 Cavalry moved from Position DOG to AN KHE Strip by CV-2 aircraft. The first elements departed at 150635 hours and the Battalion closed AN KHE at 151218 hours. HHC, 3d Bde; 1/21 Artillery (-); Company C, 8th Engineers; the 1/5 Cavalry; and supporting units moved by road to AN KHE leaving Position DOG at 150800 hours and closing at 151540 hours. Elements of the 1/5 Cavalry at Position BULLET and C Battery, 1/2i Artillery were moved by air to PHU CAT where they joined the wheel convoy.

During the morning of 15 May Companies ^g and C, 2/7 Cavalry conducted a march from their blocking positions at BR 780683 south in the SUOI CA Valley to position BULLET searching for enemy forces and installations with light scattered contact. Company A, 2/7 Cavalry remained on the high ground vicinity LZ DELTA searching for enemy installations and forces. Company B closed Position BULLET at 151650 hours and at 151652 Companies

A and B, 2/7 Cavalry were extracted from the operational area to AN KHE. Company C, 2/7 Cavalry remained at BULLET for the night while Company D (-) secured the logistical base at PHU CAT. Troop D, 1/9 Cavalry departed BULLET at 151705 hours and closed AN KHE at 151933 hours.

On 16 May 66 Company D, 2/7 Cavalry began movement from PHU CAT at 160745 hours closing AN KHE at 160845 hours. The artillery battery and Company C, 2/7 Cavalry were extracted from BULLET by UH-1D and CH-47 closing AN KHE at 161555 and terminating Operation DAVK CROCKETT.

12. RESULTS:

a. Enemy Losses:

- | | |
|------------------------|-------------|
| (1) KIA (BC) | 345 |
| (2) KIA (EST) | 192 |
| (3) VCC | 82 |
| (4) VCS | 720 |
| (5) WIA (EST) | 112 |
| (6) Individual Weapons | 40 |
| (7) Crew Weapons | 12 |
| (8) Grenades | 89 |
| (9) Mortar Rounds | 28 |
| (10) Rice | 9 Tons |
| (11) S/A Ammo | 3396 Rounds |

b. Friendly Losses:

- | | |
|---------|-----|
| (1) KIA | 27 |
| (2) WIA | 155 |
| (3) MIA | 1 |

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

- a. Supply and resupply procedures were performed in accordance with the Div TAC SOP and were considered adequate in all phases.
- b. Combat loads, ammunition, and weapons carried by assault troops were determined by the nature and duration of the operation and announced in the Brigade federations order.

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- c. A minimum of preventative maintenance was performed at the field location. More emphasis should be placed on equipment maintenance.
 - * d. Repair parts re-supply is still a problem in the Quartermaster and Engineer Generator area. In the Quartermaster area, repair parts for field ranges have been on order since late last year. There has been very little supply action in this area.
 - e. Food containers still remain a problem. Units are using unserviceable food containers because there are no requirements. A "B" priority request was submitted by HHC 4d Bde (AT8502) on 6054 (23 Feb 1966) with the items still due out at this time.
 - f. The ration content was of a much better quality than issued during previous operations. Ice in limited quantities was made available. Both were considered to be of value to the morale of the individual soldier.
 - g» Transportation was available and adequate during the operations problems were encountered that could have been avoided if units had figures readily available as to tons of equipment and number of troops to be moved. Another problem that arose was a result of convoy commanders not having information available as to the number of vehicles to be in their convoy. This should be an item of interest to all commanders and an item of immediate concern to convoy commanders upon receipt of such missions.
 - h. The current ASR for 105mm "BEEHIVE" rounds is adequate to meet needs.

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:

- a. Night Road March: During this operation the Brigade conducted a night road march over roads ordinarily interdicted by enemy forces. This movement of a convoy of 368 vehicles without incident enabled the Brigade to achieve tactical surprise in the area of operations.
- b. Hunter-Killer Concept: This concept consists of searching for enemy forces and installations with small, mobile units - retaining the bulk of the forces available to be committed as rapid reaction forces when contact is made. This technique of operations conserves troop strength aircraft resources, and gives the commander the maximum degree of flexibility.

15. COMMANDERS ANALYSIS:

- a. Summary: Operation DAVY CROCKETT was a highly successful action in which a VC Battalion was virtually wiped out. The battle plan was to surround the area which most likely contained the enemy and to push a ground force into it until contact was made. This

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technique can only be used when the location of the enemy is known. During Phase II the new concept of Hunter-Killer was used in the CROW'S FOOT Area. Essentially this concept is to place small Hunter teams on the ground throughout the AO and back them with a large Killer force married up with helicopters ready for rapid employment. The mission of the Hunters is to find the enemy. Aerial ground searches are conducted. Then, when the enemy is found, the fight is turned over to the Killer teams, and only large enough Killer teams to eliminate the enemy are used. Although significant enemy contact was not made, we were able to check out a large area with minimum use of helicopters and less wear and tear on the Infantry Battalions. It is my opinion that a Brigade can deploy to the BONG SON Area any time and, within three days, find a fight with a minimum of one enemy battalion.

- b. Summary of Civil Affairs/Psychological warfare Activities during Operation DAVY CROCKETT: During Operation DAVY CROCKETT only limited civic action projects were initiated due to the lack of security along Hwy #1 north of BONG SON.

On the 11th of May sick call was conducted near the village of TAN QUAN at coordinates BS 9110. Seventy-six (76) people were treated. One Battalion of the 40th Regiment ARVN provided road security.

Additional sick calls were held at the village dispensary in BONG SON. One hundred and forty-seven (147) people were treated.

Psychological operations were begun by Troop D, 1/7 Cavalry, using an attached psychological warfare team. At about H + 5 hours a leaflet drop over the entire sector was made emphasizing the CHIEU HOI program and the hardships encountered by VC units. This was followed by a loudspeaker broadcast and another leaflet drop on the second day. Broadcasts using amplified tapes were employed daily in Phase I after the second day. When the operation was moved to the CROW'S FOOT Area, mass coverage leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts were made initially with other loudspeaker broadcasts being made on subsequent days.

Two specific missions were conducted using an airborne interpreter in an attempt to get intrenched VC to surrender without a fight. One mission resulted in 12 VCS surrendering to the ground forces. Two CHIEU HOI's were picked up with leaflets in their possession. These CHIEU HOI's were turned over to the VN District authorities on 6 May 66.

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16. RECOMMENDATIONS: A loudspeaker capability should be made organic to the Brigade. Often the requirement for psychological operations is so immediate that normal support units cannot react. Tapes and live voice broadcasts can be made by organic interpreters. These timely psychological operations would greatly enhance the capabilities of the Brigade.

HAROLD G. MOORE
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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Annex I (Task Organization) to After Action Report for Operation DAVY CROCKETT

1. 03 May - 071000 May 1966

<u>1/7 Cav</u> U	<u>2/7 Cav 1-</u>	<u>1/9 Cav (OCA)</u>	<u>Brigade Control</u>
Set Tm 1/9	Set Tm 1/9 Cav	C/8 Engr' (-) AT Pit, 1/7 Cav AT Pit, 2/7 Cav APC Tp, ARVN Set Co, ARVN	1/21 Arty (DS) Btry, 2/1/ Arty 227 AHB (DS) Pit (-), 545 MP Co B, 228 ASHB (DS) Sig Spt Tm, 13 Sig Tm 3, 10 RRU Tm 3, IPW/CI Tm, 16 Wx Sqdn Fwd Spt Elm (Spt) Water Pt, Sth Engr

2. 071000 May - 091500 May 1966

<u>1/7 Cav (-)</u>	<u>2/7 Cav</u>	<u>1/5 Cav</u>	<u>1/9 Cav (-)</u>	<u>Brigade Control</u>
Set Tm 1/9	Set Tm, 1/9 Cav D Troop 1/9 Cav AT Pit 1/7 Cav	Set Tm 1/9	OCA	No change except C/8th Engr attached

3. 091500 May - 131500 May 1966

<u>1/5 Cav (-)</u>	<u>1/7 Cav (-)</u>	<u>2/7 Cav</u>	<u>1/9 Cav (-)(OAC)</u>	<u>Brigade Control</u>
		Pit C/8 Engr Set Tm, 1/9 Cav	Ren Pit, 1/5 Ren Pit, 1/7	Cav D Tp, 1/9 Cav AT Pit 1/7 Cav 1/21 Arty (DS) Btry 2/17 A 227 AHB (DS) Co B, 228 ASHB (DS) Co C, 8 Engr(-) Tm 3, IPW/CI Tm 3, 10 RRU Tm 3, 16 Wx Sqdn Fwd Spt Elm (Spt) Wtr Pt, 8 Engr Sig Spt Tm, 13 Sig

4. 131500 - 141800 May 1966

<u>1/7 Cav (-)</u>	<u>2/7 Cav</u>	<u>1/5 Cav (-)</u>	<u>1/9 Cav (-)</u>	<u>Brigade Control</u>
	Pit, C/8 Engr Set Tm 1/9 Cav		Co, 1/7 Cav Ren Pit, 1/5 Cav	No Change except Pit (-) 545 MP

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5. 141800 - 161300 May 1966

1/7 Cav

2/7 Cav

1/5 Cav (-)

1/9 Cav

Brigade Control

D Tp,
1/9 Cav
cn 0
Sig Spt Tm
13th Sig

Pit (-) 545
MP

(OAC)

1/21 Arty (OS)
Btry, 2/17 Arty
227 AHB, CDS)
Co B, 228 ASHB (DS)
Sig Spt Tm, 13 Sig
Tm3, IPW/CI
Tm3, 10 RRU
Tm3, 16 Wx Squn
C/8 Engr
Fwd Spt Elm (Spt)
Wtr Pt, 8 Engr

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