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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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AGAM-P(M)(17 July 67)FOR OT

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SUBJECT: ⁹ Combat After Action Report ¹⁰ for period ending 10 APR 67, ¹¹ Operation DAZZLEM conducted by the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) (U), ¹² (Headquarters), (U), (S)

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Forwarded as inclosure is a Combat After Action Report for Operation DAZZLEM. Operation DAZZLEM was conducted by the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) during the period 9-10 April 1967. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AM)
APO 96490

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

THRU: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
APO 96350

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO 96234

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OPERATION: OPORD DAZZLEM, defense of the 1st Air Cavalry Division base camp, Camp Radcliff, RVN (BR4647).
2. (U) DATE OF OPERATION: Attack on the defensive complex and subsequent operations, 090050 April to 101200 April 1967.
3. (U) LOCATION: Camp Radcliff, BINH DINH Province, RVN.
4. (U) COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 1st Air Cavalry Division.
5. (U) REPORTING OFFICER: Major General John J. Tolson, Commanding General, 1st Air Cavalry Division.
6. (U) TASK ORGANIZATION: At the time of the attack, defense of Camp Radcliff was being conducted by 1/12 Cavalry, with B, 1/8 Cavalry OPCON. Other forces are shown on Inclosure 1.
7. (U) SUPPORTING FORCES: a. USAF flare ship support (Spooky) was requested by FSOC at 0053 but was denied at 0108 because the base was not under attack at the time. A second request was made at 0120. Spooky was in radio contact with 2/17 Arty by 0147 and was reported on station at 0156. An aircraft was on station until 0615.

b. A request was submitted by FSOC at 0234 for four immediate combat proof TAC air strikes in support of the forces at Camp Radcliff. The strikes were planned on suspect routes of withdrawal and probable assembly areas along these routes. The request was approved and the strikes were delivered as indicated.

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<u>MISSION NR</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>TGT</u>	<u>ORDNANCE</u>
BA 09-1	0320	BR420596	4x750 lb bombs
BA 09-2	0340	BR432599	4x750 lb bombs
BA 09-3	0350	BR421629	4x500 lb bombs
BA 09-4	0400	BR393603	4x500 lb bombs

Visual reconnaissance of the strike areas was conducted by FAC aircraft after daylight with no reports of enemy personnel or equipment observed.

8. (C) INTELLIGENCE: a. Weather data. Sunset 8 April was 1858 hours with EENT at 1945 hours, and moon rise at 090536. This was also the first day of the new moon. The weather was hazy, with 5 mile visibility early in the evening. Stratus and ground fog moved in about midnight reducing visibility to 4 miles. At 0200 the weather went to 1500 feet scattered with 5 mile visibility with haze. Ground fog formed by 0700, lowering visibility to 1/16 mile, but cleared by 0825 to 1 mile visibility and by 0900, 6 mile visibility with haze.

b. Enemy. Enemy activity in the vicinity of Camp Radcliff was slightly increased during the thirty days prior to the 9 April attack. Probable contributing factors of this increase were VC attempts to intimidate village elections, less US patrolling due to lower troop density, and the fact that no US operations had been conducted in the TAOR to disrupt activity and supplies in VC base areas and assembly points since February. This increase included sightings by agents of small enemy units operating near villages and questioning civilians to the north of Camp Radcliff. Based on their reports & ARVN intelligence analysis, it appeared that the enemy was attempting to gather information on the local elections and conduct reconnaissance of RF/PF locations, normal patrol routes, and ambushes. It is possible that this was a cover to hide the real purpose of the increased activity. There were other indications of possible attack. Radar sightings were frequently made near where the mortars had been fired in past attacks (and were again in this attack), but artillery fire and patrols could not confirm the presence of enemy. An agent report from ARVN II Corps MID, evaluated C-4, received 30 March indicated one company of the 407th Sapper Battalion and one company H-15 LF Battalion were to organize a training course in Kon Hannung base area to the north of the TAOR. Experience has shown that for the past attacks on Camp Radcliff, and as a general rule throughout Vietnam, sapper units are normally reinforced for attacks. These additional forces are used to provide security. Also on 25 March an artillery OP observed what appeared to be a uniformed 1-3 man patrol making a visual reconnaissance of the base camp with binoculars from the top of a hill outside the barrier (BR 574440). A patrol was dispatched, but contact was not made. In addition there was a slight increase of special agent reports of suspected CPs. Most importantly, the division long range patrols deployed to the north and beyond artillery range had had several sightings of or contact with enemy forces; however, this fact could not be assessed in light of past enemy activity because the division had never utilized LRPs in these locations prior to those sightings. Based on these and other facts, the following assumptions, conclusions and observations are made:

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(1) The real purpose of the attack on LZ Charles is not known, but there are several possibilities:

(a) The attack on LZ Charles was the main effort with the harrassing fire being placed on the Golf Course as a diversion. This quick offensive victory over a US force on the eve of local elections would have psychological and political implications. If this was the purpose, the enemy's timing was off and the mortar fire alerted the defenses on LZ Charles.

(b) The mortar attack on the Golf Course was the main attack and the ground attack was secondary with several intentions possible. The ground attack on LZ Charles may have been made because the VC commander felt he could gain a cheap ground victory; i.e., an attack of opportunity. As a bonus the attack would also create a diversion to assist the withdrawal of his mortars and crews. If this was his purpose, he was successful as the major US effort was to relieve LZ Charles and not to destroy the withdrawing mortar crews. Another possible variation is that LZ Charles may have been near the enemy's withdrawal route and he wanted to insure that these possibly troublesome forces were fixed during his withdrawal of his mortars and crews. If this was the case, he was successful.

(c) Whatever the purpose, the results were that the mortars and crews as far as we know escaped without casualties. All 15 confirmed enemy dead, nine inside the perimeter wire at LZ Charles and 6 beyond, were the result of the ground attack and not from the mortar crews.

(2) The attack on Camp Radcliff was conducted by a well-trained and professional force of at least 3 mortar crews and a 50-60 man assault force. They were undoubtedly the main force VC or NVA, were probably a sapper unit reinforced with infantry, and possible one company of the 407th Sapper Battalion reinforced with one company of the H-15 Battalion. The indications that it was a sapper unit that conducted these attacks are:

(a) The weapons captured on LZ Charles were 4 AK-47s, 2 AK-47s with folding stocks, and 1 assault rifle that seems to be a European modified model on an AK-47 with folding stock. (See Picture). Division OB files reflect that of the enemy units that normally operate near the TAOR, only the 407th Sapper Battalion has folding stock AK-47s.

(b) The enemy KIA were dressed in loin cloths or shorts and had their heavily callused and scarred bodies completely camouflaged with charcoal in the best sapper tradition. Sapper units normally wear shorts and often no shirts when attempting to infiltrate. This facilitates the detection and neutralization of trip wires, flares and mines.

(c) The attackers on LZ Charles used a large amount of grenades and satchel charges, booby trapped a US mortar, and had no difficulty in breaching the wire.

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(d) The professionalism of the attack, as indicated by the large volume of accurate mortar fire, ferocity of the ground attack, and obviously complete reconnaissance (command bunkers and communications were immediately neutralized) are characteristics of sapper operations.

(e) Of the past mortar attacks on Camp Radcliff, one was confirmed as having been conducted by the 407th Sapper Battalion and the others had characteristics of sapper operations.

(3) The mortar positions used for the attack that were found by ground reconnaissance were within 200 meters of the perimeter wire, had approximately 300 meters between firing positions, were to the north so that the direction of fire was down the long axis of the Golf Course fixed-wing runway, and were in defilade. These have been characteristics of the past mortar attacks on Camp Radcliff.

9. (C) MISSION: Secure Camp Radcliff.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: 1/12 Cav + (B, 1/8 Cav OPCON) secured Camp Radcliff by disposing of available forces as indicated below. (Also see inclosure 5)

(1) A 1/12 Cav (-) occupied defensive positions in the eastern sector of the Y-ring, and established LP/OPs in the Y-ring at darkness. 3 A 1/12 Cav was the QRF force,

(2) B 1/12 Cav (-) occupied defensive positions in the western sector of the Y-ring, and established LP/OPs in the Y-ring at darkness. At the time of the attack troop strength at LZ CHARLES was 42, including the company CP (7), 1st platoon (16), elements of the 4th platoon (17) and a searchlight section from B Battery, 29th Arty (2).

(3) C 1/12 Cav secured the western half of the Camp Radcliff perimeter (D-ring) and conducted patrols in the X-Y-Z rings as directed.

(4) D 1/12 Cav secured the eastern half of the Camp Radcliff perimeter (D ring) and conducted patrols in the X-Y-Z rings as directed.

(5) B 1/8 Cav (+) used 5 platoons to secure key bridges on Highway 19 within the TAOR and the artillery battery at checkpoint 89 (BR362458)

b. Factors affecting the defense.

(1) Equipment.

(a) Searchlights. Five operational searchlights were in position on the Y-ring. The searchlight on LZ CHARLES was damaged early in the attack.

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(b) Countermortar radars. There were two AN/MPQ-4A radars in the base camp, and both were in operation at the time of the attack. The Div Arty radar was at BR 474447 with a sector of scan of 5955 to 6400 mils. The radar from 1/21 Arty was at BR 471482 with a sector of scan of 4900 to 5345 mils. Both sets were OPCON to 2/17 Arty.

(c) Ground surveillance radar.

1 AN/PPS-4 radar sets were located at towers 5, 22, and 45 on the perimeter (D ring).

2 AN/TPS-33 radar was at tower 7A on the perimeter (D ring).

(d) Night vision devices (Starlight scopes). Two were in position on the barrier at towers 45 and 49. There were four on the Y-ring, one each at CHARLES, KAREN, JACELYN and MARY.

(e) The forces on the Y-ring had a total of 8 LP/OPs dispersed between strongpoints on likely avenues of enemy approach.

(2) Fire support. Two 105mm batteries (12 operational tubes) were inside Camp Radcliff. When not engaged in H&I fire missions, each tube was laid on a separate counter-mortar concentration. One 105mm battery (6 operational tubes) was at BR 362458 to fire in support of forces securing Highway 19 west of Camp Radcliff. LZ CHARLES was within range of this battery. One helicopter from 2/20 Arty (Aerial Rocket Artillery) was airborne on mortar alert prior to the attack. Three other mission-ready ARA ships and one armed Chinook (ACH-47A) were on the Golf Course. All 4 ships were fueled and armed. When the mortar attack began, one of the three ARA ships on the Golf Course was preparing to take off to effect normal relief of the ship on patrol by 0100.

c. The above information is presented graphically on inclosure 5.

11. (C) EXECUTION: a. General. On 9 April 1967 an unidentified enemy force attacked the Camp Radcliff defense complex with mortars and ground forces.

(1) The mortar attack began at 0050 and ended at 0058, during which time at least 83 rounds from 82mm mortars landed on the southeast corner of the helicopter parking area (Golf Course). See inclosure 5.

(2) The ground attack was launched against forces defending LZ CHARLES (BR432498) by an estimated 40-60 enemy at about 0100. The perimeter of the LZ was penetrated in three places before small arms fire from the defenders and intense artillery and ARA fire drove the enemy from the position at approximately 0140. Contact was broken at about 0155.

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b. The first indication that the base was under attack was the impact of mortar rounds on the Golf Course at 0050H. The G3 and FSCC duty officers in the DTOC heard explosions, ran outside to investigate, saw rounds exploding on the Golf Course, and immediately returned to the DTOC. The alert was sounded by siren and over the base defense radio net within a few seconds of the beginning of the attack. The first rounds of Quick Fire were reported on the way by 0051 and all artillery tubes were engaged in Quick Fire by 0052. There had been no reports from the counter-mortar radars up to this time.

The pilot of the ARA ship on mortar patrol was low on ammunition, as he had been firing H&I and was about to be relieved on station. Shortly after the first rounds landed, the ARA pilot reported observing flashes from the vicinity of BR 485485 and engaged the target, expending his remaining ammunition. He reported one position silenced and began adjusting artillery fire on two other flashes which he saw in the same area. The ARA reported silencing these positions also. By this time (0054) the second ARA ship was airborne. Quick Fire was continuing and mortar rounds were still falling on the Golf Course.

The first report of a mortar location from the counter mortar radar was received by 2/17 Arty at 0056, and B 2/17 fired 45 rounds of HE on the target, which was given as BR465532. Counter mortar radar recorded 8 rounds from this location, which was almost 6000 meters from the center of impact of all the rounds landing on the Golf Course. (The range of the 82mm mortar is 3040 meters). Enemy mortar fire was reported to have ended by 0058, and at 0117 the S2, 2/17 Arty, arrived on the Golf Course and began collecting shell report data.

Shortly before 0100, the forces at LZ CHARLES heard noise outside their wire and fired an 81mm mortar illumination round. They could see nothing unusual so the searchlight was turned on (visible light) and pointed in the area where the noise was heard. One VC was observed outside the wire and was killed by small arms fire. At this point an enemy force of 40-60 men, which had been working their way toward the position, launched their attack. The VC threw grenades and bangalore torpedoes into and beyond the perimeter wire, and opened fire with automatic weapons from all around the LZ. The main force of the attack came from three principal directions (incl 6). One element cut through the single roll of concertina wire and penetrated the perimeter from the southwest. Another force opened and entered through the gate to the southeast, while the third assaulting element penetrated the wire on the northwest. Friendly forces returned fire with small arms and machine guns, M-79 grenade launchers and hand grenades, but were unable to immediately bring artillery or ARA fire on the attacking force because of communications difficulty. One of the first installations to be hit was the Company CP bunker, and a satchel charge was placed on or near the three radios just outside the bunker, blowing the antenna off one (the FO radio) and making the other two inoperative.

The first report of conditions at CHARLES was received at the DTOC at 0120 from 1/12 Cav and indicated that the LZ was under attack from all sides of the perimeter. At 0126, 2/17 Arty began firing illumination and HE for CHARLES. At 0126 the artillery INO at 1/12 Cav received word over the FO radio at CHARLES

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that the position was being overrun, and that the only communication with the unit at the LZ was through the FO radio. The S3, 1/12 Cav, requested that DTOC move reinforcing units to the barrier to release the infantry for offensive operations. This was approved and Support Command received the order to relieve 2 platoons each of C and D Companies, 1/12 Cav, currently on the barrier.

During the next few minutes one of the enemy assault elements reached the center of the LZ and directed small arms fire and grenades into most of the defensive bunkers in the position. Other VC had thrown grenades into various bunkers as they swept into the position. Of significance is the fact that all of those in positions of leadership were killed or wounded relatively early in the attack.

At 0135 two additional ARA ships and one ACH-47A were reported on the way to support the LZ. These ships fired on the enemy and provided illumination at the LZ until the USAF flare ship arrived at 0156. ARA craters were found in the perimeter wire the next day.

At 0140 a report was received at FSOC in DTOC that artillery was still firing 50-200 meters outside the perimeter of the LZ. At the same time G3 in the DTOC received word that the ground attack had been repulsed and that ARA was in the area of the LZ. It was also reported that the CO of B, 1/12 was among the wounded at the LZ and that Medevac has been requested. ADC-B released the QRF for commitment to CHARLES, while CO, 1/12 Cav requested and received permission to commit to the east of the camp (near BR485485) forces then being released from barrier security, to search for the mortar position reported there.

At 0145 LZ CHARLES reported that firing had ceased, but at 0146 the battalion CC ship was hit by small arms fire. The QRF began landing at 0150 and had closed at 0154. The LZ was still under heavy sniper fire from the east, which ARA and later Spooky attempted to suppress. The QRF fired on the retreating enemy from inside the perimeter wire. The battalion CC ship was non-flyable on return to the base camp and ADC-B released his helicopter to CO, 1/12 Cav for use.

At 0200 Support Command reported 2 companies had reached the barrier. The remaining two companies were reported at the barrier at 0210, although communications had been temporarily lost with one of the companies. 1/12 Cav units turned the barrier mission over to the reinforcing units and prepared for S&D operations in the TAOR.

Medevac was on station at the LZ shortly after 0120 but was unable to get in due to firing at LZ CHARLES. The ship was reported on the LZ by 0215 and began moving the WIA to 2d Surgical Hospital at Camp Radcliff. At 0216 the artillery was reported firing on routes of egress from CHARLES, and by 0220 the first casualty report was received from the LZ, indicating 6 US KIA and 6 WIA. Eleven enemy KIA had also been located by that time.

Spooky had been on station since 0156, providing illumination and interdiction fires on likely withdrawal routes from the LZ. At 0235 four immediate combat proof TAC Air strikes were requested through DASC ALFA. These were flown as indicated in para 7b above.

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By 0310 the 1st Platoon, C 1/12 Cav had landed at LZ MARY (BR499489) to begin their sweep to the west toward the perimeter, while two platoons of D 1/12 Cav were preparing for an air assault to LZ 54 (BR402509) west of the base camp to attempt to gain contact with the enemy withdrawing from CHARLES. S3, 1/12 Cav, requested release of his two platoons still on the D ring and at 0314 the S3, 34th S&S Bn, was told to execute the battalion portion of the contingency plan and effect the relief.

At 0320 the S2, 2/17 Arty identified the caliber of the mortars fired against the camp as 82mm. Identification was based on tail fins found on the Golf Course. However, the presence of duds led to suspension of shell rep activity until after daylight. By the time the artillery returned to the impact area, souvenir hunters had made almost half of the craters unusable for shell rep and EOD had destroyed most of the duds.

The final friendly casualty figure from LZ CHARLES was reported at 0425 as 9 KHA and 15 WHA. All other personnel were present or accounted for.

By 0437 G2 had prepared and implemented a first light aerial reconnaissance plan, using aircraft from E Battery, 82d Artillery, FAC and 11th GS Company (07-1). The alert state was terminated at 090630 with elements of Support Command and 34th S&S Bn instructed to provide security on the D ring until relieved. Relief was planned to take place by last light unless 1/12 Cav established contact in the TAOR.

At 0905, 1/12 Cav reported the 2d Platoon of C, 1/12 on the ground at LZ 2 (BR388532) for S&D operations. Shortly thereafter a complete report of aircraft damage was received from the Assistant Division Aviation Officer. (Inclosure 4). By 1120, the 70th Engineer Battalion reported that the 16 Golf Course runway panels which were damaged by mortar fire had been replaced, and that the runway was completely repaired.

1/12 Cav elements operating in the TAOR did not establish contact with the enemy during the day and it was decided to delay release of tenant units from the barrier security mission in order to establish overnight platoon ambushes along likely withdrawal routes.

Search operations continued on 10 April and by 1300, 1/12 Cav had identified the locations from which three of the mortars had fired in the attack. One tube had been at BR467497 and two tubes had been emplaced about 20 meters apart near BR470497. The enemy had not dug in the circular base plates of his mortars, but all positions were in defilade of tower 17 on the barrier. Wicker ammo baskets and packing materials with Chinese and Russian markings were found in each location, while a total of 92 fuze caps were recovered from the three areas. Each area had 2-3 well-used trails leading in different directions and a beaten area, which looked as though people had been resting there, was found about 150 meters north of each position. There were no artillery craters found near the positions but 2-3 ARA craters were reported 200-300 meters north of them.

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Graphical presentation of the attack is on inclosures 5 and 6.

c. Claymore mines and trip flares had been emplaced around LZ CHARLES but the enemy was apparently able to neutralize or avoid them in his approach to the position. The intensity of supporting fires on and around the LZ precluded evaluation of the devices after the attack. There were no electrical anti-intrusion devices near the reported locations of the mortar positions.

d. Countermortar radar reported a total of five mortar positions between 0056 and 0227. The first of these has been discussed in paragraph 11b above. All are listed below.

<u>TIME</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>RDS OBS</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
0056	BR46505318	8	45 rds HE
0115	BR47604924	2	No record
0123	BR47544930	2	" "
0125	BR47644933	2	" "
0227	BR42804984	2	96 rds HE

These locations are plotted on inclosure 5 in relation to mortar positions subsequently discovered by the infantry and are related to positions used during previous attacks.

e. On inclosure 5 are general plots of the craters used for preparation of shell reps by the S2, 2/17 Arty. (Point 7) Analysis of the two smaller groups of craters revealed a general direction of fire from the northeast of the impact points, rather than from the north, where three positions were subsequently located by the infantry. None of the back azimuths from the large group of craters pointed toward the northeast. These facts plus the report of ARA engaging flashes near BR485485, and our previous experience with the 407th Sapper Battalion using at least six mortars to attack the base camp, all tend to support the hypothesis that there were more than three mortars firing on the camp at the beginning of the attack.

The mortars in position to the northeast (near BR485485) began the attack by adjusting. The two small groups of rounds represent over and short rounds in the adjustment, and once corrections had been determined, both groups of three mortars began fire for effect. About this time, ARA observed the flashes of the mortars to the northeast, expended their ammunition on one and adjusted artillery on the other two. The tubes near BR485485 ceased firing and did not subsequently rejoin the attack. The remainder of the rounds which hit the Golf Course were fired from the three tubes north of the camp.

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This hypothesis requires the enemy to have had an observer to adjust the fire and good communications between the FO, the mortars and possibly an FDC. The selection of the northeastern position to adjust may have been dictated by the need to place an FO on high ground near the gun-target line for ease of adjustment. Advance knowledge of the assigned sectors of scan of the counter-mortar radars might also have been a factor in selection of the northeast mortars to conduct the adjustment, thereby increasing the chances of completing the adjustment undetected.

12. (C) RESULTS: a. 1st Air Cavalry Division.

(1) Personnel*

KHA	9	(8-1/12 Cav, 1-Div Arty)
**WHA	15	
MHA	0	

(2) Equipment.

Aircraft 15 damaged in mortar attack.
1 hit by SA fire at LZ CHARLES (Not flyable on return to Camp Radcliff)
1xM60 MG captured (LZ CHARLES)
1xAN/MSS-3 truck-mounted searchlight (LZ CHARLES)
M151 severely damaged.
Searchlight moderately damaged
1xM-16 rifle captured
2xCal 45 pistols captured.
1xM151 on Golf Course heavily damaged
16 runway panels damaged.

b. Enemy (all from LZ CHARLES).

KIA (BC)	15
Individual weapons	7
AK 47 magazines	29
7.62 ammo	500 rds
Grenades	40
VC gas masks	3

*These figures are from LZ CHARLES only, since there were no personnel casualties from the mortar attack.

**Two men from 2/7 Cav received slight fragment wounds when a WP shell fired by B 2/17 Arty landed in their area. They are not included in this figure.

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13. (U) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: a. Resupply of artillery ammunition was immediate and effective. Vehicles moved under blackout conditions and the resupply effort was continued until there were 1000 rounds at each of the three battery positions.

b. Medevac was responsive and as usual was on the scene in the midst of the fight. The ship landed as soon as the fire at LZ CHARLES diminished and continued operations until all casualties had been evacuated, even though the LZ was receiving sniper fire.

14. (U) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: None.

15. (C) COMMANDERS ANALYSIS: a. The mortar attack on Camp Radcliff followed the pattern of previous attacks on the base and other division installations. The primary mortar target was the Golf Course, and all rounds landed in a relatively small sector in the southeast corner of that area. It is significant that this part of the Golf Course was where three unrevetted CH-54 (Flying Crane) helicopters were habitually parked. That the three mortar positions positively identified were in defilade within 200 meters of the perimeter wire on the north of the camp is in keeping with the MO of the 407th Sapper Battalion. As in previous attacks, the counter-mortar radar failed to locate these positions.

b. The attack on LZ CHARLES was well planned and was carried out forcefully. The assault elements obviously knew how to get into the position and where key installations were located once they were inside. The loss of radio contact resulted from early damage of two of the radios in the CP bunker, while the searchlight was damaged in the initial assault and the mortar bunker was hit by the first assault unit. Successful defense of the position can be attributed to the spirit and determination of the defenders and the accurate and continuous fire delivered by 2/17 Arty, ARA, and the armed Chinook. The following is an example. Sgt Martin Murray, a machine gunner in the 1st Platoon B, 1/12 Cav, had been firing at the attackers from atop his bunker when a grenade landed near him, wounding him and knocking him off the bunker. He crawled back upon the bunker and resumed firing until hit by three rounds from an AK47, which wounded him seriously. Realizing that he could no longer fire or secure his weapon, he removed and hid the bolt before losing consciousness. His machine gun, incomplete, was the one removed from the LZ as the enemy withdrew.

c. The report of aircraft damage is at inclosure 4. It should be noted that the majority of the aircraft organic or attached to the division were in the PERSHING AO. The aircraft at base camp were either on the Golf Course or dispersed throughout the camp in accordance with OPORD GRASSHOPPER, as indicated in the following summary.

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AVDAGT

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

Aircraft dispersed off the Golf Course	18-228 ASH Bn 5-229 AH Bn (QRF) 3-478 AVN CO <u>26</u>
Aircraft on the Golf Course Awaiting Maintenance	2-1st Bde 5-2d Bde 9-1/9 Cav 1-11 GS Co 1-227AH Bn 12-229 AH Bn 5-228 ASH Bn <u>35</u>
Aircraft dispersed on the Golf Course	13-Div Arty 3-478 Av Co <u>16</u>
Total aircraft at Camp Radcliff	77

It is significant that 8 of the aircraft which were on the Golf Course awaiting maintenance were revetted and received only minor damage. All three of the unrevetted CH-54s on the Golf Course were in the target area. One received major damage and two received minor damage. In the opinion of maintenance personnel the revetted aircraft which received minor damage would have been heavily damaged without the revetments.

d. There is no indication of the relationship of the attacks to each other since no prisoners had been taken by the time this report was prepared. It can be presumed that as in the past, the 407 Sapper Battalion used the mortar attack as a diversion for the main effort, considering damage to aircraft on the Golf Course to be a bonus effect. The speed and precision with which the attack on LZ CHARLES was carried out could indicate that the enemy intended to overrun the position, kill the defenders and withdraw under cover of the confusion created by the mortar attack. Faulty timing could account for the fact that the attacks were not initiated simultaneously.

e. Lessons Learned.

ITEM: Location of enemy mortar positions.

DISCUSSION: The mortar positions for three of the attacks against the base camp (20 Feb 66, 3 Sep 66, 9 Apr 67) have been in defilade within 300 meters of the barrier wire on the north side of the perimeter. The positions were carefully chosen and prepared to preclude effective direct fire from forces on the barrier, and were located in the area where the artillery does not normally fire H&I (within 500 meters of the towers).

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

OBSERVATION: The enemy has identified and repeatedly exploited a weakness in the defense of the base camp. The area should be evaluated to determine how best to change defense procedures to deprive the enemy of his mortar positions.

ITEMS: Dispersion of communications capability.

DISCUSSION: All of the radios at the LZ were located just outside the command bunker. The speed with which the enemy located them and took action to destroy them is in keeping with previous experiences of this and other units, and can be attributed to thorough reconnaissance of the position before the attack.

OBSERVATION: Establishment of an alternate CP with part of the communications capability or a dummy CP with obvious display of radios and antennas could reduce the likelihood of losing all communications early in an attack against a fortified position.

ITEM: Destruction of craters.

DISCUSSION: It was reported that souvenir hunters and other unauthorized persons had moved through the mortar impact area after the attack, tampered with dud mortar rounds, and destroyed almost half of the craters. In addition EOD personnel destroyed most of the duds before the artillery shell rep team could locate and examine them.

OBSERVATION: There were sufficient undisturbed craters to enable preparation of reasonably accurate shell reps. However, the danger in tampering with duds and searching for shell fragments in craters should be made a matter of command emphasis.

16. (C) RECOMMENDATIONS: a. No recommendations are required since deficiencies can be corrected without assistance.

b. Action taken to overcome deficiencies.

(1) The program to construct revetments has been given added emphasis, and priorities needed to insure rapid completion of the program have been established. All aircraft on the Golf Course, regardless of mission-ready status, will be in revetments.

(2) Static defense positions on the Y-ring have been eliminated. Personnel released from defense of these positions are being deployed in LP/OPs in the Y-ring each night.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

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(3) Division Artillery will continue a program of training and live-fire tests of AN/MPQ-4A countermortar radar crews to overcome identified weaknesses.

(4) A pattern of selection of mortar positions has been identified and a study is under way to determine the most effective means of denying the enemy access to defilade areas near the perimeter.

(5) A briefing on the base defense plan and the history of previous attacks on the base camp will be presented to the officers and NCOs of each infantry battalion on assuming the responsibility for security of Camp Radcliff.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

FOR THE COMMANDER:



DANIEL B. PLYLER

LTC, AGC

Adjutant General

4 Incl

3 Overlays

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Incl 1

TASK ORGANIZATION

1/12 Cavalry
B 1/8 Cav (OPCON)
2/17 Arty (-) DS
B 2/19 Arty (Attached to 2/17 Arty)
1 Plt, B, 2/20 Arty (GS) 1 Acft 1st Av Det (GS)
1 Sct Tm, B, 1/9 Cav (OPCON)
4 Tms, 54th Inf Det (GS)

Four provisional companies were provided by Support Command and two were provided by 34th S&S Battalion as prescribed in OPORD DAZZLEM. These companies were alerted and placed OPCON to CO, 1/12 Cav during the attack. They remained under his control until 100830 when the last elements of the tenant units were relieved on the D-ring and returned to their parent units.

Incl 1

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Incl 2 Journal Summary

Significant reports received at DTOC during the attack. Unless otherwise indicated, the source for these entries is the DTOC Journal.

- 0050 Incoming mortar rounds reported by shift officers, who heard explosions, ran outside, saw the flashes, and ran back inside to give the alarm. Mortar rounds were falling in the SE corner of the helicopter parking area in lanes E & F.
- 0050 Units notified that base was under attack by siren and base defense radio net. (Radio Log)
- 0051 Quick fire (counter mortar fire program) reported on the way. (2/17 Arty)
- 0053 Spooky (AC-47) requested from DASC ALFA. (ALO Journal)
- 0054 DTOC forward notified of attack.
- 0057 ARA has engaged muzzle flashes vic BR 485485, reported 1 mortar knocked out of action. (FSCC Journal)
- 0058 Mortar fire ceased.
- 0100 DTOC Fwd notified that mortar fire had stopped.
- 0100 Position at LZ CHARLES came under attack. This was not reported immediately because of communications difficulties at the LZ.
- 0103 1/12 Cav reports possible sighting at BR 446480.
- 0108 Request for Spooky turned down by DASC ALFA because camp was not currently under attack. (ALO Journal)
- 0117 S-2, 2/17 Arty began to collect shell reports. (FSCC Journal)
- 0120 1/12 Cav reports position at LZ CHARLES (BR 432498) has been under ground attack from all sides of perimeter since 0100. 1/12 requested permission to have forces on barrier released for commitment to LZ CHARLES. QRF standing by, but more forces will be needed. Reason for late report was due to radios being damaged by enemy attack on LZ CHARLES.
- 0120 Spooky again requested from DASC ALFA. (ALO Journal)
- 0125 DISCOM told to send 4 provisional companies to the barrier (D Ring) to relieve 2 platoons of C 1/12 Cav and 2 platoons of D 1/12 Cav.
- 0126 Artillery firing illumination for LZ CHARLES. (FSCC Journal)
- 0128 Arty LNO at 1/12 Cav reports that CHARLES is being overrun. CP in vic reports that mortar rounds did land on CHARLES. No contact with CHARLES through command channels. S3, 1/12 Cav requested that DTOC move tenant units to the barrier and release infantry for operations in the TACR.

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- 0140 LZ CHARLES reports that ground attack has been repulsed and that ARA was firing in the area. Company CO reported to be wounded.
- 0140 Artillery still firing 50-200 meters from the perimeter. (FSCC Journal)
- 0140 ADC-B released the QRF for commitment to LZ CHARLES.
- 0144 1/12 Cav requested permission to put forces on the ground east of the camp to locate the mortar position reported at BR485485. Forces to be used will be from C 1/12 which would be released when DISCOM companies reached the barrier.
- 0145 LZ CHARLES reports firing has ceased.
- 0146 CC ship of 1/12 Cav received some hits at CHARLES. Replacement requested, as ship was en route to MUSTANG pad. (1/12 Cav)
- 0147 Spooky in contact with 2/17 Arty. (ALO Journal)
- 0150 2 ships from QRF landed at LZ CHARLES and 2 others are en route. (1/12 Cav)
- 0154 QRF (1 platoon) closed LZ CHARLES. (1/12 Cav)
- 0155 ADC-B aircraft released to 1/12 Cav for use as CC ship.
- 0156 LZ CHARLES reports receiving sniper fire from the east. (1/12 Cav)
- 0156 Spooky on station firing on snipers around LZ CHARLES. (FSCC Journal)
- 0200 DISCOM reports 2 companies on the barrier.
- 0210 DISCOM reports third company in position, believe fourth company also in position but temporarily out of radio contact.
- 0215 Medevac reported on the ground at LZ CHARLES. (1/12 Cav)
- 0216 Artillery firing on egress routes starting 3 Km west of LZ CHARLES. (FSCC Journal)
- 0220 Initial report of casualties: US-6 KIA, 6 WIA. Enemy-11 KIA. (1/12 Cav)
- 0235 Four immediate TAC Air Strikes requested from DASC AFA. (ALO Journal)
- 0240 3d Bde (Pear) reports 3 casualties from short friendly round in 2/7 Cav area. 1 sprained ankle (running after round landed) and 2 minor frag wounds. Round started fire in barracks which was extinguished.

Incl 2-2

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- 0305 Two platoons from D 1/12 Cav being relieved on the barrier by DISCOM. Platoons will be committed to the west of base at LZ 54 (BR 402509) to attempt to engage enemy forces withdrawing from LZ CHARLES. (1/12 Cav)
- 0310 First lift from C 1/12 landed at LZ MARY (BR 499189) for sweep west to attempt to locate survivors of the mortar crew engaged by ARA at BR 485485. (1/12 Cav)
- 0310 Plans for first light recon of T'OR initiated using Btry E, 82d Arty, Air Force FIC and G-2 Air. (FSCC Journal)
- 0312 S-3, 1/12 Cav requested relief of last 1/12 Cav elements on the barrier to permit use in S&D operations.
- 0314 34th S&S informed to send forces to the barrier to release final elements of 1/12 Cav.
- 0320 S2 2/17 Arty confirms from tail fins that 82mm mortars hit base camp
0320 1/12 Cav reports from LZ CHARLES that US casualties are now 8 KIA and 10 WIA. Medevac being harassed by sniper fire from the east. Enemy KIA dressed in black shorts and loin cloths, with web equipment and mess gear. Had grenades and much ammo. 5 AK-47s found, 2 with folding stocks.
- 0345 1/12 Cav reports 1st Platoon C 1/12 Cav crossing Song Be River at BR 492484 moving toward mortar position reported at BR 485485.
- 0425 1/12 Cav reports final friendly casualty count at LZ CHARLES as 9 KIA and 15 WIA. All others present or accounted for.
- 0425 1/12 Cav reports that relief of D Company from the barrier is completed.
- 0437 First light recon plan will have E 82d Arty, US F FIC and OV-1 aircraft sweeping areas assigned by G-2.
- 0450 2/17 Arty reports center of impact of mortar rounds estimated to be BR 46564757 and that approximately 40 rounds landed in the vicinity. (FSCC Journal)
- 0455 1/12 Cav reports relief of C Company on the barrier has been completed. All 1/12 Cav units now off the barrier.
- 0610 Alert state terminated effective 090630H. 34th S&S Bn and DISCOM directed to continue to provide security on the D ring with minimum forces necessary. C&D 1/12 will continue S&D missions until last light today. 34 S&S and DISCOM forces will remain OPCON to CO, 1/12 Cav and unless 1/12 makes contact in the T'OR, 34 S&S and DISCOM forces will be relieved of D ring (barrier) security by last light. If contact develops be prepared to remain 48 hours.
- 0800 2/17 Arty reports crater analysis indicates a mortar was positioned vic BR 477574. (FSCC Journal)

Incl 2-3

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- 0835 Damage report on Golf Course runway. Five rounds fell on the south end of the runway and 16 panels must be replaced. 70th Engr Bn working on it.
- 0945 1/12 Cav reports 2d Plt C 1/12 Cav on the ground at LZ Z (BR388532).
- 1015 Aircraft damage due to mortar rounds reported by 11 Av Group. (See incl 4 for complete report).
- 1120 70th Engineer Bn reports Golf Course runway completely repaired.
- 1230 At 1150H B 1/9 checked BR465537 and BR341581 for possible mortar positions. At 1215H reported no positions located but found many fresh trails moving NW, had been used in last 48 hours. At 1230H B 1/9 found a well camouflaged network of hooches and bunkers under a canopy of undergrowth inhabited in the last 3-4 hours. To check vic BR466532, believe it to be a mortar position.
- 1430 2/17 Arty now reports count of incoming mortar rounds is 72, including 5 duds. Shelreps substantiate that 3 mortar positions were used (previously reported by Div Arty).
- 2045 1/12 Cav reports that at 2035H 3d Platoon B 1/12 Cav received SA fire at BR434475. Have closed on LZ JOHN (BR428475) and returned fire. 2041 Tower #9 (BR499479) receiving SA fire and requested illumination. 1/12 Cav checking, and rounds could be friendly troops inside Y Ring.
- 2120 1/12 Cav sure SA fire on Tower 9 not from friendly source. Radar reports 8-10 men with 1 metallic object moving north 800-900 meters NW of Tower 7. (BR 446471). Location of moving personnel placed at BR44174805.

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Incl 2-4

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Incl 3 Targets Fired During Mortar Attack 9 April 1967

<u>TGT #</u>	<u>GRID</u>	<u>NATURE OF TGT</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>RDS FIRED</u>
KF830	40584995	Counter mortar	A/2/17	150 HE
KX1101	421499	VC Location	A/2/17	30 HE
KX1102	430504	VC Location	A/2/17	36 HE
KX1103	426504	VC Location	A/2/17	36 HE
KX1104	421501	VC Location	A/2/17	18 HE
KX1105	420498	VC Location	A/2/17	18 HE
KX1106	421492	VC Location	A/2/17	18 HE
KX1107	420495	VC Location	A/2/17	15 HE
KX1108	423503	VC Location	A/2/17	15 HE
KX1109	417501	Sus VC Loc	A/2/17	30 HE
KX1110	414506	Sus VC Loc	A/2/17	25 HE
KX1111	411507	Sus VC Loc	A/2/17	25 HE
KX1112	409509	Sus VC Loc	A/2/17	25 HE
KC3604	401508	Illumination	A/2/17	93 ILL
KX1113	430505	Illumination	A/2/17	8 ILL
KF884	46715014	Counter mortar	B/2/19	10 HE
KF812	47205025	Counter mortar	B/2/19	10 HE
KF817	490480	Counter mortar	B/2/19	10 HE
KF844	45755030	Counter mortar	B/2/19	10 HE
KF852	488483	Counter mortar	B/2/19	10 HE
KF810	46185022	Counter mortar	B/2/19	7 HE
KX1114	414506	Sus VC Loc	B/2/19	60 HE
KX1137	417501	Sus VC Loc	B/2/19	30 HE
KX1115	420490	VC Loc	B/2/19	60 HE
KX1116	401508	VC Loc	B/2/19	30 HE
KX1117	419479	Sus VC Loc	B/2/19	60 HE
KX1118	499515	VC Loc	B/2/19	30 HE
KX1119	498511	VC Loc	B/2/19	30 HE
KX1120	500502	VC Loc	B/2/19	30 HE
KX1121	486486	VC Loc	B/2/19	25 HE
KX1122	412510	VC Loc	B/2/19	6 HE
KX1123	424483	VC Loc	B/2/19	12 HE
KX1121	486486	VC Loc	B/2/19	42 HE
KX1124	427502	VC Loc	B/2/19	103 ILL
KX1125	424483	VC Loc	B/2/19	45 ILL
KX1126	485485	VC Loc	B/2/17	2 WP
KX1127	490480	VC Loc	B/2/17	40 HE
KX1128	492483	VC Loc	B/2/17	45 HE/3 ILL
KX1129	427498	VC Loc	B/2/17	96 HE/94 ILL
KX1130	426504	VC Loc	B/2/17	45 HE
KX1131	423480	VC Loc	B/2/17	56 HE
KX1132	396547	VC Loc	B/2/17	28 HE
KX1133	414506	Sus VC Loc	B/2/17	30 HE
KX1134	420490	Sus VC Loc	B/2/17	35 HE/21 ILL
KX1135	419482	Sus VC Loc	B/2/17	30 HE
KX1136	477497	Sus VC Loc	B/2/17	24 HE
KX1137	465532	Sus VC Loc	B/2/17	45 HE
KX1138	415503	Sus VC Loc	B/2/17	50 HE
KF811	439476	Counter mortar	B/2/17	9 HE

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Incl 3 Targets Fired During Mortar Attack 9 April 1967, Cont'd

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<u>TGT #</u>	<u>GRID</u>	<u>NATURE OF TGT</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>RDS FIRED</u>
KF833	440480	Countermortar	B/2/17	9 HE
KF832	443487	Countermortar	B/2/17	7 HE
KF845	450496	Countermortar	B/2/17	9 HE
KF860	449500	Countermortar	B/2/17	7 HE
KF863	456497	Countermortar	B/2/17	9 HE

TOTALS

	<u>HE</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>ILL</u>
A/2/17	441		101
B/2/17	574	2	150
B/2/19	430	-	190
	1445	2	441

In addition to the above expenditure of 105mm howitzer ammunition, ARA fired 149 of their 2.75 inch rockets at observed and suspect enemy locations during the attack.

Incl 3-2

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Incl 4

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Aircraft Damage


<u>Type</u>	<u>Nr</u>	<u>Extent</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Revetments</u>
UH-1B	1	Minor	11th AS Co	Yes
UH-1D	4	Moderate to Minor	2-11 GS Co 1-227 AH Bn 1-229 AH Bn	3
CH-47	7	2 Major 5 Minor	228 AH Bn	4
CH-54	3	1 Major 2 Minor	478 Hel Co	No
Total	15	3 Major 12 Moderate to minor		8

All of the aircraft in revetments at the time of the attack received only minor damage.


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
1. Items of equipment recovered from the wreckage of the aircraft carrier USS Intrepid (CV-11) on the beach at Iwo Jima, February 1945.



2. Folding stock AK-47 (stock retracted)




3. Folding stock AK-47 (stock extended, right side)



4. Folding stock AK-47 (Stock extended, left side)




5. Modified 11-47



6. Modified AK-47

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5




7. VC gas mask

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
6. Unidentified sealed plastic pouch found with VC gas masks at LZ CHARLES.



1. Mortar positions reported by Div Arty counter mortar radar 090056 A
2. Mortar positions reported by Div Arty counter mortar radar 090115-0
3. Radars do not show max range.
4. Night ambushes C 1/12 Cav 09-10 April.
5. Mortar positions discovered by 1/12 Cav on 10 April.
6. Suspect location of 3 mortars. Fired on by ARA 090054.
7. Location of shell craters.

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2. Mortar positions reported by Div Arty counter mortar radar 090115-090125 April.
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
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
VC
 KIA-15 (BC)
 7 WEAP
 27 MAGS
 3 GAS MASKS
 (OTHER ASST DEQUIP)

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

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
FRIENDLY
KHA-9
WHA-15




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WHA-15

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


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
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
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