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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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#### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGAM-P (M) (14 Feb 68) FOR OT RD-T674236 20 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1967 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

0

1 Incl ' as C. A. STANFIEL Colonel, AGC Acting The Adjutant Genera

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#### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMCBILE) APO San Francisco, California 96490

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#### 2. (C) General

E

1.

a. General situation: During the period 1 August to 31 October 1967, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) conducted extensive search and destroy, village cordon and search operations, and provided protection for the pacification programs in its area of operations. Operation FERSHING which started on 11 February 1967, cortinued in Binh Dinh Province. Operation DAZZLEM providing security of Camp Radcliff and the Division TACR, and Operation BYRD, a one battalion task force under the control of I FFORCEW in Binh Thuan Province also continued. The 2/8 Cav conducted orerations for four weeks under the control of the 173rd Abn Ede in Operation POLLING. On 1 October 1967 the 3d Brigade was placed OPCON to the Americal Division conducting Operation WALLOWA. Concurrent with tactical operations the Camp Radcliff base development program continued.

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b. Division organization and key personnel during the reporting period were as follows:

(1) Division Headquarters

÷ .

	Major General John J. Tolson III	Commanding General
	Brigadier General George S. Blanchard Brigadier General Richard L. Irby	Ass't Div Comdr 2 Aug 67
	Colonel Oscar E. Davis	A_s't Div Comdr
	Colonel George W. Casey Colonel George W. Putnam Jr.	Chief of Staff 12 Oct 67
	Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Runkle Lieutenant Colonel M.L. Welch	ACofS, G-1 10 Oct 67
	Lieutenant Colonel Herman E. Schubarth Lieutenant Colonel Lyman C. Richardson	ACofS, G-2 12 Aug 67
	Lieutenant Colonel William C. Louisell	ACors, G-3
ì	Lieutenant Colonel Roscoe Robinson, Jr.	ACofS, G-4
	Licutement Colonel Joseph E. Wesiak	ACofS, G-5
(2)	1st Brigade	- Gi
•	Colonel Donald V. Rattan	CO, 1st Bde
	Lieutenant Colonel Wilbur G. Jenkins	CO, 1/8 Cav
	Lieutenant Colonel John E. Stannard	CO, 2/8 Cav
	Lieutenant Colonel Loyd P. Rhiddlehoover Lieutenant Colonel Daniel W. French	CO, 1/12 Cav 9 Oct 67
(3)	2d Brigade	
	Colonel Fred E. Karhohs Lieutenant Colonel Joseph C. McDonough	CO, 2d Bde 10 Oct 67
	Lieutenant Colonel Daniel S. Rickard	CO, 1/5 Cav
	Lieutenant Colonel Joseph C. McDonough Lieutenant Colonel Joseph B. Love	CO, 2/5 Cav 26 Sep 67
	Lieutenant Colonal M.C. Ross	CO, 2/12 Cav
(4)	3d Brigsde	
	Colonel James O. McKenna	CO, 3d Bde
	Lieutenant Colonel Edward M. Pierce	CO, 1/7 Cav
	Licutement Colonel Leo D. Turner Licutement Colonel Joseph T. Griffin	CO, 2/7 Cav 2 Aug 67
	Licutenant Colonel John A. Wickham, Jr. Licutenant Colonel Herlihy T. Long	CO, 5/7 Cav 10 Oct 67
(5)	Division Artillery	
	Colonel George W. Putnam, Jr.	CO, Div Arty

Colonel George W. Putnam, Jr. Colonel Richard Winfield 5 Conficlential

23 Sep 67

Confidential Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 SUBJECT: CO, 2/19 Arty Major Vernon W. Gillespie CO, 2/20 Arty Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Knowles 00, 1/21 Arty Lieutenant Colonel Lowell E. Oder CO, 1/77 Arty Lieutenant Colorel George P. Dawson CC. E/8º Arty Major James H. Brown' (6) 11th Aviation Group CO, 11th Avn Gp Colonel Joseph L. Gude CO, 227 Avn Lieutenant Colonel George C. Horton CO, 228 Avn Lieutenant Colonel Frank W. Nadeau, Jr. 3 Aug 67 Lieutenant Colonel Robert Kerner CO, 229 Avn Lieutenant Colonel John E. Bell (7) Support Command CO, Spt Comd Colonel Hubert S. Campbell CO, 15th 545 Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Vaughn CO, 15th TC Lieutenant Colonel Vaughn C. Emerson CO, 15th Med Lieutenant Colonel W. Rex Davis CO, 27th Maint Lieutenant Colonel William H. Creed CO, 15th Admin Captain Barton Whittekind 2 Sep 67 Captain Douglas C. Verdier 00, 1/9 Cav Srdn (8) Lieutenant Colonel R. H. Nevins, Jr. CO, 8th Engr (9) Lieutenant Colonel Edwin S. Townslow CO, 13th Sig (10) Lieutenant Colonel Paul Gentry CO, 545th MP Co (11) Captain Maynard D. Eaves CO, HHC 1st Cav Div (12) Captain Joseph K. Hulquist 4 Sep 67 Captain Robert L. Kruse (13) Special Staff Lieutenant Colonel W. Rex Davis Surgeon IG Lieutenant Colonel Daniel W. French 9 Oct 67 Lieutenant Colonel Clare F. Beames III Chem Off Lieutenant Colonel Duke C. Bredford, Jr. SJA P Lieutenant Colonel Zane E. Finkelstein AG Lieutenant Colonel Donald W. Connelly

Lieutenant Colonel Lewell V. Autrey Lieutenant Colonel Harold McCormack

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28 Jul 67

Carifidential SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 Lieutenant: Golenel: Atigaboal. Harageones Provost Manshal Major William Witters CIAH ... (14) Attached Units Lieutenant Colonel Albert L. Hutson, Jr. CO, 1/50 Mech Inf CO, 478 Avn Major Eldridge W. Brock CO, 191 MI Det Major John R. McCann Major James T. Shiraishi CO, 14th Mil Hist 25 Sep 67 Captain Walter B. Gunn Captain David B. Knight GO, 371 Radio Research Co .... CO, 24 Det, 5th, Major Gordon Spillinger . Wea Sqdn (15) Supporting Units Sub-Area Comdr Colonel Robert C. Arbuckle 2 Aug 67 Colonel Jack I. Hamlin Lieutenant Colonel William K. Hunzeker 00, 34 S&S Bn Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Cochran CO, 56 Med Det Captain Robert L. Jackson CO. 11 Avn Gp Pathfinder Co CO, 382d TC Det Captain Daniel J. Rice 1st Lieutenant Ver Neil D. Mesecher CO, 184 Cml Plt 1st Lieutenant Thomas J. Hawes CO, Det 1, 54 Sig Bn 1st Licutonant Jerry F. Matcalfe 00, 25 Inf Plt (SD) 00, 34 Inf Plt (SD) 1st Lieutenant John P. Davern (15) List of military units stationed at Camp Radcliff, see inclosure 1-1.

(16) VIP visits listed at inclosure 2-1.

3. Personnel:

2

a. Strength: Authorized and assigned strength at the beginning and close of reporting period were as follows:

(1)	Beginning of Reporting Period	0FF	MO	т <u>м</u>	AGG
	Authorized	1221	677	15,027	16;925
	Assigned	1131	557	17,318	19,006
(2)	Close of Reporting Period Authorized Assigned	0FF 1237 1208	14 14	FM 15,696 15,372	AGG 17;642 17,194

b. Replacements: A total of 4153 enlisted replacements were received. During the same period division losses were 3873. Some 239 emergency leaves were processed during the period.

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c. Morale and Personnel Services:

(1) Morale throughout the division and attached elements remained

excellent.

(2) Decorations Awarded:

Medal of Honor	Sector and Party	2
Distinguished Ser	vice Cross	4
Silver Star	-42	168
Legion of Merit .		30
Distinguished Fly	ing Cross	182
Soldier's Medal	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	94
Bronze Star w/V		354
Bronze Star	an the second	1138
Air Medal w/V		160
Air Medal		4719
Army Commendation	Medal w/V	218
Army Commendation		1821
Purple Heart		424
-		

(3) Combet Badges Awardou:

Combet.	Infantryman Badge	21 89
Combat	Medic Badge	69
Aircra	ft Crewman Badge	345

d. Promotions: A total of 7747 enlisted personnel were promoted during this reporting period.

e. Reenlistments: A total of 231 reenlistments or extension actions were completed. The reenlistment/extension breakdown was: 70 first term RA reenlistments, 98 career reenlistments, 37 AUS enlistments, 24 extensions, and 2 enlisted reserve and national guard reamlistments.

f. Postal ectivities for the reporting period were as follows:

(1)	Money Order Sales	\$2,226,834.61
(1) (2)	Postal and Parcel Post fees	92,385.06
(3)	Incoming mail	1,191,093 lbs
	Daily avorage:	38,793 lbs
(4)	Outgoing mail	415,884 lbs
	Daily average:	4,516 1bs
(5)		92
(6)	Number of outgoing mail days	92
		·

h. Financial Services:

(1) CAMPS was modified, to pay on the 15th currently and to distribute pay statements on the 30th.

(2) The in-processing pay orientation has been revised and formalised, and the twice-monthly pay has been de-emphasized. The savings program and SGLI have been emphasized.

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(3) In September a Savings Program compaign was conducted. The division participation rose from 83% to 91%. This kept the Minuteman Flag eligibility and catitles the division to a one-year stor on the flag, which has been recuested.

i. Chaplain Activities:

(1) Distribution of New Testaments and Fraver Booklets was mode to new Skytroopers at Division Training Center Chaplein's Crientation Loctures.

(2) Religious tapes for devotional services were produced for forward area chapleins.

(3) Non-divisional units in our AO were covered by the Division Chaplains.

(4) A chapel, constructed completely from annunition boxes, was dedicated at LZ Bartlett. (BYRD AO)

(5) \$2,500.00 was contributed for the establishment of a Nursing School in Qui Nhon.

(6) Approximately 135 Division personnel attended Jewish High Holy Day services at Nha Trang during the first part of October.

j. Military Justice

(1)	General	Courts	Martial	14	
(2)	Special	Courts	Mertial	58	
(3)	Summery	Courts	Martial	8	
(4)	Article	15's		489	

k. Inspector General Activities: No significant trends in complaints and/or requests were revealed.

1. Medical

(1) Disease and injury statistical data:

(a)	In	jured as a result of hostile action (IRHA)	731
(ь)	Not	n-battle injuries	617
(c)	Di	Sense	
	<u>1</u>	Malaria Total	425
		<u>a</u> Vivox	144
		<u>b</u> Falciparum	281
	2	Scrub Typhus	0
	2	Hook Worm	11
	4	Fsychiatric cases	32
	2	Others	21 29

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- (d) Killed in Letion
- (e) Remaining in Hospital (In country) 484

149

(2) Discussion of Diseases:

Malaria cases: A total of 425 cases of malaria occurred in personnel of this division from 1 August to 31 October 1967 inclusive. Of these 144 cases were due to plasmodium vivax.

The malaria incidence is as follows:

UNIT	AUG	SEP	OCT ·	TOT/.L
HHC 1st Bde	0	1	1	2
1/8	7	13	13	33
2/8	5	5	21.	31
1/12	2	1	9	12
HHC 2nd Bde	1	0	6	7
1/5	9	11	24	44
2/5	2	10	12	24
2/12	21	18	13	52
HHC 3rd Bde	2	2	1	5
1/7	20	18	16	54
2/7	9	9	18	36
5/7	20	7	21	48
Div Arty 1/9 Avn Gp Spt Gmd Sig Bn Engr Bn HHC Div 15 Admin 1/50 Others TOT/L	3 1 2 2 2 3 0 0 1 116	8 1 2 4 0 4 - 5 1 0 1 121	7 2 5 5 0 4 1 3 2 188	18 4 11 11 2 10 12 2 3 4 425

(a) Experience gained from the previous currers indicates that the malaria season in the Central Highlands ranges from March through November with a peak expected during the Foriod April through July.

(b) The total malaria incidence is 425 cases as opposed to 412 for previous cuarter.

Other selected diseases of importance are as follows:

Scrub Typhus		0
Immersion Foot		4
Heat Exhaustion	1	32
Poisoning		2
Animal Bites		45
Hepatitis		38
Langue Fover		0
Infectious Moningitis		0

(c) Discussion of IRH/., WIA, and NBI

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1 KIA/IRHA ratio 125/692 or 1/5.52 was considerably different from the ration 1/4.87 observed in Korea.

2 Types of IRHA's. During the reporting period 86 punji stake wounds occurred compared to 100 for last reporting period.

2 'NBI: The total number of non-battle injuries this quarter is 617.

m. Office of Information and History

(1) The Information Office continued to increase its service to the world's press and division troops during the reported period. The following is an analytical breakdown by functions:

(a) The Information Section overatid forward vress centers during the following operations

Pershing		11 Feb 67 - continuing
Byrd		26 Aug 66 - continuing
Bolling		20 Sep 67 - 16 Oct 67
Wallowa	25	1 Oct 67 - continuing

(b) The Information Section continued to place emphasis on hometowners, both redio and newspaper.

	HOMETOWNERS	TAPED HOMETOWNERS
August	546	146
September	579	349
October	434	504
TOTAL	1 559	<del>999</del>

(c) In addition the Information Section exchanged 12 taped messages with citizens of Columbia, South Carolina for the Rally Support for Vietnam Personnel, (RSV). Messages received were broadcast over the local radio station.

(d) A weekly hospital newsletter to four hospitals which provides unit level news such as promotions and awards is premared and distributed to hospitalized Gavalrymen.

(e) Troop Topics emphasizing ist Cavelry accomplishments were published each week and command information brochures were distributed on the following subjects:

1Geneva Convention (3 Aug)2UGARPAC (10 Aug)3Army C/S Speech (17 Aug)4Battle Field Litter (24 Aug)5Heroes of Vietnam (31 Aug)6Programs of Insurance (7 Sep)7Reserve Obligation (14 Sep)8Communism (21 Sep)9Stand-by Air Travel (28 Sep)10NCO Candidates School (5 Oct)11Presidency (12 Cct)12Red China (19 Oct)13Chieu Hoi (26 Oct)

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(1) 135 newamen visited the division during the duarter, 53, 43, 39, in August, September and October respectively.

> AF UPT LADDS FURLISHING CO ABC TV MEWS FREE LANCE CRS NEWS NBC MEWS JUSTAO MEXIC. N TV TIME-LIFE I.N.S. NOS CONSTELATION MAGAZINE, FARIS YOUNGSTOWN VENDICATOR, YOUNGSTOWN, CHIO V.LLEY PUBLICATIONS D.SPO MUTUAL BRO.DC/STS NEWSWEEK M.G.ZINE YOMUIRI SHIDBUN THE BIG FICTURE KXJB-1 BISMARK, NORTH DAKOTA KOTV-TUL34 KXTV-SACRAMEN O, CALIFORNIA LONDON DAILY MAIL KHRH-HCUSTON AGENCY FR. NCE PRESSE OKINAMA MORNING STAR STARS AND STRIPES ORLANDO SENTINAL, ORLANDO, FLORIDA UPI INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC BROADCASTING LABORATORY ENFIRE NEWS SERVICE WLRW CHAMF. IGN. ILL

(g) The radio section produced the following news stories, interviews and editorial support, during the currter.

<u>1</u> Number of news stories (i.e. news corv) fired over AFRS-An Khe totaled 1,605. Section SCF calls for 2 newscasts onch day at 1305 and 1905. 1st Cav news headlings are aired at 2305.

2 Number of toped interviews aired over AFRS-An Khe during the quarter totaled 351. The interviews are usually featured during our local newscasts.

<u>3</u> Number of regular taped radio hometown interviews sent to hometown News Center, Kansas City totaled 999.

4 Number of taped radio hometown messrges sent to W/LT in Tampa, Florida, totaled 42.

5 Continued to produce two taped news programs each wook for hospitelized Cavalrymen in Qui Nhon.

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<u>6</u>: Continued to provide NFTV-Qui Nhon with war reports, news stories, tapëd interviews, Camp Radcliff recreational activities and slides.

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<u>7</u> Continued to produce two newsletters (0600 and 1800) each day totaling 93 newsletters during this current. (Newsletters are produced for base camp and forward division command post). Special additional reports concerning Sports Events, Mid-Bast Crisis and war, and stateside racial disturbances, were attached to regular newsletter.

<u>8</u> Continued to furnish Columbia RSVP officials with tapes concerning news of the 1st Cav Division, its background and the effects the RSVP program is having on skytroopers morale and the "First Team's" civic action projects. (12 tapes)

<u>9</u> Continued to provide /.FVN-An Khe with 3 redio announcers each day giving the division approximitely 11<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> hours of local broadcast time daily. AFVN, Saigon provided the other 12<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> hours to complete the broadcast day. During the local time periods the ennouncers provided musical entert: inment, local weather, information and news programs while placing emphasis on division policies, etc.

(h) OI/.H continues to have operational control of 13th Signal Battalion Photo Section and was responsible for taking and developing an estimated 17,000 photos. Almost 16,000 prints were made from selected negatives.

(i) The military press section, in addition to supporting with stories and aditing, was responsible for the relates of 709 stories and factures during this reporting period, many grining recognition in national papers such as the New York Times, Stars and Stripes, Chicago Tribune, Denver Fost, Houston Chronicle, San Francisco Chronicle, Minneapolis Star, Louisville Courier-Journal, and the Marin Horald.

(j) Frowided deily report to UBARV to publicize role of army Aviation in Vietnam.

(k) Frowided a 1st Cavalry Representative to Stars and Stripes, Saigon.

and Stripes.

(1) The publishing of the Cavalair in Tokyo at Stars

(3) The Office of Information and History continued with considerable historical documentation of the Division's activities. One historical team was in operation during the period. The team completed three historical research documents: 2/5th Cav in the Southern Crescent (11 Mar 67), 2nd Bde in Queng Ngai Province (6-22 Apr 67) and 1/5th Cav in Fleiku Province (14-15 Aug 66). The second Seven Month History and Briefing Data for the period Apr-Oct 66 was completed and distributed during the reporting p riod. Research projects are in the final stores of preparation for the following combat sections:

UNIT	DATE	FL.CE	OFTRATION
1/12th Cav	17 Dec 66	506 Valley	Thayer II
1st Bde	30 May - 1 Jun 67	Bong Son Plains	Fershing
2m <sup>3</sup> Bd.	28-29 Jun 67	Dam Tra-O Lake	Fershing
2na Bde	21 Jun 67	Fhu My Valley	Pershing
2/8th Cav	9 Aug 67	Song Re Valley	Fershing

Captain John A. Cash from the Office of the Chief of Militery History, Department of the Army, visited the Division during the period 27-29 October. The purpose of the misit was consultation with unit historians in support of The Army's Combat After Action Interview Fregrem. All infantry battelion historians were contacted during the visit. As a result of Captain Cash's visit, emphasis for the next reporting period will be placed on After Action Interviews.

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#### 4. Intelligence

a. (U) LTC Lyman C. Richardson replaced LTC Herman E. Schuberth as ACofS, G2, on 23 August 1967. During this reporting period five officers departed this section and six replacements arrived.

(C) Operations. During the month of August the regiments of 'h. . the 3d NVA Division engaged in considerable movement. Headquarters, 18th NVA Regiment, and one battalion moved from the Cav Giev Free south to the Nui Mieu Mtns. This move was to facilitate the resentry of the 2d VC Regiment from Quang Ngai into the Cay Gier area. At the same time, the 22d NVA Regiment redisposed with the 8th Rattalion and regimental headquarters on the eastern side of the An Lao Valley: the 9th Pattelion in and around the Bong Son Plains, and the 7th Battalion east of Highway One along the coast of the Bong Son Plains. Around 24 August the advanced elements of the 2d VC Regimental Headcuarters and the 95th Battalion were located in the Cay Giep Mountains. FW reports and documents indicated that the Regimental HQ and the 93d and 97th Battalions of the 2d VC Regiment were also on the move south. Friendly operations in the Cay Gier Mountains on the 26th and 30th of August and, subsequently, a five battalion operation initiated on 6 September pro-empted any plans of the 2d VC Regiment to close the entire force in the Cay Giep area. The 22d NVA Regiment has continued operations in the same general vicinity. However, the Headquarters, 22d NVA Regiment, moved back to the Cat Mit area (BS 7626) where it now remains. Agent reports again indicated that the 2d VC Regiment (-) was making the move down to join with its 95th Battalion. In early October the 2d VC Regimental Headquarters and its 93D Battalion were identified by friendly operations in the 506 Valley area (BR 8377). The 97th Battalion of the 2d VC Regiment still remains in Quang Ngai. The 18th NVA Regiment continued moving south in September and October. The 18th Regimental Headquarters and the 9th Battalion arc presently disposed in the CRID AC, probably in the Phu Cat Mtns. The 8th Rattalion had been identified in the Nui Mieu Mtns in October, exact location unknown. The 7th Rattalion, 18th Regiment, is presently operating in the mountains west of LZ Crystel (vic BR 8266). The 2d VC Regiment has probably closed in the Cay Giep Mtns, while its 93d Battalion is probably still located in the 506 Vallev area,

#### c. (C) Enemy Casualties and Losses.

	KIA	CAPTURED	WEAPONS
	<u>NVA/VC</u>	NVA/VC	IND/C/S
AUGUST	95/402	25/201	129/4
SEPTIMBER	1 54/275	52/65	146/22
OCTOBER	1 49/221	32/78	118/17

d. (C) Order of Battle. The Order of Battle Section continued operations at the Division CP at LZ Two Bits, at Camp Radcliff and with the 3d Brigade in Quang Nam. The receipt of a microfilm camera at the Division OB section and its use in conjunction with the sections Microfilm Reader/Printer should significantly expedite the processing's and discomination of Order of Battle information to 1st Cav units.

(1)	Surveillance Mis	sions:	CONPLETED 1	-
	MISSION TYPE	ASTA	IFFORCEV	
	IR	172	60	
	SLAR	125	•	
	PHOTO	165		
	REPRINT	33		•
	P.TATOT	1.95	60	

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(2) General Comments:

(a) IR. The ASTA Platoon had only one of three CV-1C aircraft authorized by TOE throughout the reporting period. This aircraft is one of the first OV-1C aircraft manufactured; herce, many missions were aborted due to aircraft and/or sensor system melfunctions. Weather during this period caused 136 missions to be aborted. Three new OV-1C aircraft-were scheduled but failed to arrive during the period September-October. Assistance was recuested from IFFCRCTV in support of the Infrared Program and this was provided by the 225th Aerial Surveillance Company.

(b) <u>SLAR</u>. The ASTA Pletoon has continued to support the "Market Time" operation in conjunction with the U.S. Navy and the "Lightning Bug" Operation in conjunction with the 229th Avistion Bn. Coly two of the three OV-1B aircraft authorized by TOE have been on hand throughout the reporting period. Weather had little effect on the SLAR due to the favorable characteristics of the sensor.

(c) <u>PHOTO</u>. The photo missions flown by the ASTA Platoon have been primarily medium to large area type coverage which were made into mosaics. One mission of the Cay Giep Mountains was made into a full size 1/25,000 photo map by the 569th Engineer Co (Topographic). The majority of these missions have been beyond the designed capabilities of the ASTA Platoon. Another achievement of the ASTA Platoon in this field is the use of camouflage detection film and the ability to process it. Seven processing tanks and a water jacket had to be febricated in order to facilitate processing of the film. The imagery interpretation (II) Section, 191st MI Det, has completed an experiment with a hand hald camera program utilizing a 35mm commercial type camera equipped with a 200mm telephoto lens for photographing spot targets from aircraft. This program is being studied at the close of this period.

(d) The Photo Section of the ASTA Platoon and the II Section of the 191st MI Det were moved to L? English where they joined up with the ASTA Platoon on 3 August 1967. The Direct Support Maintenance Detachment of the 15th Transportation Bn displaced from An Khe to join the ASTA Platoon at LZ English during August 1967. The collocation of the ASTA Platoon and support units has reduced the reaction time for support of the 1st Air Cavalry Division and resulted in a more efficient operation.

f. (C) 191st Military Intelligence Detrohment.

(1) Counterintelligence (CI)

(a) It is a common practice in much of rural Vietnam for a fathor to take the name of his eldest son. For example, when Neuven Van Ba has a son named Neuven Van Hai, the father becomes known as Mr. Hai and the son is called Hai. During interrogations and compilation of blacklists it is important to obtain all names used by the subject.

(b) Counterintelligence personnel should remember that the dict forg use many low level type agents (barbers, coke girls, laundry shop connect) in their reconnaissance and intelligence gathering networks. U.S. personnel often overlook the common bystender, persont, or child in their search for the Viet Cong "intelligence agent".

(c) When dealing with Vietnamese names, discritical marks (tone marks) should be used. When screening large numbers of people or making long lists of names, the tone marks are almost a necessity since it is the on or two or more people to have the same name but different tone marks.

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(d) In the last three months it has become more apperent that the Vist Cong gain a great deal of information from loose or casual talk by U.S. troops. Information concerning future movements, strengths, location, and other classified information should be disseminated on a strict need-to-know basis.

(e) There has been an unusually high number of lost classified documents, mostly SOI's. In units implementing strong socurity measures the number of losses has been greatly reduced or eliminated. The increase in enemy imitative deception on friendly radio frequencies necessitates an increase in communications and communication document security.

(f) During the past 30 days, Vie. Congleadre and guerrilles seem to be changing their usual tactics of hiding during the day and staying in the hamlet from darkness to dawn. Lately the cadre and guerrilles appear to enter the hamlet at sundown and leave at 2300 or 2400 hours. This may be an attempt to counter the NFFF cordon and search operations.

(g) In a static situation intelligence personnel along with NFFF and Police Special Branch should gather as much information as possible about each area visited. It has been found that the same area is often re-visited in the search for caure and guerrilles and a thorough knowledge of the terrain, population, and previous results from that hamlet are an invaluable aid in the second or third search.

(h) The first weeks of both training and utilization of the Kit Carson Scouts is the most important period for them. They have many fears, the least of which is their own doubt of being good enough to serve with a 1st Cav Company. The extra time spent briefing and metting the Scouts adjusted in their new home will save many hours of problem solving in the future. Assigning them a "buddy" is one of the better methods used during these first few weeks.

(2) IPW

(a) The IP<sup>1</sup> Section interrogated 2,391 detainees and 346 NVA/VCC. 325 linear inches of captured enemy documents were translated. Items not translated at this headcuarters were forwarded to IFFV for further exploitation/translation. Shortages of cualified linguists have slowed the readout's of documents, cut down on the speed of total interrogations and have made good liasion with GVN/ARVN intelligence agencies somewhat more difficult.

(b) Interrogation Techniques:

1 All provious lessons learned are still applicable.

2 It has been found that many male detainees have false identification papers. These papers usually try to represent the individual to be younger or older than he actually is, in order to avoid the draft.

<u>2</u> The NVA soldier is often disillusioned with his indoctrination after having reached the South. This can be taken advantage of by the interrogator.

<u>4</u> In some cases, PW's are so camer to please the interrogetor they can be used successfully to get the cooperation of more reluctant PW's.

5 When interrogating, the use of unit rosters or blacklists should be used to check the deteinee.

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<u>6</u> "Therse of Chien Hoi's or PW's from the same unit for identification purposes is useful. Once a PW has been identified by a courade, he usually will cooperate,

7 The quicker an individual is interrogated after capture, the more information he is likely to reveal.

<u>S</u>. The new replacements appear to be much younger. Also, the enemy is starting to train and use large numbers of North Vistnamess Montagnards for replacement in their regular units.

3. (U) Det 31, 5th Weather Squadron.

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(1) The southeent persons dominate' the vector thro equat and September. During the latter part of September, the transition period began for the change to the northeest monooon. The transition period was completed and the northeest represent established on ? October. Turing the first week of actober a trapical depression developed in the South a China dea, moved northeest, and entered the Republic of Vietnam near Chu lai on 8 October.

(2) During the southwest monsoon, conditions were favorable for airmobile operations with the major obstacles to operations caused by scattered thunderstorms, fog and low clouds on the higher terrain. In both the Pershing and An Khe areas thunderstorms caused low visibilities and higher terrain to be obscured. The thunderstorms occurred most frequently between 1400 and 1800 local and were usually of short duration. With a moderately strong easterly sea breeze, usually in the afternoon, low slouds would form along the ridge line west of the coastal plain, occasionally partly obscuring the terrain above 2,000 ft. Fog and ground fog were also present during the southwest monsoon; however, fog on the coast was fairly rare and usually not dense except along the rivers. When fog did form on the plains it usually dissipated by 0800 local. For occurred with a greater frequency in the interior valleys. The An Las Valley was particularly apt to have fog which usually formed near 0300 prd Valley was particularly apt to have log which about he reported fog dissipated near 0900 during August and September. An Khe reported fog on eight days that caused visibility restrictions below three miles. fog usually formed near 0700 and dissipated by 0800. Precipitation for both Bong Son and An Khe was below normal for August and September with An Khe reporting 4.99 in thes in August and 7.09 inches in September. Maximum temperatures on the Bong Son Plain in August and September averaged in the high 90's and 100 plus degree temperatures were not uncommon. Low temperatures for this area averaged near 76 degrees. An Khe reported high and low norn temperatures as follows: 'Sep, 90-72, Aug, 87-73. Susty surface winds in unust were 25 to 30 knots, gusts from the southwest frequently occurring between midnight and 1800 local.

(3) The preserve of the Intertropical Convergence Some (the boundary between the anuth out and northeest menseon) followed by the tropical depression noving into the anea caused heavy mains and scattered bounderstorms with the associated low cloudiness and poor visibilities during the first nine days of October. This condition frequently caused ridges to be obscured. Rain close foll from the 13th thru the 16th; otherwise conditions were favorable for simpobile operations. Table for the unality discipated between 0700 and 0800. For in the interior valleys the function were favorable for simpobile operations decreased is fore the interior of 000 and 0800. For in the interior valleys the function were a high and low term between in the fore 300 areas is follower with the average high and low term areas the fore 300 areas of 03 and 07 decrease. In the reported average high and low terms to 9.9, inches at 10 the for Clober. The only time surface winds were a problem was when the tropical decreasion moved by Pong ion causing wind trusts its 30 knows.

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h. (U) 37ist Radio Reasearch Company. Due to the sensitive nature of activities, a negative report is submitted.

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i. (C) 54th Inf Det

(1) During the period 1 August - 30 October 1967, the 54th Infantry Detachment (Silent Sentries) maintained ground surveillance redar support for the 1st Cav Div (AP) in the Pershing AC and in An Khe.

(2) In the Porshing AO, AN/PPS-4 redar sets were located at LZ Two Bits (1), LZ Dog (1), and LZ English (2). Significant actions are those reported by the team at LZ English.

(3) During the early part of August (1-5), heavy movement was detected north of LZ English by the radar team, and it was suspected to be a resupply trail moving west into the An Lao Valley. This was later confirmed by patrols. Through constant surveillance by radar and frequent adjustment of artillary and M42 dustor interdiction fires, it was reported by the end of August that the trail was no longer traveled during the hours of darkness.

(4) In An Khe the detachment maintains four operational terms for base defense. Teams are periodically sent to check points on Route 19, Popular Forces camps, and, in some instances, marry up with foot petrols to provide additional surveillance security.

(5) At the end of this reporting period the 54th Inf Det had 29 personnel (19 authorized), 10 AN/PFS-4 redar (four authorized plus two from each brighde HHC) and two AN/TPS-33 (two authorized). The detechment is preparing a modified TOF requesting a total of 42 personnel to maintain a full operational capability with assigned ocuirment.

j. (C) Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP).

(1) On 24 September 1967, Ceptein Varren Gooding assumed command of the detechment when Captain Tucker was reassigned, A summary of strength as of the end of this reporting period is as follows:

Authorizod			Assigned				
Officers	)	4		17.4	3	•	
EM		114	••		94		
Montagne	rd ARVN	18			14		`
Vietname	se ARVN	18			6		

(2) The LRRP detrchment is assigned to Division HHC for administrative and logistic support and, at present, the detrchment is operating without an approved TOE. This requires that equipment he obtained from resources within the Division.

(3) IRRP petrols operated to good advantage under operational control of the brightes, providing intelligence date and reporting energy movement.

5. (C) Operations and Training

La. Organization

(1) MTOE Actions

(a) On 22 August representatives of this division attended a conference at Hq.USARV on modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) for infantry and division artillery battalions. This division proposed that an airmobile infantry battalion consist of a head-

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quarters and headouarters company, a combat support company, and four rifle companies with a total strength of 943. Proposed additions to the DS artillery battalion included a liaison party for the cavalry squadron, forward observer parties for the cavalry squadron and a fourth rifle company, additional fire direction personnel, and warrant officer technicians for the counter-mortar radars. A standardization team from DA visited HC USARV in September to review these proposals. To date no decisions have been made.

(b) On 15 October the division submitted to H<sup>A</sup> USARV a list of critical personnel additions to the 67T Series TOE. MTOE incorporating these additions were submitted to USARV on 31 October. To date only the first priority recurst, door gunners for all UH-1 helicopters, has been approved.

(2) A Bn TF (TF 2/8 Cav) was pleced OPCON to 173d Abn Bde during the period 17 Sep 67 through 14 Oct 67,

(3) On 25 Sep 67, OPCCN of A/1/69 Armor was released and they became OPCON to 4th Inf Div.

(4) The 1/50 Inf (Mech) Bn arrived at Gui Mhon from the ZI and was attached to the division. The unit was rlaced CPCOM to the 3d Bde and became operational in the CRESCENT area on 29 Gep 67.

(5) The 3d Bdc (3 Bn's with support elements) was placea CFCON to the Americal Div effective 1 Oct 67.

b. Operations: During the reporting period, combat elements of the division have continued operations in the PERSHING AC. One En TF continued Operation DAZZLEM. A En TF conducted operations under IFFV control in Operation BYRD throughout the reporting period. Another En TF conducted operations for four weeks under control of 173d Abn Bde in Operation BOLLING. One Ede with full support was placed OPCON to Americal Div on 1 Cct and is conducting Operation WALLOWA. The division has continued to conduct Operation PERSHING in eastern SINH DINH and southern OWANG MOAI Provinces during the reporting period. The force employed has varied from three brigades with 7 battalions to two brigades with 4 battalions.

c. Discussion and Analysis of Major Operations: Figures used in discussing operations contained in this report have been taken from division daily sitreps. Discrepancies between these figures and data presented in after action reports should be resolved in favor of the after action reports which contain G-1 and G-2 figures developed after the operation was terminated.

(1) Operation EYED (25 August 1966 - continuing). This is the oldest operation in JFFV and is taking place in BJNY "WHAN Province. This location bes unique historical significance since Ho Ghi Minh taught school in FHAN THITT, the province carital. TF 2/7 Cavalry is OPCON to IFFV and continues operations in support of GVN Revolutionary Development activities (See Inclosure 3 for Task Organization). As of 312400H Oct 67, the following counts had been reported:

BLOW Y		US	
KIA VC/NVA POLT VC/NVA DETAINTES MPUS COPT SA/CS TOUS RICE DEST/CAPT	734/17 94/7 1131 273/10 360/24	KIA WIA MIA	23 278 0

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(2) 3d Bde reconnaissance in force into the SONG RE Valley (1 Aug - 19 Aug 67). 1 Aug the 3d Bde began moving north into a recon zone in southern QUANG NGAI. The operation was initiated when the 5/7 Cay air assaulted into the NUOC DINH Valley. On 2 Aug 2/12 Cav air assaulted into the SONG NE Valley and on 3 Aug the 2/8 Cav air assaulted to the area north of the SONG NE Valley. The Brigade conducted operations in this area with moderate success until 6 Aug when 5/7 Cav shifted and air assaulted into the SONG RE Valley to the west. On 9 Aug the 2/8 Cav air assaulted to LZ's in the SONG RE Valley north of the 5/7 Cav. A/2/8 Cav upon laming received heavy automotic, mortar, and 57mm RR fire from an estimated 2 to 3 NVA Co's in heavily camouflaged and fortified positions. After engreing the enemy with organic weapons and support artillery, the company pulled brck and 46 sorties of TAC AIR Strikes were conducted on enemy positions. 12 enemy AW positions were observed and engaged by sircraft. A second Co reinforced A Co in the afternoon, however contact could not be regrined. A search of the bettlefield disclosed 8 NVA KIA, 5 small arms and 2 crew served weapons. Another 20-30 enemy were estimated KIA. On 13 Aug the 2/12 Cav air assaulted to L7's in the valley north of the 2/8 Cav. 3d Bde continued operations in the SOMG RE Valley until 18 Aug when redeployment back to the PERSHING AO was initiated. Final elements departed the SONG RE and closed PERSHING AC on "O Aug. Results of this operation were:

ENEMY		•	FRIEN	DLY
KIA	42		KIA	7
POW	2		WIA	.44
DETAINEES	242			

(3) Operation JOIN HANDS (6 Sep = 15 Sep 67). This joint US/ARVN operation was initiated on 6 Sep with 3 Bn's (1/5 Cav, 1/8 Cav, and 2/12 Cav) from 2d Bde and 2 Bn's from Marine Task Force - Bravo, 22d Inf Div (ARVN). Two companies of the 1st Air Cavalry Division made amphibious landings on the beaches along the eastern base of the Cay Giep mountains. The other elements of the joint force air assaulted into LZ's in the Cay Giep Mountains. Elements of the 40th Regt. (ARVN) screened along the western flank while one Co of the 41st Regt. (ARVN) with attached APC Troop screened to the south. Navy swift boats operated off shore throughout the operation. No major enemy force was encountered, and only sporadic contacts were encountered. Results of this operation were:

1 ACD		27d INF DIV (ARVN)
ENEMY KIA	10	11
POW	5	13
FRDLY KIA	0	1
WIA	12	8

(4) Operation BOLLING (1 ACD participation 17 Sep - 14 Oct 67). See Inclosure 3 for Task Organization. IFFORCEV directed 173d Abn Bde to conduct this operation with 2 Bn's in an AO located west of TUY HOA. The 1 ACD released TF 2/8 Cav OPCON to 173d Abn Bde effective 17 Sep 67. 2/8 Cav air assaulted into LZ's in the BOLLING AO on 19 Sep 67. 2/8 Cav operations terminated on 14 October when they returned to the PERSHING AO. Results of scattered contacts during this operation were:

ENEMY		FRIENDLY
KIA	21	KIA O
POW	12	WIA 7
SA WPNS CAPT	8	·

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(5) Operation W/LLCMA (4 Oct 67 - continuing). (See Inclosure 3 Task Organization). IFFCRCEV notified 1 ACD on 28 Sep that a rapidly deteriorating situation in ICTZ required that III MAF be reinforced. 1 ACD was alerted to be prepared to release one 3 Bn Pde. On 30 Sep an advance party moved north and 3d Bde began preparations for deployment to I Corps Tactical Zone. The Bde movement began the morning of 1 Cct as 2/12 Cav and the 3d Bde CP departed for CHU LAI. By that evening 3d Pde CP, 2/12 Cav, B/1/9 Cav, and C/1/77 Arty were closed and 3d Pde was OFCOM to the Americal Division. The 1/7 Cav moved the following day and by 03'245H Cct 67, 5/7 Cav and all combat support elements of the 3d Bde were closed imerical Div. Operation WALLCMA began the maxt day as the 3d Bde began air assoulting into their new AO. This rapid and responsive deployment of a combat Bde into a new area over 100 Km distant graphically illustrates the flaxibility and movement capabilities of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

Since arriving in ICTZ, the 3d Bde has repulsed two major enemy attacks (one on a Bn CP/fire-base and another on a belicopter lagger area) and made one major contact with elements of 2 NVA Bn's. Additionally numerous small contacts are made daily. Results as of 312400 Oct 67 are as follows:

ENEMY		 FRIEN	DLY	
KIA POW	675 17	KIA WIA	46 480	
WPNS CAPT SA/CS	64/21	MI/.	0	

(6) Operation VOTER (3 Sep 67) and VOTER II (22 Oct 67). The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in conjunction with the 22d Inf Div (ARVN) and civilian police forces took positive steps to insure that elections held in BINH DINH Province were not influenced by NVA/VC forces and were protected from enemy terrorist activities. Under both these plans the Division increased operations in the constel populated areas in the days preceding the election. On election day, the civilian police secured all polling sites and elements of the 22d Inf Div (ARVN) formed an inner ring of security. The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) severely restricted its presence in the vicinity of all polling sites and repositioned forces to provide an outer ring of security. The success of these operations can be seen in the 7 ct that in both elections the wircentage of registered voters who actually voted in the AO/TAOP exceeded the percentage.

(7) Operation PERSHING (12 Feb 67 - continuing) (see inclosure 3 for Task Organization)

(a) Attached and supporting units of the 1st Cavely Division (Airmobile) continued throughout the reporting period to conduct Operation PERBHING in a 1032 secure mile AC in northesstern BINH DINH Province. Enemy Main Force Units having already been driven out of the heavily populated plains and scattered in the surrounding mountain areas, the Division effort was primarily directed toward continued elimination of the VC infrastructure, protection of the population and GVN secure areas, elimination and disruption of VC/NVA base areas, and the annihilation of isolated enemy units in the highlands.

(b) During the reporting period the Division has executed the following missions under Operation PERSHING:

Southern CU/NG NGAI Province to search out and capture or destroy the 3d NVA Div, VC units, VC infrastructure, and enemy base areas.

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2 Provided security/protection during GWN election periods to the heavily populated areas in Northern RINH DINH.

<u>2</u> Coordinated for maximum combined operations with the 22d Inf Div (ARVN) and the Capitol ROK Inf Div.

<u>4</u> Maintained sufficient force south of  $B^{ONG}$  SCN to prevent the resurgence of energy operations and to provide outer protection for revolutionary development offorts.

5 On a mission basis, furnished aviation support for elements of the 22d Inf Div (ARVN) employed in combat operations.

 $\underline{6}$  Coordinated with the 22d Inf Div (ARVN) for the security of Highway QL-1, a major North-South LOC passing through BINH DINH Province.

(c) Significant actions occurring in Operation PERSHING during the reporting period were:

1 Actions of  $\Lambda/2/5$  Gav, Nui Mieu cave complex (vic CR 015771) from 22 Aug to 3 Sep. While on a search and destroy operation Co  $\Lambda/2/5$  Cav spotted enemy movement in a rocky area. Contact was established late in the afternoon and the next morning a FCV reported that the cave complex contained 50-100 NVA. In continuous 24 hour operations, Co A laid siege to the area, killed those trying to escape and tried to persuade those remaining in the caves to surrender. On 3 Sep, further operations were deemed unprofitable and the Co withdrew as heavy naval gunfire was put into the area. Total results for the operation were 33 NVA KIA and 41 NVAC. US losses were only 1 WIA. In terms of enemy losses this was the most successful operation during the reporting period.

2 Enemy attack on D/1/8 Cav, RS 922046, 22 Aug 67. After a day of operations with negative enemy sighting, D/1/8 Cav established a defensive perimeter at darkness. At approximately 2020 sniper fire began around the position and five minutes later an estimated 2 VC platoons began firing small arms and rifle grenades into the company position and started to probe the perimeter. Artillery and illumination was placed on enemy positions and two separate VC squads observed moving into the perimeter were eliminated. Enemy activity continued until just prior to daylight. A first light search of the area around the perimeter disclosed 19 enemy KIA's. Friendly losses were 3 WIA (not serious).

<u>3</u> Enemy attack of LZ OLLIE and LZ UPLIFT, 25 Aug 67. At 252345H Aug the perimeter security force conducted a preplenned small arms "Mad Minute" as a routine security measure. Two minutes later LZ UPT.IFT received 7 rounds of 75mm RR fire in the vicinity of the FOL storage area. Results were 14 WIA. ARA scrambled and engaged flashes until field artillery took over the target. Approximately 15 minutes later LZ OLLIE received mortar fire. ARA was still airborne and engaged suspected targets. At 260120H Aug, LZ UPLIFT was on 100% alert with ARA and Spocky on station when approximately 40 rounds of mortar fire were received. Results were 2 KIA, 10 WIA, and 14 aircraft damaged (only one non-flyable, all repairable. ARA, artillery and Spocky engaged targets at two different locations. Daylight reconnaissance disclosed enemy positions and evidence of 75mm and 82mm weapons. It is believed that the "Mad Minute" at LZ UPLIFT confused the enemy and caused the disruption of a preplanned co-ordinated attack. Aircraft in secure revetments and all personnel on alert significantly reduced material damage and personnel casualties.

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4 2d Bde attack against 2d VC Regt H<sup>+</sup>'s, CAY GIEP Mtns, 28-30 Aur 67. On 28 August, B/1/9 Cev, utilizing a HOI CHM, located the suspected site of the 95th VC Bn and 2d VC Regt Ho's in the CAY GIEP Mtns. The troop called in TAC Air strikes and air assaulted their rifle platoons to four different locations. Acting on the information obtained, 2d Bde air assaulted 1/5 Cav (-) on 30 Aug into the area and established contact with enemy elements. Heavy rain hampered operations however, medium and heavy artillary and 12 TAC Air Strikes were put into the area. Sporadic contact continued throughout most of the night. Results were 25 NVA KIA and 1 NV.C; various equipment was captured including 2 Chicom radies of the type found only at Regt level. Friendly casualities were 2 KIA and 4 <sup>w</sup>IA.

Enemy attack on LZ TWO BITS, 5 Sep 67. Enemy activity began, at 052010 Sep with light probing ration on the west side of TWO BITS north. Both perimeters were placed on 100% alert, however weather precluded dispatch of ARA. At 2035H probing again started and shortly thereafter 2 rounds of mortar fire fell inside the perimeter in the 1/9 Cav area. These rounds were followed almost immediately by heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire all around the perimeter of TVC BITS north. Artillory began firing interdiction fires and illumination at 2043. ARA and Spooky were on station at 2100H. Sporadic enemy firing continued until approximately 2145H. At 060045H Sep firing again broke out and it was apparent the enemy was in the village between T" BITS north and south. The crea was engaged with defensive fires from the perimeter and ARA. Enemy fire continued to come from this area until 0159H when all units reported no contact. The last and final incident occurred at 0325H when enemy fire was received for approximately 10 minutes in one sector of THO BITS south. Results of this attack/probe conducted by an estimated reinforced company were 9 US WIA and one US KIA. 10 energy were estimated KIA.

<u>6</u> Search and Destroy operation of B<sup>/1</sup>/8 C<sup>1</sup>v, vic BS 917096, 17 Sep 67. At 170810H, ARVN elements from the 40th Root reported sighting a VC Co. As ARVN forces advanced, the energy scattered into small groups and attempted to evade to the south. 1st Brigade scouts were dispatched immediately and were engaging the energy at 0817H. As corial forces fixed the energy and provented his escape. B/1/8 Cav with six tanks and three D-7 bulldozers may a rapidly to the contact area. B Co closed the area at 0915H and began system tic search and destroy operations. The VC Co had gone to ground and were hiding in bunkers and tunnels in the village and in heavy brush along the water line. In a series of small scattered actions throughout the day, B/1/8 Cav accounted for 31 VC KIA, and 1 VCC. A total of 46 bunkers were destroyed as the D-7 bulldozers were put to use in assisting to clear the village.

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7 Enemy attack of Bridges 514-3, BR 803969, 24 Sep 67. One infantry sound of A/1/8 Cav and an'M-42 Duster-were defending Bridge 514-3 on the night of 24 Sep 67. At 2220H a well armed enemy force of 15-25 men attacked using grenades, M-79's, AK-47's, and B-40 RL's. All commo was immediately knocked out, however preplanned defensive artillery and illumination began firing within 5 minutes of the start of the attack. The attack was repulsed and ARA and gunships were on station supporting at 2240H. A reinforcing platoon made a night air assault to an L2 north of the bridge and began to sweep north, however, contact broke at 2315H shortly before they arrived. The area was immediately searched and 8 NVA KIA's, 2xAK-47's and 1xB40 RL found. Friendly losses were 2 ND ATA and 8 NS WIA. The bridge was undamaged.

<u>8</u> Search and Destroy operations of 1<sup>1</sup>/7 Cav, An Lao Valley, 24-27 Sep 67. On the afternoon of 24 Sep while searching with the aid of a HOI CHANH, 4 enemy soldiers were observed entering a cove vic BS 777114. The area was searched and a typewriter and documents found relating to the 22d NVA Regt. The area yielded 1 NVA KIA, <sup>1</sup> NV/C, and a new 15 watt Chicom radio. Another Co searching in the area vic BS 754196 discovered an arms cache and made light contacts. There were 6 NVA KIA, 6 NVAC, and 1 NVA HOI CHANH. All were from the 22d Regt. The arms cache yielded a total of 19 small arms, 22 crew served weapons and a large emount of ammunition. Among the weapons captured were 82mm mortars, 75mm RR's, HMG's, and 5 MG's.

<u>9</u> Air/ground Search and Destroy Operation, 1/9 Cav and 1/5 Cav, BR 8175, 10 - 11 Oct 67. Elements of the 1/9 Cav, 1/5 Cav, and 1/50 Inf (Mech) had been searching in the 506 Valley for three days with minor success when C/1/9 Cav sighted and engaged an estimated 30 man force. Artillery fires and TAC Air strikes were called in and 10 enemy were KIA. The following day, 11 Oct, D/1/5 Cav air assaulted into the area. They made scattered contact resulting in 11 NVA KIA and 4 NV/C. They also found numerous bodies and weapons from the previous days fighting. Total enemy losses from this encounter were 53 NVA KIA, 5 NVAC, and 14 crew served and 34 small arms captured. Five days later C/1/9 Cav picked up 8 NVA HOI CHANH's from the same area.

10 Enemy attack of C/1/50 Inf (Mech), SW CAY GIFP Mtns, vic BR 9287, 31 Oct 67. Co C/1/50 Inf had conducted search operations and formed a perimeter for the night. At 310130H Oct an unknown size enemy force attacked utilizing rocket launcher and small arms fire. The Co called in ARA, artillery and TAC Air strikes. Spooky came on station and provided illumination. Sporadic contact continued until davlight resulting in 15 NV/ KIA while friendly casualties were 3 US KIA and 10 US WIA.

(d) Enemy losses from Operation PERSHING as of 3'2400

Oct 67:

KIA NVA/VC	1134/2774
POW NVA/VC	194/1917
Returnees NVA/VC	31/179
CD's captured	1 539
Detainecs	9416
Wpns Capt SA/CS	1063/102
Rice/Salt seized	364/43 (tons)

#### (8) Operation DAZZLEM (1 October 1966 - continuing)

(a) DAZZLEM is the plan for the defense of Camp Radcliff and security of the TAOR. One Infantry Battalion operating under Division control, assumes the mission of base security, conducts offensive operations in the TAOR, and provides for the security of Hwy 19 within the TAOR. This Infantry battalion, a DS artillery battalion and other attached units as required, form the Base Defense Task Force.

(b) Significant actions

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<u>1</u> Convoy ambush, Hwv 19, BR 349454, 2 Ser 67. At 021855H Sop 67 a 24 vehicle convoy travelling from FLEIKU to OUI NHON was stopped when a mine was command detonated under the first vehicle. The convoy then began recuiving small erms and sutematic waspons fire from an estimated 200 man enemy force in a 700 meter killing range. 3 gun jeeps from h/1/7 Cav were sent to the area and "Go-Go" came on station. Contact was not established. Friendly losses were 8 US KIA, 20 US WIA, and 17 vehicles damaged.

2 Enemy mortar attack of Hwy 19 firebise, 3 Sep 67. At 030246 Sep 67 the firebase at BR 361457 began to come under mortar attack. ARA and "Go-Go" were dispatched to the scene and engaged suspected targets. By 0325H firing had ceased. Approximately 80 rounds of 60mm and 82mm fire worerreceived withing the perimeter. A Muhinter/killer team and the Base Defense CRF were inserted into the area but contact could not be established. Friendly losses were 1 US KIA and 11 US WIA. 3 enemy bodies were found the next day at first light.

3 Combat action of 5/7 Cav along Hwy 19 on 17 Sup 67. At 171225H Sep 67, e Romo plow working along Hwy 19 was engaged and hit by an enemy B-40 rocket launcher. MP's arrived on the scene and hit by an enemy B-40 rocket reundate. In 5 different number of the several several almost immediately and found 1 NVA KIA and sev 446 men running north. The CRF air assaulted into the area but was unable to establish contact. at 1420 a UH-1 landed on the highway to fix a jammed mechinegur. Firing erupted and the pilot was KIA, the copilot managed to get the ship off and out of the area. The CO, 5/7th now put ARA and "Go-Go" into the fight, air air assaulted the remainder of the RF company and called for TAC Air support. Following the fir strikes, the commony swept thru the woods and as it neared the rord an intenso close range finefight erupted. Contact was not completely broken until 2000H. That night IPW readout disclosed that 5/7 Cav prompt action had disrupted a 30 vehicle ambush rlanned by 2 NVA Cols. The POW said his Co CO, XO, PO, and Asst FO were KIA this day. Total enemy losses were 20 NVA KIA, 1 VC KIA, 1 NVAC, and 3 crew served and 10 small erms weepons ceptured. Friendly losses were 6 US KIA and 7 US WI ...

<u>4</u> Energy attack on Pacific Architects and Engineer site, BR 447448, 8 Oct 67. At 080030H Oct, the PAST site began to receive small arms fire. This was immediately followed by an estimated 15 VC entering the compound thru 2 holes cut in the wire on the south side. These VC ran through the brea throwing an estimated 200 different satchel charges into buildings and under trucks. The attack lasted from 15 to 30 minutes. At the time of the attack there were 9 US guards in the compound, 5 of which were on duty. Results of the attack wore; 1 US soldier KIA, 1 US soldier ULA, 1 Korean civilian KIA, 1 VN civilian WIA, 25-30 vehicles damaged and various other damage to huts and buildings. 3 VC were KLA inside the compound.

Oct 67.

(c) Enemy losses from Operation DAZZLEY as of 312400

KI. NVA/VC POM NVA/VC Returnees NVA/VC CD's captured Detainees Wpns Capt SA/CS Rice/Salt seized

25/7 29/.1 (tons)

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c. (C) Combat Developments

(1) <u>Airborne Survey System (ABC Systems)</u>. Divarty continued to evaluate the ABC System throughout the reporting p riod. A lack of repair parts and an inoperable computer caused excessive downtime.

(2) <u>Sniper Program</u>. The division completed its evaluation of the Colt Realist eniper scope. The M16 with the colt scope is not a suitable weapon for sniping. The division will issue three accurized M14 rifles with M84 scopes to each battalion and to the long range reconnaissance patrol (LRRP) company for sniping. The weapon are on hand; the scopes are on order.

(3) <u>Night Vision</u>. Sufficient individual night weapons sights have been issued to the division to permit the issue of 35 scopes to each infantry battalion. Nine medium range devices have been issued to Diverty for use on OP's at fire bases. They have proved successful in identifying movement at ranges beyond 2,000 meters and have been an asset to the interdiction program.

(4) <u>Sound Radios</u>. The sound radio (AN/PRT-4, AN/PRR-9) is being issued to replace the AN/PRC-6 on a one-for-one basis. Two battalions were issued scuad radios during this period.

(5) Light Weight Load Carrying Equipment. The division completed its evaluation of 40 sets of light weight load carrying gear. Results of the evaluation were inconclusive due to the limited number of items. The division requested 400 additional sets for long term evaluation.

(6) <u>XM148 Grenade Leuncher</u>. This item product unsatisfactory in infantry units due to its lack of durability; consecuently, USARV directed that they be turned in. However, 1/9 Gev has devised a method of mounting the launcher coaxially on the M60C machine gun used by scout observers on OH-13 scout helicopters. Durability in this environment is not a problem since the weapon does not receive the rough handling it did in the hands of ground troops. Firepower on scout melicopters is similarity increased. Fifty-two XM148's have been retained for use by 1/9 Cav.

d. (C) Training.

(1) Division Programs. The Division Training Center (DTC) continued its four-day replacement training course (RTC) and the combet leaders' course (CLC). A total of 4,054 officer and enlisted replacements were trained in this ounter. Seven NCO's from the AEVN 22d Division were graduated from the combet leaders' course along with 306 division soldiers/ During the first two weeks in August the division conducted special five-day orientation courses for selected field grade officer replacements. The course included orientation in the field on division, brigade and support command operations plus liaison visits to adjacent US and /PVN divisions.

(2) Facilities. In September the DTC enlarged its mines and booby traps course. Now, after a through orientation, each trainee negotiates the course individually. Range facilities have been improved and expanded. Construction was begun on a new 100-men classroom. In October the 173d Airborne Brigade established its training center at. An Khe. The Brigade will share 1st air Cavalry Division training facilities with the DTC. In addition they have brought along a complete mock villy rewhich they share with the DTC.

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#### (3) Support of II CTZ RF/PF Training.

(a) In September the division organized and equipped six Combined Mobile Training Teams (CMTT) and five Combined Mobile Improvement Teams (CMIT) as part of a II CTZ/IFFORCEV program to train and improve the combat proficiency of Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF). Each CMIT consists of one company grade officer, one NCO and one EM from the division; one NCO from a MACV sector advisor team and one ARVN instructor/translator. Its mission is to provide two weeks refresher training on site to RF companies. Each CMTT consists of one officer, and one NCC from the division, one NCO from the MACV sector advisor team, and one interpreter. Its mission is to train PF platoons on site. At present the division is providing three of the six interpreters.

(b) The terms function under the operational control of the senior province advisor (SFA) of the sector in which they are employed. Support remains a division responsibility. The five CMIT's were dispatched to the five coastal provinces in II CT? during the first week in October. During the second week in October, five CMIT's were dispatched to the five coastal provinces in II CT2. The sixth term was dispatched to Phu Boh Province to work in the provincial PF training center. As of 31 October, two RF companies and two PF platoons had been trained; Three RF companies and three PF platoons began training on 30 October.

(c) Linison has been established with the Regional Force Company Training Team (REFCOTT) at Phu Cat. The division is prepared to provide assistance on call to this vital training program.

(4) Artillery Training. Diverty conducted four three-day forward observer courses for newly errived FO's. A total of 34 FO's were trained. Emphasis was placed on problems and techniques pecular to Vietnam. Each firing bettery was administered the gunner's oualification test monthly. In addition, Diverty conducted periodic quick fire tests for all subordinate units.

(5) Other Training

(a) During this quarter 112 personnel from the division attended aviation maintenance and supply courses conducted under the Army Aviation Mobile Technical Assistance Frogram (AAMTAP). Thirty-one division soldiers attended the MACV Records School; twenty-four of these were from the Division LRRP Co. Future cuotas to this school will be filled solely from the LRRP Co.

(b) The 1st Bright graduated twenty-six students from its Vietnamese language course. The objective of the course is to provide soldiors from rifle companies in the bright with a basic language capability. The brighte's goal is to have two language cualified men per rifle company.

#### 6. Logistics

a. General: During the period 1 August 67 through 31 October 67 combit service support was provided for three major operations: Ryrd, Pershing, and 3d Pde Operations in I CTZ.

(1) Operation Byrd continued throughout this period with no changes to the logistical support system. Can Ranh Bay Support Command requested a conference on 15 August to discuss a reduction in strength of FSA personnel at Phon Thiet. It was determined as a result of the conference that FSA support could not be reduced below the current level of 112 personnel.

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(2) Operation Pershing continued throughout this period. On 1 August 1967 Pershing AO was extended to the north requiring that a FSE be established at LZ Montezuma (Duc Pho) to support the 3d Brigade. 3d Brigade trains remained at LZ English. FSP's were required at Ba To and Gia Vuc due to the extensive flight time encountered by CH-47 in resupply operations from LZ Montezuma. USAF aircraft (C-123 & C-7A) moved supplies from the FSA at LZ Montezuma to the FSP's. CH-47's transported supplies from FSP's to fire bases as required. This phase of Pershing terminated on 21 August 67. In September the FSA at LZ Uplift was reduced to the strength level maintained before the explosion at LZ English (6 June 67). Highway 1 between Oui N . and Pershing AO was closed on 3 October 67 because heavy rain washed out a bridge and bypass. The highway reopened on 5 October 67. Rased on the orrival of the Northeast monsoon the stockage levels for all classes of supply were raised to a 3 day level in the Pershing AO on 8 October 67. In addition, Highway 1 was interdicted by enemy destruction of two bridges on 16 October 67 resulting in a blockage of the LOC for several hours.

(3) 3d Bde operations in I CTZ, initiated on 1 October 67, required the deployment of the 3d Bde with 3 battalions and logistical support units to Chu Lai and Tam Ky and vicinity under the operational control of the Americal Division. The brigade base and a FSE were established at Hill 63 (LZ Baldy). A medical clearing company (15th Med Bn) and a maintenance detachment (27th Maint Bn) were located with the FSE. Aircraft maintenance facilities were established at Chu Lai (C Co, 15th TC Bn). Resupply and services were provided by Qui Nhon Support Co Command through a FSA located at Hill 63. Considerable difficulty was encountered in resupply operations due to heavy rains washing out several bridges and flooding the road bed. Resupply operations by organic air from Chu Lai to Hill 63 (64 km) were not capable of supporting a. brigade in combat operations. During the period 14 - 18 Oct resupply of rations (12,288 rations), barrier material (91.2 tons) and ammunition (308.8 tons) was conducted using 33 C-130 sorties. Normal resupply eperations rosumed on 19 Oct 67. The FSA was reduced to a linison team on 30 Oct 67.

b. Supply and Services:

(1) General: During the reporting period the following key personnel changes were made in Headquarters 1st Cavelry Division and 15th Supply and Service Battalion.

(a) Major Francis X.R. Connors, Headquarters, 15th Supply and Service Battalion assumed the duties as Assistant Division Supply Officer on 18 September 1967.

(b) Major Wilson J. Sherrel, Headcuarters 1st Covelry Division assumed the duties of Assistant Chief of Supply and Service Branch, G-4.

(c) Captain William H. Hallam, Headquarters, 15th Supply and Service Battalion assumed the duties of Division Class III Officer on 30 August 1967.

(d) 1LT Robert B. Hahn, Herdouarters, 15th Supply and Service Battalion assumed the duties of Division Class I Officer on 18 September 1967.

(2) Class I Activities:

(a) Liaison Staff visits and mess inspections were conducted in vorious unit mess halls throughout the TAOR and AO. Generally, the standards for food preparation, storage, and Class I support have improved.

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(b) Ice and ice cream shipment to troop units in the

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AO has been successful without any significant delay. Reefer was are being used as the principal merns of transportation. M 3 1.

(c) Drainage and dust control problems have been alloviated within the Class I supply point by filling in holes and using pineprime as a dust palliative.

(d) Sentry dogs are provided by the 212th Militory Police Company to patrol the Class I supply point during the hours of darkness.

(e) The Division Food Advisor attended Menu Board meetings at Qui Nhon on 12 August and 16 September 1967.

(3) Class II & IV Activities:

(a) Construction of new warehouses and open sheds continued with success during the reporting period. Sensitive items are being moved into the completed structures as they are completed.

(b) On 8 September 1967, two corrections were attached to the Class II & IV Supply Point. These sections were utilized in re-warehousing procedures and delivery of surrlies to divisional units.

(c) Replenishment of surplies has generally been adequate to meet the domands of the division. Certain critical shorts ges were experienced in the areas listed below but have not impaired the mission readiness of the division:

1 CTn 50-901 and 50-902 with particular emphasis on short-ges of sweeters, woll pullover; satks, mushioned sale (Sizes medium and large); gloves, flying (sizes 2 and 3); helmet, ballistic flying (sizes medium and large).

2 Self-Service Supply Center items (e.g. office stationery and reproduction paper, identification tog (blank), chain, identification trg.

3 .TOE items in the category of air craft tool sets, typewriters, camora and other photographic materiel, /N-ASC 11, AN-FRC-25, leuncher, grenade.

4 Construction and borrier material in the arge of timber 4" x 4" through 8" x 8".

(d) A coordination meeting was held in the office of the DSO between Supply Officer 173d Airborne Brigede, DSO & Chief of Supply and Service Brench, 64 to discuss meterial and independent responsibilities in the area of Supply Support.

(e) Post, Camp and Station property responsibilities were transferred from the 1st Cavalry Division to the 625th Supply and Service Battrlion, AKSAC effective 16 October 1967.

(f) During reporting period, the division made a large turn-in and made shipment to 1st Logistic Command of TOE & MTOE not recuired for operations. This is a recurring task and will emphane to peceive maximum attention. V.1

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(4) Class III Activities

(a) Frequent visits to the FSE were conducted by the

G-4 Staff.

(b) Numerous fuel surveillance checks were conducted throughout the division AC and fuel samplings were analysed to insure that blending ratio's were in accordance with established stendards.

(c) Construction of revetments around the fuel beg area and construction fo FOL drum racks been during the reporting period. Both of these construction projects are approximately 80% completed.

(d) Class III personnel clong with Aeriel Ecuirment Surport personnel established a JP-4 sling-out eres in Da Nang for use in sling loading to LZ Baldy.

(5) Class V Activities:

(a) Ligison visits were made to various whits of the division and a complete ammunition serviceability, accountability and storage inspection has been conducted in the TACR.

(b) Ammunition was moved from the Class V sling-out area to the 630th Ammunition Supply Point. This move was completed 31 August 1967.

(c) Ammunition continues to be available in adequate quantities to meet the division needs. During the reporting period two items of ammunition were placed on ASR, submitted to Headquarters ... IFFV and approved.

(6) Aerial Supply Activities

Aerial equipment support personnel continue to provide riggor support at the forward supply points, inspection recovery and classification of slings and other cerial deliver items.

(7) The following onts of supplies were used during this reporting period:

(a) Class I (STON)

A Rations: 2,512,44 B Rations: 3,382.39 C Rations: 1,698.70

(b) Class II & IV (STONS)

Clothing & Ecuip: 3,365.09 Fortification Material: 4,852.85

(c) Class III (Gols)

/VG.S: 735,905 JP-4: 6,740,300 MOGAS: 2,317,710 Diosel: 2,819,895 Package Product: 277.7 (STON)

(d) Class V (STON)

Tonnage---46,185.79 (STONS)

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c. Transportation

(1) Air Transportation. Significant movements during the period 1 August - 31 October 1967 were as follows:

TYPE DATE	UNIT	ORIG	DEST	A/C	CARGO/LBS	<u>P£X</u>	SORTIES
01 1 Aug	1/7, C-1/2	1 Eng	AK	C1 30/C7A	62500 <sup>-</sup>	562	18
01 3 Aug	2/8, C-2/1	9 <b>NK</b>	DUCP	C1 30	42310	624	9
01 3 <i>L</i> ug	. 2/8 (-)	AK	Eng	C7A	34390	43	. 9
01 10 Au	g 15th Med	AK	B.TO	C7A	38370	70	12
CC 12/14	Aug ASTA PLT	ĂΚ	Eng	C123	154240	1.14	17
01 17 Au	g 3/18 Arty	ЛК	CHUL	C1 30	15642	6	1
01 19 Au	g 2/8, 2/12	BATO	Eng	C71	96400	353	33
01 19 Au	g 15th Med	B.TO	LITTS	C7A	48120	567	35
01 15 Se		Eng	TUY H	C7A	6660	17	3
01 17 Se		Eng	VANC	C1 3Ó	87000	562	10
01 17 Se		Eng	TUMH	C1 30	173592	103	10
01 14 Se		AK	Eng	C1 30	27000	377	6
CE 1 Oct		Eng	CHUL	C1 30	514000	870	29
CE 2/3 0		eng	TAMK	C1 30	939000	947	57
CE 3 Oct		Eng	TIMK	C1 30	32000	53	8
CE 3 Oct		AK	TAMK	C1 30	342365	759	25
01 4 Oct		LITTS	.K.	C7A	20000	332	20
CE 5 Oct		Eng	CHUL	C1 30	75969	43	-4
CE 5-7 0		AK	CHUL -	C1 30	1082941	263	
01 11 Oc	t D/227	Eng	CHUL	C1 30	186900	31	···•}

(2) SEA (UBAF) Air Lift Service and C7A Courier Service.

(a) At close of report period a total of 7 drily passenger/cargo flights were scheduled to An Khe by the SEA (USAF) Airlift Service. C130 medical evacuation service was provided on Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday.

(b) A daily courier service was maintained throughout the period with C7A flights in operation between An Khe, Bong Son, Chrystal, English, Gui Nhon, Phen Thiet and Chu Lai.

(3) Ground Transportation:

(a) The Avision was supported throughout the period by the 541st Transportation ( many (Light Truck). This unit furnishes transportation in support of base camp requirements as well as limited support to forward elements.

(b) During the reporting period vehicle support averaged below 35 available vehicles daily due to a shortage of drivers in the unit. A driver shortage has been identified as USARV wide, and has been inversion of the state of t

d. Ground Maintenance.

(1) Vehicle readside spot checks in both the base camp and forwari areas were continued throughout the reporting period. Spot checks in the base camp indicated improvement in organizational maintenance in this area. Spot checks in the forward area indicated a lack of emphasis on driver/operator and organizational maintenance. Inspection reports were forwarded through command channels and the units replied by indersement on action taken to correct deficiencies. The following areas were exphasized to improve unit maintenance operations and condition of equipment:

(2) Command Maintenance Management Inspections:

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(a) 1st Battelion/7th Cavelry was inspected on 12 Sep 67. The inspection resulted in an overall rating of satisfactory.

(b) 191st Military Intelligence Detachment was inspected on 17 October 1967. The inspection resulted in an overall reting of unsatisfactory.

(c) 2nd Battalion/5th Cavelry was inspected on 26 October 1967. The inspection resulted in an overall rating of satisfectory.

(d) Results of these indicated that additional emphasis was needed in the areas of Army Ecuimment Records Procedures and operator/organizational maintenance technicues. Classes were conducted for division personnel on DA Form 2406 (Materiel Readiness Report) and generator maintenance classes were conducted in the forward areas.

(3) Supply stock inventories, plus implementation of the mechanized records system have reduced the zero balance on the 11,728 line ASL to 51.4%. The need for RBE and RBX requisitions has dropped considerably for this reason.

(4) Several courtesy visits were paid to the 27th Maintenance Battalion by Mr. Jack Turner, Technical Representative from ATAC, in an effort to reduce the multifuel fleet problems experienced by this division. This division has initiated an extensive program directed toward command emphasis, for complete and proper organizational/operator maintenance on these vehicles. This includes wide dissemination of information received by this headcuartors such as directive changes, suggested improvements, modifications, and general information which should be common knowledge both at D/S and organization/operator level.

(5) End of Report Period Statistics (Percent Operational)

Vehicles - 96.3% Radios - 96.8% Generators - 95.8% Artillery - 98.7% Weapons, Light - 99.8%

### e. Facilities:

(1) The construction of the 1st Air Cavalry Division base camp has been underway for twenty-five months. During this period the base camp has changed from a forward operations center to the division rear area. The majority of the maneuver elements of the division receive their logistical support from other than the Comp Radcliff complex. These units have a very small percentage of their unit at Camp Radcliff.

(2) This small percentage consists of housekeeping personnel and those either just arriving in the unit or rotating. Since the units are primarily located in the area of operations, there is no need for mess hall and billets to be built for those troops.

(3) Facilities should be built to house only the personnel expected to be occupying the area.

(4) The engineer unit which has been tasked with the mission of constructing the base camp can concentrate their efforts on the operational facilities. It would also enable the units to have more personnel in the area of operation.

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f. Aircraft Maintenance:

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(1) The following number of aircraft, by type, have been dropped from accountability during the reporting period:

ACFT TYPE		AMOUNT	
0H-1 35		10	
UH-18		17	
UH-1C		5	
UH-1 D		63	
UH-1 H		6	
Сн-47А		2.	
CH-54		3	
TO-1D		1	

(2) The following number of sircraft, by type, have been received from stock or other commands during the reporting period:

CRT TYPE	MOUNT
0H-1 35	9
UH-1B	6
UH-1 C	7
UH <del>_</del> 1 H	132
CH-47A	2
CH-54	2

(3) Safety of Flight Inspection

Inspection of AFT Vortical Shaft Thrust Bearing Lubrication Lines, TB 5501529-209-20/23 dtd 13 Oct 67. A one time inspection of the line to insure that adsounte lubrication is being provided to the thrust bearing. There were no discrepant lines found on the fifty-three (53) aircraft inspected. Project completed and closed on 31 October 1967.

(4) Maintenance Management Projects:

(1) DECCA Provisions: All aircraft assigned to the division were inspected for compliance with modification work orders that incorporated DECCA Navigation System provisions. Survey indicates compliance accomplished on 179 aircraft. Project completed and closed on 15 October 1967.

(5) End of reporting period statisticst.

Aircraft Armament

#### (a) Aircraft LSL by DSU (S Fill)

<u>A cD</u>	<u>Со В</u> `	Co C	Co D
73	72	77	85
92	68	88	90 89
73	76	92.	89

(b) Average NORS (\$) (1 Aug 67 thru 31 Oct 67) ? . .

ACFT TYPE	NORS (3)
OH-1 3	5
UH-1B	6
· UH-1 C	4
UH-1D	3
UH-1 H	2
CH-47/	· 1
07-1	15
CH-54	1
33	

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Conf. Jential

(c) Average NCRM (%) (1 Aug 67 thru 31 Oct 67)

N

ACFT TYPE	1.8	NORM (3)
OH-135		22
UH-1 B		24
UH-1 C		25
UH-1D		23
UH-1H		19
. CH-47`	-1.5	37
OV-1		- 19
CH-54		25

(d) Average operationally roady (%) (1 Aur 67 thru

31 Oct 67):

OR (%) ACFT TYPE CH-135 73 70 71 UH-1B UH-1 C 74 UH-1D 79 62 UH-1H CH-47 66 OV-1 CH-54 74

### 7. (C) Civil Affairs

a. General efforts during the reporting period were directed toward support of combat operations in the Pershing 40, and continuation of civic action in the TACR.

(1) Population and Resources Control

(a) Creration DRAGNET continued with noticePlot success during the reporting veried. The 816th National Police Field Force (NFFF) Battalion was replaced by the 222nd Battalion. Tabulated results of DRAGE NET appear below:

> Enemy KL. = 133 Enemy FC<sup>4</sup> = 159 Houses searched = 16,111 CDs = 375 ICs = 60,820 Weapons = 86 Documents = 147 in Ammo = 14,324 rds Mid Supplies = 46 lbs Minos and Grenades = 445 Rice = 7,610 lbs captured TNT = 51 one pound blocks

(b) Rice Harvest Control. The 1st ACD assumed the initiative for the control of rice in the Fershing AO with operation "RICE GRAIN". While the development of a rice control plan was primarily a GVN responsibility the 1st ACD requested meetings on 19 September with GVN officials. Another meeting was held on 26 September at which time the rice control plans for Hoai Nhon, Hoai An and Fhu My Districts and Rinh Dinh Province were presented. Implementation of the plans was begun immediately.

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34

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Support includes night patrols, aerial surveillance, normal ground operations in the vicinity of harvesting areas and transvortation for movement of rice from contested areas. Additionally, harassment and interdiction fires have been placed in areas in which intelligence indicates possible rice caches are located or possible routes used for transportation of rice by the VC. The current status of the rice harvest is as indicated below.

> Hoai Nhon District - 40% completed Hoai An District - 75% completed Phu My District - 10% completed

(c) During the last few days of July 1967 the 1st Ede began extensive operations in the upper An Lao Valley to extract Montagnards of the Ede Tribe. By the end of August 1967 approximately 300 Montagnards had been extracted. A temporary holding area was established adjacent to the CD camp in Bong Son. On 6, 8, and 10 Sep a total of 274 Montagnards were transported by 229th Avn Bn to An Khe and the permanent Montagnard Resettlement Camp. The long delay in movement was caused by indecision on the part of District and Province GVN officials on where to settle the refugeos. From 10 Sep to 31 Oct on additionel 142 Montagnards were c transported directly to An Khe from the Div IPW Cage after interrogation was complete. In the TACR 395 Montagnard refugees came in voluntarily to the 1st Cav Div and were placed in the Montagnard resettlement area. Other than the Montagnards, very few refugees were picked up during this period.

(d) During the period 64,875 lbs of salt was captured of which 58,550 lbs were redistributed in GVN controlled areas, 150,681 lbs of rice were captured of which 108,277 lbs were redistributed in GVN: comtrolled areas.

(2) National elections were hald on 3 September for president, vice president and senate. No incidents were recorded in the TAR and Pershing AO. Percent of registered voters voting in our area of operations was 95.7% compared to 89.9% in Binh Dinh Province and 81% nation wide.

Elections for the Lower House of Delegates were held on 22 Oct. Again no incidents were reported in the 1st Covalry Division Area of Operations. \* In the Division area 89.3% of the registered voters turned out to vote. 84.7% voted in Binh Dinh Province and 73% nation wide.

(3) Support of Revolutionary Development

(a) 2nd Brigade, operating in Fhu My District, continued the major Division role in supporting RD by providing a protective outer shell to the pacification program in Phu My Valley.

(b) On 31 October, Phu My District completed Phase II of its pacification plan marking the successful completion of pacifying twenty-four hamlets of the thirty-six scheduled for pacification during 1967. The 41st ARVN Regiment continued to provide effective close in sedurity to the RD effort.

b. Civic Action

(1) On 20 Sep 67 an Air Force jet accidently dropped one 750 1b bomb on Tam Quan Village, BS 88084. Representatives of the ALNO, SFA, and G-5 offices went to the scene of the incident immediately. Cn 21 Sep 84 pieces of 2"x4"x101 lumber, 82 ammo boxes and 120 lbs of rice were delivered by G-5 and distributed through District officials to those people whose houses had been destroyed or badly demaged. On 23 Sep solatium payments were made by the SJA for 3 dead and 16 wounded by the bomb. 2

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3%

(2) On the night of 5-6 Sep 67 an estimated 40 VC attacked Two Bits North. ARA was called into action resulting in extensive demage to the hamlet adjacent to the west side of the perimeter. On 8 Sep G-5 distributed, through District officials, 160 ammo boxes and 180 lbs of rice to the people whose homes were destroyed or badly demaged. Solatium payments were made by the 3JA on 12 Sep for 6 dead and 26 wounded innocent civilians.

(3) During the reporting pariod 575 MEDCAPS were held treating 27,550 patients.

(4) All but two of the eleven schools programed for repair in the Bong Son area are now completed.

(5) In the TAOR the An Tuc High School continues to be a major project. Control of this project has been turned over to the 1st Air Cav Div Civic Action Fund Council. The Council, which now has ever \$11,000.00 in funds is responsible for financing the project which is now 45% completed.

(6) Over 1000 Montagnards have settled in the Montagnard Resettlement Area west of An Khe during the past quarter bringing the total population to approximately 1700.

(7) A long range project continued in the form of cooperative pig stys in the An Khe area.

c. Psychological Operations:

(1) General

(a) Psychological Organizations from August through October were characterized by emphasizing psycps vulnerabilities within the ranks of the enemy. During the priod approximately 400 hours of loudspeaker brondcast, 42,874,000 leaflets, and 28 relliers were recorded.

(b) Reports of PWs and Hoi Chanhs indicate that the psyops broadcast messages are best received during might time. Target audiences can hear the message better during these hours and are more susceptible to the propaganda appeals.

(c) Noteworthy activities included the establishment of rally points in the 506 and the An Lao Valley, followed by speaker appeals giving instruction to the enemy in the area to come down to the valley or wave to any helicopter in the area to be picked up. A significant event was the rallying of 8 NVA in the 506 Valley on 16 Oct 67. This event has been exploited and psyops effort continues in the area. New ideas have been developed to induce NVA soldiers to defect from their units. Leaflets include instructions on ways to escape from their units. Hoi Chanhs stated that this is one of the reasons they did not rally before. A special leaflet has been developed with instructions on how to escape from their unit and rally.

(2) Programs: Psyops programs during this period included operations to exploit VC/NVA vulnerabilities, over the An Lao Valley, 506 Valley, Cay Giep and Nui Micu Mountains, information and weapons reward, curfew, elections and rice harvest.

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(a) Themes used:

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1 VC leaders cannot support you; choose freedom

not death.

- 23 Your life is hard, defect; GVN welcomes you. Good treatment to Hoi Chanhs.

  - Are you sick or wounded.
- 4 Hardship 5 Are vou s 6 Chieu Hoi 7 What does Chieu Hoi Appeals made by Hoi Chanhs.
- What does Chieu Hoi mean to the NVA soldier. 8 Ways to escape from their units and rally

instructions.

•)

Weapons reward and reward for information. Don't pay VC taxes and inform of tax collectors. 11 Curfew on water ways.

(b) Posters and Leaflets developed:

Leaflet of Hoi Chanh message to his comrades.

- 2 Reward for information
- 3 Rally instructions
- 4 Curfew on water ways.

### (c) adTapes used:

- Appeal by Hoi Chanhs to their comrades.
- Election tape.
- Chieu Hoi appeals.
- Hardship. 4
- Curfew on waterways.
- Anti-tax and food collection.
- JUSPAO tapes.

(d) Chieu Hoi Program:

1 During this period a total of 28 Hoi Chanhs rallied to the 1st Cav Div, to include 10 NVA.

2 Results of Hoi Chanh interrogations revealed that most of them rallied because of a lack of food and medical supplies, sickness, afraid of being killed by artillery, air strikes and bombs.

3 Hoi Chanhs were exploited for psyops by tape recorded messages appealing to their comrades to rally to the GVN, emphasizing good treatment, food, clothing and medical care, and by leaflet messages with the same appeals.

(3) Equipment and support:

(a) The 1st Cav Div received support from the 245th Psyops Co, in the form of leaflets, posters and tapes.

(b) The 9th Air Commando Sodn continued air support with the 02B and C-47 eircreft broadcasting loudspoaker messages and leaflets drop.

(c) In late October heliborne loudspeakers were received by the Division. This will rive the Bdes an immediate reaction capability and should improve the overall props effort.

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SECTION II (C) COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Confidential

- 1. PART I Observations (Lessons Learned)
  - a. Personnel

None

- b. Operations
  - (1) Item: Minesweep SOP

Discussion: A number of mine and booby trap incidents could have been prevented had tactical commanders been aware of the capabilities and techniques employed by minesweep teams. Two deficiencies have been noted in recent minesweep operations:

<u>1</u> Failure of the tactical unit commander and minesweep team leader to coordinate and agree on the type of sweep desired and the security for the mine-sweep team.

2 Impatience of the tactical commander to get on with his mission before the area has been properly swept.

Cbservation: Minesweep SOP's outlining the carebilities and limitations of, and the techniques employed by minesweep teams will be prepared and distributed to tactical units.

(2) Item: Land Mine Incidents Involving Vehicles

Discussion: During convov operations several precrutionary measures can be taken to minimize consulties caused by lend mine detonations.

<u>1</u> Wear protective vests during convov operations. Serious wounds caused by fragments can be prevented.

2 Sand bag all vehicles. The sand bags serve as a barrier to fragments from the mine as well as fragments generated from the vehicle by the blast coming through the floor.

2 Strive for uniformity in vehicle markings) deemphasize special markings on command element vehicles. There is a growing tendency to mark command vehicles in such a manner as to clearly distinguish them from all other vehicles in the column.

<u>4</u> <sup>D</sup>isperse after a mining incident and clear the area with a minesweep team. The most common reaction is to gather around personnel wounded during a mining incident and attempt to assist them. However, further and unnecessary casualties have resulted from this due to the command detonation of a nearby mine.

Observation: The above techniques are being disseminated to all units in the division.

(3) Item: Effect of Terrain on Artillerv Trajectories

Discussion: There is a danger inherent in firing over troops on ridgelines which are higher than the target being fired on end are between the firing battery and the target. If the ridgeline is wooded, a shift in range may result in a tree burst.

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Observation: FDO's have been directed to profile the area in the vicinity of each friendly position. This profile must include the safe clearance of any trees in the area occupied by friendly troops. A no-fire box is then established by deflection and ourdrant elevation limits.

#### (4) Item: Airborne Mortar Patrols

Discussion: Maintaining aerial rocket artillery helicopters on airborne mortar patrol is inefficient and disproportionately increases aircraft flying time.

Observation: During the quarter a new morthr patrol technique was employed. ARA ships were kept on two-minute strip elert while an observer in an O-1 aircraft kept the area of interest under observation. Flying time for the ARA ships was reduced. Response time remained virtually the same. ARA ships should still be placed on airborne morter patrol during periods of high tension, especially when the threat of enemy rocket attack is apparent.

(5) Item: Location of Villages Adjacent to Defensive Positions

Discussion: A small vill ge occupies the draw between IZ's TWO BITS, North and TWO PITS, South. Many of the houses in this village are less than 50 meters from the perimeter. On the night of 5-6 September an estimated company of VC slipped into the village and attacked both LZ's by fire. Many of the VC occupied houses along the edge of the village. This fire was returned, and ARA ships attacked the enemy positions. This resulted in numerous civilian casualties and caused considerable damage to several of the houses.

Observation: Where possible, defensive positions or fire bases should not be built adjacent to villages. If the terrain and situation dictate otherwise, arrangements should be made, preferably before occupying the position, to relocate houses a reasonable distance away from the wire.

#### (6) Item: Sourch and Destroy Techniques

Discussion: On 17 September B Co, 1/8th Cav, conducted a search and destroy operation on the Bong Son Plain. Their task organization included six tanks from A Co, 1/69 Armor, three D-7 bulldozers, and two M-42 dusters. Responding to a contact by elements of the 40th ARVN Regt, B Co closed the area of contact and began a thorough search. The VC force, an estimated company, had gone to ground. Individuals were discovered hiding in bunkers and tunnels and in heavy brush along a stream line. Making good use of the attached dozers, tanks and dusters, B Co systematically destroyed the bunker complex. Results were 31 VC KIA; one VC and four civil defendants captured. There were no US casualties.

Cbservation: Tailoring infantry units to include combet vehicles and bulldozers assists materially in routing the enemy from underground shelters and bunkers.

c. Training and Organization

None

d. Intelligence:

None

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e. Logistics

(1) Item: Increase of Ice Shipment to Divisional Units.

Discussion: During the reported period the replacement and consumption (R&C) factor of ice was increased from 3.0 lbs/man/day to 3.9 lbs/man/day for troops in the AO. The increase was made possible through the judicious use of available resources. Maximum use of all available reefer vens was made by the Qui Nton Support Command for line haul through-put, thus reducing all through-put by air to emergency deliveries only. Additionally, Qui Nton resorted to local purchase contract to precure additional ice which was necessary to increase the R&C factor.

Observation: Continuous effort is being made to further increase the replacement and consumption factor of ice for the troops in the AO. The objective is to achieve a R&C factor of 5-6 lbs/men/day which could then be diverted to the AO when necessary to reise the P&C in the AO.

(2) Item: Transportation of critical items of supplies from Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay Depots:

Discussion: Habitually this command is required to request release of critical items of surplies which are mission essential to the division and in a critical shortage posture. Normally, these critical items are located at Sairon and Cam Ranh Bay Depots. These denots are not the assigned depots which provide direct service support to this division, therefore transportation to move these critical released items to Camp Radcliff becomes significant and normally difficulties are encountered.

Observation: Coordination is made with the 1st Covalry Division liaison officer at Saigon who has the responsibility of making the necessary coordination to receipt for, process and request shirment of released critical supply items to the division. Experience has shown that many critical items are not timely shipped to the division. Nonavailability of aircraft or other transportation requests receive a higher priority than subject type items causing delays. A combination of air-lift and sea-lift is used to insure responsiveness and timely through-put of critical items of ecuipment released to the division at either Saigon or Cam Ranh Bay Depots. Additionally, small items which can be carried aboard the normal courier from the division to the depots mentioned above and the item is hand delivered to the division.

(3) Item: Lateral Transfer of Fouipment.

Discussion: Property accountability has a vast impact on supply operations in the division. Management of available resources is applied at each level of Command to insure that necessary items of ecuipment are available in recuired cuantities. Conversely, unneeded equipment must be redistributed and/or other methods of dispersing property must be effected. Is available is an available and responsive tool which the Commander can use to redistribute available resources to other units es recuired. Control of lateral transfer therefore becomes persmount and must be closely supervised.

Observation: It has been observed that proper leteral. transfer procedures have not been enforced and have caused extreme herdships on existing supply operations and back-haul methods. To insure

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proper implementation of an effective lateral transfer system, units prenow required to maintain and report to the AC of S, G4; current listings of equipment status to include authorized quantity, modified allowances, on hand quantities, FUPOSAT, and equipment unneeded.

(4) Item: Turn-in procedure for unneeded courment.

Discussion: Upon deployment of the 1st Air Cavalry Division from Fort Benning, Georgia to RVN, units within the Division brought all equipment authorized by TOE. Some end items recuired for use in CONUS are not recuired for tactical operations in the RVN. Examples of this type equipment are; Burner, Assy Space Heater; Cutter, Grass Towed; Decontaminating Apparatus; Charger, Radiac; Heater Space Coal/Oil; Life Preserver; Stove, Gasoline. This type of equipment is considered to be non-mission essential in RVN and should be turned-in for storage so the units will not have unnecessary equipment on hand.

Observation: A request was submitted by the 1st Cavalry Division to USARV requesting authority to turn-in items of TOE/ MTOE not needed. The request was approved. Units are now turning in, to the Division Supply Office, those items that have been approved by USARV for turn-in. DSO coordinates with the 1st Log Supporting Supply Activity for Division turn-in, and the equipment is then placed in storage at Qui Nhon. All outstanding requisitions for like equipment will be cancelled and the units will retain a cory of 1st Cav uncles msg AVDAGL-S T10-1433, 140520Z Oct 67 as authority for the turn-in.

f. Civil Affairs

(1) Item: Senitery Fills

Discussion: At an LZ with several units, a size-ble sanitary fill is needed to handle the trash and gerbage. Often there is not adequate room on the LZ itself.

Observation: Select a suitable safe site near the LZ. The site selected should be one that is not used for growing cross. Also there should be no trees or huts on it. Then coordinate with district officials for use of the land. This may take up to one week. If a site is not selected prior to consultation with District officials, they will attempt to give locations that are inadequate and much time will be wasted.?

(2) Item: Movement of Graves

Discussion: Sometimes tactical necessity dictates that selected graves must be moved, especially around perimeters.

Observation: No grave should be moved unless absolutely necessary. Coordinate with district officials who will have the hamlet chief remove the necessary graves. Provide two ammo boxes for each grave moved.

(3) Item: Rice Control

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Discussion: The main responsibility for rice control falls to GVN officials at Province and District levels. The plan should include procedures for accountability from harvesting to consumption.

Observation: Present rice entrol first to be effective, must be revised to include such items as: centrol and accountability of rice stored in hamlets after harvesting, transportation of rice across district and province boundaries, and marchants records check and accountability of imported rice. Further, early coordination prior to the beginning of harvesting seasons must be made to insure implementation and support by US/ARVN units.

. (4) Item: Revolutionary Development

Discussion: The pacification program in Fhu <sup>M</sup>v District utilizing Military Civil Teams (NCT), will begin its final phase on 1 November for the 1967 schedule.

Observation: To date twenty-four of the projected thirty-six hamlets have been pacified thereby extending the area of VVN control in Phu My District. The success of the MCT thus far indicates that a similar type pacification program may be used in other areas where RD teams are not available.

(5) Item: Psyops Immediate Reaction missions

Discussion: During the past three months some psyops immediate reaction missions have not been exploited due to the absence of means available to react in the times required.

Observation: During the last part of October each Ede received one set of 1000 watt heliborne speakers. With these loudspeakers available in the Edes any psyops immediate reaction mission can be exploited in the time required and the set of t

(6) Item: Psyops Ground Operations

Discussion: Psvops field teams employed the armed propaganda team in support of National Police Field Force (NPFF) cordon and search operations. The APT were called back by the Province Chief for a period of about three weeks, leaving the ground operations with no propaganda support.

Observation: To offset this problem members of the MPFF have been assigned the mission of giving propagenda support in this type of operation. Good comments have been received from the psyops field team about the effectiveness of the propagenda put out by the NPFF. Even so, they are not as effective from a psychological point of view. The APT members can describe how they lived under the VC and why they rallied to the GVN while the NFFF cannot.

g. Other

None

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Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 SUBJECT:

GEORGE W. PUTNAM, COLONEL

Chief of Strff

JR GS

2. PART II Recommandations

None

-5 :

FOR THE COMMANDER:

4 Incl

19

1. List of Units at Camp Redcliff

- -<u>2</u>.
- 2. Visitors Withdraws, Hqs, DA 3. Task Organization 4. TAC Air Supporting Forces

# CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-GC-OT (15 Nov 67) SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 RCS CSFOR-65 UIC WAGEAA 1st Cav Div (AM) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

(C) This headquarters has reviewed the lat Cavalry Division (AN) Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 and concurs with the report and makes the following comments:

a. Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph f(3) (pages 41 and 42), Civil Affairs. These plans and concepts have been incorporated into the Combined Campaign Plan AB143.

b. Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph f(6) (page 42), Civil Affairs. The APT was detached from the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) in October to participate in the National Day Parade in Saigon. By the time the team returned, the new province chief had reconsidered the command relationship and to date has declined to return the APT to the control of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM).

c. Reference Inclosure 2, page 2 - 1, date line 31 August 1967. COL Arnold was the Deputy Chief of Staff I FFORCEV during this period.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

IAMES P. GASTON

Captain, AGC Assistant Adjutant General

> Downgraded at 3 year Intervals Declassified after 12 years DOD DIR 5200.10

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AVHGC-DST (15 Nov 67) 2d Ind SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (W-AGE-AA)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 7 DEC 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) (AGEA) as indorsed.

2. Concur with report as indorsed. Report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NALATSUKASA

Captain, AGC Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furn: HQ, 1st Cav Div HQ, I FFORCEV

270930 Dec

GPOP-DT(15 Nov 67) 3d Ind (U) SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 67 from Hq, 1st Cavalry Division (UIC: WAGEAA) (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 31 JAN 1368

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

19.

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. Reference paragraph 5a(1), page 18, regarding MTOE actions: DA has directed that Infantry battalions of 1st Cavalry Division be standardized at 920 aggregate strength and be reorganized in March 1968 with the Artillery battalions to be reorganized in June 1968. A request was made by this headquarters to DA to change these dates to 15 Jan 1968; however, no reply has been received to date.

## FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

K. F. OSBOURN MAJ, AGC Asst AG Confidential.

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

(C) The following is a listing of all military units stationed at Camp Radeliff.

a. 1st Air Cavalry Division assigned units:

1st Brigede (Airborne) 2d Brigade 3d Brigade 5th Cavalry, 1st Battalion 5th Cavelry, 2d Battalion 7th Cavelry, 1st Battalion 7th Cavelry, 2d Bettalion 7th Cavalry, 5th Battalion 8th Engineer Battalion 8th Cavelry, 1st Battalion (Airborne) 8th Cavalry, 2d Battalion (Airborne) 9th Cavalry, 1st Soundron 11th Aviation Group 11th General Support Aviation Company 12th Cavalry, 1st Battalion (Airborne) 12th Cavalry, 2d Battalion 13th Signal Battalion 15th Medical Battalion 15th Administration Company 15th Supply and Service Battalion 15th Transportation Corps Battalion (AM&S) 19th Artillery, 2d Battalion (105 Towed) (Airborne) 20th Artillery, 2d Battalion (Aerial Rocket Artillery) 21st Artillery, 1st Battalion (105 Towed) 27th Maintenance Battalion 41st Public Information Det chment (Team FB) 42d Public Information Detachment (Team FB) 77th Artillery, 1st Battalion (105 Towed) 82d Artillery, E Battery (Aviation) 227th Aviation Bettalion (Assault Helicopter) 228th Aviation Battalion (Assault Support Helicopter) 229th Aviation Battalion (Assault Helicopter) 545th Military Police Company HHC, 1st Air Cavalry Division HHB, 1st Air Cavalry Division Artillery HHC & Band, Support Command

b. 1st Air Cavalry Division attached units:

14th Military History Detachment 17th Artillery, 2d Battalion (105 Towed) 25th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) 26th Chemical Detrchment 29th Artillery, B Battery, 2d Flatoon (Searchlight) 34th Infantry Flatoon (Scout Dog) 41st Civil Affairs Company (Teams 4, 6, 11, 12, 13, 14) 50th Infantry (Mech), 1st Battalion 54th Infantry Detechment (Ground Radar) 54th Signel Bettalion, Detachment 1 60th Artillery, 4th Battalion, C Bettery (40MM AM SP) 184th Chemical Flatoon (DS) 191st Military Intelligence Detachment 241st Signal Detechment (CH-54 Avionics Support) 371st Radio Research Company 382d Transportation Detachment (CH-54 DS Maint) 478th Aviation Company (Heavy Helicopter) 583d Military Intelligence Detachment United States Army Combet Tracker Team 7 United States Army Combat Tracker Team 8

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SUBJECT:	Op	eretional Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 5
	c.	1st Air Cevarry Division provisional units:
		1st Aviation Detachment 17th Artillery, 2d Battalion, D Battery
		An Khe Army Airfield Command
		Long Range Reconneissance Patrol Detechment
1.1	d.	The following units comprise the An Khe Sub Area Commend:
		25th Ordnence Detachmont (EOD) 34th Supply and Bervice Battalion (DS)
		43d Engineer Detachment (Maint)
		52d Engineer Detachmont (Fire Truck)
		86th Engineer Detachment (Utilities)
		89th Finance Detachment 178th Maintenance Company (D3) (Div)
		235th Quartermester Detachment (POL)
	*	252d Quartermester Detechment (POL)
		259th Transportation Detachment
		520th Transportation (TTP)
		522d TCID
		527th Engineer Detechment (Fire Truck) 527th Personnel Service Company, Detechment of
		527th Transportation Detachment (TTP)
		540th Engineer Company (Heavy Meint Sup)
		541st Transportation Company (Light truck)
		537th Engineer Detachment (Fire Truck)
		554th Signal Detachment (Maint)
		602d Engineer Detechment (Water Point)
		625th Supply and Service Company (DS) 630th Ordnance Platoon (Ammo)
		647th Quartornaster Company
		727th Engineer Detechment (Water Point)
		An Khe area Transportation Office
		Pacific Architects and Engineers, An Kho Office
i i		Philco MHE
	6,	The following units comprise the 70th Engineer Rettalion:
		HHC and Lettered Companies, 70th Engineer Battalion (except A and B Companies)
		84th Engineer Battalion, B Company (Const)
		444th Engineer Detechment (Concrete Mixing and Flecing) 511th Engineer Company (Penel Bridge)
		630th Engineer Company (Light Ecuipment)
ł.	ſ,	The following units comprise the Area Signal Coordinator:
		36th Signal Battalion (Combat Area), D Company
		40th Signal Battalion, Platoon from D Company
		41st Signal Battalion, Platoon from HHC
		69th Signal Battalion Photo Detachment 585th Signal Company (Support)
	8.	The following modical units are located in An Khe:
	• <i>d</i>	the second second second second second second second second
		4th Medical Detachment (VFI) (attached to 616th Med)
		20th Preventive Medicine Detechment (attrched to 616th Med) 56th Medical Detechment (DS)
		435th Medicel Detechment
		616th Medical Cleering Company
		1-2
		Confidential

Confidential

h. The following Air Force units are located at Crmp Redcliff:

5th Weather Scuadron, Detechment 24 15th Aerial Port, Detechment 6 537th Troop Carrier Scuadron, An Khe Detechment 834th Air Division, An Khe Detechment (ALCE) United States Air Force (TACP)

1-3

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i. 610th Transportation Company (AM) (GS)

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TASK ORGANIZATION FOR MAJOR OPERATIONS

OPERATION: (C)

4

1. BYRD (26 Aug 66 - Continuing)

TF 2/7 Cav

2/7 Cav A (-) 1/21 Arty Plat C/2/20 Arty (ARA) C (-) 229 AHB Sec B/228 ASHB Sct Sec C/1/9 Cav Plat C 8th Engr 4 Tms 25 Plt (Scout Dog) 2 Tms 13 Sig 3 Tms LRRP Det Det 371 RRU 3d FSE

WP 8th Engr

2. BOLLING (19 Sep - Continuing)

TF 2/8 Cav (OPCON 173d Abn: 17 Sep 67 - 14 Oct 67)

2/8 Cav Sct Tm, C/1/9 Cav C/2/19 Arty 1/A/2/20 Arty (ARA) Plat A 8th Engr PF Tm (-), 11 Avn Gp Tm, 13 Sig 2 Tm's, 34 Inf Plat (Scout Dog) Tm, 27 Maint

3. WALLOWA (4 Oct 67 - Continuing)

3d Bde (OPCON Americal: 1 Oct 67 - Continuing)

1/7 Cav 5/7 Cav 2/12 Cav B/1/9 Cav Cmbt Tracker Tm 2 Sqds, 34th Inf Plat (Secout Dog) 1/21 Arty (-) (Reinf) (DS) b/1/21 Arty C/1/21 Arty C/1/21 Arty C/2/20 Arty (ARA) (DS) Det E/82 Arty / 227 AHB (-) / A 228 ASH PF Tm 11 Avn Gp C 8 Engr (-) (Reinf) Plat B 8 Engr Equip Plat (-) Hq Co 8 Engr

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

Tm, Det 31, 5th Wea Sodn Plat 545 N<sup>F</sup> Co Tm IPW/ CI/OB 191 MI Det Tm, 371 RRU Tm, 13 Sig Tm, 245 Psy Ops Co TACP FSE Co 15 Med Bn Det 27 Maint Bn Co 15 TC Bn Plat (-) 478 Avn Hv Hel Co (MSN basis) Additional Non-Division Support 1/1 Cav Sqdn (-) (Reinf) - Americal A/1/1 Cav B/1/1 Cav 4/2/17 Cav

4. PERSHING (11 Feb - Continuing)

1st Brigade

Maneuver Battelions 2/19 Arty (-) DS C/1/30 GSR !/7/15 GSR C/7/13 GSR A 8 Engr Plat 545 MP Co 25 Inf Plat (Scout Dog) (-) Tm, 13 Sig Tm, IPW/CI 191 MI Det Tm, 245 Pys Ops Co Co, 222 NPFF Tm, LRRP Det Tm, 5th Wea Sodn

2d Brigade

Manouvor Battalions 1/77 Arty (-) (DS) C/2/19 DS B/7/13 G3R B/7/15 CSR C/7/15 GSR A/1/30 GSR B/1/30 GSR

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Confidentia 36 SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Feriod Ending 31 October 1967 · Mr. B 8 Ener Plat 545 MP Co Tm, 13 Sig Tm, IPW/CI 191 MI Det Tm, 245 Pay Ops Co Tm, 5th Wea Sodn Tm LRRP Det 2 Sqd, 25 Inf Plat (Scout Dog) Co, 222 NPFF 3d Brigade (OPCON Americal Div 1 Oct 67) Maneuver Battalions 1/21 Arty (-) DS U/1/77 Atch C/2/20 Atch A/1/30 OPCON C 8 Engr Plat 545 MP Co 34 Inf Plat (Scout Dog) (-) Tm 13 Sig Tm IPW/CI 191 MI Det Tm, 245 Psy Cps Co Tm, 5th Wea Sodn Tm, LRRP Det Co, 222 NPFF Maneuver Battalions 1/5 Cav 2/5 Cav 1/7 Cav 5/7 Cev 1/8 Cav 2/8 Cav 1/12 Cav 2/12 Cav 1/50 Inf (Moch) Division Artillery 7/13 Arty 2/17 Lrty 2/20 Arty (ARA) (-) B/29 Arty (SLT) C 4/60 Arty (AU) E/82 Arty (Avn) Division Troops Base Defense Battalion 1/9 Cav (Reinf) 8th Engr (-) 11th Avn Gp 13th Sig (-) 371 RR Co 545 MP Co Tm 41 CA Co 184 Cml Det 222 NPFF (-)

7.

Det (-), 5th Wea Sodn

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5. DAZZLEM (1 Oct 66 - Continuing)

Base Defense Task Force

5

2/8 Cav (open period - 3 Aug) 1/7 Cav (3 Aug - 14 Sep) 5/7 Cav (2 Oct - 31 Oct) 2/17 Arty (-) B/2/19 Arty A/2/20 Arty (ARA) 3 Co's (Prov) (Guard)

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# TAC AIR SUPPORTING FORCES:

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# DAZZLEM (010600 Aug 67 to 010600 Nov 67)

TAC AIR

# B-52

Missions	106	<i>.</i> .	Missions	None
Sorties	223		Sorties	None
Bomba	512,730		Bombs	None
Napalm	198,500			
Rockets	1.304		0.51	

# PERSHING (010600 Aug 67 to 010600 Nov 67)

T.C AIR	B-52	
Missions 1,149 Sorties 2,698 Bombs 5,929,846 Napalm 2,055,250	Missions Sorties Bombs	6 45 810 tons

# Total for reporting period

TAC I.IR		B-52
Missiona	1,255	Missions
Sorties	2,921	Sortics
Bombs	6,442,576	Bombs
Napalm	2,253,750	
Rockets	3,140	

6 45 810 tons

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