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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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AGAM-P (M) (4 Mar 69) FOR: OT-UT-684268

~~7 March 1969~~

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Cavalry  
Division (Airmobile), ~~Period Ending 31 October 1968~~ (U).

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 1st CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)  
APO San Francisco 96490

WD/2M

6 December 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968  
RCS CSFCR-65 (RT) (U)

THRU: Channels

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION I: OPERATIONS

1. (C) OPERATIONS

a. General

(1) This reporting period covers the continuation of Operation Jeb Stuart III, the conclusion of Operation Lam Son 225 and the initiation of Operation Comanche Falls/Lam Son 261 in the Jeb Stuart AO.

(2) Two major enemy contacts were made during the reporting period. The first occurred at 0045H on the 16th of August when an estimated reinforced Sapper Company launched a coordinated mortar and ground attack against LZ Nancy. The perimeter was penetrated by approximately 20 Sappers. Results of the attack were 19 US KIA, 72 US WIA, 20 NVN killed and two NVN PWs, seven individual and six crew served weapons were also captured. The second major contact occurred on 20-23 August when elements of the 1/8 Cav and 3/5 Armored Cavalry Squadron cordoned the 808th NVA Battalion vicinity YD 4057. Results of the contact were three US KIA, 22 US WIA, 144 NVN killed, and 14 NVA and 25 weapons captured.

(3) The 1st ACD continued Operation Jeb Stuart III to accomplish its two fold mission of rice denial and offensive operations in Base Areas 101 and 114. Results of operations during the reporting period were:

(a) US: 55 KIA, 597 WIA and 6 aircraft destroyed.

(b) Enemy (NVA/VC): 1,073/181 killed, 40/77 captured, 6/15 returnees and 45 crew served weapons, 465 individual weapons, 1,369 large caliber rounds, 1,077 mines and grenades, two anti-aircraft guns, 65,069 small arms ammunition and 265 tons of rice captured.

During a ten day period between 25 Sep and 4 Oct, rice denial operations by the 1st Sde on the coastal plains northeast of Quang Tri City resulted in the discovery of rice caches totaling 64.5 tons.

(4) The 3d Regiment, 1st ARVN Division working in close cooperation and coordination with the 1st ACD, completed Operation Lam Son 225 in Base Area 114. The results of this highly successful 118 day operation were:

(a) 3d ARVN Regt: 78 KIA and 295 WIA.

(b) Enemy: 359 NVA and 21 VC killed and 177 individual weapons, 28 crew served weapons, 5,533 large caliber rounds, 1,975 mines and grenades, 114,000 small arms ammunition, and 4.63 tons of rice captured.

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(5) During late August a gradual concentration of enemy forces was noted in the eastern portion of Base Area 101. This portion of the base area was known to be heavily fortified and believed to contain several battalion size base areas and storage facilities. The area lies across a major rice route and is on an important link in the transportation of rice from the coastal plains of Hai Lang District to the jungles. On 1<sup>st</sup> Sep, Operation Comanche Falls/Lam Son 261 was initiated in Base Area 101 to destroy enemy forces, caches and bunker complexes in this area prior to the arrival of the northeast monsoon. Three US battalions, the 1st ARVN Regiment (-) and the 1-11th RF battalion participated in this operation. After 21 days of sustained combat operations throughout BA 101, Operation Comanche Falls (Phase I), terminated at 1200H on 2 Oct. The combined US and ARVN forces located and destroyed several large base camp installations and effectively interdicted enemy lines of communication throughout the base area. On 2 Oct Phase II of Operation Comanche Falls was initiated to interdict enemy movement toward Shau Valley from BA 101 and destroy suspected supply installations located west of the Base Area. Results of Operation Comanche Falls I & II as of 31 Oct were:

(a) Friendly:

- 1 US: 17 KIA, 49 WIA, 2 MIA, 4 aircraft destroyed.
- 2 1st ARVN Regt: 20 KIA, 8<sup>+</sup> WIA.

(b) Enemy:

1 By US (NVA): 80 killed, 7 captured, 7 returnees, 149 individual, 9 crew served, 1,083 large caliber rounds, 22,815 small arms ammo, and 173 mines and grenades captured.

2 By 1st ARVN Regt (NVA): 236 killed, 4 captured, 1 returnee, 121 individual, 14 crew served, 3,910 large caliber rounds, 39,100 small arms ammo and 35 mines and grenades captured.

(6) On 26 Oct, the 1st Air Cavalry Division was alerted to deploy to III Corps Tactical Zone. The advance party departed the 27th, followed by 2<sup>nd</sup> Cav and 44C, 3d Bde on the 28th. The 3d Bde Task Force closed at Quan Loi in III CTZ on 30 Oct, and the entire brigade was operational on the 31st.

b. 1st Brigade Operations:

(1) During the reporting period the 1st Brigade continued Operation Jeb Stuart III and participated in Operation Comanche Falls. Except for a major engagement on 20-23 Aug in which 144 NVA were killed, contact with the enemy was light and sporadic throughout the brigade AO. The 1st Brigade's rice denial operations were extremely successful with 218,855 pounds of rice found during the quarter. During one ten-day period, rice denial operations conducted on the coastal plains northeast of Quang Tri City resulted in the discovery of 129,855 pounds of rice.

(2) The 1st Bde continued the security mission of LZ's Betty, Sharon, Anne, Pedro and Tombstone and augmented the security forces of Ga and Nhung Bridges near LZ Betty. Elements performing base security were held to a minimum in order to provide maximum number of troops for maneuver and offensive operations. During the day platoons on LZ security would air assault into the AO and were airlifted back to the LZ in the late afternoon. The brigade assisted the 1st ARVN Regiment and GVN Authorities in the security of Engineer efforts and pacification activities during the construction of the road to the village of Gia Daug.



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(3) The 1st Bde conducted extensive Cordon and Search, Swooper, Mini-cav, and Srtch operations throughout the AO in a concentrated attack on the VC infrastructure. These operations were based on intelligence provided by the Trieu Phong DTGCC and ARVN and US sources, and utilized to the maximum ARVN Forces, Popular Forces, and National Police Field Forces.

(4) The brigade maintained close and continuous coordination with the 1st ARVN Regt. During the reporting period the brigade assisted in air assaulting one ARVN Battalion in the vicinity of the "Street Without Joy," and two ARVN Battalions into the mountainous terrain south of the Pa Long Valley.

(5) One of the two major contacts of the reporting period involved elements of the 1st Bde. Early in the afternoon on the 20th of August, A Troop, 1/9 Cav Blues came under heavy automatic weapons fire while conducting a snatch operation northeast of Quang Tri City. This element was subsequently reinforced and extracted. Three companies of the 1/8 Cav were air assaulted into the contact area and two Troops of the 3/5 Armored Cavalry Squadron and D Troop 1/9 Cav were placed OPCON to the 1/8 Cav. The task force established a cordon around the 808th NVA Battalion and subsequent sightings over a three-day period resulted in three US KIA, 22 US MIA, 144 NVA KIA, 14 NVA PW, six crew served and 52 individual weapons captured, and four Ho Chi Credits.

c. 2d Brigade Operations:

(1) During the reporting period the 2d Bde participated in Operation Jub Stuart III and from 11 Sep to 2 Oct conducted Operation Commanche Falls (Lam Son 261) with units from the 1st and 3d Brigades, the 1st Regiment, 1st ARVN Division and the 1/11th RF Battalion. On 2 Oct the 2d Bde conducted Operation Commanche Falls Phase II in conjunction with the 1st ARVN Regiment's continuation of Operation Lam Son 261.

(2) The 2d Bde conducted operations against light and scattered resistance on the coastal plain, on the Piedmont and in RA 101 during the reporting period. The brigade was responsible for the security of Hunter Beach, Skyking Avenue, Highway 555 and QL-1, and LZs Hardcore, Jane, Nancy, and Barbara.

(3) At 0700 on 11 Sep the 2d Bde began Operation Commanche Falls by air assaulting the 1/8 Cav, 1/5 Cav, 1/1 ARVN Bn and 3/1 ARVN Bn along the southwest boundary of RA 101. The 1/7 Cav was then air assaulted into the southeast portions of the base area and the 1/11 RF Battalion from Quang Tri was air lifted in to secure LZs in the northeastern portion. These two battalions established screening and trail interdiction operations in coordination with the four maneuver battalions' attack northeast into Base Area 101. C Trp 1/9 Cav and the 2d Bde scouts provided air screen on all sides of the operation. Operation Commanche Falls (Phase I) terminated at 1200H on 2 Oct. The operation succeeded in denying the enemy his forward support base area and disrupted his lines of communication. In addition to destroying several large base camp installations (676 bunkers), the allied forces killed 270 NVA soldiers and captured six NVA soldiers, 137 individual weapons, 11 crew served weapons, 118 mines and grenades, 37,733 small arms ammo and 3,113 large caliber rounds.

(4) With the disruption of the NVA/VC installations in Base Area 101, the 2d Bde initiated Phase II of Operation Commanche Falls to interdict enemy movement toward the A. Shau Valley and to destroy large supply installations reported to be west of RA 101. On 2 Oct the 2d Bde air assaulted the 2/12 Cav into LZ Davis Hill, southwest of RA 101, followed by 1/1 and 4/1



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ARVN Battalions. The three battalions conducted operations west of RA 101 with the 4/1 ARVN Bn advancing to the western portion of the Division AO. Although contact with the enemy was light and sporadic, the allied forces destroyed several large enemy supply installations and accounted for the following: 53 NVN killed, six captured, five returnees, 125 small arms, 10 crew served, 22,654 small arms ammo, 2,041 large caliber rounds captured and 287 bunkers destroyed.

d. 3d Brigade Operations:

(1) During the reporting period the 3d Bde participated in Operation Job Stuart III and provided elements to the 2d Bde to participate in Operation Comanche Falls. The brigade completed operations in the Job Stuart III AO on 27 Oct and began deployment to the III CTZ on 28 Oct. Rome Flow operations, initiated on 1 July to destroy a known major bunker and tunnel complex in the vicinity of the "Graveyard" and the "Street Without Joy," was concluded on 16 Aug. The successful operation cleared approximately 3,000 acres in the area and uncovered several caches.

(2) The 3d Bde continued to provide base defense for Camp Evans and bridge/highway security along that portion of QL-1 with the Brigade's AO. The brigade conducted extensive rice denial operations on the coastal plains in conjunction with RF/FF. During the period a large search and clear operation was conducted through Base Area 114 in conjunction with elements of the 3d ARVN Regt to recheck previously discovered enemy locations. Contact throughout the reporting period was relatively light and scattered.

(3) On the 26th of Oct the brigade was alerted to deploy to III Corps Tactical Zone and on the 27th the advance party was airlifted to Quan Loi, III CTZ. On 28 Oct, HHC and 2/7 Cav airlifted to Quan Loi and was placed OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division. The 1/7 Cav and 5/7 Cav were placed OPCON to the 1st ACD. On 29 Oct the 2/8 Cav was released OPCON 1st Bde, airlifted to Quan Loi and placed OPCON 3d Bde (1st Inf Div). The 2/12 Cav was released OPCON 2d Bde on 30 Oct, airlifted to Quan Loi and placed OPCON 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div. The 3d Bde Task Force was fully operational in III CTZ on 31 Oct.

e. 1/9 Cavalry Squadron Operations:

(1) During the reporting period the squadron supported Operations Job Stuart III and Comanche Falls I and II. During the first half of August both A and B Troops were under operational control of XXIV Corps. A Troop provided extensive reconnaissance support for the 1st Marine Division in the Da Nang area while B Troop was supporting the 101st Abn Division's Operation Somerset Plain in the Shau Valley. C Troop assumed responsibility for the entire division AO.

(2) During the reporting period the 1/9 Cav conducted extensive reconnaissance and surveillance operations throughout the 1st CD AO. The Squadron operated in general support during Operation Job Stuart III; however, support to the brigades on a mission basis has been habitually provided by A Troop to the 1st Bde, B Troop to the 3d Bde and C Troop to the 2d Bde. All troops continued to conduct intensive first and last light reconnaissance around Camp Evans, LZ's Betty, Sharon, Jane, Nancy and the Wunder Beach Complex. Except for special operations, the emphasis has been directed in B's areas 101 and 114, the rocket belt, the Piedmont and coastal plains. Mortar patrols, "Sniffer" missions, bomb damage assessment, and insertion of the Troops' organic infantry platoons (blues) into known or suspected enemy locations and to secure downed aircraft continued to be routine missions by 1/9.

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1 VFR Count:

<u>RW DAY</u>	<u>RW NIGHT</u>	<u>FW DAY</u>	<u>FW NIGHT</u>
13,7052	10,121	10,054	23

2 GCN Count: 2,383

(d) Quarterly statistics by aircraft type:

	<u>SCRTIES</u>	<u>TASKS</u>	<u>CARGO(TONS)</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>HRS</u>
AH-1G/UH-1B/C	8906	3392	4	0	5113
UH-1H	100,047	40,968	6187	120,179	22409
CH-47/CH-54	20,291	14,809	21,376	114,853	6610
CH-64	7,298	1,724	11	1,774	2108

(3) 13th Signal Battalion:

(a) Missions and significant activities were assigned in Annex G (signal) to OPLAN 37-67 (U). Additional communications capability was provided to 1st Brigade to fulfill the requirements of the tactical situation. These capabilities were:

- 1 One AN/MRC 12 channel system from Camp Evans to LZ Betty.
- 2 One AN/MRC-112 4 channel system from LZ Betty to Quang Tri.
- 3 One AN/MRC-112 4 channel system from LZ Betty to LZ Anne.
- 4 One switchboard SB-86 with capability to terminate 60 telephone lines.

(b) During Operation Comanche Falls, the following additional communications capabilities were required:

- 1 One AN/MRC-112 4 channel system from LZ Betty to LZ Cindy. This system along with two FM radio stations was installed at LZ Cindy to support the US advisor to 1st Regiment, 1st RVN Division located at LZ Cindy. This system became operational on 4 Oct 68

- 2 An Airborne Radio Relay was put on station from 180600 Oct 68 until 191600 Oct 68 to provide communications for 3d Brigade elements west of LZ Davis and LZ Jerome. C-74 aircraft from Phu Cat were used to carry equipment and personnel from 13th Sig Bn.

- 3 Ground FM radio relay was established on Davis Hill on 23 Nov 68 in support of 2d Brigade operations.

(c) Throughout the reporting period the following communications services were provided:

- 1 Secure radio teletype and FM voice radio (AN/VSC-2) for the following units:

- 1st Bde
- 2d Bde
- Division elements at Red Beach
- Division elements at Phu Bai
- G2 Air

2 FM radio for the following nets:

- D-1 Command Operations
- D-2 Command Intelligence
- PMO
- G2 Air
- Race Defense
- XXIV Corps Command
- Air Liaison
- Naval Gunfire
- FSCC in Divarty net
- 13th Sig Bn Command

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3. Communications Center secure teletype circuits: XXIV Corps, The Viet Army Area Communications Center, Major Subordinate Units.

4. Scheduled and special motor messenger service for Division Main CP, Camp Evans.

5. Scheduled air messenger service by UH-1H between Division HQ and major subordinate commands.

## g. 8th Engineer Battalion:

(1) During the reporting period, the majority of the 8th Engineer Battalion's effort was directed towards the support of the 1st AGF in Operation Comanche Falls I and II. Extensive effort was also directed towards the construction and improvement of base camps. At the close of the period elements were prepared for and began moving to III CZT. HQ remained at Camp Evans and supported line companies by placing equipment CECOM to them. The Division Training Center was built by D Company, 14th Engineer Battalion, under the direct supervision of HQ.

(2) Company A remained at LZ Sharon and supported the 1st Bde. Various construction projects were carried out at this LZ such as road maintenance on access roads at the LZ and the road to LZ Betty. Minesweep teams swept Highway QL-1 each day from Quang Tri to Hoi An. Elements of Company B were CECOM to Company C during Operation Comanche Falls I.

(3) Company C remained in direct support of the 2d Bde at LZ Nancy. Five minesweepers were provided each day for the access roads and QL-1 in the brigade FO. A major project completed during the reporting period was the construction of LZ Nancy, to include the construction of the brigade TOC and laying of the perimeter wire. In support of the 2d Bde during Phase I and II of Operation Comanche Falls, C Company built 13 landing zones and destroyed 60 bunkers.

(4) Company D was utilized during the period in the construction and development of Camp Evans and in support of the 3d Bde. Tasks such as perimeter bunker and base defense TOC were initiated and completed. The company also assisted the 3d Bde in perimeter expansion and construction at LZ Long and LZ Hieu 1.

## 2. (C) Significant activities

a. General: See paragraph 1a.

b. Significant activities occurring in Operation JOC STUWOP III and Operation Comanche Falls I and II during the reporting period:

(1) 1 Aug: 02/1, 09:54, Y0323100, made contact with unknown size enemy force, received 30 fire from bunker, engaged with organics, arty and air strikes, resulting in 8 VC KIA.

(2) 2 Aug: 3d Bde Scouts, 1930H, Y0593304, observed and engaged 5 indivs, resulting in 4 VC KIA.

(3) 6 Aug: 4/1 RVN TF working with 1/8; totals for opp from 4-6 Aug from Y03464 to Y03858: 12 VC KIA and 5 VC PW. 2/5 at Y0464121 found a large bunker complex consisting of 20 bunkers, two mess halls and an aid station.

(4) 7 Aug: TF working with D 1/9, 0917 H, Y0523536, made contact with estimated VC platoon resulting in 11 VC KIA and 1 VC PW. A 2/5 found (in bunker complex discovered 6 Aug) five individual weapons, five 82mm mortars, two 60mm mortars, one 57mm ML, three IFFs and two 12.7mm machine guns. 3/7 CECOM 2d Bde, found a cache at Y0242207 consisting of mortar ammo, one 82, one individual weapon, miscellaneous medical supplies, individual clothing and equipment, four field telephones and one switchboard.

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(5) 9 Aug: A 1/12, 1258H, YD 332385, engaged approximately six enemy resulting in five NVA killed. 4/3 ARVN Bn, 1300H, YD 498196 found hospital complex containing 85 pounds medical supplies, new surgical equipment and misc medical supplies. Also found 20 graves of NVA killed in previous contacts.

(6) 10 Aug: D 1/8, 1230H, YD 370605 received MW fire from enemy in bunkers, engaged with SA and grenades resulting in three NVA killed. 1st Bde scouts, 1845H, YD 435565, on last light recon received S' fire from est enemy squad, engaged with SA resulting in six VC killed. 4/3 ARVN Bn found 50 additional NVA in graves in vicinity of hospital complex discovered on 9 Aug.

(7) 11 Aug: 4/3 ARVN Bn, 0735H, YD 505196, engaged est enemy platoon, resulting in four ARVN KIA, nine ARVN WIA, and 14 NVA killed. Also found 30 enemy in fresh graves. A 2/5, found six large huts with unground bunkers at YD 472116, containing 50 pounds NVA clothing, rolls of copper wire, one telephone, four switchboards, a telephone transformer and misc commo equipment.

(8) 12 Aug: A 2/8, 0915H, YD 298183, ambushed and killed three NVA. 4/3 ARVN Bn, 1400H, YD 505197 engaged unknown size enemy force resulting in 25 NVA killed. The battalion also found a cache containing six crew served weapons, 21 individual weapons, 1500 R40 rockets, 5000 rounds SA ammo, 10 T mines and misc medical supplies and documents. The 1/3 ARVN Bn found a cache at YD 436225 containing 960 chicom grenades, 500 T mines, 20 82mm mortar rounds and 22,000 rounds SA ammo.

(9) 13 Aug: A 1/12, 1515H, YD 328396 engaged est enemy platoon resulting in eight NVA killed. E 1/5 engaged five enemy resulting in four NVA killed. 4/3 ARVN Bn, in vicinity of previous day's contact, found six enemy killed by arty and 100 82mm mortar rounds.

(10) 14 Aug: C 1/9, 1157H, YD 559139 engaged and killed three NVA with LMG and grenades.

(11) 15 Aug: A 1/12, 1430H, YD 333395 engaged and killed three NVA. C 2/8, 1120H, YD 334321, ambushed and killed three NVA. 4/3 ARVN Bn, 0955H, YD 503193 made contact with an unknown size enemy force and killed 12 NVA. In the same area, the battalion found nine individual weapons, two crew served weapons, 500 large cal rounds and 100 bottles of penicillin.

(12) 16 Aug: LZ Nancy ((YD 440395), 0110H received approximately 150 82mm mortar rounds and the perimeter was breached by approximately 20 sappers. Contact broke at 0300H, results: 19 US KIA, 71 US WIA, 18 NVA killed and two NVA captured.

(13) 17 Aug: Four platoons RF/PF working with C 2/7 via YD 514453 killed 16 VC and three NVA.

(14) 19 Aug: 3d Bde, Scouts, 0815H, engaged and killed two NVA at YD 532408 and 0840H engaged and killed three NVA at 564424. LZ C-101, YD 344195, 0830H-1000H, received 75-100 rounds of indirect fire, resulting in 1 US killed and 3 US wounded.

(15) 20 Aug: At 1400H, one squad from A Trp 1/9 Cav inserted at YD 330585, came under heavy MW fire from an unknown size enemy force. At 1500H three helicopters were shot down in the same area. A, B, and C 1/8 CAV air assaulted into the area. A and C 3/5 Cav and D 1/9 Cav were also committed in the area. The contact continued until 23 Aug. The 1/8 Cav Task Force supported by artillery, US Air Force TAC Air and Naval gunfire accounted for 144 NVA killed, 14 NVA captured, six crew served weapons and 52 individual weapons captured and four Hoi Chanh.

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(16) 21 Aug: 3d Bde Scouts, on first light check, observed and engaged seven enemy resulting in 6 NVA killed.

(17) 22 Aug: At 1920H CAMP EVANS received five 122mm rockets, two inside and three outside of the perimeter, no friendly casualties or damage. Suspected enemy firing positions at YD 506224 and YD 502222 engaged with arty and AAA, two secondary explosions observed. At 1919H on 23 Aug B 5/7 found six NVA killed by arty at YD 502222.

(18) 23 Aug: 2d Bde Scouts, 0815H, observed company size enemy force at YD 365450, the scouts and AAA engaged resulting in 23 NVA killed. A cordon and search operation by B and C 2/7 and four RF/PF platoons at YD 536444 resulting in the RF/PF killing nine NVA.

(19) 26 Aug: Air strikes and arty strikes put into an area recording maximum intensity sniffer readouts resulted in five NVA killed and the destruction of eight large bunkers and 18 other structures.

(20) 22 Aug: Three TF companies, 0900H, working with B 2/12, vicinity YD 515470, made contact with an unknown sized enemy force resulting in 13 NVA killed. E 2/7, 1340H, YD 588416 engaged five enemy resulting in three NVA killed and nine individual weapons captured.

(21) 28 Aug: C 1/5, 1850H, YD 290330, platoon ambush made contact with approx ten indiv resulting in five NVA killed by Arty and one NVA killed by SA.

(22) 30 Aug: Two RF companies, 1215H, operating with B Trp 3/5 and D Trp 1/9 made contact with approx 25 enemy at YD 598482 resulting in five VC killed, eight VC captured and seven individual weapons captured.

(23) 1 Sep: Elements of the 1/7 and 2/7 found several rice caches containing a total of 33,500 pounds of rice.

(24) 2 Sep: B 2/7, 1320H, YD 517448 received 10-15 rounds SA fire from unknown sized enemy force, engaged with SA, M60 and M79 resulting in three VC killed. C 1/9, 1520H, YD 362383 engaged and killed four NVA.

(25) 3 Sep: 1/5 FAC, 1110H, YD 330334 observed platoon size enemy force, engaged with Arty and air strike resulting in 12 NVA killed.

(26) 6 Sep: E 1/7 found a 10,000 pound rice cache, vic YD 602390.

(27) 8 Sep: Camp Evans, 1915H received seven 122mm rockets inside perimeter resulting in two US killed and 13 wounded and light equipment damage. Suspected firing position at YD 555216, from which C 5/7 observed rocket flashes, was engaged with 81mm mortars, Arty and AAA, one secondary explosion observed. The firing position was confirmed by C 5/7 on 9 Sep.

(28) 10 Sep: 2d Bde scouts, 1915H, YD 397404 received AW fire from four positions, engaged with AW fire resulting in four NVA killed.

(29) 12 Sep: B 1/9, 0715H, YD 508227 engaged and killed three NVA, at 1830H B 1/9, YD 585397 received 10-15 rounds AW fire, engaged with rockets and AW fire resulting in three NVA killed. PF working with C Trp 3/5 captured 11 VC and several documents.

(30) 13 Sep: 1/1 ARVN Bn, 0830H, YD 364349 made contact with unknown size enemy force, resulting in 16 NVA killed. In the contact area the battalion captured two crew served weapons, 10 individual weapons, 15,000 meters telephone wire, 1,000 rounds 82mm mortar ammo, 50 BAO rockets and misc medical supplies.

(31) 14 Sep: 1/1 ARVN Bn, 0915H, YD 368349, engaged and killed nine NVA and captured seven individual weapons. At 1325H in the same general area the battalion made contact with an est enemy platoon resulting in six NVA killed and four individual weapons captured. A 1/9, 1800H, YD 300415 observed numerous indiv with weapons, received AW fire, engaged with rockets and AW fire res: 7 VC KIA. B 1/9, 1515H, found a 8,000 lb rice cache YD590390.

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(32) 15 Sep: 3/1 ARVN Bn, 1390H-1530H, YD 368378, made contact with unknown size enemy force, engaged with organics and air strikes resulting in five NVA killed by SA and 10 KIA.

(33) 16 Sep: 1/1 ARVN Bn, 0500H, YD 369356 ambushed and killed four NVA.

(34) 18 Sep: 4/1 ARVN Bn, 1150H, YD 367334 engaged est enemy platoon with organics and arty resulting in 22 NVA killed. In the contact area the battalion captured two anti-aircraft guns, six indiv weapons, 1,000 82mm mortar rounds, and 10,000 rounds 12.7 anti-aircraft ammo. D 2/5, 1515H, YD 343359 engaged six enemy resulting in three NVA killed. B 1/9, 1545H, YD 535241 engaged and killed three NVA.

(35) 20 Sep: D 2/8, 1225H, YD 356603 found a 10,000 pound rice cache.

(36) 21 Sep: 1/1 ARVN Bn, 1505H, YD 358377, made contact with unknown size enemy force resulting in seven NVA killed and four indiv weapons captured. 4/1 ARVN, YD 374340 found a cache containing 10,000 rounds of SA ammo and 300 pounds of TNT.

(37) 22 Sep: 4/1 ARVN Bn, 1213H, YD 365336, made contact with an est enemy platoon, engaged with organics and arty resulting in six NVA killed and 10 individual and two crew served weapons captured.

(38) 24 Sep: ~~4/1~~ 3/5, 1213H, YD 430590 engaged three enemy, resulting in one NVA killed and two captured. Camp Evans, 1545H received seven 122mm rockets resulting in three US slightly wounded.

(39) 25 Sep: 2/1 ARVN Bn, YD 353334 found an ammo cache containing 100 B40 rockets, 50 B41 rockets, 1,000 rounds SA ammo and 100 sticks TNT. C 2/8 was guided by a Hoi Chanh to a 6,000 pound rice cache at YD 396685

(40) 26 Sep: 4/1 ARVN Bn, 0500H, YD 360350 made contact with unknown size enemy force resulting in nine NVA killed and six indiv weapons captured. C 1/8, C 2/8 and C 1/9 found rice caches totalling 26,300 pounds at YD 375578, YD 400582 and YD 4964361.

(41) 27 Sep: 4/1 ARVN Bn, 1145H; found 13 NVA killed by SA in vicinity of 26 Sep contact at YD 361349. A 3/5, 1200H, YD 465586 engaged three NVA resulting in one NVA killed and two captured. E 2/7 found an 8,000 pound rice cache at YD 578419 and C 1/8 found three caches in the vicinity of YD 377578 totalling 8,650 pounds.

(42) 29 Sep: C 5/7, 1150H, YD 505222 found a cache containing 48 individual weapons.

(43) 1 Oct: B 2/5, 0740H, YD 440194 ambushed five enemy resulting in three NVA killed. 2/1 ARVN Bn found a bunker complex at YD 315315 containing two generators, one switchboard, one AF/GRC-9 radio and three loudspeakers. B and C 2/8 found several caches containing 14,000 pounds of rice in the vicinity of YD 364615 and YD 409577.

(44) 20 Oct: C 2/8 found 21,100 pounds of rice at YD 388593. D 1/8 found an ammo cache at YD 213435 containing 160 B40/B41 rocket rounds, 77 60mm mortar rounds, two indiv weapons and 4,000 rounds SA ammo.

(45) 3 Oct: C 2/8, 1600H, YD 388595 found a 34,640 pound rice cache.

(46) 4 Oct: C 2/8 found 8,000 pounds of rice at YD 387593. B 5/7 found six 122mm rocket warheads and motors at YD 520208. D 5/7 found a bunker complex at YD 380241 containing two typewriters, office supplies, intercom system, and 13 indiv weapons.

(47) 5 Oct: E 2/12, guided by a Hoi Chanh, found a hospital facility vicinity YD 234295 containing misc medical supplies and mortar ammo. B 2/12, YD 254284 found 37 B40 rockets, 13 60mm mortar rounds and four indiv weapons.

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(48) 6 Oct: D 1/9, YD 172319 found a bunker complex containing nine indiv weapons, three rocket launchers, machine gun barrels, binoculars, 500 pounds TNT and assorted military equipment.

(49) 7 Oct: D 2/7, 2350H, YD 502361 ambushed approx 20 enemy resulting in three VC killed. D 1/9 found a hospital complex northwest of LZ IDAHO (YD 170320) containing 50 cases of medical and surgical supplies and equipment. In the same general area the troop found 4,800 rounds SA ammo, 40 82mm mortar rounds, 40 120mm mortar rounds and 12 SKS rifles. B 2/12, YD 252287 found a bunker complex containing three radios, two generators, eight telephone sets, one switchboard, and a code book.

(50) 8 Oct: 3/1 ARVN Bn, 1235H, YD 340344 made contact with unknown size enemy force resulting in eight NVN killed. B 5/7, YD 499266 found nine graves with VC killed by SA in a previous contact. E 2/12, 0807H, YD 493423 found 5,000 pounds of rice hidden by a hut. 4/1 ARVN Bn continued to exploit the large medical /weapons cache found by D 1/9 on 7 Oct. Found in the area were 20 individual weapons, 100,000 propaganda leaflets, 100 122mm rockets with warheads, 200 82mm mortar rounds, 100 B40 rockets, 20 75mm RL rounds, and 500 NVN uniforms.

(51) 9 Oct 68: D 1/5, YD 305344 found 22 individual weapons, medical supplies and a large supply of miscellaneous individual clothing and equipment. 3/1 ARVN Bn, YD 337348 and YD 343347 found two bunker complexes containing 12 B40 rockets, 275 pounds TNT, one telephone and miscellaneous medical supplies. B 2/12, YD 243292 found a cache containing miscellaneous medical supplies and equipment to include 200 bottles of penicillin and numerous surgical instruments.

(52) 11 Oct 68: 4/1 ARVN Bn, YD 168319 found a ammo cache containing 400 B40 rockets, 50 60mm mortar rounds, 200 82mm mortar rounds, 100 pounds plastic explosives, 500 electric blasting caps and 2000 meters of telephone wire.

(53) 15 Oct: B and C 2/8 found several caches northeast Quang Tri City containing 5,7000 pounds of rice. D 2/5 picked up a detainee at YD 414433 who led the unit to a cache containing 200 pounds of TNT and three cement blocks packed with 15 pounds of explosive each. The detainee stated that the VC intended to use these explosives to destroy a QL-1 highway bridge at YD 476376.

(54) 18 Oct: E 2/12, YD 259292 discovered what was believed to be a NVN training center. Found in the area was two indiv weapons, one German gasoline engine, two Czech movie projectors, five loud speakers, and a movie screen. C 2/8, YD 419567 found two caches containing 7,200 pounds of rice.

(55) 19 Oct: RF/PF working with D 2/7 engaged an unknown size enemy force at YD 562295 resulting in seven VC killed, three VC captured and six individual weapons captured. D 1/7, YD 535435 found 4,000 pounds of rice.

(56) 20 Oct: D 1/7, YD 540432 found 8,000 pounds of rice. PF's working with A 1/12 engaged an unknown size enemy force at YD 370600 (four were classified VC PW's.)

(57) 21 Oct: D 1/7, YD 534436 found 6,000 pounds of rice.

(58) 23 Oct: C 1/12, 2208H, YD 359608 ambushed three enemy resulting in two VC killed and one VC and one individual weapon captured.

(59) 26 Oct: B 1/8, 1315H, YD 307361, found a cache containing fifteen 81mm mortar rounds, eight 60mm mortar rounds, 7 3.5 RL rounds, 45 57mm RL rounds, and 4 indiv weapons. C 2/7 found 3,500 pounds of rice at YD 525440.

(60) 28 Oct: 2/1 ARVN Bn, 1000H, YD 267298 found 15 two-story structures containing ten individual weapons, 32 B40 rockets, and 40 NVN uniforms.

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SECTION II: LESSONS LEARNED

1. Personnel: None

2. Operations:

a. Employment of LRP teams in close proximity to friendly troops

(1) Observation: Numerous problems are encountered by LRP teams employed in close proximity to friendly troops.

(2) Evaluation: LRP teams employed in close proximity to friendly troops seldom make any significant sightings. If any sightings are made, enemy contact usually follows, since enemy forces are more alert in areas where US troops are known to be operating. Employment of artillery and LRP may be precluded by presence of other US troops in the vicinity. During periods of low visibility the possibility of an encounter with friendly troops exists.

(3) Recommendation: That LRP teams not be employed in close proximity to friendly troops.

b. Maximum use of LRP assets.

(1) Observation: LRP teams are occasionally employed in the same area more than once without sufficient interval.

(2) Evaluation: In critical areas, after an initial negative assessment, a second LRP mission is planned and executed. Since the insertion and extraction are often the most critical parts of the mission, the obvious element of surprise may be compromised.

(3) Recommendation: That LRP teams not be inserted into the same area without sufficient time lapse and, if the mission is essential, that every effort at relocating the insertion and extraction points be made.

c. Illumination for night movement:

(1) Observation: Ground movement of units in company and multiple company night operations is difficult during periods when natural illumination is less than 20%.

(2) Evaluation: Indirect artillery or airborne illumination can successfully be used to assist in terrain navigation and control of elements without compromising location and intentions. Artificial illumination will provide sufficient light to negotiate difficult terrain and obstacles, and control subordinate elements. The illumination may be employed two or three kilometers from the ground forces and still provide the subdued illumination required.

(3) Recommendation: When natural illumination is 20% or less, that artificial illumination be used to provide the ground forces sufficient illumination to negotiate difficult terrain.

d. Maximizing ambush activities on rice routes.

(1) Observation: The multitude of rice routes traversing the Piedmont area requires that combat power be properly organized and positioned to impede enemy movement.

(2) Evaluation: A rifle company can establish up to eight night ambushes, each of sufficient strength to successfully engage the enemy rice carrying parties usually encountered. The ambush sites should cover a 1500-2000 meter front, and be reconnoitered during daylight. Reducing the number of ambushes to four allows the company to have a combat patrol between positions. Small, multiple ambushes require that the soldiers are constantly alert during the night and therefore day operations should be planned to provide time for rest.



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(3) Recommendation: That to successfully interdict rice carrying routes, it is necessary to cover up to a 2000 meter front with one company by using small multiple ambushes and combat patrols.

**e. Stay Behind Forces in Villages.**

(1) Observation: Continued surveillance of villages immediately after operations have proven to be successful in interdicting enemy activity within the objective area.

(2) Evaluation: In recent operations involving cordon and search tactics, it has been found that a stay behind force of one platoon is usually successful in interdicting enemy activity within the objective area. The search by US forces is not always effective and some enemy items may be left undiscovered. The NVN/VC habitually return to a village after the operation to recover weapons, food and equipment.

(3) Recommendation: That one platoon be used as a stay behind force upon completion of cordon and search operations of villages.

**f. NPF Operations.**

(1) Observation: Combined Military-National Police Field Force operations when properly conducted, continued to contribute to the elimination of the VC infrastructure.

(2) Evaluation: An important consideration in the planning of these combined operations is the early coordination between tactical and military police elements. This facilitates the receipt of valuable police intelligence information from special branch police specifically directed to a target village or hamlet. Information may be obtained which enables the selection of a valid time at which the cordon should be established in order to achieve the effect of surprise, and to insure that the village or hamlet is sealed off at a time when it is occupied by VC infrastructure. Insufficient warning frequently results in poorly executed cordon and search operations.

(3) Recommendation: That units participating in NPF operations make maximum effort to coordinate operations as far in advance as is feasible to insure the achievement of best possible results.

**g. Mobility**

(1) Observation: The mobility of an airmobile cavalry battalion operating in mountainous jungle terrain is difficult to maintain due to the adverse conditions normally encountered.

(2) Evaluation: Although subjected to conditions that restrict mobility, every commander and trooper must be instilled with the concept that mobility is a state of mind. Every possible device and technique available and workable must be used to maintain and enhance the unit's mobility. Units must travel light, taking only that equipment necessary for the accomplishment of the mission and survival. The companies should receive resupply once, during the heat of midday. This technique allows units to start moving at first light, take a break during the heat of day and continue until last light. Every trooper should be required to carry one stick of C-4 explosive in his pocket. The squad leaders should carry the blasting caps and fuses. Prior to receiving resupply, a touch down LZ should be blasted out of the jungle. Besides facilitating resupply, a LZ now exists that could be used for future combat operations requiring air assault in that area.

(3) Recommendation: That programs as explained in the above be considered in other units.

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**h. Aircraft Availability**

(1) Observation: During this quarter aircraft availability became a serious problem due to non-availability of parts, over commitment in US maintenance, insufficient time available for maintenance, lack of facilities for night maintenance, and excessive blade time on aircraft.

(2) Evaluation: These factors have resulted in a reduction of available aircraft for support of tactical units.

(3) Recommendation:

(a) Expedite processing of normal and WDP requisitions for aircraft repair parts.

(b) Equipment required to perform US maintenance in forward areas be made available to the supporting US detachments; (i.e. M-60 crane for removal and installation of engines, transmissions, rotor hubs, blades, 100 CFM air compressors, an aircraft washing capability).

(c) Intensely managed components to provide quick turn around maintenance.

(d) Field training teams to visit operational units periodically and to provide high caliber instruction to individuals undergoing on-the-job training in critical specialities.

(e) Curtail non-tactical operations to a reasonable extent and reduce "blade time" on mission ready aircraft.

**i. Employment of "Sniffer" with pre-planned airstrikes.**

(1) Observation: Use of an airstrike in conjunction with sniffer missions provides immediate reaction to max readings. This greatly aids in finding and fixing the enemy so that elements of THE FIRST TEAM can exploit the situation.

(2) Evaluation: On 26 August 1968, based upon reliable intelligence, a sniffer mission was flown in a 4 by 6 kilometer box. A preplanned airstrike was scheduled for 30 minutes after the start of the sniffer. After 30 maximum readings in the area, a scout team located a suspected CP area. The airstrike was then put in resulting in the destruction of a large enemy bunker complex.

(3) Recommendation: That Sniffer missions be used in conjunction with airstrikes in operations where feasible.

**j. Tactics:**

(1) Observation: During this reporting period elements from the 1st Brigade have made contact on numerous occasions while returning to investigate previously destroyed base camps or base areas. Enemy bunkers and other structures were found to have been rebuilt under the previously destroyed bunkers utilizing dead fall and other debris as camouflage.

(2) Evaluation: The concept of considering areas of previous contact cleared because the enemy has evaded and/or because the bunkers were destroyed should be avoided. The NVL/VC often return to previous base camps.

(3) Recommendation: The tactic of planning operations in previous contact or discovered base camp areas should be encouraged.

**k. Rice Denial Operations**

(1) Observation: During the reporting period large quantities of rice were confiscated in the 1st Brigade A.C. Two methods of concealment were found and used extensively in the "Street Without Joy" and Reach areas. The new cache sites were found generally in sand dune areas off main trails and in grave yards. The cache sites were disguised as graves, marked by 105 cannisters or sticks pointing to the cache site or located near prominent sand dunes. The rice was generally buried in porcelain or metal containers

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with a plastic or rice matting covering the container with approximately two feet of sand providing the final layer. The second method detected was finding new rice in old cache sites. After US personnel had excavated a cache site and extracted the rice, the enemy returned to the original hole, increased its depth, deposited new rice then covered the rice with sand to the depth at which US personnel terminated excavation.

(2) Evaluation: Because of the new cache site locations, units must keep personnel well dispersed, completely saturating a given area. The sand dune area should not be overlooked especially if the dunes are located on high ground. Personnel must be instructed to meticulously probe the area with probes made of bamboo or any means available. Once a cache site has been located, personnel should continue to search the entire area with added emphasis given to the vicinity of the cache site. The trend has been five or more rice containers at one cache site. If the area looks favorable, consideration should be given to bringing a backhoe or bulldozer on the site to assist in the excavation.

(3) Recommendation: That operations be planned for previous cache site areas with personnel thoroughly briefed to investigate old cache holes. More attention should be placed on the dunes area near, but not in the villages, and consideration be given to periodic plowing of old and suspected cache site locations.

1. NVA and VC Trends:

(1) Observation: During the reporting period, local guerrilla and NVA forces have been found taking refuge in underground bunkers located in the sand dune areas separating the beach along the South China Sea and "The Street Without Joy".

(2) Evaluation: By conducting a thorough aerial and ground reconnaissance looking for individuals having no apparent reason for being in the sand dune areas, retracing footprints or following other signs, the 1st Brigade discovered sand mounds which, after exploration, have proven to be underground bunkers or aid stations.

(3) Recommendation: That more attention be given to the less inhabited sand dune areas paralleling the coastal regions

m. Firebase Construction.

(1) Observation: Firebase Construction could be planned more adequately.

(2) Evaluation: The importance of thoroughly planning the construction of firebases needs to be emphasized.

(3) Recommendation: See TAB F: Firebase Construction

n. Incidents Involving Minesweeps:

(1) Observation: On 17 August, one officer was killed and 18 FM were injured in two separate incidents of mine detonation during minesweep operations

(2) Evaluation: These incidents occurred on the return through the area having just been mineswept. It can be stated with great certainty that these mines were placed subsequent to the minesweep operation.

(3) Recommendation: The area swept by minesweep teams must be kept under constant surveillance during the operation to prevent the placing of mines behind sweeping teams.

3. Training

. Visitation by Combat Research Teams

(1) Observation: Chainsaws could be utilized more effectively.

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(2) Evaluation: A team, consisting of Mr R P McGowan from the US Army Limited War Laboratories at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, and Mr Miles Davis of the Homelite Corporation in Springfield, Oregon, accompanied combat engineers on several LZ cutting missions. They contributed much to improving the operating efficiency of the engineer crews. They visited each engineer company and held formal classes on safe and efficient methods of falling trees, clearing areas, and on proper sharpening and maintenance of chain saws. The team also brought twelve Homelite chain saws and left them with the battalion. The chain saws were equipped with two attachments, (a brush cutter and a winch) which proved to be less useful than the chain saws themselves. The chain saws are now in the hands of the three combat engineer companies, and have proved to be effective in landing zone cutting operations.

(3) Recommendation: The visit was most beneficial to the division engineer battalion. It is recommended that a welcome be extended to similar research teams, when applicable. It is recommended that the LZ cutting team from Limited War Laboratories be invited to instruct other combat engineer battalions in the area of operations.

#### 4. Intelligence

##### a. Volunteer Informant Program

(1) Observation: During the reporting period, agents of the CI Section of the 3d Bde and Div have been personally contacting the civilian populace of Phong Dien in an effort to increase their participation in the Volunteer Informant Program. The results accomplished were the turn-in of 381 separate pieces of VC and NVA ordnance and 101 pieces of US ordnance. A total amount of 168,450 piasters was paid to 43 voluntary informants.

(2) Evaluation: All participants in the VIP were interviewed and assessed for possible future utilization as informants. Through persuasion and demonstration of friendliness, personnel assigned to this duty were able to establish many responses to the VIP policies. The program has shown that by gaining the confidence of the Vietnamese, a greater response will be obtained. This confidence was not gained in a period of one or two contacts but rather through continuous effort of staff personnel over a period of approximately five months.

(3) Recommendation: That this information be presented to other units.

##### b. Prisoner Interrogation

(1) Observation: A specific numbering system for PW's was initiated. The numbering system runs chronologically by operation and includes a notation as to the brigade responsible for capture. This numbering system avoids the difficulties in pronunciation of Vietnamese names.

(2) Evaluation: The numbering system proved to be an effective method for classification and categorizing PW's. Efficiency was improved in expediting prisoner interrogation.

(3) Recommendation: That other units be made aware of the numbering system.

##### c. Interrogation

(1) Observation: By using photographs and relief maps, IPW was able to get more detailed information from detainees.

(2) Evaluation: During the period of Operation Comanche Falls I, it was noted that with a detailed interrogation by 2d Brigade IPW, and with the use of relief maps and photographs of the area, the back-tracking of Chieu Hoi's and PW's was made easier. A file of photographs of the hamlets in the AO proved very effective in interrogation of IC's, CD's and PW's. They

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could see their hamlet and point out the houses and bunkers which VC and infrastructure personnel used as hiding places.

(3) Recommendation: That relief maps and aerial photos be made available to IFW teams for use in the interrogation of detainees.

#### 5. Logistics

##### a. Increase in the Number of PRC-25 Radios for a LRP Company.

(1) Observation: There are not sufficient PRC-25 radios to satisfy the communications requirements of the LRP Company.

(2) Evaluation: It has been found that two PRC-25 radios per team are required to insure adequate communications. One radio is used to communicate with LRP Control while the other radio is used to coordinate with artillery, air, or other friendly units as necessary. In addition, the extra radio allows the six man team to break up into three, two man groups (each with a commo capability in the event the team is forced to split up and evade). Normally one or two relays are maintained at key FOBs to insure communications with all teams. A liaison team is maintained at each Brigade TOC that requires a PRC-25 or RT-524. For all aerial reconns a PRC-25 radio is carried.

(3) Recommendation: That the number of PRC-25's authorized for the LRP Company be increased to a minimum of 25. This would allow ten teams to be in the field at one time (20 PRC-25's), one liaison team at each Brigade (3 PRC-25's), 1 radio relay (1 PRC-25), and one radio for use on aerial reconns and on the C&C helicopter during insertions.

##### b. The Car 15

(1) Observation: The Car 15 rifle has proven to be an effective weapon for LRP teams.

(2) Evaluation: Several Car 15 rifles were given to the LRP Company for testing and evaluation. The rifles proved superior to the M16 in LRP missions for the following reasons: compactness (12" shorter—doesn't hang up in thick jungle), lightweight, and it presents smaller silhouette. Long range accuracy is not necessary for LRP teams as an M14 rifle equipped with a telescopic sight is carried by one team member.

(3) Recommendation: That LRP unit be issued the Car 15, as a TOC weapon.

##### c. M102 Howitzer

(1) Observation: A recurring problem exists with the machine bolts vibrating loose in the rail and link group of the M102 Howitzer.

(2) Evaluation: Normal firing eventually causes the bolts to loosen, thus stripping the bolt and in some cases causing the bolts to snap off.

(3) Recommendation: That holes be drilled through the heads of the bolts and wire be run through the holes and laced around the bolts so they cannot turn independently.

##### d. Base Development Officers

(1) Observation: A Separate Base Development Officer is required at each base camp of any appreciable size.

(2) Evaluation: The requirements at separate base camps differ too much for them to be managed from a single office located away from the concerned camp. Also, to see that standards of layout, construction, and similar problems are met, it is necessary that a base development officer be available, on a daily basis, to check the project area.

(3) Recommendation: That the commander of a base appoint a base development officer who controls all construction on the base.

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6. Organization

a. Placing the Long Range Patrol Company under Operational Control of the Air Cav Squadron.

(1) Observation: The placing of the LRP company under operational control of the Air Cav Squadron has resulted in better and more efficient utilization of the team's capabilities.

(2) Evaluation: In October, the LRP's came under the operational control of the Air Cav Squadron and have been employed in this manner since that time. The Squadron can react immediately to timely sightings made by the teams and consequently quickly develop a situation. Insertion of each team is based upon timely and up-to-date intelligence provided by scout teams from all troops.

(3) Recommendation: That other units be made aware of this organizational change and its benefits.

b. Need for a New Engineer Line Company.

(1) Observation: The manpower resources of the 8th Engineer Battalion are over committed at times when the three brigades conduct operations simultaneously.

(2) Evaluation: It is difficult for the 8th Engineer Battalion to efficiently support the Division base and the three brigades with only three line companies under such circumstances.

(3) That TO3.2-2157 be changed to authorize one more line company.

7. Other: None

SECTION III: HQS, D: Survey Information

Escape, Evasion and Survival - Negative report submitted.

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FOR THE COMMANDER:



31 Incl-TABS B thru AE w/d, Hq, DA  
TAB A: Task Organization  
~~TAB B: Weather and Terrain~~  
~~TAB C: Enemy Activities~~  
~~TAB D: Aerial Surveillance~~  
~~TAB E: Intelligence Activities~~  
~~TAB F: Firebase Construction~~  
~~TAB G: Training/Combat Developments~~  
~~TAB H: Key Personnel Roster~~  
~~TAB I: G-1 Activities~~  
~~TAB J: Division Strength~~  
~~TAB K: Casualty Statistics~~  
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~~TAB M: Unit Listing~~  
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~~TAB Q: R&R Program~~  
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~~TAB W: Provost Marshal Activities~~  
~~TAB X: Finance Activities~~  
~~TAB Y: Chaplain Activities~~  
~~TAB Z: Surgeon's Activities~~  
~~TAB AA: Inspector General Activities~~  
~~TAB AB: Logistic Operations~~  
~~TAB AC: Logistics~~  
~~TAB AD: Civil Affairs~~  
~~TAB AE: Psychological Operations~~

C.E. DOYLE  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 HCS  
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

MAJ Sanderson/rrm/2506

DA, HQ, XXIV Corps AFO 96308

13 JAN 1969

TO: Commanding General, US Army, Vietnam, APO 96375

1. (U) The ORLL of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) has been reviewed at HQ, XXIV Corps and is forwarded IAW USARV Reg 525-15.

2. (C) Comments on Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

a. Concur with commander's recommendations without further comment, except those recommendations listed below.

b. Item: NFFF Operations, page 13, para 2f. Concur with recommendation, which results in better operations. However, early notification and coordination increases the possibility of a compromise, and therefore should be limited to key NFFF personnel.

c. Item: Mobility, page 13, para 2g. Concur. A more effective means of felling trees with explosives should be made available. A linear shaped charge could increase the clearing capacity of the quantity of explosives carried.

d. Item: Visitation by combat research teams, page 15, para 3. Concur. Further recommend junior officers and NCO's receive training in chain saw operation. Lack of supervision of operations and maintenance of small items of powered equipment contributes substantially to its poor performance.

e. Item: Increase in the number of PRC-25 Radios for a LRP Company, and the Car 15, page 17, paragraphs 5a and 5b respectively. Concur with recommendations. Appropriate action for the LRP Company to request authorization for the recommended equipment is through MTOE submission. As an interim measure, the unit can request temporary loan of equipment in accordance with USARV Reg 700-20.

f. Item: M102 Howitzer, page 17, para 5c. The appropriate procedure to recommend safety wiring of machine bolts in the M102 howitzer rail and link group is through submission of an Equipment Improvement Report in accordance with TM 38-750.

g. Item: Placing the Long Range Patrol Company under operational control of the Air Cav Sqda page 18, para 6a. The 101st Abn Div (AM) has also placed the LRP Company under the operational control of the Air Cav Sqda. An advantage derived from this organization is improved helicopter support for long range



13 JAN 1969

AVII-GCT

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968 RCS  
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

patrols. Continuing emphasis, however, must be placed on the intelligence collection mission of the LRP Company.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*H.R. Taylor*  
H.R. TAYLOR  
CPT, AGC  
ASST AG

AVHGC-DST (6 Dec 68) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 October 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 24 JAN 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

2. Reference item concerning need for a new line company, page 18, paragraph 6b. To support the DA standardization program, an additional engineer company for the 1st Cavalry Division (Ambl) would require an additional company for the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl). Such action would require 234 additional spaces and related engineer equipment which are critically short at this time. After it has been determined that the requirement cannot be satisfied from engineer assets available in this command, a formal request and concept plan IAW USAFV Circular 310-44 will have to be submitted by the 1st Cavalry Division (Ambl). Upon receipt of this request, appropriate action will be taken by this headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON  
1LT, AGC  
O/C AG CLASSIFIED

GPOP-DT (6 Dec 68) 3c Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Cav Div (Airmobile) for Period  
Ending 31 October 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558

10 FEB 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-  
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C. L. SHORTT  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968  
TAB A: Task Organization

1. 1 Aug 68: Task Organization
  - a. 1st Air Cavalry Division
    - HHC, 1 ACD
    - 1/9 Cav
      - 62d Inf Plat (Combat Trackers)
      - 8th Engr Bn
      - 13th Sig Bn
      - Co E, 52d Inf (IRP)
      - 545th MP Co
      - 26th Chem Det
        - 184th Chem Plat
      - 371st Radio Research Unit
      - 191st Military Intelligence Det
        - 583d Military Intelligence Det
      - 14th Military History Det
      - 42d Public Information Det
      - Special Security Det
      - Det 31, 5th Weather Sqn (AF)
    - b. 1st Bde
      - HHC, 1 BDE
      - 1/8 Cav
        - 1/12 Cav
      - 25th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
      - 41st Public Information Det
    - c. 2d Bde
      - HHC, 2 Bde
      - 1/5 Cav
        - 2/8 Cav
        - 2/12 Cav
      - 3 Sgdn, 5th Cav (OPCON)
    - d. 3d Bde
      - HHC 3d Bde
      - 2/5 Cav
      - 1/7 Cav
      - 2/7 Cav
      - 5/7 Cav
      - 34th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
    - e. Div Arty
      - HHC, Div Arty
      - 2/19th Arty (105)
      - 2/20th Arty (ARA)
      - 1/21st Arty (105)
      - 1/30 th Arty (155)
      - 1/77th Arty (105)
      - E Btry, 82d Arty (Avn)
    - f. 11th Avn Gp
      - HHC, 11th Avn Gp
      - 227th Aslt Hel Bn
      - 228th Aslt Spt Hel Bn
        - 478th Hvy Hel Co
      - 382d Trans Acft Maint Co
      - 229th Aslt Hel Bn
      - 11th GS Co

A-1

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1968  
TAB A: Task Organization (Cont)

- g. Division Support Command
  - HHC & Band, Div Spt Cmd
  - 15th Admin Co
  - 15th Admin Co
  - 15th S&S Co
  - 15th Med Bn
  - 15th Trans Acft Maint Bn
  - 27th Maint Bn
- 2. 25 Aug: 2/8 Cav released OPCON 2d Bde placed OPCON 1st Bde.
- 3. 30 Aug: 1st Bn 3d Regt placed OPCON to 1st ARVN Div, 2d Bn released OPCON 1st ARVN Div placed OPCON 3d ARVN Regt
- 4. 8 Sep: 3d Bn released OPCON 3d ARVN Regt and airlifted to PK 17.
- 5. 10 Sep: 1/8 Cav released OPCON 1st Bde placed OPCON 2d Bde.
- 6. 11 Sep: 1/7 Cav released OPCON 3d Bde placed OPCON 2d Bde
- 7. 12 Sep: 4th Bn released OPCON 3d Regt and airlifted to LZ Geronimo.
- 8. 18 Sep: 1/8 Cav released OPCON 2d Bde placed OPCON 1st Bde.
- 9. 1 Oct: 2/5 Cav released OPCON 3d Bde placed OPCON 2d Bde, 1/7 Cav released OPCON 2d Bde placed OPCON 3d Bde.
- 10. 18 Oct: 1/7 Cav released OPCON 3d Bde placed OPCON 2d Bde.
- 11. 21 Oct: 1/7 Cav released OPCON 2d Bde placed OPCON 2d Bde.
- 12. 24 Oct: 2d Bn 3d ARVN Regt airlifted to Hue, 3d Bn 3d ARVN Regt airlifted to LZ Miguel.
- 13. 28 Oct: HHC, 3d Bde and 2/7 Cav airlifted to Quan Loi, III C/2, placed OPCON 1st Inf Div. 1/7 Cav and 5/7 Cav placed OPCON 1st AGD.
- 14. 29 Oct: 2/8 Cav released OPCON 1st Bde airlifted to Quan Loi placed OPCON 1st Inf Div.
- 15. 30 Oct: 2/12 Cav released OPCON 2d Bde airlifted to Quan Loi placed OPCON 1st Inf Div.
- 16. 31 Oct 68: Task Organization of maneuver battalions.
  - a. 1st Air Cavalry Division
    - 1/7 Cav
    - 5/7 Cav
  - b. 1st Bde
    - 1/8 Cav
    - 1/12 Cav
  - c. 2d Bde
    - 1/5 Cav
    - 3/5 Arm Cav

