

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 2D BRIGADE  
1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION  
APO 96490

AVDABB-C

3 June 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report - Operation CONCORDIA SQUARE

TO: Commanding General  
1st Air Cavalry Division  
APO 96490

1. (U) OPERATION: CONCORDIA SQUARE
2. (U) PERIOD COVERED: 081600 May 68-171100 May 68.
3. (U) LOCATION: Gio Linh District, Quang Tri Province, RVN (See Incl 1)
4. (U) COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division
5. (U) REPORTING OFFICER: Colonel Robert N. Mackinnon  
CO, 2d Bde, 1st Air Cav Div
6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:
  - a. HHC 2d Bde
  - b. Maneuver Units
    - 1-5 Cav
    - 2-5 Cav
  - c. Arty Support
    - 1-77 Arty (- C Btry)
    - AL-30 Arty (GS)
  - d. Other
    - B-8 Engr Bn
    - 2d FSE
    - B-15 Med Bn
    - 2d Plt A 15 S&S Bn
    - B-27 Maint
    - 2d Plt, 545 MP Co
    - 2 Squads 25th Plt (Scout Dog)
    - TM, 191 MI Det
    - TM, 5 WHTR Bn
    - TM, 7 PSYOPS Bn
    - TM, 371 RRU
    - PIO TM, 15 Admin Co
    - ALO TM
    - TM, 13 Sig Bn

-DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Encl 180 TAB-2

DECLASSIFIED

7. (C) INTELLIGENCE: *CONFIDENTIAL*

a. Weather. Climatic conditions as forecasted for the Dong Ha area prevailed during the operation and did not seriously hamper airmobile operations within the AO. Ground haze was encountered twice until mid-morning, with unlimited ceilings and visibility there after. Precipitation was negligible. Wind averaged 5-10 knots from the NW with the temperature ranging from 74-99.

b. Terrain. The 2nd Bde operated in Northern Quang Tri province along the coastal plains. Scrub brush was the predominant type of vegetation in the area. Tree stand, ditches, and sand dunes restrict ground observation and fields of fire to 150 meters. Movement was generally unrestricted throughout the AO.

c. Enemy. Units identified in contact with elements of the 2nd Bde were 2nd Bn and 3rd Bn's 48 Regt, 320th Div; 19th Bn (Trans) 320th Div; 15th Trans Co; 48th Regt; 5th Trans Co 9th Group; 228th Bn, 350th Regt, 330th Div; 330 Dir Hq Co; 19th Bn, 27th Regt, 304th Div; 7th Bn, 56th Regt, 324th Div. (All confirmed by POW). Elements of the 2nd Bde were in moderate to heavy contact throughout the Operation.

8. (C) MISSION: Conduct combat operations within AO to locate, destroy or capture the enemy and to interdict his infiltration route.

9. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. The 2d Brigade deployed from the Scotland II AO to the vicinity of Dong Ha prior to the commencement of Operation Concordia Square. At 081600 May 68 the 2d Brigade assumed control of the AO (Incl 1) with two (2) Air Cavalry battalions, 1-5 Cav and 2-5 Cav.

b. The 1-5 Cav was responsible for the Southern portion of the AO with the CP located at Firebase C-1. On 11 May 68, 1-5 Cav was tasked with the mission of providing 1 Company to secure HWY 1 within their AO up to Firebase C-2. This requirement continued throughout the Operation. On 11 May 68, the 1-5 Cav was reinforced with a tank platoon from Company C, 3d Marine Tank Battalion.

c. The 2-5 Cav was responsible for the Northern half of the AO (Incl 1). Their CP was located at Dong Ha, initially, but deployed to Firebase C-1 on 11 May 68. On 16 May 68, 2-5 Cav conducted a joint operation with the 1st ARVN Division to open Highway 1 from Firebases C-1 to A-2.

d. During the entire operation the 2d Brigade CP was located at Dong Ha with its rear elements located at LZ Jane.

e. In Operation Concordia Square the 2d Bde had available the following fire support.

(1) Artillery

DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVAL  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

*CONFIDENTIAL*  
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

*CONFIDENTIAL*

- (a) 77th Arty (105MM Towed)
  - Btry
  - G Btry
  - A Btry 1st Bn 30th Arty (155MM Towed) OPCON 1-77

- (b) B Btry, 2d Bn 20th Arty (ARA) Reinforcing.

(c) The Artillery organic and attached to the 3d Marine Division Artillery was also available and consisted of 105MM howitzers, 155MM howitzers, 175MM guns, 8 in Howitzers and 4.2 mortars.

(2) Air Support: Close air support was available from the 7th Air Force.

(3) Naval Support: Naval ships, to include both cruisers and destroyers were in general support of the 3d Marine Div.

f. Aviation support was provided by Brigade AVN along with 1st Air Cavalry Divisional resources from the 11th Aviation Group. The following is a recapitulation of aviation support provided to the 2d Bde:

- (1) UH1H Support

	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HRS</u>	<u>CARGO (TONS)</u>
227th AHB	668	150	114
229th HNB	651	136	6
2d Bde Avn	<u>471</u>	<u>118</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	1790	404	175

- (2) OH-13 G

	<u>HRS</u>
2d Bde Avn	143

- (3) OH-47

	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HRS</u>	<u>CARGO (TONS)</u>
228th ASHB	142	27	426

g. Aerial Reconnaissance was provided by Brigade Scouts and by teams from A Troop 1-9 Cavalry. A 1-9 Cav had available as an average, one red (gun) team and one white (scout) team daily in support of 2d Brigade.

(1) General: The 2d FSE continued to support the 2d Bde combat operations and the Marine LSU continued to substitute for the FSA.

- (2) Supply & Services: Provided by the Marine Class I yard.

DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVAL  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

*CONFIDENTIAL*

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(a) Class I: Class I at Dong Ha met the requirements of the Brigade.

(b) Class II & IV: The supply of Class II did not meet the requirements of the Brigade. There was a limited supply of clothing, boots, socks, towels, heat tabs etc. Supply of barrier material (Class IV) was unsatisfactory since lumber was not available.

(c) Class III: Class III items were limited but sufficient to meet minimum requirements.

(d) Class V: Class V items were sufficient.

(e) Laundry and Bath: Laundry services were available at Quang Tri. No bath unit was available.

(f) Water Point: The water point at Dong Ha did not have a pump which is necessary to fill the water blivots which are slung out to field.

(3) Transportation:

(a) Land: Satisfactory

(b) Air: Satisfactory

10. EXECUTION:

a. Operations during Concordia Square were characterized by heavy contacts occurring both from daylight and night operations. Contact was established with numerous different enemy units since the main infiltration route passed thru the Rde AO. 2-5 Cav experienced outstanding success conducting company size night ambushes to interdict this infiltration route. Almost as a routine, Firebase C-1 received artillery fire at approximately 1800 hours daily.

b. The first major contact involved all companies of the 1-5 Cavalry vicinity of YD 2367 (See Incl 1) when, on 9 May 68, they made contact with an estimated enemy battalion. Friendly casualties from the contact were 17 KIA and 42 WIA. On 10 May 1968 after artillery and airstrikes were placed in the area through out the night, the 1-5 Cav swept the area resulting in 147 NVA KIA & 57 individual weapons and 10 crew-served weapons captured.

c. Also, on the night of 10 May 1968, D 2-5 Cav conducted a company size ambush vicinity of YD 243707 (See Incl 1). At 2205 hours, an infiltration group of approximately 200 NVA moved to within 25 meters of the ambush before the command to open fire was given. The results of this highly successful ambush were 47 NVA KIA, 2 NVA PW, 10 individual weapons captured and no friendly casualties.

d. On 11 May 1968, A, B, & D 1-5 Cav made contact with an unknown size enemy force vicinity of YD 243673 (See Incl 1) resulting in 5 US KIA and 21 US WIA. Enemy casualties from the initial contact were 47 NVA KIA and 4 individual weapons and two crew served weapons captured. After extensive artillery fire and airstrikes were placed in the area through the night and into the next day, the 1-5 sweep the area finding an additional 35 NVA KIA and 8 individual weapons

DECLASSIFIED AT 3 YEAR INTERVAL

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DCD BIR 5200.20

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

and one crew served weapon. Total enemy losses from the contact were 82 NVA KIA and 72 individual and crew-served weapons captured.

e. On 14 May 68, D 2-5 Cav again conducting a company size night ambush engaged 50 individual in vicinity of YD 243693 (See Incl 1) resulting in 20 NVA KIA, and 5 individual weapons and 1 crew served weapon captured.

f. Heavy contact was established by two companies of the 2-5 Cavalry with an estimated reinforced enemy battalion vic YD 248742. Contact was broken and artillery and airstrikes were called into the area for the next two days. The battle area was never swept due to the termination of the operation.

12. (C) RESULTS OF OPERATION:

NVA KIA	347
PW	15
DETAINEE	18
C/S WPNS	21
INDIV WPNS	130
LG CAL RDS	92
S/L RDS	860
HG/MINES	38
US KIA	25
US WIA	117

13. LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Marking Panels:

(1) Observation. Marking friendly positions with smoke grenades can draw indirect enemy fire.

(2) Evaluation. During the operation the enemy possessed the capability of employing accurate indirect fire on friendly positions. If smoke grenades were used to mark friendly locations for aircraft, the enemy could use it as a target for artillery. It was found that the use of marker panels served to mark friendly positions as well as smoke grenades, without drawing artillery fire. When US issue panels were not available, field expedient methods were used.

(3) Recommendation: When the enemy has the capability to deliver accurate indirect fire, marker panels should be used to mark friendly locations instead of smoke grenades.

b. Tank-Infantry:

DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVAL  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

*CONFIDENTIAL*

(1) Observation. The use of armor in conjunction with infantry in attacks against fortified enemy positions is a highly successful tactic.

(2) Evaluation. 1-5 Cav employed a platoon of tanks in support of an operation against a fortified village. The tanks were positioned with the assaulting infantry. The tanks delivered suppressive fires with their .50 caliber machine guns and delivered accurate bunker destruction fires with their main armament. The suppressive fires allowed the infantry to advance within close proximity of enemy positions in order to mop up the bunkers stunned or breached by the tanks main armament. Helicopters were employed as air cover to detect and neutralize enemy anti-tank measures.

(3) Recommendation. Commanders should consider the use of tanks against fortified positions whenever they are available. The added accurate firepower, shock action and mobility enables the advancing infantry to close with and finish the enemy while restricting casualties.

c. Night Ambushes.

(1) Observation: When the enemy is not familiar with the terrain night operations, especially ambushes, can be highly successful.

(2) Evaluation. The main infiltration route from the North into this part of the area passed through the 2-5 Cav AO. One company would conduct limited operations during the day and establish night ambushes. The infiltration groups from the North were not familiar with the terrain and received poor training prior to infiltrating. Enemy elements had little or no security in front of their main body and were easy prey to a well established ambush.

(3) When operating in an area which has known infiltration routes, night operations should be emphasis as much as much as possible.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
as

*Robert D Driscoll*  
ROBERT D DRISCOLL  
1st Lt, Infantry  
Asst. Adjutant


DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVAL  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

*CONFIDENTIAL*

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL



- ① - 1-5 (9 MAY)
- ② - 2-5 (10 MAY)
- ③ - 1-5 (11 MAY)
- ④ - 2-5 (14 MAY)
- ⑤ - 2-5 (15 MAY)

- DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVAL  
 - DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
 LCD KER 5200.10

Incl 1

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED