

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 2D BRIGADE
1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION
APO 96490

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AVDABB-C

3 June 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report - Operation SCOTLAND II

TO: Commanding General
1st Air Cavalry Division
APO 96490

JA

1. (U) OPERATION: SCOTLAND II
2. (U) PERIOD COVERED: 150800 April 68-0711200 May 68.
3. (U) LOCATION: Northeastern Quang Tri Province.
4. (U) COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division.
5. (U) REPORTING OFFICER: Colonel Robert N. Macdonnon
CO 2nd Bde, 1st Air Cav Div
6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:
 - a. HHC 2d Bde
 - b. Maneuver Unit
 - 1-5 Cav
 - 2-5 Cav
 - c. Arty Support
 - 1-77 Arty (- C Btry)
 - A 1-30 Arty (GS)
 - d. Other
 - B-8 Engr Bn
 - 2d FSE
 - B-15 Med Bn
 - 2d Plt A 15 S&S Bn
 - B-27 Maint
 - 2d Plt, 545 MP Co
 - TM 191 MI Det
 - TM, 5 WHTR Sqdrn
 - TM, 7 Psyops Bn
 - TM, 371 RRU
 - PIO Tm, 15 Admin Co
 - ALO TM
 - TM, 13 Sig Bn

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incl 180-TAB 1

7. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

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a. Weather: Climatic conditions as forecasted for the Khe Sanh area prevailed during the operation and did not seriously hamper airmobile operations within the AO. Ground fog and haze prevailed until mid-morning, with scattered and broken ceilings to 2500-3000 feet. Weather conditions at aircraft loader points restricted airmobile movements to a greater extent than did the Khe Sanh weather. Precipitation was negligible except for heavy showers on 7 May. Winds averaged 7-15K from the NW with the temperature ranging from 72-100.

b. Terrain: Heavy bombing and artillery fires throughout the AO materially altered the landscape. Numerous LZ's existed, and movement was generally unrestricted throughout the AO. Areas of dense canopy and underbrush existed, mostly in the Southern portion of the AO, but did not present any problem to troop movement. Observation and fields of fire from elevated positions were unrestricted. Numerous trails and improved footpaths were prevalent throughout the area.

c. Enemy: Units identified in contact with elements of the 2nd Brigade were 5th Bn, 2nd Regt, 304th Div (Confirmed by POW). Combat operations during the report period were characterized by light ground contact. Enemy forces employed indirect fire weapons against LZ's and company fire bases, and made one ground attack against a 2nd Bde LZ which was repulsed.

8. (C) MISSION: Find, engage and defeat the enemy and to conduct combat operations within AO to relieve pressure on the Khe Sanh Combat Base Area.

9. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. Operation Scotland II began on 150800 April 1968 with the 2d Brigade becoming OPCON to TF Glick, a force subordinate to the 3d Marine Division. The 2d Brigade was deployed with two (2) battalions, 1-5 Cav with its CP at LZ Wharton and 2-5 Cav with its CP on LZ Snapper. The 2d Brigade CP was located on LZ Wharton. On 17 April 68, the 1-5 CP displaced to LZ Snoopy, later called LZ Peanuts, while the Brigade CP displaced to LZ Snapper.

b. On 3 May 1968, Col Robert N Mackinnon assumed command of the 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division, relieving Col Joseph C McDonough who served as Brigade Commander since 29 September 1968.

c. The 1-5 Cav conducted operations in the Western part of the AO (Incl 1) with one company providing security of HILL 471 and one company providing security for LZ Peanuts. The two maneuver companies initially conducted operations in the vicinity of the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp. On 22 April 68, the two companies then shifted their emphasis to the South, until 3 May, when they returned to the Northern half of the AO.

d. The 2-5 Cav conducted operations in the Eastern part of the AO (Incl 1) with one company providing security for LZ Snapper. One company conducted operations in the vicinity of XD 8533, while the other two companies conducted operations to the South of LZ Snapper and then to the Northeast in the vicinity of LZ Wharton.

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e. On 5 May 68, B, C, and D 1-5 were extracted from the AO to LZ Stud, with D 1-5 then being further deployed to C-1. On 6 May 68, A, B, and C 1-5 were airlifted to Dong Ha, as was A 2-5 Cav. On 7 May 68, the remainder of the 2-5 Cav, as well as the 2d Brigade CP, displaced into the Concordia Square AO, as Operation Scotland II terminated at 071200 May 68.

f. In Operation Scotland II the 2nd Bde had available the following fire support.

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(1) Artillery Support:

(a) 1st Bn 77th (105-MM Towed) -- DS

- (1) A Btry 1-77 Arty
- (2) B Btry 1-77 Arty
- (3) A Btry, 1st Bn 20th Arty (155-MM Towed) - OPCON
- (4) 1 searchlight-attached

(b) B Btry, 2d Bn 20th Arty (ARA) reinforcing 1-77 Arty

(c) The artillery supporting the 26th and 1st Marine Regt were also available and fired in support of the 2nd Bde.

(2) Air Support: Close air support was available from the 7th Air Force.

g. Aviation support was provided, for the most part, by Brigade resources and by the 11th Aviation group. On occasions marine helicopter support was received.

(1) The following is a recapitulation of aviation support for the 2d Bde:

(a) UH1H Support

	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HRS</u>	<u>CARGO (TONS)</u>
227th AHB	1,872	511	306
229th AHB	2,649	535	92
2d Bde AVN	774	194	0
TOTALS	5,295	1240	398

(b) CH-13G

	<u>HRS</u>
2d Bde Avn	315

(c) CH-47

	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HRS</u>	<u>CARGO (TONS)</u>
228th ASHB	578	292	1,734

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(2) In addition the 229th AHB also provided UH1H helicopter support to marine units with area.

<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>HRS</u>	<u>CARGO (TONS)</u>
82	51	2.6

h. In addition to Bde scouts the 2d Bde was supported by A Troop 1-9 Cavalry who provided both white (recon) and red (gun) teams on a mission basis.

10. (C) EXECUTION:

a. During Operation Scotland II, the 2d Brigade experienced only light contact with the enemy elements operating in the AO. The enemy used rockets, mortars and artillery frequently to shell LZ Peanuts and occasionally, LZ Snapper and company FOB's.

b. The first significant contact occurred near the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp when A & D 1-5 engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 13 NVA KIA. On 24 April 68, the two companies swept through the camp meeting no resistance.

c. On 29 April 1968, D 2-5 FOB was attacked by an unknown size enemy force vic YD 826320 resulting in 8 NVA KIA, 2 NVA PW's from the 304th Division and 12 AK-47's, 2 AK-50's, an RPG and a B-40 rocket launcher captured.

d. The largest contact occurred when an estimated Sapper company attempted to overrun LZ Peanuts. During the day of 4 May 1968, LZ Peanuts received an artillery attack which hit the ammo dump of A 1-77 Arty destroying 6 105 howitzers. At 0250 hours on 5 May 1968, a 60MM mortar attack was launched, followed by a sapper attack w/est NVA company at 0300 hours from the South, West and North. Contact continued until 0440 hours when the enemy retreated. Results of the contact were 29 NVA KIA killed and 17 AK-47's and 3 B-40 rocket launchers captured.

11. LOSSES FOR OPERATIONS:

NVA KIA	69
PW	2
DETAINEE	0
C/S WPNS	8
INDIV WPNS	43
IG CAL RDS	1,260
S/A RDS	29,899
HG/MINES	1,085
RICE	7900 LBS
US KIA	10
US WIA	60

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FOR THE COMMANDER:

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
Robert D. Driscoll
ROBERT D. DRISCOLL
1st LT, Infantry
Asst. Adjutant

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