

AFTER ACTION REPORT



CAMBODIAN CAMPAIGN

[22 February – 19 May 1971]

Copyist's Note

This is NOT "a true copy."

The original from which it was made is more than 32 years old, printed on the 8-1/2 by 10-inch paper that was standard at the time, using what was no doubt a worn out mimeograph machine. It is still legible, but parts are hard to read.

This copy was produced by scanning the original, then manually fixing all the garbled sections. In the process, misspellings and typographical errors were corrected. Otherwise, the content is unchanged from the original.

Where possible, the names of US dead, wounded, and missing in action have been added in footnotes, along with aircraft tail numbers, to facilitate cross-reference with databases such as the Virtual Wall and the crash files maintained by the Vietnam Helicopter Pilots Association.

The original report contains six fold-out maps, each hand-drawn and hand-colored. The maps are too faded to scan, so they are not included, and a simple map of Cambodia is included in their place -- for now. Eventually, a way will be found to reproduce the maps.

Readers who can supply additional names of casualties or facts about the incidents described in this report are requested to please send them to

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST SQUADRON, 9TH CAVALRY
1ST AVIATION BRIGADE
APO San Francisco 96289

AVDAUX-C

17 June 1971

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Air Cavalry Combat Operations in Cambodia

THRU: Commanding General
1st Aviation Brigade
APO San Francisco 96289

TO: See Distribution

1. DATES OF OPERATION: 22 February 1971 to 19 May 1971

2. LOCATION: Republic of Cambodia

3. COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 1st Squadron 9th Cavalry

4. REPORTING OFFICER: LTC Carl M. Putnam

5. TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION:

HQ, 1st Squadron, 9th Air Cavalry (I-9 ACS):

A Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry (Apache) (A/1-9)

B Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry (Saber) (B/1-9)
detached 27 March 1971

C Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry (Cavalier) (C/1-9)

A Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry (Silver Spur) (A/3-17)

B Troop, 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry (Stogies) (B/3-17)
joined 27 March 1971

F Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry (Centaur) (F/3-4)
joined 31 March 1971

Air C Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (Black Horse) (11 ACT)
joined 24 February 1971

A Battery, 2nd Battalion, 20th Aerial Field Artillery (Blue Max) (A/2-20)
Direct Support

6. BACKGROUND:

a. On 21 February 1971, the 1-9 ACS was alerted to begin cross-border operations. On 22 February 1971, 1-9 began aerial reconnaissance missions in Cambodia. With four Air Cavalry troops working in support of four ARVN task forces operating under Headquarters Military Region III (MR-III), the Air Cavalry set out to find, fix, and destroy the enemy.

b. To support the cross-border operations, forward operating locations (FOL) with rearm/refuel points were established at Katum and Thien Ngon. A/1-9 living at Song Be operated from Loc Ninh and later laagered from Tay Ninh while the rear elements moved to Phuoc Vinh and then to Di An. B/1-9 living at Bearcat had its combat elements laager at Quan Loi, 100 kilometers closer to the area of operations. C/1-9 was already laagering from Tay Ninh with its rear at Phuoc Vinh and later this was moved to Di An. A/3-17, already living at Quan Loi, operated from Katum, and later operated from Loc Ninh. Headquarters 1-9 established a forward command post (CP) at Katum to facilitate coordination with the Air Cavalry Troops and the ARVN Task Forces. The forward CP was moved to Tay Ninh East in April to facilitate coordination with MR-III headquarters, which was also at Tay Ninh.

7. TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS:

a. Because of the unique rules of engagement in Cambodia, minor modifications to normal Air Cavalry tactical maneuvers were required. ARVN platoons designated as "Browns" were trained in Air Cavalry tactics to replace the Aero-Rifle (Blue) platoon. To be responsive to ARVN ground forces the Cavalry needed a means of direct communications with the ground commanders. This was accomplished by use of a command and control (C&C) helicopter with both an ARVN liaison officer (LNO) and a senior Air Cavalry officer on board. The LNO coordinated with the ground commanders and relayed clearances to engage targets located by the Air Cavalry. This provided the coordination necessary to deliver close-in fire support to troops in contact.

b. Deep penetration into Cambodia and the necessity to return to Vietnam to refuel and rearm meant the visual reconnaissance (VR) time in the area of operations would be greatly reduced. The key to increasing VR time was to increase the endurance of the AH-1G, since the OH-6A did not have fuel consumption problems. To maximize VR time, it was necessary to reduce the ordnance load of the AH-1G and increase fuel load nearer to capacity. To compensate for the lighter ordnance load of the Air Cavalry AH-1G, A/2-20 Artillery was placed in direct support of the Air Cavalry Task Force. These helicopters were used in a direct fire role to engage known enemy locations, to

provide firepower for troops in contact, and to protect downed aircraft and crews.

8. TRAINING: In the two months prior to the Cambodian operation, the Squadron had been training ARVN rifle platoons to perform detailed ground reconnaissance normally accomplished by the Aero-Rifle (Blue) platoon of the Air Cavalry Troop. Use of these ARVN platoons (Browns) greatly reduced the language problem between the forces accomplishing ground reconnaissance and the reinforcing troops that followed. In Cambodia, U.S. ground forces were not allowed on the ground; however, the Browns were immediately available to secure downed aircraft or to rescue shot down crews. General Minh, Commanding General, MR-III, decided to expand the Brown team concept to 13 teams. The Air Cavalry Troops familiarized these teams with helicopter operations, training them in rappelling, rigging downed helicopters for extraction, and ground reconnaissance as well as refresher training in booby traps and marksmanship. Practical exercises were conducted to provide the Browns with experience. The training proved very effective as can be seen by results attained by some of the platoons.

9. DEFINITION OF TERMS:

AFA - Aerial Field Artillery, A/2-20 flying AH-1G gunships.

GAF - Ground-to-air fire; whenever an aircraft is fired at from the ground.

Pink Team - The basic combat element of the Air Cavalry, consisting of one AH-1G and one OH-6A. (3-17 utilized the OH-58). In Cambodia the Pink Team was supplemented by a UH-1H C&C aircraft.

C&C - The command and control aircraft carrying the ARVN LNO and senior Air Cavalry officer. In Cambodia, a C&C aircraft accompanied each Pink Team.

A/S - Air Strike; when concentrations of enemy troops, equipment or bunkers were found, air strikes were requested.

BDA - Bomb damage assessment; after an A/S a Pink Team was called in to check the area and assess the damage, caused by bombs or artillery.

Section of AFA - Two AH-1G gunships from A/2-20; when AFA was requested a section (flight of two) was sent to engage the target.

Heavy Section of AFA - Three AH-1Gs; if there were an uneven number of AH-1Gs available, a heavy section was formed by aiding one additional AH-1G to a section.

KBH - Killed by helicopter; when the enemy was killed by a Pink Team, he was considered KBH.

KBAFA - Killed by Aerial Field Artillery; when the enemy was killed by AFA, he was considered KBAFA.

KBA/S - Enemy killed by an air strike.

KBARTY - Enemy killed by artillery

Forward Operating Location - Location where the Air Cavalry would rearm and refuel; also a jump off point for cross-border operations. There are no maintenance, mess, or overnight facilities at the forward operating location. Examples were Katum, Thien Ngon and Loc Ninh.

Laager Site - A location forward of the Troop's base camp where minor maintenance can be performed and mess and overnight facilities are available. A and C/1-9 laagered at Tay Ninh while their rear elements were at Phuoc Vinh (later moved to Di An.)

BROWNS - A platoon-size Vietnamese unit designated to work as the Aero-Rifle (Blue) platoon of the Air Cavalry. Each Air Cavalry Troop involved in cross-border operations had a Brown platoon, which was under the command of the troop commander.

LESSONS LEARNED

Use of Mini-Gun on the OH-6A:

The use of mini-guns mounted on the OH-6A scout aircraft did not prove successful for 1-9 ACS in Cambodia or Vietnam. The Squadron eventually utilized only non-mini-gun aircraft. It was felt the advantages of using a three-man crew far outweighed the advantages offered by a two-man crew with a mini-gun.

Three-man crew advantages:

1. Three pair of eyes for reconnaissance
2. Effective firepower from both sides of aircraft in nearly all directions.
3. Ability of gunner to carry a wide variety of weapons for use against varied targets (including smoke, CS, fragmentation, incendiary, concussion, and white phosphorous grenades; M-79 grenade launcher, and M-60 machine-gun).
4. Observer can mark location with smoke while gunner engages enemy.
5. Pilot utilizes right turns.

Advantages of mini-gun:

1. Tremendous firepower.
2. It was discovered that when taking fire from an enemy position the mere noise from the mini-gun, regardless of direction of fire, would occasionally cause the enemy to cease fire and move for cover; however, this makes it difficult to assess the size of the enemy force being encountered.

Disadvantages of two-man crew:

1. The right side of the aircraft is unprotected.
2. Pilots tend to make left turns so the observer can maintain visual contact with target. (It is an established fact that when hovering or in slow flight at near max-gross loads, less power will be required and better aircraft performance can be achieved by utilizing right turns.)
3. The mini-gun tempts the pilot to use his aircraft as a gunship against targets that could be more safely and effectively engaged with the Cobra – thus forgetting his primary mission of reconnaissance.
4. The mini-gun puts excessive structural strain on the aircraft. (When the mini-gun is engaged while flying straight and level the aircraft will yaw as much as 10-15 degrees to the left, and the airspeed will bleed off 5-10 knots in a sustained burst.)

Maintenance Standdown:

Most ground combat units are allowed a maintenance standdown; this was not the case for Air Cavalry. It was found in both Cambodia and Vietnam that a 1-2 day maintenance standdown per month gives the Air Cavalry Troop time to repair battle damaged aircraft. With the type of flying performed by the Air Cavalry, it is subject to an extremely high rate of battle damage, much more so than any other aviation unit. It is therefore reasonable that the Air Cavalry be allowed a monthly standdown to repair these aircraft without sustaining further aircraft damage. During this standdown the Troop's operational mission can be adequately covered by one or more of the other Troops in the Squadron.

Liaison Officers:

The use of C&C helicopters with personnel from each country aboard proved to be a very acceptable way to run a combined operation. Normally the C&C helicopter carried a senior Air Cavalryman and an ARVN representative from the ground force responsible for the area. On several occasions, three countries were represented (US, Vietnam and Cambodia), with the Air Cavalryman speaking only English; the ARVN LNO speaking French and English; and a Cambodian LNO who spoke French.

The ARVN LNO provided clearance to fire into an area and prevented the Air Cavalry from firing into friendly positions while troops were in contact. Upon request from the Air Cavalry, the ARVN LNO would call in mortar fire, ARVN artillery, and VNAF air strikes. The ARVN LNO also provided the language bridge between the Air Cavalry and Brown platoon operating on the ground.

The Air Cavalry representative passed the desires of the ground commander to the operating Pink Teams, obtained clearances to fire, and requested/directed USAF strikes into lucrative areas.

Use of Brown Platoons:

The Brown platoons after receiving training in Air Cavalry tactics proved to be very effective in the roles of securing downed aircraft and Eagle Flights. C/1-9 in particular was very successful in picking up many POWs and detainees through the use of Eagle Flights.

After much discussion the ARVN placed Browns OPCON to the Troop and the Troop commander could then make insertions as he saw fit without regard for ARVN unit boundaries. This increased the Air Cavalry's flexibility and allowed the Troop to react to any situation.

Air Cavalry Under Single Commander:

It was found in Vietnam and confirmed in Cambodia that Air Cavalry forces should remain under the control of a single Cavalry commander. In a fast moving and fluid situation the commander must be able to cross attach and reinforce any Troop that has established contact with the enemy. If a Troop is attached, assigned, or placed OPCON to another maneuver element, the Air Cavalry commander has lost his flexibility and capability to develop a situation or influence a course of action.

Conditions which may require cross attachment or reinforcement are excessive battle damage, low maintenance availability, areas of priority, or an enemy contact large enough to be exploited by additional Air Cavalry forces.

Due to the standardized operations of Air Cavalry, cross attachment and reinforcement pose no problems. The commander contacts the Troop and directs it to provide a designated number of teams or type aircraft to another Troop. On several occasions when aircraft were shot down in a location far removed from their organic Blue Platoon, it is faster to have another Troop's Blues secure the aircraft and extract the crew.¹ These rapid cross attachments and reinforcements are possible only when the Troops are under a single commander. If permission had to be obtained from another maneuver element, valuable time would be lost.

Use of Air Cavalry:

Often while working with United States and Vietnamese forces, the ground commander looks upon the Air Cavalry Troop as a solution to his firepower, resupply, and C&C problems. These are not the missions of Air Cavalry. Each platoon of an Air Cavalry Troop contributes to the mission of finding, fixing, and destroying the enemy. The removal of one of these platoons greatly reduces the effectiveness of the entire Troop.

The Air Cavalry commander must resist the efforts of ground commanders to fragment the unit into an odd-job aviation element, and assist in finding the proper request channels for Aviation support.

Arming of Aerial Crews:

The scout observer in the OH-6A, seated in the left front seat, is normally armed with the M-16 rifle. However, its length makes the M-16 rifle cumbersome to use since many times the stock of the weapon bumps the cyclic. In the past, to remedy the situation many observers used the AK-50, which has a metal folding stock. This weapon has a 30-round magazine and can be fired with the stock in the folded position, utilizing the pistol grip and

¹ The original report uses "Blues" in this context. Presumably the same considerations applied to Browns.

hand guard. When it became illegal to use captured weapons, the crews had to revert back to the M-16.

The same problem exists for the Cobra crewmen who seldom carry a weapon other than their sidearm. The M-16 is too long to fit inside the Cobra without interfering with the controls of the aircraft.

The CAR-15 when available was utilized; however, its limited availability resulted in only two or three of these weapons per Air Cavalry Troop. This is an insufficient allocation when one considers the number of people participating in aerial flight in an Air Cavalry Troop. It is recommended that the CAR-15 be made standard issue for Air Cavalry Troops. These weapons are as dependable and durable as the M-16, but because of their telescoping stock and shorter barrel they can be carried and utilized much more effectively.

Light Pink Team:

When scout aircraft are working in areas of heavy foliage or village areas, the enemy is capable of firing from any direction. Scouts were often fired upon from the rear, or the blind side. To remedy this problem, C/1-9 increased the size of the Pink Team to two OH-6As, each with a three-man crew, and one AH-1G. The Cobra and UH-1H (C&C) roles did not change. The two scouts flew much like fire teams do, one slightly behind and to the side of the other. When a target or area of interest was located the two aircraft set up a circle with the aircraft 180 degrees out from each other, or one little bird working over the area while the second aircraft sets up and orbits about the primary aircraft. This method was used by C Troop whenever working a known or suspected hot area. The use of two OH-6As provided additional visual reconnaissance, more firepower, and mutual protection for the scout crews.

The Cambodian campaign proved Air Cavalry can successfully perform all of its missions while supporting non-English-speaking allies and complying with the peculiar rules of engagement imposed by the campaign. It is hoped other units may profit from the experiences and lessons learned by 1-9 Air Cavalry Squadron.

CARL M. PUTNAM
LTC ARMOR
Commanding

INCLOSURES: 1. DAILY OPERATIONAL SUMMARY
 2. MAPS

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Maj. Ronald G. Maxson, US Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky
LTC Carl J. Haaland, 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry, Vietnam

23-24 FEBRUARY 1971²

1. OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

This two-day period was accented by numerous ground-to-air firings and the location of numerous bunker complexes and fighting positions. A/1-9 reported the possibility that its aircraft may have been tracked by enemy radar as they received unexplained beeps on the FM radio. A/1-9 located several trails, bunkers and hootches; these were engaged, resulting in large secondary explosions and small arms ammunition cooking off. B/1-9 discovered several bunker complexes that appeared to have been used by 200 individuals in the last 24 hours. One enemy was KBH. C/1-9 meanwhile was finding numerous hootches and bunkers with hard packed trails and roads. They received small arms fire from several villages but failed to return fire for fear of injuring women and children.

A/3-17 had an AH-1G make a forced landing due to mechanical problems. The crewmen suffered back injuries, and the aircraft was slung to Quan Loi.³ 11 ACT joined the cross-border operations on the 24th of February and began working in the vicinity of the Chup Rubber Plantation.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION:

A/1-9
B/1-9
C/1-9
A/3-17
11 ACT
A/2-20

3. ACTIVITIES STATISTICS:

a. Browns Utilization:		<u>Insertion</u>	<u>Extractions</u>	
		1	1	
b. Aircraft firings:	<u>Hit</u>	<u>No Hit</u>	<u>Crash/Destroyed</u>	
	4	12	0	
c. Totals for the day:	<u>KBH</u>	<u>KBA/S</u>	<u>KBAFA</u>	<u>KBARTY</u>
	18	15	1	0

² Not included in this summary is SP4 Monty Lewis Harbin from Auburn, WA. A scout in A/1-9, Harbin was killed the night before cross-border operations began when a WP grenade he pulled from its container turned out to have no pin installed. The grenade went off and he was killed.

³ VHPA website says A/3-17 had a UH-1H crash on 24 February, killing seven. They were WO1 Thomas Evans Bennett from Boston, MA; WO1 Steven William Goelz of Morton, MN; SP4 Vernon Andrew Green of Muncy, PA; WO1 Clarence Dean Hakes of Isanti, MN; SP5 Craig James Jakel of Eggertsville, NY; SP4 Michael Henry Keys of Manson, WA; and CPT Joseph Michael Wilsher of Edinburg, TX.

25-27 FEBRUARY 1971

1. OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

Activity began to pick up as an ARVN convoy was ambushed by an estimated two companies of NVA. The Air Cavalry as usual had a Troop ready to join the fight, supporting the ARVN with gunships and VR missions.

A/1-9 again located several bunker complexes, and finding the enemy in small groups, engaged them resulting in several KBH. A scout also came upon a stalled enemy 2-1/2 ton truck, which was engaged and destroyed. B/1-9 supported an ambushed ARVN convoy with Pink Teams and four sections of AFA, resulting in 30 KBH and 27 KBAFA. Four ground-to-air firings were reported from the area. General VR around the area proved it to be a training area complete with wooden mock-ups of 122mm rockets and launchers. Also found was a flatbed 3 ton truck, which was destroyed. On 5 March, an ARVN sweep of the area located another 100 NVA bodies which were credited as KBH.

On 26 February, B/1-9 while conducting VR in the general area of the previous day's contact spotted commo wire along a trail, and one enemy was KBH. Further to the south, a Cobra took heavy small arms GAF, and an OH-6A twice took GAF from what appeared to be all directions. Then an OH-6A taking fire from three 51-caliber positions, one 30-caliber machine gun position, and numerous small arms, burst into flames and crashed. From 1445, when the LOH⁴ went down, till 1600 hours, 41 Cobras and 16 LOHs expended in the area, knocking out three 51-caliber positions, several 30-caliber positions and untold numbers of small arms. Aircraft from B and C/1-9, A/3-17, 11 ACT, and A/2-20 supported the mission.

ARVN troops attempting to reach the downed aircraft were only able to come within 200 meters before being taken under extremely heavy fire. After two days of hard contact the ARVN forces were forced to leave the area, never having reached the downed aircraft. The crews' bodies were never recovered.⁵

C/1-9, aside from assisting B Troop, worked their area of operations (AO) also, finding a weapon pit with the weapon in it covered with plastic. The weapon was destroyed and a secondary explosion was

⁴ LOH = light observation helicopter, pronounced "Loach."

⁵ The crew of OH-6A #69-16067 consisted of CPT Jon Edward Swanson of Denver, CO and SSG Larry Gene Harrison of Williamston, NC. Their remains were finally recovered in 2003, and they were buried in a common grave at Arlington National Cemetery. CPT Swanson was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor by President George W. Bush.

observed. C Troop also located three campsites and a docking site, and destroyed four sampans.

A/3-17 was also having success with locating sampans. They observed eight VC in sampans on a river; these were engaged with organic weapons resulting in five sampans destroyed and two damaged. A/3-17 supported an ARVN convoy, which had been ambushed by an estimated platoon-size element equipped with AK-47s and B-40 rockets. A/3-17 was credited with 26 KBH.

In the vicinity of the Chup Rubber, the 11 ACT located an estimated 100 bunkers, some constructed of PSP.⁶ While working this area, they received ground-to-air fire. Engaging the firing positions, they killed 12 NVA.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION: No Change

3. ACTIVITIES STATISTICS:

a. Browns Utilization:		<u>Insertion</u>	<u>Extractions</u>	
		1	1	
b. Aircraft firings:	<u>Hit</u>	<u>No Hit</u>	<u>Crash/Destroyed</u>	
	6	21	1	
c. Totals for the day:	<u>KBH</u>	<u>KBA/S</u>	<u>KBAFA</u>	<u>KBARTY</u>
	245	0	27	0

⁶ PSP = pierced steel planking; used by engineers to construct runways and helipads.

28 FEBRUARY - 5 MARCH

1. OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

During this period the majority of attention was given to A/1-9 and the ARVN task force around Snuol. On 28 February, the ARVN task force requested support for troops in contact five kilometers northwest of Snuol. As A/1-9 entered the area they were taken under heavy ground-to-air fire to include small arms, B-40, 30 caliber, and 51 caliber. The C&C aircraft took six hits while orbiting at 3000 feet. The area was continuously engaged by Pink Teams, AFA, and A/S, silencing three 51-caliber positions and numerous 30-caliber and small arms positions. By the end of the day the ARVN reported more than 40 enemy KBH.

The following day while on VR mission near the contact area, a LOH sighted a 50-caliber pit with the tripod in it. Small arms fire was immediately received and the area was engaged with organics, with undetermined results. Meanwhile another Pink Team destroyed two large hootches, four Lambrettas, two motorcycles, six 100-pound bags of rice, several rolls of concertina wire, an undetermined number of bicycle tires, and 500 gallons of POL.⁷ Three enemy were also engaged, resulting in three KBH.

The ARVN task force reinforced the unit that had made contact, and moved to the east. They failed to sweep the contact area, which contained numerous enemy packs, papers, and weapons to include mortar tubes.

While working for Task Force 333, a Pink Team from B/1-9 encountered three 51-caliber positions, and with the assistance of AFA was able to neutralize the positions. The same day Task Force 333 came under a mortar attack. A Pink Team located three 120-mortar positions, still firing; these were silenced. Another Pink Team located two bunker complexes of 50 and 30 bunkers each. The bunkers were interconnected by commo wire. There were no indications the enemy occupied the area.

C/1-9's area of operations was quiet. Numerous bunkers and hootch areas were located, but few people. C Troop did destroy many of these hootches and bunkers, but little of significance was discovered.

An A/3-17 Pink Team received 30 caliber GAF and engaged with organics, three sections of AFA, and artillery – resulting in nine NVA KBH. On 4 March, while on a convoy escort mission, a 3-17 Pink Team received heavy automatic weapons fire with yellow tracers. The fire was suspected to be 23mm. Nine sections of AFA were sent to the location and received GAF at 3000 feet and 150 knots. The area was engaged and an air strike was requested.

⁷ POL = petroleum, oil, and lubricants

11 ACT spotted one 2-1/2-ton truck, camouflaged, and while engaging this vehicle located a second truck and destroyed both. They were OD in color.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION: No Change

3. ACTIVITIES STATISTICS:

a. Browns Utilization:	<u>Insertion</u>	<u>Extractions</u>		
	0	0		
b. Aircraft firings:	<u>Hit</u>	<u>No Hit</u>	<u>Crash/Destroyed</u>	
	15	46	0	
c. Totals for the day:	<u>KBH</u>	<u>KBA/S</u>	<u>KBAFA</u>	<u>KBARTY</u>
	113	1	26	0

6-9 MARCH

I. OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

This time period was one of relative quiet. The Air Cavalry continued the mission of VR, but the enemy, except when pressed, refused to fight.

A/1-9 was having a good deal of success locating bunker and hootch complexes in the Snuol area. Many times air strikes were called in to destroy the complexes and deny their use to the enemy. While performing VR an OH-6A received 51-caliber fire and crashed into the trees. The crew was extracted with minor cuts and the aircraft was destroyed in place.⁸

B/1-9 was unable to make any significant contact with the enemy; however, the troop soon discovered the enemy was using the Cambodian villages for their rest stops and food procurement. An example of this was when an individual was spotted riding a bicycle that had three boxes strapped to it. The boxes contained an estimated 3,500 rounds of 7.62 ammunition. The individual evaded into a village and was later seen seated at a table with women and children. The Troop did not engage for fear of hitting the civilians. The suspect's complexion was much lighter in color than the Cambodian villagers. These observations of light skinned, military age males with military type haircuts living in villages were to become a daily occurrence.

C/1-9 changed its area of operations on the 7th and began working for the 225th and 46th ARVN Task Forces. The first day in the new area, the Cavalier troops found a classroom area with 10 bleachers-type seats 30 feet long, and six 15x20-foot bunkers. Also in the area was a tent with a table and eating utensils and packs.

A/3-17, also experiencing a lull in the action, was locating numerous bunker complexes and occasional small groups of enemy. These were engaged with organics and air strikes were called in.

11 ACT, meanwhile, was continuing to experience success in locating enemy vehicle, this time finding a 1-1/2-ton, military-type truck, OD in color. The vehicle had been camouflaged, but was destroyed.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION: No Change

⁸ The crew of OH6A # _____ consisted of WO1 Walter Robert Smith, ___ Gaylord Stewart, and _____

3. ACTIVITIES STATISTICS:

a. Browns Utilization:		<u>Insertion</u>	<u>Extraction</u>	
		0	0	
b. Aircraft firings:	<u>Hit</u>	<u>No Hit</u>	<u>Crash/Destroyed</u>	
	1	12	1	
c. Totals for the day:	<u>KBH</u>	<u>KBA/S</u>	<u>KBAFA</u>	<u>KBARTY</u>
	19	4	6	0

10-16 MARCH

I. OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

During this period the majority of significant actions again took place in the Snuol area. A/1-9 had been able to continue to locate large bunker complexes and was receiving sporadic 51-caliber anti-aircraft fire as well as numerous incidents of small arms ground-to-air fire.

On 10 March, an A/1-9 OH-6A was shot down by small arms, 51-caliber and B-40 rocket fire, 24 kilometers north of Snuol. Medevac and the Browns were immediately sent to the area but were forced to return due to intense ground-to-air fire. AFA and three air strikes were utilized and the Browns were then inserted.⁹ They found the aircraft had burned and were able to remove one U.S. KIA. Two flight helmets were found 200 meters from the wreckage of the aircraft. Three days later, the pilot of the aircraft walked into Snuol. The remaining crew member is still missing.¹⁰

On 14 March another A/1-9 OH-6A received heavy ground-to-air fire, crashed and burned. The crew was extracted.¹¹ Prior to being shot down the crew observed one jeep, seven pallets of estimated eight bags of rice each, estimated two-hundred 82mm mortar rounds with several tubes, five 51-caliber machine guns, and 35 pallets with 16 boxes each of undetermined material. The area was engaged with organics, AFA, and air strikes, resulting in 25 NVA KBH.

While being unable to make contact with any large size enemy forces, B/1-9 did locate and destroy numerous bunkers and intercept several small groups of the enemy carrying supplies, and generally disrupted the enemy's lines of communication. C/1-9 had an AH-1G shot down while engaging a bunker complex, killing both crewmen.¹² One NVA had been KBH in the complex by the little bird before the Cobra engaged the area.

A/3-17 had an OH-58A take heavy automatic weapons fire, wounding both the pilot and observer.¹³ The aircraft was safely landed and the crew

⁹ Under the rules in effect at the time, the only US personnel allowed on the ground were maintenance personnel to rig downed aircraft. In this instance, an Alpha Troop staff sergeant, whose name is thought to have been Nelson, spent considerable time on the ground alone with the Browns. OH-6A #67-1642 was not recoverable.

¹⁰ The observer whose remains were recovered was SP4 Robert T. Kiser of West Mifflin, PA. The pilot who walked into Snuol was WO1 Craig Jeffery Houser of ____, IN. The gunner or "torque" who is still MIA was SGT Curtis Richard Smoot of Varnado, LA.

¹¹ Need names

¹² CPT Joel Thomas Hageman of Wichita, KS and 1LT Van John Joyce of Philadelphia, PA were killed in AH-1G #68-15062.

¹³ Need names

extracted. AFA, artillery and air strikes were put into the area, but a BDA was not completed due to heavy ground-to-air fire.

11 ACT was interdicting a good deal of motorcycle and bicycle traffic. They located five enemy walking down a road wearing khaki shirts and dark trousers, and all five had the same type of handkerchief around their necks. These soldiers attempted to evade and were KBH. 11 ACT continued to locate enemy vehicles – this time a 1/4-ton jeep, green in color, was engaged and destroyed.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION: No Change

3. ACTIVITIES STATISTICS:

a. Browns Utilization:		<u>Insertion</u>	<u>Extractions</u>	
		4	4	
b. Aircraft firings:	<u>Hit</u>	<u>No Hit</u>	<u>Crash/Destroyed</u>	
	9	23	3	
c. Totals for the day:	<u>KBH</u>	<u>AFA</u>	<u>A/S</u>	<u>KBARTY</u>
	58	5	3	0

17-20 MARCH

I. OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

During this period the major actions again took place in the Snuol area. The ARVN, when using U.S. helicopters for a combat assault, were forced to use a secondary LZ¹⁴ due to extremely heavy fire. After the insertion one of the choppers was shot down.¹⁵

A/1-9 sent a Pink Team to locate the crew and attempt a rescue. When the aircraft was located, two of the crew were seen standing nearby, but heavy ground-to-air fire prevented the rescue attempt. While flying at 1500 feet above the first ARVN LZ, an Alpha Troop Cobra received intense ground-to-air fire, knocking out the engine. The aircraft was safely autorotated into the LZ and the crew exited the aircraft. The C&C aircraft immediately landed to pick up the crew. As the co-pilot was running to the rescue bird, he was killed. The C&C aircraft was taking heavy fire, with the gunner and co-pilot both being wounded and the pilot receiving shrapnel wounds. When the Cobra pilot reached the aircraft, the pilot of the C&C aircraft elected to leave the LZ. On take-off the co-pilot of the Cobra was seen lying on his back with wounds on the upper part of his chest.¹⁶ The aircraft with extensive battle damage flew to Loc Ninh where the wounded were medevaced.

The ARVN ground commander was unable to secure the downed aircraft but reported the co-pilot KIA. During the night the enemy attacked the ARVN positions capturing the U.S. KIA and five ARVN. The following day seven sections of AFA and 10 VNAF air strikes were put in, but reports from the ground unit said the ARVN were becoming scattered and unorganized. At 1800, all comms with ground units was lost.

The following day Alpha troop attempted to locate separated units and screen the flanks and rear of the withdrawing ARVN forces.

B/1-9, while finding many signs of the enemy, was making few contacts. They were able to locate two 2-1/2-ton trucks, one Land Rover, one 1-1/4 ton-

¹⁴ LZ = landing zone

¹⁵ The downed chopper was UH-1H #69-15664 from the 128th Assault Helicopter Company, 11th Combat Aviation Battalion. The crew consisted of W01 James H. Hestand; CW3 Richard Lee Bauman of Columbus, OH; SSG Craig Mitchell Dix of Livonia, MI; and SSG Bobby Glenn Harris of Mission, TX. Hestand was captured and released to US control after almost two years in captivity on 12 February 1973. Bauman and Dix survived the crash and are listed as MIA. Hestand reported seeing Harris dead outside the aircraft after the crash.

¹⁶ The co-pilot or "Xray" of AH-1G #68-17035 was 1LT Lawrence Eugene Lilly of Los Angeles, CA. Larry is listed as KIA, but his remains have never been recovered. The rescued pilot was CPT David L. "Doc" Schweitzer of _____.

truck, one tractor, two 1/4-ton jeeps and one car, OD in color, with blacked out headlights. The car appeared to be of French make. These vehicles were engaged, rendering them inoperative.

C/1-9 was also having trouble making any large enemy contacts, but did intercept several small groups of enemy carrying supplies on bicycles and motorcycles.

A/3-17 changed areas of operation on the 19th and began working the Fish Hook area. Visual recon here proved the enemy was again using this area for resupply. Twice enemy elements of 20 or more people were located and engaged; however, the dense foliage prevented the aircraft from making accurate damage assessments of the action.

11 ACT located what appeared to be a motor pool area with a 3/4 and a five-ton truck, OD in color, and maintenance equipment in the area. The Blackhorse people also had two LOHs shot down in this period, one of which caught fire and was completely destroyed. The other aircraft was slung out and repaired. In both cases the crews were successfully extracted.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION: No Change

3. ACTIVITY STATISTICS:

a. Browns Utilization:	<u>Insertion</u>	<u>Extractions</u>		
	2	2		
b. Ground to Air Firing:	<u>Hit</u>	<u>No Hit</u>	<u>Crash/Destroyed</u>	
	8	9	2	
c. Totals for the period:	<u>KBH</u>	<u>KBAFA</u>	<u>A/S</u>	<u>KBARTY</u>
	40	40	0	0

21-28 MARCH¹⁷

1. OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

This was a period of relative little ARVN or enemy activity. The Air Cavalry continued to VR extensively and employed artillery and air strikes on several large bunker and hootch complexes.

A/1-9 while on VR spotted a 2-1/2-ton truck, and engaged with organics and AFA, resulting in one truck destroyed, one KBH, and one KBAFA.

On 23 March, an Alpha Troop Cobra, while on approach to Snuol exploded with both crewmen being KIA.¹⁸ An OH-6A following the Cobra's flight path reported 15-20 rounds of small arms fire, but was unable to engage due to the proximity of friendly troops.

B/1-9 located a collection of 15-20 bicycles in a village. Approximately 700 meters from the village were an estimated sixty 55-gallon drums containing an undetermined type of POL. These were engaged and destroyed. Another Pink Team located three 120mm mortar tubes set up and ready for use. While the Cobra engaged the area, he received light GAF resulting in no injuries or damage. On 27 March, B/1-9 withdrew from the Cambodian operations and returned to Bearcat to support the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division.

C/1-9 continued to locate small groups of enemy, and was averaging one ground-to-air fire per day. On one of these occasions the crew chief/gunner received two rounds of AK-47 fire in his breastplate.¹⁹ He continued to fly the mission uninjured.

A/3-17, working the Fishhook and Funnel areas, was locating hootch and bunker complexes such as a 50-hootch complex with numerous campfires still burning. There were several ox carts in the area with clothes, and eating utensils still on the table. Another complex had an estimated one hundred 100-pound bags of rice and numerous hootches, some of which had pictures on the walls. Air strikes and AFA were called upon to engage the areas.

B/3-17 (Stogie) began cross-border operations on 28 March, in the Snuol area with A/1-9 laagering from Tay Ninh and working the Chup Rubber plantation area. The Stogie troop was given a rather rude welcome to the Snuol

¹⁷ Not mentioned in this report because its unit was not involved in cross-border operations is OH-6A #68-17322 from F Troop, 1-9 Cav, which crashed on 24 March. Killed were CW2 Steven Michael Larrabee of Irvine, CA and SP4 William David Smith of Lafayette, LA.

¹⁸ The report says "on approach" to Snuol but "approaching Snuol" is probably more accurate. The crew indicated no intention to land at Snuol and had no reason to unless there was an in-flight emergency, and there were no radio calls to indicate one. Killed when AH-1G #68-15111 blew up were CW2 Paul John Foti of Long Island City, NY and 1LT Donald Keith Osborn of Loveland, CO.

¹⁹ Need name

area by being the recipient of 51-caliber fire the first day in the area. They engaged with organics and AFA, destroying 12 hootches and observing two secondary explosions.

11 ACT continued to find small groups of enemy. They also located several fresh bunkers. At one location they found one 55-gallon drum and a 500-gallon tank. These were engaged and destroyed; it is not known if they contained POL.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION:

- A/1-9
- B/1-9 (Last day 27 March)
- C/1-9
- A/3-17
- B/3-17 (First day 28 March)
- 11 ACT
- A/2-20

3. ACTIVITIES STATISTICS:

a. Brown Utilization:		<u>Insertion</u>		<u>Extractions</u>
		5		5
b. Aircraft firings:	<u>Hit</u>	<u>No Hit</u>		<u>Crash/Destroyed</u>
	5	19		2
c. Totals for the period:	<u>KBH</u>	<u>AFA</u>	<u>A/S</u>	<u>KBARTY</u>
	29	1	6	1

29 MARCH - 3 APRIL

1. OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

During this time very few large enemy contacts were established. Air Cavalry continued to locate and engage small groups of the enemy, and destroyed several bunker and hootch complexes.

A/1-9 was now working the Chup Rubber plantation, laagering at Tay Ninh and operating from Thien Ngon. A Pink Team located a convoy of ten ox carts with 20-30 people wearing black pajamas and green fatigues. The carts were carrying mortar rounds and rice. The little bird took fire and the convoy was engaged with organics and AFA, resulting in eight ox carts destroyed, two damaged, and three NVA KBH. Another estimated 20 individuals were KBH, but due to the dense vegetation the scout was unable to locate them.

C/1-9 again had a crew chief/gunner receive small arms fire in his breastplate, this time receiving shrapnel wounds in the neck, but the bullets did not penetrate the armor.²⁰ Charlie Troop called in air strikes on several areas that appeared to be storage areas for the enemy, destroying several tons of rice.

A/3-17 had two OH-58s receive 51-caliber hits. One aircraft made a precautionary landing and was slung out. The other continued to fly. The source of fire was engaged with undetermined results. The Silver Spur troop also located several large bunker complexes in a two-kilometer area of the Fishhook, to include twenty 4x4 bunkers, forty-five 6x8 bunkers, one hundred 10x20 hootches, twenty 4x8 bunkers, and thirty-five 10x20 hootches. B-52 strikes were requested for the area.

B/3-17 received credit for ten KBH while supporting an ARVN unit in contact. They also located what appeared to be a training area. One 20x30 hootch with 18 benches and a platform was located. There were also several bunkers and tunnel entrances in the area.

11 ACT had a UH-1H receive an estimated 30 rounds of GAF with an undetermined number of hits in the aircraft's fuel cell. The aircraft made a precautionary landing and the crew were extracted. While the Browns and a maintenance crew were en route the enemy mortared the aircraft, followed immediately by a ground attack involving an estimated 250 NVA wearing steel pots and with fixed bayonets. The Pink Team and section of AFA who had been orbiting the downed aircraft engaged and were assisted by aircraft from A and C/1-9 and two more sections of AFA.

²⁰ *Need name*

A/1-9 had a UH-1H receive three hits of 51-caliber and sit down near an ARVN base camp. The bird was slung out without further incident.

A/2-20 had an AH-1G receive an undetermined number of 51-caliber hits, with one crewmember receiving shrapnel wounds in the arm.²¹ This aircraft was landed, crew extracted, and the bird slung out without further incident. An ARVN ground sweep the following day confirmed 137 enemy killed.

F/3-4 joined the cross-border operation 1 April, and worked in support of the 18th ARVN Division, primarily along Highway 7.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION:

A/1-9
C/1-9
A/3-17
B/3-17
11 ACT
F/3-4
A/2-20

3. ACTIVITIES STATISTICS:

a. Brown Utilization:		<u>Insertion</u> 4	<u>Extractions</u> 4
b. Aircraft firings:	<u>Hit</u> 10	<u>No Hit</u> 39	<u>Crash/Destroyed</u> 1
c. Totals for the period:	<u>KBH</u> 103	<u>AFA</u> 50	<u>A/S</u> 19

²¹ Name?

4-10 APRIL

1. OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

During this period, the enemy activity appeared to increase slightly. They were engaged in large groups by both A and B/3-17. C/1-9 also discovered an area of enemy concentration.

A/1-9 was unable to locate any large groups of enemy, but was able to locate two enemy on bicycles, one in black pajamas and the other in green fatigues. Both had packs. The soldiers attempted to evade and were KBH and the bicycles were destroyed.

C/1-9 meanwhile detected a fairly large size unit. They spotted 100-150 enemy soldiers on motorcycles with packs, heading west, but clearance to engage was denied. The following day, approximately 10 kilometers west of where these soldiers had been spotted, C/1-9 had four ground-to-air firings resulting in four U.S. wounded.²² For a three-day period the enemy continued to fight, resulting in more ground-to-air firings. In a 3x1 kilometer area there were nine GAF. Thirty-seven KBH were suffered by the enemy, and 15 motorcycles and 20 bicycles destroyed.

A/3-17, while conducting a BDA of an air strike, reported 50 enemy KBA/S and numerous bunkers, hootches, and fighting positions destroyed. Two enemy were spotted attempting to set up a 30-caliber machinegun. They were engaged and KBH. Artillery was then adjusted into the area.

B/3-17 had very good results in respect to enemy losses during this period. On 5 April, in response to ARVN troops in contact, B/3-17, A/3-17 and AFA were called in to assist. The ARVN later reported 213 enemy KIA and credited 30 KBH to B/3-17, 10 KBH to A/3-17, and 30 KBAFA to A/2-20. On the 6th of April, B/3-17 engaged a suspected enemy location and an ARVN sweep later confirmed an additional 30 KBH, with three AK-47s, three field glasses, 10 B-40 rockets, and 10 hand grenades captured.

11 ACT engaged two NVA wearing green fatigues in the Chup Rubber Plantation, resulting in two KBH. The following day they spotted a bicycle with a pack attached to it. They engaged and received a secondary explosion. Later they located another bicycle with a mortar tube strapped to it. This was engaged and destroyed.

²² The VHPA website indicates Charlie Troop's SP5 Alton Reese Roberts of Gastonia, NC was killed in an incident on 13 April. The Virtual Wall website says he perished in Vietnam, not Cambodia. *Need to verify; also need names of wounded.*

F/3-4, while on a VR mission, had an OH-6A receive an estimated 10 rounds of ground-to-air fire, resulting in hits in the bottom of the aircraft and the main rotor system. The aircraft was flown to Katum. The area was engaged and the Browns inserted, resulting in three KBH, and two AK-47s and one machinegun captured.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION: No Change

3. ACTIVITIES STATISTICS:

a. Brown Utilization:		<u>Insertion</u>	<u>Extractions</u>
		4	4
b. Aircraft firings:	<u>Hit</u>	<u>No Hit</u>	<u>Crash/Destroyed</u>
	12	15	0
c. Totals for the period:	<u>KBH</u>	<u>AFA</u>	<u>A/S</u>
	131	30	50

11-30 APRIL

I. OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

This period was characterized by continued scattered engagements and interdiction of enemy supply lines. No major engagements resulted, but numerous small contacts were developed by the Air Cavalry Troops.

Activity continued to be light in the area of operation assigned to A/1-9. Several ground-to-air fire incidents occurred with one aircraft being totally destroyed, although no injuries to the crew resulted.²³ Two motorcycles were also destroyed.

C/1-9 was involved in a more productive area of operation and continued to find the enemy in small groups, often transporting supplies or equipment. These various contacts resulted in 55 enemy KBH by the Cavalry troopers in the area south and west of the "Dog's Head." Enemy ground-to-air fire was also encountered with regularity, but resulted in only occasional minor damage to Charlie Troop aircraft.

Still operating in the Snuol area, A/3-17 recorded 21 enemy KBH. Many bunker complexes were also discovered in the area. Most of the enemy encountered in the area were identified as NVA, being well equipped with uniforms, weapons, and food.

A BDA of artillery by A/3-17 on 12 April revealed 10 bunkers and five hootches destroyed. An air strike in the same area destroyed 25 more bunkers and 21 hootches, with one VC killed by the air strike.

One hundred buffalo were observed by B/3-17 on 14 April. The animals showed pack strap marks and were engaged. Thirty-five of these animals were killed. Five enemy soldiers also fell to the guns of B/3-17 in this period of operation. Numerous bunkers, hootches, and rice caches were also engaged and destroyed. Nine times B/3-17 aircraft attracted fire from enemy gunners, resulting in two U.S. personnel being wounded and one aircraft destroyed.²⁴

F/3-4 destroyed one 3/4-ton truck and killed five enemy soldiers. There were also three instances of ground-to-air fire with one U.S. killed and one wounded.²⁵

²³ Need tail number, names of crew.

²⁴ Need tail number, names of wounded.

²⁵ Killed was SP4 Kenneth Wayne Shamblin of Sissonville, WV. Need name of WIA.

One mortar tube and one 75mm recoilless rifle were destroyed by 11 ACT, and three enemy were KBH in scattered engagements. 11 ACT aircraft received enemy ground-to-air fire in 13 cases, resulting in four hits.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION: No Change

3. ACTIVITIES STATISTICS:

a. Brown Utilization:		<u>Insertion</u>		<u>Extractions</u>	
		4		4	
b. Aircraft firings:	<u>Hit</u>		<u>No Hit</u>		<u>Crash/Destroyed</u>
	16		44		3
c. Totals for the day:	<u>KBH</u>		<u>KBA/S</u>	<u>KBAFA</u>	<u>KBARTY</u>
	117		3	0	0

1-19 MAY

1. OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

Activity continued to be scattered in the area of operations assigned to A/1-9. Only five instances of ground-to-air fire were reported, but one of these resulted in three U.S personnel killed and the aircraft destroyed.²⁶ This occurred on 7 May. A significant contact of the period occurred on 3 May, when an Alpha Troop scout spotted eight individuals wearing brown shorts and pants. Also six APCs,²⁷ one motorcycle with sidecars, three 3/4-ton trucks, one 2-1/2 ton mess truck with a thatched roof, and one serving line with chow were observed. Alpha Troop engaged the area with organics resulting in two KBH and destroying one 2-1/2-ton truck and one motorcycle. An air strike was also placed into the area. Two other enemy were engaged in the area and KBH. On 5 May another four NVA were KBH when observed in an area containing buildings, bunkers, and food and other supplies.

On several occasions NVA in the area were observed and engaged while transporting supplies by motorcycle and bicycle. On 18 May 30 bicycles with packs were observed. The scout received AK-47 fire and engaged the area with results of six NVA KBH and 30 bicycles destroyed.

Charlie Troop also continued to encounter enemy supply movement via motorcycle and bicycle. On 4 May, C/1-9 accounted for 15 KBH and destroyed several weapons when the area around a bunker and hootch complex was exploited. On 5 May, eight Viet Cong wearing black pajamas with two AK-47s were observed. Thirty bicycles were also in the area. The five enemy were KBH and 30 bicycles were destroyed.

The Brown platoon of Charlie Troop was inserted several times for general recon with results on three occasions and a total of nine detainees being held. On 13 May the Browns were inserted to secure two POWs.

The engagements in which Charlie Troop was involved resulted in 82 enemy KBH, in the period. Characteristic of these actions is an event of 19 May, in which five enemy individuals wearing green fatigues, equipped with

²⁶ Lost with OH-6A #67-16679 were 1LT Frank Walter Bengtson of Millbury, MA; WO1 David Paul Meyer of Collinsville, IL; and SP4 Larry Wayne Rothel of Granbury, TX.

²⁷ APC ordinarily stands for Armored Personnel Carrier, but if that's what Alpha troop spotted and engaged, the incident should have been featured more prominently than it was in the report. *More investigation needed.*

packs and carrying AK-47s, were engaged with organics. Five enemy were KBH, with the weapons and packs being destroyed.

F/3-4 on 10 May inserted their Brown platoon in an area which yielded the capture of two packs containing documents, one AK-47 magazine, two bags of TNT, and one entrenching tool. An undetermined number of individuals were spotted moving but no contact was made. The documents revealed the unit as NVA C-54 with 50 men assigned, 14 men absent, and 18 men present for duty. There were also numerous diaries and 80 kilos of rice. The Brown platoon was inserted on five other occasions, but without significant findings. In scattered engagements, five KBHs were added to the Troop's total.

A/3-17 reported very little contact with the enemy in its area of operation. During the entire period, three instances of ground-to-air fire were reported with negative hits or injuries resulting to Silver Spur aircraft. Bunker and hootch complexes continued to be found and destroyed, but few enemy personnel were observed.

On 4 May, 80 water buffalo showing pack strap marks were discovered by B/3-17. The herd was engaged, resulting in 22 water buffalo killed. An area showing use by approximately 40 enemy was observed on 13 May. The area was engaged, with six KBH. Six trucks were discovered by visual reconnaissance on 17 May and were partially destroyed by the Stogie organization. On seven occasions, ground-to-air fire was received but no hits were sustained by B/3-17 aircraft. The troop also had a total of seven enemy KBH resulting from its engagements in its AO.

On 14 May, 11 ACT spotted 50 individuals riding on eight ox carts. The AH-1G while flying at 2000 feet and 120 knots received 50 rounds of AK-47 fire from the carts. The aircraft received no hits and no engagement was made as the LNO identified the people as friendly and did not give clearance to fire. Only two other ground-to-air fire engagements occurred, both with negative damage to 11 ACT aircraft.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION: No Change

3. ACTIVITIES STATISTICS:

a. Brown Utilization:		<u>Insertion</u>	<u>Extractions</u>
		14	14
b. Aircraft firings:	<u>Hit</u>	<u>No Hit</u>	<u>Crash/Destroyed</u>
	4	23	1
c. Totals for the period:	<u>KBH</u>	<u>KBAFA</u>	<u>KBA/S</u>
	129	1	5

RESULTS OF AIR CAVALRY
OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA²⁸

108	TONS OF RICE								
1429	STRUCTURES DESTROYED								
22	TRUCKS DESTROYED								
342	BICYCLES DESTROYED								
54	MOTORCYCLES DESTROYED								
130	SAMPANS DESTROYED								
94	WEAPONS DESTROYED								
27	WEAPONS CAPTURED								
	US KBH	US KIA	US MIA	US WIA	A/C HIT GAF	A/C SHOT DOWN	A/C RECOVERED	A/C DEST	
A/1-9	284	7	1	10	19	7	0	7	
B/1-9	349	2	0	0	9	3	2	1	
C/1-9	252	3	0	87	27	14	12	2	
A/3-17	149	8	0	6	14	8	6	2	
B/3-17	94	0	0	2	6	1	0	1	
11 ACT	146	0	0	5	13	3	1	0	
F/3-4	19	1	0	1	3	0	0	0	
A/2-20	330	4	0	1	3	1	1	0	
OTHER	0	4	0	0	1	1	0	1	
	1613	25	1	33	95	38	22	16	

²⁸ The casualty figures in the table need further investigation. The table says A/3-17 lost eight KIAs, for example, but other databases provide only seven names. Similarly, the table says A/2-20 AFA had four KIAs, but no "Blue Max" losses are mentioned in the report and the VHPA website does not show any A/2-20 losses during the period of the campaign. Finally, the table lists four "Other" KIAs but only the three from the 128th Assault Helicopter Company UH-1H on 17 March are accounted for.

CAMPAIGN MAPS

The original after action report prepared by the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry included six maps, labeled as follows:

1. ARVN Concept of Operations 22 Feb
2. Disposition of Air Cav 21 Feb
3. Disposition of Air Cav 22 Feb
4. Disposition of Air Cav 24 Feb 71
5. Disposition of Air Cav 23 March
6. Disposition of Air Cav 1 April

The maps were drawn and colored by hand and are too faded to be scanned. Until they can be reproduced, the attached map of Cambodia will have to suffice.

INCLOSURE 2

