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Authority NND 927622

By MW NARA Date 12/14/83

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
 HEADQUARTERS, 3D BRIGADE (SEPARATE)  
 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)  
 APO San Francisco 96490

AVDABD-0

10 April 1971

SUBJECT: Operations Report for Period 1 Nov 70 - 10 Apr 71

Commanding General  
 Hq, 1st Cav Div (AM)  
 ATTN: AVDAGT-DT  
 APO US Forces 96490

## SECTION I: Operations Report.

## 1. (C) Task Organization:

## a. OPCON Units:

- (1) 1-5 Cav (7 Dec 70 - 19 Mar 71)
- (2) 2-5 Cav (1 Nov 70 - 10 Apr 71)
- (3) 1-7 Cav (24 Mar 71 - 10 Apr 71)
- (4) 2-8 Cav (1 Nov 70 - 10 Apr 71)
- (5) 2-11 ACR (1 Nov 70 - 10 Apr 71)
- (6) 1-12 Cav (24 Mar 71 - 10 Apr 71)
- (7) 2-12 Cav (24 Mar 71 - 27 Mar 71)
- (8) D/1-9 Cav (1 Nov 70 - 31 Dec 70)
- (9) D/3-17 Cav (31 Dec '70 - 7 Feb 71)

## b. Supporting Units:

- (1) 1-21 ARTY (DS)
- (2) C/1-30 ARTY (GSR)
- (3) A, C/2-19 ARTY (DS)
- (4) C/2-20 AFA (DS)
- (5) C/8th ENG (DS)
- (6) C/15 MED (DS)
- (7) 371st RRW (DS)
- (8) 3 FSSE (DS)
- (9) B/1-9 Cav (GS)
- (10) F/1-9 Cav (GS)
- (11) F/3-17 Cav (GS)
- (12) 13th Signal Det (DS)
- (13) 191st MI Det (DS)

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2. Mission: During the reporting period, the missions for 3d Brigade were many, with the primary mission being destruction of the 350 NVA Regiment. Other major missions included targeting HQ, SR-7 and enemy local force elements within the AO. On 24 March, as the 1st Brigade, 140D, completed standdown, the 3d Brigade assumed the additional missions of targeting HQ, SR-5, and the 81st Rear Service Group in War Zone "D". Also, on 24 March, the responsibility for defense of Camp Gorvad was assigned to 3d Brigade.

3. Execution: During the reporting period, operations can best be separated into two periods. The first being from 7 November 1970 to 24 March 1971 when the 3d Brigade operated primarily in Binh Tuy Province with three airmobile battalions and one armored cavalry squadron. The second period being from 24 March 1971 to 10 April 1971 when the Brigade assumed OPCON of three additional airmobile battalions and the responsibility for the old 1st Brigade and the Camp Gorvad AO's.

a. Period I (1 November 1970 - 24 March 1971):

(1) During this period of almost five months, the 3d Brigade operated in virtually all areas of the assigned AO, with the exception of the Northeastern section and the extreme Southwestern section of the AO. Operations were conducted utilizing the 1-5 Cav, 2-5 Cav, 2-7 Cav and 2-11 AGR, as principle maneuver elements. During all operations, emphasis was placed on small unit tactics, with individual companies breaking down to platoon, squad and sometimes half-squad size units. The enemy continued to travel in 02-05 man elements and continued to avoid contact with U.S. units. Activity remained light, with only a few exceptions, during the entire reporting period.

(2) There were many different types of operations conducted during the reporting period. These varied from widely separated ground reconnaissance by individual battalion to concentrated efforts by all four battalions massing in one area. One significant operation was called the "Rice Denial Program". Beginning in late November, two battalions, the 1-5 Cav and 2-5 Cav, were employed in the area of the Vo Dat - Tanh Linh "Rice Bowl". The U.S. units operated on the fringes of the "Rice Bowl" and RF-PF Units operated within the "Rice Bowl" itself. The objective was to deny the rice produced in the "Rice Bowl" to the enemy. In the past this area had been an extremely good source of food. However, the success of the "Rice Denial Program" was unquestioned. The enemy managed to take some rice out of the area, but for the first time in many years, the villagers in the "Rice Bowl" area had sufficient food for themselves and had excess rice to sell in Saigon.

b. Period II (24 March 1971 - 10 April 1971):

(1) With the standdown of the 1st Brigade, more responsibility fell to the 3d Brigade. On 24 March, the 1-7 Cav, 1-12 Cav, and the 2-12 Cav were placed OPCON to 3d Brigade. Concurrently with the addition of these battalions to the Task Organization, the 3d Brigade assumed the 1st Brigade's former AO, thereby increasing the 3d Brigade's AO to include virtually all of Long Khanh Province in addition to Binh Tuy Province.

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(2) There was no significant change in operations with the assumption of control over the new units and areas. The 2-12 Cav and 2-11 Cav continued operations in southern War Zone III, and the 2-8 Cav, 2-10 Cav and 2-11 ACR continued operations in Binh Tay Province. The 1-6 Cav began standdown on 19 March and was passed CFCOF from II Brigade at that time. On 27 March 1971, the 2-12 Cav began standdown operations, including the Task Organization to four airmobile battalions and one armored cavalry squadron. On 10 April 1971, the 2d Brigade was redesignated as a separate brigade and passed CFCOF to II Field Force.

#### 4. General:

a. Vietnamization Program: Throughout all operations during the reporting period, emphasis was increasingly placed on the Vietnamization Program. Combined and coordinated operations were conducted periodically with the GVN Forces. Training programs were conducted by both GAT-MIT teams and line companies. Response by the GVN Forces showed that they were becoming increasingly capable of conducting their own operations.

b. Population/Resources Controls: Continued emphasis was placed on this program in an effort to disrupt and disorganize the Shadow Supply System, operating primarily along Route QL #1. Mobile checkpoints and Eagle Flights were the primary means of checking the daily traffic on QL #1 in an effort to curtail enemy transshipment of supplies. No definite success can be claimed in this program, but it is felt that the Shadow Supply System was hampered by this operation.

#### 5. Significant Activities:

##### a. November:

(1) On 1 November, the 2-5 Cav closed FSB ~~Chiyue~~<sup>Ingalls</sup> and began construction of FSB Cheyenne (YB26536). The 2-5 Cav began operations in the northern portion of the Brigade AO. The period 1-6 November was one of negligible activity. At 051530/AM 767475, B/1-9 Cav observed and engaged 03 individuals while on VR resulting in 03 enemy KBH. While conducting VR in the same area on 6 November, B/1-9 Cav received ground-air fire at 061205/AM 767472 and a LCH received 01 hit requiring a forced landing. Negative friendly casualties. Another LCH at 061615/ZT 141560 received 08 rounds of S/A fire with negative hits. Area was engaged with negative enemy assessment.

(2) A total of four significant events were reported during the period 7-8 November. At 071215/YT 659032 F Troop/2-11 ACR reported an automatic ambush detonation resulting in 03 VC KIA and 01 AK-47 CBA. On VR, B/1-9 Cav observed and engaged 02 individuals near a bunker complex resulting in 02 VC/NVA KBH. There were also two instances of ground-air fire reported, resulting in negative hits. Areas were engaged with negative results.

(3) The period 9-13 November was one of very light activity. At 091500/YT 656025 F Troop/2-11 ACR reported an automatic ambush detonation resulting in 02 VC KBH. At 101350/YT 117462 while on VR, B/1-9 Cav observed and engaged 01 individual resulting in 01 KBH.

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(4) The period 14-15 November was one of light activity. On 14 November a series of automatic ambushes reported by F Troop/2-11 ACR detonated resulting in 05 VC KIA. At 150500/VT 850003 B/1-9 Cav observed and engaged 01 individual resulting in 01 VC KIA.

(5) At 161144/VT 850003 B/1-9 Cav observed and engaged 01 individual resulting in 01 NVA KIA. An automatic ambush detonation was reported by F Troop/2-11 ACR resulting in 01 VC KIA.

(6) The period 17-18 November was one of light contact. At 171445/VT 674947 LRF Team 75 observed and engaged 01 individual resulting in 01 VC KIA. At 181120/VT 746122 D/2-8 Cav observed and engaged 05-06 individuals. Enemy returned fire with 10-15 rounds AK-47 fire resulting in 01 US KIA. Negative enemy assessment. At 181545/VT 675041 F Troop/2-11 ACR reported 05 VC KIA's resulting from an automatic ambush detonation.

(7) The period 19-27 November was one of very light activity with a total of 10 fleeting contacts with 01-03 individuals resulting in negative friendly casualties and 01 AK-47 KIA. Two instances of ground-air fire were reported resulting in light damage to a LOH from B/1-9 Cav. Negative friendly casualties. On 21 November, 2-5 Cav conducted retrograde of FSB Cheyenne and opened FSB Peggy, vicinity XT860330, beginning operations in the northern "Rice Bowl".

(8) On 28 November, activity increased somewhat. At 280930/VT 768224 C/2-5 Cav made contact with 03 individuals. While sweeping the area, C Company received heavy small arms and B-40 fire. Artillery, AFA and air strikes supported the contact. Results: 03 NVA KIA/03 US KIA. While supporting the contact, a B/3-17 LOH received ground-air fire on two occasions resulting in minor damage to the aircraft. The 2-5 Cav command and control helicopter also received ground-air fire resulting in 01 US KIA.

(9) At approximately 291550, the 3d Brigade LNO at Ham Tan reported that an RF convoy had been ambushed at ZS068849. 3d Brigade supported the contact with AFA and pink teams. During the contact with an estimated NVA Company the supporting aircraft of C/2-20 AFA and B/3-17 Cav received ground-air fire on five occasions, one of which was .51 cal. Results of the contact were 08 NVA KIA and minor damage to a LOH from B/3-17 Cav.

(10) At 301530/VT 752078 D/2-8 Cav observed and engaged 03 individuals resulting in 01 VC KIA/POW.

b. December:

(1) The period 1-5 December was one of light activity, characterized by seven fleeting contacts with 01-03 individuals. There was no enemy assessment from the contacts and 01 US was slightly wounded. A ground-air fire at 041530/VT 764425 resulted in one US KIA and light damage to the aircraft. At 051130/VT 655032, an M-551 from F Troop/2-11 ACR detonated an anti-tank mine resulting in severe damage to the M-551 and one US KIA.

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(2) At 061000/VT 02000, FSB Mace moved into a bunker complex and began receiving heavy mortar fire. The 27th Reconnaissance Rifle Platoon (Blues) was inserted in support of FSB Mace. Hostile activity continued until approximately 0700 hours, resulting in 03 VC KIA, 02 VC WIA, and 01 VC MIA. At 061000/VT 021447, A/2-8 Cav spotted and engaged 02 individuals resulting in 02 VC KIA.

(3) On 7 December, the 3d Brigade concluded operations in AC Chief and passed OPCCN to 3d Brigade at 1700 hours. The 1-5 Cav opened FSB Apache (YT730245) in conjunction with the 3d Brigade's "Rice Funeral Operation". At 070930/VT 891201, an RPG from G Troop/7-41 AOB detonated a mine resulting in 04 US KIA and loss of the vehicle. Also, there were 02 incidents of ground-air fire during the day with negative damage to the aircraft involved.

(4) The period 8-10 December was one of light activity. There were a total of five ground contacts with 01-03 individuals resulting in 03 VC KIA and negative friendly casualties. At 082310, the radio relay station on Fui Chue Chen received 01 round of mortar fire resulting in 01 US KIA. On 10 December, B/1-8 Cav sightings resulted in 02 enemy FBU at 09035500.

(5) The period 11-15 December was one of negligible ground activity with only two ground contacts occurring. One US KIA resulted from these contacts. There was a significant increase in ground-air firing incidents. A total of six occurred during this period resulting in 02 VC KIA and 01 US combat loss. Enemy firing sites were engaged with negative assessment.


(6) Activity was light during the period 16-20 December with three fleeting contacts reported. There were negative injuries and negative enemy assessment resulting from the contacts. On 192135, FSB Mace received 06X60mm mortar rounds impacting inside the perimeter. At 192225, an additional 60mm mortar round impacted at FSB Mace. Suspected enemy firing sites were engaged with counter-mortar fire, AFA, and Nighthawk. Negative damage or friendly casualties resulted from the standoff attacks. On 201220/VT 784049 C/2-8 Cav was engaged by a possible command detonated mine resulting in 05 US KIA.

(7) Light activity continued during the period 21-24 December. On 211445/VT 616250, LRP Team 42 engaged 02 VC resulting in 02 VC KIA. At 221550/VT 799245, B/1-5 Cav was engaged by an USEF. Friendlies returned fire and AFA and pink team supported. Results: Enemy - Unknown; US - 01 KIA, 02 WIA. Two other light contacts and two ground-air fires were reported with negative friendly casualties and negative enemy assessment.

(8) On 24 December at 1745 hours, the 3d Brigade began the observance of the 1970 Christmas Truce. No hostile activity marred the truce and elements of the 3d Brigade spent Christmas day in stationary positions. At 1800 hours, 25 December, combat operations were resumed.

(9) Only two ground contacts were reported during the remainder of December, resulting in 01 VC KIA and negative friendly casualties. Two automatic ambushes employed by A/2-8 Cav detonated on 28 and 29 December, accounting for 08 VC KIA and 04 enemy weapons captured. At 1755 hours on 31 December, 3d Brigade ceased combat operations in observance of the New Year's Truce.

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of January:

(1) New Year's Day operations were conducted on the part of 2d Brigade. The main activities of 2d Brigade in January and preparations were made to support the operation of 2d Brigade in support of operation against HQ, MR-7 on the part of the bridge. A contact in the area east of FSB Macap, but contact was made relatively light and occurred on 1-10 January. On 2 January, 1st/2d Cav engaged 07 VC individuals resulting in 01 NVA KIA. One VC was wounded during the contact. Also on 2 January, 1st/2d Cav was engaged by an USEP utilizing B-40 and AK-47 fire. AAA and Artillery supported the contact. The contact resulted in 02 US WIA and 01 US KIA with negative enemy assessment. On 5 January, in order to support the operation in progress, the 1-5 Cav opened mini-FSB Trap. At 06055/YT 795009, 2B/2-8 Cav engaged 02 individuals resulting in 01 VC KIA. At 091442/YT 720083, D/2-5 Cav was engaged by an USEP resulting in 04 US WIA and negative enemy assessment.

(2) There was negative contact on 11 and 12 January and only one contact reported on 13 January. D/2-8 Cav observed and engaged 06 individuals resulting in 01 enemy KIA. A total of four contacts were reported on 14 January. These contacts were fleeting engagements and there was negative enemy assessment. Two US were WIA. Also on 14 January, mini-FSB Trap was closed and the 1-5 Cav reconstituted at FSB Apache.

(3) The period 15-22 January was one of light contact. B/1-5 Cav made contact with 06-08 individuals at 160905/YT 769267. The enemy was in a bunker complex and pink team and Artillery supported. There was negative enemy assessment and 03 US WIA. At 161523, ~~2B~~B/1-5 was sweeping the contact area, they were again engaged by the enemy resulting in 01 US KIA. Negative enemy assessment. At 182155/ZS 025782, 2C/2-8 Cav and the 15th and 8th PF Platoons from Binh Tuy Province, while on a combined operation, observed and engaged 08 VC, resulting in 01 VC KIA and negative friendly casualties. Four other light contacts were reported during this period with negative results.

(4) At 231110/YT 777289, 2B/1-5 Cav engaged 05 individuals resulting in 01 NVA KIA. During the period 24-28 January, most activity resulted from B/1-9 Cav operations. On 24 January, visual sightings by a pink team resulted in 03 VC KBH. Also on 24 January, ground sightings by the B/1-9 Blues resulted in 02 VC KIA. On 28 January, a visual sighting by B/1-9 Cav resulted in 01 enemy KBH. The B/1-9 Cav Blues were inserted on the sighting and made contact with an USEP resulting in 01 US WIA and 01 US KIA.

(5) Due to intelligence data obtained during January, the 2-8 Cav was displaced from FSB Silver on 28 January and established FSB Fontaine in order to support an operation against HQ, MR-7 on the Nui Be complex.

(6) The period 29-31 January was characterized by continued light activity. On 29 January, the 1-5 Cav shifted its operations to the area north of the Vo Dat "Rice Bowl" and established mini-FSB Claire (YT820455). FSB Apache continued to be maintained by the 1-5 Cav. At 301134/YS 829939, G Troop/2-11 ACR made contact with 02 individuals resulting in 01 VC KIA. 4C/2-8 Cav received

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sniper fire at 310900/YS 850907 resulting in 01 US WIA. Friendly element returned fire with negative results. Also on 31 January, an automatic ambush established by F Troop/2-11 ACR detonated at YS 914912 resulting in 01 VC KIA.

d. February:

(1) On 1 February, the 2-5 Cav conducted retrograde operations at FSB Peggy and began construction at FSB Sandra (ZT096195) in support of an operation begun against HQ and 1st Bn, 33d NVA Regiment.

(2) Light activity continued during the period 2-5 February. At 020935/YS 860917, 2D/2-8 Cav engaged 02 individuals resulting in 01 VC KIA and 01 US WIA. Also on 2 February, FSB Sandra received 14-20 rounds of 81mm mortar fire at 0645 hours. All rounds impacted outside the perimeter and caused no damage. At 041330/ZT 176175, the B/1-9 Cav Blues engaged an USFF resulting in 02 VC KIA and 01 VC POW (WIA). Two other light contacts were reported during this period with negative results.

(3) A significant contact took place on 6 February. 1A/2-5 Cav at 0849 hours moved into a bunker complex and observed 02-03 individuals. Contact was initiated and the enemy returned fire with small arms. At 1130 hours, 1A again reconned by fire and received small arms and 03 B-40 rockets in return. Contact was broken and was reinitiated at 1440 hours when the friendly element again reconned the area by fire and again received small arms and B-40 fire in return. The contact was supported by air strikes, pink team, AFA and Arty. Results: Enemy - 05 VC KIA; Friendly - 03 US WIA.

(4) Another significant contact took place on 7 February. At 070930/YS 796902, 2B/2-8 Cav found an enemy commo wire and began following the wire to the south. Recon by fire was conducted with negative return fire. At 1005 hours 2B triggered an enemy booby trap resulting in 03 US WIA. Also at this time the unit received a light volume of small arms fire. As the platoon began maneuvering towards the enemy, it began receiving a heavy volume of small arms, automatic weapons, and B-40 fire. Contact continued throughout the day although the intensity lessened to sporadic fire shortly after the initial period of contact. AFA, Arty, pink teams, air strikes and Medivac supported the contact. Results: Enemy - Unknown; Friendly - 06 US KIA, 08 US WIA.

(5) Activity in the AO decreased considerably during the period 8-13 February. A total of six minor contacts were reported with only one yielding any significant results. E RCN/2-5 Cav engaged one individual resulting in 01 NVA KIA. FSB Fontaine received 02 standoff attacks during this period. At 082330, 03 rounds of enemy launched 105mm rounds were received causing 04 US wounded. The second attack was received at 102236 when 04 rounds of enemy launched 155mm rounds were reported, causing negative casualties or damage.

(6) Light activity continued from 14-17 February. On 14 February, the 1-5 Cav conducted retrograde of mini-FSB Claire and reconsolidated the CP at FSB Apache. A/2-8 Cav at 140912/YS 820927, received 20-30 rounds of sniper fire resulting in 02 US WIA. Suspected area was engaged with negative results. At 150835/ZT 065311, 2A/2-5 Cav observed 06-07 individuals and engaged with organics, resulting in 01 NVA KIA. E RCN/2-5 Cav engaged 02 individuals at 171630/ZT 014144, resulting in 01 NVA KIA.

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(7) **Ground activity** during the period 18-23 February centered in the 2-8 Cav's AO. At 182050 hours, FSB Fontaine received 06760mm mortar rounds, 05 impacting within the perimeter and 01 impacting without detonating. Five US were wounded in the attack. Counter-mortar fire, AFA, and HighBark reacted to the attack. At 191012/YS 828922, E RON/2-8 Cav engaged 05 individuals resulting in 01 NVA KIA. Enemy KIA was later identified as an NVA Captain. There were negative friendly losses. E RON/2-8 Cav at 201016/YS 830932 was engaged by an enemy utilizing small arms and D-40 rockets, resulting in 01 US KIA and 03 US MIA. Friendlies returned fire with negative results. Two other contacts were reported in the 2-8 Cav's AO with negative significant results. Also during this time period, the 1-5 Cav opened with FSB Cheryl (N1861173) to support operations against the 26 In, 33d FIA Regiment.

(8) The remainder of February was extremely quiet with only two contacts reported. There were negative significant results from either contact.


e. March:

(1) The bulk of activity that began in late February continued in early March. During the period 1-3 March, only one significant contact occurred. At 051445/YS 845925, E RON/2-8 Cav engaged and engaged 10 individuals in a bunker complex. The enemy returned fire with small arms. Contact broke almost immediately, but was re-established sporadically until 0600 hours. The 2-8 Cav's command and control helicopter reported fire and was shot down in the contact area and had to make an emergency landing at 0700 hours. Negative friendly losses. A DDP from E/1-9 Cav also received a mortar round while supporting the contact and made a forced landing at 0600 hours. Friendly fire killed the command was supported by AFA, Arty, pink team, and High BARK's. Results: Enemy - Unknown; Friendly - 01 KCS KIA, 02 US MIA.

(2) At 0600 hours, the 1-5 Cav began preparations for an operation south of FSB Mac. At 0600 hours, the 1-5 Cav engaged and engaged 10 individuals at 060045/YS 845923 resulting in 01 NVA KIA and negative friendly casualties. On 11 March, the 1-5 Cav closed the operation and returned to the 1-5 Cav's AO. On 13 March at 0700 hours/YS 845924, E RON/2-8 Cav engaged 10 individuals resulting in 01 US KIA.

(3) During the period 12-17 March, one minor contact and two significant contacts were reported. At 141210/YS 845924, E RON/2-8 Cav received small arms fire while in a fox posture, resulting in 01 US KIA. At 151548/YS 635940, engaged 02 individuals in a bunker complex. Received return fire from 10-12 enemy utilizing light arms, small arms and B-40 fire. AFA, arty, pink team and air strikes supported the contact. Results: Enemy - Unknown; Friendly - 02 US KIA. At 160725/YS 845925, LRP Team 22 engaged 04 individuals with claymores and small arms resulting in 01 NVA KIA's. While searching the bodies, the team received small arms fire from 03 individuals. Contact broke at 0830 hours and the LRP team was extracted at 1145 hours with negative casualties. Pink team and E/1-9 Cav Bunk supported the contact. Negative enemy assessment.





(4) The period 18-22 March showed a marked increase in enemy activity. On 18 March, a total of five ground contacts occurred. E 500(4)/1-5 Cav engaged 02-03 individuals at 181200/YS 842907 resulting in 01 VC KIA, A 181500/YS 842961, 2g/2-11 ACR engaged 02 individuals resulting in 01 VC KIA. There were negative results from the other three contacts. Four contacts were reported on 19 March resulting in 02 VC KIA by 3B/2-8 Cav at YS 848930 and 01 VC KIA by 2G/2-11 ACR at YS 843957. Also on 19 March, the 1-5 Cav ceased combat operations in SVN and began standdown at Bien Hoa. The unit was released OPCON from 3d Brigade at 191530 hours.

(5) On 20 March there were three instances of ground-air fire that resulted in negative damage or casualties. Three ground contacts were reported on 21 March resulting in 01 VC KIA by 2E/2-11 ACR at YS 867964, 02 VC KIA and 01 VC POW by the 513 RF Company, OPCON to the 2-8 Cav and 02 US from 2D/2-5 Cav were WIA in a contact at ZT 021173.

(6) Activity again became light during the period 23-25 March. At 241100/YT 836066, a LCH from F/1-9 Cav received ground-air fire, receiving an unknown number of hits to the aircraft. The aircraft lost directional control and crashed resulting in 02 US KIA and 01 US WIA.

(7) On 24 March, as the 1st Brigade Headquarters began standdown, the 3d Brigade assumed OPCON of the 1-7 Cav, the 1-12 Cav and the 2-12 Cav. The 3d Brigade also assumed control of the 1st Brigade's AO and the Camp Gorvad AO. On 27 March, the 2-12 Cav ceased combat operations in SVN and began standdown at Bien Hoa. The 2-12 Cav was released OPCON from 3d Brigade at 270810 hours. Also on 27 March, the 1-12 Cav assumed responsibility for defense of Camp Gorvad and moved a TAC CP to that location.

(8) Activity for the remainder of the month remained relatively light. At 260915/YS 827897, 3A/2-8 Cav engaged 03 individuals resulting in 01 VC KIA. RCN/2-8 Cav at 270937/YS 834925, engaged 04 individuals resulting in 01 NVA KIA. At 271210/YS 834925, A/2-8 Cav received small arms fire from 02 individuals resulting in 01 US WIA. Return fire by A Company produced negative results. At 311150/ZT 096105, E RGI/2-5 Cav engaged 02 individuals. Enemy returned fire with small arms. Results: Enemy - 02 VC KIA; Friendly - 01 US WIA.

f. April:

(1) The period 1-6 April was characterized by light activity. 3D/2-5 Cav was engaged by 01 individual at 011100/ZT 092287 resulting in 01 US WIA. 4E/2-11 ACR at 021315/YS 829964 engaged 04 individuals resulting in 02 VC KIA. 1C/2-5 Cav at 051330/YT 974137 engaged an USMC resulting in 01 VC KIA. Four other fleeting contacts were reported with negative results.

(2) On 7 April, in response to recent intelligence, the 1-7 Cav reoriented operations from War Zone "D" to an area south of FSB Mace. To support the operation, the 1-7 Cav CP relocated to FSB Mace.

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(3) After the arrival of 2nd Cav, activities in the area south of FSB Mace increased. At 0600 hours on 9 April, 2nd Cav engaged 03 individuals. KIA, enemy pluck down, and 21 other personnel. 100 was reported killed as a result of air strikes. 21 other personnel were captured and released as 100. The enemy was equipped with a variety of weapons, including a mortar, and 100 were taken approximately 100 meters. 100 was taken into custody and 100 were taken to the air station. 100 were taken to the air station. Friendly losses were 01 US KIA and 01 US KIA. Due to this increased activity, the 2-5 Cav was relocated from the eastern portion of the AO to the area south of the contacts. The 2-5 Cav moved a MOS 11B to FSB Mace to control operations.

(4) At 1200 hours on 10 April, the 3d Brigade was redesignated 3d Brigade (Separate), 1st Cavalary Division (AM) and became CFCOM to II Field Force. Two contacts were reported on 10 April resulting in 01 enemy KIA at ZS084934 by the 513 RF Company, CFCOM to 2-11 ABL, and 01 enemy KIA at Y3817956 by D/2-8 Cav.

## SECTION II: Lessons Learned.

- a. Personnel: None.
- b. Intelligence: None.
- c. Operations:

### (1) Safety Annex to Operation Orders.

(a) Observation: Incorporation of safety annex to operation orders at battalion level instills a safety conscious attitude in leaders and men during the course of tactical operations.

(b) Evaluation: The issuance of safety reminders as an annex to the operation order and disseminated to the lowest level following issuance of the operation plan is considered responsible to this command for greater awareness of safety and corresponding decrease in the incidence of accidents.

(c) Recommendation: That widespread use of safety reminders be made in conjunction with tactical missions by the use of safety annexes to operation orders.

- d. Organizations: None.
- e. Training: None.
- f. Logistics:

### (1) Consolidation of Unit Supply at Battalion Level.

(a) Observation: It was evident that there existed a more efficient method of conducting resupply operations which would release numerous personnel with MOS 11B to serve in the field.

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(b) Evaluation: Previously, resupply operations were conducted at company level, necessitating a supply sergeant, another supply clerk in the rear and a supply representative for each company at the Forward FSB, in addition to the B-4 personnel. The consolidation of supply operations level eliminated unnecessary duplication of effort, decreased the chances of administrative error, handling of equipment and liability accountability was improved. The company supply sergeant now communicates directly with the unit from the Forward FSB and coordinates directly with the Service Platoon Leader, establishing a closer rapport with the soldier in the field and his company supply sergeant.

(c) Recommendation: It is recommended that the success of this program be disseminated to other units for possible implementation.

g. Communications: None.

h. Material: None.

i. Other:

(1) Resources Control Check Points:

(a) Observation: Resources control checkpoints are only as effective as the communications link between check points.

(b) Evaluation: In any resources control program the effectiveness of the individual checkpoints will be directly dependent upon the amount of coordination and communication that takes place between two adjacent checkpoints. The vehicles searched and their contents should be reduced ahead so that any difference in the cargo will be readily noted. It is all too easy to stop along side a road and throw off supplies then destroy the bill of lading for those supplies. If there is no communication link between checkpoints, there will be no discrepancies noted for an operation such as that.

(c) Recommendation: That there be more coordination between US and RVN checkpoints and especially between checkpoints of adjoining districts or provinces. Without their coordination, a mere search of the vehicle will continue to be at best marginally effective.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*[Signature]* CPT, ADA, Actg Asst AG

ALAN A. MITCHELL

CPT, AGC

Adjutant General

(11)

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