


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3D BDE (SEP), 1ST CAV DIV 'AM'

TF GARRY OWEN



OPERATION KATUM
27 SEPT - 2 OCT 1971
AFTER ACTION REPORT

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 3RD BRIGADE (SEPARATE)
1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)
APO San Francisco 96490**

AVDAGT-P

7 October 1971

SUBJECT: Operation Katum After Action Report (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) This after action report describes the planning and execution phases of the 3rd Brigade (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)'s conduct of Operation Katum to withdraw US personnel and equipment from Fire Support Base Katum in Tay Ninh Province near the Cambodian border during the period 27 September - 2 October 1971. It is written with the intent of identifying specific problem areas which may be avoided in the future by this Brigade and to provide information to other commands receiving similar missions.

2. (U) This letter is regraded unclassified when separated from the after action report.

Jonathan R. Burton
JONATHAN R. BURTON
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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7 October 1971

SUBJECT: Operation Katun After Action Report

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 3RD BRIGADE (SEPARATE)
1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)
APO San Francisco 96490

AVDAGT-P

7 October 1971

SUBJECT: Operation Katun After Action Report

1. (U) PURPOSE: This report is a review and an analysis of the 3rd Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM)'s conduct of operations encompassing the events and actions undertaken by commanders and staff officers from receipt of the mission through the planning and execution stages of the operation. It serves as a "lessons learned" guide for future operations involving similar forces and operational conditions. Details of each aspect of the operation to include highlights and lessons learned are further elaborated upon in the Annexes.

2. (C) BACKGROUND: Increased enemy activity in the 25th ARVN Division AO in northern Tay Ninh Province during October resulted in the placement of C and A Co's, 1st Bn, 12th Cav, OPCON to the 23rd Arty Group on 21 and 24 September 1971 to provide security for B & C Batteries (8"/175), 2nd Bn, 32 Arty at Fire Support Bases Katun and Pao respectively. These Fire Support Bases were located approximately 110 Km northeast of the 3rd Bde Base Camp at Lion Hoa and 175 Km west of the 1st Bn, 12th Cav's current AO in Lan Dong Province, and had been subject to increased enemy bombardment, surveillance, and attack.

3. (C) MISSION: During the evening hours of 28 September 1971, the Commanding General, 3rd Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM) was notified by the Commanding General, Third Regional Assistance Command that he was to conduct a two battalion Task Force operation to withdraw US personnel and equipment from Fire Support Base Katun (XT 333903) near the Cambodian Border to Tay Ninh West commencing on 30 September 1971. The 2nd Sqd, 11 ACR at Forward Operating Base Andrews (XT 472387), 33 Km southeast of Tay Ninh, was placed OPCON to CG, 3rd Bde for the duration of the operation by CG, TRAC.

4. (C) TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION: CG, 3rd Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM) designated his Deputy Commanding Officer for Operations as the Task Force Commander.

TASK FORCE GARRY OWEN

DCC-A with Bde Light Tactical CP

2nd Sqd, 11th ACR
(OPCON 3rd Bde)
E Troop
F Troop

1st Bn, 12th Cav
B Co
C Co
D Co(-)

D Troop, 229th AHB
A Co, 229th AHB
362 ASHC(-)
F Btry, 79th LFA

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G Troop
155 How BtryD Co, 2nd Bn, 5th Cav Section, 525th Sig Co.
(OPCON 1/12 Cav) Plt, 501st Engr Co
B Dtry(-), 21st Arty

5. (C) PLANNING: Planning commenced upon receipt of the CG's planning guidance at 282030 September 1971 in the Brigade TOC at Bien Hoa Army Base. A formal OPORD (Annex H) was written, disseminated, and briefed to all commanders and staff by 290900H September 1971. Task Force Commander (DCO-A) concluded the meeting with special instructions.

6. (C) CONCEPT: It was envisioned that the operation would be conducted in three phases commencing 29 September 1971. Phase I was to be movement on 29 September to Tay Ninh West by the 1st Bn, 12th Cav (USAF fixed wing & CH-47 Hel), 2nd Sqd, 11th ACR (road) and 3rd Brigade Troops and Trains (CH-47 Hel and road). Phase II was to be conduct of the operation to secure FSB Katun on 30 September, followed by evacuation of US personnel and equipment to Tay Ninh West. The withdrawal from FSB Katun was to be a deliberate maneuver, in which a maximum number of US personnel would be airlifted and heavy equipment would be moved to Tay Ninh by tactical road march. Phase III was to be redeployment of forces to initial bases and release of OPCON units to parent unit control. Withdrawal operations were to be supported by maximum field artillery, aerial field artillery, and air to provide preparations and suppressive fires around FSB's and along air corridors. Duration of the operation was estimated at 3-5 days.

7. (C) EXECUTION: a. The 29 Sep 71 activities proceeded according to the Phase I plan with the 3rd Bde Light TAC CP moving by CH-47 helicopter to Tay Ninh West and collocating with the 2/32 Arty Bn Hqs. By mid afternoon the 2/11 ACR CP closed in the same location, and the 3rd Bde Trains, moving by tactical convoy road march from Bien Hoa, were operational in Tay Ninh West by 1800 hours. The 1st Bn, 12th Cav moved from 40 FSB locations by CH-47 helicopters to Vo Dat and then by C-130 and C-74 USAF fixed wing aircraft to Tay Ninh West closing at 2010 hours. The 2/11 ACR with two Troops and a 155 Howitzer Btry had previously road marched to the French Fort area north of Mui Da Den Mountain and established a night defensive position. One Troop (G Trp) established NDP at FSB Buchl, and closed on the column early 30 Sep 71.

b. Early morning 30 Sep 71 the 2/11 ACR moved north along TL-4 to link up with C Co, 1/12 Cav and B Dtry, 2/32 Arty at FSB Katun. G Troop and 155 How Btry, 2/11 ACR established FSB Ladysmith 7000 meters north of the French Fort area along TL-4 to provide fire support for E and F Troops, 2/11 ACR enroute to Katun. 1/12 Cav combat assaulted to FSB Ladysmith by UH-1H Hel, followed by B Dtry, 1/21 Arty(-) by CH-47, to provide a quick reaction force and additional firepower in the area. Throughout the morning the 362 Avn Co had been moving US personnel and equipment by CH-47's from Katun. The 2/11 ACR movement to Katun was supported by F Dtry, 79th Arty (LFA) and D, 229th Avn Bn (Pink Teams). E and F Troops, 2/11 ACR linked up with B Dtry, 2/32 Arty at 1330 hours and prepared for return movement of personnel and equipment south to the Tay Ninh area. E Troop, 2/11 ACR

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with two 81 How and one 175mm gun departed at 1640 hours and closed at French Fort in a night defensive position for the evening. F Troop 2/11 ACR developed refueling problems at Katun and as a result C, 1/12; F, 2/11 and B Btry (), 2/32 remained in position at Katun on 30 Sep 71.

c. UH-1H helicopter lifted blivets of fuel to F, 2/11 ACR during the early morning hours of 1 Oct 71. By 0920 hours the remaining US personnel and equipment had cleared FSD Katun. C, 1/12 Cav combat assaulted from Katun to Tay Ninh West and remained near the airfield in a reaction posture. F Troop, 2/11 ACR moved from Katun by road by-passing 2/11 ACR and 1/12 Cav elements at FSD Ladysmith; E Troop with B Btry 2/32 had moved earlier to an area south of their NDP at French Fort and north of Nui Ba Den. With mission complete all elements were released to parent unit control by 2000 hours.

d. A small Bde CP element and reduced convoy remained overnight departing Tay Ninh 020800 Oct 71.

8. (U) HIGHLIGHTS: a. The accomplishment of the assigned mission in minimum time with minimum casualties.

b. The responsiveness of the 3rd Bde, 1st Cav Staff in developing and disseminating a detailed operation order (Annex H) in the very minimum of time. Command Group anticipation of possible withdrawal operations initiated a more responsive posture and facilitated planning.

c. The conduct of coordinated tactical operations on short notice between headquarters: the 2/11 ACR, 2/32nd Arty, and the 3rd Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM), who habitually do not normally operate together.

d. The complement of airmobile and armor in combined operations.

e. The ability of the 3rd Bde, 1st Cav to displace massive aircraft resources and troops, and fly a tremendous number of hours in the execution of the mission without experiencing a single aviation accident or incident.

f. The movement of forces by tactical convoy road march, USAF C-130 fixed wing, OH-47, and UH-1H helicopters in a short time frame, depicting flexibility of operations.

g. Interdiction and suppressive fire programs during day and night operations along air corridors, TL-4, and Fire Support Bases.

h. The capability of supporting TF Garry Owen operations along the Cambodian border and simultaneously providing support to remaining 3rd Brigade elements operating in the Brigade AO as far east as the South China Sea.

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9. (U) LESSONS LEARNED: a. Placements of units OPCON to another command does not imply fulfillment of logistical support requirements by that command unless specific prior coordination has taken place.

b. Logistical support stocks and related peculiar support items must be kept well forward to insure the availability of adequate and timely resupply. During this operation, blivets and bladders of fuel were continuously airlifted from Cu Chi to the objective area. This action increased helicopter blade time, extended supply lines, and reduced responsiveness. Lack of sufficient fuel bladders, nozzles, adapters, and hoses for POL resupply causes delay in class III resupply.

c. Staff officers, engineers, and riggers must understand the numerous means of transporting, configuring, and emplacing the M4T6 Bridge; misunderstanding may result in significant tactical delay.

d. Land line communications should be established between the Brigade Forward CP and the Brigade Trains. Dependence on radio to handle the tremendous number of admin-log transmissions and corresponding coordination is extremely difficult.

e. The present configuration, equipping, and manning of the 3rd Brigade Light TAC CP can be improved to provide a more functional, efficient, compact, and professional operational organization.

f. The lack of an additional AVLB and shortage of parts for critical equipment (AVLB and M88's) reduces flexibility when one of these pieces is nine damaged or breaks down mechanically. When operating in areas where landroutes are subject to being covered by blown culverts and bridges, additional AVLB's must be preplanned.

g. Rotation of mine-sweep teams every 30 minutes results in longer distances being covered in shorter time with less fatigue and less chance of missing mines.

h. Military Police support continues to be a valuable asset in moving large columns through built-up areas.

ANNEXES

A - Operations

E - Aviation

B - Intelligence

F - Engineer

C - Logistics

G - Fire Support

D - Signal

H - OPORD 3-71 (Katun)

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ANNEX A (Operations) to 3rd Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM)'s Operation Katun
After Action Report

1. (C) GENERAL: The Brigade was given the mission to withdraw US personnel from FSB Katun at 282030 Sep 71. The Brigade Light Command Post displaced 91.5Km the following morning to Tay Ninh West and was operational 14.5 hours after receiving the mission from CG, TRAC. Brigade aircraft resources committed to the mission were displaced approximately 91.5Km within 21 hours after the order. 2/11 ACR conducted a road march of approximately 72.5Km to Katun in 41 hours after the original order. 1/12 Cav conducted a series of airmobile operations utilizing UH-1H, CH-47, and C-130 aircraft over a distance of 212.6Km to react as the combat security force for the withdrawal. The last US personnel (at FSB Katun) from C/1/12 Cav were extracted 50.8 hours after the original order. The Brigade Task Force completed its mission of returning D/2/32 Arty to Tay Ninh in 71 hours, and the Brigade was given a mission complete from TRAC 71.5 hours after receiving the mission. The 2/11 ACR had returned to vicinity of Tay Ninh; 1/12 Cav had already closed the 212.6Km back to its Area of Operations, and the majority of Brigade aircraft had returned to Bien Hoa and Bearcat by this time. Attached as appendices are the detailed sequence of events for the operation. A general overview was depicted in paragraphs 6 and 7, of the basic report.

2. (C) HIGHLIGHTS: a. The task Force accomplished its assigned mission in the minimum preplanned time of 3 days with minimum casualties.

b. There were no aircraft accidents, incidents, or precautionaries during the Task Force execution of the mission.

c. Forward Air Controllers (Rash Facs) of the 3rd Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM) provided responsive air strikes north of Tay Ninh. During the period 28 Sep - 2 Oct 71, a total of 22 CV-10 sorties and 64 fighter sorties were executed in the area.

d. The ability of the Brigade to displace massive aircraft resources and personnel within hours of receipt of mission.

e. The complement of airmobile and armor in a combined operation.

f. The conduct of coordinated tactical operations on short notice between three headquarters (2/11 ACR, 2/32 Arty, and 3rd Bde/1st Cav) who habitually do not normally operate together.

g. The movement of forces by tactical convoy road march, USAF C-130 aircraft, CH-47, and UH-1H helicopters in a short time frame demonstrating flexibility of operations.

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3. (U) LESSONS LEARNED: a. The demonstrated advantage of quick reaction to an assigned mission due to "in-house" planning for a probable contingency. The Brigade Staff should continue to plan for possible contingencies.

b. The demonstrated advantage of quick reaction to an assigned mission by the Brigade due to direct control over aviation, logistics, and medical support. The Brigade is ideally configured for responding to Task Force commitments.

c. The requirement for attention to detail and very close supervision by S-3 and S-4 personnel, when resupplying by aircraft, during a highly sensitive mission. Units not familiar with aircraft resupply or extraction require additional guidance, supervision, and detailed coordination.

d. The advanced placement of critical items, such as bridging, to the forward area as soon as possible. Equipment should be broken down to enable transportation by organic aircraft if possible; dependence on non-organic aircraft may result in excessive delays. Direct control of organic aircraft by the Task Force Commander enables immediate response to the tactical situation.

e. Collocation of unit command posts with the Task Force Garry Owen command post at Tay Ninh facilitated direct coordination, decreased response time, and reduced radio communications. When tactically feasible, collocation of CP's for short duration missions of a time sensitive nature should be emphasized.

f. There is a requirement for review of the Light Tactical Brigade CP to improve its configuration, equipment, and manning status to provide for a more functional, efficient, compact and professional operation.

[REDACTED]

Appendix 1 (Sequence of Events, 27-28 Sep 71) to Annex A (Operations) to 3rd Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM)'s Operation Katun After Action Report

1. (C) 27 September 1971 - DCO-A directs primary staff to begin preparation of an "in-house" contingency plan anticipating possible withdrawal of 1/12 Cav combat forces and other US support forces from FSB Face (XT 071883) and FSB Katun (XT333903).

2. (C) 28 September 1971: 0800H LNO team consisting of representatives from S-3, 229th Avn Bn, Signal, 1/21 Arty, S-2, S-4 Brigade Engineer visit Tay Ninh West and 2/11 ACR for initial reconnaissance and coordination. DCO-A conducts direct coordination with 2/11 ACR.

2030H Brigade Commander orders withdrawal of 1/12 combat forces and 2/32 Arty support forces from FSB Katun commencing 29 September 1971.

2130H Brigade S-3 notified CO, 1/21st Arty to redeploy B(-) 1/21st Arty from FSB Mace (YT6211) to vicinity of Tay Ninh West (YT1651) on 29 September by late afternoon; provide Task Force with fire support coordination center which will be co-located with Brigade Forward CP. Five Sections of AFA deploy to T.N.W. on 20 September 1971.

2130H Brigade S-3 Notified 2/11 ACR LNO that the squadron will road march from present location (FOB Andrews) to vicinity Tay Ninh. Select and report location of squadron. Be prepared to withdraw P/2/32 Arty, equipment, and US personnel on 30 September 1971 from Katun to an area to be announced.

2200H Brigade S-3 notified the Brigade Security Platoon to displace at 290800H September from Dien Hoa to FSB Tinbuku and secure one of 1/12 Cav FSB's. Brigade Security Platoon revert OPCON 1/12 upon closure of destination.

2215H Brigade S-3 notified all members of Brigade Light Command Post to be prepared to displace at 290700H Sep by CH-47 from Sandy Pad, BHAD, to T.N.W.

2230H Brigade S-3 notified 2/5 Cav to assume security mission at radio relay site at Nui Chau Chan on 29 Sep and release 1st & 3rd platoons of A/1/12 Cav for priority mission.

2245H Brigade S-3 notified 1/12 Cav to displace 29 Sep by fixed wing (USAF) from Vo Dat Airstrip to T.N.W. Select and report your location at T.N.W. Advance party will move ASAP on the morning 29 Sep. 1/12 Cav is relieved of Nui Chau Chan security mission on 29 Sep. Brigade Security Platoon will be OPCON to secure on FSB. Insure elements displacing have a 3-day log.

2300H Brigade S-3 notified CO, 229th Avn Bn to displace to T.N.W. on 29 Sep. Be prepared to support withdrawal of C/1/12 from Katun on 30 September. 2 Medivac aircraft will deploy.

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Appendix 2 (Sequence of Events, 29 September 1971) to Annex A (Operations) to 3rd Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM)'s Operation Katun After Action Report

0015H Brigade S-3 notifies 1st & 3rd Plt of A/1/12 on Nui Chau Chan to displace at 290800H by CH-47 to Vo Dat; move by fixed wing to T.N.W. and join A(-).

0400H Brigade Transportation Office notified Brigade S-3 that fixed wing air request for 1/12 Cav has been approved by HQ'S TRAC.

0600H Culvert crossing at XT289628 on TL-4 destroyed. Will require AVLB and/or temporary bridge.

0700H Brigade Light TAC CP delayed one hour CH-47 move because of heavy ground fog vicinity Sandy Pad, BHAD.

0730H OPORDER 3-71 (Katun) distributed to Commanders Brigade Staff and other personnel.

0840H Brigade CP lifts off from Sandy Pad, BHAD in two CH-47 sorties.

0900H All commanders briefed on OPORDER 3-71 (Katun) at Brigade TOC, Bien Hoa.

0920H One CH-47 (#129) makes emergency single engine landing at Lai Khe. Light CP off loads into another CH-47 and continues move to T.N.W. at 0955H.

1055H Brigade S-3 notifies 2/5 Cav to be prepared to release D/2/5 OPCON to 1/12 Cav if 1 & 3 A/1/12 can not be extracted because of fog from Nui Chau Chan. D Co, 2/5 Cav will move by CH-47 to Vo Dat and by fixed wing to T.N.W.

1100H Brigade Forward Light Command Post and Task Force Commander, DCO-A, operational at T.N.W. Radio comms with all elements except Brigade Rear (VHF only). Radio comms with rear only possible by relay via Black Virgin Mt. or by aircraft.

1200H Convoy (Bde Trains) from Bien Hoa departs for T.N.W.

1215H Request for Airborne Relay.

1220H Brigade S-3 notifies 2/5 Cav to release D Co, OPCON to 1/12 Cav ASAP.

1225H Brigade S-3 notifies 1/12 Cav that D/2/5 Cav will be OPCON for OPORD 3-71. 1 & 3 A will remain on Nui Chau Chan, OPCON to 2-5 Cav.

1230H Brigade Forward request ETA on first 38' span M4T6 bridge to T.N.W. Two additional bridges will be constructed and brought to T.N.W. on 30 Sep.

1500H 1/12 CP closed T.N.W.

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[REDACTED]

Appendix 2 (Sequence of Events, 29 September 1971) to Annex A (Operations) to 3rd Bde (Sop), 1st Cav Div (AM)'s Operation Katun After Action Report (Cont'd)

- 1530H 2/11 ACR CP closed T.N.W. and collocated with TF Garry Owen Hq.
- 1600H B(-), 1/21 Arty completed movement of 3-105's to T.N.W.
- 1635H Convoy from Dien Hoa closes T.N.W.
- 1730H Bridge will not be displaced to T.N.W. CH-54's are not available because of maintenance difficulties.
- 1830H Last elements of 2/11 ACR Close.
- 1900H 2/11 ACR will not refuel tonight, 3 CH-47 sorties of fuel were delivered to the wrong location.
- 2010H Last elements of 1/12 Cav close.
- 2010H All CP's established. All forces and support assembled and operational. Comm to all elements established.
- 2212H One section of AFA and Flare Ship on 5 min standby.

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A-2-2

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Tab A (Task Force Elements Closure Times) to Appendix 2 (Sequence of Events 29 September) to Annex A (Operations) to 3rd Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM)'s Operation Katun After Action Report

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>CLOSING TIME T.N.W.</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> |
|-----------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|
| TF CP/TF CO | 291100H | T.N.W. (2/32d CP) |
| 525 Sig Section | 291000H | T.N.W. (2d/32d CP) |
| D/229th | 291200H | T.N.W. (NW of Airfield) |
| F/79 AFA | 291400H | T.N.W. (NW of Airfield) |
| 1/12 Cav CP | 291500H | T.N.W. (NW of Airfield) |
| 2/11 ACR CP | 201530H | T.N.W. (2/32d CP) |
| A/229th AHB | 291730H | T.N.W. (NW of Airfield) |
| B(-) 1/21 Arty | 291830H | T.N.W. (NW of Airfield) |
| Flt/501st Engr | 291830H | T.N.W. (NW of Airfield) |
| 2/11 ACR | 291830H | (See Tab C) |
| 1/12 Cav | 292010H | (See Tab C) |

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Tab B (Air Movement Table, 1-12 Cav, for 29 September 1971) to Appendix 2 (Sequence of Events, 29 September 1971), to Annex A (Operations) to 3rd Dde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM)'s Operation Katun After Action Report.

| <u>ELEMENT</u> | <u>PZ</u> | <u>LO</u> | <u>LZ</u> | <u>LC</u> |
|----------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| 1/12 Cav CP | TBT | 1217 | T.N.W. | 1500 |
| B/1/12 | YT766712 | 1256 | TBT | 1348 |
| | TBT | 1435 | Vo Dat | 1540 |
| | Vo Dat | 1628 | T.N.W. | 1830 |
| D/1/12 | TBT | 1310 | Vo Dat | 1600 |
| 3/D/1/12 | RR | 1330 | Vo Dat | 1630 |
| D(-)/1/12 | Vo Dat | 1525 | T.N.W. | 2010 |
| RCN 1/12 | YT775697 | 1330 | RR | 1400 |
| D/2/5 | Mace | 1400 | Vo Dat | 1530 |
| OPCON 1/12 | Wishart | 1400 | Vo Dat | 1530 |
| D/2/5 | Vo Dat | 1500 | T.N.W. | 1651 |

TBT - FSB Timbuktu (YT779657)

RR - FSB Round Rock (YT674576)

Mace - FSB Mace (YT628111)

Wishart - FSB Wishart (YT577186)

Vo Dat - Vo Dat Airfield (YT723326)

LO - Lift Off Time

LC - Lift Complete Time

PZ - Pickup Zone

LZ - Landing Zone


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Tab C (Closing Locations of Combat Elements as of 292400H September 1971) to Appendix 2 (Sequence of Events, 29 September 1971) to Annex A (Operations) to 3rd Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM)'s Operation Katun After Action Report

| UNIT | LOCATION | COORD |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------|----------|
| <u>1/12 Cav (+)</u> | Tay Ninh West | XT168516 |
| A/1/12 (-) | FSB Pace (OPCON 23d Arty) | XT071883 |
| B/1/12 | Tay Ninh West | XT168516 |
| C/1/12 | FSB Katun (OPCON 23d Arty) | XT331901 |
| D/1/12 (-) | Tay Ninh West | XT168516 |
| E/1/12 (-) | FSB Tinbuktu | YT779657 |
| E/Rcn/1/12 | FSB Round Rock | YT674576 |
| 1&3/L/1/12 | Nui Chau Chan (OPCON 2/5 Cav) | YT605103 |
| 2/D/1/12 | FSB Pace (OPCON 23d Arty) | XT071883 |
| D/2/5 | Tay Ninh West | XT168516 |
| Bde Security Flt | FSB Tinbuktu | YT779657 |
| <u>2/11 AGR</u> | | |
| CP | Tay Ninh West | XT168516 |
| E Troop | French Fort | XT279680 |
| F Troop | French Fort | XT279680 |
| G Troop | FSB Deuhl | XT216535 |
| How 155 SP | French Fort | XT279680 |
| <u>B(-) 1/21 Arty</u> | Tay Ninh West | XT168516 |
| <u>B/2/32 Arty</u> | FSB Katun | XT331901 |

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DAY 1: LOCATIONS AS OF
29 2400H SEP 71

- C 2-32
- A 1-12(-)
- 2 D/1-12

- B 2-32
- C 1-12

- E 2-11
- F 2-11
- G 2-11

- 2-32
- 1-12
- 2-5
- 2-11
- 2-11

TASK
FORCE
GARY
OWEN

DESTROYED
290600

FSB BUELL

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Appendix 3 (Sequence of Events, 30 September 1971) to Annex A (Operations) to 3rd Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM)'s Operation Katun After Action Report

- 0540H FOL sorties for 2/11 ACR ready for pickup at Cu Chi (2/11 ACR Rear).
- 0615H 2 CH-47's enroute to Cu Chi for pickup of fuel.
- 0650H G Trp 2/11 ACR SP from NDP to FSB Ladysmith.
- 0745H E & F Trp 2/11 SP from French Fort to Katun.
- ✓ 0805H AFG (M113) in 2/11 Convoy from French Fort to Katun hit by unkn type enemy mine. 5-US WIA (1-seriously). Medevac supported.
- ✓ 0845H Mine estimated at 60 lbs, command detonated. 3-US WIA (lacerations); 2-US WIA (internal inj).
- 1030H 2/11 ACR 155 How close FSB Ladysmith.
- 1030H First half of Eng Bridge arrives at FSSE Pad, T.N.W.
- 1145H Combat assault of elements of 1/12 Cav into Ladysmith begins.
- 1230H B(-) 1/21 Arty, 3-105's laid and ready to fire at FSB Ladysmith.
- 1230H While conducting road march from French Fort to Katun, an AVLB of 2/11 ACR detonated a 50 lb mine at XT291870.
- 1330H First elements of 2/11 ACR arrive at Katun.
- 1330H 2nd half of Engr Bridge arrives at FSSE Pad in T.N.W.
- 1510H 1/12 Cav completes airlift of all elements into FSB Ladysmith.
- 1640H E Trp 2/11 ACR begins road march from Katun south with one 175mm gun and two 8" Howitzers. F Trp will remain at Katun because of insufficient FOL resupply resulting from a ruptured bladder. C/1/12 will remain for security of ACR elements.
- 1805H One section of AFA and Flare Ship put on 5 minute alert.
- 1835H CH-47's released for evening.
- 1915H Ready Flight released standby status.
- 1930H E Trp, 2/11 ACR, and B(-) 2/32 complete road march to French Fort.
- 2045H AFL and Flare Ship begin interdiction missions on highway TL-4. D/229th Blues and one escort cobra on 2 minute standby alert.

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Tab A (Closing Locations of Combat Elements as of 302400H September 1971)
to Appendix 3 (Sequence of Events, 30 September 1971) to 3rd Bde (Sep),
1st Cav Div (AM)'s Operation Katun After Action Report.

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>COORD</u> |
|------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------|
| <u>1/12 Cav CP</u> | FSB Ladysmith | XT264752 |
| A /1/12(-) | FSB Pace (OPCON 23d Arty) | XT071883 |
| B/1/12 | FSB Ladysmith | XT264752 |
| C/1/12 | FSB Katun | XT331901 |
| D/1/12(-) | FSB Ladysmith | XT264752 |
| E/1/12(-) | FSB Tinbuku | YT779657 |
| E/Rcn/1/12 | FSB Round Rock | YT674576 |
| 1&3 A/1/12 | Nui Chau Chan (OPCON 2/5 Cav) | YT605103 |
| 2/D/1/12 | FSB Pace (OPCON 23d Arty) | XT071883 |
| D/2/5 | FSB Ladysmith | XT264752 |
| Dde Sec Plt | FSB Tinbuku | YT779657 |
| <u>2/11 ACR CP</u> | Tay Ninh West | XT168516 |
| E Trp | FSB St Barbara | XT279680 |
| F Trp | FSB Katun | XT331901 |
| G Trp | FSB Ladysmith | XT264752 |
| How 155 | FSB Ladysmith | XT264752 |
| <u>B/1/21 Arty (-)</u> | FSB Ladysmith | XT264752 |
| <u>B/2/32 Arty</u> | | |
| 1-175mm & 2-8" | FSB St Barbara | XT279680 |
| 1-175mm | FSB Katun | XT331901 |

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Appendix 4 (Sequence of Events, 1 October 1971) to Annex A (Operations), to 3rd Bde (Sop), 1st Cav Div (AM)'s Operation Katun After Action Report.

0100H TF Garry Owen receives confirmation of fixed wing (USAF) schedules for 1 October 1971.

0215H F/79 AFA while on interdiction mission along TL-4 received small arms fire, automatic weapons and possible B-40 ground to air fire (GAF) flying at 2200 ft at 110 knots. GAF came from 3 locations: XT245760, 245761, and 268768. F-79 engaged with organics. 2/11 ACR 155 How supported. Res: Negative hits or damage, unknown enemy losses.

0758H Engineers began breakdown of Bridge into 2 CH-47 sorties. CH-54 developed maintenance complications.

0803H C/1/12 begins extraction from FSB Katun.

0910H F Trp 2/11 ACR begins road march south from FSB Katun.

0915H Lead vehicle of F Trp (5 minutes from Katun) struck a mine, resulting in 1-US WIA. Medevac supported.

0920H Last elements of C/1/12 extracted: FSB Katun officially closed of US personnel and equipment.

0935H B/1/21 Arty begins airlift of 3-105's from FSB Ladysmith to T.N.W.

1031H F Trp, 2/11 ACR, passes by FSB Ladysmith. G Trp and 155 How will tail F Trp.

1057H 1/12 Cav begins extraction of elements from FSB Ladysmith. D/2/5 will remain at FSB Ladysmith until 2/11 ACR crosses bridge location.

1222H 1/12 CP and B/1/21 Arty (-) close T.N.W.

1400H Engineers find 6 mines vicinity XT289628. Estimated to be 50-60 lbs. Condition: old mines, recently implaced, destroyed in place with craters $4\frac{1}{2}$ ' wide and $2\frac{1}{2}$ ' deep each.

1430H First C-130 lifts off T.N.W. with 1/12 Cav elements

1453H D/2/5 extraction complete from FSB Ladysmith. FSB Closed.

1500H Engineers uncover 10 additional mines AT XT287646. Will destroy in place.

1615H Task Force convoy departs T.N.W. for Dien Hoa.

1620H E Trp & F Trp 2/11 ACR cross bridge.

1729H Last elements of 2/11 ACR cross bridge.

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Appendix 4 (Sequence of Events, 1 October 1971) to Annex A (Operations) to 3rd Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM)'s Operation Katun After Action Report (Cont'd)

1905H D/229th released by TF CP; Unit departs for Dearing.

1920H Task Force terminates area of operation along TL-4 effective at 1920H. 25th and 18 ARVN LNO's notified.

1936H 2/11 ACR closes FSB Bouhl (XT218538); D/2/32 Arty enroute to T.N.W. with organic security.

1940H DCO-A releases all remaining Bde elements (MFA, medevac, Flare), return to Bien Hoa.

1956H TF convoy closed Bien Hoa.

2000H Commanding General of 3rd Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM) informs Task Force Commander, DCO-A, that TRAC has released Cav of mission as of 1936H. 2/11 ACR returns to CFCOM to TRAC. All aircraft will return to base ASAP. Brigade Light CP will return at 020800 Oct by CH-47.

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Tab A (Air Movement Table 1-12 Cav, for 1 October 1971) to Appendix 4 (Sequence of Events, 1 October 1971) to Annex A (Operations) to 3rd Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM)'s Operation Katun After Action Report.

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>PZ</u> | <u>LO</u> | <u>LZ</u> | <u>LC</u> |
|-------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1/12 CP | FSB Ladysmith TNW | 1110 1705 | TNW TBT | 1222 1830 |
| C/1/12 | FSB Katun TNW | 0803 1430 | TNW Vo Dat | 0920 1610 |
| G/1/12(-) | Vo Dat | 1630 | TBT | 1745 |
| 3/G/1/12 | Vo Dat | 1710 | RR | 1730 |
| E/1/12 | FSB Ladysmith TNW | 1057 1420 | TNW Vung Tau | 1120 1600 |
| D/1/12(-) | FSB Ladysmith TNW Vo Dat | 1120 1455 1800 | TNW Vo Dat TBT | 1222 1701 1845 |
| 3/D/1/12 | Vo Dat | 1815 | Mace | 1828 (TBT weathered in) |
| D/2/5 | FSB Ladysmith TNW Vo Dat | 1405 1530 18-0 | TNW Vo Dat Mace | 1453 1700 1830 |

PZ - Pickup Zone

LO - Lift Off Time

LZ - Landing Zone

LC - Load Complete Time

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Appendix 5 (List of 2-11 ACR Key Equipment) to Annex A (Operations) to 3rd Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM)'s Operation Katun After Action Report

The following is a listing of combat and logistics vehicles taken on Operation Katun by the 2-11 ACR:

| | M551 | M113 | M109 | M125 | M88 | M123A1C | M577 | M54A1 | M35A1 | M578 | M60A1 (AVLB) | Wtr Trl |
|------------|------|------|------|------|-----|---------|------|-------|-------|------|-----------------|---------|
| Lt CP | | | | | | | 2 | | | | | |
| E Trp | 6 | 16 | | 3 | | | | | | | | 1 |
| F Trp | 4 | 17 | | 3 | | | | | | | | 1 |
| G Trp | 5 | 15 | | 2 | | | | | | | | 1 |
| How Dtry | | 1 | 4 | | | | 2 | 1 | | | | 1 |
| Sqdn Maint | | 1 | | | 2 | | | | | 1 | 1 | |
| DS Maint | | | | | 3 | | | | | | | |
| Trains | | | | | | 5 | | | | | | |
| TOTALS: | 15 | 50 | 4 | 8 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 |



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Annex B (Intelligence) to 3rd Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM) 's Operation Katum
After Action Report

1. (U) GENERAL: The initial intelligence situation which faced Task Force Garry Owen was considered to be serious. Enemy concentrations of force had materialized along the Cambodian-Tay Ninh Province boundary. The 209th NVA Regiment was situated near Pace and the 5th VC Division, which had operated near Snuol was moving south towards Katum; there were indications that the 7th, and possibly the 9th Division were moving toward Pace, and finally there were numerous reports that elements of the 429th Sapper High Command and unidentified NVA regular forces were concentrating between Tay Ninh and Katum, particularly along Route TL-4 north of Nui Ba Den.
2. (C) INTELLIGENCE GATHERING: Intelligence gathering for the TF Forward CP was accomplished primarily through liaison with the Allied intelligence facilities available at Tay Ninh West. The 18th ARVN Division was particularly helpful in providing information on enemy dispositions through the US Advisory Team with them. The 2/32nd Artillery was helpful in making available agent reports and other intelligence as it was received. Intelligence was also provided directly from the Brigade S-2 at Bien Hoa.
3. (C) INTELLIGENCE DISSEMINATION: Intelligence dissemination was accomplished through the medium of direct contact with command and operations personnel through intelligence briefings, and the updating of the task force CP situation map. On the evening of 29 September 1971 a full intelligence briefing was given to the commanders and staff on the enemy situation from Tay Ninh to Katum, followed by a briefing by the Task Force Commander. Other intelligence as it became available was reported directly to operations personnel, to the liaison officer of the 2nd Sqd, 11 ACR, and the S-2, 1st Bn, 12th Cav.
4. (U) SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE: Significant intelligence, which was developed in the course of the operation highlighted activity in the Pace area. Near the western edge of QL-22 south of Pace, and near the Cambodian-Tay Ninh Province boundary the enemy had concentrated significant main forces. These forces included major elements of the 7th NVA Division and a forward headquarters element of the 5th VC Division. The city of Tay Ninh was also a locus of enemy operations as many reliable reports were received indicating that Tay Ninh and Tay Ninh West were to be hit by indirect fire on the nights of 29 and 30 Sep. Indirect fire was later received as predicted. Enemy concentrations along the main axis of movement TL-4 for Task Force Garry Owen were centered from Nui Ba Den to the area of the French Fort. North of the latter point enemy forces were light and believed to be intended for harrassing, mining, and indirect fire attacks. From the French Fort south, significant concentrations of sappers, and possibly main forces, were believed to pose a serious threat to the Task Force. The fact that this threat did not in fact materialize is a credit to the high degree of security and massive show of force provided by the Task Force in the area.

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Annex C (Logistics) to 3rd Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM)'s Operation Katum
After Action Report

1. (C) PLANNING PHASE:

a. Logistical planning was embodied in Annex F (Service Support) to OPLAN 8-71 (Tay Ninh) with modifications.

(1) Units were to deploy with 3 day supply of MCI rations and sustain operations with resupply of MCI rations.

(2) The 215th CS Bn was prepared to install a refuel point at Tay Ninh (West) with 20,000 gal JP-4 capacity. Basic refuel capability would be the existing ARVN facility. The ARVN facility had a 100,000 gal capacity.

(3) The 229th AHB was prepared to open a rearm point on order at Tay Ninh (West). Initial rearm capability would be from the existing facility operated by the 12th CAG.

(4) A graves registration team from the 226th S&S Bn, Saigon Support Command, was alerted to be available on call.

(5) The 215th CS Bn was tasked to provide a clearing station with support from the 2/32nd FA at Tay Ninh (West).

b. Logistical planning began on 27 September 1971. A representative from the Brigade S-4 went to Tay Ninh (West) on 28 September 1971 to establish contact with 2/32nd FA support personnel and obtain information on facilities available.

c. The Brigade S-4 maintained close coordination with the CO and staff of the 215th CS Bn and with the unit S-4's involved.

2. (C) EXECUTION PHASE:

a. The deployment order was received at approximately 282200H September 1971 and the advanced party arrived at Tay Ninh (West) on the morning of 29 September 1971. The advanced party consisted of the Brigade S-4, the Forward Service Support Element (FSSE) commander, a FSSE NCO and the Brigade Surgeon.

b. The advanced party performed the following functions:

(1) Coordinated with units located at Tay Ninh (West) for sites for billeting, Brigade light TAC CP, clearing station, FSSE and 1/21st FA S-4 section, infantry location, and convoy staging area.

(2) Checked hook-out pad.

(3) Located rearm and refuel facilities.

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- [REDACTED]
- (4) Secured a motor pool for equipment.
 - (5) Coordinated with 1/21st FA to set up sling-out operations.

(6) Met the convoy and deployed personnel and equipment to respective locations as necessary (i.e., Class V to hook-out pad, MHE to hook-out pad, and personnel and vehicles to their respective areas).

- (7) Monitored in-bound movement of 1/12th Cav personnel.

c. The main body of the FSSE (including the medical team), the 1/12th and 1/21st support elements moved from Bien Hoa to Tay Ninh (West) in road convoy on 29 September 1971.

d. The medical clearing station was established adjacent to the Brigade CP and was operational by 291700 September 1971.

- (1) The capacity of the clearing station was 20-30 casualties.
- (2) Personnel included 1 doctor and 6 EM from 215th CS Bn and 1 doctor and 3 EM from 2/32nd FA.
- (3) The 215th CS Bn and 2/32nd FA each provided one front line ambulance.
- (4) Two medevac aircraft were provided by 215th CS Bn and two aircraft were available from Long Binh "Dust Off". Back up support for Bien Hoa was furnished by Long Binh "Dust Off".
- (5) Medical resupply was provided by aircraft from Bien Hoa.
- (6) Radio communications were established between the clearing station and the Medevac helipad. Land Line communications were established between the clearing station and the TAG CP.

e. On 30 September 1971, a Brigade S-4 representative, an assistant FSSE commander, two POL specialists and one POL NCOIC arrived. In addition the contingency POL point arrived.

f. On the morning of 30 September 1971, it became evident that the existing ARVN POL facilities were inadequate. Aircraft were backed up for 15-20 minutes, primarily due to poor up-keep of the POL point. At that time nine points were operational. Upon arrival of the POL section, one POL point was brought into operation immediately and by 010030 October a total of 14 points were operational. A 15th point (for crane use) was operational by 010800 October. The additional points were made operational through initiative and partial cannibalization of the 3rd Brigade Contingency POL system. On 1 October, by direction of TRAC G4, the contingency POL system was installed. Liaison with ARVN POL advisors facilitated the replacement of the cannibalized parts used on the existing system.

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g. Coordination was made with the 25th ARVN Division G4 advisor concerning the on-hand assets of the rearm point. Before the problem became critical, arrangements were made for resupply of required assets.

h. A major problem occurred when resupply of MOGAS for a 2/11th ACR tank recovery vehicle was not available when required. As a result, the entire operation was stalled until fuel could be delivered. The cause was the unavailability of a proper fitting to fill blivets from a tanker. After a fitting was obtained, fuel was hooked to the vehicle site.

3. (C) WITHDRAWAL PHASE:

a. At approximately 2300 on 30 September 1971, the withdrawal phase began when fixed wing transportation was coordinated and requested through the Brigade Transportation Office for extraction of personnel and artillery from Tay Ninh (West).

b. At approximately 2300, ground transportation was coordinated and requested to extract the FSSE, support elements and the light TAC CP. Air Cover for the ground transportation was also coordinated.

c. On 1 October 1971 extraction of personnel and equipment began.

(1) Helicopter operations brought personnel and equipment into Tay Ninh (West) from Katun and FSB Ladysmith.

(2) Fixed Wing (C-130 aircraft) operations began at approximately 1300 hours. Five sorties accounted for 104 persons to Vung Tau, 292 persons to Vo Dat, and 35 persons and 3 each 105mm Howitzers to Xuan Loc.

(3) Personnel and equipment not required for close-out operations were loaded on ground transportation and departed for Bien Hoa at 1615 hours with the 4th Transportation Command daily convoy. This included the bulk of classes IV & V and the 1/21st FA S-4 section.

d. Although all personnel and equipment were prepared to return to Bien Hoa on 1 October 1971, the TAC CP, the FSSE main body (including medical facilities) and the 1/12th S-4 section remained until 2 October 1971, they returned by road convoy on the morning of 2 October 1971.

e. The contingency POL point was left in operation with two persons for control and security.

f. Two 350 GPM pumps which were installed to maintain the existing POL system were also left in place. All 3rd Brigade equipment will be returned when the existing system is sufficiently improved to sustain normal operations.

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4. (U) LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Problem: Advance contact with units in the area.

(1) Discussion: Contact with key units at the location should be made at the earliest possible time. This facilitates coordination for sites to be used by all elements entering the area. Existing facilities should be used whenever possible. This reduces the amount of equipment required. Additional planning can then be directed towards the actual mission.

(2) Recommendation: That a planning group be sent to any future locations to determine what existing facilities are available and to coordinate closely with units already at the location to determine what support can be provided and how it will be provided. This is to include all advisory elements and ARVN controlled facilities.

b. Problem: Non-availability of logistical LNO's from OPCON units.

(1) Discussion: The Brigade experienced considerable difficulty in maintaining coordination with the logistical elements of units OPCON to 3rd Brigade. A major problem arose concerning fuel for 2/11th ACR vehicles. Insufficient coordination resulted in excess time required to solve the problem. A logistical liaison officer could have assisted in solving this problem.

(2) Recommendation: That a logistical LNO from each unit under operational control of the 3rd Brigade be available in or adjacent to Brigade TAG CP.

c. Problem: Complete identification of support functions.

(1) Discussion: When the OPLAN was written, it did not specify the extent of support to be provided to OPCON units by 3rd Brigade. At a point in the operations, a unit ran out of fuel. It was intended that each unit provide its own basic support and be capable of handling its own logistical problems; however, assets of the 3rd Brigade were required to solve this problem.

(2) Recommendation: That required support be specified in the OPLAN and coordination be made with all units involved to insure understanding.

d. Problem: Provision for anticipating problems arising from units not familiar with airmobile operations.

(1) Discussion: Potential problem arose when extra slings, nets, and chains were required by a unit not familiar with airmobile operations. Extra slings, nets, and chains had to be obtained as a top priority project when advance planning for this situation could have resulted in less effort and confusion when the assets were required.

(2) Recommendation: That extra hook-out equipment be on hand for emergency use, especially when dealing with units that are not inherently airmobile.

[REDACTED]

e. Problem: Requirement for S-4 representative in TAC CP.

(1) Discussion: During the 1st day of the Task Force operations, there was no S-4 representative in the CP. As a result it was often difficult for operations personnel to contact FSSE personnel as logistical problems arose. An S-4 representative who would remain in or adjacent to the CP could devote full time to maintaining contact with FSSE personnel and free operations personnel from logistical problems.

(2) Recommendation: That an S-4 representative be included in or adjacent to the Brigade light TAC CP.

f. Problem: Logistics communication net.

(1) Discussion: When logistics personnel in the CP needed to contact logistics personnel in the support areas, other operations had to be interrupted to obtain radio communications. In extremely busy periods some of the radios were not available. Thus, communications were hampered severely. The purpose of an S-4 representative in the CP is to maintain contact with the FSSE and other support personnel. Without communications, this function is not possible.

(2) Recommendation: That a logistics net be established with a radio in the CP for the S-4 representative, a radio in the FSSE commander's jeep, a radio in the jeep of each unit's S-4 and other radios as required by FSSE elements available.

g. Problem: Use of existing POL facilities.

(1) Discussion: When the Task Force began full scale operations at Tay Ninh (West), it immediately became evident that the existing POL facilities were not adequate to maintain sufficient operations. Adequate coordination with the 25th ARVN Division had not been obtained to determine the limitations of the POL facilities. If the refueling capacity had been determined earlier, provisions could have been made to upgrade the existing system before the demand for fuel reached its peak. This problem had been anticipated however, and 2 each 350 GPM pumps were brought with the FSSE on a contingency basis. These pumps were placed into use.

(2) Recommendation: That efforts be made to determine not only what facilities exist at a site but the capabilities of these facilities under extreme operating conditions.

h. Problem: Centralization of medevac operations.

(1) Discussion: Medevac missions were supposed to originate with the TAC CP and be passed on to the clearing station. In one case the 2/32nd FA directed a mission to the clearing station and a medevac helicopter was dispatched without the approval of the TAC CP. This was the result of insufficient coordination with both the 2/32nd FA and the clearing station.

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(2) Recommendation: That channels of communication be established for medevac operations and that all units and personnel involved be briefed on the correct lines of communication to be followed in all cases.

i. Sleeping quarters for medical staff.

(1) Discussion: It was determined that sleeping quarters for the medical staff should be consolidated and close to the clearing station.

(2) Recommendation: That an additional tent be added to the facilities required for the clearing station for staff sleeping quarters in the event facilities are not available close to the station.

j. Problem: A separate medevac refuel pad.

(1) Discussion: To avoid delays in medevac operations, a refuel pad should be designated for medevac use only.

(2) Recommendation: That a refuel pad be designated for medevac use only and be clearly marked to eliminate chance of inadvertent use by other aircraft.

k. Problem: Ground transportation for the logistical elements advance party.

(1) Discussion: When the advance party arrives on location, it must have ground transportation available to facilitate coordination and arrange for the main body to move into operation immediately upon arrival.

(2) Recommendation: That ground transportation be airlifted to the location with the advanced party.

l. Problem: Additional personnel transportation for FSSE use.

(1) Discussion: In addition to the vehicle used by the advanced party the FSSE should have a gun jeep. The gun jeep serves as a means of transportation for the assistant FSSE OIC and/or the NCOIC in coordinating support activities. In addition it can be used as security jeep in convoys.

(2) Recommendation: That a $\frac{1}{2}$ ton jeep with M-60 machine gun mounted be taken to the forward location for use by FSSE personnel. If possible the gun jeep should contain a radio.

m. Problem: Coordination with higher commands.

(1) Discussion: Whenever a Task Force Operation is established by a higher command, such as TRAC, there should be a single point for staff coordination of all activities between the higher commands and the Task Force. In this operation TRAC sent 2 C-7A's to Tay Ninh (West) loaded with Class V. No coordination was made with Task Force personnel concerning this shipment. As a result, no unloading capability was available and the aircraft had to return.

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(2) Recommendation: That a point of contact be established between higher commands and the Task Force through which all mutual activities can be coordinated.

n. Problem: Supply personnel in supported units.

(1) Discussion: FSSE personnel are not capable of supporting the Task Force and the individual units also. Therefore, each Battalion should provide for a supply section to handle supply problems in the unit and assist in loading/off-loading, banding and rigging of supplies.

(2) Recommendation: That individual units provide for adequate supply personnel for their supply operations.

o. Problem: Inspection of helicopter pads.

(1) Discussion: An inspection of helicopter pads should be made to reveal any obstacles. An instance in particular was the medevac pad at Tay Ninh (West). There were radio towers near the pad that did not have night lights. Serious damage could result if aircraft strike unseen items upon landing.

(2) Recommendation: That an aviation safety officer inspect all helicopter pads for overall safety in day or night use.

q. Problem: Tow bar requirement.

(1) Discussion: When vehicles are moving in convoy, tow bars should be available in the event a vehicle becomes unable to move and has to be towed.

(2) Recommendation: That the convoy commander of all convoys insure that tow bars are available.

5. (U) POTENTIAL PROBLEMS AVERTED BY PRIOR PLANNING:

a. Potential Problem: Arrival and location of the Brigade Surgeon.

(1) Discussion: A potential problem could result if the medical representative is not the Brigade Surgeon. On this operation the Brigade Surgeon had to coordinate with colonels and a general in obtaining facilities for the clearing station.

(2) Action Taken: The medical representative in the advance party was the Brigade Surgeon.

b. Potential Problem: Materials Handling Equipment.

(1) Discussion: A MHE back-up capability should be available. The 6000 pound RT forklift went out of operation at Tay Ninh (West) and a 5 ton wrecker was required to off-load material.

[REDACTED]

(2) Action Taken: Primary and secondary heavy lift capability was provided when the Task Force moved into operation. The items were 6000 pound RT Forklift and 5 ton wrecker.

c. Potential Problem: Control of Fixed Wing Aircraft Movement.

(1) Discussion: Whenever movement by fixed wing aircraft is anticipated, a control specialist should be available to coordinate loading and movement of the aircraft.

(2) Action Taken: A control specialist was assigned to the FSSE whenever movement by fixed wing aircraft was anticipated.

d. Potential Problem: Cargo Transportation for FSSE use.

(1) Discussion: In addition to the vehicle used by the advance party, the FSSE should have a 2½ ton truck available. The 2½ ton truck can be used to transport CONEX's, POL items, etc., which must be moved with minimum of lost time. It can also be used in convoys to bring items to the forward location and return items to the rear.

(2) Action Taken: A 2½ ton cargo truck was taken to the forward location for use by FSSE personnel.

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ANNEX D (Signal) to 3rd Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM)'s Operation Katum After Action Report

1. (C) GENERAL: Communications for TF Garry Owen operations were provided by organic 3rd Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM) and 1st Signal Brigade (USARV) assets. The original communications concept called for secure operation on the 3rd Bde Command Net (B-1) in the Tay Ninh area, with the 3rd Bde Opns/ Intel Net (B-2) and Special Purpose Net (B-11) continuing normal operations in the Bde AO. A 3rd Bde radio team was planned for insertion on Nui Ba Den mountain (vic Tay Ninh) to operate a secure retransmission station for the B-1 Net. Communications other than the B-1 Net from the TF Garry Owen CP to Bien Hoa Army Base were to be provided over existing VHF multichannel systems operated by the 39th Signal Battalion (1st Signal Bde). Four circuits were planned as follows:

- a. Sole user voice: 3rd Bde TOC-TF Garry Owen CP
- b. Sole user voice: 1/21 Arty FDC-TF Garry Owen Arty LNO
- c. Common user voice: Sabre-Sabre Forward (TNW)
- d. TTY: 3rd Bde Commcen-TF Garry Owen CP

2. (C) ANALYSIS: a. TF Garry Owen FM Command Net (B-1). Difficulty was experienced in two areas: operation in secure mode and retransmission operation. Difficulties in secure operations are attributed to the fact that the 2/11 AGR does not normally operate nets in the secure mode. The impossibility of placing 3rd Bde personnel on Nui Ba Den due to inclement weather necessitated use of airborne FM relay provided by 1st Signal Bde. Inability of the "bird" to monitor secure retransmission due to lack of MR III Nestor Keylist on the "bird" limited the full use of this capability and contributed to secure voice operation difficulties on the first day of tactical operations of TF Garry Owen. The airborne relay worked with satisfactory results as a secure retransmission facility for exchange of classified data between TF Garry Owen CP and the 3rd Bde TOC at Bien Hoa. It also served the Garry Owen CP requirement for a retransmission facility which was needed to contact maneuver elements in their night defensive positions to the north of Nui Ba Den.

b. VHF Circuit Support. Activation by the 39th Signal Battalion of the 4 circuits allocated to the 3rd Bde was not as expeditious as it should have been. Initially, circuit quality was poor. However, once the circuits were installed and priorities were established, communications by VHF systems between Tay Ninh West and Bien Hoa were satisfactorily maintained for the duration of the operation. The teletype circuit between TF Garry Owen CP and 3rd Bde commcen was installed but was not activated due to the brevity of the operation.

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c. Communications Operation in the Garry Owen CP. Installation of communications facilities inside the CP was not optimum. For example, proximity of the switchboard served to circumvent normal telephone operations and contributed to the noise level in the CP. Failure to remote FM radios impeded maintenance by signal personnel and at times resulted in untrained personnel making adjustments to radios with undesirable results.

3. (U) LESSONS LEARNED:

a. When airborne relay support is requested from USARV in the future, it will be requested that the "bird" stop at Bien Hoa for coordination and setting of Nestor keylist prior to proceeding "on-station".

b. To insure that the highest possible quality is provided on VHF circuits it will be specifically requested that 4 wire patches instead of 2 wire patches be installed at each relay point on systems over which 3rd Bde circuits are routed.

c. Every attempt will be made to remote communications facilities from operating areas to the inside of the TF tactical CP. This will reduce noise and personnel traffic in the CP and will minimize the possibility of less than optimum operation of communications facilities.

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ANNEX E. (Aviation) to 3rd Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM)'s Operation Katum
After Action Report

1. (C) GENERAL:

a. The mission of the 229th Avn Bn (Aslt Hel) was to provide tactical airlift, aerial resupply, aerial fire support and reconnaissance for TF Garry Owen.

b. Record of flight hours by type of Aircraft:

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>TYPE OF AIRCRAFT</u> | | | | <u>TOTAL</u> |
|---------------|-------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| | <u>CH-6A</u> | <u>UH-1H</u> | <u>AH-1G</u> | <u>CH-47</u> | |
| HQ, 229th Avn | — | 26:55 | — | — | 26:55 |
| A Co | — | 176:00 | — | — | 176:00 |
| D Trp | 86:24 | 41:54 | 54:30 | — | 182:08 |
| 362 | — | — | — | 151:00 | 151:00 |
| F/79 | — | — | 164:30 | — | 164:30 |
| GS | 1:00 | 76:00 | — | — | 77:00 |
| TOTALS | 87:24 | 320:09 | 219:00 | 151:00 | 777:33 |

c. There were no aircraft accidents or incidents during the operation.

d. F/79 had 100% of its organic aircraft "mission ready" during the tenure of the operation..

e. Sorties flown by type:

(1) CH-47 sorties

(a) 3rd Bde (Sep), 1st Cav sorties.

| | |
|-------------------------|-------------|
| Backhaul | - 10 |
| Artillery | - 20 |
| CP's (Bde & 229 Avn Bn) | - 5 |
| Class I | - 3 |
| Class III | - 12 |
| Class V | - 9 |
| TOTAL | - 64 |

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(b) HQ's TRAC sorties.

| | |
|---------------------|-----|
| Bridge | - 3 |
| Equipment (Backhoe) | - 2 |
| Resupply | - 3 |
| TOTAL | - 8 |

(c) TOTAL CH-47 sorties - 72

(2) UH-1 Airlift sorties.

| | |
|---------------|------|
| Total sorties | -136 |
| Total Pax | -680 |

2. (U) LESSONS LEARNED:

a. ATC Facilities. Advanced planning and coordination should be conducted to insure the availability of ADF Beacons and GCA facilities.

b. Rearm. Rearm stockage levels and availability for immediate rearm was not adequate. It is recommended that a special ammo team be established to prestock, operate, and maintain a responsive rearm point. Special emphasis should be given to scout and ARA peculiar munitions and flares.

c. Conservation of Blade Time Proper Usage of Aircraft. Mission No. 3251 was scheduled as a front haul of slings and nets from Phu Loi to Tay Ninh West. Due to incorrect contact information, the aircraft wasted 1 hr, 30 min while orbiting and sitting on the ground before proper frequency contact was made. The load was finally moved by CH-47 helicopter and consisted of only 800 lbs (36 cu ft) of slings and nets. Precise coordination, understanding the need for conserving blade time, and proper usage of aircraft are continuing training requirements. This mission could have been accomplished with UH-1H helicopter.

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Annex F (Engineer) to 3rd Bde (Scp), 1st Cav Div (AM)'s Operation Katum
After Action Report

1. (C) GENERAL: Katum required a significant use of engineer support and staff advice on matters pertaining to breaching of obstacles, clearing mines, firebase site selection and their preparation along route TL-4 from Tay Ninh to FSB Katum. The most prominent obstacle to be breached was a major size stream crossing (XT 287642) requiring suitable bridging to span the gap and allow the passage of the 2nd Sqd, 11 ACR vehicles returning from FSB Katum with B Btry (-), 2nd Bn, 32nd Arty. During movement to Katum, the 2/11 ACR had employed its AVLB to cross this obstacle; however, this vehicle was later rendered ineffective as the result of a mine detonation. The 501st Engineers were then tasked to breach the gap utilizing M4T6 bridge spans to allow closure of the units at Tay Ninh. M4T6 bridging was rigged at Bien Hoa and later at Tay Ninh Forward TF CP for transportation to the site by CH-47A model helicopter or by crane. This method of transportation facilitates emplacement and reduces movement time. On 1 October 1971, the Brigade received several operational set-backs when both the crane and the preplanned standby CH-47A helicopter were diverted for maintenance and other mission essential requirements, thereby greatly delaying the 010800H Oct 71 hours scheduled crossing time.

2. (U) LESSONS LEARNED: a. M4T6 Bridging can be prepared for air movement in numerous configurations. Understanding of these techniques by riggers, engineers, and staff officers would have resulted in the move being accomplished by CH-47A helicopters (to lift the bridging) in three distinct loads to the site, rather than delaying required movement and construction until CH-47C or crane lift transportation became available. While construction and emplacement would have been more difficult and tedious, valuable time would have been saved allowing for early passage of the convoy.

b. Prior to moving to the objective area (if time permits) a detailed map reconnaissance study should be conducted to determine the necessity for a bridge section to move with the TAC CP or Brigade Trains to the forward area early in the operation. Bridging displaced forward early in the operation reduces the number of dedicated sorties required during peak periods of the operation and ensures increased response to tactical requirements.

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Annex G (Fire Support) to 3rd Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM)'s Operation Katum After Action Report

1. (C) MISSION: On 28 September 1971, the 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery was notified to deploy fire support assets to Tay Ninh West (XT1651) to support the evacuation of US personnel and equipment from FSB Katum (XT333903).

2. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION (ARTILLERY).

B 1/21 (-) -DS TF Garry Owen

F/79 AFA - Reinf 1/21 FA

How Btry, 2/11 ACR - DS 2/11 ACR

2/32 FA - GS

GWN Artillery - GS

3. (C) ANALYSIS: Fire support needs for TF Garry Owen during the Katum operation fell into two categories - suppressive fires to counter enemy attacks against allied fire bases and installations, especially during the landing or takeoff of aircraft, and direct fire support for the 1/12 Cav in its ready reaction mission. B Battery (-), 1/21 Artillery was selected for the TF Garry Owen mission due to its posture at FSB Mace which allowed for immediate redeployment, the shortest flight time, and minimal effect on Brigade operations in the Mace area due to other available artillery support. B Battery was positioned with the 1/12 Cav reaction force at FSB Ladysmith (XT265748) from which the most hostile segments of TL-4 could be covered and from where they and the reaction force could be deployed in case of heavy contact during Katum's evacuation. The medium artillery of the 2/11 ACR provided direct support fires for their ground mobile forces and were available to reinforce the fires of B 1/21. AFA was used extensively to provide immediately responsive fire support to aircraft landing or departing locations subject to frequent attacks by fire and to attempt to locate and destroy gun crews during these attacks.

4. (C) HIGHLIGHTS: a. During the period from 2045 hours, 30 September to 0700 hours, 1 October a coordinated suppressive fire program along the entire length of TL-4 from Katum to Nui Ba Den was conducted employing AFA, a UH-1H flare ship and field artillery. By coordinating preplanned artillery concentrations paralleling TL-4 with the flight schedule of the AFA section and the flare ship, continuous surveillance, AFA fires, and field artillery fires were maintained along TL-4 during the hours of darkness.

b. B Battery (-) 1/21 Artillery conducted a fixed wing move from Tay Ninh West to Xuan Loc airstrip on 1 October. In addition to conserving already overused CH-47 assets, the G-130 move provided an unexpected training experience for members of the battery (most had never conducted a fixed wing artillery move).

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Annex G (Fire Support) to 3rd Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM)'s Operation Katun
After Action Report (Cont'd)

5. (U) LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Use of AFA Multiple Cover Missions: Observations: The opportunity presented itself for AFA to simultaneously cover a moving convoy and other aircraft entering/leaving fire support bases. This was done by widening the orbit pattern of the aircraft. Initial problems were encountered however by not having ground controllers at both the fire base and the convoy on the same frequency so as to coordinate the AFA activities.

Recommendation: When providing dual AFA cover for separate units a common frequency should be used between the AFA section, ground controllers, and the units in convoy.

b. Prior Coordination of Equipment Usage. Observation: At the CP site different sections shared items of equipment such as antenna masts, generators, lighting sets, vehicles, and "swing" radios. It became evident there was a duplication of equipment available at the CP site.

Recommendation: Detailed prior coordination be affected between the Hq Commandant and tenant sections as to power sources (one large generator could suffice for all). Brigade Signal could consolidate usage of AB-577 Antenna Mastheads for Brigade S-2, S-3, and Artillery.

c. Communications Section Personnel in TAC CP Party. Observation: Many communications problems arise in establishing comm in a new area of operations. In a small TAC CP element such as the 1/21 TAC CP an effort is made to keep the number of men to a minimum. Comm personnel proved invaluable in the TAC CP operation both during the set-up stage and during subsequent operations.

Recommendation: At least one radio repairman with tools, test equipment, and selected parts, and one wireman should be an established part of the TAC CP party.

d. Communications to Brigade Trains Area. Observation: The only available communications to the Brigade Trains area was by FM radio. This was an impractical situation due to the nature of logistical conversations.

Recommendation: Land line communications should always be established from the CP to the Trains area.

Appendices:

- 1 - Artillery Movements
- 2 - Artillery Expenditures

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Appendix 1 (Artillery Movements) to Annex G (Fire Support) to 3rd Bde (Sep),
1st Cav Div (AM)'s Operation Katun After Action Report

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>DEP</u> | <u>CLOSED</u> | <u>FROM</u> | <u>TO</u> | <u>TRANSPORTATION</u> |
|--------------------------|------------|---------------|--------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 29 September | | | | | |
| 1/21 TAG CF Adv Party | 0900 | 0945 | Dien Hoa | T.N.W. | UH-1H |
| B 1/21 (-) | 0900 | 1530 | Mace | T.N.W. | CH-47 |
| TAG CP, S-4 | 1200 | 1615 | Dien Hoa | T.N.W. | Convoy |
| 30 September | | | | | |
| B 1/21 (-) | 0900 | 1400 | T.N.W. | FSD Ladysmith (XT 265748) | CH-47 |
| 1 October | | | | | |
| B 1/21 (-) | 0900 | 1130 | FSD Lady- smith | T.N.W. | CH-47 |
| B 1/21 (-) | 1300 | 1330 | T.N.W. | Xuan Loc | C-130 |
| 1/21 TAG CP (-) | 1400 | 1730 | T.N.W. | Dien Hoa | Convoy |
| B 1/21 (-) | 1900 | 1945 | Xuan Loc | Mace | CH-47 |
| 2 October | | | | | |
| 1/21 TAG CF (-) | 0800 | 0845 | T.N.W. | Dien Hoa | CH-47 |

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Appendix 2 (Artillery Expenditures) to Annex G (Fire Support) to 3rd Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM)'s Operation Katum After Action Report.

FIELD ARTILLERY

TOTALS

236 HE
210 IGM
28 ILL
6 WF

MISSIONS

27 Suppressive Fire
1 GAF
4 DT
1 ILL

AFA

10 lb HE - 361
17 lb HE - 146
Fleshette - 215
Flight Hours - 164.5 hours

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Annex H (OPORD 3-71 - Katun) to 3rd Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM)'s Operation
Katun After Action Report

NOTE: OPORD 3-71 (Katun) is provided only to those personnel who were not on initial distribution. Addresses previously receiving OPORD 3-71 (Katun) should insert their copy at this Annex.