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
Opard 215

After Action Report: Countdown

Volume 2

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USARV/MACV SUPCOM



OPORD

215

AFTER ACTION

REPORT

COUNTDOWN

VOLUME TWO

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96375

AVHCG

4 June 1973

SUBJECT: After Action Report - Operation COUNTDOWN

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1. Almost eight years after its creation on 20 July 1965, the United States Army, Vietnam, more recently known as the United States Army Vietnam/Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Support Command (USARV/MACV SUPCOM), accomplished its mission in support of United States and Free World Military Assistance Forces in the Republic of Vietnam and was disestablished on 28 March 1973. During the three years preceding the cease-fire agreement, all of USARV's ground combat units were redeployed to CONUS and other Theaters. The USARV/MACV SUPCOM continued to be engaged in the unique mission of phasing down and closing out the command. During the last sixty days subsequent to the signing of the cease-fire agreement, twenty-four units redeployed to CONUS and to USAREUR and the remaining units were inactivated in the Republic of Vietnam. At the same time 13,244 US Army troops and over 36,000 ROK troops were redeployed to world-wide stations and Korea respectively.
2. The attached after action report reviews the USARV/MACV SUPCOM activities in preparation for and the execution of Free World Military Assistance Forces redeployment from the Republic of Vietnam. The period covered by the report is generally from 1 November 1972, the date of accelerated planning for possible redeployment, until 29 March 1973, when redeployment was completed. The beginning of this period also coincides with the closure date of the last Operational Report-Lessons Learned (ORLL) submitted.
3. The final phaseout and withdrawal of a Theater Army from an active area of operations was unique. Headquarters operated with fewer and more junior personnel at a time when the tempo

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
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and magnitude of operations were increasing. There were, and are, no field manuals on this subject. Plans were based on logic, common sense, and a fundamental understanding of functions. The smaller staffs insured daily and direct coordination which allowed for immediate reaction to Presidential and national desires. The successful withdrawal of US Army forces from RVN can be attributed to a very small group of relatively junior officers excited by challenge, and inspired by the need to react to continually changing requirements. The personnel involved represent a cross section of Army talent. It was obvious from their performance that the Army's units and activities can look forward to manning by very high quality personnel in future years.

1 Incl
as


M. G. ROSEBOROUGH
Major General, USA
Commander

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After Action Report

OPERATION COUNTDOWN

VOLUME II

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ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

1. PURPOSE. To report the significant activities and major problem areas experienced by the 1st Aviation Brigade Headquarters and its subordinate Combat Aviation Groups during pre-ceasefire operations as well as events encountered during the standdown and withdrawal of US Army aviation from the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

2. GENERAL.

a. This annex reports activities of the Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade and its subordinate units during the period 1 November 1972 through 28 March 1973. The Headquarters report is divided into two major categories: (1) Significant Activities and (2) Commanders' Observations and Recommendations. The Significant Activities category is further subdivided into a Pre-X-Day Phase extending from 1 November 1972 through 27 January 1973 and a Withdrawal Phase beginning 28 January 1973 (X-Day) and terminating on the final day of Brigade withdrawal on 29 March 1973.

b. Information pertaining to the Pre-X-Day Phase has been included due to its significance during the planning stages for the 60-day withdrawal and redeployment from the RVN. Inclusion of activities during this phase also has insured complete coverage of events and observations which occurred following submission of the last Operational Report-Lessons Learned Report (ORLL), period ending 31 October 1972.

c. Activities related to standdown and withdrawal were combined under the Withdrawal Phase for this Headquarters because there was no distinct division between the two phases. Unit standdowns and withdrawals were continual from X-Day through X+60 beginning with standdown of the Air Cavalry Troops on X-Day and terminating on X+59 as U-21 aircraft belonging to the Command Aircraft Company were flown from South Vietnam to Singapore for retrograde. The Headquarters staff was phased down gradually throughout the redeployment phase as job requirements diminished and functions ceased. Final 1st Aviation Brigade functions ceased on X+59, 28 March 1973.

d. Individual After Action Reports of each subordinate Combat Aviation Group are attached as appendices: 11th CAG at Appendix 1, 12th CAG at Appendix 2, 17th CAG at Appendix 3, and 164th CAG at Appendix 4.

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

3. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES (PRE-X-DAY).

a. Personnel.

(1) During the period 1 November 1972 to 27 January 1973, the ACofS, G1, was extensively involved in the coordinated staff planning for the withdrawal of US aviation forces in Vietnam. Personnel replacement was the dominant factor in planning each contingency. An aviator shortage throughout the Brigade began to manifest itself in November 1972. A shortfall of 45 aviators was projected for December. This shortfall, added to the understrength figures throughout the Brigade of approximately 100 aviators, made the shortage almost critical. Further complicating the personnel structure were the Christmas Drop Policy and the DA Travel Ban during the December holidays. Through coordinated action with DA and USARV/MACV SUPCOM, the Christmas Drop Policy for aviators was modified. This action reduced the aviator shortage within the RVN; however, DA could offer no relief on the aviator shortfall projected in December. DA did program additional aviator input to the RVN for January 1973 to aid in meeting the authorized aviator strength levels in Vietnam. This action only minimized the Brigade's losses as the Brigade remained approximately 140 aviators understrength on X-Day at which time all replacement personnel to the RVN were terminated.

(2) Other activities by the ACofS, G1, included providing detailed information to units on proper audit procedures for unit funds, domestic hire funds, and other sundry funds. Suspense dates and control procedures were revised to facilitate the timely completion of collateral investigations and flying evaluation boards. A hiring freeze was imposed on all civilian personnel. This freeze was subsequently lifted when the ceasefire was announced to allow for the hiring of mission essential personnel.

(3) Significant progress was made in identifying drug abusers. During the period 1 - 8 December 1972, all units of the Brigade underwent a urinalysis test. These tests were brought about by massive in-country personnel transfers during Increment XIV. A card file system was instituted to readily identify each drug abuser, the number of times the individual was positive, his unit, date tested, and disposition of the individual.

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(4) The Adjutant General's staff was primarily involved with enlisted personnel strength accounting, awards and decorations, and withdrawal planning.

(a) Vietnam continued to experience a critical shortage of personnel at the maintenance supervisor/first sergeant level (MOS 67Z50). Based upon an authorized strength of 122 personnel in grades E-7 and E-8, only 41 to 47 individuals were assigned to the Brigade during any portion of the period 1 November 1972 to 27 January 1973.

(b) Shortages of personnel who possessed hardskill maintenance and housekeeping MOS's were encountered as a result of a procedural change in drug abuser disposition. This procedural change announced in November involved approximately 150 enlisted soldiers. It required medical evacuation to a CONUS station of those personnel identified as first-time drug users. Replacement of these unanticipated losses could not be programmed and, initially, created some personnel shortages in various aviation MOS's.

(c) Processing awards and decorations was a significant activity of the Adjutant General's office. During this reporting period, the following awards were made to members of this Command:

Silver Star	14
Legion of Merit	6
Distinguished Flying Cross	135
Soldier's Medal	3
Bronze Star with "V"	11
Bronze Star for Service	1480
Bronze Star for Achievement	209
Army Commendation Medal with "V"	32
Army Commendation Medal for Service	2008
Army Commendation Medal for Achievement	315
Air Medal with "V"	186
Air Medal	8461
Purple Heart	38

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(d) Throughout this period, the Adjutant General's office planned for a possible announcement of a ceasefire with subsequent withdrawal of troops from the RVN. Among the planning areas were: phased losses of personnel with close and continuous strength accounting; processing of officer evaluation reports; awards and decorations; and termination of suspense and other correspondence. Planning proved initially difficult due to a lack of experience for a withdrawal of this nature; however, utilizing the experience of previously announced incremental troop withdrawals and guidance received from higher headquarters, most planning was completed and awaiting implementation upon the ceasefire announcement.

b. Intelligence and Security.

(1) The ACofS, G2, continued to accumulate all available data on the enemy's heat seeking missile, the SA-7. These data were used to brief all newly arrived aviators and to provide supplementary information to field commanders concerning high threat areas. The SA-7 data were also widely disseminated to a variety of research and other service users.

(2) In addition to the accumulation and dissemination of SA-7 data, close observation was maintained on the enemy disposition and his location of heavy anti-aircraft weapons. Close coordination with the Air Force and other Army intelligence channels provided invaluable intelligence which was further disseminated to the subordinate commands.

(3) A physical security inspection was made on 23 December in the 1st Aviation Brigade Headquarters. Courtesy counter-intelligence inspections were conducted for the 1st Aviation Brigade Headquarters and the 12th Combat Aviation Group between 10 - 15 January. Continued emphasis was placed on escape and evasion training and techniques and two members of the Brigade attended the Annual Escape and Evasion Conference sponsored by the USAF at Clark AFB in the Philippines.

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

c. Operations.

(1) Operational Plan Formulation and Planning.

(a) Preliminary planning was begun for the withdrawal of all US Army aviation elements from the RVN following the late October news releases of a possible ceasefire in Southeast Asia and US troop withdrawal. Planning was well under way in November. Very little guidance was provided this headquarters concerning the terms of a possible withdrawal except that all US military personnel had to be out of country within a 60-day time frame. Due to the "close hold" security requirements of available information, coordination and thorough planning was quite difficult. The limited number of staff officers assigned to the Campaign Planning Group were required to develop the overall OPLAN based upon logical planning assumptions and their own analysis of foreseeable problem areas. All pertinent aspects were considered and integrated into the final OPLAN. The aviation annex to the USARV/MACV SUPCOM OPLAN 215 was prepared on 15 November, well within the suspense date established by USARV/MACV SUPCOM. Ten days later the 1st Aviation Brigade OPLAN 215 was approved and disseminated to the field for further planning by subordinate headquarters.

(b) The OPLAN was thorough and complete in all respects. Areas concerning personnel, equipment retrograde and transfer, installation security, logistical matters, civilianization of military functions for on-going requirements, and property transaction were integrated into the composite plan. Only a few minor alterations were required in the final plan prior to its full implementation on X-Day. These changes were necessitated due to further available guidance and to events occurring between initial planning in November and the OPLAN's implementation on 28 January 1973.

(2) ATC and Flight Information. In October 1972, the Southeast Asia NOTAM Center ceased operations in the RVN. This event created a void in the areas of Flight Information and Notices to Airmen, a very serious matter due to the recurrent changes of air traffic control frequencies, functions, and assets. To correct this situation, the 1st Aviation Brigade established a procedure for dissemination of flight information and Notices to Airmen by means

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report
of electronically transmitted messages to each major aviation
element followed by telephonic verification of the message
receipt and data.

(3) Standardization and Safety Conference. A quarterly
USARV/MACV SUPCOM Standardization and Safety Conference was
held on 11 - 13 January 1973. The major topics of discussion
were the new aviation regulations and training programs as well
as training safety. Interpretation and feasibility of observing
regulatory requirements within the RVN were discussed in con-
sideration of reduced facilities and resources. Panel discus-
sion and conferences were held among standardization instructor
pilots and unit instructor pilots for each type of US aircraft
in the RVN. Several problem areas were disclosed and viable
solutions developed to be utilized at the unit level. Since
each US aviation unit in Vietnam had representatives at the
conference, problem areas which had previously been solved
by one unit were passed to other units for edification.

(4) Instrument Waivers for Army Aviation in Vietnam.

(a) Instrument flight requirements established by Depart-
ment of the Army during 1972 required that all Army aviators
possess a current Standard Instrument Flight Certification
by 31 December 1972. Those Army aviators possessing only the
Tactical Instrument Certification or no instrument rating at
all were required by regulation to undergo necessary instrument
flight training and ground study in order to upgrade or obtain
a Standard Instrument rating.

(b) Due to lack of suitable training resources and
facilities, it became impossible for most aviators in the RVN
to meet this requirement. Therefore the Commander, 1st
Aviation Brigade sought relief from this DA policy require-
ment by submitting a waiver request to USARPAC. The waiver
was submitted on behalf of all Army aviators in Vietnam who
were not in possession of a Standard Instrument Certification.
There were several problems encountered in this endeavor
because the waiver request had to identify aviators by
name as it applied to each individual. Developing this
waiver listing was relatively simple for those personnel in
aviation units and assignments. However, much difficulty

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

developed for those Army aviators in non-aviation assignments such as MACV or Army Advisory Groups and Teams throughout Vietnam. When the listing was finalized, a waiver was approved as requested per CINCUSARPAC GPAV message 052201Z Feb 73.

d. Equipment Retrograde/Turnover.

(1) Based on a series of messages received from higher headquarters, ACofS, G4, 1st Aviation Brigade, initiated title transfer to VNAF for numerous items of aviation equipment. Subsequently, the major end items were hand receipted back to ACofS, G4, for use by US Forces until such time as they became excess to USARV/MACV SUPCOM requirements. ACofS, G4, developed the necessary procedures to effect physical transfer of the property which had been title transferred. Simultaneously, plans were formulated for the total retrograde of 1st Aviation Brigade personnel and equipment. Combat Aviation Group Aircraft Maintenance Officers were appointed as Project Officers for the transfer of aircraft, armament systems, and avionics equipment within each Military Region. The project officers were directed to monitor, control and report physical transfers of these assets as they occurred. A series of plans were formulated to provide for the orderly retrograde of 1st Aviation Brigade personnel and assets based on sequenced input and directives received from higher headquarters. A synopsis of each of these plans follows:

(a) Vung Tau Plan: A feasibility study was conducted to determine the best possible point of departure for the surface retrograde of US Army aviation assets. All ports which were capable of handling SEATRAN vessels and Navy aircraft carriers were scrutinized. The initial decision to utilize Vung Tau as the singular point of retrograde operations was based on the geographical make-up of the Vung Tau area. The deep water port was adjacent to the airstrip which would facilitate easy movement of U-8 aircraft from the airstrip to the docks; Vung Tau was already equipped with billet space and facilities to support the large task force required for this type operation with minimum engineer improvements; Vung Tau port area is surrounded on three sides by water which would minimize security force requirements. Only two major drawbacks were evident in the early stages of planning: (1) The distance some aircraft would have to be flown to arrive at the retrograde site; and (2) the fact that non-flyable aircraft would have to be moved by sling operation over long distances creating serious hazard to aircraft and crews. 1st Aviation Brigade OPLAN 215

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

was developed on the premise that Vung Tau would be used for retrograde operations.

(b) Retrograde by Air: Indications were received from higher headquarters that the possibility existed that limited SEATRAN resources might be available to provide for retrograde movement. Based on this information, ACoFS, G4, 1st Aviation Brigade, drew up plans to facilitate the retrograde of 1st Aviation Brigade assets using Air Force cargo aircraft. To devise this plan, a survey was conducted of all airfields' capabilities for handling C-141 and C-5A aircraft. Potential staffing requirements were evaluated and equipment was identified for such a contingency. Much of this planning hinged on the requirement for U-78 and other fixed wing aircraft to be ferried to an offshore location for subsequent preparation and disposition.

(c) Newport Plan: Constant refinement of input and improved disposition instructions on US Army aviation assets caused revisions in plans and planning guidance. A plan was sought which would eliminate any additional engineer support, reduce security requirements, and reduce distances aircraft would have to travel to effect retrograde. The most feasible plan became known as the Newport Plan. Under this plan the 388th TC would shoulder the bulk of the retrograde requirements by processing all aircraft from Military Regions III and IV and all AH-1G and CH-47C aircraft retrograde requirements from Military Region II. The 388th TC would use the Newport dock facilities at Saigon. The 604th TC would process the OH-6A retrograde requirements for Military Region II from Nha Trang and the 142nd TC would be responsible for all retrograde requirements in Military Region I from Danang. Because of existing facilities at these locations, no additional engineer support was required, no additional security forces were required, and the flight time and aircraft/crew hazard was reduced to a minimum.

(2) All of the above enumerated plans required reorganization of Norman Harwell Associates (NHA) contract support personnel because of the non-availability of sufficient military personnel to accomplish the projected mission. The Newport Plan minimized the movement of NHA civilian personnel and equipment. To cover the advent of maintenance and retrograde requirements which might still be required beyond a possible X+60 day limitation in the event of a ceasefire, the Commander, Aviation Maintenance Activity, initiated action to expand or extend the NHA civilian

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

personnel contract to take care of this contingency. The ultimate result of these planning steps and phases was not known until the completion of retrograde operation in the RVN.

(3) Detailed plans were written describing the packaging and shipment of aviation repair parts at the unit PLL level, Forward Supply Points, and the Central DSSA. Because of the requirement to support aviation operations after the ceasefire, flexibility was designed into the plans. Aviation units would pack their own PLL when the unit ceased operations. This packaged PLL would be turned in to the supporting Forward Supply Point. The computer in the Central DSSA would identify parts as they were no longer required and send material release orders to the Forward Supply Points detailing what parts were to be packaged and where they were to be shipped. Using these procedures, when the AH1G helicopters stopped flying, all applicable repair parts would be identified, packaged, and retrograded. Supply support to aircraft still flying would continue. When the Forward Supply Points stooddown, supply support would shift directly to the Central DSSA. A team of NHA contract civilians were identified to be used after the departure of military personnel to pack and retrograde the repair parts and supplies which remained in the Central DSSA.

(4) On 20 December 1972, the Aviation Material Management Center (AMMC) stooddown. Their primary mission for the four months prior to the standdown was Class IX support to VNAF. This mission was transferred to the Theater Aviation Material Management Center (TAMMC) in Okinawa on 1 December 1972. In early November an agreement was made between the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force to issue VNAF Aviation Intensively Managed Items (AIMI) for UH1H aircraft through June 1973 and CH47A aircraft through March 1973. Quantities were negotiated and the US Army Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM) was tasked to provide them. These AIMI items were issued from AVSCOM to VNAF through AMMC in order to comply with billing requirements. Close coordination was made with VNAF and AVSCOM and the issues were completed in December 1972. With the standdown of AMMC, all open dues-out for VNAF and dues-in from AVSCOM for normal requisitions were left open. Reconciliations were made with both activities and files adjusted. Approximately 3,000 dues-in and dues-out remained. A special computer printout of these files was made to allow manual processing. When issues were made, manual billing cards were also prepared. The US Army Aviation Supply Activity (USAASA) was the retail aviation supply activity for all Army aviation in the RVN. They were tasked to receive and to issue the

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

remaining repair parts to VNAF after AMMC ceased operation. Repair parts remaining in AMMC stocks were screened against USAASA requirements. Those required to support Army aviation in the RVN were retained; the balance was retrograded to TAMMC.

e. Logistics.

(1) In the latter part of October 1972, a series of messages from USARV/MACV SUPCOM, CINCUSARPAC, USAAVSCOM and DA initiated a project called Enhance Plus. This project was to constitute a wide range buildup of RVNAF military power through the massive insertion of war materials. The 1st Aviation Brigade was directed to title transfer 286 UH1H and 22 CH47A aircraft, armament subsystems, avionics consoles, aircraft repair parts and components, tools, ground support equipment, and property book TOE items. On 8 November 1972, the title transfer of all required equipment and assets was completed. Hand receipts were issued by VNAF to US forces covering the aircraft, armament subsystems, avionics consoles, and repair parts. Final physical transfer of these assets would take place as they became excess to US Army requirements.

(2) Using the Project Enhance Plus requirements as a starting point for determining remaining assets that would be retrograded in the event of a ceasefire, 1st Aviation Brigade commenced planning and preparation for a total withdrawal of its personnel and assets. Based on actual and projected on-hand balances of assets and equipment, 1st Aviation Brigade, G4 staff began assembling data which would be essential in planning a mass retrograde operation. This data included, but was not limited to, type of assets to be retrograded; amounts by type of air transportability kits and herculite bags on hand and needed; number, by type, of vessels, SEALAND vans, and Air Force cargo aircraft required; short tons by location of supplies and repair parts that would have to be retrograded; manhour requirements for preparation of aircraft for retrograde by surface or air; and various contingency evaluations based on the premise of ferry operations to offshore locations of fixed wing aircraft.

(3) Information was gathered to determine materials required for future massive retrograde operations. Materials on hand were identified, located and earmarked for retrograde operations. Items which were deemed necessary but not on hand were requisitioned on high priority from CONUS to facilitate complete availability when retrograde operations commenced.

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(4) Feasibility studies were conducted to determine retrograde sites for each contingency operation. Where retrograde operations were to be primarily conducted by air, a plan was developed selecting primary and alternate aerial ports based on geographic location, aircraft handling capability, and aerial port staffing and equipment. The initial plans for surface movement via SEATRAN vessel supported by feasibility studies indicated that Vung Tau port would be the most logical and advantageous retrograde site for 1st Aviation Brigade assets because of the port draft, accessibility from the airfield to the port itself, and billeting space for personnel manning the retrograde site. As these plans continued to take shape, an alternate plan for surface retrograde was developed utilizing the ports of Danang and Newport with limited retrograde via SEALAND van from Nha Trang. This latter plan was adopted because of the geographical accessibility to present locations of 1st Aviation Brigade units, limited requirements for security, and lack of requirements for engineer support.

(5) ACoFS, G4, 1st Aviation Brigade, began publication of letters of instruction and consolidated information to form the Logistical Annex to 1st Aviation Brigade OPLAN 215. OPLAN 215, augmented by interim letters of instruction, provided units in the field with information and procedures to cover all contingencies of the standdown, withdrawal and roll-up of 1st Aviation Brigade units in the RVN.

(6) Because of the surface transportation assets required to retrograde U-8 aircraft, 1st Aviation Brigade requested authority from USARPAC and DA to ferry these aircraft to Singapore for subsequent retrograde. Delays in a response to this request created many technical problems at the lower levels and made firm planning difficult. Due to CONUS requirements for rapid disposition of these aircraft, DA directed that the U-8 aircraft would be retrograded by SEATRAN vessel direct from the RVN to CONUS. U21 aircraft would be ferried to Singapore and the contract with the Lockheed depot repair facility there would be expanded to accommodate the additional input of 37 U21 aircraft.

(7) On 21 November 1972 the ACoFS, G4, 1st Aviation Brigade, published a Milestone Chart. The Milestone Chart was to be used as a management tool to check on the timeliness of required actions by various staff elements in the accomplishment of their assigned missions during the actual operation of Project Enhance Plus and the retrograde of 1st Aviation Brigade assets after a ceasefire had been signed.

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(8) Contingency plans were formulated at a USARV/MACV SUPCOM level requiring the use of US Army UH1H aircraft assets for extended periods of time to provide aviation support to the Four Party Joint Military Commission and International Commission for Control and Supervision. These programs required extensive planning for support and accountability beyond the normal scope of the 1st Aviation Brigade mission. Additionally, plans were developed to loan ten UH1H aircraft with a 365-day support package to Air America to augment its aviation fleet for operations in the RVN after a ceasefire to support the Defense Attache Office (DAO). These requirements were in addition to the 286 UH1H aircraft already title transferred to VNAF as part of Project Enhance Plus. Messages were sent to higher headquarters requesting an input of seven UH1H aircraft in order to meet all requirements and contingencies.

(9) To simplify the retrograde of repair parts and aviation peculiar equipment, a request was sent to CINCUSARPAC asking for blanket disposition instructions. The only aircraft in Vietnam that was not elsewhere in the Pacific was the OH6. Disposition was given to retrograde all repair parts except those applicable to the OH6 to TAMMC in Okinawa. Retrograde of OH6 parts would be to Sharpe Army Depot. All aviation peculiar equipment that was not transferred to VNAF was to be shipped to Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, Texas.

(10) In early November, OH58, OV1 and CH54 aircraft were transferred from the RVN. This was an opportunity to test the plans designed for the identification, packing, and shipping of parts after a ceasefire. Aviation units turned in PLL's to their supporting Forward Supply Points. USAASA then prepared DD Forms 1348-1 and the parts were retrograded directly from each storage facility. Few problems were experienced and the ceasefire plans were found to be sound. The retrograde of these parts was completed on 29 December 1972.

(11) Excess stocks of supplies, equipment and repair parts were identified and located within depot facilities and released for early retrograde to CONUS or other out-of-country locations in an effort to reduce on hand balances prior to a maximum effort for total withdrawal.

(12) Dining facilities were to close as directed by the Army Support Element of each Military Region. 1st Aviation Brigade Food Service Supervisor visited each Military Region to insure an orderly standdown of each dining facility and that 1st Aviation Brigade personnel would consume a minimum of C-rations.

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(13) A Maintenance Assistance and Inspection Team (MAIT) was established in the Quality Assurance Branch, Aviation Maintenance Activity, ACoFS, G4, 1st Aviation Brigade, for the purpose of making subordinate unit visits in an effort to assist these units in preparing administration, maintenance activities, and assets for future withdrawal operations. All subordinate units within the Brigade were visited during December and early January and each received assistance as necessary from the MAIT.

f. Transfer of Billeting, Bases, Installed Property and Equipment and Other Real Property. Plans were formulated by Logistics Division, ACoFS, G4, 1st Aviation Brigade, to transfer post, camp and station equipment and buildings on an "as is/where is" basis to the GVN agency designated to occupy each specific facility. These basic plans followed previous base transfer guidelines, but excluded unnecessary repair and replacement of major items.

g. Safety. The quarterly USARV/MACV SUPCOM Standardization and Safety Conference was convened at Vung Tau, RVN on 12 January 1973. The Unit Safety Officers of each group and company size elements were represented. Main topic areas included accident trends and cause factors, the new AR 95-1, accident rates, aircraft accident reports, outlook for Safety Officer replacements, and future requirements in safety related areas of unit operations. Numerous informative discussions were held and valuable data gleaned from the conference which each Unit Safety Officer was able to apply to his Safety Program in order to increase the safety consciousness within his unit.

h. Inspector General.

(1) The 1st Aviation Brigade Inspector General section formed an IG Team from key personnel within the headquarters element to conduct Pre-USARV/MACV SUPCOM IG assistance visits to the units within the 1st Aviation Brigade.

(2) The 164th Combat Aviation Group and its five subordinate units located at Can Tho were inspected on 10 - 12 January. Assistance was provided in those areas where discrepancies were noted. This Pre-IG Inspection was helpful to the units of the 164th CAG. The Group received a Superior rating from the USARV/MACV SUPCOM IG Inspection conducted 15 - 19 January 1973.

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(3) A 1st Aviation Brigade Pre-IG assistance visit was also begun on 21 January 1973 for units of the 17th Combat Aviation Group. This visit was proceeding quite well and most units had been aided in several problem areas. On 24 January 1973 the announcement was made of the signing of a ceasefire to be completed on 28 January, and 17th CAG was notified that the Annual USARV/MACV SUPCOM IG Inspection would be canceled. The Brigade IG Inspection Team then discontinued its functions. However, the discrepancies noted by the Pre-IG Team enabled corrective action to be taken by units of the 17th CAG and enabled them to complete standdown and withdrawal actions with few problems.

4. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES (WITHDRAWAL PHASE).

a. Personnel.

(1) During the withdrawal phase from 28 January to 28 March 1973, the ACoFS, G1, commenced the standdown/redeployment actions pertaining to the withdrawal of 1st Aviation Brigade personnel from the RVN. Eighteen Domestic Hire and other Sundry Funds were terminated and final audits conducted on all accounts. All terminal audits and files were turned into Vietnam Open Mess Agency (VOMA) by 2 March 1973.

(2) All units within the Brigade underwent urinalysis testing before 28 February 1973 when urinalysis testing was terminated in the RVN. Personnel, under the age of 29, departing the RVN after 28 February 1973 were required to have a Commander's Certificate stating that each had been evaluated negative on an urinalysis test conducted within 60 days of his departure.

(3) On X-Day the US Army Aviation Supply Activity had 24 military, 155 NHA contract personnel, and 330 local national personnel assigned. Military personnel were reduced according to the withdrawal schedule. Reduction of NHA personnel commenced on 27 February 1973 and by 28 March 1973, the total was reduced to approximately 100. Those remaining personnel would conduct the final preparation and shipment of the aviation supply parts in the ASA open storage depot. The local national employees were reduced in three phases with the final reduction occurring on 28 March 1973.

(4) The awards and decorations function of this headquarters was a significant morale factor for personnel assigned to the Brigade. This headquarters attempted, and succeeded within the

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

limited time available, in assuring that all personnel assigned on X-Day, and who had been recommended, received their awards prior to departure from the RVN. Action was taken on recommendations for award based upon the announced unit drawdown schedule to insure timely presentation. At the request of this headquarters, subordinate units were required to submit abbreviated recommendations in packet form, i.e., BSM, AM, ARCOM, etc. Much credit must be given to these units in that their submission procedures were flawless and enabled this headquarters to complete the awards and decorations function with minimum difficulty.

(5) During the withdrawal phase, the following awards were processed:

Silver Star	5
Legion of Merit	12
Distinguished Flying Cross	74
Soldier's Medal	2
Bronze Star Medal with Valor Device	13
Bronze Star Medal "Service"	1252
Bronze Star Medal "Achievement"	246
Army Commendation Medal with Valor Device	34
Army Commendation Medal "Service"	1847
Army Commendation Medal "Achievement"	471
Air Medal with Valor Device	110
Air Medal "Achievement"	11548
Purple Heart	14

(6) The processing and orderly termination of suspense correspondence, to include Congressional and Presidential Inquiries, line of duty investigations, and individual support cases was smooth and convenient to all commanders. Effective X-Day, all outstanding suspense items were identified and controls were established to insure early completion. Subsequent papers received from higher headquarters were telephonically processed and all responses made by this headquarters. Cooperation and services provided by subordinate commands, down to company level, were excellent and responsive, and reflected the individual commander's determination to make the withdrawal complete in all respects. Much credit must be given to Headquarters USARV/MACV SUPCOM Adjutant General's office which was primarily responsible for the timely termination of this correspondence and development of these procedures.

(7) On X-Day the Record Management Officers of each Combat Aviation Group were notified to strictly adhere to the USARV/MACV SUPCOM message which detailed the disposition of records

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

throughout the standdown. They, in turn, notified subordinate units to label all records and begin preparation for shipment of records and files. The Admin Services Division was responsible for preparation and shipment of Confidential and Secret documents and files. Confidential files were sent via registered mail to USARHAW on X+20. Secret files and documents, except for 13 mission essential files, were mailed on X+30. All other records of the Brigade and its units were shipped by X+58.

b. Intelligence/Security.

(1) All available information on enemy SA-7 missile firings at Army aircraft was compiled in a report entitled "SA-7: Final Analysis." This report was sent to USAAVSCOM PM AEWSPPS and to BG Maddox, the Director of Army Aviation. Record copies were also sent to the records holding area for 1st Aviation Brigade files at USARHAW. All of the files of the 1st Aviation Brigade G-2 section concerning the SA-7 missile were sent to USAAVSCOM PM AEWSPPS on 17 February 1973.

(2) A counterintelligence inspection was conducted upon closure of each 1st Aviation Brigade installation. These inspections were conducted by members of the 1st Aviation Brigade G-2 section or by members of the 575th Military Intelligence Detachment. All inspections were completed in a very satisfactory manner.

c. Operations.

(1) Operation HOMECOMING.

(a) Operation HOMECOMING was the unclassified code word for the recovery and return of American Prisoners of War from both North and South Vietnam. In anticipation of American POW releases in South Vietnam by the PRG during the 60-day time period stipulated by the Paris Agreement, a plan was formulated for Army aviation to support Operation HOMECOMING.

(b) The USARV/MACV SUPCOM served as the principal agent for developing the Operation HOMECOMING Plan. Army aviation was to assume a key role in the entire operation.

(c) A tentative plan was developed on 5 February 1973. The general concept was for an advance party in three aircraft to arrive at the designated release point prior to the scheduled release time. This advance party would be composed of US personnel overseeing the prisoner release, interpreters, a medical team and pathfinders.

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(d) The main lift force would arrive at the release site at the designated release time for the POW pickup. Additional aircraft would be available for use in replacement, maintenance, and recovery of downed aircraft as necessary. Command and control aircraft would serve as radio relay between the advance party and the Command Operations Center. The main extraction force aircraft would pick up the POW's and return them to an airbase for onward movement to Clark AFB in the Philippines via C9A Air Force aircraft.

(e) Within a few days the PRG representatives indicated that their first American POW release would occur in Military Region III north of Saigon. Based upon this information, a more advanced plan was developed. All aspects were thoroughly evaluated and all pertinent staff sections cooperated with the plan's finalization.

(f) Aviation planners developed their specific portion with the key aviation personnel who would be involved. These included commanders and operations officers of the 1st Aviation Brigade, 12th Combat Aviation Group, and 59th Corps Aviation Company. Details developed included a team designated Force Alpha. This force would consist of two UH1H "slick" helicopters and one medical evacuation "dustoff" helicopter. This element would transport the advance party into the release site to complete the transfer requirements and to set up the area for the arrival of Force Bravo. Force Bravo would consist of five UH1H "slick" helicopters and would be utilized to transport the released POW's to Home Base at Tan Son Nhut for transfer to C9A aircraft and movement to Clark AFB.

(g) Force Charlie, a backup force, was positioned at an intermediate site to respond to any emergencies. This reserve force consisted of one UH1H "slick" to be used as a spare and one UH1H equipped to perform maintenance repairs. A CH47C was also available to perform recovery operations if necessary.

(h) The final Army aviation requirements would be accomplished by two command and control UH1H aircraft which would work in relays to provide radio relay communications between the Advance Party at the release site and the Command Operations Center.

(i) Except for the delay in the release of the POW's, all portions of the Operation HOMECOMING Plan was accomplished according to schedule. The aviation support of Operation HOMECOMING was proven to be a sound concept during the conduct of the first mission. This concept would continue to be used during subsequent release of US Prisoners of War anywhere in South Vietnam. The plan was not required to be used again.

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(2) VNAF Flight Following Service.

(a) The withdrawal schedule outlined in 1st Aviation Brigade OPLAN 215 required standdown of all Aviation Detachments (Divisional) (ADD's) on X+15. This plan was established in order for CH47C aircraft support to be available after standdown in order to retrieve various major items of ATC equipment from remote sites.

(b) Due to the standdown of the ADD's, a void would occur for aircraft flight following services (FFS) throughout Vietnam. This problem area was recognized very early in the withdrawal planning and action was undertaken to fill this void through utilization of assets of the Vietnam Air Force.

(c) Although the VNAF had not attempted to provide VMC flight following service to the US Army, it was discovered that they had an excellent capability through their Aircraft Control and Warning Centers (AC&WC) which had been used primarily for control of tactical operations. These centers could easily provide the US Army with FFS. These VNAF AC&WC's, located at Can Tho, Saigon, Ban Me Thuot, Pleiku, and Danang are equipped with long range radars and sole-user telephone circuits, plus high frequency radios for communications between stations.

(d) A request was submitted in January 1973 through the US Air Force Advisory Group to Headquarters, VNAF, requesting flight following service for US Army aircraft. Several coordination meetings were held to finalize operating procedures. A discrete UHF radio frequency was assigned and an agreement completed for the VNAF to begin providing the flight following service for the US Army effective 1 February 1973 (X+4).

(e) It was also agreed that the US Army FFS should continue to operate for a short transition period. However, after a few days of operation, it was determined that the VNAF service was very satisfactory and the US Army flight following services officially terminated operations on 12 February 1973 (X+15) as scheduled. Various aviation unit operations offices continued to provide backup FM and VHF radio flight following services for their aircrews throughout the withdrawal period. This ATC transfer of flight following service contributed to a smoother and earlier withdrawal of US Army ATC equipment.

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

while providing continuous VMC flight following service for all US aircraft during the final phases of withdrawal of US forces from the Republic of Vietnam.

(3) Aviation Waiver. In mid-February, the 1st Aviation Brigade was advised that a waiver, previously omitting aviators in Southeast Asia from requirements for attaining annual night and instrument flying minimums, completing the Annual Written Examination and of maintaining instrument qualifications, had been rescinded effective 1 January 1973. In light of this news, and because numerous aviators had already departed the RVN without knowledge of this rescinded waiver, attempts were made to obtain an extension of the waiver due to the RVN withdrawal activities currently in progress. This request was not favorably considered.

(4) Redeployment. Throughout the withdrawal phase, the ACofS, G3, was involved with a variety of ongoing actions pertaining to the total withdrawal/transfer of 1st Aviation Brigade assets and personnel. The schedules established by 1st Aviation Brigade OPLAN 215 were closely monitored and minor alterations made when the situation or directives required. The ACofS, G3, insured that those units being redeployed prepared their necessary equipment and/or Color Guards for shipment and received necessary redeployment orders. Several units required extensions to their scheduled inactivation/redeployment dates and order amendments were prepared as needed.

(5) Operational Reports. Aviation operational reports continued throughout the withdrawal phase and new reports were added to provide the commander with current aircraft status and utilization on a daily basis. These reports came from Brigade units as well as from the Special Aviation Detachments in support of the International Commission for Control and Supervision and the Four Party Joint Military Commission. Flying hour records for each of these detachments were also maintained in order to provide the USARV/MACV SUPCOM Comptroller a basis for which to compute user-country costs for Army aviation support.

(6) After-Action Report. The ACofS, G3, was also responsible for compiling the 1st Aviation Brigade and Aviation Officer After-Action Report for USARV/MACV SUPCOM. This major task was developed according to established formats and input was received from all staff sections. Each subordinate Combat Aviation Group

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

consolidated after-action reports from its subordinate units and a Group Report was submitted to Brigade. Each Group Report was included in-total as an appendix to complete the 1st Aviation Brigade After-Action Report. The report covered activities from 1 November 1972 through the final withdrawal of each unit. Arrangements were made for the After-Action Project Officer to complete this report during USARV/MACV SUPCOM rollup operations at USARPAC following redeployment of the 1st Aviation Brigade.

(7) Ongoing Actions. Operational problems, routine and unusual, were dispatched effectively throughout the withdrawal phase and smooth G3 functions continued until the 1st Aviation Brigade ceased all operations and departed the RVN.

d. Equipment Retrograde/Turnover.

(1) On 28 January 1973 the 388th TC, 604th TC, and 142nd TC Direct Support Units organized their personnel and equipment to commence retrograde operations under the Newport Plan. The 388th TC was to assume responsibility for retrograde of all aircraft from Military Region III and IV and all AH1G and CH47 aircraft from Military Region II. This operation was established at the deep water port of Newport, Saigon, RVN. The 604th TC was to assume responsibility for retrograde of all OH6A aircraft located in Military Region II operating at Nha Trang, RVN. The 142nd TC established retrograde operations at Danang, RVN, to accommodate all rotary wing aircraft scheduled for retrograde from Military Region I. Previously identified and stocked retrograde materials were moved to the retrograde processing sites. Teams of NHA civilian and US Army personnel were established to accept and prepare aircraft for retrograde.

(2) A combined Retrograde Operations Support Southeast Asia (ROSSA) and Maintenance Assistance Inspection Team was formed using USAAVSCOM and 1st Aviation Brigade Quality Assurance Section personnel to assist the organizations at the retrograde sites in classification, documentation, historical record checks, and preparation of aircraft. WECOM technical assistance personnel were sent to the field to assist units in turning in and processing weapons systems.

(3) Initial aircraft input to retrograde sites arrived on 30 January 1973. The aircraft input followed the unit standdown

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

schedule as contained in 1st Aviation Brigade OPLAN 215 with changes. By 7 February 1973, all of MR I and II OH6A aircraft had been secured in SEALAND vans and provided to SEALAND Corporation for shipment. By 22 February 1973, all MR III and IV OH6A aircraft had been secured in SEALAND vans and provided SEALAND Corporation for shipment.

(4) Coordination was effected with TMA for the tentative input of SEATRAN vessels on 16 February 1973 and 5 March 1973. The USAAVSCOM escort team for the first SEATRAN arrived from CONUS on 8 February 1973. The second escort team arrived from CONUS on 25 February 1973. The first vessel was programed to receive no less than thirty U8, nine CH47C, forty-five AH1G aircraft, and the wing boxes and blade boxes for the U8s and AH1Gs. All aircraft were to be retrograded from Newport. The second SEATRAN was programed to receive twenty-five CH47C and 52 AH1G aircraft and all the blade boxes for the AH1G helicopters. The initial stop for this second vessel was Danang followed by a second stop for pick up of the remaining aircraft at Newport.

(5) On 28 January 1973, the US Army Aviation Supply Activity, with its Forward Supply Points, had in stock, approximately 2,330 tons of repair parts valued at \$35 million which were to be retrograded or issued to Air America in support of ICCS and/or DAO. Repair parts were applicable to UH1H, U21, CH47C, U8, AH1G, and OH6A aircraft as well as avionics and armament components. The retrograde of repair parts was keyed to the standdown and retrograde of aircraft by type. Armament systems and repair parts were immediately retrograded on 28 January 1973. By 10 March 1973, all repair parts had been packaged and shipped, except those applicable to UH1H and U21 aircraft. OH6A aircraft parts were retrograded to Sharpe Army Depot, armament items to Red River Army Depot; and all other items to USARBCO, Okinawa. A requirement existed to fly UH1H and U21 aircraft until after 28 March 1973. In order to conform to the military withdrawal schedule, NHA contract civilians assumed the responsibility to retrograde remaining repair and supply parts after 28 March 1973.

(6) Dues-out to units were canceled fifteen days prior to their standdown dates. Dues-in from CONUS were canceled throughout the period as net assets became excessive to requirements. Maximum utilization of lateral search was utilized to preclude requisitions on CONUS. An agreement with VNAF was consummated for VNAF to provide NORS support on a fill or kill basis during the entire withdrawal period.

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(7) On X-Day, the requisition objective of all stocks at the Forward Supply Points and all stocks except UH1H, U21 and avionics were zeroed. This precluded replenishment requisitions of those line items of stock. NORS only support was provided for aircraft standing down prior to 27 February 1973. Routine requisitions were processed to CONUS for U21 and UH1H aircraft until 27 February 1973, then NORS only support was provided.

(8) Units were responsible for packaging PLL items and turning them in to the supporting Forward Supply Point for retrograde. Repair parts from the units applicable to UH1H and U21 aircraft were retained in-country and all other parts were retrograded. Identification and processing of repair parts to be retrograded and the final close out of the Aviation Supply Activity by NHA contract personnel posed no significant problems.

(9) UH1H and U21 maintenance problems were minimal during the withdrawal phase. Adequate tools, parts and civilian maintenance personnel (NHA) were available during the entire period which enabled the 1st Aviation Brigade to meet or exceed the operational readiness requirements desired by USARV/MACV SUPCOM. Aircraft flying commitments were also minimal during this period which significantly enhanced the operational readiness of aircraft. No major maintenance problems developed.

(10) On 20 February 1973, the transfer of 24 T55-L7C engines was effected which completed the engine transfer program to VNAF under Project Enhance Plus.

(11) The Aviation Supply Activity was tasked with providing a 90-day support package of repair parts to Air America in support of ten UH1H aircraft in support of DAO and a second 90-day package in support of thirty UH1H aircraft for the JCCS. The support package was computed using demand data on record. During the period 27 February 1973 through 14 March 1973, all repair parts in-country which matched the support package were identified and earmarked for turnover to Air America after all support requirements of US Army missions terminated. The physical issue of these parts was to be accomplished by NHA contract personnel after 28 March 1973.

(12) On 27 January 1973, VNAF was provided with a listing of 286 UH1H aircraft serial numbers which would be physically transferred to them under Enhance Plus as they became excess

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

to the needs of the US Army. A schedule of UH1H transfers (completed transaction) is listed below:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE</u>
9 Feb 73	6	6
10 Feb 73	21	27
12 Feb 73	16	43
13 Feb 73	16	59
14 Feb 73	7	66
15 Feb 73	12	78
16 Feb 73	7	85
17 Feb 73	7	92
20 Feb 73	10	102
21 Feb 73	2	104
22 Feb 73	2	106
23 Feb 73	6	112
24 Feb 73	7	119
25 Feb 73	1	120
27 Feb 73	2	122
28 Feb 73	2	124
6 Mar 73	17	141
9 Mar 73	29	170
10-20 Mar 73	116	286

e. Logistics.

(1) Intra-RVN air transport for personnel and material was inadequate and unresponsive to the needs of the 1st Aviation Brigade. All US Air Force scheduled air service was terminated on 28 January 1973. The bulk of 1st Aviation Brigade intra-RVN movement was handled through organic means or via special air-lift request.

(2) The 1st Aviation Brigade was tasked to provide aviation support for ICCS, FPJMC, and DAO. Additionally, a standing requirement existed to transfer 286 UH1H aircraft to VNAF as input directed by Project Enhance Plus. FPMC was supported by VNAF titled aircraft which were transferred to VNAF and hand receipted back for use by the US crewmen flying for JMC. DAO was supported by ten UH1H aircraft selected and designated for bailment to Air America. This bailment agreement was sent to the home office of Air America on 8 March 1973 for signature and implementation. ICCS was supported initially by VNAF titled aircraft which were transferred to VNAF and hand receipted back to US forces. Simultaneously, twenty-three US titled aircraft

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

were designated and selected for transfer to Air America to assume this mission after signature and initiation of the agreement sent to the Air America home office on 9 March 1973. Seven VNAF titled aircraft were also required by Air America to meet the total commitment of 30 UH1H aircraft required to support ICCS. Fixed Wing support for this same requirement would be provided by aircraft already owned and operated by Air America.

f. Transfer of Billeting, Bases, Installed Property and Equipment and Other Real Property. The transfer of installed property and equipment, base closures, dining facility closures, and final actions pertaining to property books were completed in a timely manner and few problems resulted during these transactions. Tables showing closure dates for 1st Aviation Brigade dining facilities, property books, and bases follow:

DINING FACILITIES

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CLOSURE DATE</u>
1. 12th CAG	23 Jan 73
2. F Troop, 4th Cavalry	1 Feb 73
3. C Troop, 16th Cavalry	1 Feb 73
4. F Troop, 8th Cavalry	4 Feb 73
5. 60th Aslt Hel Co	5 Feb 73
6. H Troop, 10th Cavalry	6 Feb 73
7. 17th CAG	8 Feb 73
8. F Troop, 9th Cavalry	12 Feb 73
9. H Troop, 17th Cavalry	15 Feb 73
10. 18th Corps Avn Co	17 Feb 73
11. 180th Aslt Spt Hel Co	19 Feb 73
12. 129th Aslt Hel Co	27 Feb 73
13. 57th Aslt Hel Co	28 Feb 73
14. D Troop, 17th Cavalry	16 Mar 73
15. 1st Avn Bde	25 Mar 73

PROPERTY BOOK CLEARANCE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
1. 321st Avn Det	8 Feb 73
2. F Troop, 4th Cav	10 Feb 73
3. 344th Avn Det (Div)	10 Feb 73
4. 94th Med Det	10 Feb 73
5. F Troop, 9th Cav	12 Feb 73
6. 546th Med Det	13 Feb 73
7. D Troop, 17th Cav	14 Feb 73

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
8. 318th Avn Det (Div)	14 Feb 73
9. H Troop, 10th Cav	14 Feb 73
10. F Troop, 8th Cav	14 Feb 73
11. 519th Med Det	15 Feb 73
12. C Troop, 16th Cav	15 Feb 73
13. HHC, 12th CAG	16 Feb 73
14. 129th Med Det	21 Feb 73
15. 312th Avn Det (Div)	26 Feb 73
16. H Troop, 17th Cav	28 Feb 73
17. 774th Med Det	28 Feb 73
18. 345th Avn Det (Div)	28 Feb 73
19. 611th TC	5 Mar 73
20. 180th Aslt Spt Hel Co	6 Mar 73
21. 399th Avn Det (Div)	7 Mar 73
22. 25th Med Det	7 Mar 73
23. 142nd TC	7 Mar 73
24. 129th Aslt Hel Co	8 Mar 73
25. 60th Aslt Hel Co	9 Mar 73
26. 62nd CAC	9 Mar 73
27. HHC, 11th CAG	11 Mar 73
28. 57th Aslt Hel Co	11 Mar 73
29. HHC, 17th CAG	12 Mar 73
30. 604th TC	13 Mar 73
31. HHC, 164th CAG	14 Mar 73
32. HHC, 1st Avn Bde	15 Mar 73
33. 59th CAC	15 Mar 73
34. 388th TC	15 Mar 73
35. 201st CAC	24 Mar 73
36. Comd Acft Co	24 Mar 73
37. 18th CAC	24 Mar 73

BASE CLOSURE

1. Tan My	1 Feb 73
2. Camp Worthington, Ninh Hoa	8 Feb 73
3. Lassiter AAF, Bien Hoa	13 Feb 73
4. Lane AAF, An Son	28 Feb 73
5. Pleiku, 17th CAG	9 Mar 73
6. Can Tho, 164th CAG	10 Mar 73
7. Danang, 11th CAG	12 Mar 73
8. Nha Trang, 201st CAC	14 Mar 73
9. Tan Son Nhut, 12th CAG	24 Mar 73
10. MACV Annex, 1st Avn Bde	24 Mar 73

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

g. Inspector General.

(1) The 1st Aviation Brigade Inspector General served on the USARV/MACV SUPCOM Base Closure Inspection Team following X-Day. This team was programed to make preliminary and final inspections of all US Army installations in the RVN. A base closure schedule was established and followed with only minor deviations.

(2) The preliminary inspection served to inform all unit commanders of the USARV/MACV SUPCOM base closure requirements in order that high standards could be met in advance and all bases could meet their scheduled closure dates without being overburdened with last minute police and maintenance requirements.

(3) The final inspection insured that USARV/MACV SUPCOM base closure standards had been met and permitted the final transfer of the base property and facilities to GVN agents. All 1st Aviation Brigade units completed their inspections in excellent fashion and no significant problems were encountered in base closure/transfer.

h. Flight Surgeon.

(1) Adequate personnel were present in the Surgeon's office and in all six Army aviation dispensaries throughout the RVN. These dispensaries provided medical aid as necessary and insured proper medical clearance of assigned aviation personnel.

(2) All dispensary operations were enhanced by the utilization of previously stockpiled medical supplies throughout the detachment withdrawal phase and medical equipment and supplies were transferred to GVN personnel on an "as is/where is" basis. This procedure greatly facilitated the medical detachment stand-down process.

(3) All aviation medical detachments were inactivated at X+45, but flight surgeons at Can Tho, Danang, and Nha Trang were reassigned to the Army aviation unit at the base and continued to provide aviation medical service until final unit standdown.

(4) The 1st Aviation Brigade Flight Surgeon served as flight physician for Army aviation units at Tan Son Nhut from X+15 until final Brigade redeployment.

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

i. Safety.

(1) The USARV/MACV SUPCOM aircraft accident rate for the first nine months of FY 73 was 13.8 per 100,000 flying hours. The FY 73 goal for USARV/MACV SUPCOM was 15.0 per 100,000 flying hours. The command experienced 210 accidents during FY 72 for an aircraft accident rate of 17.0. Only 30 US Army aircraft accidents have occurred in the RVN in FY 73.

(2) Several factors were instrumental in reducing the accident rate during the past six months:

(a) Strong Command guidance.

(b) Quarterly Safety Conferences.

(c) Unit Safety Program Assistance Visits.

(d) School-trained Safety Officers at each company-size aviation unit.

(e) Thorough utilization of EIR's and component analysis program.

(3) Aviation personnel in every unit are to be commended for their sense of professionalism with regard to safety. This represents the most effective asset in attaining this fine safety rate.

j. Aviation Contractor Support.

(1) Norman Harwell Associates, Inc (NHA) was the US civilian contract agency directly responsible to provide maintenance support for US Army aviation in the RVN. Over 1,200 individuals were employed in this firm under the aviation support contract. These civilians were generally organized into four direct support transportation companies and the Command Aircraft Company as well as an aviation supply activity and aviation maintenance activity to provide total aviation support throughout the RVN. The 142nd TC was located at Danang in MR I. Direct support aviation maintenance in MR II was performed by the 604th TC at Nha Trang. The 388th TC and Command Aircraft Company were based on Tan Son Nhut Air Base in Saigon. The 611th TC at Can Tho served as the aviation support company in MR IV. Additionally, over 150 NHA personnel worked at the US Army Aviation Supply Activity in Saigon receiving, stocking

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report and distributing aviation repair parts and supplies to forward supply points and aviation units throughout the RVN.

(2) By December 1972, NHA personnel were performing nearly all US Army aviation maintenance above the organizational level. Military personnel in the direct support companies and the supply activity primarily served in administrative and supervisory positions. The transformation from maintenance performed by military personnel to civilian contractor maintenance for US Army aviation occurred gradually throughout the years of the Vietnam conflict. The contractor had developed a smooth operation resulting in high quality workmanship and performance as problem areas were encountered and eliminated.

(3) As the possibility of a ceasefire and US troop withdrawal became a reality, the contractor became an integral element of withdrawal planning and execution. The massive retrograde operation was the first key area of consideration. Specific teams of NHA personnel were identified for use at the retrograde sites of Danang, Nha Trang, and Newport to prepare aircraft for shipment to CONUS. These personnel were in position at their assigned ports on X-Day and all aircraft retrograde operations progressed most efficiently throughout the withdrawal period. Over 210 US Army aircraft were processed for retrograde, most ahead of schedule, due to the fine organization and efforts of these NHA retrograde teams.

(4) As more information became available concerning Army aviation support to be provided to the Four Party Joint Military Commission and the International Commission for Control and Supervision, the civilian contractor again became a key element of consideration. Special aviation detachments were formed to support the five ICCS regional sites and the eight FPJMC regions. In order to keep military personnel in these detachments at a minimum, only Army pilots and crewmen were designated for these detachments. Eleven maintenance sections basically consisting of 23 men each were identified from contract civilians within the transportation companies to complete the formation of these special aviation detachments. These contract maintenance personnel kept all aircraft in a high state of operational readiness in order to insure that each aircraft was prepared to fulfill its important mission of transporting the peace-keeping supervisors throughout the RVN. Unprogramed efforts were often required from the maintenance crews due to identification markings necessary for the aircraft. The initial

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report requirements, plus later changes, were required on short notice. Each suspense was met with the fine efficiency and expediency which typified aviation contract maintenance.

(5) Another area of endeavor in which NHA personnel contributed immeasurably concerned the retrograde of over 2,000 tons of aviation repair parts. These parts, primarily located at the Central Direct Support Supply Agency in Saigon and at the forward supply points in each military region were retrograded to various CONUS and inter-theater locations. Identification, packaging, and shipment preparation was conducted by the civilian personnel under military supervision during the 60-day withdrawal phase. Following the departure of the military personnel, the contractor continued the retrograde operations for those U21 and UH1H parts and supplies which remained. This final procedure was completed rapidly in the same fine professional manner which characterized the support rendered by NHA contract personnel to US Army aviation in the RVN. The outstanding performance and efforts by the NHA contractor greatly facilitated the smooth withdrawal of Army aviation from the Republic of Vietnam in accordance with the ceasefire protocols.

5. COMMANDERS' OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
JACK V. MACKMULL, BRIGADIER GENERAL, USA.

a. Personnel Shortages.

(1) Observation. Personnel shortages as a result of the ban on Christmas holiday travel and Christmas drops seriously affected many US aviation units in Vietnam.

(2) Evaluation. Although no Christmas drops were planned for 1972, the policy was implemented at the last minute. In conjunction with Christmas drops, Department of the Army restricted PCS travel during the holidays. As a result, many Army personnel departed Vietnam prior to the holidays while their programmed replacements were delayed until early January. This created serious effects within aviation units due to the personnel turmoil and loss of personnel in key MOS's, many of which were already at alarmingly low levels.

(3) Recommendations. Future programmers of replacement personnel must recognize that Christmas drops and DA travel ban policy can seriously affect the personnel replacement schedule within the Army. Sufficient replacement personnel must be

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

requisitioned with reporting dates to their command prior to 15 December in order to offset the expected losses during the holiday period due to Christmas drops.

b. Personnel Redeployment.

(1) Observation. Redeployment of personnel during incremental phases presented various problems due to numerous changes in established schedules.

(2) Evaluation. On X-Day, the 1st Aviation Brigade had 4,243 personnel assigned. Initially, difficulties were encountered in planning personnel shipments due to the lack of firm guidance on procedures for the incremental drawdown of personnel. During the initial phase of withdrawal, the number of personnel scheduled to depart the Brigade during the period X-Day to X+14 was changed on three separate occasions between X-Day and X+6. Finally on X+6, the Brigade was able to advise subordinate commands of the number of personnel departures authorized during the first 15-day increment. While this late advice caused no insurmountable problems, it did lead to confusion on the part of subordinate commands. As it was, the Brigade was directed to have an assigned strength of 3,158 on X+14. Morning reports on X+14 indicated precisely this designated total.

During each of the four incremental phases, problems were encountered because of changes in the basic plan. Most of these changes resulted from situations which could not have been anticipated during prior planning conferences. Nevertheless, the varied changes and uncertainties concerning personnel redeployments caused frequent phases of confusion at this headquarters and was amplified at field units.

(3) Recommendations. None.

c. Personnel on R&R and Leave in CONUS.

(1) Observation. Those Brigade personnel on leave or R&R in CONUS on X-Day posed a particular problem in personnel accountability and clearance.

(2) Evaluation. At the beginning of the withdrawal the 1st Aviation Brigade had approximately 152 personnel on R&R or leave in CONUS. In accordance with USARV/MACV SUPCOM OPLAN

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

215, subordinate units were required to identify these individuals to the servicing personnel service company in one of two categories: Mission essential or non-mission essential. Those personnel identified as mission essential were notified to return to the RVN as soon as possible. All personnel thus identified returned to their duties within 14 days.

Personnel in the non-mission essential category were identified so CONUS assignment instructions could be obtained, thereby allowing the individual to remain in CONUS rather than return to the RVN. Difficulty was encountered because the PSC's were not able to obtain, on a timely basis, assignment instructions from HQ DA. This delay created the requirement to internally reassign some personnel to permit their unit of assignment to reach zero strength and to meet required unit inactivation/redeployment schedules.

(3) Recommendations. In similar situations in the future, those personnel on leave or R&R away from the unit who are identified as non-mission essential should be given priority processing from HQ DA in order for the PSC/unit to rapidly clear their accountability and simplify the problems encountered by the individual as he awaited orders.

d. Strength Accountability of Medical Evacuees.

(1) Observation. Strength accountability of medical evacuees became a significant problem to units within the Brigade at X+17.

(2) Evaluation. Individuals who reported to the replacement companies for onward transportation to CONUS were subject to urinalysis screening. During outprocessing, approximately 95 enlisted individuals proved positive for use of drugs. These individuals had previously been losses to their units' morning report. IAW CONUS assignment instructions, however, these individuals were transferred to the Detoxification Center as a result of their positive urinalysis test and subsequent reassignment orders were published directing rehabilitation UP para 7b, AR 635-212 at a CONUS hospital. This action required corrections to the losing units' morning report. Generally these corrections were not made in a timely manner and created many administrative problems.

(3) Recommendations. That the previous in-country unit of assignment of an identified drug user be notified immediately

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

by the outprocessing replacement company and that instructions be provided concerning correction of unit morning report entries in the medevac message.

e. SA-7 Missile Information.

(1) Observation. Information concerning the SA-7 missile and SA-7 firings was in high demand by research organizations such as the United States Army Aviation Systems Command in St. Louis, Missouri; AFSSCOM EW, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas; DA, MG Sammet, Washington, DC; and other services and organizations such as 7th Air Force, Air Force Advisory Group, 358th Flight Detachment, 70th Aviation Detachment, as well as all units within the Brigade.

(2) Evaluation. The ACofS, G2, was tasked to fulfill this requirement. Data collection efforts from the field, as well as maintenance of these reports and dispatching messages to the large list of addressees became a major task of the G2 section.

(3) Recommendations. The G2 should be prepared to suggest countermeasures, high threat areas, and the best flight altitude at which to fly in order to avoid aircraft losses to the SA-7 and other anti-aircraft threats.

f. Theft of Repair Parts.

(1) Observation. A sudden increase in pilferage of aviation repair parts from the Saigon Central DSSA was experienced in November. On several occasions, unauthorized Vietnamese personnel were seen inside the warehouses at night.

(2) Evaluation. A limited guard force consisting of one US gate guard and three Vietnamese local hire walking guards secured the storage area. The NHA night shift consisted of five US contract civilians. A survey of the area was made. The night shift was increased to 20 civilians, providing an increased presence of personnel in the area. Lighting of the perimeter fence line was improved and a layer of concertina wire reinforced the top of the fence. Guard towers were constructed around the perimeter and the guard force increased to eight Vietnamese guards in addition to the US guard. As a result of the increased security, warehouse break-ins stopped.

(3) Recommendations. None.

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

g. Flight Waiver Rescission.

(1) Observation. The new Army Regulations 95-63, dated 8 December 1972 and 95-1, dated 20 December 1972, caused rescission of a long standing waiver applicable to instrument qualifications, written examinations, and accomplishment of instrument and night flying minimums for fixed and rotary wing aviators in Southeast Asia. Due to several conflicting items in these and other pertinent aviation regulations, the fact that this SEA waiver had been rescinded was not recognized until 19 February 1973. This created numerous problems for those aviators in the RVN.

(2) Evaluation. The new Army Regulations 95-63 and 95-1 were received in Brigade Headquarters on 12 January 1973, just prior to the USARV/MACV SUPCOM Standardization and Safety Conference. Aviation personnel studied these regulations and noted several conflicting areas between the two new regulations as well as Army Regulation 95-64 and TM 38-750. This headquarters then dispatched messages to USARPAC requesting clarification. Several telephone conversations were also undertaken from the USARV/MACV SUPCOM Aviation Standardization and Training Officer to officers at the USARPAC Aviation Office to further define deficiencies among the regulations. This headquarters was advised that most of the conflicting items listed had already been addressed and further clarification information would be forthcoming from Department of the Army.

On 9 February 1973, clarification information was received at this headquarters and disseminated to subordinate commands. On 19 February 1973, CINCUSARPAC GPAV message dated 170631Z Feb 73, Subject: Reestablishment of Annual Flying Requirements for Aviators Assigned in SEA, was received. It stated that the old CINCUSARPAC waiver of December 1969, which granted a waiver in instrument qualifications, written examinations, and accomplishment of instrument and night flying minimums for fixed and rotary wing aviators in Southeast Asia had been rescinded effective 1 January 1973. The rescission of this waiver would affect every aviator in the RVN, most of them adversely. This adverse effect was due to several reasons:

(a) The untimely notification of the waiver rescission seven weeks into the new semi-annual portion of the year was the major problem because many aviators had departed the RVN

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report with their flight records closed under the provisions of the rescinded waiver. These aviators were unaware of the reestablishment of the retroactive flight requirements.

(b) The US Army was engaged in the total withdrawal of all personnel and assets from the RVN under provisions of the ceasefire. The restrictions placed on aviation utilization, as well as increased personnel work requirements prior to and following the ceasefire, prevented many aviators from flying. Night flying missions and missions for instrument training were virtually nonexistent.

(c) Those aviators remaining in the RVN could not meet their pro-rated semi-annual night and instrument minimums due to the accelerated withdrawal of Army aviation from the RVN.

This headquarters then requested that the effective rescission date of the waiver be advanced to 28 March 1973 due to reasons listed above. A date of 28 March would eliminate the huge administrative problem which existed in Vietnam due to the 1 January 1973 waiver rescission date; an administrative requirement which would further burden redeployment operations from the RVN.

CINCUSARPAC's answer to the USARV/MACV SUPCOM Aviation Officer's request followed in a message dated 262142Z Feb 73 and was received at this headquarters on 28 February. This message stated that CINCUSARPAC recognized the peculiar USARV/MACV SUPCOM problems associated with rescinding waivers for aviator flying requirements, but determined that, in view of DA training objectives, a change of the date of rescission of the SEA waiver from 1 Jan 73 to 28 Mar 73 was not warranted. It offered some relief to aviators by proposing that waivers could be granted on an individual basis by commands gaining aviators who had departed the RVN after 1 January 1973. Waivers could be granted to those aviators who would be unable to complete their night and/or instrument flying minimums by including an entry in the remarks section of the aviator's Form 759 stating that assets and facilities were not available to achieve night and instrument minimums during the period 1 January through the date the aviator departed the RVN.

All US Army commands in the RVN were notified of the rescinded waiver and were advised to enter the following statement in the remarks section of the individual aviator's DA Form

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

759: "Assets and facilities were not available during period 1 January 1973 to (date of close-out) for maintenance of annual night and instrument flying requirements as required by AR 95-1."

Furthermore, all commands were required to insure that all aviators who had departed the RVN after 1 January 1973 be notified concerning the SEA waiver rescission, in order that each of these aviators might request a waiver of annual night and instrument flying requirements from 1 January 1973 to the date of close-out of their individual flight records in SEA by including the statement addressed above. Copies of the aviation messages were provided to those aviators whose records had been closed out, but who had not yet departed the RVN.

This administrative burden, while completed for USARV/MACV SUPCOM, is not complete for those commands gaining aviators who departed the RVN in 1973. Over 1,200 of these aviators affected by the waiver's rescission could conceivably request flight waivers from their gaining commands. Those aviators going to nonflying assignments have no other recourse.

(3) Recommendations. That Aviation Staff personnel at higher headquarters consider all the ramifications of staff actions and decisions which affect significant numbers of personnel.

h. ADD Extension.

(1) Observation. The X+15 standdown date for all Army Aviation Detachments (Divisional) (ADD's) did not permit continued operations at some Army airfields. Airfield operations had to be extended in the interest of proper air traffic control and safety.

(2) Evaluation. The Army ADD's throughout the Republic of Vietnam were responsible for Army flight following service and airfield operations. Six detachments supervised these operations at Hue, Danang, An Son, Pleiku, Nha Trang, Ninh Hoa, Phan Thiet, Saigon (H-3), Bien Hoa, and Can Tho. These detachments were scheduled to cease operations on X+15 and to complete standdown operations by X+30. This schedule was programed in order to utilize available CH47 support to transport major avionics items to retrograde sites and was planned to coincide with programed aircraft density and personnel reductions.

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

As final Army flight following services were terminated and the ADD's began standdown, minor problems developed in the area of airfield operations. The aircraft density at several key 1st Aviation Brigade locations remained at a relatively high level due to reductions in the rate of personnel and equipment withdrawals and in preparations to meet certain aviation contingency missions. Therefore, the airfield operations portion of each ADD at Danang, Pleiku, Nha Trang, An Son, Saigon, and Can Tho was directed to remain operational until aircraft traffic density in the vicinity of those airfields was reduced to a level that would permit final standdown. Airfield control towers were closed and operations continued utilizing vehicle or ground-mounted FM radio facilities. Back-up FM flight following service was maintained by unit operations sections. The inactivation dates of the ADD's remained the same (X+30) except for the 345th ADD at Can Tho. In cases where airfield operations were extended beyond the unit inactivation date, required personnel were reassigned to the aviation unit at the operated airfield. ATC equipment was retrograded on schedule and no further problems were encountered.

(3) Recommendations. None.

i. Coordination, Communication and Control.

(1) Observation. The coordination, communication and control of activities during ceasefire operations were fragmentary in some instances due to the widely separated geographical areas involved and high degree of security classification that surrounded activities at the outset.

(2) Evaluation. In an operation involving many nations, agencies, widely separated geographical locations, and complicated actions, definitive lines of communication and control are necessary. Security classification should be conducive to effective mission accomplishment and exchange of information. These necessary elements for efficient operations were developed as they became essential to accomplish each task. Only after operations had progressed to the near stage of completion were the security restrictions lifted to facilitate ease of communication.

(3) Recommendations. That future operations of this magnitude be developed in the same manner as field orders to include all encompassing lists of agencies for all correspondence and messages and a central clearing agency for all information pertaining to the operations involved. Security classifications

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

should be a matter of early concern and established only to that degree which will facilitate communications and not restrict actions and communications. Addressing operations in this manner would facilitate smoother operations and efficiency. These essentials could not have been foreseen as there was no precedent established.

j. Directives and Decisions.

(1) Observation. Sufficient guidance and definitive information were not available from higher headquarters to enable working staffs to arrive at a totally complete plan of execution for the 60-day withdrawal.

(2) Evaluation. There was a lack of information critical to the planning of an orderly and expedited withdrawal of 1st Aviation Brigade personnel and assets, as well as a lack of decision/approval to ferry U8 aircraft to Singapore; no firm commitment was received as to mode of transport for retrograde operations. Information from all concerned activities was not channeled through a central coordinating agency; thus, DA, CINCUSARPAC, USARV/MACV SUPCOM, and 1st Aviation Brigade did not always have the same information on all aspects of the plans; and, all higher headquarters were not aware of all contingency plans involving USARV/MACV SUPCOM aviation assets.

(3) Recommendations. That future operations of this magnitude and complexity be provided with a communication/coordination outline which would allow all concerned agencies to be addressees on all pertinent information. That consideration should be given to early decisions on critical factors of the operations; i.e., use of SEATRAN vessels, surface/air movement of fixed wing aircraft, etc.

k. Retrograde of Stocks.

(1) Observation. A maximum effort was made to retrograde stocks in the Central DSSA that were not on the ASL and did not have any demand history.

(2) Evaluation. A total of 76 Air Force pallets and 37 SEALAND vans of repair parts were retrograded under this program. Global preservative, required to protect aircraft during movement by sea, was also inadvertently retrograded. This had been requisitioned for ceasefire contingencies and picked up on the

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

computer's stock records. Since no demands for Global were in the computer, the stocks were later identified as excess and shipped. Upon learning that it had been shipped, a check with transportation personnel revealed it would take approximately 30 days to recover the shipment (shipped by SEALAND). A priority shipment was made from CONUS, and the problem was alleviated. An immediate review of stocks was made and a separate computer file created to hold special project stocks to insure a similar retrograde shipment would not be repeated.

(3) Recommendations. None.

1. Identification of Parts.

(1) Observation. Due to the requirement to provide repair parts support after the ceasefire, the end item application of repair parts had to be determined. After such a determination was made, parts not required to support this flying program would be retrograded.

(2) Evaluation. It was determined that the five character US Army Material Category Structure assigned a repair part did not meet the requirement. Aircraft application was only shown when the part was peculiar to a specific aircraft. If it was applicable to more than one aircraft, there was no way to identify the specific applications. The aircraft scheduled to fly were UH1H, CH47, and U21. IBM cards were key-punched for each line item in the applicable parts manual and coded to show the end item application. This card deck could then be matched against computer files to identify required parts.

(3) Recommendations. This was a very time-consuming project and is only feasible where labor rates for key-punch operators are low. A better method of identifying specific end item application would be useful whenever end item densities in a theater change. This could be in the form of a computer prepared card deck with special computer programs for their use, provided by the CONUS NICP's.

m. Airlift of Repair Parts.

(1) Observation. The 1st Aviation Brigade had a daily Special Airlift Mission Requirement (SMAR) of six pallet spaces on a C-130 aircraft. This aircraft picked up aviation repair parts in Saigon and delivered them to Nha Trang, Pleiku, and

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

Danang. Cargo for Can Tho was handled by channel air. The cargo was given to the supporting aerial port and moved based on priority.

(2) Evaluation. In early November, a backlog of NORS aircraft repair parts began building at the 8th Aerial Port for shipment to Can Tho. Close coordination with Air Force personnel only stabilized the backlog. It was not eliminated. On 14 Nov 72, MACV advised this headquarters that all C-130 flights would be staged out of Thailand due to parking space problems in Saigon. Shortly after the movement of C-130 aircraft to Thailand, more problems were experienced with the SMAR mission. Due to maintenance problems, many missions were canceled. A backlog of cargo developed and movement of cargo by channel air up-country was impossible due to these maintenance problems. The cargo backlog for Can Tho was corrected by utilization of surface transportation. Commercial trucking was available with a 24-hour lead time. Movement took one day, resulting in a two-day shipping time. The backlog was reduced to zero. Five pallet spaces per day were given to the Brigade on 5 Dec 72. By close coordination and use of other available C-141 space, the backlog was maintained within limits. The 15-day stockage level in the units' PLL was sufficient to absorb most problems during this period. Continued problems in this area would have required an increase to a 30-day parts stockage level.

(3) Recommendations. None.

n. Support of Special Missions.

(1) Observation. Support for special mission requirements had to be developed as requirements became known.

(2) Evaluation. Some delays were experienced in formulating procedures for establishment of support for special missions. Such details as color coding of aircraft, accountability and ownership of aircraft, and aircraft support requirements were developed as they became known. Earlier distribution of procedures could have proven helpful in timely execution of aviation requirements.

(3) Recommendation. That prior to the initiation of actions of this scope, procedures be developed in the early stages concerning the type of operation, to include, but not limited to, method of accomplishment, accountability and control of assets,

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report
and sequence of events to facilitate an effective method of
supporting special missions with aviation assets.

o. Title Transfer of Aircraft and Tools.

(1) Observation. Aircraft and tools were title transferred to VNAF in general terms and provisions made for the owning unit to physically transfer its aircraft and tools during its stand-down period. Ongoing missions were supported from hand receipted aircraft and tools.

(2) Evaluation. Missions requiring aircraft and tools to remain in the hands of US military and civilian contractors beyond the unit standdown date made unit property book clearance difficult. A system had to be set up whereby these assets could be physically transferred to VNAF to clear the property book and then VNAF had to execute a hand receipt for the same property to be returned to US military and civilian contractor users until mission completion. In this manner, all property books were cleared to comply with unit standdown dates while ongoing missions were accomplished. These transfers took place in widely separated areas by individual units.

(3) Recommendations. That future operations involving use of equipment after execution of title transfer provide for procedures whereby a central agency would accept physical accountability for equipment and execute the necessary hand receipts for continued use by losing activities. This would facilitate clearance of property book accounts while maintaining control and providing standardized procedures for the transfers.

p. Timeliness of Requirements.

(1) Observation. Messages directing the title transfer of equipment and assets to VNAF did not provide sufficient lead time to effect proper coordination of such transfers.

(2) Evaluation. In some cases, direction for the title transfer of assets to VNAF provided for a completion suspense date measured in terms of hours. Considering the widespread locations of 1st Aviation Brigade units throughout the RVN and the relatively inadequate lines of communications, a more feasible notification and execution schedule should have been developed.

(3) Recommendations. That consideration for distances, locations, and lines of communications be given prior to

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report
directing intricate actions with short suspense dates in future
equipment transfer operations.

p. Instability of Situations.

(1) Observation. The tactical situation during the stand-
down phase of the ceasefire appeared to be unstable. On one
occasion, retrograde operations were stopped on the premise
that aircraft already prepared for retrograde by surface might
be required for tactical deployment.

(2) Evaluation. AH1G aircraft when prepared for retrograde
were stripped of their weapons systems. The weapons systems,
repair parts, and the aircraft were prepared separately for
individual shipment. This situation made it highly impracticable
to reconstitute the aircraft to an operational condition if re-
quired for contingency planning prior to actual departure from
the RVN.

(3) Recommendations. That future massive withdrawal opera-
tions consider the possibility of leaving aircraft intact, with
armament systems and repair parts collocated as necessary for
shipment so that they might easily be reconstituted to a
mission-ready configuration if necessary.

q. Bailment Procedures.

(1) Observation. Bailment of US titled aircraft to a US
civilian contractor was required to provide continued aviation
support to ICCS and DAO after US Army aviation unit standdown
and withdrawal.

(2) Evaluation. To support special aviation mission re-
quirements after the standdown and withdrawal of US Army units,
procedures were established to provide for the bailment of US
Army titled aircraft to a US contractor to provide support to
ICCS and DAO. The bailment procedure was developed by the
United States Army Aviation Systems Command in St. Louis,
Missouri, and mailed to the executive offices of the contractor
overseas for signature. Before the contractor could assume
the mission responsibilities for ICCS and DAO, the aircraft
had to be painted and inspected. The time lapse in completing
the contract agreement delayed the placement of these assets into
the hands of the contractor. VNAF titled aircraft were used by
the Army during this interim period to provide required aviation

ANNEX B (1st Avn Bde) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

support. The US titled aircraft designated for transfer to the US contractor were placed into a float status to facilitate acceptance inspections by the contractor prior to completion of the bailment agreement.

(3) Recommendations. That procedures be established to accommodate future operations of this type whereby such bailment agreements could be accomplished on-site to avoid delays in completing the transaction of assets.

Appendices

1. 11th CAG After Action Report
2. 12th CAG " " "
3. 17th CAG " " "
4. 164th CAG " " "

APPENDIX 1 (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

1. Purpose: To report chronologically and clarify significant organizational activities experienced by the 11th Combat Aviation Group during pre-standdown, standdown, withdrawal, and roll-up operations.
2. General: Inclusive periods are designated as follows: Pre-standdown phase 1 November 1972 thru 28 January 1973; Standdown phase 29 January thru 27 February 1973 (X+1 thru X+30); Withdrawal phase 28 February thru 14 March 1973 (X+31 thru X+45); and Roll-up phase 15 March thru 29 March 1973 (X+46 thru X+60). These increments are criteria for the Group as a whole, taking into consideration that specific units within the Group completed a combined Standdown and Withdrawal phase between X+1 and X+15.

- a. Significant Organizational Activities.

- (1) Pre-standdown phase. Personnel activities within the Group, at unit and staff level, remained normal in all respects until definite guidance for ceasefire and standdown was received on 26 January 1973. On that date, specific instructions were received during conferences held at 1st Aviation Brigade Headquarters concerning the implementation of OPLAN 215. With a specific ceasefire date at hand, the S-1 section immediately began to accelerate personnel actions as specified within the OPLAN. Personnel shipment rosters were prepared for each increment and individuals to be shipped on the initial increment were transferred to Camp Horn. Much of the administrative portions of the transfer and retrograde of equipment were accomplished in early November under the guidance of Project Enhance. This enabled the Group to merely hand receipt necessary property from the Vietnamese Armed Forces. The Group's mission remained the same with continued support throughout Military Region I to include combat and combat service support to the First Regional Assistance Command, I Corps, three Vietnamese Infantry Divisions, one Vietnamese Airborne Division, and one Vietnamese Marine Division. Operational activities stabilized during the period as the Group continued to provide combat and combat service support to elements of FRAC and the Vietnamese I Corps. Although no major operations were conducted during this period, the level of activity remained high and the Group logged an average of over 4,000 flying hours per month. Reconnaissance provided by the Air Cavalry Troops became a primary intelligence tool for the American advisory staff as well as for the Vietnamese Commanders due to the diminishing air

APPENDIX 1 (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

activity in Vietnam. With the advent of increased activity in southern Military Region I, combat support took on a role of increased importance. The support provided by the remaining CH-47C Chinooks became the life's blood of many firebases and the friendly forces occupying them. The loss, early in this period, of the remaining OH-58's and CH-54's increased the burden upon the remaining aircraft which posed problems due to the increased hour load on the aircraft and pilots. This load was lightened somewhat by consolidating missions whenever possible, utilizing one aircraft, in many cases, to support several locations during scheduled hours of the day. A daily inter-regional shuttle was established utilizing a CH-47 that stopped at all major unit locations within the region on a regularly scheduled basis. This allowed individuals to conduct business or transport correspondence from one location to another without monopolizing an aircraft solely for that purpose. The 11th CAG experienced recurring problems with contractor engineer support on the DaNang AFB compound. Supervisory personnel employed by contractor firms did not have access into the compound due to the lack of valid passes. These passes were not requested in sufficient time from the VNAF Military Police detachment located on the airbase. The problem stemmed from a lack of coordination between the contractor firms and the local military police forces. In many cases, lengthy work delays were experienced due to the lack of these personnel. This problem was partially alleviated by providing individuals from the Group to escort these personnel on and off the post. This, while solving the problem in part, did not provide a permanent solution. In future situations involving American units stationed on installations maintained by a host country, care should be taken to insure timely coordination between contractor firms and host security forces. Early November placed new requirements on the Group; with ceasefire, entailing the complete withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam close at hand, much planning and preparation had to be accomplished. Items destined for turnover to Vietnamese forces had to be inventoried and prepared for transfer. This was accomplished with relative ease due to detailed prior coordination. When the ceasefire went into effect, the Group implemented OPLAN 215 and began the transition from combat activities to those of equipment retrograde/turnover and personnel withdrawal with relative ease.

APPENDIX 1 (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(2) Standdown phase. On 28 January 1973 the 11th CAG ceased all combat operations and began to retrograde personnel and equipment. The turnover of PCS property began immediately at the Group's forward location on Tan My Island, reaching completion on X+8. Troops and equipment located at the forward location were moved to DaNang to facilitate a rapid turnover of property to the Vietnamese. Deep Water Pier was secured and opened as the retrograde site for CONUS EVAC aircraft and units began the movement of aircraft to the retrograde site. The preparation of all AH-1G and OH-6A aircraft for retrograde was completed on X+15. The first CH-47's were transferred to the retrograde site and prepared for shipment. Personnel were shipped to Camp Horn three days prior to their departure date to outprocess which aided the units in clearing their morning reports prior to the individual's actual departure from Vietnam. Inactivation of the Air Cavalry Troops was completed on schedule despite problems incurred in the shipment of personnel due to reduced shipping allocations. Personnel were slotted for the special detachments, aircraft were issued and the detachments began daily missions on X+6. The 62nd CAC continued to provide daily support to the RAC at the levels which had existed prior to the ceasefire, experiencing its first cutback in missions on X+28. The Group also maintained a standby gunship commitment consisting of five aircraft until X+16. The overall level of mission support continued through the standdown phase and into the withdrawal phase at a level of nine aircraft daily.

(3) Withdrawal phase. The Group entered the withdrawal phase with 402 personnel actual strength level, and 33 aircraft. As the RAC personnel were withdrawn from their forward locations and their numbers diminished, the mission load decreased proportionally. By X+32 the daily mission load had dropped to six aircraft. The Group was tasked to maintain an additional contingent to support Operation HOMECOMING which required a freeze on shipment of selected personnel who had previously been scheduled for shipping during this increment. This commitment also made it necessary to retain two CH-47's to fulfill standby recovery capability. This presented still another problem due to the arrival date of the ship to transport the retrograde aircraft to CONUS. These problems were alleviated by a revised shipping schedule for personnel who would be needed to support Operation HOMECOMING commitments and revised shipping and transfer dates for the aircraft involved. The CH-47's were released for

APPENDIX 1 (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

turn-in on X+34 and were prepared for shipment by X+37. The ship arrived on its revised reporting date and no problems were experienced in loading the aircraft on board. Minor revisions had to be made in the shipment of personnel and aircraft so that the commitments contained in the Operation HOMECOMING plan could be met. Personnel continued to outprocess and report to Camp Horn on a regular schedule until 2 March 1973 when all personnel shipment was stopped due to problems in the prisoner exchange. Shipment was resumed on 5 March 1973. Consolidation of Group assets vacated property which was promptly turned over to the appropriate receiving agency. Negotiations were conducted with LSA and NHA personnel to help clarify and expedite the turnover of property to these personnel when no longer needed by the Group. The property turnover was conducted on a staggered schedule to allow the Group Commander to have maximum control of the property until vacated by Group personnel. This alleviated many problems without delaying or hampering property turnover.

b. Commander's Observations and Recommendations.

(1) Pre-standdown phase. A shortage of personnel in critical MOS's presented a distinct problem during the pre-standdown phase. These shortages caused an increased maintenance manhour requirement due to the lack of trained personnel. These increased hours dedicated to maintenance were necessary to provide adequate on-the-job training for selected personnel to improve the quality of maintenance at the crew level. This period was highlighted by the implementation of what proved to be an effective drug education and rehabilitation program. Individuals who had serious problems at the beginning of the reporting period went through an intensive counseling and rehabilitation program which resulted in a decisive decrease in the usage of drugs by personnel previously identified as drug users. During this period an increased reliance on organic security became necessary due to the inadequacy of the security provided by regional forces personnel utilized by VNAF to provide this service. A security force was formed from the members of the Air Cavalry Troops' "Blues" platoon (the ground component of the Aero Rifle Platoon). These infantrymen had been utilized to recover downed aircrews and aircraft. The number of thefts decreased appreciably, and maintenance personnel were freed to concentrate on their primary jobs. Intelligence procurement and dissemination increased both in quality and quantity during the reporting period. The S-2

APPENDIX 1 (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

section was able to acquire intelligence from a greater number of sources and agencies than had been utilized before, enabling the section to cross-check their information and evaluate the source, giving the units more exacting intelligence information. The end result was that pilots and mission commanders received thorough briefings on the tactical situation before they departed for the mission areas.

(2) Standdown phase. Shipment of personnel became a problem due to the flexibility that the Group had to maintain during the early standdown phase. Additional commitments that were not outlined in the original plan had to be put into effect. An increased CH-47 commitment and the need to retain a standby gunship commitment during the early portion of the standdown phase made it necessary to retain personnel otherwise not required. Personnel that could have filled these slots were required to continue the Group's mission at existing levels. This necessitated shipment of personnel that were needed to complete the standdown at unit level. This was particularly significant in the case of F Troop, 4th Cavalry which had a maintenance detachment at DaNang, while the bulk of the troop was at Tan My. These difficulties were shortlived as the turn-in of property progressed and individuals were freed for shipment. Intelligence procurement became extremely difficult during this period. Sources that were available prior to the ceasefire began their drawdown making up-to-date information difficult to obtain. Without this valuable information, aircrews were exposed to situations that could otherwise have been averted. Several aircraft sustained damage, after the ceasefire, in areas that were still contested, though not reported as such. Daily missions continued within the parameters established within the OPLAN and began to diminish proportionally with the withdrawal of advisory personnel. Few problems were experienced in the turnover of property. Extensive planning and coordination conducted prior to the ceasefire allowed smooth turnover of Vietnamese forces. The Group continued to consolidate its personnel and equipment, freeing buildings and station property for turnover as soon as possible. This eliminated the problems of theft and enabled the security platoon to reduce its personnel strength and ship excess personnel.

(3) Withdrawal phase. The shipment of personnel became a routine process characterized by minor revisions necessitated by Operation HOMECOMING. As commitments decreased, personnel were

APPENDIX 1 (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

in turn released for shipment. The CH-47's were released on X+34, packaged, and shipped on X+37. Loading and shipment of retrograde aircraft was a professional operation allowing the ship to depart early the following day. Transfer of assets and station property continued and final coordination with respective civilian contractors was completed, with tentative date for final turnover being X+55. The contractor personnel were receptive to our needs and were in agreement with the revisions necessary due to the Group's continued operation until X+59. The turnover of mess facilities and clubs was designed to provide uninterrupted operation during the change. The Group, in the last few days of the withdrawal phase, continued to tie up loose ends so that the final close-out was accomplished with a minimum of personnel and effort. All aircraft were readied for final transfer upon termination of missions and property was ready, when vacated, for occupancy by contractor personnel. This facilitated an effortless withdrawal of personnel and final roll-up of the 11th Combat Aviation Group's mission in the Republic of Vietnam.

3. Specific: Inclusive periods were designated as follows: Pre-standdown phase 1 November 1972 thru 28 January 1973; Standdown phase 29 January thru 27 February 1973 (X+1 thru X+30); Withdrawal phase 28 February thru 14 March 1973 (X+31 thru X+45); and Roll-up phase 15 March thru 29 March 1973 (X+46 thru X+60). These increments were criteria for the Group as a whole, taking into consideration that specific units within the Group completed a combined Standdown and Withdrawal phase between X+1 and X+15.

a. Significant Organizational Activities.

(1) Pre-standdown phase.

(a) Personnel: 26 January 1973: After a period when personnel activities remained normal in all respects, the Group Adjutant and selected members of the staff received detailed guidance for implementation of OPLAN 215 at 1st Aviation Brigade Headquarters. Personnel movement plans were drawn up and forwarded for approval.

(b) Equipment retrograde/turnover: 11 November 1972: The last of the eleven OH-58A helicopters assigned to the 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) were flown to Nha Trang for turn-in. 13 November 1972: The last of the five CH-54A helicopters assigned to the 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) were flown to Deep Water Pier, DaNang for turn-in. 14 - 23 November 1972:

APPENDIX 1 (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

In conjunction with Project Enhance, much of the equipment belonging to the 11th CAG was title transferred to the ARVN and VNAF. This equipment was then hand receipted back to the using units. 25 November 1972: The Group received a USARV/MACV SUPCOM message that directed that all excess equipment should be turned in through normal supply channels before the end of the calendar year.

(c) Intelligence/Security: 5 November 1972: Detailed briefings were established on a daily basis with elements of VNAF, D/17th Cavalry, 62nd Aviation Company (Corps), and the S-2 Section, 11th CAG to improve the operational effectiveness of the Nighthawk base defense mission. 16 November 1972: The S-2 Section assumed overall responsibility for the supervision of compound security, gate guards, and local national daily hires. 12 December 1972: The Assistant S-2 became the OIC of the 11th CAG TOC during the hours of darkness to increase the effectiveness of intelligence exploitation by the aircraft involved in the Nighthawk mission.

(d) Operations: 1 November 1972: At BT007653 D Troop, 17th Cavalry Nighthawk team observed three enemy personnel with weapons and packs. The team engaged resulting in three enemy KBH and one secondary explosion. Air Cavalry elements from D Troop, 17th Cavalry while conducting a visual reconnaissance four miles west of Firebase Baldy (BT049387) observed and engaged an enemy command bunker resulting in three enemy KBH. 5 November 1972: An AH-1G from D Troop, 17th Cavalry was shot down during target engagement resulting in one US KIA. An OH-6A aircraft attempting to rescue the downed aircrew received intense enemy small arms fire causing light damage to the aircraft and wounding the pilot. The pilot was able to maneuver the aircraft to a secure area. A light reconnaissance team conducting operations five miles north of Dien Ban was engaged by an enemy command detonated mine resulting in one OH-6A destroyed and two US KIA. 6 November 1972: A UH-1H from the 62nd CAC was flying a naval gunfire adjustment mission in Quang Ngai province. The pilot attempted to circumnavigate a storm line to return to home station. The attempt was unsuccessful and due to a low fuel situation, the pilot was forced to execute a precautionary landing in the vicinity of BS346610 to wait for weather conditions to improve. Due to enemy activity in the area, the crew and passengers moved away from the aircraft to set up a defensive position. During the night the storm intensified, causing heavy flooding of the river area and washing the aircraft downstream.

APPENDIX I (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

Radio contact was maintained with the crew during the night and pickup was accomplished the following morning by a USAF HH-53. The aircraft was not recovered. 10 November 1972: D Troop, 17th Cavalry while conducting operations three miles east of Dai Loc (AT978571), engaged and destroyed a bunker 15x20' resulting in three enemy KBH and one bunker destroyed. F Troop, 4th Cavalry engaged in enemy company-sized element (AT812998) equipped with .51 caliber weapons resulting in three enemy KBH. 15 November 1972: D Troop, 17th Cavalry's Nighthawk team located and engaged an enemy launch site destroying six 122mm rockets. F Troop, 4th Cavalry observed and engaged two T54 tanks, two Soviet armored personnel carriers, and four trucks one mile south of Qua Viet River (YD 379662). During the engagement, the team received heavy automatic weapons fire and one SA-7 was launched by enemy ground troops forcing the aircraft to depart prior to making a damage assessment of enemy forces. 19 November 1972: DaNang AFB received an attack by fire (27 122mm rockets). The 11th CAG sustained damage to two aircraft and no personnel injuries. 26 November 1972: A CH-47C from the 62nd Aviation Company received moderate small arms and automatic weapons fire while resupplying San Juan Hill. The aircraft sustained one hit from a .51 caliber weapon which passed through the copilot's windshield and several wiring bundles in the right forward cabin area causing an electrical failure. The aircraft commander was slightly wounded in the face and a precautionary landing was executed at Duc Pho. The aircraft was later repaired and returned to DaNang. 5 December 1972: Elements from D Troop, 17th Cavalry conducting a reconnaissance mission west of Duc Pho (BS302359) observed an enemy command bunker containing 10 personnel. The team engaged destroying the bunker and 10 KBH. 6 December 1972: Elements from D Troop, 17th Cavalry received small arms fire while conducting a reconnaissance south of Dai Loc (AT965560). The ensuing engagement resulted in 10 enemy KBH. 11 December 1972: A light reconnaissance team from F Troop, 4th Cavalry, acting as a Naval Gunfire adjustment platform, directed fires resulting in 11 secondary explosions. 12 December 1972: An Air Cavalry white team from F Troop, 4th Cavalry observed an enemy troop concentration and two 130mm guns firing on friendly positions. The team adjusted Naval gunfire resulting in 12 secondary explosions. 19 December 1972: Elements from F Troop, 4th Cavalry conducted a search and rescue operation in the vicinity of YD400644 for the crew of a downed Air Force OV-10. The team was successful in extracting the downed pilots and returning

APPENDIX 1 (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

them to DaNang for medical attention. The pilot of the OV-10 died of injuries incurred in ejection and the aerial observer was treated for injuries and returned to duty. 26 December 1972: DaNang AFB received an attack by fire (19 122mm rockets) lightly damaging two CH-47C aircraft. Negative casualties were sustained. 30 December 1972: Elements from D Troop, 17th Cavalry conducting operations in Quang Ngai province (BT028668) engaged an area occupied by 50 to 60 enemy personnel resulting in 10 enemy KBH. 31 December 1972: A light reconnaissance team from F Troop, 4th Cavalry observed four tanks and 20 troops at YD338704. The team adjusted Naval gunfire with unknown results. 3 January 1973: Elements from D Troop, 17th Cavalry conducting reconnaissance operations in the vicinity of BT118242 observed an enemy encampment area. The team engaged resulting in 10 KBH and one enemy soldier captured by the C&C aircraft. 4 January 1973: A light reconnaissance team from D Troop, 17th Cavalry observed an enemy encampment area at AT826638. The lead OH-6A received intense small arms fire damaging the aircraft and wounding the gunner. The aircraft was able to return to DaNang and seek medical aid for the wounded crewmember. 6 January 1973: A light reconnaissance team conducting a bomb damage assessment of a B-52 strike (YD298748) observed trucks moving in the area. The team adjusted Naval gunfire resulting in five secondaries and six sustained fires. 8 January 1973: DaNang AFB received a misdirected Loran strike causing light damage to one building and one UH-1H aircraft. Six members of the 11th CAG were slightly injured with minor cuts and bruises. A UH-1H aircraft from the 62nd Aviation Company while flying in support of the Vietnamese Airborne Division was reported shot down in enemy held territory northwest of Quang Tri (vic YD3155). Field reports indicated that the aircraft was hit by small arms fire and an SA-7 missile. Negative contact was established with the crew and repeated attempts to locate the aircraft were unsuccessful. USAF aircraft participating in search and rescue efforts reported intense anti-aircraft fire and numerous SA-7 firings throughout the area. The search and rescue attempt was terminated with negative results and four crewmembers and two passengers were listed as missing in action. 9 January 1973: Elements from D Troop, 17th Cavalry located and damaged a 130mm field gun. Air Force fighter bombers on station reported destroying the gun and 180 rounds of ammunition. 10 January 1973: A light observation team from D Troop, 17th Cavalry located a cache of 20 122mm rockets (AT955627). The team vectored Vietnamese ground forces into the area and the rockets were captured intact.

APPENDIX 1 (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

13 January 1973: An OH-6A from D Troop, 17th Cavalry received heavy small arms fire in the vicinity of BT003609; the aircraft received damage and the Vietnamese advisor on board was wounded.

16 January 1973: A UH-1H from the 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) conducting standardization training, sustained damage from an unknown explosive device which detonated as the aircraft terminated a pinnacle approach to Marble Mountain (BT068711). The instructor pilot made a precautionary landing in a rice paddy near the base of the pinnacle. A maintenance recovery team was dispatched to the site and the aircraft was flown to DaNang.

17 January 1973: The Nighthawk team from D Troop, 17th Cavalry discovered an enemy 122mm rocket launch site, engaged and destroyed six rockets. Enemy troops were able to launch 22 rockets which impacted on DaNang AFB resulting in negative damage or injury within the 11th CAG.

22 January 1973: Elements from D Troop, 17th Cavalry observed and engaged an enemy squad-sized element in a small village vicinity BS753382. The team destroyed three hootches and one bunker, killing four personnel and capturing one enemy soldier.

28 January 1973: Elements from F Troop, 4th Cavalry engaged targets along the Son Tra River resulting in 30 enemy KBH. The contact terminated at 0755. At 0800 hours, all armed combat activities by the 11th CAG ceased due to the provisions of the unilateral ceasefire in the Republic of Vietnam.

26 January 1973: All PCS and installation property was title transferred to ARVN and VNAF.

(2) Standdown phase - 28 January - 27 February 1973:

(a) Personnel: 28 January 1973: Shipment of personnel was begun on X-Day and proceeded according to instructions received in conjunction with the implementation of OPLAN 215.

15 February 1973: The Morning Reports of F Troop, 4th Cavalry and D Troop, 17th Cavalry were zeroed. All of the personnel from these units had been either shipped out of country, transferred to the Joint Military Commission or the ICCS, or assigned to the HQ 11th CAG.

(b) Equipment retrograde/transfer: 28 January 1973: D/17 Cavalry ceased combat operations and prepared to retrograde all OH-6A helicopters to CONUS through the 142nd Transportation Company. D/17 was informed of a requirement to maintain five AH-1G Cobra gunships on strip alert for an indefinite period. Two of the gunships would be provided by F/4th Cavalry with crews provided by D/17. All other AH-1G Cobras were prepared for retrograde. F/4th Cavalry ceased combat operations and

APPENDIX 1 (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

prepared to retrograde all AH-1G Cobra gunships and all OH-6A helicopters to CONUS through the 142nd Transportation Company. 142nd Transportation Company issued final SOP's to all units for the turn-in and retrograde of all aviation equipment. 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) continued their normal mission load and assumed responsibility for providing maintenance support for the UH-1H helicopters to be utilized by the ICCS and the JMC. 1 February 1973: 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) turned in one UH-1H aircraft to 1st Air Division, VNAF. F/4 Cavalry completed the turn-in of all OH-6A and AH-1G aircraft (with the exception of the two AH-1G Cobras which remained on strip alert). D/17 completed the turn-in of six AH-1G and seven OH-6A helicopters and the PLL of UH-1H parts plus all parts for the OH-6A and AH-1G. The 11th Aviation Maintenance Officer instructed 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) that all avionics command consoles would remain on board and be turned in with the aircraft. 3 February 1973: The remaining UH-1H aircraft belonging to D/17 Cavalry Troop, F/4th Cavalry Troop, and the 142nd Transportation Company were laterally transferred to the 62nd Aviation Company (Corps). This represented a total of 10 UH-1H aircraft. The 11th CAG had a total of 33 UH-1H aircraft on hand. All of these were assigned to the 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) and were to be utilized in the following manner: 19 for 62nd operations, eight under operational control of the Four Party Joint Military Commission, and six under the operational control of the International Commission for Control and Supervision. One CH-47C was turned over to the 142nd Transportation Company for preparation for retrograde to CONUS. 5 February 1973: One CH-47C was turned into the 142nd Transportation Company for preparation for retrograde to CONUS. 10 February 1973: F/4th Cavalry Troop completed turn in of all equipment and after auditing, destroyed their property books. 15 February 1973: 519th Medical Detachment completed turn-in of all accountable property. 277th S&S Battalion audited their property books, confirmed all zero balances, and destroyed the books. D/17 completed turn-in of all accountable property and, after auditing, destroyed their property books. 20 February 1973: Because of a gradual reduction in the mission requirement for UH-1H aircraft, two UH-1H's were turned in to VNAF. Two CH-47C aircraft were turned in to the 142nd Transportation Company for retrograde. 22 February 1973: The 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) completed the turn-in of all PLL stock to the 142nd Transportation Company. 23 February 1973: The last increment of the Group's basic load of ammunition was turned in

APPENDIX 1 (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

to the ARVN ASP #511 in DaNang. 26 February 1973: One additional UH-1H was turned in to the 1st Air Division VNAF. 27 February 1973: One additional UH-1H was turned in to the 1st Air Division VNAF. RECAP: During the standdown phase, the Group closed the property books of the 519th Medical Detachment, the 321st Airfield Detachment (Divisional), D Troop, 17th Cavalry, and F Troop, 4th Cavalry. Twelve UH-1H aircraft were turned over to the 1st Air Division VNAF; and four CH-47C helicopters, 18 OH-6A and 17 AH-1G helicopters to the 142nd Transportation Company for retrograde to CONUS. During this period, Group aircraft strength went from 84 to 33.

(c) Intelligence/Security: 28 January 1973: The S-2 Section conducted a survey of all units in the 11th CAG to determine the volume of classified material which would require shipment with the unit records and submitted requests for sufficient records shipment containers to ship all required material. Plans were implemented to arrange for a security platoon to handle security for the 11th CAG compound and the CONUS Evac point at Deep Water Pier. 2 February 1973: S-2 arranged for additional liaison with FRAC G-2 to provide rapid update to the current enemy situation. This was necessary to compensate for a lack of information about current tactical situations. ARVN sources were very reluctant about forwarding information which was required for pilot briefing. 3 February 1973: S-2, having overall responsibility for physical security, implemented plans to release as many local national employees, both housemaids and daily laborers, as rapidly as possible contingent upon the pace of troop withdrawals. 27 February 1973: The S-2, acting on instructions received from the Military Region I "Assistance in Kind" custodian, terminated the employment of daily hires, instructed the compound gate guards that no daily hire personnel were to be allowed on the compound, and submitted all AIK financial data records for audit.

(d) Operations: 28 January 1973: UH-1H aircraft, number 68-15352, received fragmentation damage from incoming rockets while on Orange Pad at Quang Ngai (vic BS649737). The aircraft sustained seven hits with negative casualties. Upon inspection, it was determined that only light damage had been sustained and the aircraft was flown back to DaNang for replacement. UH-1H aircraft, number 67-17843, while flying in support of CORDS, received moderate small arms fire (vic BS742525). There were negative hits or casualties and the aircraft continued its

APPENDIX 1 (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

mission. 29 January 1973: The U-21A section was relieved from attachment to the 62nd Aviation Company (Corps). 30 January 1973: UH-1H aircraft, number 70-15795, flying in support of the 3rd ARVN Division received light small arms fire (vic BT055515). Negative hits or casualties were taken and the mission was completed. UH-1H aircraft, number 68-16122, while flying for the Quang Ngai Province Senior Advisor received intense small arms fire (vic BS557900). After landing at Binh Son (vic BS601921) and inspecting the aircraft and crew, it was found that the PSA, COL Truman R. Bowman had been lightly wounded in both arms. The aircraft sustained 15 hits and was determined not airworthy. COL Bowman returned to Quang Ngai city by vehicle and a CH-47C aircraft was dispatched from DaNang to recover the UH-1H.

1 February 1973: Three enemy rockets struck the vicinity of Duc Pho (vic BS812318) while UH-1H aircraft, number 67-17843, was parked. Negative damage was inflicted to the aircraft or crew and the mission was completed. 2 February 1973: UH-1H aircraft, number 68-15352, while flying for CORDS, received intense small arms fire (vic AT935837). Negative damage or casualties were sustained and the aircraft completed its mission. 3 February 1973: UH-1H aircraft, number 69-15947, while flying for the 1st ARVN Division, received light small arms fire (vic AT935837). The aircraft sustained one hit in the left drive shaft access panel on the tail boom section. There were negative casualties and the mission was completed. 4 February 1973: Due to a change of command within FRAC, the requirements for a DCG aircraft was eliminated. CH-47C aircraft, number 67-18495, while on a mission for the 2nd ARVN Division to LZ Stinson, received light small arms fire (vic BS555815). The aircraft sustained one hit through the forward green blade. There were negative casualties and the mission was completed. 5 February 1973: UH-1H aircraft took over the FRAC shuttle-bus requirements from CH-47C aircraft.

8 February 1973: UH-1H aircraft, number 70-15671, while supporting FRAC, received small arms fire (vic BS735523). There were negative hits or casualties and the aircraft completed the mission. 10 February 1973: UH-1H aircraft, number 69-15674, while supporting the 2nd ARVN Division, received light small arms fire (vic BS790400). The aircraft sustained one hit in the leading edge of the main rotor blade with negative casualties. The mission was flown to completion. 12 February 1973: Two CH-47C aircraft, numbers 67-18505 and 67-18495, were dispatched to Phu Bai airfield (YD886154) to transport, under the direction of JMC representatives, NVA and Viet Cong POW's to some pre-determined location to the north. The pilots were briefed at Phu Bai and stood by until the mission was cancelled at 1900.

APPENDIX 1 (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

13 February 1973: All excess navigational maps were turned over to LTC Hahn, USAF-AFAT, for transfer to VNAF. 14 February 1973: Two CH-47C aircraft, numbers 67-18505 and 67-18495, transported 100 NVA and Viet Cong POW's from Phu Bai airfield (YD886154) to Camp Evans (YD541348). The POW's were then trucked from Camp Evans to the exchange point. 16 February 1973: 62nd operations received a warning order for "Operation HOMECOMING". The mission called for 10 UH-1H aircraft and one CH-47C aircraft. Steps were taken to comply with the requirements of the warning order. 17 February 1973: The 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) was relieved from the requirements of furnishing aircraft support for the Marine Division Senior Advisor, 1st ARVN Division Senior Advisor, and the 3rd ARVN Division Senior Advisor. 20 February 1973: The 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) was relieved from the commitment of providing a UH-1H aircraft for the FRAC shuttle-bus run. 25 February 1973: The 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) was relieved from the commitment of providing two UH-1H aircraft in support of CORDS.

(e) Transfer of billeting, bases, installed property and equipment, and other real property: 1 February 1973: F Troop, 4th Cavalry completed the transfer of the installation at Tan My Island. The island, with all installed property and equipment, was turned over to the 1st ARVN Division.

(3) Withdrawal Phase (X+31 thru X+45 - 28 February thru 14 March 1973).

(a) Personnel: 2 March 1973: In accordance with a message received from USARV/MACV SUPCOM, all shipment of personnel was halted until further notice. 5 March 1973: Due to favorable action on the part of the North Vietnamese and the Provisional Revolutionary Government in their commitment to release US POW's, shipment of personnel was resumed. Shipment rosters were prepared to provide personnel movement schedules which would satisfy two alternate plans as they would affect Group strength requirements. One plan reflected a requirement that the Group maintain sufficient assets to support the Operation HOMECOMING effort until X+59; the other plan would relieve us of this commitment on X+45. All movement of personnel during the withdrawal phase are linked to an as yet unknown decision which will determine the necessary strength for the period from X+46 thru X+59. Plans were made to transfer all personnel remaining in the Group after X+45 to the morning report of the 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) on X+45, 14 March.

APPENDIX 1 (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(b) Equipment retrograde/turnover: 11 March 1973: The Camp Swampy area was released to the VNAF at 1700 after all personnel, military and civilian under the control of the 142nd Transportation Company had moved to the Camp Gimlet compound. 12 March 1973: Current plans call for the property on hand in the Camp Gimlet compound to be picked up on the hand receipt of US contractor personnel who will remain in that compound.

(c) Intelligence/security: During the withdrawal phase, each unit consolidated its personnel into fewer and fewer quarters to allow the buildings to be inventoried and sealed. This allowed the units to discharge many of their housemaids and cut down on the number of local nationals with access to the compound. As each unit shipped its personnel and equipment, the S-2 Section conducted counterintelligence inspections to insure that all classified material and official material had been destroyed or turned over to proper authorities. The Custodian of Classified Material in each unit was required to account for the disposition of all classified material before he was allowed to outprocess. 12 March 1973: All Secret documents remaining in the Secret register were released for shipment.

(d) Operations: An AC-119 Stinger gunship with six Vietnamese and five USAF crewmembers executed successive missed approaches at DaNang due to bad weather. Low fuel forced the crew to abandon ship over the South China Sea in conditions of heavy fog. The 11th CAG Group Commander, in a UH-1H operated as the Air Mission Commander for the rescue effort, directing a CH-47C from the 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) and personally rescuing two VNAF crewmembers. The end result was five USAF personnel and five VNAF personnel rescued. One Vietnamese crewman drowned. 3 March 1973: The 11th CAG was relieved from all CH-47C commitments and the aircraft were prepared for turn-in.

(e) Transfer of billeting, bases, installed property and equipment, and other real property: During the withdrawal phase, plans were implemented to turn Gimlet compound on DaNang AFB over to US contractor personnel. These contractors would hand receipt the buildings, installation property, and PCS equipment directly from the VNAF.

(4) Roll-up Phase (X+46 thru X+60, 15 - 29 March 1973): The roll-up phase was scheduled to begin with the redeployment of the 11th Combat Aviation Group Colors on 16 March 1973. IHC

APPENDIX 1 (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

morning report was drawn down to two entries, CPT Frank Leggio and CSM Richard Kegriss who carried the Colors, the morning report, unit history file, and other memorabilia to HQ USAREUR. On 11 March 1973, the 321st Signal Detachment and the 519th Medical Detachment zeroed their morning reports. The 142nd Transportation Company zeroed out its morning report on 15 March 1973. The Group Commander, remaining personnel of the Group staff, and needed personnel from the deactivated units were transferred to the 62nd Corps Aviation Company. Although greatly consolidated, command and staff relationship remained essentially the same through an ever decreasing workload. The daily missions stabilized at five UH-1H aircraft in support of the First Regional Assistance Command. The Operation HOMECOMING commitment remained at 11 aircraft with crews plus nominal administrative and logistic support. The 62nd CAC had 16 UH-1H aircraft remaining, all of which had been transferred to VNAF and hand receipted back to the company. This phase was scheduled to begin with 120 personnel; however, due to the shipping freeze announced on 11 March 1973, 257 personnel remained assigned. In accordance with instructions from the Army Support Element, MR I, all personnel initiated individual outprocessing.

b. Commander's Comments on Lessons Learned.

(1) Pre-standdown phase:

(a) Observation: The follow-up urinalysis program IAW USARV Reg 600-10 became ineffective for several reasons. Due to a lack of transportation, the results of samples forwarded to Saigon from the unit were not available for 10-12 days. The 95th Evacuation Hospital terminated follow-up urinalysis program and provisions were not made for the establishment of a back-up program. Evaluation: In an environment where a great deal of priority is placed on a test such as the drug testing program, provisions must be made to support it. Our unit needed to receive the results in a more timely manner so that actions could be initiated for those who were confirmed abusers. Recommendation: Transportation must be made available to subordinate units for the purpose of providing priority shipment of urine samples between widely dispersed points. It is very difficult for subordinate units to make these types of arrangements, and it puts them in the position of begging space on flights. It further results in an uneconomical use of manpower

APPENDIX 1 (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

in an area that isn't even authorized one person on a Group TO&E. Higher headquarters also should have published a specific letter of instruction to outline procedures to be followed at the time the 95th Evac Hospital ceased to function as a follow-up urinalysis center. Command Action: Our drug personnel took the initiative to meet courier and passenger flights at the airfield to insure that samples were shipped. We also made arrangements for the 11th CAG dispensary to collect samples to forward to the appropriate medical facility in Saigon. The 11th CAG Drug Abuse Officer also notified his counterpart at G-1 First Aviation Brigade, to make him aware of the problems.

(b) Observation: At times recommendations for awards required an excessive length of time at HQ First Aviation Brigade for boarding action before they were returned to the unit. There were also many instances where awards were lost in the administrative process after they left this headquarters. Due to the inherent time lag, the fact that an award had been lost did not manifest itself until five or six weeks after submission. Evaluation: This unit needed a more expeditious method of receiving approval of awards. Initially, when an award was taking an inordinate amount of time, this unit needed to evaluate where the bottleneck existed. This unit had a very limited means of monitoring the date that awards were received by this headquarters, which didn't provide any information about the length of time each recommendation took to clear headquarters. Evaluations disclosed that awards were generally misplaced or lost en route from the CAG to Brigade. Recommendation: Recommend that higher headquarters expedite the processing of awards and place firmer controls on an award once it arrives at their location. At a minimum, they should log the date of arrival and the date departed and keep a location listed for the whereabouts of each award at all times. Command Action: This unit instituted stringent controls on award recommendations and began a card file system which monitored the award from the time that it was received until it had been approved or disapproved by higher headquarters. This at least enabled this headquarters to fix the blame on the loss of an award recommendation. It was also insured that this unit maintained a complete file copy of each award that it processed so that it could make true copies of the recommendations that were lost elsewhere. The Brigade AG was also notified as these problems surfaced.

(c) Observation: There was a considerable amount of personnel turbulence and personnel shortage in all areas.

APPENDIX 1 (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

This period was characterized by minimum personnel staffing and continually operating at lower skill levels than would be considered prudent under optimum conditions. Evaluation: The Group was continually plagued by the curtailment of US forces in RVN. Curtailments came into effect periodically slashing manning levels with very little consideration being given to critical skill areas. A considerable percentage of aviators were required to fly more than the recommended number of hours after approval of the Flight Surgeon because there was a shortage of aviators in the Group. Very few new enlisted personnel arrived with any experience, even though most were school trained. This required that massive OJT programs be established to maintain an effective and safe aviation maintenance program. Trying to man an Aviation Group in a combat zone without the proper number of experienced personnel is a venture into an area of possible catastrophe. The safety of crew and passengers for every flight should be foremost in the minds of everyone at every level of command. When requesting personnel with this in mind, the replacements are no longer numbers but become meaningful players in the key mission of providing safe effective flight hours for supported units. Recommendation: Recommend that higher headquarters emphasize the criticality of having highly motivated, well trained individuals in aviation units. Also each higher headquarters must make a diligent effort to evaluate the quality of replacements. There is a tendency to manage Army personnel quantitatively rather than qualitatively. This often results in an imbalance of experience from unit to unit. More consideration should be given to the fact that in a combat zone or any high hour flying program, it will be necessary to operate aviation units in shifts if the mission is to be performed adequately. There are also the numerous housekeeping and security functions that must be performed and since no augmentation is provided for this, those people must come from within an already overtasked unit. Keeping these considerations in mind, movement should be made toward a higher manning level or housekeeping and security functions should be taken away from units and be relegated to lower skilled individuals assigned for this purpose. The number of personnel should be increased to insure at least two full eight to ten hour working shifts can be maintained for unit operations. Command Action: This CAG tried to place personnel in the best position to benefit the Group. As new personnel arrived, each man was interviewed individually to ascertain his experience level and any special skills he might have. Then, based on each unit's needs, this unit tried to spread out experience equitably

APPENDIX 1 (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

so that everyone would benefit. Higher headquarters was kept advised of personnel status so that they could assist in maintaining adequate levels of skilled personnel.

(d) Observation: Defense of an installation against indirect fire weapons is a mission which requires maximum flexibility and the highest degree of cooperation between all available installation defense elements. Evaluation: In an effort to increase the effectiveness of Nighthawk base defense operations, the 11th CAG, during the previous reporting period, had arranged for the S-2 section to have access to special intelligence information from the DaNang SSO office, and established a daily briefing for Nighthawk crews, AC-119 stinger gunship crews, USAF intelligence officers, VNAF Nighthawk crews, and operations elements. With the continual decrease in the aviation assets available for this critical mission, efforts were directed toward increased flexibility and quick response to enemy activities. Due to the increase in intelligence resources available, and the perishable nature of much of the information gathered about enemy activities in the DaNang rocket belt, new methods of directing the Nighthawk operation for maximum effectiveness and shock had to be devised. Nighthawk helicopter crews tended to concentrate their efforts in areas of historical VC and NVA activity and thus allowed the enemy to gain an advantage by shifting his areas of operation. With the limited assets which could be dedicated to the Nighthawk operation, it was impossible to cover the 380 square kilometers which make up the area from which rockets and similar indirect fire weapons may be employed against DaNang Air Base. Recommendations: (1) That the Assistant S-2 take over supervision of the 11th CAG tactical operations center during the hours of darkness so that intelligence information from SSO, the USAF intelligence staff, the 3rd ARVN Division, and other sources could be effectively evaluated and passed immediately to the Nighthawk crews in flight to increase our flexibility and quick response capabilities; (2) that sweep patterns in the DaNang area be limited to the area three kilometers on either side of the line circling the base that represents the maximum effective range of the 122mm rocket, unless intelligence indicates that there will be activity in some other part of the area on any particular night; (3) that maximum use be made of AC-119 stinger gunships and VNAF UH-1 assets to provide more continuous coverage during the hours of darkness; (4) that, during the periods of high threat, the Nighthawk team be relieved on station by the first light team provided by D/17th Cavalry;

APPENDIX 1 (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

and (5) that a limited program be established to include military personnel from other elements of the intelligence and base defense teams in the crews of the Nighthawk missions to provide an increased awareness of the value of accurate information and the need for close cooperation between all base defense elements.

Command Action: All recommendations listed above were instituted by the 11th CAG.

(e) Observation: The most common problem that has manifested itself in the Forward Supply Point during the period has been the inability to establish rapid communications between the Forward Supply Point and the Central DSSA in Saigon.

Evaluation: Due to the lack of the automatic data processing capability, the Forward Supply Point had to do everything in the manual mode. This would have not been a major problem had it not been for the fact that with the loss of air support (no U-21's from the 1st Avn Bde and no USAF SMAR flights), both sending and receiving NORS requests and paper work required as much as seven days. Recommendation: Either ADP systems must be maintained or the SMAR (aircraft) capability retained in the future, if rapid replacement of parts and disposition of major shipments is to be accomplished smoothly.

Command Action: In an attempt to shorten the time span, a system of calling the DSSA twice a day was set up. Also, the FRAC U-21 was used as frequently as possible.

(f) Observations and Evaluations: Due to the lack of military personnel, a daily physical inventory of tools and equipment was not practical. Although the military has maintained the primary hand receipt through the unit PBO, the "hands-on" maintenance and control of the property has been by the civilian contractor. Although no major losses have occurred under this system, it is not an adequate method of maintaining physical control over the equipment. Since the civilians have the need for the equipment, they should also have the direct responsibility of inventorying and maintaining it. Recommendations: When a civilian contractor totally accepted all "hands-on" maintenance with the military maintaining a supervisory, quality assurance role, the contractor should also be allowed to accept the needed equipment as a hand receipt holder. It is recommended that the site supervisor sign for the equipment and then delegate his responsibility by sub-hand receipting the individual shop sets, tool cribs, and tool boxes to the "lead man" of the respective sections.

APPENDIX 1 (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(g) Observation: Life Support Equipment maintenance is not provided by any unit in the Army. Evaluation: While the Project Manager for Life Support Equipment has provided a number of fine and adequate items of survival equipment, there was no one assigned or trained to repair the equipment. Flootation equipment was a typical example. Upon inspection of the Survival Kit, Individual Overwater (FSN 8465-973-1863 LIN U7286) that had been carried on this unit's aircraft, it was discovered that each CO2 inflation bottle was still packed in a cardboard box and not fitted to the life raft. This was the way that the kit was issued through supply channels. No one knew how, or was technically qualified to inspect and maintain this item. Another example was that more than 50% of the Life Preservers, Underarm (FSN 4220-630-8714) units checked did not function or had cuts and holes worn in the inflation wings. By the standards of other services, some of these units were overdue time change retirement from the service. A careful check of AR 611-201 will show that repair of Life Support Equipment is not a part of the job description or training of any MOS in the United States Army. TM 55-8465-206-13, Maintenance of Army Survival Kits, has been published. This TM-55 series manual would indicate that these functions should be performed within Transportation Corps Aircraft Maintenance units. Current TO&E's do not provide personnel. Recommendations: (1) That appropriate modifications be made to AR 611-201 (possibly to MOS 43E, Parachute Rigger) to establish the responsibility for LSE repair; (2) the LSE repairmen be trained for this work (possibly by other service schools); and (3) that TO&E's be written to provide necessary personnel and equipment. Command Action: Recommendations have been forwarded to higher headquarters.

(h) Observation: There are civilian institutions in Military Region I where US Army personnel from the 11th CAG could provide voluntary assistance to needy Vietnamese people. Evaluation: There are numerous areas in close proximity to the 11th CAG where medical, economic and social assistance to the Vietnamese people is inadequate. Recommendation: That the officers and men of the 11th CAG take advantage of every opportunity to meet and work with the Vietnamese -- building goodwill and understanding between the people of the United States and Vietnam. Command Action: (1) On numerous occasions, elements of the 11th CAG have provided both the Crescent Beach and the Sacred Heart orphanages with excess/unserviceable equipment such as plywood, nails, blankets, beds and pillows; (2) gifts

APPENDIX 1 (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

of food and building materials were furnished to the directors of the leper colony at Crescent Beach after a sapper attack had destroyed five of their wards; (3) the "Shoe-shine Boys", an organization to assist homeless street boys, was supported by gifts of beds, mattresses, plywood, light fixtures, paint and other building materials. Personnel from the 11th CAG spent their free time assisting in the construction of a home in DaNang City for those orphans of the street; (4) each flight surgeon assigned to the CAG conducted a vigorous campaign of Med-Cap efforts, not only among the Vietnamese employees of the 11th CAG but also among the local orphanages and hospitals; (5) at Tan My Island, the location of F/4th Cav, medical treatment was given to the families of local villagers. The Cav Troop also conducted air/sea rescue efforts to rescue local fishermen from the water when their boats would capsize in the frequent heavy seas, and contributed supplies money and assistance for local schools and orphanages; (6) numerous functions were sponsored by the officers and men of the Group to promote better understanding and goodwill between the Vietnamese people and US forces; Christmas and Thanksgiving parties for the children and families of the local Vietnamese employees and informal social functions for the commanders and staffs of local Vietnamese Army and Air Force units; and (7) the chaplain of the 11th CAG actively publicized the plight of the orphans in DaNang and, with the commander's encouragement, arranged for those members of this command who wished to do so, to adopt Vietnamese children.

(2) Standdown phase:

(a) Observation: No major problems were experienced by this unit during the standdown phase. Four days advance notice of the standdown allowed this unit to expedite all personnel actions and suspense correspondence. This advance notice also enabled the personnel to ship their hold baggage in advance and was further facilitated by the relaxing of the regulation requiring individuals to have PCS orders before shipping their baggage. A minor problem arose with the requirement for all personnel to wear khakis on the flight to CONUS. Brass insignia and belts with brass buckles were not in the supply system, nor were they available at the Post Exchange. This required enlisted personnel to pay out of their own pockets for items that should have been government issue at concessions operated by local nationals. This unit was informed of this requirement only two days in advance of the first shipment of personnel.

Recommendation: Recommend that the uniform requirement be given in advance to the units to allow for uniform accessories to be

APPENDIX 1 (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

made readily available to all personnel through normal supply channels.

(b) Observation: No provisions for centralized control of physical security had been made, and physical security rapidly became critical after the ceasefire. Evaluation: The requirement for maintaining adequate physical security fell into two areas. The first was the requirement to protect classified information and to deny the enemy information about current and projected operations. The second was the requirement to safeguard government supplies and equipment, and the personal belongings of military personnel. Recommendations: (1) That in addition to normal S-2 activities for providing supervision of the security of all classified material and encouraging unit programs to educate military personnel about the need for security of personal belongings and requirements for safeguarding classified defense information, the S-2 section expand its activities in the physical security field; (2) that the S-2 section assume overall supervision of the operations of the security forces, direct the deployment of guards, and establish operating procedures for the gates, controlling access to 11th CAG areas; (3) that the Assistant S-2 assume custody of the "Assistance in Kind" daily laborer fund and insure that adequate supervision is provided for local nationals working on the compounds belonging to the 11th CAG. Command Action: All recommendations listed above were instituted by the CAG.

(c) Observation and Evaluation: The transfer of Shop Platoon equipment to VNAF contained several inherent problems. Although the USARV OPLAN was followed as to inventorying and preparing equipment for transfer by the 142nd Trans Co (ADS), the VNAF gave little cooperation towards an efficient turn-in. A schedule was established as to time and place of turn-in, but the VNAF failed to show with their representatives at the pre-arranged time. This disregard for scheduling resulted in a loss of manpower and equipment hours needed for other phases of the standdown mission; i.e., flatbed trailers and 5-ton tractors. Recommendation: The primary inventory phase of shop platoon equipment should have been done jointly by US Military and VNAF representatives, thus relieving the time factor of reinventory just prior to transfer. It is recommended that VNAF appoint more personnel for handling and accepting of transfer items. Apparently, only one VNAF officer was able to sign for this equipment and he was never present at prearranged times.

APPENDIX 1 (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(d) Observation: The 11th CAG was responsible for the retrograde of 25 AH-1G, 17 OH-6A, and seven CH-47C helicopters from Vietnam via the Deep Water Pier at DaNang.

Evaluation: This unit had the responsibility for preparing all AH-1G, OH-6A, and CH-47C helicopters in MR I for retrograde via ship from the Deep Water Pier in DaNang. Some of the factors to be considered were how much of the preparation would be handled by the owning unit prior to turn-in to this unit and how to transport the aircraft from their location at DaNang AFB to the Deep Water Pier. Additionally, it was necessary to coordinate very closely with the higher headquarters during the operation.

Command Action: (1) The aircraft were prepared by having the units thoroughly clean the aircraft prior to turn-in. The 142nd TC then completed the preparation of the aircraft for shipment; i.e., preserving engines, removing rotor blades, sealing the aircraft, etc. The only significant problem encountered was a requirement from higher headquarters for information from the aircraft log books after the aircraft had been prepared. This necessitated opening the aircraft to get to the log books and then resealing the aircraft. Another problem was that the units did not remove the explosive cartridges from the AH-1G rocket pod mounts in all cases. This required reopening the barrier paper covering the AH-1G stub wings on a few aircraft and then resealing them. (2) the OH-6A aircraft was transported to the Deep Water Pier in the Sea Land vans that they were to be shipped in and presented no specific problems other than securing the helicopters in the vans. Two helicopters were placed in each van by placing them in a slight angle so that their tail booms were alongside each other. The helicopters were held in place by means of 2x4 bracing nailed to the floor of the van alongside and over the helicopter skid tubes. The wooden boxes containing the OH-6A main rotor blades were secured by padding them with cushioning material and strapping them to the floor of the van beneath the helicopter using salvage cargo tiedown straps. The straps were nailed to the floor of the van at each end. Shipping the OH-6A helicopter in Sea Land vans facilitated ease of transportation and loading and unloading at the ports of embarkation and debarkation as well as increasing the protection from corrosion during shipment. (3) The AH-1G helicopters were prepared for shipment at DaNang AFB and transported to the Deep Water Pier on flatbed trailers when the preparation was complete. Sufficient low-boy trailers were not available, necessitating the use of regular flatbed trailers. It was

APPENDIX 1 (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

necessary to lift some overhead wires along the way to allow the helicopters to pass underneath. Even so, a few long hanging wires were ripped down during the movement. Use of low-boy trailers would have prevented this. The AH-1G main rotor blades were shipped in standard AH-1G main rotor blade shipping boxes and presented no unusual problems. One helicopter was damaged when the truck upon which it was loaded pulled forward while the crane that was used to lift the helicopter onto the trailer was still attached to the helicopter lifting eye. As the truck pulled forward, the helicopter slid aft along the trailer until the rear of the helicopter skids lodged in the wheel well cutouts on the trailer, causing the helicopter to rock backwards breaking the "stinger" and damaging the tail boom when it struck the rear edge of the trailer bed. The helicopter transmission mounts and skid attaching points may possibly have been damaged as well.

(4) The CH-47 helicopters were flown to the Deep Water Pier and final preparations were performed on each aircraft at that location, except for one unflyable aircraft that was transported to Deep Water Pier by surface means. Final preparation of the aircraft at the Deep Water Pier required the dispatch of men and equipment to that point, but presented no particular problems. The CH-47 rotor blade boxes were used to ship most of the rotor blades. Those blades, for which boxes could not be found, were secured in racks inside the helicopters. The CH-47 retrograde operation went smoothly with no unusual problems.

Recommendations: (1) That the requirement for information from aircraft log books be determined prior to sealing the aircraft for final preparation; (2) the preparing unit should insure that all explosives are removed prior to sealing the aircraft; (3) that the Sea/Land van method of shipment be used for shipping OH-6A helicopters in the future; and (4) that AH-1G helicopters be transported on low-boy trailers instead of regular flatbed trailers.

(3) Roll-up phase:

(a) With the exception of the frequent changes in projected shipping schedules, the roll-up phase was free of significant problems. VNAF and the various civilian contractors were cooperative and the turnover of real property and property book items was completed. The remaining items were transferred in a few hours.

(b) The Security Platoon did a satisfactory job of keeping the theft of government and personal equipment at an

APPENDIX 1 (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

acceptable level. ASE HQ at Camp Horn experienced considerable problems and tasked the Group with 20 men in order to form a security detachment.

(c) Once personnel were released for shipment, no problems were experienced in drawing down to the projected level of 76 officers and men remaining on X+59. Effective on X+55, the 62nd CAC was scheduled to zero out its morning report with the remaining personnel being assigned TDY to FRAC at no cost to the government.

(d) With the release of all missions and commitments on X+59, a long, proud history of Army Aviation in Military Region I of the Republic of Vietnam came to an end.

Tab: A - Four Party Special Aviation Detachment
B - ICCS Flight Detachment-MR I
C - 11th CAG Organizational Structure
D - Organization of 11th CAG
E - 11th CAG Command and Staff Positions
F - Awards and Decorations
G - Authorized and Assigned Strength - 28 Jan 73
H - Operational Statistics
I - Aircraft Vulnerability
J - Aircraft Authorized and On-hand

TAB A (Four Party Special Aviation Detachment) to
Appendix 1 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

1. Purpose: To report significant activities and lessons learned by the Four Party Special Aviation Detachment.
2. General: This report covers the activities of the JMC Aviation Detachments from its activation on 28 January 1973 until completion of activities and deactivation of the detachment.

a. Significant Organization Activities:

(1) The FPJMC Aviation support package was formed on 272400H January 1973, and consisted of eight UH-1H aircraft, one OIC, 16 pilots, eight crew chiefs, one NCOIC, and one Technical Inspector. A 23-man NHA civilian work force was authorized, but was never identified by name or separated from the 142nd Transportation Company manpower pool for economy of force reasons. On X+7, the detachment was further augmented by the addition of a trained Maintenance Officer. As JMC Teams were designated for Regions I and II, separate aviation detachments had to be established to augment each team. The two aircraft in support of JMC Region I remained, out of the necessity for support, under the control of the larger Region II team.

(2) During the period 28 January to 13 March 1973 the Region I and II Aviation Detachments flew 525 hours, carried 140 passengers, and transported 10 tons of cargo. On two occasions seven out of the total eight aircraft were tasked for daily missions; however, the average daily commitment was five aircraft per day.

(3) The maintenance teams that supported the detachment, though hampered by the scarcity of selected parts, were able to complete five periodic examinations, and several major component changes. Despite the fact that no blade hour restrictions were placed on the missions and no ceilings were placed on the number of aircraft that could be committed on a daily basis, the detachment was able to maintain an availability rate of 81%. This was due largely to the outstanding maintenance support provided by the 142nd TC shop teams.

TAB A (Four Party Special Aviation Detachment) to Appendix 1
to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

b. Commander's Observations and Recommendations: Few major problems were experienced by the detachment during the operational period. The major problems experienced by the JMC as a whole were not associated with the aviation aspects but in the coordination between the four parties themselves. All missions assigned to the Aviation Detachment received a timely response and experienced only minor difficulties during the conduct of the mission. The detachment recorded one firing incident during the period which resulted in negative damage to the aircraft or injuries to the crew or passengers. This is significant because numerous hours were flown into contested areas or territory owned by the PRG/DRV. Unfortunately, the FPJMC never fully deployed into Region I or II; consequently, most of the flying hours were in support of routine administration missions and the aircraft were never fully utilized for their stated purpose.

3. a. Specific:

24 January 1973: At 2400 hrs the FPJMC Special Flight Detachment was formed and prepared for missions to commence on notification of the ceasefire.

28 January 1973: The first mission in support of FPJMC was flown to transport initial personnel to the Region I headquarters in Hue.

5 February 1973: The Aviation Detachment transported DRV contingents from DaNang AFB to the FPJMC compound located at Camp Horn.

7 February 1973: (1) The Aviation Detachment was augmented by the addition of a maintenance officer to aid the team in required daily and scheduled maintenance. (2) The Aviation Detachment transported DRV contingents from DaNang Air Base to the FPJMC compound located at Camp Horn.

11 February 1973: The Aviation Detachment inserted two PRG representatives into Tra My (old Hau Duc) without incident.

12 February 1973: Aircraft from the JMC Detachment transported PRG representatives from Tra My to the FPJMC compound located in DaNang.

TAB A (Four Party Special Aviation Detachment), to Appendix 1 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

30-31 March 1973: The FPJMC was scheduled to be disbanded on this date with all aircraft turned over to the VNAF and all personnel transferred to shipping points for transfer to CONUS.

b. Commander's Observations on Lessons Learned: None.

TAB B (ICCS Flight Detachment - MR I) to Appendix 1 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

1. Purpose: To summarize the activation, operation, and standdown of the ICCS Flight Detachment in MR I.

2. General:

a. Significant Organization Activities:

(1) Organizational phase (28 January 1973): Upon notification of the ceasefire on 28 January 1973, the ICCS Flight Detachment was formed from the personnel and equipment assets of the 11th CAG. Major Zane K. Rector (XO, 11th CAG) was designated as the detachment commander.

(2) Operational phase (29 January to 20 March 1973): The ICCS Flight Detachment conducted transportation and resupply for the ICCS delegations in Regions I and II (MR I).

(3) Standdown-Withdrawal-Roll-up Phase (20 - 27 March 1973): The ICCS Flight Detachment was relieved of flying responsibilities by Air America on 27 March. Assigned personnel were withdrawn from RVN and equipment was turned over to PA&E and Air America.

b. Command Observation and Recommendations:

(1) Organizational phase (28 January 1973).

(2) Operation phase (29 January to 20 March 1973):
Observation: ICCS personnel were not aware of the aviation detachment's availability to them in MR I.
Recommendation: That ICCS personnel should have been briefed on the aviation assets available to them.

Observation: Poor communication existed between operations personnel in Region I and Region II causing a mis-utilization of aircraft by the ICCS Teams.

Recommendation: Aviation support be routed through one operations office where missions can be properly scheduled to prevent waste of aircraft blade time.

Observation: Aircraft were being used to fly to areas where adequate and secure ground transportation was available.

Recommendation: That ICCS personnel should first attempt to move personnel and supplies by road convoy unless time is of the essence.

TAB B (ICCS Flight Detachment - MR I) to Appendix 1 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

Observation: ICCS personnel made no apparent attempt to observe ground activities between their regional and field locations when they traveled by aircraft.

Recommendation: That ICCS personnel should use road convoys as the primary means of transporting supplies and personnel. This would present more opportunities to observe the actions of the PRG, DRV, RVAF and US personnel from a vantage point.

(3) Standdown-Withdrawal-Roll-up phase (20 - 27 March 1973): Observation: Air America continued to postpone the acceptance of the ICCS mission in MR I. The initial transfer of missions was to take place on X+30. It was postponed to X+37, X+44, and was finally scheduled for X+59. This caused unnecessary hardship on assigned personnel and their families who needed a definite date to prepare for the move to their next assignment. Recommendation: That Air America be required to reassign aircraft and pilots from their missions in other areas to support the ICCS mission in Vietnam.

3. Specific:

a. Significant Activity:

28 January 1973: ICCS Detachment formed with 13 officers, eight EM, and six UH-1H's all from 11th CAG assets. Maintenance support was provided by a 23-man NHA contract team under the 142nd TC. Personnel were assigned to 62nd Avn Co.

31 January 1973: ICCS quartering party from Saigon arrived to inspect DaNang and Hue facilities. Party was briefed on the aviation assets available to them.

5 February 1973: ICCS teams arrived from Saigon and deployed to DaNang and Hue. Coordination meeting held with operations officers from DaNang, Hue Regional Headquarters, and the Aviation Detachment.

6 February 1973: First mission flown in support of ICCS.

14 - 22 February 1973: ICCS flown to Quang Tri to observe daily prisoner exchange.

28 February 1973: ICCS aircraft received ground fire northwest of Hoi An (coord BT085625) wounding the pilot. ICCS members from Canada and Indonesia were aboard.

TAB B (ICCS Flight Detachment - MR I) to Appendix 1 to Annex B
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

29 February 1973: All ICCS aircraft were grounded until further notice on orders from Saigon ICCS Headquarters. Exceptions required written approval.

9 March 1973: ICCS team taken to Gio Linh field site. First time to cross north of Thach Han River.

27 March 1973: Aircraft transferred to Air America.

27 - 29 March 1973: Personnel departed RVN.

b. Commander's Comments:

Evaluation: During the operations phase, it became apparent that the delegations from Canada, Hungary, Indonesia, and Poland knew very little about the utilization of helicopters in supporting their mission.

Observation: The "CHIP" personnel were using aircraft for short flights between secure areas where less expensive ground transportation was available. Aircraft were also being flown with only a few personnel on board.

Recommendation: CHIP personnel should be briefed on the expense and effective use of blade hours when employing aircraft.

Command Action: The detachment commander and operations officer conducted extensive discussions about aircraft utilization with operations personnel in both ICCS Regions I and II.

TAB C (11th CAG Organizational Structure) to Appendix 1 to
Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
APO, 96349

HHC, 11TH CAG
APO, 96349

62ND AVIATION COMPANY (CORPS)
APO, 96349

519TH MEDICAL DETACHMENT
APO, 96349


321ST AIRFIELD DETACHMENT (DIVISION)

F TROOP, 4TH AIR CAVALRY
APO, 96349

D TROOP, 17TH AIR CAVALRY
APO, 96349

142ND TRANSPORTATION COMPANY
APO, 96349

TAB D (Organization of 11th CAG) to Appendix 1 to Annex B
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report



TAB E (11th CAG Command and Staff Positions) to Appendix 1
to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

<u>UNIT OR STAFF POSITION</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>NAME</u>
GROUP COMMANDER	14 JUN 72 - 28 MAR 73	STANLEY D. CASS 523-44-2707, LTC, FA
EXECUTIVE OFFICER	27 APR 72 - 28 MAR 73	ZANE K. RECTOR 413-54-2705, MAJ, FA
S-1	20 OCT 72 - 28 MAR 73	FRANK J. LEGGIO, JR. 144-38-2617, CPT, TC
S-2	1 APR 72 - 10 NOV 72	RICHARD W. PEDERSON 141-40-3799, CPT, FA
	10 NOV 72 - 28 MAR 73	WELDON O. SPENCER 450-70-9673, CPT, MI
S-3	18 OCT 72 - 28 JAN 73	JOHN P. KENNEDY 029-30-6274, MAJ, AR
	28 JAN 73 - 28 MAR 73	WILBER W. SORENSON 523-50-2603, MAJ, AR
S-4	1 SEP 72 - 28 MAR 73	JOE E. PARISH 254-54-2908, MAJ, IN
CO, 62ND AVIATION CO (CORPS)	6 OCT 72 - 28 MAR 73	OLLIE C. CRADDOCK 261-54-6273, MAJ, FA
CO, F TROOP, 4TH CAV	10 SEP 72 - 12 FEB 73	KERMIT E. LARSON 463-62-9607, MAJ, AR
CO, D TROOP, 17TH CAV	3 SEP 72 - 12 FEB 73	WILBERT W. SORENSON 523-50-2603, MAJ, AR

TAB F (Awards and Decorations) to Appendix 1, to Annex B
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

SILVER STAR	0
DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS	5
BRONZE STAR	21
AIR MEDAL	116
ARMY COMMENDATION MEDAL	32
TOTAL	174

TAB G (Authorized and Assigned Strength - 28 Jan 73) to
 Appendix 1 to Annex B, to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>		<u>WO</u>		<u>ENLISTED</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>	
	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASSD</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASSD</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASSD</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASSD</u>
HHC, 11TH CAG	16	16	0	2	24	32	93	50
62ND Avn Co	25	30	60	24	298	175	383	229
142ND Trans Co	6	6	6	3	151	62	163	71
D Troop, 17TH Cav	19	20	31	22	216	180	266	222
F Troop, 4TH Cav	19	18	31	19	216	152	266	189
321ST AD(D)	1	1	0	0	7	8	15	9
519TH Med	1	1	0	0	8	8	9	9
TOTALS	87	90	128	70	920	617	1195	779

TAB H (Operational Statistics) to Appendix 1 to Annex B
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

HOURS FLOWN:	NOVEMBER	4,081
	DECEMBER	4,196
	JANUARY	4,289
	FEBRUARY	1,406
CUMULATIVE HOURS:		30,245
SORTIES FLOWN:		45,741
TROOPS LIFTED:		15,218
CARGO LIFTED: (TONS)		2,518
ENEMY KBH:		90
STRUCTURES DAMAGED:		206
STRUCTURES DESTROYED:		322
SAMPANS DAMAGED:		19
SAMPANS DESTROYED:		120
VEHICLES DAMAGED:		0
VEHICLES DESTROYED:		0
TANKS DAMAGED:		0
TANKS DESTROYED:		0

TAB I (Aircraft Vulnerability) to Appendix 1 to Annex B
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>SHOT * AT</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>	<u>SHOT DOWN</u>
NOVEMBER	51	15	3
DECEMBER	55	9	4
JANUARY	25	11	1
FEBRUARY	5	2	0
MARCH	2	1	0

TAB J (Aircraft Authorized and On Hand) to Appendix 1 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

	UH-1H		AH-1G		OH-6A		CH-47	
	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H
62ND AVN CO	20	21					6	6
D TROOP, 17TH CAV	10	10	10	9	9	7		
F TROOP, 4TH CAV	8	9	9	8	9	9		
142ND TRANS CO	2	2						

APPENDIX 2 (12th Combat Aviation Group) to ANNEX B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

1. Purpose: To report significant activities and planning involved in the standdown of 12th Combat Aviation Group during the period 1 November 1972 through 14 March 1973.

2. General:

a. Section 1: Significant Organization Activities.

(1) Pre-X-Day Phase: During the period 1 November 1972 to 29 March 1973 the 12th Combat Aviation Group continued to provide army aviation support to the Commander, Third Regional Assistance Command (TRAC), Headquarters, MACV and USARV. Group assets included two air cavalry troops, F Troop, 8th and F Troop, 9th US Air Cavalry stationed at Bien Hoa Army, which were OPCON to Cdr, TRAC, with the primary mission of providing security for the key installations and US personnel in Military Region III. Their mission ended on 28 January 1973 commensurate with the cease fire. Additional Group assets included the Command Aircraft Company which provided U-21 fixed wing support for all MR's and Headquarters, MACV/USARV. The 59th Corps Aviation Company was also assigned to Group and supported Headquarters TRAC, USARV and MACV with utility and command and control helicopters. An additional major unit of Group was the 388th Transportation Company with the responsibility for providing all in-country general support and back-up direct support aircraft maintenance. Subsequent to the ceasefire, the 388th provided the major effort for retrograde of army aircraft from Vietnam. The last aircraft to be retrograded by surface means was taken out of Newport dock on 3 March 1973.

The outstanding efforts of 12th Group during this reporting period were evidenced by the numerous significant achievements. The combined average monthly flying hours of the two air cavalry units, flown while accomplishing their primary mission, exceeded all other air cavalry averages in Vietnam. The aircraft loss rate was the lowest in Vietnam even though the combat activity in MR III had increased sharply. The Command Aircraft Company completed one accident free year of U-21 fixed wing support for all of Vietnam which included VII transportation for the highest ranking US personnel to visit Vietnam as well as neighboring countries.

An additional unit of this group was the 312th Aviation Detachment (Divisional). The 312th Commander was responsible for operating Hotel 3, which was the major heliport in Vietnam, and Lassiter Heliport at Bien Hoa Air Base, the home of both F/8 and F/9 Air Cavalry Troops.

APPENDIX 2 (12th Combat Aviation Group) to ANNEX B, to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

Subsequent to receipt of the 1st Aviation Brigade OPLAN 215, actions were initiated to prepare for standdown of this Group and its units. This phase was marked by enthusiasm and optimism on the part of all staff sections and unit headquarters. Plans were formulated and information was disseminated to unit levels. The process of reviewing and revising plans resulted in numerous changes in planning guidance for some units. As the cease-fire efforts continued and it became evident that peace would not occur in 1972, units resumed their missions and waited for final planning to be accomplished. Suspense dates were established and plans were formulated for the timely submission of OER's, PER's, awards, funds dissolution, and personnel strengths. As guidance was published and changes noted, units were contacted to insure their understanding and compliance.

Significant reorganization that occurred included the formation of special aviation teams to support the Four Party Commission and the International Commission for Control and Supervision. This selection was primarily based upon aviator retainability and qualifications. Guidelines and suspenses for the termination of funds were also established. Rosters of personnel assigned and those pending orders were prepared during the initial stages of the pre-standdown and forwarded in order to assist in zeroing morning reports. A list of mission essential personnel for extension beyond normal DEROS was submitted to USARV for approval. This was limited to key personnel in critical slots. Although activities were conducted on a continuing basis, the frequency of changes and actions resulting therefrom consumed considerable time on the part of administrative personnel at all levels of command.

During this first period, units were instructed to turn-in all excess equipment in anticipation of the cease fire. The S-4 section conducted inspections in the areas of motor maintenance, arms room, mess hall, and supply operations. Safety inspections were conducted at Lassiter's rearm and POL points. All unit property books were audited for the scheduled Annual General Inspection and/or standdown.

The 12th CAG was preparing for an Annual General Inspection scheduled for the end of February. The overall posture of the group was improved by the pre-AGI inspections and assistance visits to the subordinate units. Equipment was in fair shape but there were problems with the "time lag" encountered in the offshore supply system. Equipment was earmarked for support of the aircraft retrograde mission and put in good condition. Coordination was made with Vinnell Corp and PA&E for top priority on all projects once X-Day arrived.

APPENDIX 2 (12th Combat Aviation Group) to ANNEX B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

Since planning originally commenced in mid-October there was no major problem during this time. Units were briefed on standdown procedures and copies of Annex F to USARV OPLAN 183 were furnished to all units. PERT charts were drawn up and used as a management tool to facilitate an orderly standdown. Personnel turbulence made it necessary for some units to change key standdown officers which could have been avoided by astute personnel management.

The initial reaction to the promised ceasefire was enthusiasm and hard work in the effort to accomplish a fast withdrawal of US forces. However, the subsequent turn of events, when the war continued, saw a definite abatement in total productivity. All functional areas of military activity suffered from a reluctance to turn from peace preparations back to prosecution of the war. Even the promising start toward standdown began to suffer as morale took a downswing. The formulation of plans for standdown and the dissemination of information to troop units slowed, as did unit reaction. The resumption of mission tasks was accomplished as the final plans for standdown were completed.

Based upon data obtained from Brigade OPLAN 215, skeletal plans were outlined to coordinate the intelligence collection and counterintelligence functions as effected by depleted resources and personnel security - debriefing requirements. The disposition of unit files and security equipment was considered in the light of assumptions concerning time phased mission reduction. Document security, communication security, and personnel security measures were planned in accordance with the proposed troop and mission reduction.

The 12th CAG Signal Section was actively engaged in maintaining communications to include an effective distribution system between 12th CAG Headquarters and subordinate units. The telephone communications from Saigon to Bien Hoa and Plantation went steadily downhill because this system was no longer under US control.

During the period from 1 November 1972 to 14 March 1973, plans and contingencies were formulated for the standdown of all aviation maintenance facilities in MR III. A plan for continued maintenance support for US Army aircraft in MR III subsequent to the standdown of the military maintenance units was established and implemented. Plans and contingencies were also formulated for the retrograde of 153 aircraft from Newport dock facility as well as the transfer of all remaining UH-1H aircraft in MR III to GVN (VNAF).

APPENDIX 2 (12th Combat Aviation Group) to ANNEX B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(2) Standdown Phase: Upon official notification of the ceasefire, plans had to be updated and certain inadequacies of these plans were identified. Special aviation mission teams were organized; however, no provision for the administrative and support requirements had been made. Immediate reassignment of personnel with the MOS's 71B/H (clerical and administrative), 94P (cooks), and 76Y (armor/unit supply) caused problems for subordinate units. It not only created hardships for the individuals involved but also caused units to reassign personnel internally. Additionally, with the shortage of these MOS's throughout the Group, further reassignment between units was required in order to assist each unit to standdown in an orderly fashion. Most of the reassignments levied on individual units could have been anticipated and implemented in the current OPLAN.

The Unit Fund was turned in to the Central Post Fund on X+10 with no discrepancies. Pertinent files and records were boxed and forwarded to AG Publications as per instructions.

F/8, F/9 and 129th Medical Detachment commenced standdown on X-Day and were completed by X+15. The standdown was accomplished in a timely and orderly fashion. The remaining units in group continued to turn-in excess equipment and made coordination for the turn over of PC&S property. The army installation at Bien Hoa was turned over to the ARVN on X+16. The LOI's published for standdown were followed by all units and proved to be a definite assistance. Sufficient transportation, other than TO&E was made available through Transportation Motor Pool (TMP). The Newport Plan was successfully put into operation for retrograding aircraft. Update information from the 1st Aviation Brigade OPLAN 215 was disseminated and the group standdown plan was updated and briefed to all units. The units located at Bien Hoa ceased tactical operations and started standdown immediately while all other units continued their missions. Title transfer of selected TO&E property had been effected previously and was hand receipted back to US units. PC&S property at Bien Hoa was turned over to ARVN Units.

Notification of the ceasefire order brought back the enthusiasm seen initially in October. Minor changes in the OPLAN were implemented and units commenced immediate shipment and processing of troops. Special Mission Teams were organized and briefed. The sudden increase in personnel security requirements presented no particular problems. Staff coordination and adequate planning provided for effective personnel security processing. The planned termination of intelligence processing

APPENDIX 2 (12th Combat Aviation Group) to ANNEX B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

and dissemination caused some problems in providing for Special Action Teams. This was compounded by the cut-off of incoming material by higher headquarters. Although planning was adequate and timely for the most part, the uncertainties in contingency planning resulted in holding certain assets, notably secure voice radio and security containers, beyond the planned turn in date. The screening and disposition of files was uncomplicated though changes in the cut-off date occurred frequently.

(3) Withdrawal Phase: To assist in a planned withdrawal, release rosters were submitted. However, because of changes in unit missions the actual withdrawal did not coincide with the rosters and resulted in delays while orders were being published. This, in turn, caused delays in outprocessing. This phase of the ceasefire concerned not only the withdrawal of troops but also the reassignment of personnel within Vietnam to meet the needs of special teams.

Intelligence files and logs were closed. Where necessary, mission-essential documents were transferred permanently to 1st Aviation Brigade. All files were disposed of in accordance with standdown plans. Staff sections reduced personnel strength where practical. Some difficulties were encountered as planning deficiencies appeared. Again, uncertainty in the contingency area caused a slow-down in personnel clearances, turn-in of files and disposal of classified material and references.

Mission requirements were reevaluated and aviation assets were adjusted accordingly. The OPSUM Report was terminated on 1 March 1973. All other reports were continued. The Group assumed the responsibility for providing all aviation support in MR III for "Operation HOMECOMING". This added responsibility was thoroughly coordinated with 1st Aviation Brigade and plans were formulated for this Group to maintain a special aviation staff to control aviation support in MR III after X+45. The majority of the communication equipment was turned-in during this period. Radio communications with the F Troops, 8th and 9th Cav was terminated on X+14. During the withdrawal phase (20 Feb - 1 Mar 73) COMSEC records were shipped to the custodians of the gaining unit in CONUS.

All safety files and records were turned over to 1st Aviation Brigade. Group and Special Detachments retained the responsibility for aircraft accident investigations until standdown. The 12th CAG and its subordinate units safety record of 7.5% was a "milestone" in aviation safety. The accident rate for RVN was 13.8%. This low rate was brought about by experienced and

APPENDIX 2 (12th Combat Aviation Group) to ANNEX B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

safety conscious commanders and all support personnel.

(4) Roll-up Phase: The final phase of the ceasefire was concerned with the establishment of internal controls to insure unit deactivation standdown and final morning report submission. A skeleton staff was established for movement to Brigade in order to finalize all unit administrative actions.

During this phase, the final disposition of files and references was accomplished; the transfer of personnel security functions to the 1st Aviation Brigade was made along with the closing of document control logs. As the units cleared their areas, the exit security inspection was completed and final reports were forwarded to 1st Aviation Brigade. A methodology for security debriefing of personnel was implemented as they processed out of their units into the Camp Alpha transshipment area. All mission requirements were combined and sufficient aviation assets were transferred to the CAG to support all remaining aircraft requirements. Command Aircraft Company (CAC) and 1st Aviation Brigade Headquarters were the only aviation units in MR III remaining after X+45. All reports after X+45 were forwarded from CAC to the Group staff which was reduced to seven personnel and remained until X+59 to provide aviation support for MR III.

b. Section 2: Commander's comments on lessons learned:
Robley W. Davis Jr., LTC, IN.

(1) Special Teams Formation

(a) Observation: The actual composition of special aviation teams was not adequate to enable them to perform both their mission and meet team administrative requirements.

(b) Evaluation: The requirement was to assign only aviators and crewchiefs to each special aviation team; however, it became apparent that each team needed operations and administrative personnel to maintain flight records and orders. Units had to be tasked to provide the additional support personnel; however, they could not be assigned to the teams due to team strength limitations.

(c) Recommendation: Special aviation teams be formed as separate detachments with the complete capability of performing operations and related administrative functions.

APPENDIX 2. (12th Combat Aviation Group) to ANNEX B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(2) Orders for Special Teams:

(a) Observation: Members of special aviation teams were not reassigned promptly to a controlling headquarters or organization.

(b) Evaluation: When the special teams were formed, plans had not been completed to reassign team members to a gaining unit. This created confusion among the team members as well as their parent units. Morning reports did not accurately reflect unit strengths since members to be transferred were actually present for duty with their teams. The air cavalry troops were unable to zero out morning reports in a timely manner because team members were selected from their assets and had not been reassigned. In addition some confusion existed as to rating schemes and the administration of military justice.

(c) Recommendation: Personnel on special teams be immediately reassigned to a controlling headquarters that is scheduled to maintain a morning report throughout the entire period of utilization.

(3) Destruction of Unclassified Material:

(a) Observation: Adequate instructions were not published for the destruction of unclassified material.

(b) Evaluation: Although there were adequate instructions for the boxing and shipment of classified and unclassified files, no plans or guidance was received for the destruction of such material as regulations, manuals, and forms. There were inadequate facilities at Tan Son Nhut to effectively destroy the abundance of such material. Numerous phone calls and coordination with PA&E, the fire department, and other activities were required to locate a suitable facility for burning large quantities of unclassified material.

(c) Recommendation: Plans must be made for the large scale destruction of unclassified material in the final stages of unit standdown and withdrawal.

(4) Files and Security Containers:

(a) Observation: Uncertainty caused by added missions and responsibilities caused a slowdown in files disposition. This in turn delayed turnover of security containers.

APPENDIX 2 (12th Combat Aviation Group) to ANNEX B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(b) Evaluation: As previously mentioned, the delay in the proposed ceasefire caused decreased productivity at all levels, a psychological reaction to disappointment sometimes referred to as "stand-downitis". Staff planning and more particularly, staff coordination suffered because of this phenomenon. Decisions were slow incoming and even slower in dissemination as each level of the hierarchy added its own "safety factor". Thus, at Group level, files were held beyond a time of any practical usefulness. The resultant, all-out purge and disposition when this static situation was overtaken by the third change of suspense date, caused a day-long stoppage in other activity. The chain reaction result was a holdup in transfer of security containers. Not a large problem, nevertheless it was time consuming and counter-productive.

(c) Recommendation: That early planning and initiation for and disposition of historical and general files be required at all staff levels.

(5) Closing of Funds:

(a) Observation: More command supervision at unit level was required to insure proper closing of funds and availability of auditing officers.

(b) Evaluation: The terminal audits of funds were conducted by persons with little or no prior knowledge of funds management or administrative procedures. This created a training problem; other problems resulted from auditing officers not initiating their audits promptly through failure to notify their respective fund custodians of the date for final audit.

(c) Recommendation: Auditors should be carefully selected and immediately initiate terminal audit procedures.

(6) Maps:

(a) Observation: The USARV/MACV SUPCOM Map depot began disposition of assets early in the standdown. New supplies were not obtained.

(b) Evaluation: An immediate need for maps arose with the formation of the Special Action Teams by 12th Combat Aviation Group. This need was met out of stock-on-hand; however, the on-hand supply was seriously depleted. Contingency planning required additional map supplies which could not be readily obtained through normal channels.

APPENDIX 2 (12th Combat Aviation Group) to ANNEX B to
USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(c) Recommendation: That normal supply channels remain open and functioning as long as US Forces require support in the combat area.

(7) PCS Orders:

(a) Observation: The shipment of personnel available for release was slowed by the lack of orders.

(b) Evaluation: Although assignment instructions were received, orders were not published by X+10 as originally indicated but continued through X+20. This often prevented units from releasing those persons scheduled for shipment and meant changing shipping dates by as much as three weeks. During the second increment, this prevented the units from maintaining their shipment rates and caused a delay in scheduling. In addition to creating problems for the various headquarters, it also created a hardship for individuals and their families.

(c) Recommendation: Orders be published as scheduled and in accordance with shipping lists submitted by individual units.

(8) Intelligence Information:

(a) Observation: Military Intelligence collection assets began standdown almost immediately upon X-Day. The collection responsibility was to be taken over by Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces agencies who would continue operations and reporting. This office was not in a position to assess the workability of such a plan and only observed that the quality and quantity of intelligence information received through normal channels was inadequate.

(b) Recommendation: That US Intelligence collection and processing agencies continue support to US Forces until they exit the combat area.

- Tab A - 12th CAG Army Aviation Element
- B - 12th CAG Air Tow Detachment
- C - 312th Aviation Detachment-Divisional
- D - 12th CAG Command Aircraft Company
- E - 59th Corps Aviation Company
- F - 388th Transportation Company
- G - F Troop, 8th Cavalry, 12th CAG
- H - F Troop, 9th Cavalry, 12th CAG
- I - 12th CAG Special Aviation Teams
- J - FPJMC Aviation Detachment-RW-Regions V, VII & HQ

TAB A (12th CAG Army Aviation Element) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

1. Purpose: To report significant activities and planning involved in the standdown and close out of the 12th Combat Aviation Group Army Aviation Element (AAE) at the Third Regional Assistance Command. (TRAC).
2. General: During the period 1 November 1972 to 29 January 1973, plans and contingencies were formulated for the stand-down and close-out of the Third Regional Assistance Command Army Aviation Element. (TRAC AAE).

TRAC AAE was composed of a chief of AAE, two Assistant Aviation Staff Officers, and two enlisted clerks. Located at TRAC Hq, Plantation, RVN, AAE was an integral part of the TRAC Staff. The AAE was a subordinate element of the 12th Group and served as the operative element for the 12th Group commander in his function as the TRAC Aviation Officer. AAE came under the staff supervision of the S-3, 12th Group.

The primary mission of AAE was to serve as advisors for employment of Army aviation assets for the TRAC Commander and his staff and to supervise and coordinate all of the Army aviation assets and support in MR III.

Basically aviation support for Military Region III consisted of administrative helicopter support for the 11 Provinces in the region as well as support for three division advisory teams, the Ranger Brigade Advisory team, and the Armor Brigade Advisory team.

The primary mission of AAE, however, was mission planning and coordination for the two Air Cavalry troops and the Air TOW Detachment which were under the operational control of the Commander, TRAC.

This was accomplished by face to face coordination with Division and Province advisory teams throughout the Military Region and formulating Visual Reconnaissance plans based on their recommendations. These plans were then presented to the TRAC Commander and staff for approval or modification. Once approved, the missions were given to the Air Cavalry by AAE along with available intelligence gathered from the TRAC G-2. This planning and mission coordination for the Air Cavalry was the bulk of the workload for AAE and it formed a constant series of plans, operations, and updates to maintain a current picture of enemy activity along with the other intelligence gathering agencies.

TAB A (12th CAG Army Aviation Element) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

During the period of this report, the enemy heightened and expanded his activity throughout the military region in an effort to gain additional territory prior to the expected ceasefire. This created additional planning requirements because it was necessary to maintain a watch on centers of enemy activity while at the same time attempting to make a systematic covering of the other areas in the military region. This was accomplished by maintaining close coordination with all of the elements in the military region and reacting to important intelligence trends.

AAE was also responsible for coordination of CH-47 support within MR III for the resupply of U.S. assets and the recovery of downed aircraft. MR III had no organic CH-47 assets and AAE was responsible for arranging CH-47 support from MR IV when this support was required.

Finally, AAE maintained the net control station for both secure voice and FM radio for all of the elements within 12th Group.

A. Section 1: Significant Organizational Activity

(1) Pre-X-Day: From the period 1 November 1972 to 27 January 1973 plans were drawn for the standdown of AAE. It was realized that as of X-Day tactical operations would cease and that the coordination of administrative missions could be assumed by the S-3 section of 12th Group. As a result it was decided that AAE would be stood down on X+1 and that all remaining missions and reports would be delegated to the S-3 section.

(2) Standdown Phase: Standdown was accomplished between 1200 hours 28 January 1973 and 1200 hours 29 January 1973. No significant problems were encountered and personnel strength was adequate to accomplish the mission.

B. Section 2: Observations and Recommendations:

(1) Pre-X-Day: No specific observations or recommendations. Plans were disseminated from both TRAC and 12th Group in adequate time to facilitate planning and no major problems were encountered.

(2) Standdown Phase: Observation: Units of the command as well as elements within the Military Region required

TAB A (12th CAG Army Aviation Element) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

additional CH-47 support after notification of a ceasefire because of turn-in requirements. This caused a strain on an already over-taxed support system.

Recommendation: That a CH-47 be assigned as a group asset until X+10 to be used as necessary to turn in aircraft and equipment.

3. SPECIFIC:

A. Section 1:

(1) Pre-X-Day: During the Pre-X-Day Phase there were no significant activities with reference to the standdown plans; however, there was increased activity in the military region. During this period the Air Cavalry concentrated their activity along the major infiltration routes in Tay Ninh Province and the Saigon River corridor. Numerous enemy fortified areas were found and targeted for TacAir and B-52 strikes. B-52 targeting was accomplished by coordination between the Air Cavalry, AAE, and the G-2 Air and G-3 Air on the TRAC staff. Once a strike was recommended and executed, the Air Cavalry normally conducted a bomb damage assessment of the target area. Approximately 50% of the B-52 strikes in MR III during this report period were either recommended by the Air Cavalry or targeted by the TRAC staff as a result of Air Cavalry reconnaissance in conjunction with other intelligence reports.

The Air TOW Detachment working in conjunction with the Air Cavalry averaged engaging in nine targets a month during this period and had confirmed destruction of one tank, two APC's, and eight trucks. AAE controlled the disposition of the Air TOW Detachment and habitually assigned them to operate with the Air Cavalry in any area that would have a possible armor threat.

During this period, because of the increased work load, the liaison visits to the advisory teams at Province and Division was somewhat curtailed. Although some visits were still made, the majority of the mission planning was a result of intelligence reports and maintaining reconnaissance along the infiltration routes.

This effort by the Air Cavalry, coordinated by AAE, was successful in that the Commander, TRAC was kept abreast of

TAB A (12th CAG Army Aviation Element) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

the current enemy activity in the region and was better able to advise the III Corps Commander on methods of dealing with the enemy threat.

(2) Standdown Phase: Upon notification of the ceasefire, AAE began the actual standdown procedures. All personnel assigned were briefed by the Chief, AAE as to the time-table and their specific duties.

Tactical operations were halted and the radio nets were closed. The radio equipment was turned in to the appropriate agencies. All continuing operational functions and report functions were assumed by the S-3 section on X+1. All activities normally in contact with AAE for aviation support were notified of the standdown and informed to process any requests through the S-3 section. All activities at the Plantation installation were closed out and all personnel and equipment moved to the S-3 section, 12th Group on X+1.

B. Section 2: Commander's comments - Robert E. Weathersby, MAJ, IN.

(1) Pre-X-Day: No significant observations or recommendations.

(2) Standdown Phase: All standdown activities went smoothly and with a minimum of coordination problems. The entire standdown of AAE took less than 24 hours and all of the remaining required functions of AAE were absorbed by the S-3 Section of 12th Group on X+1.

The only problem area to be noted was the problem of CH-47 support in MR III. Due to the requirements in MR IV and the International Commission for Control and Supervision and the Joint Military Commission, CH-47 support became very restricted immediately after X-Day. It was recommended that early coordination be effected through Vietnamese Air Force channels to insure CH-47 support for aircraft recovery after the standdown of U.S. CH-47 assets.

TAB B (12th CAG Air Tow Detachment) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to
USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

1. Purpose: To report significant activities involved in the standdown and the close out of the Air TOW Detachment.

2. General: The First Combat Aerial TOW Detachment commenced operations with the 12th Combat Aviation Group on 1 November 1972. A significant armor threat had developed in MR III and the TOW Detachment was employed to counter the threat. The TOW Detachment consisted of two NUH-1B helicopters with the XM-26 missile system installed. Six pilots and three enlisted men were assigned to the Detachment. In addition, four technical representatives from Hughes Aircraft Company provided the technical know-how to maintain the weapon systems. The personnel were assigned to HHC 12th Combat Aviation Group, attached to F Troop 9th Cavalry and received missions from Army Aviation Element, TRAC. The aircraft were employed daily with both cavalry troops that were operating in an armor threat area. The aircraft were not only used to engage targets, but were also employed in a reconnaissance role to further enhance the Air Cavalry mission. One tank, two APC's, six trucks, and numerous other point targets were engaged and destroyed by the TOW Detachment.

a. Section 1: Significant Organizational Activities

(1) Pre-standdown phase: Plans were formulated for the orderly turn-in of aircraft and withdrawal of personnel.

(2) Standdown phase: The retrograde of two NUH-1B helicopters was completed on 30 January 1973 (X+2). Standdown was completed in a timely and orderly fashion.

b. Section 2: Commander's Observations and Recommendations:
Karl B. Hill, Jr, CPT, AR.

Standdown phase: Contingencies for equipment not organic to the unit, such as fork lifts and flat bed trucks, should be made available to insure an orderly withdrawal of equipment and to meet suspense dates established.

3. Specific:

a. Significant activities occurring in each phase as they relate in the following areas:

(1) Pre-standdown phase: Air TOW conducted normal operations in conjunction with F Troop 8th U.S. (Air) Cavalry and F Troop 9th US (Air) Cavalry). Air TOW engaged an average of

TAB B (12th CAG Air TOW Detachment) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to
USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

nine (9) targets a month, resulting in the destruction of one (1) T-54 tank, two (2) armored personnel carriers, and eight (8) 2½ ton and 5 ton trucks. Plans were formulated for standdown of XM-26 system equipment and the two (2) NUH-1B helicopters.

(2) Standdown phase: On 26 January 1973 three (3) officers of the Air TOW Detachment were notified of their new assignment with the ICCS. On 20 January 1973 the officers departed the Air TOW Detachment for their new assignments. On 30 January 1973 the three (3) enlisted men departed the Air TOW Detachment enroute CONUS. In addition, three (3) civilian technical representatives from Hughes Aircraft Company departed the Air TOW Detachment on 1 February 1973. Mr. J. J. Moniz, Chief Engineer from Hughes Aircraft Company, and CPT K. B. Hill, Jr. Detachment Commander, remained until 3 February for final disposition of the XM-26 system and related equipment. On 28 January 1973 standdown procedures commenced. On 29 January 1973 the XM-26 systems were removed from aircraft 553 and 554 - aircraft 554 was turned in for retrograde. On 30 January 1973 aircraft 553 was turned in for retrograde. Packing for XM-26 system and back up test equipment commenced. On 31 January 1973 aircraft parts were successfully turned in and an Air Force loading team started palleting the XM-26 equipment. On 1 February 1973 the Air Force load team completed palleting and the equipment was loaded upon a C-141 aircraft.

b. Section 2: Commander's comments on lessons learned, and recommendations relative to each phase and areas of concern.

(1) Pre-standdown phase: No significant recommendations or observations with regard to operational employment of air TOW. However, support of a test detachment, such as Air TOW, employed to a theater of operation, should receive much more emphasis than Air TOW did in areas of administration and logistics. Personnel assigned to Air TOW were unable to reconcile their 201 personnel records for the first 8 months of their assignment to the Detachment due to a lack of interest or knowledge from supporting administrative personnel. The Air TOW Detachment made two (2) PCS moves within RVN and were not issued orders for their moves until 2 months into the second move, at which time much confusion existed as to who belonged to whom. Upon PCS to 12th Combat Aviation Group in November 1972, the Air TOW Detachment finally experienced competent administrative support and all problems related to personnel administration were resolved. More emphasis should be established in this area by higher headquarters to ensure orderly administration of an individual's personal

TAB B (12th CAG Air TOW Detachment) to Appendix 2 to Annex B
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

records. The repercussions of poor administration could prove to be disastrous to an individual's career. Logistical support, with regard to major moves made by the Air TOW Detachment, was sub-standard in that equipment necessary to make the move, such as fork-lift and flat-bed trucks, was not readily available. This interfered with the smooth flow of events and caused severe interruptions to the pre-determined schedule. Provisions for unique units or detachments, such as the experimental Air TOW Detachment, should be made well in advance of their arrival in any theatre of operation, with special emphasis given to the areas of administration and logistics. Quite often as not, small test units will require sanitary laboratory environments for experimental test equipment, which dictates another contingency area.

(2) Standdown phase: Obstacles experienced were not insurmountable. However, due to the uniqueness and sensitivity of the XM-26 system and the special handling required, a contingency for a C-141 aircraft should have been made so as to preclude the equipment remaining in the freight yard for any period over 24 hours.

TAB C (312th Aviation Detachment - Divisional) to Appendix 2
to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

1. Purpose: To relate significant organizational activities of the 312th Aviation Detachment (Div) during the Pre-X-Day through Roll-up phases of the standdown of US Forces in RVN.

2. General:

a. Significant Organizational Activities: The 312th Aviation Detachment (Div) was responsible for furnishing Air Traffic Control for H-3, Saigon H-3, Saigon Heliport, and traffic advisories for all other heliports in the Saigon Area. The Saigon Heliport was the largest heliport in operation in the RVN. In addition, the 312th furnished VFR flight following for MR III through the operation of Capital Center flight following facility. During the past 12 months there were a total of 73,874 landings and departures from H-3 and 123,770 air movements flight followed by Capital Center. These went from a high of 9,156 for H-3 and 16,912 for Capital Center in January 1972, to a low of 6886 for H-3 and 6,852 for Capital Center in November, 1972.

(1) Pre-X-Day Phase: During the Pre-X-day phase, plans were initiated for the timely submission of awards and required reports. Additionally, plans were made for the orderly turn-in of TOE and station property and the phase out of assigned personnel. Plans were also made for the establishment of Air Traffic Control at the Newport aircraft retrograde site. The U.S. Embassy signed for all real property comprising H-3. The Air Traffic at H-3 and Capital Center declined to approximately 225 combined operations per day. On the third of November, a mobile control tower was moved to Lassiter AHP at Bien Hoa to provide ATC services for two air cavalry troops located there. It controlled approximately 100 movements per day.

(2) Standdown Phase: During this phase, the tower operations at Lassiter AHP was closed and the mobile tower moved to H-3. Capital Center and Saigon Tower operations were consolidated utilizing this mobile tower. The turn-in of TOE equipment was accomplished and station property was laterally transferred in place to the U.S. Embassy. All award recommendations were submitted and the phase out of personnel commenced.

(3) Withdrawal Phase: This phase of the operation was devoted to the turn over of the equipment previously laterally transferred and retained on hand receipt to Vietnamese and U.S. Embassy personnel and the close out of remaining functions

TAB C (312th Aviation Detachment - Divisional) to Appendix 2
to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

and operations at H-3. All tenant units at H-3 were involved in clearing their areas of operation in preparation for turn over of facility to the U.S. Embassy. Air movements remained stable at approximately 225 per day during the initial portion of this phase, showing a gradual decline as aircraft missions were reduced and aircraft phased out.

(4) Roll-up Phase: This phase was devoted to processing remaining personnel, submission of final morning report and unit deactivation.

b. Commanders Observation: Bobby G. Berryhill, LTC, AR.

(1) Pre-X-Day Phase: This phase was marked by enthusiasm for the anticipated ceasefire in November which gradually diminished on the part of many as it became apparent that there would not be a ceasefire prior to Christmas. This enthusiasm re-appeared rapidly, however, when the ceasefire was announced, and all assigned tasks were cheerfully undertaken to expedite the standdown of the unit.

(2) Standdown Phase: The plans made during the pre-X-day phase for the phase out of non-essential personnel and the turn-in of property worked extremely well and with a minimum of problem areas. By the end of this phase, all TOE and station property had been turned over, and only mission essential personnel retained.

(3) Withdrawal Phase: During the initial portion of this phase some confusion existed as to who would be operating the heliport, if anyone, and what elements would remain as tenants. The turn back of all real property was made to the U.S. Embassy. Five personnel were designated to be transferred to the Command Aircraft Company (CAC) to act as air traffic controllers and heliport guards until X+58.

Roll Up Phase: Five personnel designated to act as air traffic controllers and heliport guards were transferred to CAC on X+45.

3. Specific: During the Pre-Standdown Phase, plans were initiated for the orderly release of personnel. Personnel were released as the mission requirements diminished with those personnel considered non-essential to the unit mission and

TAB C (312th Aviation Detachment - Divisional) to Appendix 2
to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

those who had been in country longest departing first. Sixteen personnel were released between X-day and X+28, with the remaining 15 to be released by X+45. During the period from X-day until X+30, all TOE and station property was turned in and the property book submitted for audit and destruction. Operations of Capital Center continued until X+51 and Saigon Tower operations continued until X+58. Newport tower operations ceased at X+33. The utilization of the mobile flight operations center, previously located at Lassiter AHP, to consolidate Capital Center operations and Saigon Tower allowed for an earlier and more orderly turn-in of complex equipment which had been used as permanent facilities. This consolidation also allowed for the release of some personnel which would have otherwise been required until the withdrawal phase. The use of a radio jeep with PRC-25 back up FM was found to be quite satisfactory for air traffic control at the aircraft retrograde site at Newport.

TAB D (12th CAG Command Aircraft Company) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

1. PURPOSE: To report significant activities and planning involved in the standdown of the Command Aircraft Company during the period 1 November 1972, through 28 March 1973.

2. GENERAL:

a. Section 1: Significant Organizational Activities

(1) Pre-X-Day Phase: Basic information and planning guidance contained in 1st Aviation Brigade OPLAN 215 was received from 12th Group. The Command Aircraft Company organized their activities at this time to meet the requirements set forth in OPLAN 215.

During this period the Command Aircraft Company performed its mission of priority air transport as directed by higher headquarters. Aircraft allocations were as follows:

(a) USARV	6 Acft
(b) MACV	7 "
(c) MR-1	2 "
(d) MR-2	2 "
(e) TRAINING	1 "

The mission of the Command Aircraft Company was to provide fixed wing air transport utilizing the U21A aircraft in support of Headquarters MACV, Headquarters USARV, the four Military Regions and the Free World Armed Forces. In accomplishing its assigned mission the Command Aircraft Company flew an average of 1200 hours per month under all types of weather conditions throughout Southeast Asia including Thailand and Cambodia. The unit maintained an operational ready rate of 80% or higher during the last twenty (20) months of operation.

On 5 November 1972, the remaining U21A aircraft in Vietnam were assigned to the Command Aircraft Company. This consolidation resulted in 24 U21A aircraft being assigned with a requirement to provide (18) mission ready aircraft per day. Aircraft were reallocated as follows:

TAB D (12th CAG Command Aircraft Company) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(a) MACV	9 Acft
(b) MR-1	1 "
(c) MR-2	1 "
(d) 1st Avn Bde	2 "
(e) Radio Relay	3 "
(f) Training	2 "

Mission requirements remained at (18) throughout the pre-X-day phase.

(2) Standdown Phase: During the period 28 January through 3 February 1973, aircraft allocations were revised as follows:

(a) MACV	6 Acft
(b) Four Power (JMC)	8 "
(c) ICCS	3 "
(d) MR-1	1 "
(e) MR-2	1 "
(f) 1st Avn Bde	1 "

(3) Withdrawal Phase: During this phase the mission and aircraft allocations for the Command Aircraft Company remained unchanged.

(4) Roll-up Phase: This phase was scheduled to begin on X+55.

b. Section 2: Observations and Recommendations:
Richard E. Urick, MAJ, IN.

(1) Pre-X-day Phase: During this phase the Command Aircraft Company was required to relocate from Hustler Compound TSN to various other facilities both on and off TSN airbase. This move was accomplished within (48) hours, and was a significant achievement in itself due to the size of the unit and amount of equipment on hand. The move from Camp Hustler was initiated

TAB D (12th CAG Command Aircraft Company) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

six days prior to X-day, which proved to be the key factor in the expeditious and orderly standdown of the unit. As a result of the move, a large percentage of post, camp, and station property, no longer required, was turned-in.

(2) Standdown Phase: Mission requirements and aircraft allocations remained unchanged through 27 February 1973 (X+30). On 28 February 1973 (X+31) the three (3) aircraft in support of ICCS was terminated. Preparations were made to transfer all organizational and direct support maintenance responsibility including special tools and equipment to a civilian contractor.

(3) Withdrawal Phase: The lack of definitive planning guidance and changing mission requirements during this period created numerous problems for this organization in its attempt to plan and organize a scheme for the orderly withdrawal of aircraft assets.

(4) Roll-up Phase: The unit initiated roll-up activities on (X+55). Aircraft and crews began to depart for Singapore in accordance with a much revised retrograde schedule. The flight to Singapore for 17 aircraft was direct over the Gulf of Siam. Aircraft began departing to Singapore on 27 March and movement was completed on 29 March. Nine aircraft were deployed to Bangkok and completed movement on 30 March.

3. SPECIFIC:

a. Section 1: The significant activities which occurred included the move from Hustler Compound to other facilities both on and off Tan Son Nhut airbase. The unit continued its mission of priority air transport to higher headquarters. Reports, OER's, EER's, personnel actions and other administrative requirements contained in OPLAN 215 were completed in a timely manner. The transfer of all maintenance responsibility including the special tools and equipment peculiar to the U-21A aircraft, to a civilian contractor, was planned and executed. Two FM radio relay equipped aircraft were placed on standby in support of project "HOMECOMING". Plans were formulated for the retrograde of twenty-five (25) U21A aircraft to the Lockheed overhaul facility in Singapore upon termination of mission commitments. These plans were altered on numerous occasions and resulted in seventeen aircraft being sent to Singapore as scheduled with the remaining nine being assigned to Bangkok, Thailand.

TAB D (12th CAG Command Aircraft Company) to Appendix 2 to
Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

b. Section 2:

(1) Planning Guidance

(a) Observation: Planning guidance was changed frequently as the result of changes in the political situation.

(b) Evaluation: Significant tasks were completed in a timely manner only by tremendous effort at unit level. The guidance contained in the written OPLAN was changed a number of times resulting in far reaching changes in unit plans. It is apparent that changing missions and lack of firm planning data can be expected in withdrawal operations and is probably unpreventable.

(c) Recommendation: Plans and operations personnel tasked with the responsibility of preparing a withdrawal plan must be aware of the far reaching effects of changes in planning guidance at unit level and make every effort to minimize the number of changes required.

(d) Command Action: None

TAB E (59th Corps Aviation Company) to Appendix 2 to Annex B
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

1. PURPOSE: To report significant activities and planning involved with the standdown and closure of the 59th Corps Aviation Company.

2. GENERAL: This report begins 1 November 1972 and continues thru the Standdown and Withdrawal Phases.

A. Significant Organizational Activities

(1) Pre-X-Day Phase: The 59th Corps Aviation Company continued to provide Army Aviation support in Military Region III to Headquarters, MACV, USARV, TRAC and CORDS. The "Deans", in addition to their normal utility missions, provided professional aviation support for numerous general officers, to include the Commanders of MACV, USARV and TRAC. These missions flown averaged more than 33 general grade officers per month. The third Platoon headquarters was repositioned to "Plantation" at Long Binh in order to facilitate better aviation support for the CDR, TRAC. The remaining two lift platoons continued to operate from Hotel 3 at Tan Son Nhut. In preparation for standdown, basic suspense dates were established and plans were formulated to insure a coordinated effort at all levels. Guidance from higher headquarters along with changes were incorporated daily into a flow chart of activities to identify and solve any problem areas that could arise. The unit also received the additional requirement to provide maintenance support for the International Commission for Control and Supervision and Four Party elements during the Standdown Phase.

(2) Standdown Phase: Information was continually up-dated and minor changes to the 1st Aviation Brigade OPLAN 215 were implemented. After special teams were identified and personnel requirements organized, the Company commenced immediate shipment and processing of troops. The "Deans" received an additional mission requirement of flying the Vice President of the United States during his visit to Saigon and Phnom Penh. Coordination was effected between the US Secret Service Agents, MACV, 1st Aviation Brigade, and Dean Operations involving the use of ten aircraft in the Saigon area for the Vice Presidential Party, a ready reaction force for security purposes, and an additional five aircraft element prepositioned at Phnom Penh to support the Vice President during his stop over at the Cambodian capital.

TAB E (59th Corps Aviation Company) to Appendix 2 to Annex B
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(3) Withdrawal Phase: During this phase, internal reassignment of personnel was accomplished to insure continuity and enhance mission accomplishment. The company combined two of its flight platoons at Hotel 3 into one platoon. This consolidation was made because of the reduction of missions and personnel during this period. Approximately X+25 two CH-47s were attached to the 59th Corps Aviation Company to increase the air support capabilities for Military Region III. The additional aircraft maintenance support required for the ICCS and Four Party elements created extra problems for the 59th CAC Maintenance. Sound prior planning coupled with superior management techniques enabled all elements involved to accomplish their mission without undue mechanical problems.

(4) Roll-up Phase: The final phase was concerned with last minute changes and the transfer of all unit property. The final morning report was submitted at X+45.

B. Section 2: Observations and Recommendations

(1) Pre-X-Day Phase: All elements of the company reacted in an enthusiastic and efficient manner to support efforts in planning the phase down. Planning guidance was provided. However, numerous changes in the guidance caused alterations in the unit's standdown schedule.

(2) Standdown Phase: Once the plan was activated, the company reacted swiftly to the standdown requirements. In spite of minor changes, the major events and milestones took place according to the company standdown chart.

(3) Withdrawal Phase: Withdrawal was hampered by the great number of personnel that exited at once. The company was required to shift movement requirements almost on a daily basis. As jobs were completed, these personnel were utilized for various other requirements in order to facilitate a smooth standdown. Five aircraft were turned over to Air America on X+30.

(4) Roll-up Phase: Due to prior planning, the roll-up phase progressed smoothly. Sufficient personnel were retained to accomplish all phases of the mission. A contingency force was selected from the remaining personnel to make the tentative POW pick up should the need arise. As equipment and vehicles were turned in, the capabilities of the unit decreased. Remaining aircraft were turned over to VNAF on X+59.

TAB E (59th Corps Aviation Company) to Appendix 2 to Annex B
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

SPECIFIC:

A. Section 1: The unit had a logical and well planned standdown. Milestone charts eliminated most of the confusion. All requirements from higher headquarters were accomplished on specified dates.

(1) Personnel: Changes to personnel lists and mission requirements caused never-ending changes to personnel. Company records and funds were closed in an orderly manner without any difficulty.

(2) Equipment retrograde/turnover: Equipment was turned in with a minimum amount of trouble. Five aircraft were turned over to Air America with the remaining aircraft transferred to the Vietnamese Air Force.

(3) Intelligence/security: Physical security of the company became a problem due to the withdrawal of Air Force security personnel from the unit area. The 59th Corps Aviation Company personnel were trained and utilized to secure the area. COMSEC equipment was delayed in being turned in because the need for secure communications existed longer than planned.

(4) Operations: The Vice President's visit to Saigon and Phnom Penh Cambodia required special planning for operations. Aircraft were provided for the Vice Presidential Party and a ready reaction force placed on standby in the Saigon area. Five aircraft were sent to the Cambodian capital to support the Vice President and his party during his visit to Cambodia. The 59th CAC was also selected to pick up the first US POWs to be released by Communist forces in South Vietnam. An advanced party of three aircraft flew to Loc Ninh in order to facilitate the final coordination for the POW release. The lift aircraft used to fly the POWs away from the release point arrived at Loc Ninh a half hour after the advanced party. The Peoples Revolutionary Government representatives began to stall and cause delays that lasted over eleven hours. Finally, the pickup was made with no further difficulties. A special Command Operations Center was set up at the "Dean" VIP Helipad (TSN Air Base) to further facilitate and coordinate the operation. This operations center was specially equipped to meet the needs of the USARV/MACV SUPCOM Commander and representatives from all elements involved with the POW pickup.

TAB E (59th Corps Aviation Company) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(5) Logistics: The turn in of supplies was orderly and well planned. The main problems encountered were with weapons and weapons subsystems. These subsystems were taken off and put on three different times in a period of two weeks before they were finally turned in.

(6) Transfer of control of air combatant assets: Five aircraft were turned over to Air America. The remainder of the aircraft were turned over to the VNAF. Because of superb prior planning by Dean Maintenance, no problems occurred during aircraft transfer.

(7) Transfer of functions and reporting: On X+25 all orderly room files were turned over to the AG. Operations continued to submit its daily OPSUM and weekly OPREP-5. All reporting functions ceased on X+45.

(8) Transfer of billeting, bases, installed properly and equipment, and other real property: The billets were closed as personnel decreased and most station property was turned over in place.

B. Section 2: Commander's Comments on Lessons Learned, - Theodore A. Speaker, MAJ, IN.

(1a) Observation: On X Day, the 59th Corps Aviation Company Operations was tasked with the issue of personal weapons, SOI's and maps covering MR III to ICCS and Four Party.

(1b) Evaluation: Weapons received from F Troops were in poor condition. This included crewserviced and personal weapons. The issuance of SOI's to the additional pilots that were assigned or attached to the 59th Corps Aviation Company, could not be fulfilled. Sufficient SOI's were not available. Maps and other publications, such as tactical Aerodrome Directories, Low Altitude Instrument Approach Procedure Charts, Enroute Charts, and Enroute Supplements could not be issued to every aircraft commander. ICCS and Four Party team members did not have any publications and only a limited number of maps covering MR III area.

(1c) Recommendations: Crewserviced and personal weapons should be maintained in accordance with Technical Manuals. Proper supervision of losing unit's weapons should have resolved the problems of rusty and dirty weapons. ICCS and Four Party members should have retained their SOI's and

TAB E (59th Corps Aviation Company) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

other frequency publications for future use, or higher headquarters should have obtained additional SOI's and frequency publications for issue. Maps, Tactical Aerodrome Directories, and other Flight Information Publications should have been ordered prior to X day, to insure that at a minimum, every aircraft commander had these publications at hand. Maps of specific areas and special maps of MR III should have been retained or acquired by higher headquarters for use of ICCS and Four Party pilots. The 59th Corps Aviation Company PRO should not have accepted any weapons without a thorough inspection.

TAB F (388th Transportation Company - ADS) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

1. PURPOSE: To list the significant activities and standdown of the 388th Transportation Company (ADS).

2. GENERAL: This report covers the period 1 November 1972 thru 14 March 1973. The primary mission of the 388th Transportation Company was the Direct Support, Backup Direct Support and General Support for aircraft maintenance for all Army aviation assets within Military Region III and selected Allied Forces aviation assets. Upon the signing of the ceasefire an additional mission of establishing a retrograde site and retrograding 167 Army aircraft from RVN was assigned to the 388th. The primary phase of this operation were pre X-day, preparation, sustaining and roll up.

a. Section I; Significant Organization Activities.

(1) Pre X-day phase: Upon being alerted to the possibility of a ceasefire, this unit initiated action to inventory all TO&E equipment and prepare necessary paper-work for shortages. Unit personnel rosters were checked for correctness and people identified as potential early releases. Reconnaissance of proposed retrograde sites were conducted to ascertain the extent of logistical support to include engineer support. The first site considered was Vung Tau. Coordination was effected with PA&E and the sub-area commander to alert them to the mission and support required should the ceasefire be signed. The second retrograde site under consideration was the Army terminal of Newport. A reconnaissance of this facility was conducted to update a previous contingency plan that was to be used for Increment 14 retrograde. After a comparison of the two retrograde sites, it was determined that the Newport site would have the greatest number of advantages and thus higher headquarters was informed. After several weeks, approval was granted to use Newport as the retrograde site for approximately 157 aircraft, should the ceasefire be announced.

(2) Preparation Phase: On 24 January, physical movement of packaging and preservation materials and equipment from Hotel-3 to Newport was initiated. A Lieutenant was appointed as Movement Control Officer to supervise logistics operations. Most materials and equipment were previously positioned at Hotel-3. Those items not on hand were acquired by S-4, 12th Combat Aviation Group, and G-4, 1st Aviation Brigade. In

TAB F (388th Transportation Company - ADS) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

some cases, AVSCOM representatives (ROSSA Team), expedited acquisition of specialized equipment from CONUS. All logistical movements were accomplished utilizing organic tactical vehicles. Logistical support continued throughout all phases of the operation.

(a) Engineering support at Newport was provided by Pacific Architects and Engineers. This support consisted of constructing four aircraft wash points and providing water and electricity to those points. In addition, electricity was installed in the processing trailer and carpenter shop.

(b) Food service for the noon meal was provided civilian and military personnel by transporting food to the retrograde site in mermite cans. Those personnel not desiring this service ate at the Seamans Club at Newport.

(c) On 25 January, a carpentry shop was established at Newport by NHA Inc. This shop constructed 28 each 780 gear containers for CH-47 aircraft, CH-47 blade racks, OH-6A blade racks, work stands for processing, wrapping tables, records processing and storage facilities, and other items as required. Personnel requirements varied throughout the period. Initially, six technical inspectors, two bus drivers, one armorer and one OIC were on site. By X+20 the inspector requirement was reduced to two personnel. Other military personnel were utilizing on an "as required" basis as truck drivers, MHE repairmen, POL and food delivery. Contract civilian personnel averaged 113 and were utilized for the following functions:

- 1 Technical inspection and inventory of aircraft.
- 2 Stock record accounting.
- 3 Carpentry support.
- 4 Aircraft towing.
- 5 Aircraft disassembly, preservation of engines and fuel controls, and rotor blade packaging.
- 6 Aircraft washing/steam cleaning.

TAB F (388th Transportation Company - ADS) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

- 7 Wrapping/bagging of aircraft.
- 8 Spraying U-8 and AH-1G aircraft with Global coating.
- 9 Loading OH-6A aircraft into Sealand vans.
- 10 Final preparation. i.e. installing tiedown rings, strut blocks, deflating struts, etc.
- 11 Final paperwork. i.e. TCMD and 1348-1 preparation.
- 12 POL point operation.
- 13 MHE operation and maintenance.
- 14 Bus and truck drivers in support of civilian personnel.
- 15 Movement and loading upon arrival of Seatrain.

(d) No security personnel were required since Alaska Barge and Transport, Inc. provided all security for Newport. The personnel and equipment mobilized at Newport were expected to prepare 67 AH-1G, 30 U-8, 26 OH-6A, 2 UH-1B, and 28 CH-47C aircraft for retrograde between X+4 and X+40. However, these assets were expected to be able to produce 6 completed aircraft per day.

(3) Sustaining phase: Aircraft delivery to Newport commenced on X+1. Aircraft arrivals at Newport by type and numbers were as listed below:

X+1	14 OH-6A, 1 UH-1B, 4 AH-1G	X+17	1 CH-47C
X+2	19 AH-1G, 6 CH-6A	X+18	1 CH-47C
X+3	13 AH-1G, 2 CH-47C, 4 OH-6A	X+19	1 CH-47C
X+4	1 OH-6A, 2 AH-1G	X+20	3 CH-47C
X+5	3 AH-1G	X+21	None
X+6	10 AH-1G, 1 CH-47C	X+22	None
X+7	None	X+23	None
X+8	2 CH-47C, 15 RU-8D	X+24	None
X+9	1 AH-1G, 1 OH-6A	X+25	1 CH-47C
X+10	1 CH-47C, 1 OH-6A, 12 RU-8D	X+26	None
X+11	None	X+27	2 CH-47C
X+12	8 AH-1G, 1 U-SF, 2 U-8D	X+28	None
X+13	5 AH-1G, 3 CH-47C	X+29	None
X+14	None	X+30	None
X+15	None	X+31	None
X+16	1 CH-47C	X+32	None

TAB F (388th Transportation Company - ADS) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

Aircraft arrivals at Newport were controlled by jeep-mounted radio operated by the 312th ADD. Plans called for aircraft to arrive at 10 minute intervals, however as many as 6 aircraft arrived simultaneously. Flexibility, sound judgement and expeditious handling on the helipad permitted such arrivals without undue safety hazard.

Two towing crews proved sufficient to expeditiously clear the helipad of aircraft. Towing commenced as soon as the pilots were clear of their aircraft. Inspectors began checking aircraft as soon as it was positioned for shutdown. Initial experience indicated that some AH-1G's were arriving with ammunition and explosive bolts still installed. This problem was brought to the attention of G-4, 1st Aviation Brigade, who reiterated turn-in procedures to all units and directed that aircraft arriving with explosives aboard would return to their respective units. Only 5 more AH-1G's arrived with armament, and they were de-armed by crew members prior to acceptance by the 388th. The local EOD team was extremely cooperative in picking up ordnance and providing assistance as required.

The heavy influx of aircraft from X+1 to X+3 temporarily over crowded assigned facilities. Negotiation with Port authorities acquired additional space for aircraft parking and processing.

U-8 aircraft were flown into Tan Son Nhut where the wings and dipole antenna were removed and the engines preserved by NHA contract personnel of the Command Aircraft Company. These 30 aircraft, plus one CH-47 were towed from Tan Son Nhut to Newport after 2300 hours (during curfew) on successive nights except for a three night break during the TET holiday. An inebriated Korean driving a civilian automobile ran into one aircraft, the second night, causing minor sheet metal damage. An MP escort accompanied all night towings.

U-8 wings and antenna were crated by the storage and distribution section of ASA and trucked to Newport on 388th tactical vehicles.

Flexibility and efficiency were paramount during this phase of the operation. The arrival date of the first Sea-train fluctuated as much as ten days. This time progressively

TAB F (388th Transportation Company - ADS) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

got shorter and the number of aircraft required to fill the vessel became larger. When the vessel arrived on X+19, 108 aircraft were loaded aboard. These consisted of 30 U-8, 66 AH-1G, 10 CH-47C, and 2 UH-1B aircraft. All U-8 wings and helicopter rotor blades were also placed aboard this ship.

The first Seatrain arrived at 1330 hours on X+19. At 1515 hours that date, the first aircraft was loaded aboard ship. During loading operations, the following damage to aircraft was sustained:

- (a) Eight AH-1G pilot tubes were damaged.
 - (b) One AH-1G vertical stabilizer was dented.
 - (c) One U-8 antenna wire was pulled loose.
 - (d) Three or four U-8 nose wheels were turned beyond limits.
 - (e) Three CH-47 shipping bag wheel covers were ripped.
- Loading of the Seatrain proceeded 24 hours per day and was completed in approximately 48 hours.
- (3) Transfer of aircraft was accomplished as follows:
 - (a) 388th accepted aircraft from owning unit and picked it up on Stock Record Account.
 - (b) 388th issued a 2407 to NHA requesting the aircraft be processed for retrograde.
 - (c) A work package accompanied the aircraft and each step in the processing was approved by a technical inspector upon completion.
 - (d) When the 2407 was completed, Stock Record Accounting personnel prepared a TCMD and 1348-1 for each accountable item.
 - (e) TCMD's were accepted by Port authorities and the items listed there on became their responsibility.
 - (f) Military escort personnel from ASVCOM signed the 1348-1's. The items were dropped from accountability.

TAB F (388th Transportation Company - ADS) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(f) Military escort personnel from ASVCOM signed the 1348-1's. The items were dropped from accountability.

(4) Roll-up phase: On X+20 all aircraft except 15 CH-47's had been received and processed. Supplies and equipment required to process those aircraft were not set aside and all excess was turned in to appropriate agencies. All transportation was provided by organic tactical vehicles. Removal of excess supplies and equipment continued until the last aircraft was processed and proper disposition of items had been accomplished.

b. Section II: Commanders observations and recommendations: Ernest L. Stansell, Jr, MAJ, TC.

(1) Preparation phase:

(a) Equipment Retrograde/Turnover.

1 Observation: Additional equipment required by the 388th for the retrograde mission was received in an unserviceable condition in some cases.

2 Evaluation: Subject equipment caused an additional unprogrammed manhour and parts requirement.

3 Recommendation: That commander designated to release equipment ensure that equipment is serviceable or inform the directing Headquarters that it is not.

(b) Logistics:

1 Observation: TO&E equipment assigned to this company but used by the contractor was in numerous cases lost, misplaced, borrowed without approval and in general not accounted for.

2 Evaluation: This condition was caused by the mandatory reduction in military strength which left insufficient personnel to account for equipment.

3 Recommendation: That when military strength is reduced to a level that makes accountability impossible all equipment needed by the contractor be laterally transferred to the contractor to ensure accountability.

4 Commanders Action: Equipment not in use was secured.

TAB F (388th Transportation Company - ADS) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(1) Roll-up phase:

(a) Equipment retrograde/turnover.

1 Observation: Plans for the transfer of TO&E equipment was complicated by the fact that certain equipment was needed by the contractor for use after official standdown.

2 Evaluation: The basic standdown plan contained conflicting interests in regards to mission and equipment.

3 Recommendation: That equipment necessary to accomplish specific missions be transferred to the organization scheduled to remain to the last and the equipment then turned-in as directed.

4 Commanders Action: Arrangements were made thru VNAF at higher headquarters to hand receipt necessary equipment from VNAF to the contractor.

TAB G (F Troop, 8th Cavalry, 12th CAG) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

1. PURPOSE: To report significant activities during all phases of standdown of F Troop, 8th Cavalry, 12th Combat Aviation Group, 1st Aviation Brigade.

2. GENERAL: During the period 1 November 1972 through 28 January 1973, F Troop, 8th Cavalry was under the operational control of the Commander, Third Regional Assistance Command (TRAC), to provide security for key installations and US personnel in Military Region III. The mission involved conducting visual reconnaissance mission along major avenues of approach into the key installations of Saigon, Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa. The troop had been moved from Da Nang to Bien Hoa beginning 15 October 1972 and was concurrently conducting tactical missions and improving the cantonment area.

a. Section 1: Significant Organizational Activities.

(1) Pre-X-Day: From the period 1 November 1972 through 27 January 1973 plans were made for the standdown of the Troop. Checklists for functional areas provided by higher staff agencies were reviewed and personnel were briefed on the expected actions that would be required in relation to X-Day.

(2) Standdown Phase: Standdown was accomplished between 270800 January 1973 and 281000 January 1973. All UH-1H's with crews and sidearms required to support the International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS) and the Joint Military Commission (JMC) were relocated to Saigon. The Troop Operations Center was discontinued and proper disposition was made on all classified documents and materials. One VRC 46 radio set was relocated to the orderly room for administrative communications.

(3) Withdrawal Phase: TO&E and TDA equipment, to include equipment found on post, was turned into the proper agencies. Clean up of the entire troop area continued throughout this phase. The Bien Hoa Army Base was inspected; post, camp and station (PC&S) property was turned over to ARVN representatives; and buildings were jointly inventoried and turned over to the PA&E Real Estate Section and the ARVN representative. Remaining vehicles and weapons were turned in as the rear detachment moved by bus to Camp Alpha, Tan Son Nhut Air Force Base, for redeployment to CONUS.

TAB G (F Troop, 8th Cavalry, 12th CAG) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(4) Roll-up Phase: The Troop Command Post was established at Headquarters 12th Combat Aviation Group. A deactivation ceremony was conducted on 14 February 1973. The remaining few members of the unit were outprocessed. The morning report was reduced by attrition to zero balance.

b. Section 2: Commander's Observations and Recommendations: William D. Dantzler, MAJ, AR.

(1) Pre-X-Day: The prohibition against the use of the Aero-Rifle Platoon in a ground role and the nonavailability of ready US reaction forces dictated that only aerial visual reconnaissance techniques be employed. The Aero-Rifle Platoon was employed as a full time base security force. Maintenance availability of the AH-1G helicopters, was also a limiting factor. The age of the AH-1G fleet, the added complexity of the weapons and the stabilization systems, the lack of personnel qualified in AH-1G maintenance, resulted in low availability and seriously affected the capability of the entire troop. The sophistication of the AH-1G made it imperative that school trained mechanics be made available to maintain the system to meet high availability requirements.

(2) Standdown Phase: Immediate transfer of some key personnel to support the ICCS and JMC required that each man be cleared in a short period of time. Clearance papers, efficiency reports, awards and decorations, and all other possible personnel actions had been prepared in advance. Selection of aviators for the JMC/ICCS teams was made on the basis of DEROS. Consequently, it was not possible to hold platoon leaders until all aircraft were turned in or transferred.

(3) Withdrawal Phase: Orders were completed according to prepared deployment roster submitted on X+2, allowing a gradual phase out of unit personnel. Maximum efficiency of the remaining personnel was obtained by assigning specific areas of responsibility and daily objectives to complete standdown.

(4) Roll-up Phase: All personnel except two were released to return to CONUS. Two men were pending an Article 15. The commander and the Morning Report Clerk remained to clear the morning report of all personnel.

TAB G (F Troop, 8th Cavalry, 12th CAG) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

3. SPECIFIC:

a. Section 1: Significant Activities.

(1) Pre-X-Day:

(a) Personnel:

1. Personnel strength had dropped to approximately 80% and only the concentrated efforts of the Group Commander kept the aviator strength at a minimum acceptable level. One combat casualty, family emergencies and normal DEROS's combined to require replacements of all platoon leaders and key staff officers except the CO and XO. The strength of the 11B aerorifle platoon personnel, dropped to the point that 22 men from other sections were required to complete the unit guard detail requirement of 36 men each day. In addition, a lack of experienced AH-1G mechanics and a shortage of technical inspectors caused a poor AH-1G availability.

2. Standby EER's and OER's were written, all voluntary personnel actions were requested, and preference statements were submitted.

3. During this period the Human Relations Program and Drug Control Program were major areas of endeavor.

(b) Equipment retrograde/turnover: Equipment designated by higher headquarters was transferred to ARVN and then hand receipted back to the Property Book Officer. The avionics float equipment was reduced to 20 percent.

(c) Intelligence/Security: Enemy intelligence was provided by daily visits from TRAC G-2 personnel, intelligence summaries prepared at TRAC, and the 12th CAG S-2. The TRAC G-2 personnel debriefed the scout pilots each day and provided valuable additional information to that already available from spot reports. The troop also provided its own local security.

(d) Operations: During the period 1 November 1972 through 28 January 1973, F Troop, 8th Cavalry, conducted Air Cavalry Reconnaissance operations in the Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, and Binh Long Provinces around the Michelin Plantation. Use of USAF Tactical Air Support was emphasized.

TAB G (F Troop, 8th Cavalry, 12th CAG) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

This additional factor proved a great asset since the Forward Air Controller used fighter-bombers on significant targets thus discovered. TAC Air was also used to open up holes in triple canopy jungle, enabling the scout helicopters to recon in more detail. This interservice relationship proved to be a great asset to both services and an excellent weapon against the enemy. The US Air Force obtained detailed descriptions and locations of targets plus an immediate bomb damage assessment. The US Army received heavy ordnance on known targets in a short period of time, enabling further development of the situation. While involved in these operations the unit had light aircraft losses and casualties. From 1 November 1972 to standdown, two aviators were evacuated as a result of hostile actions and two aircraft were downed and destroyed in place. In all cases, recovery of the downed crews was immediate, utilizing organic assets.

(e) Logistics: Since the unit had recently arrived in this area, logistics relationships were still being established at the beginning of the period. In general, logistics support provided by ARVN or VNAF was difficult to establish and maintain, while support provided by US military or US controlled contractors was smooth and efficient.

1. The shortage of TO&E equipment, especially generators and special tools, continued to hamper the mission effectiveness of the unit. Ammunition resupply and operation of the ammunition resupply point by organic personnel was an area of major effort.

2. The maintenance availability of vehicles continued downward until early January and in some cases lack of vehicles hindered the efficiency of the sections within the unit. Availability of spare parts was the primary problem.

3. All members of the unit were encouraged to ship large valuable possessions to CONUS by hold baggage in mid-November. In early January more emphasis was put on this area and transportation was set up on a regular basis enabling all members of the unit to ship hold baggage.

(f) Transfer of functions and reporting: Plans were made for transfer of functions to officers, NCO's or EM who would remain in the unit until X+15. All normal reports continued.

TAB G (F Troop, 8th Cavalry, 12th CAG) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(g) Transfer of billeting, bases, installed property and equipment and other real property: All buildings and installed property were jointly inventoried and hand receipts were signed by the Property Book Officer in early December. ARVN representatives accompanied the inventory team.

(2) Standdown Phase: Since the entire unit was intact at the beginning of the standdown phase, each platoon was tasked to prepare aircraft and personnel for the designated ICCS or JMC agency. As UH-1H aircraft became available they were flown out by personnel who would compose the special ICCS and JMC teams.

(a) Personnel:

1. Individuals were tasked to clear assigned areas. Officer areas were cleared by platoon leaders and enlisted areas were cleared by platoon sergeants. When each man had completed clearing and had signed out, he reported to operations and waited for movement.

2. EER's were issued to be placed in individual 201 files later. Blank OER forms were not available, so pencil drafts were completed and turned in to the administrative officer. A list of personnel on TDY, R&R or on leave in CONUS was submitted to 12th CAG with a request that all personnel remain in CONUS to await reassignment.

(b) Equipment Retrograde/turnover:

1. All UH-1H aircraft were immediately transferred, as were all vehicles. However, vehicles were held on hand receipt and utilized until closure of the unit.

2. The requirement to clear conex containers forced distribution of military equipment to the proper place within the troop.

3. Weapons systems were removed from all AH-1G and OH-6A helicopters although packing boxes were not available. All nonflyable aircraft were reported to 12th CAG AMO. The first of many loads of ammunition, aircraft parts, vehicle parts, and TO&E equipment were moved to Long Binh and Saigon.

TAB G (F Troop, 8th Cavalry, 12th CAG) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(c) Intelligence/security: Civilian personnel, except mess personnel, were released at the end of the working day without prior notice to prevent last minute pilfering. They were given a date to return for their final pay. The normal guard commitment was reduced to six men on two bunkers and one tower, and one man roving on the heliport. One aircraft (with no M-60's mounted) received fire and sustained three hits at approximately 0830 on 28 January 1973.

(d) Operations: Normal missions continued through 270600 January 1973, and a first light reconnaissance of the Bien Hoa Army Base was conducted until 280800 January 1973. The secure-voice FM and all other tactical radio nets were terminated at 280800 January 1973.

(e) Logistics: Initial turn-in of equipment and supplies was begun. Maximum available equipment was moved by organic transportation.

(f) Transfer of functions and reporting: All departing personnel with key functions briefed the individual assuming his functions to insure responsible continuity.

(3) Withdrawal Phase: Two major tasks; the turn in of the remaining aircraft equipment and supplies, and the clean up of the unit area while the personnel strength was declining, were accomplished.

(2) Personnel: The initial deployment of personnel was executed in accordance with release rosters previously submitted. After X+1 requirements changed on a daily basis. The XO was appointed to coordinate personnel shipments with the S-1. Supervisory personnel who were needed to close out certain functions were retained until their responsibilities ended. Some personnel with family emergencies were deployed earlier than planned rather than use the emergency leave system. Levies for several MOS's were filled to complete the JMC team and to redistribute personnel within 12th CAG.

(b) Equipment retrograde/turnover: All AH-1G and OH-6A aircraft were delivered to Newport for retrograde 29 January 1973, the first day that Newport was open. One AH-1G and one OH-6A were evacuated as sling loads. Required property adjustments were completed later. The Keystone

TAB G (F Troop, 8th Cavalry, 12th CAG) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

Officer, assisted by the Transportation Coordination Officer (TCO), was responsible for the retrograde of all US Government equipment. The responsible officer reported the equipment ready for turn in to the Property Book Officer, who coordinated with the Keystone Officer. The TCO was delegated the responsibility for turning in all empty conex containers. The additional capability afforded by the daily use of five ton and ten ton flat bed trucks, tractors trailer trucks and a contractor-operated fork lift was invaluable. All deadlined organic vehicles were turned in and other vehicles that developed major problems during this period were turned in. Three 2 1/2 ton trucks, three 1/4 ton trucks and 20 M-16 rifles were retained for the use of the troop. One bus, provided on a daily basis, was used to move personnel to out process at the MACV Annex and then to Camp Alpha.

(c) Intelligence/security: One 3/4 ton truck was hit by one round of small arms fire on QL 1 near Long Binh on X+4. A 2 1/2 ton truck was stopped near the Bien Hoa ARVN gate and the driver was held up while three ARVN's attempted to steal his truck. Employment of housemaids was kept to a minimum and all daily hire employees were kept under continuous supervision. No civilians or ARVN's were allowed to enter the post unless they were escorted by US personnel. On the day of departure extra effort was required to keep VN personnel out of the troop area.

(d) Operations: A requirement for three standby AH-1G's and crews was received on 29 January 1973. This unit was tasked for two standby crews to fly aircraft on strip alert if needed. The troop was also tasked for fourteen infantrymen from 30 January 1973 through 31 January 1973 for a special mission involving the visit of Vice President Agnew to Southeast Asia. The personnel were designated and equipped with weapons, ammunition, and rappelling equipment. They returned to the unit on 1 February 1973.

(e) Logistics: TMA vehicles composed of major support required by the troop. The unit mess was closed on X+7 and personnel subsisted at the F/9 mess until departure.

(f) Transfer of functions and reporting: Final monthly reports were submitted at the end of January as normal reports. All fund audits were completed. All files and records were packed and shipped according to directives from higher headquarters.

TAB G (F Troop, 8th Cavalry, 12th CAG) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(g) Transfer of billets, bases, installed property and equipment and other real property: Preparation of billets and clean up of the entire area continued. The USARV IG, accompanied by a Base Closure Team, visited on 30 January 1973 and provided detailed guidance on standards of condition for base closure.

(4) Roll-up Phase:

Personnel: The rear detachment personnel proceeded to Camp Alpha and were shipped within two days. The CO and the Morning Report Clerk stayed behind to zero out the morning report.

b. Section 2: Commander's Comments on Lessons Learned.

(1) Civilian employees.

(a) Observation: Civilian workers were a valuable asset to the unit.

(b) Evaluation: The nine civilian local national employees in the mess hall and three secretaries were well qualified and enthusiastic workers who fit well into a fixed base operation.

(c) Recommendation: That foreign nationals be utilized to the maximum extent possible.

(2) Air crew recovery by OH-6A helicopters.

(a) Observation: The OH-6A helicopter made two recoveries during normal recon operations.

(b) Evaluation: The OH-6A scout aircraft was usually near the ground and close to any enemy activity directed against aircraft. It proved an excellent aircraft for recovery of one or two crew members, particularly in an area where the vegetation allowed sufficient room for the OH-6A to land or hover low enough to make a pick-up. The OH-6A presents a small target. With its high speed and maneuverability, the OH-6A is an ideal aircraft for this type of operation.

TAB G (F Troop, 8th Cavalry, 12th CAG) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(c) Recommendation: That the OH-6A scout helicopter be used to extract downed crews during air cavalry reconnaissance missions.

(3) Excess Property.

(a) Observation: Much excess property from aircraft parts to individual weapons was on hand in the unit.

(b) Evaluation: Only the officer or NCO signed for property knows what is accountable and what is not, which could result in unauthorized disposal. When excess is on hand it endangers the accountability of authorized accountable items because personnel tend to avoid documentation of excess. Officers are prone to sign for anything when there is excess available. Weapons control is difficult when excess weapons are on hand.

(c) Recommendation: That higher command spot check units to insure that all government property is accounted for properly and that all excess is turned in to the proper agency during standdown.

(4) Standdown procedures.

(a) Observation: Checklists and SOP's from higher commands and support agencies were an excellent means of orienting personnel on required standdown actions.

(b) Evaluation: In some cases, especially in aircraft maintenance, the pressure of daily maintenance problems prevented the aircraft maintenance platoon leader and his supervisors from detailed study, planning and preparation for the turning in of helicopters and aviation support equipment. Once the helicopters were physically deposited with the gaining agency, considerable work was required to complete the property accountability records for the aircraft and support equipment. In other cases, especially in the area of dissolution of funds, inadequate checklists were received.

(c) Recommendation: That issuing agencies insure that the SOP's or checklists are understood and that plans have been made to comply with the guidance provided.

TAB H (F Troop, 9th Cavalry, 12th CAG) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

1. PURPOSE: The purpose of this report is to cover those actions prior to, and during the standdown phase of F Troop, 9th Air Cavalry.
2. GENERAL: The period covered by this report extends from 1 November 1972 to X+16, 13 February 1973. X-Day was designated as 28 January 1973. Probably the most important lesson learned was that there can not be too much prior planning. Planning must be updated and continuous. Part of this planning was aided by one consolidated SOP from the next higher headquarters. The SOP not only helped to organize standdown but was also used as a measuring device for progress. One problem area was created by the various visitors and inspectors from higher headquarters. This was particularly apparent when concerned with police. Everyone sees his task differently and policing an area that was once the responsibility of a battalion was not accomplished like a minute wash. Since trash collection was less than adequate to meet the requirements of standdown, a centralized refuse point was established. From this point combustible trash was separated and burned. The ashes were later policed up by front end loader or shovels. Next to planning, attitudes became the next most important ingredient for a successful standdown. This, however, was a leadership responsibility.

a. Section I:

(1) Pre-X-Day phase: During the month of November 1972 the Troop was anticipating standdown as a result of the attempts in October to initiate a ceasefire. Although operations were continued at a normal pace, planning for the standdown was possible. This planning included preparation of folders for each individual in the unit. Each folder contained clearance forms, orders, and any other personal data that concerned each individual. OER's were typed and each rater and endorser was told to begin writing drafts on their officers. Awards were also written to expedite future actions. Rosters were made to include all those duties which would be essential to clear the post. Those rosters included but were not limited to: Transportation Officer, Keystone Officer, Summary Court Officer, and CPO Officer. These personnel were selected according to their retainability after X-Day. This was possible by selecting those personnel with the longest time remaining In-Country.

TAB H (F Troop, 9th Cavalry, 12th CAG) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(2) Standdown phase: Upon notification of the cease-fire the Troop was relieved of all operational requirements except for a heavy gun team which was maintained on strip alert. The primary emphasis during the first eight days was to turn in all assigned aircraft. Almost simultaneously the Troop began policing the billet area for all TA-50 and other government property. Through experience from a past move, to preclude pilferage from becoming a major problem, the base was immediately put off limits to other than US vehicles. All personnel were warned about the possibility of increased pilferage and advised to ship hold baggage as soon as practicable. Vehicles were scheduled from TMP on X+1. These vehicles were immediately put into use moving equipment for turn-in and when a slack period was determined the Troop began shipping empty conex containers to the turn-in yard. The mess hall remained in operation until X+14 since the equipment would be turned-over in place. Weapons were turned in as personnel began leaving the Troop. Along with the weapons a sufficient amount of ammunition primarily for local security purposes, was maintained. The nature of the enemy situation and possibility of pilferage made it necessary to maintain a limited security guard force at night.

(3) Withdrawal phase: Withdrawal began almost simultaneously with the standdown phase. Personnel were initially taken from the Troop to support other special missions. In addition, 10 to 15 personnel were processed out of country each day. A total of 58 troops were left at Bien Hoa for the roll-up phase.

(4) Roll-up phase: During the roll-up phase it was essential that vehicles be available to carry trash and move out that personal gear which the troops had to keep until the last minute. These included, bedding, flight suits (nomex), jungle fatigues, and boots. This equipment could not be disposed of without shipment to the proper turn in point. Also during the roll-up phase a requirement for heavy equipment existed. This equipment was not available through PA&E and was only obtained through favors from the Air Force at Bien Hoa Air Base. The equipment was used to remove large quantities of trash and ashes. Also it became necessary to borrow a bulldozer from the ARVN to remove and level areas where house trailers had been removed. The roll-up phase was that portion of the standdown where all

TAB H (F Troop, 9th Cavalry, 12th CAG) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

loose ends were tied together. It was the period of final inspection and the last police call. With the foregoing in mind, personnel and at least one vehicle were available for the last police. The Troop was fortunate enough to have a vehicle borrowed from another unit which was returned to the unit when it departed Bien Hoa.

b. Section 2: Observations and Recommendations.

(1) Pre-X-Day: If standdown can be forecasted, planning ahead is essential to begin the standdown on the first day. This plan should include those personnel by name responsible for individual areas. Judgement should be used during personnel selection so that a man will be given a job which he is capable of handling and that he will have sufficient time, remaining in country, to finish the job. The plan should also include a tentative schedule for turning in equipment. In this regard it would be folly to turn in all vehicles the first day. By the same token weapons must be kept until the last day. As personnel are transferred their weapons can be turned in by lots of 25 or 50. Another plan should be developed to consolidate personnel remaining in as few buildings as possible. Those buildings which are emptied should be policed, repaired, and boarded up. This plan will allow for orderly clearing and will provide a visual measure of accomplishment.

(2) Standdown phase: A single standdown plan should be initiated at the next higher headquarters. This plan or SOP should consolidate all requirements from Brigade and higher headquarters.

(3) Withdrawal phase: Withdrawal must be planned and controlled to prevent the loss of personnel which are essential to successful standdown. As jobs are completed these personnel may be utilized on various other requirements.

(4) Roll-up phase: Sufficient personnel must be kept for a last minute manicure of the area. Plans must be made to transport these personnel from the area since most equipment, including vehicles, will be turned in prior to the roll-up phase.

3. SPECIFIC:

a. Section 1: Everyone in the Troop was eager to leave but attitudes were high and necessary chores were accomplished

TAB H (F Troop, 9th Cavalry, 12th CAG) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

in good order through all three phases. This attitude is particularly important with respect to the PBO. He must be energetic and well informed if a smooth turnover of equipment is going to take place. This means that the PBO must be briefed ahead of time on the various turn in points and formats for required reports. An officer should be designated, prior to standdown, if time permits, as Keystone Officer. This officer can assist the PBO and the various sections turning in equipment by staging himself at the turn in point. Security after the ceasefire was focused on pilferage by local nationals. This problem became more acute as time progressed. To meet these requirements, the Troop utilized two roving patrols in M151's and a gate guard. In conjunction with the security force, the Troop placed the post off limits to all vehicles other than US vehicles. To meet deadlines and provide the necessary creature comforts, plans must be made to have all supplies on hand prior to X-Day. This is important, since logistic facilities are probably phasing down also. Arrangements must be made ahead of time to transport all nonfunctional equipment by flat bed truck or other forms of transportation. TMP must have signature cards and requests 24 hours prior to requirements. C-Rations must be layed on for the last few meals after the mess is closed out. Normally it should take one day to close the mess if facilities are being turned over in place. Transferring equipment ran smoothly. Administration became very important. Knowledgeable and responsible people were retained to handle administrative requirements to see that all was performed properly and were channeled to the proper hands. Transferring of station property was a different type of problem. Since buildings were transferred to one ARVN unit and post, camp, and station property to a second unit, coordination had to be made for two separate transfers. All property whether buildings or post, camp, and station should be inventoried ahead of time and checked against PA&E inventories. By inventoring ahead some shortage can be made up. Finally after the post, camp, and station property has been removed a police of the area will again have to be performed.

b. Section 2: Commander's Comments on Lessons Learned - George P. Hewlett, MAJ, AR.

(1) Inspections.

(a) Observation: During the course of the standdown many visitors, both announced and unannounced, came through the area. These visits were time consuming and distracting.

TAB H (F Troop, 9th Cavalry, 12th CAG) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(b) Evaluation: To thoroughly police an area as large as Bien Hoa it took more than manual labor. Some desirable equipment necessary should be large lawn mowers, motorized by a tractor, a front-end loader, and a dump truck.

(c) Recommendation: Coordination should be made with area engineers to support final police requirements.

(2) Hold Baggage.

(a) Observation: Hold baggage had to be moved from Bien Hoa to Saigon for shipment.

(b) Evaluation: Each individual desired to keep his personal belongings until the last minute. This caused an unnecessary burden on the Troop because it meant each individual had to take time off to ship hold baggage. Transportation had to be arranged daily to transport these people to Saigon and back to Bien Hoa.

(c) Recommendation: A hold baggage team should be sent to outlying areas to check hold baggage on location and crate it for shipment.

(4) Final Transportation.

(a) Observation: Vehicles must be turned in prior to roll-up phase. At least one vehicle must be available for final, unforeseen, requirements.

(b) Evaluation: Two possibilities exist to meet final transportation requirements. TMP vehicles can be utilized until the last moment and if possible vehicles can be borrowed on hand receipt from other units not currently standing down.

(c) Recommendation: That coordination be made at group level to hand receipt necessary vehicles from other units until standdown is complete.

TAB I (12th CAG Special Aviation Teams) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

1. PURPOSE: To report the operations of Special Aviation Teams in support of the ICCS.

2. GENERAL: This report covers operations of special aviation teams from 28 Jan 73 to 28 Mar 73 in support of the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

a. Significant organizational activities.

(1) Preparatory phase: The preparatory phase extended from X-day (28 Jan 73) to approximately X+17. During this period the members of the special aviation teams inspected and prepared the aircraft for ICCS flights and organized themselves under the direction of the special aviation team leaders. Since both teams worked closely together, a single team chief was appointed to control both teams. The teams consisted of a total of 26 aviators and 16 enlisted crew chiefs. During the preparatory phase an operations officer was appointed to receive mission requirements from the ICCS and schedule crews and aircraft to fulfill these missions. An Aviation Maintenance Officer was appointed to supervise maintenance and an administrative officer was appointed to take care of financial, personnel, and other administrative matters for members of the teams. During this phase, the teams inspected all aircraft, assigned crew chiefs to each aircraft, performed necessary maintenance, and painted the aircraft with ICCS markings. The special ICCS markings were painted on the aircraft and the detachment was ready to fly missions on X+2 (30 Jan 73). ICCS personnel were not prepared to submit operational requirements until X+7. A few missions for J4, MACV were flown the first week; however, for the most part this period was used to conduct orientation and standardization flights for assigned aviators. All aviators and crew chiefs were briefed on the sensitive nature of their assignment, and emphasis was placed on maintaining high standards of duty performance and appearance. The possible international diplomatic consequences of any accident, incident, or personal conflict were also discussed.

(2) Operational phase: This phase extended from X+7 to X+52. During this phase the special aviation teams operated on a daily basis. Seldom were more than six aircraft operating on a given day. Mission requirements were relayed from the ICCS to the operations officer who scheduled

TAB I (12th CAG Special Aviation Teams) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

crew and aircraft for the following day. The policy was established that aircraft would be preflighted and run-up one hour prior to take-off. This enabled maintenance problems to be identified and corrected in time to meet the flight schedule. During this phase no problems were encountered. The teams also maintained a perfect record of no accidents, incidents, or forced landings. The majority of missions were conducted in MR III with occasional missions flown in northern MR IV.

(3) Closeout phase: This phase overlapped the operational phase and extended from X+39 to X+58. During this phase the teams continued to be fully operational while engaged in the transfer of aircraft to ICCS Air Services for the purpose of assuming the ICCS support missions. On X+39 and again on X+45 six UH-1H helicopters were transferred. The time, place, and other details of the transfer were well coordinated in advance and no problems were encountered. Twelve additional UH-1H helicopters were received on X+38 from aviation units in process of deactivation. They were received and prepared for ICCS use with a minimum of difficulty. Upon termination of the ICCS missions these helicopters were turned over to VNAF.

b. Commander's Comments on Lessons Learned -
L. Bryce Whitson, MAJ, TC.

(1) Observation: The composition of the special aviation teams was not adequate to enable the team to perform both administrative functions and mission requirements.

(2) Evaluation: The requirement was for the teams to be made up of aviators and crew chiefs; however, it became apparent that the team needed operations and administrative personnel to maintain flight and maintenance records and to process orders. These needs required the team utilize personnel from other units to perform these operational and administrative functions.

(a) Operations.

1. Observation: Initially the overall control of the detachment was not well defined.

TAB I (12th CAG Special Aviation Teams) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

2. Evaluation: Missions were received from the ICCS operations center with the detachment being responsible through aviation channels for a number of reports. Flight clearances in MR III were obtained from Third Regional Assistance Command. Although the mission was successfully accomplished, conflicting guidance was occasionally received resulting in lost motion at team level.

(b) Recommendation: That special aviation teams be formed as a separate detachment responsible to the headquarters that works closest with the supported activity.

I
TAB J (FPJMC Aviation Detachment - RW - Regions V, VI and Headquarters) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

1. PURPOSE: To report significant activities involved in the establishment, operation and planned standdown of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission Special Mission Detachment (Rotary Wing) (Regions V, VI and Headquarters) during the period X-1 through X+65.

2. GENERAL:

a. Section 1: Significant Organizational Activities.

(1) Pre-X-Day Phase: The Four-Party Special Mission Detachment (FPSMD) was formed to support delegation members of the United States, the Government of Vietnam (GVN), the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG). The FPSMD was composed of 24 officers and warrant officers, two non-commissioned officers and 11 specialist crew chiefs. Personnel availability, planning, and assignments were accomplished by 12th Combat Aviation Group (12th CAG). The FPSMD was assigned 11 UH-1H helicopters, marked with white stripes for ease of recognition. (Later the color of the stripes was changed to orange)

(a) The OIC of the FPSMD was tasked with the duty of serving in the capacity of Army Aviation Officer in the Operations and Plans Division of the US Delegation to the Central FPJMC. This required the executive officer to assume the duties of Detachment OIC and responsibility for operations and mission planning for the FPSMD at flight line level. Normal mission activities were conducted by all of the members of the detachment in their former units up to and including X-1 (27 Jan 73).

(b) Aircraft and personnel were assigned to sections for direct support to the regions. Six aircraft and crews were assigned to support Region V at Plantation (Bien Hoa) and two aircraft and crews were assigned to support the Region VI at My Tho. The OIC, detachment commander, NCOIC, TI and three aircraft and crews were assigned to support the JMC headquarters at Saigon.

(2) Standdown Phase: Planning was initiated from X-day forward concerning the standdown of the detachment. The

TAB J (FPJMC Avn Det - RW - Regions V, VI and Headquarters)
to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action
Report

majority of personnel had received PCS orders through headquarters, 12th CAG. These personnel were subsequently assigned to the 527th Personnel Services Company, MACV Special Troops, thus necessitating revocation and reissue of orders. The aircraft were initially assigned to the 59th CAC on hand receipt from VNAF. The OIC of the detachment subsequently signed for the aircraft from VNAF, and effected return of the aircraft to VNAF upon completion of the JMC mission.

(3) Withdrawal Phase: There were heavy mission requirements for the FPSMD during the last few days of the JMC life. These requirements were dictated by the necessity to extract DRV and US personnel from team sites to Regions and to Saigon. The FPSMD members performed that mission, quickly effected return of aircraft to VNAF and departed Saigon on the final aircraft deploying US troops from Vietnam on 30-31 March 1973.

b. Section 2: Commander's Comments on Lessons Learned -
Robert E. Weathersby, Jr., MAJ, IN

(1) Forming of Special Mission Detachment.

(a) Observation: The actual composition of the FPSMD teams was not adequate to enable them to perform both their mission and meet team administrative requirements.

(b) Evaluation: The requirement was to assign only aviators and crew chiefs to the FPSMD; however, it became apparent that each team needed operations and administrative personnel to maintain flight records and orders. Units had to be tasked to provide the additional support personnel, however, they could not be assigned to the teams due to team strength limitations.

(c) Recommendation: SMD's be formed as separate detachments with the complete capability of performing operations and related administrative functions.

(2) Orders for Special Mission Detachment.

(a) Observation: Members of the FPSMD were not reassigned promptly to a controlling headquarters or organization.

TAB J (FPJMC Avn Det - RW - Regions V, VI and Headquarters)
to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action
Report

(b) Evaluation: When the SMD was formed, plans had not been completed to reassign team members to a gaining unit. This created confusion among the team members as well as their parent units. Morning reports did not accurately reflect unit strengths since members to be transferred were actually present for duty with their teams. The air cavalry troops were unable to zero out morning reports in a timely manner because team members were selected from their assets and had not been reassigned. In addition some confusion existed as to rating schemes and the administration of military justice.

(c) Recommendation: Personnel on SMD's be immediately reassigned to a controlling headquarters that is scheduled to maintain a morning report throughout the entire period of utilization.

(3) Arrival of Special Mission Detachment.

(a) Observation: Members of the FPSMD flew combat missions on 27 January 1973, and were required to arrive at Saigon on 28 January 1973.

(b) Evaluation: Personnel were not notified of their selection for, nor assignment to, the SMD until X-1. Upon arrival on X-day at Saigon, little time for billeting and initial briefings was available since the unit was required to be immediately operational, and the first missions were actually flown on the date of arrival.

(c) Recommendation: That personnel being assigned to SMD's be notified far enough in advance so that adequate planning can be effected. This should include billeting arrangements, acceptance of aircraft and associated equipment and an initial briefing by the OIC prior to the first missions to be flown. This is a prime example of "close hold" information/planning being withheld until much too late in the ball game.

(4) Billeting for members of Special Mission Detachment:

(a) Observation: Members of the FPSMD were billeted with the 59th CAC.

TAB J (FPJMC Avn Det - RW - Regions V, VI and Headquarters)
to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action
Report

(b) Evaluation: The officer personnel were assigned BOQ space which was to remain open until X+60. However, the enlisted personnel were assigned billets that were to close on X+45. This fact required a move by the enlisted personnel during their assignment to the SMD and billets that would remain open until X+60.

(c) Recommendation: All personnel assigned to SMD be initially billeted in an area that will be open until the completion of the mission. This will eliminate the necessity of a move during the mission period.

(5) Vehicles for special mission detachment.

(a) Observation: No arrangements were made to provide necessary transportation facilities to members of the FPSMD.

(b) Evaluation: Transportation arrangements were not accomplished prior to the arrival of the FPSMD. Due to the distance involved between the billeting area and the flight line, detachment members were required to hitch-hike or procure commercial transportation at a cost to themselves.

(c) Recommendation: That arrangements be made to provide military or TMP vehicles to SMD personnel on an around-the-clock basis to provide means of arrival at the place of duty at the appropriate time.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

1. PURPOSE. To report significant organizational activities of the 17th Combat Aviation Group for the period 1 November 1972 through 11 March 1973.

2. GENERAL. This report includes the activities of HHC, 17th Combat Aviation Group, Eagle Combat Aviation Battalion (Provisional), 201st Aviation Company (Corps), H Troop (Air), 17th Armored Cavalry, 57th Assault Helicopter Company, 60th Assault Helicopter Company, and the 604th Transportation Company (Direct Support).

3. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES.

a. Command.

(1) Mission:

(a) To provide command, staff planning, and operational control of assigned and attached aviation units.

(b) To provide Army aviation support as directed to US, RVNAF and other FWMAF for the conduct of combat, combat support and other counter-insurgency operations in Military Region II.

(2) Organization:

(a) Pre-X-Day: Prior to 28 January 1973, the 17th Aviation Group (Combat) was composed of one Combat Aviation Battalion, one Air Cavalry Troop, one Assault Helicopter Company, one Corps Aviation Company, and one Direct Support Maintenance Company (TAB A).

(b) Post X-Day: On 4 February 1973, as a result of moving from its base at Ninh Hoa to Nha Trang, the 60th Assault Helicopter company was detached from Eagle Combat Aviation Battalion (Provisional) (ECAB), and assigned directly to the 17th Group for command and control (TAB A). Other disposition remained the same until 28 February 1973 when ECAB was deactivated. At this time 129th AHC and the 180th ASHC came directly under 17th Group Headquarters for command and control.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(3) Personalities: There were no command or staff changes following X-Day, thus individuals named herein served during both Pre and Post X-Day operations.

(a) Commander, 17th Group: At unit deactivation the commander was LTC Frederick O. MacManus, 008-22-0226, ADA.

(b) Primary Staff: At the close of the reporting period Primary Staff were:

1 Deputy Group Commander: LTC Osbin E. Smith, 411-54-3826, FA.

2 S-1: CPT Jerry F. Anderson, 451-62-2707, IN.

3 S-2: MAJ Dennis D. White, 576-36-7022, MI, on 21 November 1972, vice 1LT Marcellous Cooper, 225-70-2291, MI, who departed on 3 November 1972.

4 S-3: MAJ Erle W. Thomas, 239-58-2291, ADA.

5 S-4: CPT Walter R. Moss, 531-46-9766, AR, on 4 January 1973 vice CPT Gary L. Holmes, 496-40-2047, CE.

(c) Special Staff: At the close of the reporting period Special Staff Officers were:

1 Aircraft Maintenance: MAJ Robert K. Dillion, 314-36-0567, TC on 7 December 1972, vice MAJ John D. Bradford, 414-66-2130, TC who departed on 28 November 1972.

2 Surgeon: MAJ William W. Pollard, 544-38-6551, MC.

3 Signal: CPT George H. Mitchell, 524-66-1436, SC.

4 Safety: CPT William H. Campbell, 180-36-8340, FA on 18 January 1973 vice CW2 Kenneth R. Whitley, 453-72-3894, AVN.

5 Chaplain: CPT Jack L. Thomas, 242-36-2143, CH, departed 17 November 1972 and was not replaced.

6 Installation Defense Coordinator: CPT William H. Campbell, 180-36-8340, FA vice CPT Paul A. Pressly, 249-80-9042, IN on 12 December 1972.

(d) Eagle Combat Aviation Battalion (Provisional). At the close of the period the commander and staff were:

1 Commander: LTC William H. McGee, 428-56-9041, AR.

2 Executive Officer: MAJ Allen R. Todd, 453-50-8759, EN. This position was left vacant at X-day when MAJ Todd assumed command of the aviation support detachment for RJMC III.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

- 3 S-1: CPT Tyler Tugwell, 220-40-7139, AG.
- 4 S-2: CPT Robert S. Davis, 539-42-6866, FA.
- 5 S-3: CPT Jack L. Baxter, 203-36-7767, FA.
- 6 S-4: CPT David P. Kennedy, 455-56-1103, ORD.

(e) Unit Commanders: At the close of the reporting period the Unit Commanders were:

- 1 HHC, 17th Group: CPT Walter J. Probka, 152-32-0147, FA.
- 2 57th AHC: MAJ Monty B. Price, 460-68-5714, IN, vice MAJ John D. Hughes, 254-46-1982, IN, on 21 December 1972.
- 3 H/17th ACS: MAJ Ronald M. Fishburn, 445-32-2827, AR.
- 4 129th AHC: MAJ Hugh C. Durham III, 434-54-9434, IN.
- 5 180th ASHC: MAJ Frank J. Klein Jr., 457-56-1915, FA.
- 6 H/10th ACS: MAJ Sidney E. Lyons Jr., 406-60-5902, AR.
- 7 60th AHC: MAJ Jon C. Stillman, 396-32-8099, IN.
- 8 201st CAC: MAJ Dale W. Pierce, 537-42-7855, IN.
- 9 604th Trans Co.: MAJ Charlie B. Davis, 193-26-8317, TC.

b. Personnel.

(1) Replacements: 17th CAG received a total of 267 individual replacements during this period as compared to 1523 individual replacements during the previous reporting period. This was the result of completely shutting off the replacement stream in the middle of October when it appeared that a ceasefire was near. When the ceasefire did not materialize, nearly a month and a half passed before replacements again began arriving. The replacement stream again was shut-off on 20 January, following positive negotiations toward a ceasefire.

(2) Strength: The overall strength of 17th CAG varied during this reporting period. The general trend was decreasing strength due to a fewer number of replacements brought about by the impending ceasefire, until the latter part of December when it seemed apparent that the Group would be here for some time and unit strength increased until X-day. A breakdown of Group strength by unit on X-day is included in TAB C. The strength of 17th CAG on X-day was 1616 personnel.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(3) Personnel management: Personnel turbulence was not as high during this period as during the last reporting period. The significant problem was having to complete assigned missions with a decreasing number of personnel. At the low point, the end of November, Group strength was 72% of authorized, and some units were as low as 65% authorized strength.

(4) A&D: During this period 1 Nov 72 - 27 Jan 73 the Awards and Decorations Section of 17th CAG S-1 processed some 1700 awards of which approximately 100 were from the Republic of Vietnam to US personnel. The section was responsible for processing service awards and achievement awards for all deserving personnel in the Group in preparation for deactivation. This was handled in a period of 30 days.

(5) MOS Testing: MOS testing was considerably facilitated during this period because 518th PSC handled most of the necessary coordination at the Group's three primary locations, sending a representative to administer the exams. All personnel in need of testing were tested.

(6) Reenlistment Program: There were 25 reenlistments in 17th CAG during this reporting period: 17 first termers and 8 career soldiers. The objective was 9 first termers. The percentage was 188% for this unit.

(7) Civilian Personnel: Civilian personnel were hired from local resources of indigenous personnel. The local nationals were hired through two programs, permanent hires or direct daily hires.

(a) Permanent hires: Each unit, after submitting its current and projected civilian personnel requirements IAW USARV Reg 570-2 through this HQ to 1st Avn Bde, was authorized to employ local nationals on a permanent basis. The permanent hires employed in positions such as kitchen police, carpenters, secretaries, handymen, etc. A list of permanent hires by unit is provided below.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NUMBER OF PERSONNEL</u>
HHC, 17th CAG	24
57th AHC	8
H Troop/17th ACS	8
201st CAC	30
60th AHC	7
180th ASHC	7
129th AHC	8
H Troop 10th ACS	8
604th Trans Co	65

165

b Direct daily hires: Direct daily hires were employed on a daily as needed basis. They were primarily used for unskilled labor such as filling sandbags and general police. They were paid through AIK funds.

(8) Casualties:

	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>1-27 Jan</u>
KIA	0	0	1
MIA	0	0	0
WIA	5	3	3
Non-hostile death	0	0	0
Non-hostile injury (serious)	2	1	1

(9) Drugs: The 17th CAG Drug Program had one major change in its operation during this period. The program prescribed that all individuals who came up positive on any type of urinalysis, initial or follow-up, were to be transferred to the Detoxification Center for eventual medical evacuation to CONUS. The Group Commander felt that some individuals might make deliberate attempts to come up positive on a urinalysis in an effort to leave Vietnam prior to their DEROS, so he modified the program for 17th CAG to allow the unit commander to determine if the individual should be returned to his unit after detoxification.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(10) Human relations: The human relations program within 17th CAG had a decrease in activity after the initial announcement that a ceasefire was imminent. Incidents that required investigation by the human relations officer decreased considerably. Individuals who may have been prone to lodge complaints concerning racial discrimination or unequal opportunities for promotion, duty assignement, etc., seemed to want to let the alleged conditions continue since everyone felt the Group would be standing down soon. As with most other activities, the human relations program did have a slight increase in activity starting in late December when most people felt US forces would be in Vietnam for some time longer. Throughout this period most of the units continued to have their human relations council meetings on a somewhat regular basis. LT Samuel Patterson returned from the Defense Race Relations Institute at Patrick Air Force Base, Fla. on 5 Jan 73. He was assigned from ECAB TDY to USARV/MACV SUPCOM to begin a tour of Vietnam teaching a four hour block of instruction dealing with race relations to all E-5's in Vietnam.

(11) Chaplain: Chaplain Thomas departed Camp Holloway in mid November without a replacement. Regular services continued, however, with a Protestant chaplain visiting Camp Holloway from MR II Hq. Denominational services continued to be provided each week by members of the LDS faith. ECAB was assigned a new chaplain in mid-December.

(12) Headquarters Management: The Group operated a message center which was utilized for all distribution from and between units and this headquarters. It also provided a UH-1H as a daily courier to transport personnel and distribution to An Son, Ninh Hoa, and Nha Trang.

(13) Group Surgeon: During the current reporting period 17th Group maintained three medical detachments, the 94th at Camp Holloway, the 546th at An Son, and the 25th at Nha Trang. The 25th additionally provided support to the 60th AHC at Ninh Hoa. All detachments were adequately staffed during the priod of this report. In preparation for deactivation, all dispensaries screened records, returning all active records to the units. Records for personnel who could not be located were boxed and shipped to the Adjutant General, Washington D.C. Numerous staff visits were made to the

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

medical detachments to assist in inspections of installation sewage disposal, food service facilities, garbage and trash disposal, insect and rodent control, and dog control. The latter was especially important, as rabies in the RVN reached epidemic proportions. Assistance was also rendered in preparation and submission of required reports. The Surgeon's office also supported several civic action projects. In the Pleiku area, MEDCAPS were made by MAJ Pollard and 94th MED personnel on a regular basis to the many Montagard villages in the area. Additionally MEDCAPS were performed at the leprosarium near An Son. The end of the reporting period found all detachments preparing to turn over equipment to ARVN medical units.

(14) HHC: During the period from 1 November 1972 to 27 January 1973 the primary problem area in Headquarters Company was that of morale. There were many contributing factors. Primary was anxiety concerning the future, of which the most important factor was news of the progress being made towards a cease fire agreement and general withdrawal of troops. The uncertainty of the situation generated much speculation as to the possibility of extended or curtailed tours. The slowdown in the replacement stream caused turbulence in many areas resulting in increased workloads and a reevaluation of personnel utilization criteria. As preliminary withdrawal plans were made and put into effect the administrative workload correspondingly increased while the flow of unit supply items, engineer support materials, and maintenance repair parts decreased. To combat the adverse impact of these factors upon the personnel of Headquarters Company, several programs were initiated, Participation in a variety of sports was encouraged, to include intra- and intermural competition in softball, volleyball, and flag football. A facilities improvement program stressed fire prevention, area clean-up, and the resandbagging of all living quarters. Finally, timely dissemination of information at all levels had a positive and stabilizing effect on personnel, combined with other steps taken to increase efficiency, improve morale, and maintain a high level of performance.

POST X-DAY

(15) Unit Strength and Strength Accountability.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(a) As in any deactivation, one of the most difficult tasks was strength accountability. Morning reports which had been active since 1965 had to be zeroed. A command muster was conducted on X+37 to make any necessary strength adjustments in order to enable the units to properly account for all personnel and zero their morning reports. However, because of the command emphasis that had been placed on strength accountability during the previous eight months, only one strength error was found within the entire Group. 17th CAG was able to close out all of its morning reports with no problems.

(b) Group strength on X-day was 1616 personnel. The following list which depicts Group strength during the post X-day period, should be viewed in conjunction with TAB B, which indicates unit stations during the deactivation period.

<u>STATION</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
	<u>X+15</u>	
An Son		460
Pleiku		422
Nha Trang		374
<u>Group Total</u>		<u>1,256</u>
	<u>X+30</u>	
An Son		184
Pleiku		262
Nha Trang		237
<u>Group Total</u>		<u>683</u>
	<u>X+45</u>	
Nha Trang		128
<u>Pleiku</u>		<u>28</u>
<u>Group Total</u>		<u>156</u>

Although the Group deactivated on X+45, the 201st CAC at Nha Trang remained active to support Operation HOMECOMING, and the ICCS aviation detachment remained in Pleiku until final closure on X+58.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(16) Personnel Management and Redeployment.

(a) With the announcement of X-day, it soon became apparent that much of the guidance contained in both SRAC and 1st Aviation Bde OPLAN's 215 which pertained to personnel withdrawal schedules had been outdated or invalidated as a result of the rapid changes in the time frames for departure of personnel. This plan received extensive modification during a meeting with 1st Aviation Bde on X-3. This was followed at 17th Group on X-2 with a meeting of all company commanders.

(b) The initial standdown requirement was to identify all personnel on leave or TDY in CONUS and make a determination by X+5 as to whether or not they were considered mission essential. If so, they would be returned to RVN. Of the 68 personnel in this category, 13 were considered to be mission essential and were returned to the RVN within 14 days. Of personnel in the units on X-day, five enlisted men and six officers were declared mission essential and required to remain past their normal DEROS. Additionally, as of X-day, all routine personnel actions ceased.

(c) In anticipation of X-day, the 527th PSC provided 17th CAG with machine rosters supposedly containing a listing of all personnel within Group. These rosters were approximately 60% correct because of severe personnel turbulence encountered since the last muster which the machine branch had not updated. Each unit was to update these rosters and provide release dates on all personnel within the unit by X+1. Naturally, the unit commander not knowing the date for disposition of his aircraft, property, or release form mission requirements, could in no way even closely estimate an accurate date for the release of specific personnel. Recognizing that these rosters were worthless for the purpose they were intended - the cutting of DEROS orders - necessary coordination was effected with the 518th PSC to have all DEROS orders cut with an effective date of X+45 and subsequently amend them upon the individual's arrival at Camp Alpha for final outprocessing. This worked extremely well and allowed the unit commander maximum flexibility to adjust to the ever changing operational requirements.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(d) Upon receiving incremental quotas from 1st Avn Bde, units were assigned quotas for shipping, thus enabling the unit to determine individual DEROS's since they best knew their remaining requirements. Since all group personnel were basically located at three locations--Pleiku, An Son, and Nha Trang--generally each location was scheduled for a shipment every third day. This varied somewhat in the second increment when priority was given to closing out An Son and in the third increment to closing out Pleiku. Generally, heavy shipments were effected early in the increment in consonance with existing mission requirements in order to eliminate any foreseen problems caused by transportation. This worked extremely well as all increments were completed at least three to four days ahead of schedule. All transportation requirements were coordinated with SRAC. Except for the period when all transportation was cancelled in Vietnam, never was a flight requested that was not filled. Some intragroup reassignments had to be accomplished in the final increment in order to insure that all units were closed out as scheduled since 201st CAC was the only unit authorized personnel after X+45. This was accomplished with minimum delay by 518th, and all 17th CAG units completed their stand-down well ahead of scheduled. Throughout the entire deactivation period, the cooperation received from the 518th PSC and the rapidity with which they responded to the myriad requirements of 17th CAG were outstanding.

(17) Awards and Decorations:

All awards and decorations were required to be processed and forwarded to 1st Aviation Brigade prior to X+30 with the exception of the achievement awards for the standdown period. The problems encountered were basically that the subordinate units did not maintain appropriate files and suspense systems so as to know exactly who had been submitted for awards. This resulted in several awards being submitted after the established suspense date. This caused no major problem as the late submissions were coordinated with 1st Aviation Brigade and expeditiously processed in order to insure that all deserving personnel had been appropriately recognized for their accomplishments. Sixty-eight awards for achievement

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

during the deactivation period were submitted on X+33. To insure that only deserving personnel received awards, all completed awards were monitored to insure that personnel whose conduct or efficiency had deteriorated during the period since the award was submitted would not receive the award. Some cases arose in which individual service awards were revoked because of drug abuse, disciplinary problems, or other unfavorable actions by the individual. As a result of using the USARV Form 197-R for service awards, preparation time was cut drastically, and the majority of personnel received their awards prior to departing their unit.

(18) Reenlistment Program: All reenlistment activities ceased as of X-day.

(19) Civilian Personnel.

(a) As of X-day there were 165 authorized permanent hire civilian personnel employed by 17th Group. Termination requests for all spaces were handcarried to Nha Trang Civilian Personnel Office by each unit prior to X+10. The primary factor affecting release of CPO slots was the planned closure and consolidation of mess facilities and unit deactivation dates. Terminal (advance) time sheets were handcarried to Saigon on X+23 so that CPO employees could be paid on their release dates. All Domestic Hire employees were terminated on X+17 in order to avoid paying an extra month's severance pay. House maids possessing USARV passes were allowed to work on an individually arranged basis until deactivation.

(b) During the deactivation period, large numbers of daily hire personnel were used for police of the installations.

(20) Casualties: During the deactivation period, 17th Group sustained two casualties, both of whom were wounded by enemy fire at 1010 hours on X-day (28 January), while flying through the An Khe Pass.

(21) Human Relations: All Human Relations activities ceased on X-day.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(22) Drug Program: The administration of the drug program remained unchanged during the standdown period. A unit sweep was conducted for all units so that those personnel who departed after X+30, when the testing capability of Camp Alpha had ceased, would have a commander's certificate stating that they had been tested negative in a urinalysis in the past 60 days. All drug related records were destroyed at X+30.

(23) Headquarters Management: On X-day, the 1st Aviation Brigade courier was cancelled, thus placing the responsibility for distribution to and from Saigon in the hands of 17th CAG. In order to properly coordinate this and other administrative requirements, a three man liaison team consisting of one lieutenant, one E-6, and one E-5 was established at the 518th PSC. The team's mission was to handle all distribution, effect necessary coordination with 1st Avn Bde and 518th PSC handle all incoming flights of DEROS personnel from 17th CAG, and arrange for their expeditious processing through Finance and Personnel. The Group UH-1H courier continued to run on a daily basis until X+34 when it began every other day operation. The Group courier ceased operation on X+40.

(24) Unit Funds: The 17th CAG S-2 was appointed to audit all unit funds. This was accomplished by X+20. Many administrative errors were found and corrected in the various unit funds and all money and property was properly accounted for.

(25) Domestic Hire Funds: An auditor was appointed to conduct terminal audits on all DOHIF's in 17th CAG. This was completed by X+25.

(26) Personal Property and Records: All personal property and records for personnel out of country on X-day who did not return to RVN were shipped to the individual's next duty station via hold baggage and registered mail. Additionally, a personal letter was written to each individual advising him of the bill of lading or registration number, and the address to which his property and records had been

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

shipped in an effort to preclude lost items if the individual was diverted from his original assignment while on leave.

(27) OERS: All OER's were required to be completed and delivered to the 518th PSC by X+40. Many problems immediately became evident. The form to be used was the DA Form 67-7, a new form that had just been implemented for use on 1 January 1973. Most of the rating officers were not familiar with the new form or the rating system itself. Even though the new AR 623-105 had been requisitioned, the requisitions were not filled and there were no sufficient copies of the new AR. To counteract this, a 12 page lesson plan was prepared and distributed to each officer and warrant officer within 17th CAG. The lesson plan covered in great detail the new OER and how to complete it. It proved to be a very valuable tool during this period. Still, numerous OER's had to be retyped because of administrative errors. There were in excess of 400 OER's to be prepared under this new system which was complicated by the dwindling supply of clerical assets. In order to insure that all officers and warrant officers received OER's, appropriate control procedures were established at group level and cross checked with the units as well as the servicing PSC to insure that the OER's not only were completed, but also that they arrived at the PSC and were appropriately posted on the individuals 201 file and further forwarded to DA.

(28) Group Surgeon: On X-day all medical detachments obtained current unit rosters from each supported unit. These rosters were used to check against immunization records. On X+5 all personnel needing immunizations were scheduled to receive them between X+6 and X+10. Between X+11 and X+16 all medical property was inventoried and turned over to ARVN medical units. Throughout the entire period, sick call and other medical services continued on a normal basis. Medical personnel were released to DEROS predicated on the population of supported units.

(29) Headquarters Company: During the period from X-day to standdown, Headquarters Company experienced considerable turmoil in all areas. As unit strength continued to decrease,

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

the workload for remaining personnel naturally increased, which created a morale problem in certain areas. This condition was aggravated by the increased frequency of guard duty. Other contributing factors were reduction of facilities such as PX, clubs, lack of a fulltime chaplain, and the fact that the city of Pleiku was placed off-limits. Difficulties were also encountered in obtaining maintenance support for building repair as curtailment of services continued. The lack of repair parts hampered vehicle support and caused excessive dead-line time and premature turn-in. Strength accountability became a critical concern since the morning report reflected those on TDY at other units, as well as individuals who were working in An Son, Nha Trang, Pleiku, Phan Thiet, and Saigon. Factors which aided in countering these negative aspects included timely dissemination of information, free beer and soda, and recognition of large numbers of individuals for services rendered, to include awards and letters of appreciation. HHC morning report was zeroed on X+39, and all remaining personnel transferred to the 201st CAC.

c. Intelligence and Security.

(1) Enemy activity during this reporting period has been relatively intense in several areas of MR II. The primary areas of activity have been Kontum, Pleiku and Binh Provinces. These three provinces are the largest in land area and contain the largest portion of the population in the MR. Pleiku and Kontum provinces also have common borders with Cambodia and Laos which provide the enemy excellent supply routes into northern MR II. Enemy supplies have and will continue to flow unhindered across the borders of Cambodia and Laos into Pleiku and Kontum provinces.

(2) After suffering heavy losses during the last reporting period (in excess of 10,000 KIA) enemy units began concentrating on less well defended GVN positions. On 3 November the ARVN Fire Support Base at Duc Co, located 12 kilometers from the Cambodian border, came under heavy enemy attack early in the morning and was subsequently overrun and occupied in the afternoon. ABFs by 120 mm and 82 mm mortars and, reportedly, 130 mm field guns, characterized enemy preparations

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

for the ground attack. T-54 tanks were used for the first time in Pleiku Province during the assault which took Duc Co. Two tanks were disabled by the 57th Avn Co and two others by VNAF. The enemy also employed numerous .51 caliber AA machine guns resulting in numerous shot-ats and hits to friendly aircraft.

(3) On 1 November friendly forces launched an operation to recapture Duc Co and to disrupt activity by the 320th NVA Division in western Pleiku Province. The operation culminated in the recapture of Duc Co on 15 December. Enemy forces withdrew across the Cambodian border to regroup and resupply after sustaining over 1,000 KIAs in 6 weeks. Duc Co was given up by ARVN again 13 January 1973.

(4) The vast majority of Kontum Province remained under the control of enemy forces during the reported period. The only territory under the undisputed control of the GVN was the area immediately surrounding Kontum City. The GVN also continued to hold outposts at Dak Pek and Mang Buk as well as Fire Support Bases along QL 14 to the north and south of the city. The Kontum Pass was generally open although there were periods of short duration when it was closed by the enemy.

(5) One enemy division, the 10th Infantry Division, and other regimental sized B-3 Front subordinate units operated exclusively in Kontum Province during the reporting period. Surveillance of the Kontum area by H Troop, (AIR) 17th Armored Cavalry confirmed preparations for an attack upon Kontum City by the NVA. Enemy activity increased sharply in the Province, particularly in areas to the west and southwest of the city. It appeared that the 40th NVA Artillery Regiment, a B-3 Front subordinate, moved south from the Ben Het-Dak To Area to a location directly west of Kontum City. The city itself sustained only a few minor ABFs, suffering little damage and few casualties. However, the GVN Fire Support Base November, located approximately 5 kilometers to the northwest of the city on QL 14, was the target of almost continuous heavy ABFs and light ground probes

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

from late November until the afternoon of 23 December when it was overrun by NVA elements. The base was not retaken by ARVN forces until eight days later, although some 80 ARVN troops were trapped in the base and were able to maintain themselves throughout the period the enemy held the base. An attack upon the city may have been forestalled by massive B-52 strikes upon areas to the north and west of the city, but more probably by the advent of the ceasefire on 28 January.

(6) In Binh Dinh Province during the early portion of the reporting period, enemy uncertainty with regard to the ceasefire led them to concentrate their efforts upon political indoctrination operations while open acts of hostility remained minimal. ABFs constituted the most serious enemy activity in November although an attempt was made to close QL-19. December saw a substantial increase in ABFs, particularly in the northern part of the province where the majority of the 3rd NVA Division was located. Late December saw a substantial increase in enemy movement throughout the province. This activity continued into January when major elements of the 2nd NVA Regiment, 2nd NVA Division moved from Quang Ngai Province into the An Lao Valley in northern Binh Dinh. Mid-January saw the only major enemy attack in the province during the reporting period. On 12 January two NVA battalions mounted an attack against the Tam Quan District Headquarters. The attack was repulsed and enemy activity subsided into less spectacular efforts to gain control of territory prior to the ceasefire. ARVN convoys were ambushed infrequently along QL-19 and the Mang Yang and An Khe Passes were closed briefly on at least two occasions during the reporting period. Again, as in the case of Kontum Province, the enemy controlled the largest percentage of the land area of Binh Dinh. GVN forces have been able to keep QL-19 open from Qui Nhon to Pleiku and maintain a series of bases along QL-1 north and south of Qui Nhon.

(7) Late January saw the deployment of half of an Air Cavalry team from H Troop, 10th Armored Cavalry to Binh Thuan Province where an enemy attack upon Phan Thiet City was considered imminent. The attack, however, was not made. One light observation helicopter was shot down and the US observer killed two days before the ceasefire went into effect.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(8) Most of northern MR II remained in the control of the enemy during the reporting period. ARVN forces were spread rather thinly trying to keep the major road networks open and defend the cities. While the GVN controlled less land area, it did maintain control over the vast majority of the population. Aside from the three northern provinces in the MR, enemy activity in the remainder of the MR consisted chiefly of an occasional ABF against RF/PF outposts and an unsuccessful attack against the southwest suburbs of Dalat City.

(9) During the reporting period Pleiku Airbase was the target of numerous ABFs by 122 mm rockets. Although several aircraft were damaged and a few were destroyed by these attacks, damage in the main was minimal and personnel losses were insignificant. MR II headquarters was rocketed on 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27 January. The MR II Inspector General was killed during the 27-January attack. On 28 January the headquarters received two rocket attacks, one just prior to 0800 hrs and one after the beginning of the ceasefire. Little damage was sustained during any of these attacks which came generally from positions in the northwest and southwest-rocket boxes. Local Force VC units were responsible for the attacks.

(10) Enemy strength and order of battle changes have been significant since the end of the last reporting period. There are now 102 NVA maneuver battalions estimated to be operating in MR II, an increase of 22 since 1 November 1972. Their total strength at the end of the reporting period was put at approximately 18,400 as compared to 9,000 late in October of last year. The increase is due in large part to the inclusion of the 2nd NVA Division into the order of battle lists primarily because it utilizes base camps in northern Binh Dinh from which to stage operations into Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh Provinces. Also, the 24th NVA Regiment moved back into MR II from MR III in early December to reinforce the 320th NVA Division which operated in Peliku province and the 7th and 83rd Engineer Regiments operating in Kontum Province were added to the order of battle in

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

January. These latter two regiments were primarily engaged in the movement of supplies into the northern portion of the MR and improving and maintaining the enemy's extensive road network in Kontum, Pleiku and Binh Dinh Provinces. The 10th Infantry Division was formed in Kontum Province out of assets that were already available to the B-3 Front. The division was apparently formed to provide better command and control of B-3 Front subordinates operating in the province which would have been the main forces used in an attack upon Kontum City.

(11) Local Force VC units remained relatively quiescent during the reporting period. VC strength was put at approximately 3,800 to 4,100, with units operating in most provinces of the MR.

POST X-DAY

(12) On X-day, 28 January 1973, the S-2, 17th Group and S-2 Eagle Combat Aviation Battalion (Provisional) began the standdown phase of operations. On X-day, organic intelligence operations and other intelligence sources rapidly diminished their output. During the standdown phase, security control guidance and assistance was furnished the units and staff sections by both the Group S-2 and Eagle Battalion S-2 and included the following:

(a) Instructions for the final base closure security measures were furnished to all units and tenant organizations.

(b) Effected coordination with the 525 MI Detachment at Pleiku for the base closure inspections.

(c) Security debriefings were given to personnel who had access to classified information.

(d) War trophy registrations were authenticated by the S-2, Eagle Bn, Group S-2, and local Provost Marshal offices.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(13) The following is a chronological list of the significant activities of the standdown phase:

- (a) X-day-Organic intelligence operations ceased.
- (b) X+1 - X+4 - Classified files were reduced to bare operational minimums.
- (c) X+8 - Ninh Hoa Installation was cleared. The Group S-2 met with Major Young, ODCSOPS USARV/MACV SUPCOM, with reference to the final base security checks. Initial guidance was given to commanders of units at Camp Holloway on base closure security checks.
- (d) X+10 - Reduced map stockage at group. Eagle Bn turned all maps over to the Vietnamese National Police.
- (e) X-12 - Published a letter to all commanders giving guidance relative to base closure security checks and providing for individual unit base closure inspection teams.
- (f) X+15 - Eagle Bn burned remaining secret documents and closed out the classified documents register, forwarding it to Group Headquarters with the destruction certificate file. Eagle Bn retired the S-2 filing system.
- (g) X+19 - Two E-5's and one E-4 were assigned to Group S-2 to conduct base closure inspections of units at Camp Holloway.
- (h) X+23 - Eagle Battalion commenced final security check of all 17th CAG units at Lane-An Son Installation.
- (i) X+24 - Final security check by 525th MI Group made of H/17, 604th Trans Det, and the old D/17th Infantry areas. H/17th & 604th cleared Camp Holloway.
- (j) X+36 - Group S-2 classified files were further reduced. The only secret documents remaining were those which pertained to the installation mine field. 201st CAC closed its classified document register and forwarded it to Group S-2.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(k) X+37 - Camp Holloway mine field was turned over to the ARVN. A copy of the letter of transmittal was sent to 1st Aviation Brigade by registered mail.

(l) X+38 - Last secret documents were destroyed. Classified documents register was closed out.

(m) X+40 - Final security checks of Camp Holloway were completed. Installation was turned over to the ARVN.

(n) X+41 - Classified document register was turned over to 1st Aviation Brigade.

d. Operations and Training.

(1) Flight Operations: Flying hours and performance figures for the 17th CAG are listed in TAB D.

(2) Installation Defense procedures for the four bases under the control of the 17th CAG were as follows:

(a) Camp Holloway: (17th CAG HQ's)

1 The Camp Holloway perimeter was 3.5 miles in length. Thirty observation towers were situated around the perimeter which was illuminated by flood-lights during the hours of darkness. There were 3-4 fighting positions between each tower and these were manned during period of 100% alert.

2 Each tower had land line communication to the Installation Defense Coordination Center. Six command towers, equally spaced around the perimeter have radio contact with IDCC. Interpreters were present in IDCC to facilitate control and the roving commander of the relief in 1/4 ton vehicle was accompanied by an interpreter.

3 All towers were manned with a minimum of three personnel during the hours of darkness. This number was increased to four during other than normal alert status. Prior to X-day twenty-six towers were manned with Nung guards, and six by US personnel. Local Nationals were not permitted to fire upon or otherwise engage penetrators except as authorized by regulation.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

4 Triple concertina and double apron wire served as the nucleus of the perimeter defense. Trip flares were located throughout the perimeter and selected sectors had antipersonnel mines. Claymore mines were installed throughout the entire perimeter. One third of the perimeter had pressure sensitive detectors installed outside the wire and these were monitored (aurally and visually) in one of the US manned towers. This sensor field was gradually being expanded in width and depth. In addition two AN/PPS-5 radars were installed on towers and used to detect movement within the area of coverage. A US manned mortar position was located at the eastern end of the compound. Infantry personnel assigned to the Air Cavalry Troop manned this position and had 3 - 81mm and 2 - 60mm mortars. Defensive concentrations were registered around the perimeter. The mortar section responded with observed fire against suspected or known enemy attempts to penetrate the defensive wire after ARVN clearance to fire was obtained by IDCC personnel.

5 Each day at first light a low-level sweep was made by helicopter of the wire and of the terrain extending 3000 meters from the perimeter. During the hours of darkness a UH-1H equipped with a XENON searchlight and two miniguns was launched on a random basis to provide aerial surveillance of Camp Holloway, Pleiku Air Base, and the rocket boxes. Average hours flown by this aircraft each night was two to three. Two AH-1G's were maintained on a 5 minute standby status and responded as required by tactical developments in the Pleiku area.

6 During this time period, 6 bunkers were re-built, over 500 claymore pits were built IAW USARV standards and 40 new fighting positions were constructed. In addition to this, much of the tall grass, both inside and outside of the perimeter, was burned. Due to the lack of personnel, much of this was accomplished by daily laborers under US supervision.

(b) An Son (Eagle Bn):

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

1 The perimeter security for Lane Army Helicopter was provided by 9th Company, 3rd Bn., 26th Regt., Capitol ROK Infantry Division. The 9th Company manned 28 towers and as many bunkers as possible depending on the number of troops they were required to provide in support of combat operations.

2 LAH had an inner circumference of 2.4 statute miles. Defensive positions located around the perimeter included 29 guard towers, 53 bunkers, and 72 fighting positions. The perimeter was illuminated by flood lights during the hours of darkness. A flareship was on fifteen minute strip standby during normal conditions and was on a five minute standby during alert conditions.

3 There were between two and four belts of triple concertina and double-apron wire surrounding the perimeter of LAH. Numerous trip flares were located throughout the perimeter barrier. There were 762 M18A1 claymore mines around the perimeter. There were 18 operational sensor units. The sensor bunker on the perimeter was manned by US personnel. These individuals were equipped with starlight scopes and had land-line communications with ECAB TOC.

4 Fire support for LAH was obtained through the use of organic aircraft, 9th ROK Company 81mm mortars, and 105mm and 155mm artillery support from the 628th ROK Artillery Bn. The 129th AHC provided one light fire team on 15 minute strip standby during normal conditions.

5 Each night a last light low-level VR was made of the immediate area out to 4,000 meters in certain directions. During the hours of darkness, a UH-1H equipped with a XENON searchlight and two M-60's was launched on a random basis to provide perimeter aerial surveillance.

(c) Camp Worthington Ninh Hoa (60th AHC):

1 Security was provided by personnel from the 9th ROK Division. ROK forces utilized 24 towers, 88 crew served weapons positions, 527 one-man positions, and 6 observation posts to conduct their defense.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

2 The perimeter was 6.2 miles in circumference, and was illuminated by 505 floodlights. Artillery support was provided by 2 batteries located within the confines of Camp Worthington. Fire power was provided by 4 105mm howitzers, and 4 155mm howitzers. Additional artillery was located outside the perimeter, and consists of 6 105mm howitzers.

3 A ready reaction force consisted of one rifle company with APC's for mobility was available for perimeter defense, if required, ARVN forces available consisted of one infantry battalion, 3 infantry companies, and 44 RF/PF platoons dispersed throughout the local 15 KM area.

(d) Nha Trang Airbase/Camp McDermott (201st and 604th):

1 The 201st Avn Co. flight line was not separated by any barriers from the remainder of the Air Base. A fence approximately ten feet high, topped with concertina wire, surrounded the 604th Trans Co. work area with the exception of the ramp on the north side.

2 During daylight hours, security for the 201st Avn Co work area was provided by approximately 100 US personnel working in the area. Security during daylight hours for the 604th Trans Co. working area was provided by four NUNG guards and approximately 50 US military personnel.

3 Security for the 201st Avn Co. area between 1800 and 0600 was provided by 12 US guards, a three man roving patrol (two US personnel and one Vietnamese QC) and an NCOIC. Four walking guards and the roving patrol observed the entire area. At the beginning of November, 15 NUNG guards were hired to supplement existing security measures.

4 Security for the 604th Trans Co. area between 1800 and 0600 was provided by six US guards, 13 personnel working in the area and 21 NUNG guards. Two US personnel and two NUNG guards controlled access through the two gates to the 604th area during the hours of darkness. The remainder of the US personnel and NUNG guards were stationed at various positions throughout the area.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

5 As discussed in the report of the previous period, neither the 201st Avn Co. ramp or the 604th Trans Co. ramp had sufficient lighting. Some light was provided in the 201st area by four lamps near the hangar and residual light from the sheds. The majority of the light in the 604th area was a result of the open sheds. Additional lighting for both units was requested, but due to pending deactivation no action was ever taken.

(3) Unit Movement: NONE

(4) Unit Mission Changes: NONE

(5) Unit Gains: NONE

(6) Unit Losses: NONE

(7) Significant Operations: During this reporting period the 17th CAG was not involved in any major operations. TAB E outlines a summary of individual unit operations.

(8) Training:

(a) With the decrease in enemy activity in the MR during the reporting period, the Group was able to once again devote an appropriate amount of time to training, to include instrument training as well as normal standardization rides. The 30 day extension of required standardization rides which was noted during the last reporting period was rescinded in view of the increased availability of aircraft.

(b) In an effort to continually upgrade IP/SIP standards, frequent visits of 1st Aviation Brigade SIP's were solicited. Additionally, a USARV standardization board meeting was held in mid-January, continuing a practice started in October 1972. Seventeen IP's and SIP's attended.

(c) Training in nap-of-the-earth techniques, initiated during the previous reporting period, were continued with favorable results. Classes were given at the unit level on techniques of nap of the earth flying and low level navigation. Additionally, each 90 day standardization ride included a check of these skills.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(d) Each unit was required to hold an orientation briefing for each newly arrived aviator. The briefing covered a wide range of subjects including the unit missions, unit operations, maintenance, safety, standardization, enemy situation, and any other subject which would enable the aviator to function safely and effectively in his new environment.

(e) Unit training was conducted in arms familiarization. Each unit familiarized with all weapons organic to the unit on a 90 day basis.

POST X-DAY

(9) Flight Operations: Flying hours and performance figures for the deactivation period are listed in TAB D.

(10) Installation Defense Procedures during this period were as follows:

(a) Camp Holloway:

1 The installation defenses remained unchanged until X+10 with the exception that the first and last light VR of the perimeter was discontinued on X-day. Additionally, operational control of the UH-1H gun/light ship (Nighthawk), and the AH-1G light fire team was shifted from the Installation Defense Coordination Center (IDCC), to the Group Operations Center (GOC).

2 On X+10, the pressure sensitive detectors installed in one third of the perimeter were no longer manned due to personnel shortages. These were turned over to ARVN in place and operational on X+13. Additionally on X+13, the radio link sensors were retrieved from the field by an air lifted patrol from the sensor section, and turned in to H/17th CAV supply.

3 On X+11, all AH-1G's which had provided aerial fire support were turned in for retrograde.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

4 At X+20 the two AN/PPS-5 radars located in bunkers 13 and 17 were turned in to H Troop 17th CAV. Also, on X+20, the mortar section of H Troop, 17th CAV was stooddown and the equipment turned in. This left Camp Holloway without organic indirect support fire power although artillery was still available through ARVN.

5 At X+22 all bunkers were manned with NUNG guards. This was due to the reduction in forces of US units at Holloway. To help in the security of the perimeter, two 1/4 ton trucks with two US sergeants and one NUNG interpreter each patrolled the bunker line continuously at night. These two vehicles, as well as the OG's vehicle, had radio contact with IDCC at all times. Along with bunker guards, the security police guarded the main gate 24 hours a day. During the standdown, the SP's increased searching of vehicles and individuals for stolen property and contraband items.

6 On X+24 those personnel from H Troop, 17th CAV needed to maintain IDCC were transferred to ~~MHC~~ 17th CAG. These included twelve security police, three radio operators, six sergeants of the guard, two NUNG supervisory personnel, one E-7 platoon sergeant, and two E-6 section leaders. These personnel, under the supervision of three officers, stooddown the security operations of Camp Holloway on X+40.

7 On X+25, all crewserved weapons, and M-79 grenade launchers were turned in. Perimeter guards were armed with M-16's only after this date.

8 On X+34, all tactical (field) telephones were removed and turned in. This removed the land line communication link between the perimeter and the IDCC. The six command towers, equally spaced around the perimeter, were provided with radios for contact with the IDCC. Interpreters were present in the IDCC 24 hours a day to help facilitate command and control.

9 The Camp Holloway minefields were turned over to the ARVN on X+39. It was found that incomplete and inadequate records had been kept and that four areas suspected of containing mines were located on Camp Holloway. These areas

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

were recorded and marked according to regulation and were turned over to ARVN as suspected mine fields. The claymore mines which were installed along the perimeter and numbered over 500 were turned over to ARVN in place and operational.

10 Camp Holloway was turned over to ARVN on X+40, and all US personnel evacuated.

(b) Lane-An Son Installation: Installation defense at An Son changed very little during the post X-day period. The 9th Co., 3rd BN., 26th Regt., Capitol ROK Infantry Division continued to man the perimeter during the entire period until closeout of An Son. On X+1, the flare ship was no longer on standby during the hours of darkness. Fire support for Lane after X+2 was provided by the organic mortars of the 9th ROK Company. The 129th AHC provided one light fire team on 15 minutes stand by from X-day through X+11. There were no low level VR's of the perimeter made after X-day. The 18 sensor units were turned over in place to the ARVN on X+31. The 9th ROK Co. was relieved of perimeter defense on X+31 when the installation closed.

(c) Camp Worthington: All defenses remained the same with the exception that the unit's AH-1G's were turned in on X+2 and were replaced with two UH-1H's armed with mini-gun systems. These aircraft were on 5 minute strip alert during the hours of darkness. All American personnel were removed from Camp Worthington on X+9.

(d) Camp McDermott: Defenses at Camp McDermott were not changed except that as the number of American personnel decreased, additional NUNG guards were hired to replace them. On X+8, the two armed UH-1H's moved from Ninh Hoa to Nha Trang for base defense. These aircraft were maintained on strip alert through X+11. 60th AHC, upon its move to Nha Trang, occupied the Tish Compound on Camp McDermott. This posed no increased requirement for base security. On X+43, the 604th TC and 201st CAC were relocated to a compound within Camp McDermott to provide increased security. By this date all guard posts were manned by NUNGS.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

- (11) Unit Movement:
 - (a) X+8 - 60th AHC moved from Ninh Hoa to Nha Trang.
 - (b) X+31 - 129th AHC moved from An Son to Pleiku. 180th ASHC moved from An Son to Nha Trang.
 - (c) X+40 - HQs, 17th CAG moved from Pleiku to Nha Trang.
- (12) Unit Mission Changes: None
- (13) Unit Gains: None
- (14) Unit Deactivations:
 - (a) X+28 - H Troop, 17th CAV and H Troop, 10th CAV.
 - (b) X+35 - 180th ASHC.
 - (c) X+37 - 129th AHC, and 60th AHC.
 - (d) X+40 - HHC, 17th CAG, 57th AHC, 604th Trans Co.
 - (e) X+56 - 201st CAC.
- (15) Significant Operations: There were no significant aviation operations during the post X-day period. TAB E outlines individual unit operations.
- (16) Training: As of X-day all training ceased. All 90-day standardization rides were waived, and waivers for semi-annual minimums were granted to key personnel who could not fly as a result of standdown activities. Also, waivers were granted to personnel who did not have a current stand-down instrument ticket.

e. Logistics.

- (1) General.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(a) During the reporting period great difficulty was experienced in receiving and maintaining adequate supply stock in all classes of supply. This in turn greatly hampered the units in the performance of their mission. This shortage was due to supply procedures which had been implemented in October in anticipation of a cease fire agreement. All existing stock in excess of a 45 day supply were turned in for retrograde. Further, no demands were submitted in anticipation of early unit deactivations. The result was a general lack of all classes of supply with a delay of 90-120 days between requisition and receipt of 02, 05, 06, and 12 priority orders.

(b) ECAB at An Son faced an additional problem. Due to the fact ECAB was a Provisional Battalion, the S-4 had no authority to requisition parts and supplies. Therefore each unit requisitioned replenishment of supplies directly from Group. This method did not provide a supply "cushion" or stockpile at the local level, and added additional time to the time between requisition and receipt.

(2) Class II and V.

(a) During this reporting period ARVN was tasked to supply Class III and V products through letter agreement for specific quantities. An inadequate supply of Class V and some items of Class III existed from 1 Nov 72, through approximately 15 Jan 73. Subject letters of agreement were not recognized at VNAF/ARVN ASP's and depots until shortly before the end of this reporting period. Subject letters of agreement were approved by VNAF higher headquarters approximately 5 Jan 73.

(b) During this reporting period approximately 620,000 gallons of fuel (JP4) were issued to aircraft from Camp Holloway POL Point.

(c) Ammunition expenditures are listed at TAB G.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

POST X-DAY

(3) Supply.

(a) Due to the rapid phasedown, there was no real need for continued logistical support. Existing supplies were more than sufficient to sustain operations during the standdown period. Class I support was adequate in all areas.

(b) Some confusion was caused in some units within the Group as a result of new supply personnel. Due to the numerous DEROS's in December and January, there were several new property book officers. As a result, some units were not prepared to begin necessary post X-day operations.

(c) Ammunition turn in was executed in a smooth manner with no apparent problems. 17th Group turned in more than 2,200,000 rounds of various caliber ammunition.

(4) Mess activities were closed as indicated below. The use of "C" rations was held to a minimum, with only the 129th mess serving four meals of "C" rations prior to closeout of Lane Installation. This was necessitated by the one day extension of the closeout date. HHC mess supported Camp Holloway until base closure. The 201st mess was closed on X+29 and operation of a consolidated mess was assumed by Nha Trang Installation.

<u>CLOSURE DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>UNIT CONSOLIDATED WITH</u>
X+8	60th AHC	Moved to Nha Trang
X+8	H/10th CAV	129th AHC
X+17	H/17th CAV	HHC, 17th Gp
X+21	180th ASHC	129th AHC
X+29	201st CAC	Nha Trang Installation
X+30	129th AHC	Closed
X+30	57th AHC	HHC, 17th Gp
X+40	HHC, 17th Gp	Closed

NOTE: 604th Trans had consolidated with 201st prior to X-day.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(5) Aircraft refueling points operated by the 17th CAG were phased out as noted below. The Ninh Hoa refueling point was terminated 3 days early due to fuel shortage. Aircraft operating in that area refueled at Nha Trang Air Base. An Son POL point was closed and turned over to PA&E who became responsible for the recovery of fuel prior to US evacuation. Refueling in the An Son area was diverted to Phu Cat or Qui Nhon. The POL point at Camp Holloway closed on X+31 and all refueling was accomplished at the VNAF mini-port on Pleiku Air Base.

<u>CLOSURE DATE</u>	<u>FACILITY</u>	<u>DISPOSITION</u>
X+8	Ninh Hoa	Transferred to ARVN who physically removed the facility.
X+29	An Son	Transferred to PA&E.
X+31	Holloway	Transferred to ARVN.

(6) On X+37 one stake and platform trailer full of helicopter rotor blades, rocket tubes, skids and other aircraft wreckage was shipped to the Qui Nhon Property Disposal Yard.

(7) Equipment Retrograde/Turnover.

(a) On X-day all units were alerted and began their pre-planned standdown operation in the areas of PC&S and TOE property. Transportation became an immediate problem. H/17th CAV, H/10th CAV, and the 60th AHC started immediate turn in of ammunition, retrograde of US titled equipment, and physical turnover of ARVN titled equipment. The retrograde and turnover of equipment was eased by the already reduced amount of equipment on hand due to approved droppage of non-mission essential equipment. All other units turned in weapons and ammunition commensurate to unit strength. Due to aviation commitments to the ROK Army, the 60th AHC was informed to move to Nha Trang by X+9 and remain operational instead of standing down as planned by X+15. Transportation requirements were received from H/17th CAV for retrograde shopsets, the Group Signal Officer for retrograde of avionics shelters (oversized, air evacuation required), and the 604th FSP for oversized parts pallets, and other items needing to

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

to be sent to Nha Trang from Pleiku. H/17th CAV and H/10th CAV transferred their remaining UH-1H's to 57th AHC and 129th AHC respectively for the purpose of clearing their property books. Sealand vans were requested for land shipment of retrograde items to Nha Trang from Pleiku. ECAB S4 made all requests for transportation of retrograde material to Nha Trang from An Son. All units prepared for the turnover of PC&S property "as is/where is". Contact was made with each area VNAF/ARVN liaison officer to coordinate equipment transfer. CTA50-901 turn in was also started. On X-day the Group's property books reflected that only 30% of the total authorized TOE items were on hand. Operations in the Keystone Aircraft Processing Point were greatly increased after X-day. An SOP giving complete instructions on proper disposition of equipment to KAPP was distributed to all units in 17th CAG. Problems arose when units failed to follow this SOP. Some units continually attempted to turn in dirty, untagged equipment, and shortage lists were often missing or incomplete. One unit attempted to have 604th to sign for shop sets that had not arrived at the KAPP yard.

(b) X+1 thru X+15. On X+1 Sealand van transportation for retrograde items was not available at Pleiku because enemy activity had closed the roads. Therefore An Son (ECAB) received Sealand vans for retrograde cargo to Nha Trang which were to be sent to Pleiku. A conex consolidation yard was established for Camp Holloway, and a yard for conex consolidation was established at An Son also. A free turn in point for aviation and non-aviation related equipment was established, excluding PC&S property. Also on X+1, word was received that all armament and related equipment must be sent via air to Saigon. Wooden boxes the size of Air Force pallets were constructed for the shipment of rocket pods. On X-day seventy-five 17th CAG aircraft were slotted for transfer to VNAF with XM-23 armament systems. Word was received on X+3 not to retrograde XM-23 system ammunition boxes but to demilitarize and PDO them. On X+3 H/17th CAV was informed to prepare their shopsets for organic CH-47 airlift to Nha Trang due to Sealand shortage. LSA dining facility was closed and approximately 25 military and 10 civilian personnel subsisted with HHC, 17th Gp mess. Ten CPO kitchen police were transferred to HHC, 17th Gp mess. An audit schedule was issued for the property books of the 17th Gp, to coincide with the issued Bde audit schedule. On X+5, 5th ALC was requested to contact the 60th AHC to coordinate PC&S property, inventory and EOD of ammo at Ninh Hoa.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

At that time a problem arose. The ARVN, contrary to previous agreement, decided that all property at Ninh Hoa would be turned in at ARVN depots rather than on station "as is/where is". This was accomplished, but not without extra effort on the part of the unit. At the FSP in Pleiku, it was decided to open a "free turn-in" point to prevent the necessity of retrieving aircraft peculiar items from the dump. A requirement to clean, tag and preserve the items was established at first, but proved to defeat the purpose of the free turn-in point, so this requirement was later dropped. Problems were later encountered as units would drop off their junk next to the warehouse of the FSP after duty hours. As the 247th Med Det turned in their PLL on X+7, it was shipped to Phan Thiet to support the RJMC there. Later, shelves, lumber, plywood, and nails were also sent to aid in construction of support facilities there. The outshipment of all OH-6A's in MR II via Sealand vans was delayed due to non-availability of cargo tie-down straps. The straps had been on requisition since October 1972, they finally arrived in Saigon on X+4. Shipments began as soon as the tie-down straps arrived at the unit, and by X+9 all 16 OH-6A's were loaded and ready for shipment. Also during this period, air shipment was requested for retrograde of all oversized loads. Property records reflected 11% of authorized TOE equipment on hand at X+15.

(c) X+16 thru X+30. Units continued their drawdown during this period. Disposition instructions from Saigon on KAPP equipment was very late in arriving, causing a backlog of equipment and loaded vans in the 604th maintenance area. Disposition instructions were finally received on X+24 and X+25.

(d) X+31 thru X+45: The last mess hall was closed (HHC) and all final mess hall quarterly audits were turned in to Brigade. The 201st property books were also sent to Brigade. These were the last property books remaining in Group. All KAPP equipment was shipped by X+39 and the KAPP yard closed on the same day. All shipments of ASL lines through Tech Supply were finished by X+40. An ASL of 600 UH-1 lines was retained for the NHA maintenance team that remained at the 604th maintenance area to X+59, in support of ICCS and RJMC aviation detachments.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(e) The retrograde and turn-in of avionics equipment from MR II after X-day was a huge accomplishment. To assist in the inspecting and shipment of avionics equipment, a TI from the AVEL section was sent to Pleiku for a ten day period. He was particularly valuable in the handling of storage shelters and air traffic control towers. Problems were encountered in determining whether or not some of the electronic equipment was complete, and determining the expendability of missing components. These problems could have been avoided had the units obtained the proper manuals for the equipment. Non-availability of tie-down straps, cargo nets, and retrograde material created some problems in shipping avionics equipment from Pleiku. From X-day to X+38, a total of \$2,357,430.00 in avionics equipment was processed and shipped to Sacramento Army Depot through the AVEL section. Five boxes of float and end items plus one box of test equipment remained to be sent to SAD as of X+39, and shipments were completed by X+41.

(8) Transfer of Bases, Installed Property and Equipment, and Real Property.

(a) An Son - All transfer of real property was delayed until X+31 due to the reluctance of the incoming ARVN unit to sign for property until they could physically take possession. The joint inventory was conducted on X+29 and X+31. The installation was physically transferred on X+31. The actual transfer was conducted relatively efficiently with elements of the 22nd ARVN Division occupying vacated portions of the installation commencing on X+29.

(b) Ninh Hoa

(1) On X-day, the decision was made to redeploy the unit from Ninh Hoa to Tich Compound, Nha Trang. This necessitated the requirement to rapidly turn-in all excess TO&E property and the transport all mission-essential TO&E property to the new location at Nha Trang. Simultaneous coordination was effected on X-day to allow the 5th ALC (ARVN) to sign for post, camp, and the unit on its impending move. Arrangements were made for this property to be transferred on X+8. The 5th ALC stated they would bring necessary personnel and vehicles to Ninh Hoa to load PCS property and remove it as fast as it was signed for.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(2) On X+8, the 5th ALC arrived at Ninh Hoa with 25-2-1/2 ton vehicles, and began the task of counting, signing for, and on-loading the PC&S property. At this time, the personnel of the 5th ALC began to move from room to room, loading the property, and commenced stripping the walls and ceilings of plywood, light fixtures, fans, and anything else they apparently desired. When this was discovered and brought to the attention of their superiors, very little corrective action was taken by the OIC, 5th ALC, to prevent further occurrences as the vandalism and destruction continued. The 60th AHC provided a security force to remain at Ninh Hoa to try to prevent further destruction, but it met with little success.

(3) Real property transferred included approximately 50 wooden structures. They were turned over and signed for by PA&E on X+11. Despite the fact that the installed property had been stolen from many of the structures, the turn over to PA&E went without incident. The unit was officially cleared of the responsibility for Camp Worthington (Ninh Hoa) on X+11.

(c) Camp Holloway

(1) A 100% inventory of real property was conducted at Camp Holloway and was finished on 4 December 1972. The ARVN signed for all properties in the Pleiku area except Camp Holloway since it was considered a major installation. This refusal to sign the joint inventory necessitated a repeat inventory at the time Camp Holloway was transferred to ARVN.

(2) Post police and pickup of over ten years residue of war materials cannot be described in terms to fully explain the task. An average of 250 daily hire Montagnard personnel and seven trucks were used over a three week period. Approximately 500 acres of eight foot high elephant grass was burned exposing materials and scrap which had been obscured for many years. All of the military property was turned into a "free" turn in point. EOD was taken to the ARVN EOD point. Trash was burned in the sanitary fill and scrap metal was hauled off post by scrap dealers. Based on an average of 30 truckloads at 2 tons each for 20 days it is estimated that somewhere between 1000 and 1500 tons of trash were picked up and cleaned from the compound. Approximately 300 CONEX containers were picked up and turned into a central collection point.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(3) As units cleared their areas, the PC&S property was turned over to the various ARVN gaining units. However, since the ARVN units did not trust one another, as this property was signed over, it was removed from the installation. As a result, there were numerous ARVN personnel on the compound from X+30 on. These personnel did much damage to buildings by stripping them of light fixtures, plywood walls and plumbing.

(4) Permission had been received early in the deactivation period to sign over facilities to the local PA&E real property section as these areas were cleared. During the period that elapsed before signing the installation over to the ARVN, PA&E local national personnel stripped many of the buildings of PC&S property, as well as dismantling the buildings for materials. Actual sign over of the installation on X+40 was a very drawn out affair, as the ARVN's who signed for the installation were very upset by the looting which had occurred. However, the sign over finally took place late in the afternoon of X+40.

F. SIGNAL

(1) During this reporting period, as during the previous period, Camp Holloway was plagued with not having an adequate dial telephone system. On 31 October 1972, the reconstruction of the cable system leading to Camp Holloway was declared completed by ARVN signal personnel. It was hoped that this would greatly enhance the possibility that Camp Holloway would have reliable and complete access to the dial telephone system. To insure that the VNAF were aware of Group telephone requirements, complete Telephone Service Requests (TSR's) were submitted on 10 July, 7 August and 28 September. Because the old cable system was at its maximum capacity, the VNAF did not produce any work orders on the additional telephone requests. It was anticipated that once the new cable system was completed that the VNAF would complete the work orders in order that additional phones at Camp Holloway could be installed. However, the VNAF professed no knowledge of the previous requests so an additional request was submitted to SRAC on 31 October. By 2 November, no work orders for the ARVN had been produced by the VNAF. SRAC was contacted and the Group Signal Officer was informed that SRAC had not yet delivered the TSR to the

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

VNAF but that it would be done that same afternoon. By 9 November, the ARVN had still not received any work orders from the VNAF. In response to several telephone conversations and a personal visit, the US VNAF advisor said that he would use his influence to get the VNAF to write up the work orders. On 16 November, the Group Signal Officer received a call from a VNAF Warrant Officer. He stated that he was personally typing up the work orders but that all additional phones would have to be Class C phones, in that Camp Holloway had exceeded its limit of 15 percent Class A telephones. On 20 November, the ARVN picked up the work orders from the VNAF for the additional dial telephones and began to locate good cable pairs on the 03 Cable. On 21 November the ARVN and FEC personnel began installing new phones. By 4 December, 15 additional phones were installed on Camp Holloway. Although the ARVN had completed only 50 percent of the work request, no additional phones have been installed by the ARVN since that date. Because the ARVN appeared to have no intentions of completing the work orders, the 17th CAG Signal Section personally installed three critical phones. This was accomplished through the cooperation of the VNAF who operate the DTE. At this time, the revamped cable system appeared to be more reliable than the old system. Camp Holloway was experiencing a daily outage rate of only three percent and the ARVN were responsive in repairing the outages. By 5 January the outage rate began to gradually increase. This was due primarily to the fact that the ARVN ceased to repair the phones as they became inoperative. On 12 January, a letter was sent to SRAC requesting that they assist the Camp Holloway subscribers in restoring telephone outages. This request was forwarded to Pleiku DCO (VNAF) and work orders were written up on the outages. The ARVN picked up the work orders and returned them to DCO as "repaired", however, the phones were still inoperative. By 21 January, the outage rate was 22 percent. On 22 January, ARVN Signal personnel arrived at Camp Holloway to work on the outages. They refused to show their ID Cards to the gate guards and were not permitted to enter the compound. Since that day, they have not returned to Camp Holloway to work.

(2) In addition to local telephone problems, availability of long distance lines was reduced during this reporting period. Without prior notification, the trunks between

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After-Action Report.

Pleiku and Saigon were reduced from 20 lines to 9 lines. To confuse matters even more, the prefixes for Pleiku and Qui Nhon were changed without first notifying anyone. Consequently, 1st Aviation Brigade had difficulty in communicating with 17th CAG until the change had been discovered. Because of the extreme difficulty in obtaining a long distance line between Pleiku and Saigon, the HF Admin radio net between 17th CAG headquarters and Brigade headquarters was utilized by all staff sections. This was the only fast and reliable means of communications between the two headquarters.

(3) Although the elements of 17th CAG at Lane AHP did not have direct access to the dial system, FEC personnel at that location did an outstanding job. At Lane, FEC operated and maintained a very reliable common battery telephone system utilizing an AN/MTC-1. Lane AHP encountered considerable problems with the operators of the Qui Nhon DTE. Lane was totally dependent on Qui Nhon DTE for long distance lines. For no apparent reason, the Qui Nhon operators intermittently refused to accept calls from Lane. This problem was usually solved by forwarding this information to the SRAC G-6 who, in turn, informed his Vietnamese counterpart.

(4) On 17 December, the Group Signal Section began revamping the tactical telephone system on Camp Holloway, particularly in the headquarters area. Wherever possible, wires were replaced with cable and excess wires and cables were removed. The result has been a more reliable tactical phone system. The tactical phone system at Camp Holloway was an absolute necessity because of the inadequate and unreliable dial system. During the month of January, the wiremen were particularly busy replacing wires and cables that had been inadvertently burned by personnel trying to burn off the grassy areas of the compound. The Signal Section fared well on the pre-AGI conducted by Brigade. No shortcomings were found in either COMSEC or Signal.

(5) Communications Security improved somewhat during the reporting period. To enhance security awareness by all telephone subscribers in MR II, SRAC directed that all individuals answering a telephone must state "This is not a secure line." In addition, a secure voice capability was established between SRAC, CTOC, and 17th GOC.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(6) The present avionics configuration within 17th CAG consists of direct support consolidated facilities at An Son and Camp Holloway, a direct support shop at Nihn Hoa, and a general support activity at Nha Trang. Under this configuration, responsive and timely avionics support was provided to all elements of 17th CAG.

(7) The 17th Aviation Group continued to maintain aviation communications facilities at Camp Holloway (344th ADD), An Son-Qui Nhon (318th ADD), and Ninh Hoa-Nha Trang-Phan Thiet (339th ADD). These units maintained airfield and enroute flight following facilities.

POST X-DAY

(8) During the deactivation period, the dial telephone system on Camp Holloway continued to be unreliable. Initially, the number of common trunk circuits between Pleiku and Saigon was reduced from nine to two. RJMC/ICCS teams in the Pleiku area received the other seven. This made communications between Brigade and 17th CAG Headquarters extremely difficult. On X+22, Camp Holloway experienced a major dial telephone outage. Of the 62 phones on Camp Holloway, only twelve remained operational. Within 17th CAG Headquarters, only six were operational. Consequently, the tactical phone system on Camp Holloway with Eagle Switch provided the only means of reliable local communications. The only means of reliable long distance communications was the Brigade HF voice radio net. The cause of the telephone outage at Camp Holloway was attributed to a 180 foot length of the 03 Cable that was burned on Pleiku Air Base. Since the source of the outage was on the air base, it became VNAF responsibility to repair it with the ARVN furnishing the material. On X+26 the VNAF began to replace the burned section of cable. Initially, this resulted in a 100 percent outage on Camp Holloway, however, six phones were operational within four hours. On X+27, the splicing had been completed and there were 25 working telephones on Camp Holloway. Since many of the lines had been shorted out by the burning, their modules had been pulled at DCO to keep from burning up the equipment. After the splicing was completed, VNAF began to reinsert the modules. By X+29, 30 phones were operational. DCO stated that the strap wires for the other phones had been lost.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

In order that Eagle Switch could cease operation and the equipment be turned in, the Signal Section installed five new phones and restored five phones so that all activities on Camp Holloway would have access to the dial system. On X+30 at 2300 hours, Eagle Switch closed down. On X+34 all bunker line tactical phones were collected and turned in to LSA Pleiku. This action was necessary because the LSA Pleiku retrograde facility closed on X+35. Radios were placed on the bunker line for communications. All radios were transferred to the ARVN and all dial phones were returned to the VNAF upon closure of Camp Holloway.

(9) By X+10, all COMSEC equipment held by 17th CAG was consolidated for turn in. 17th Group no longer had a secure voice capability, however, it was determined that this capability was no longer required. On X+13, the COMSEC equipment was transported to Saigon where it entered the Armed Forces Courier System. ARFCOS was responsible for transporting this equipment to Lexington COMSEC Depot. Because of the time delay involved in this process, the COMSEC Custodian will not receive his clearance until after he reaches his next duty station.

(10) The MARS Station at Camp Holloway ceased operation on X+12. On that same day, the equipment was shipped to Saigon for turn in. On X+3, the MARS Station at An Son closed and the equipment was turned in to Saigon by X+12.

(11) Avionics

(a) Brigade Avionics directed that all avionics assets be retrograded to Sacramento Army Depot or Lexington Army Depot. None of these items could be transferred to VNAF or ARVN. In addition, strict property accountability was in force at all times. 604th Avionics Maintenance Facility (AVEL) in Nha Trang was responsible for conducting a technical inspection, packing and shipping of all avionics assets held by 17th CAG. Many of these avionics items were bulky, such as Avionics Shop Shelters and the various Air Traffic Control Facilities. It was anticipated that the transportation of these items from Camp Holloway and An Son to Nha Trang would be a major problem. However, this was not the case. Smaller Avionics items, such as float, repair parts and test equipment, could be transported to Nha Trang utilizing aircraft organic to the 17th CAG.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

At An Son, the transportation problem was solved by utilizing Sealand vans. Because the roads to Pleiku were not open, the Sealand vans originally designated for Pleiku were diverted and utilized by elements of the 17th CAG at An Son. The only method of transporting the bulky avionics items out of Camp Holloway was by utilizing Air Force transportation assets, such as C-130s. To avoid the time delay involved in packing and shipping these items from Camp Holloway, and unpacking, inspecting, repacking and shipping these same items out of Nha Trang, 604th AVEL sent a Technical Inspector to Camp Holloway. Under his supervision, all bulky items received a technical inspection and were packed and shipped directly to Sacramento Army Depot from the Pleiku Air Base. This operation was highly successful. Over a six day period, X+4 to X+10, eleven Avionics Shop Shelters, a TSQ-71A, a TSC-61 and an FSQ-75 were shipped directly from Pleiku and the owning units received immediate turn in credit. This operation greatly eased the congestion at 604th AVEL and facilitated the flow of avionics assets out of country. Units located at Nihn Hoa and Nha Trang experienced no transportation problems because of their close proximity to 604th AVEL. An Avionics Shop Shelter located at Phan Thiet was slung to the 388th TC in Saigon by a CH-47 that was being retrograded.

(b) By X+15, the following avionics assets at each 17th CAG locations were being processed by 604th AVEL in Nha Trang or all actions had been completed.

PLEIKU (H/17, 57th 344th)

1. 6 ea ASM-146 Avionics Shop Shelters
2. 5 ea ASM-147 Avionics Shop Shelters
3. 1 ea TSC-63 Pleiku Radio
4. 1 ea TSQ-71A Holloway GCA
5. 1 ea FSQ-75 Holloway Tower
6. 2 ea TRN-25 NDB
7. All avionics test equipment

AN SON (129th 180th, 318th)

1. 2 ea ASM-147 Avionics Shop Shelters
2. 3 ea ASM-146 Avionics Shop Shelters
3. 1 ea TSC-61 Qui Nhon Radio
4. 1 ea FSQ-75 Lane Tower
5. All avionics test equipment (minus three pieces)

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

NHA TRANG (60th, 201st, 339th)

1. 1 ea ASM-147 Avionics Shop Shelters
2. 2 ea ASM-146 Avionics Shop Shelters
3. 1 ea TSQ-70A Ninh Hoa Tower
4. 1 ea TRN-25 NDB
5. All avionics test equipment

By X+15, the following items had not been processed through 604th AVEL for retrograde.

PLEIKU (H/17, 57th, 344th)

1. 1 ea TSQ-70A Holloway Tower
2. Avionics float

AN SON (129th 180th, 318th)

1. 3 ea pieces of test equipment
2. Avionics float

NHA TRANG (60th, 201st, 339th)

1. 1 ea TSQ-70A Nha Trang Radio

On X+19, the TSQ-70A, Holloway Tower, was deactivated and was turned in to 388th AVEL. On X+22, avionics support at An Son ceased and the remaining equipment was turned into 604th AVEL. On X+31, TSQ-70A, Nha Trang Radio, was deactivated and turned in to 604th. On X+38, all avionics support at Camp Holloway terminated and the float was turned in to 604th AVEL.

(c) USARV Avionics directed that all aircraft being transferred to the VNAF had to have the following avionics configuration:

- (1) KY-28 mount and control head removed.
- (2) AN/ARC-131 FM radio installed in lieu of AN/ARC-54 FM radio.
- (3) AN/ARN-82 VHF receiver removed if the aircraft also had an AN/ARC-134 installed.
- (4) Aircraft with an AN/ASC-15, Command and Control Console had to be transferred to the VNAF with the aircraft.

This was readily accomplished by the servicing avionics facilities at Pleiku, An Son and Nha Trang.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(d) During the period of standdown, avionics property accountability was outstanding. As expected, a great quantity of excess avionics equipment was turned in to 604th AVEL. The following is a breakdown on avionics assets processed through 604th AVEL as of X+34.

	<u>ACCOUNTABLE</u>	<u>FREE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>444</u>	<u>NET GAIN*</u>
	<u>+</u>	<u>TURN-IN</u>	<u>=</u>	<u>PROCESSED</u>	<u>ACTIONS</u>
Number Items	3,157	103	3,260	28	
Dollar Value	\$3,372,885	\$132,115	\$3,505,000	\$5,265	\$126,850

*NOTE: Net Gain = Free Turn in - 444 Actions. It was anticipated that the total processed figure will approach \$5,000,000 by X+45.

(12) Air Traffic Control (ATC)

(a) Prior to X-day, 17th CAG had the following ATC configuration.

<u>TYPE EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>FUNCTION</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
FSQ-75	Holloway Tower	Camp Holloway
TSQ-70A	Holloway Tower (Mob)	Camp Holloway
TSQ-71A	Holloway GCA	Camp Holloway
TRN-25	Holloway NDB	Camp Holloway
FSQ-75	Lane Tower	Lane AHP
TRN-25	Lane NDB	Lane AHP
TSC-61	Qui Nhon Radio	Qui Nhon
TSQ-70A	Ninh Hoa Tower	Ninh Hoa
TRN-25	Ninh Hoa NDB	Ninh Hoa
TSQ-70A	Nha Trang Radio	Nha Trang
ASM-146	Phan Thiet Radio	Phan Thiet

(b) By X-day, all ATC equipment that was not mission essential or was not being utilized was prepared for turn in. This included the Holloway GCA as well as all NDBs. On X+1, the FSQ-75, Holloway Tower, was deactivated and replaced by the TSQ-70A. Because of its questionable reliability, the TSC-61, Qui Nhon Radio, was deactivated on X+2. Since the

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

60th AHC was relocated from Nihn Hoa to Nha Trang, the TSQ-70A, Nihn Hoa Tower, was deactivated on X+7. On X+10, the FSQ-75, Lane Tower, was deactivated and replaced by a PRC-25. On X+13, the ASM-146 that housed Phan Thiet Radio was transported to the 388th TC in Saigon for turn in. Phan Thiet radio retained FM capability and was relocated inside the hotel. On X+19, the TSQ-70A, Holloway Tower, was deactivated and replaced by two PRC-25 FM radios. One of the PRC-25s served as Holloway Tower and the other was utilized as Pleiku Radio. Nha Trang Radio was admitted to the HF voice radio net between 17th CAG Headquarters and Brigade Headquarters. This net was utilized to pass flight following between Nha Trang and Pleiku. On X+31, the TSQ-70A, Nha Trang Radio, was deactivated. A VRC-46 FM radio was colocated with 201st Operations in Nha Trang for flight following purposes. Eagle Control in 17th CAG GOC assumed the flight following function for Pleiku.

G. AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

(1) During the reporting period, the Group consistently met all mission requirements. The backlog of deferred maintenance from the previous reporting period affected OR rates of assigned AH1G aircraft during this period. Performance of deferred maintenance during PMP's resulted in aircraft spending an abnormally long time in scheduled maintenance overall; however, OR rates were consistently above USARV/MACV SUPCOM standards, except as mentioned, while the fleet was within the USARV/MACV SUPCOM flying hour program. Many of the problem areas encountered during the previous period were resolved only to be replaced by others having an impact on maintenance operations:

(a) Lack of scheduled transportation of repair parts from Central DSSA (Saigon) to field locations (Pleiku, An Son, and Nha Trang).

(b) Prepackage POL products support discontinued.

(2) On the positive side, 604th TC operations continued to improve with a greater output of aircraft and better utilization of float (S-2) considering the requirements to perform extensive scheduled and unscheduled DS maintenance. Although peak workloads were quite heavy in terms of man-hours expended, the "smoothing out" process of 604th

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

maintenance operations enabled the unit to meet its commitment with relative ease. During the month of January, maintenance requirements noticeably decreased. This was due mainly to a sharp decrease in Group flying hours in expectation of the cease fire.

(3) Unit aircraft status, OR rates and average flying hours for the Pre X-day reporting period are listed at TABS H and I.

POST X-DAY

(4) From X-day onward, 17th CAG operational ready (OR) rates never dropped below 88%. With curtailment of missions and transfer of aircraft, OR rates steadily increased and were an average 95% after X+12. Aircraft transfers to RVNAF kept the performance of PMP's and unscheduled minor maintenance at a minimum during the period. NORS rates were minimized by the timely receipt of parts from other units and locations in MR II as well as from Central DSSA in Saigon. Due to a lack of regular air transportation, excessive downtime was experienced beginning at X-day. The use of organic CH-47 aircraft, however, solved this problem. On a weekly basis an aircraft was dispatched to Saigon to pick up accumulated repair parts and current NORS on hand. This system yielded outstanding results as an almost zero NORS rate was experienced (X-day to X+37). The assistance and cooperation of ASA was complete and parts and supplies were processed and loaded in a matter of hours after arrival of the CH-47. On several occasions it was necessary to remove serviceable parts from a retrograde aircraft. Again, the assistance and cooperation of the 388th TC (ADS) at Newport Dock was complete.

(5) Minor problems were experienced with proper execution of DA Form 444, 2765-1 and 2408-17 early in the standdown phase. Increased command emphasis at the unit level and additional clarifying instructions brought a quick resolution to these problems.

(6) Beginning X-day, NHA Inc was committed to provide organizational and direct support maintenance and supply to special aviation detachments formed as a result of the cease fire provisions as follows:

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

<u>DETACHMENT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>NO OF UH-1H</u>	<u>AUTH NHA STRENGTH</u>
RJMC III	Pleiku	6	23
ICCS	Pleiku	6	23
RJMC IV	Phan Thiet	4	23

Preparations to send a team of NHA contract personnel to Phan Thiet to support RJMC aircraft began on X+1. Much confusion evolved during this period as to who was to provide support for the RJMC team. The 17th CAG said 388th Transportation Company in Saigon would support the team at Phan Thiet, but 1st Aviation Brigade said that 604th was to support the team. The 604th supported RJMC at Phan Thiet with NHA Maintenance Personnel. Central DSSA picked up the supply support on X+4. At Pleiku, the NHA teams were combined as a single maintenance location at Camp Holloway and provided priority support to JMC and ICCS. Additional support was provided to 57th AHC, an element of 129th AHC (from X+28 until X+36), and HHC 17th CAG. Elsewhere, NHA assumed the entire aircraft maintenance task including PMD's. At the 604th TC (ADS) by X+30, NHA had assumed the entire maintenance role, organized as a reinforced KD team.

(7) Transfer of Control of Air Combatant Assets:

(a) Transfer of aircraft to RVNAF: Transfer of UH-1H helicopters was accomplished at three sites to RVNAF units: Pleiku Air Base, Phu Cat Air Base and Nha Trang Air Base. With the exception of S3 and S5 account (retrograde and crash damage) aircraft, 95% were operational ready at the time of transfer. For schedule of RVNAF transfers during Project Enhance Plus (+), see TAB K. Total numbers of UH-1H aircraft transferred at each site are as follows (as of X+37):

Pleiku AB (60th M&S Wing):	21
Phu Cat AB (61st M&S Wing):	16
Nha Trang AB (62nd Wing, 2nd Air Div):	15
604th TC (ADS) Nha Trang AB:	37
(S2, S3 and S5 Account, 62nd Wing, 2nd Air Div)	
<u>TOTAL (AS OF X+37)</u>	<u>89</u>

(b) Retrograde of Aircraft to CONUS: All OH-6A aircraft were retrograded through 604th TC (ADS) at Nha Trang on X+2 (15 each) and subsequently departed for CONUS on X+11. Starting at X+3, 32 each AH-1G plus 2 float aircraft were

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

retrograded through the 388th TC (ADS) at Newport Dock in Saigon. By X+1- all had been retrograded. At X+3, CH-47C aircraft were retrograded from Newport. Starting with 15 aircraft, CH-47's were sent in weekly increments until this type was reduced to 0 on X+35. For schedule of retrograde actions see TAB J.

(c) Intra-Group Aircraft Transfers: On X-day, all UH-1H aircraft were transferred from H/10 Cav and H/17 Cav to the 129th AHC and 57th AHC, respectively. Sixteen aircraft meeting rigid predetermined criteria, mostly 1971 UH-1H, were transferred from all units of the 17th Group to 604th TC (ADS), S2 account for painting, reconfiguration and issue as follows:

6 UH-1H to RJMC III, Pleiku.
4 UH-1H to RJMC IV, Phan Thiet.
6 UH-1H to ICCS, Pleiku.

(d) Eagle Battalion (Provisional): Aircraft transfers/ retrogrades were coordinated through AMO, ECAB with superlative results. PLL and AIMI assets were retrograded to 604th TC by X+24. RVNAF transfers at Phu Cat were accomplished with no problems encountered. Most armament subsystems were retrograded through 604th TC facilities. All necessary actions were accomplished prior to the standdown and base closure at X+31. At standdown 8 UH-1H remained in the 129th AHC and 5 CH-47C remained in the 180th ASHC.

(e) Transfer/Retrograde of Armament Subsystems: Most armament subsystems were retrograded to the 604th TC (ADS) at Nha Trang. A limited number of XM-23 subsystems were transferred with UH-1H aircraft directly to RVNAF. A total of 91 XM-23 subsystems were transferred to RVNAF. Analysis:

SUBSYSTEM	TOTAL	RECEIVING UNIT	ULTIMATE USE	COMPLETION
	SYSTEMS			DATE
XM-19	2	604th TC	KAPP	X+13
XM-23	17	604th TC	KAPP	X+26
XM-23	91	RVNAF	RVNAF	X+23
XM-24	17	604th TC	RVNAF	X+13
XM-28	32	388th TC	KAPP	X+13
XM-35	6	604th TC	KAPP	X+1

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

<u>SUBSYSTEM</u>	<u>TOTAL SYSTEMS</u>	<u>RECEIVING UNIT</u>	<u>ULTIMATE USE</u>	<u>COMPLETION DATE</u>
XM-59	4	604th TC	KAPP	X+26
XM-158	63	604th TC	KAPP	X+13
XM-159	6	604th TC	KAPP	X+1
XM-200	79	604th TC	KAPP	X+13
TOTAL	317			

(f) Retrograde of Aviation Repair Parts (PLL): All aviation repair parts including unit PLL's and AIMI assets at Forward Supply Points (Pleiku and An Son) were retrograded to the Forward Supply Point at 604th TC (ADS). Tailored 30 day level PLL's were established from assets on hand for RJMC III, IV and ICCS at their respective sites. Evacuation of repair parts was accomplished utilizing organic CH-47 aircraft and Sealand transportation (available at An Son). Disposition instructions for CH-6A, CH-47C and AH-1G repair parts were received and parts subsequently shipped from Nha Trang. UH-1H repair parts were shipped upon termination of all activities in MR II requiring U.S. UH-1H support. The 604th TC, Nha Trang FSP was scheduled for standdown at X+50.

H. AVIATION SAFETY

1. The aircraft accident rate displayed a considerable decrease for the second straight reporting period. There were a total to three accidents during this reporting period for an accident rate of 11.4 compared with 15 accidents for the previous period and an accident rate of 23.3.

2. Personnel turbulence greatly complicated maintaining the continuity of the safety program. Due again to no incoming replacements, the safety officer and his assistant both left without replacement, and the safety position was taken over by the Installation Security Officer. Though safety qualified, he was limited in the amount of time which he could devote to safety duties.

e. Accident, incident, forced landing and precautionary landing statistics appear at TAB L.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

POST X-DAY

4. During this period the aircraft safety record was extremely good. There were no accidents, only five precautionary landings, and one aircraft ground accident resulting in minor damage.

5. The ground safety record, however, showed a sharp increase in vehicle accidents with four vehicle accidents during this period. All these accidents were primarily the result of operator error. Two of the accidents resulted in 1/4 ton vehicles being rolled over, with excessive speed being the primary cause of the accident. The other two accidents involved elements of inattention. Defensive driving practices could have prevented all these accidents.

6. Statistics appear at TAB L.

4. SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED

A. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

(1) Administration

(a) Observation: Due to the type support rendered by the 17th Group, units were located throughout MR II. In most cases service units were not located within easy access of customer units. As a result a great deal of time was lost, and in many cases, greatly inferior service rendered.

(b) Evaluation: Finance and personnel records for all group personnel were maintained in Nha Trang. The majority of units supported by 604th (Nha Trang) were at Pleiku or An Son. In both cases inferior service was rendered, time was lost in trying to communicate over an extremely poor telephone system, and needless money spent on helicopter transportation of personnel and equipment between the servicing unit and the outlying units.

(c) Recommendations:

(1) That all support units be colocated with the headquarters of the units being supported, unless this is totally impossible by the most stringent circumstances.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(2) If recommendation 1 is not possible, then the support unit must provide working detachments to each major area supported (An Son and Pleiku), so that essential services can be performed with minimum time and travel.

(2) Personnel

(a) Observation: Precipitous action was taken at DA level to stop the flow of replacement personnel to Vietnam during the October peace negotiations.

(b) Evaluation: This action created extreme hardship among operational units due to lack of personnel during the month of November. Average unit strengths during the period were 72% - 75%. Operational commitments during the period were met only as a result of great personal effort on the part of maintenance crews.

(c) Recommendation: In view of the tentative nature of such negotiations, no action toward cutting off the replacement stream have been taken until a formal agreement was signed.

(3) Morale

(a) Observation: Due to the length of time which personnel remained at Camp Holloway and Camp McDermott, troop morale suffered from lack of recreational facilities.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the early rapid withdrawal most installations closed recreational facilities early in the deactivation period. These facilities included MARS stations, snack bars, service clubs, Officer, NCO, and EM clubs, and PX facilities. Those personnel who remained behind were left with maximum time on their hands and little to do.

(c) Recommendation: While it was recognized that these facilities cannot be maintained until the last minute, it seemed that arrangements could have been made to keep facilities open for a longer period, especially Camp Holloway where no activities were available on the local economy. This was especially true in view of the fact that the political situation kept many people in RVN longer than anticipated.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(4) OER's

(a) Observation: There was much confusion and misunderstanding created as a result of instituting a new OER system concurrent with RVN redeployment.

(b) Evaluation: Trying to institute a new OER system, and simultaneously give every officer in the command an OER, proved to be a very difficult task, and from the personnel management point of view, a very damaging event. It was obvious from the beginning that no matter how much DA expounded on the average scores in DA Circular 623-1, that no one actually believed them. As a result, the new OER became highly inflated in most cases. The unfortunate part was that some units did follow the guidance given by DA with the result that the average score for their personnel were 35-40 points lower across the board than the group average and as much as 45-50 points lower than the highest unit averages. As in any new system, some officers were hurt because of the change. It is felt that the entire new OER system has been dealt a perhaps unrecoverable blow due to the large influx of OER's in this short time frame. Minimum instructional and educational time, complicated by the fact that most raters and indorsers did not trust the new system, caused raters to rate their officers high and take the chance of receiving a letter from DA rather than to rate them according to the average and take a chance on damaging the individual's career.

(c) Recommendation: RVN should have been exempted from the implementation of the new OER system. Barring that, everyone in RVN should have been written an OER effective 31 December, and had an OER written under the new system for the time they remained in country.

(5) Civilian Personnel Pay

(a) Observation: Camp Holloway civilian employee hired through CPO did not receive pay due them upon job termination.

(b) Evaluation: Terminal (advance) time sheets were handcarried to Saigon on X-23 by 1LT Wilson, Pleiku area finance officer, so that CPO employees could be paid on

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

their release dates. 1LT Hull, Pleiku Installation, was designated the officer to handle terminal pay complaints, late payments and AIK money for the Pleiku area. This procedure did not work as planned. All finance operations were relocated to Saigon and all CPO and NUNG security guard payrolls were late being paid. During the latter part of camp closure procedures the NUNG guards became apprehensive about their pay and made veiled threats to quit if no relief was rendered. Transportation arrangements for the NUNG guards had to be rearranged as a result of the late arrival of their payrolls. Further Class "A" agents from Camp Holloway ended up paying the civilian personnel, thus delaying closure of the installation. Numerous telephone calls to the Class "B" Agent, MAJ Cannon, failed to provide relief for this unsatisfactory situation.

(c) Recommendation: That Class "B" Agents insure all arrangements for terminal payment of civilian employees are confirmed at least one week in advance of their termination date.

B. INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

(1) Air Cavalry Reconnaissance Operations

(a) Observation: That coordination between SRAC G-2 and the two Air Cavalry Troops of the 17th Group was often incomplete, incorrect, and untimely.

(b) Evaluation: It became increasingly apparent during this reporting period that a renewed effort of coordination was needed between the Air Cavalry Troop elements and the SRAC G-2. A lack of communications, particularly evident between H Troop, 10th CAV and the SRAC G-2, often times led to a misutilization of reconnaissance assets. Lack of coordination, again particularly with regard to H/10, resulted in a considerable amount of wasted time, sometimes in excess of 50% of the total blade time, thereby reducing effective mission time. Specifically with regard to H/10, the SRAC G-2 all but gave total operational control of the Troop to the Senior Advisor, 22nd ARVN Division. No guidelines or policies were established by the SRAC G-2 as to

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

the employment and utilization of Air Cav assets. While the SA, 22nd Division published a policy letter delineating specifics on Cav employment and utilization, it was never followed. Furthermore, the SRAC G-2 seldom monitored H/10 activities. This was particularly evidenced by the fact that the SRAC G-2 Air was never allowed to visit H/10 or the G-2/G-3 Air, 22nd Division. Coordination between H Troop, 17th Cav and the SRAC G-2 was greatly assisted by the 17th Group S-2 becoming involved in the intelligence aspect of the reconnaissance mission. Increased use of the briefing and debriefing systems by higher headquarters resulted in more timely and effective use of intelligence data, thereby allowing for more timely reaction of ARVN forces. However, the use of the SRAC G-2 Air for other requirements often delayed intelligence gathering through his unavailability at briefings of Air Cav pilots and observers. The SRAC G-2 Air's non-availability also caused frequent coordination problems relative to the tasking of Cav assets, thereby making Cav Troop pre-mission planning extremely difficult on numerous occasions. In addition, last minute mission changes were effected by the SRAC G-2 which more often than not, were not passed on to the requesting/using unit in the field. At all times confusion resulted, frequently causing a loss of valuable reconnaissance time. Often entire missions had to be cancelled as the necessary coordination between the US Advisors and their counterparts could not be effected. The concept of the Air Cavalry Troop being utilized under the operational control of the SRAC G-2 offers the best results for the hours flown. However, it should be taken into consideration that intelligence gathering is a very personal type of operation and every effort should be made by all headquarters concerned to maintain a thorough and responsive communications system to insure that all phases of information gathering are coordinated and intelligence disseminated to all involved. This becomes even more important when it is recognized that the Air Cavalry Troop in a reconnaissance role can be a deciding factor in the outcome of armed conflicts such as Vietnam.

(c) Recommendations:

(1) That specific policies and guidance be disseminated by the headquarters having operational control over Air Cavalry assets relative to Air Cav operations, tactics, employment and utilization.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(2) That the responsibilities of the requesting or using unit and the operational headquarters involved should be specified in detail.

(3) That last minute mission changes be communicated to the field units in time for the necessary coordination to be effected at that level.

(4) That coordination/tasking by the headquarters having operational control be accomplished in a timely and detailed manner so as to allow the Cav Troop Commander and his operations section to plan their portion of the mission and allow for a proper briefing of personnel who are to fly the mission.

(5) That a representative of the G-2 be present at all pilot/observer briefings to provide the latest information on enemy activity in the A/O as well as a synopsis of the friendly situation.

(6) That the G-2 Air be present at, and participate in, pilot/observer debriefings.

(2) Security of Government and Personal Property

(a) Observation: Once the news of the impending American withdrawal was made public, property of US personnel and US government property was considered fair game by local nationals.

(b) Evaluation: The situation that existed with local hires who were already on US installations was bad enough. As soon as the withdrawal was announced, some of these personnel began to steal personal belongings from the troops in an effort to take last minute income supplement. However, with the transfer of US installations to RVNAF, the number of local nationals on installations increased drastically. In most cases these personnel were allowed to roam unescorted. Not only did the instance of thievery of personal property increase drastically, these personnel also looted buildings. Walls were torn down, mirrors broken, roofs removed, lighting and plumbing fixtures removed, and furniture was taken from the buildings. In some cases, Vietnamese guards assigned to guard property in the 604th TC area in the Nha Trang

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

participated in these thefts, and in two instances leveled loaded weapons on US personnel. This problem of thievery was encountered on each of the four US installations which 17th Group transferred to RVNAF.

(c) Recommendation: Installations should be wholly turned over on a specific date, not in a piecemeal fashion. No local national personnel should be allowed on the installation unescorted for the purpose of property transfer until that date. If at all possible, all American personnel should be off the installation at this time with the exception of the personnel transferring property. Finally, American or American hired (NUNG) guards should be utilized for installation security until the day of transfer.

C. OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

(1) Splitting of Air Cavalry Assets

(a) Observation: On several occasions the assets of the Air Cavalry Troops were split to enable them to cover two widely separated areas at the same time.

(b) Evaluation: Splitting cav packs into two teams creates more problems and hazards than can be justified by the intelligence gathered. In order to support a split cav team, a light gun team (2 AH-1G's) and 3 UH-1H's must be secured from other sources. This creates two problems: that of coordination, and that of unfamiliarity with air cavalry operations. Therefore, the augmented pack cannot work at maximum efficiency. To attempt to have a split team work without augmentation is foolhardy. Without augmentation, there is not sufficient firepower to handle a tactical emergency such as the extraction of a downed crew from a hot area. Neither is there the capability of reinforcing a dangerous situation by inserting the Aero Rifle Platoon. Finally, since only one LOH accomplishes the reconnaissance of a split team, it takes twice as long to cover the assigned area.

(c) Recommendation: Cavalry teams should never be utilized with less than 4 AH-1G's, 4 UH-1H's and 2 OH-6A's all of which come from the same unit.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(2) Selection of terrain for Air Cavalry Scout missions.

(a) Observation: On numerous occasions the areas selected to be scouted by the cav (sometimes as many as four separate areas), were too large and too widely separated.

(b) Evaluation: Due to poor prior planning, many times the cav found it necessary to fly for as much as an hour to get from one area to another. This represents wasted hours of blade time, as well as taking away from the amount of time available for reconnaissance. Additionally, the areas to be scouted were larger than could be adequately covered in the allotted time period. This resulted in cursory inspections of the areas, rather than the detailed recons needed to develop good intelligence.

(c) Recommendations:

(1) The G-2 Air for the headquarters of a non-aviation unit should be a rated aviator familiar with air cavalry operations.

(2) Aviation units must do everything possible to educate supported units to the limitations and capabilities of its aviation assets.

(3) UH-1H Missions

(a) Observation: In the role of ARVN and US Advisor support, the majority of UH-1H missions were single ship, many into insecure fire support bases in hostile areas.

(b) Evaluation: Given the type mission, there is no way of avoiding the inherent hazards. If an emergency occurs, there is not another aircraft close enough to lend aid. In some cases, there is not even radio contact with flight following facilities or other aircraft. In many cases, missions are to "fly as directed," the result of which is that the pilots do not know in advance where they'll be going, and therefore make appropriate plans.

(c) Recommendation: Each requestor for aviation support should submit an exact itinerary of flight. Any changes to

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

this route once the aircraft is airborne must be cleared through the aviation unit's operations prior to execution.

(4) Aircraft Utilization

(a) Observation: Aviation liaison personnel at CORDS who were not rated aviators did not efficiently utilize aircraft at their disposal.

(b) Evaluation: On several occasions during the reporting period aircraft were utilized in a duplicating manner as a result of staff personnel programming aircraft to go to the same general area with one or two passengers on each aircraft. By allowing the supported element to use the phrase "FLY AS DIRECTED," The operations section did not know where the aircraft were destined until the passengers arrived. By this time it was too late to attempt to combine missions since the aircraft had already departed the local area.

(c) Recommendation: Supported units should provide a detailed itinerary for the supporting unit to have available not only for scheduling aircraft and aviators but also to attempt to eliminate a situation where a duplication of effort exists.

D. LOGISTICS

(1) Supply Requisitions

(a) Observation: Personnel in the support system overreacted in October by cancelling orders of all classes of supply in anticipation of a cease fire.

(b) Evaluation: The lack of supplies in November and December as a result of this action caused a great loss of aircraft availability due to NORS. Some aircraft were down in excess of 45 days awaiting parts from CONUS. Additionally, many items to include clothing was not available in unit supplies. The PX's ran short of health and welfare items. As a result, the troops suffered unnecessary discomfort.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(c) Recommendation: Supply requisitions should not be cancelled until a firm deactivation date is set. Allow each unit and especially DS/GS, excess stockage of common usage items prior to shutdown of the supply system.

(2) Retrograde of equipment through collection, classification, and salvage (CC&S).

(a) Observation: During a time period where a large volume of items from several units are turned in to CC&S, the administrative requirements placed on them are very heavy.

(b) Evaluation: The paperwork required for this type of activity was the DA Form 2765-1. In addition to the CC&S having to process the required paperwork, they must also process and classify the equipment which is quite time consuming.

(c) Recommendation: Each unit involved in a massive turn in of equipment similar to what has been experienced recently can save an invaluable amount of time by preparing as much of the paperwork internally as possible. This relieves CC&S from being over burdened and free to process and classify the equipment which expedites the entire process.

(3) Transfer of aviation equipment/items.

(a) Observation: Transfer of aviation shop sets, tool sets, and ground support equipment to VNAF was not properly coordinated.

(b) Evaluation: The letter of instruction provided by 17th Group covering the procedures for transfer of aviation shop sets, tool sets, and ground support equipment to VNAF was not detailed enough to provide the proper guidance to the units. The letters did not list the VNAF project officers who were to sign for the equipment nor did it list how to make contact with the squadrons who were going to receipt for the equipment. The paperwork (DA Form 3161) required for the transfer of the equipment was excessive, e.g., for each tool box, shop set, etc, the letter of instruction required ten copies of

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

DA Form 3161 to be made by the unit. The 201st had 91 tool boxes alone which amounted to 910 pages of 3161's. This placed an excessive administrative burden on the unit. There also was a shortage of DA Form 3161's within Group; therefore, the unit was required to reproduce the forms locally. Prior to authorizing the transfer of equipment the responsible staff section should insure that sufficient quantities of all forms are in stock or on hand.

(c) Recommendations: On all such future transfers of equipment, the letter of instruction should be more specific as to the procedures to be used for the transfer of equipment. The names and addresses of people designated to receive the equipment should be provided to the unit well in advance.

(4) Transfer of aviation equipment/items

(a) Observation: VNAF was not prepared to receive title transferred tools and shop sets.

(b) Evaluation: No prior coordination was effected with VNAF to determine how their supply system functioned. As it turned out, all equipment had to be inventoried, logged, and the lists sent to the VNAF computer facility at Bien Hoa. It required two men several days to inventory all items of equipment by FSN and prepared the paperwork to send to Bien Hoa.

(c) Recommendation: Coordination must be made with receiving units prior to attempting transfer of equipment.

(5) Lack of Liaison Personnel

(a) Observation: All US Air Force liaison personnel were withdrawn on X+15.

(b) Evaluation: Dealing with VNAF on transfer of equipment was hindered because the channels for liaison (US Advisors) which had been open previously were no longer open. Dealing directly with VNAF created problems because of unfamiliarity with the personnel and their procedures.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(c) Recommendation: In future operations of this nature, US Advisors in areas where complicated transactions are to take place should be among the last personnel to depart.

E. COMMUNICATIONS

(1) Adverse Effects of the Vietnamization Program on Land Line Communications.

(a) Observations: The Vietnamese Armed Forces were not adequately trained or equipped to effectively manage the area communications system of which the dial telephone system was a part. In addition, ARVN signal elements were not responsive to the needs of the US subscribers. Generally, VNAF signal personnel were more cooperative than ARVN signal personnel, however, it took cooperation from both parties to maintain telephone service.

(b) Evaluation: Prior to December, the communications support provided to Camp Holloway subscribers by the Vietnamese Armed Forces was minimal, however, the support did exist. After December, the possibility of a cease fire became imminent and all communications support from ARVN personnel came to a complete halt.

(c) Recommendations: US forces should never be placed in the position where they are entirely dependent on their allies for long distance communications. If this cannot be avoided, an alternate means of communications must be established that is independent of allied control.

(2) Inadequate Signal Repair Support

(a) Observation: Throughout the reporting period, elements of 17th CAG located at Pleiku and An Son received very poor signal repair support from the Logistics Support Activities at Pleiku or Qui Nhon. It usually took two to four weeks before LSA could return a serviceable item to the user. In addition, many items were returned still inoperative.

(b) Evaluation: The long downtime for signal items was due partially to the fact that the LSA's at Pleiku and Qui Nhon reduced themselves to only a direct exchange

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

capability. All equipment had to be evacuated to Nha Trang from Pleiku and Qui Nhon for repair. The quality control was marginal in that many items were returned to the users were still inoperative.

(c) Recommendation: An Aviation Group should have its own organic direct support capability for tactical communications equipment. By virtue of command and control, this support would be more responsive to the needs of the Group. The addition of two signal repairman and supporting PLL to each avionics facility could accomplish this task.

(3) Inadequate Communications

(a) Observation: Overall availability of quality communications between units is poor.

(b) Evaluation: As a result of this unfavorable situation, necessary coordination between units, reports, and requirements tasked by higher headquarters were often delayed or misinterpreted.

(c) Recommendation: Establish a high frequency radio capability between headquarters and the separate location of each subordinate unit.

(4) Disposition of Avionics Assets

(a) Observation: Prior to X+10, there existed some confusion between 604th AVEL and Brigade Avionics as to disposition of avionics assets. This resulted in a delay in shipping. After X+10, the confusion was eliminated and shipping progressed smoothly.

(b) Evaluation: LOI's from Brigade concerning the retrograde of avionics assets were frequently changed. Often, these changes arrived late and this resulted in confusion. Also, it appeared that coordination between various agencies, such ECOM and NICP, was initially inadequate.

(c) Recommendation: That finalized disposition instruction be established prior to deactivation.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

F. AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

(1) Transportation of repair parts:

(a) Observation: Although the 604th FSP at Pleiku was functioning well, lack of timely receipt of NORS and PLL parts from the Central DSSA (Saigon) caused a serious NORS problem after the Brigade dedicated SMAR flight was discontinued.

(b) Evaluation: Discontinuance of dedicated SMAR flights by USAF upon their operational move to Thailand lengthened the requisition-receipt time for Pleiku from 4 days to 11 days. Since USAF would accept only full pallets of cargo, a delay was experienced in waiting for a pallet to fill up for a particular location. Secondly, once TMA accepted the load it waited on space available basis for on-shipment whenever a flight was scheduled. Because of the delay, units were found going NORS for many items normally stocked in PLL.

(c) Recommendations:

(1) That every effort be made to establish a dedicated SMAR flight for shipment of repair parts to in country locations (with retrograde of unserviceable repairables on backhaul).

(2) That TMA/USAF be persuaded to accept less than full pallets for on-shipment in order to expedite receipt of NORS items.

(3) As an alternative, utilize Air America or Brigade Courier missions to transport small NORS items.

(2) Transfer of Air Combatant Assets

(a) Observation: There was a decided lack of coordination concerning the transfer to VNAF and the operation of the 16 UH-1H's belonging to the ICCS and the RJMC aviation units.

(b) Evaluation: The first problem which occurred was over the XM-23 gun mounts. Before Brigade policy was announced, the mounts had been removed from the aircraft.

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

Then Brigade announced that all aircraft would retain their gun mounts. A controversy subsequently developed over whether ICCS and RJMC aircraft should retain gun mounts. Before all was said and done, the mounts had been removed and remounted several times. The second problem occurred when an attempt was made to transfer the aircraft to VNAF shortly after X-day. VNAF refused to sign for the aircraft because they would be used to carry members of opposing armed forces. As result the aircraft remained on the property book of the 604th TC until X+44 when the detachment commanders signed for the aircraft. The final disposition was completed by transferring the aircraft to VNAF as the aviation teams left country.

(c) Recommendation: Prior coordination must be sufficient to cover all possible eventualities when massive equipment transfers are made.

G. SAFETY

(1) Aviation Hazards on Allied Installations

(a) Observation: During this reporting period one US helicopter was destroyed by fire at a POL point operated by an allied country. The POL point in question was lacking proper aircraft grounding equipment, sufficient fire extinguishers, and had fuel nozzles which locked in the open or fuel flow position.

(b) Evaluation: US Army aircraft often operate from aviation facilities operated by an allied country. However, these facilities may or may not have the same emphasis placed on safety procedures and equipment that we place on our own airfields. This increases the hazards to our own aircraft and crews.

(c) Recommendation: When a facility is known to be deficient in safety standards, either our own or that of an allied country, all efforts must be made to rectify the situation. Within our own commands this is relatively simple, however, difficulty may be encountered with an allied country. If the safety standards of that facility are not brought up to our standards further operation of US aircraft from that facility should cease. If this is

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

not possible, and further use of the facility is required despite the deficient safety standards, aircrews must be notified of the hazard and warned to take extra precautions to prevent accidents.

(2) Vehicle Safety

(a) Observation: During this reporting period there was a sharp increase in the vehicular accident rate.

(b) Evaluation: Excessive speed and/or inattentive driving was the primary cause of these accidents. Vehicular accidents are, in most cases, easily preventable. Most military personnel drive their own automobile and feel fully capable of driving military vehicles. However, some of the military vehicles, notably the M-151 1/4 ton Jeep, have characteristics which do not allow them to be driven carelessly with the same margin for error found in most civilian vehicles. The primary cause for most military vehicular accidents, however, is the driver. Defensive driving techniques and observance of all traffic regulations must be practiced in military vehicles as well as civilian vehicles.


(c) Recommendations: Extensive command emphasis on safe driving at all levels of command and supervision is required to reduce the vehicular accident rate. Any person observing an unsafe act must take action to correct the driver. In addition, ground safety should be the topic of regular meetings with all personnel and should be given the same emphasis as aviation safety. Also, strict control of vehicle dispatches and drivers licenses should be implemented.

TAB: A - Organization Chart
B - Station List, Pre-X-Day
C - Unit Strength
D - Operational Results, Post-X-Day
E - Significant Operations, Pre-X-Day
F - Vulnerability Chart
G - Ammunition Expenditures, Pre-X-Day
H - Aircraft Status as of 27 Jan 73

APPENDIX 3 (17th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

- I - Average Flying Hours and/or Rate
- J - Transfer and Retrograde of Aircraft (TDE)
- K - RVNAF Transfer from 604th TC Accounts
- L - Accident Statistics
- M - US Army Aviation Support Element, Regional
Joint Military Commission III
- N - US Army Aviation Support Element, Regional
Joint Military Commission IV
- O - ICCS Region III Flight Detachment

TAB A (Organizational Chart) to Appendix 3 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report



TAB B (Station List, Pre-X-Day) to Appendix 3 to Annex B
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
HQ, 17TH CAG	PLEIKU
HHC, 17TH CAG	PLEIKU
H TRP 17TH CAV	PLEIKU
57TH AHC	PLEIKU
344TH AD (D)	PLEIKU
94TH MED DET	PLEIKU
201ST CAC	NHA TRANG
25TH MED DET	NHA TRANG
339TH AD (D)	NHA TRANG
604TH TRANS CO	NHA TRANG
60TH AHC	NINH HOA
HQ, EAGLE BN (PROV)	AN SON
H TRP 10TH CAV	AN SON
129TH AHC	AN SON
180TH ASHC	AN SON
318TH AD (D)	AN SON
546TH MED DET	AN SON

STATION LIST POST X - DAY

The following station changes occurred during the deactivation
period due to base closures.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STATION DEPARTED</u>	<u>STATION ARRIVED</u>	<u>DATE</u>
60TH AHC	NINH HOA	NHA TRANG	X+8
180TH ASHC	AN SON	NHA TRANG	X+31
129TH AHC	AN SON	PLEIKU	X+31
HQ, 17TH CAG	PLEIKU	NHA TRANG	X+40

TAB C (Unit Strength) to Appendix 3 to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

UNIT	ASSIGNED			AUTHORIZED		
	OFF	WO	ENL	OFF	WO	ENL
HHC 17TH CAG *	37	6	108	30	2	41
57TH AHC	23	20	140	18	48	214
H TRP 17TH CAV	17	22	175	16	34	216
129TH AHC	24	23	132	18	48	214
180TH ASHC	15	13	157	15	26	227
60TH AHC	25	14	128	18	48	214
H TRP 10TH CAV	21	17	155	16	34	216
201ST CAC	20	20	144	20	33	161
318TH AD (D)	2	0	16	1	0	16
339TH AD (D)	1	0	15	1	0	16
344TH AD (D)	1	0	18	1	0	16
25TH MED DET	1	0	5	1	0	7
94TH MED DET	1	0	7	1	0	8
546TH MED DET	1	0	5	1	0	8
604TH TC	8	7	86	8	7	79

*Includes personnel assigned to provisional headquarters
at ECAB.

TAB D (Operational Results) to Appendix 3 to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO</u>	<u>ENEMY KIA</u>	<u>STRUCTURES DESTROYED</u>
<u>NOV</u>						
HHC 17TH CAG	110.8	214	64	2.8	0	0
57TH AHC	1172.9	2632	5277	43.5	25	0
H TRP 17TH CAV	1421.1	1776	558	0.0	0	1
129TH AHC	2168.0	9951	21935	595.2	0	13
180TH ASHC	651.0	2564	5416	3258.0	0	0
60TH AHC	1065.4	3984	11263	161.2	0	0
H TRP 10TH CAV	1016.8	1967	910	18.0	17	66
201ST CAC	1123.0	2140	3902	25.7	0	0
604TH TCC	11.2	8	25	0.9	0	0
<u>DEC</u>						
HHC 17TH CAG	86.9	165	183	3.0	0	0
57TH AHC	1113.3	2349	4925	48.7	20	8
H TRP 17TH CAV	1300.8	1561	466	0.0	19	3
129TH AHC	1986.0	9020	17745	527.8	0	0
180TH ASHC	660.0	2658	3988	3403.0	0	0
H TRP 10TH CAV	935.1	1694	934	19.6	5	55
201ST CAC	1014.3	2028	3836	30.6	0	0
604TH TC	44.4	79	114	0.8	0	0
<u>JAN 1-27</u>						
HHC 17TH CAG	13.4	148	107	0.0	0	0
57TH AHC	916.0	1793	3773	37.2	0	0
H TRP 17TH CAV	1286.0	1438	410	0.0	3	5
129TH AHC	1798.0	8509	21258	442.2	6	2
180TH ASHC	623.0	2780	3424	3836.0	0	0
60TH AHC	1185.7	4926	13386	217.7	0	0
H TRP 10TH CAV	1027.7	2008	1182	8.1	59	146
201ST CAC	987.0	1854	3679	43.1	0	0
604TH TC	29.5	35	84	0.0	0	0

TAB D (Operational Results) to Appendix 3 to Annex B to
USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

OPERATIONAL RESULTS - POST X - DAY

X-DAY THROUGH X+40

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>HOURS</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>PAX</u>	<u>CARGO TONS</u>
HHC, 17TH CAG	47.8	71	77	.3
57TH AHC	648.2	1005	2665	28.0
H TRP, 17TH CAV	39.0	34	59	0.0
129TH AHC	754.2	3400	7966	216.2
180TH ASHC	417.0	1359	7050	1376.5
60TH AHC	574.6	1883	4450	142.6
H TRP, 10TH CAV	108.0	90	44	13.0
201ST CAC	721.7	1154	1969	18.1
604TH TC	17.5	7	25	2.8
ICCS	248.9	202	378	15.1
RJMC III	462.6	833	1032	18.7
RJMC IV	463.0	583	1180	38.3

TAB E (Significant Operations, Pre-X-Day) to Appendix 3 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

1. During the reporting period 1 November 1972 to X-day, the 17th Aviation Group continued to provide aviation support for combat operations of FWMF in MR II. The period was characterized by a lack of major operations by either FWMF or the enemy. As had been the case during previous reporting periods, the majority of enemy activity occurred in Kontum, Pleiku and Binh Dinh Provinces. Significantly, as the cease fire approached, enemy activity greatly increased in Binh Thuan Province, particularly in the Phan Thiet area. The Group was committed on a daily basis for 38 UH-1Hs, 8 AH-1Gs and 6 CH-47s to support MR II. These commitments did not include 8 UH-1Hs, 8 AH-1Gs and 4 OH-6As drawn from the two Cav Troops and organized into two Air Cavalry packages which were committed on a daily basis to gather intelligence. Mission requirements continued to decrease as further withdrawals of FWMF were made.

2. 57th AHC was normally tasked on a daily basis for 10 UH-1Hs and 2 to 4 AH-1Gs to support II CORPS Headquarters, Ranger Command, 23rd ARVN Division, and Pleiku, Kontum, Darlac and Phu Bon Province advisers. Additionally, the unit flew the daily courier mission for the Group Headquarters. Other units which received support included the ARVN 2nd Armored Brigade and 42nd Regiment, and H Troop, 17th Cav. 57th nightly provided two AH-1Gs and a UH-1H mounting two mini-guns and a xenon searchlight for the defense of the Camp Holloway-Pleiku area. On several occasions during the reporting period, Cougar guns from the 57th aided the ARVN defenders of firebases under enemy ground attack. Most notable were the results achieved at Duc Co on 1 November 1972 and at Firebase 41 On QL 14 north of Kontum on 26 January 1973. On 1 November, a heavy Cougar gun team engaged 4 tanks of an enemy combined arms assault against Duc Co and disabled two using 17 pound HE rockets. On 26 January 1973, the Cougar guns were instrumental in stopping a determined enemy ground attack against Firebase 41 by destroying several enemy crew-served weapons which were providing devastating fire support for the attackers.

3. H Troop (AIR), 17th Cavalry operated principally in Kontum and Pleiku Provinces, OPCON to SRAC G-2 or the ARVN 23rd Division. On a few occasions, H/17 moved to Binh Dinh Province to support the ARVN 22nd Division. Working closely with Group S-3 and S-2, efforts were made to improve mission effectiveness

TAB E (Significant Operations, Pre-X-Day) to Appendix 3 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

and instill in supported units and SRAC G-2 a greater understanding of Cavalry capabilities and limitations. This was achieved by the use of accurate files and reports of problem areas. An Air Mission Commander report was initiated and maintained daily. The AMC logged any significant problem areas of each day. Another report contrasted the blade time expended while actually working a mission with the blade time enroute to the AO. The latter report was kept in the event supported units requested more "on station" time without appreciating the total time required to fly a VR mission. Other problem areas concerned the size of boxes chosen for VR missions. At the time of standdown, a lengthy report was in the initial stages of preparation which cited these and other problems. The report was not completed due to standdown. However, significant progress was made during the reporting period toward bringing those who utilize the Air Cavalry Troop to a better appreciation of the Cav's mission and capabilities. The SRAC G-2 became more aware of the maintenance requirements and flight time limitations of the helicopter. As a result, the daily mission requirements were reduced to four periods and these were never divided among more than two supported units. Consequently, the blade time spent moving between supported unit locations was reduced considerably. The Pleiku last light VR was continued but instead of an entire team only one aircraft was utilized. Efforts were made to require backseaters to increase the familiarity with friendly locations in the Pleiku area, but this proved futile due to the substantial number of small unit locations throughout the area. The weakness of these flights was demonstrated when on 23 January 1973 at 1700 hours Pleiku Airbase sustained a severe rocket attack. The evening VR helicopter was already airborne with the backseater at the onset of the attack. A gun team was launched but due to the congestion of VNAF aircraft at the suspected rocket site, all three helicopters had to remain clear and return to base without firing a single round. An additional first light VR was initiated in January. During the month of January a problem began to arise between SRAC G-2 and the Troop. G-2 based its Arc Light placement as much as 80% on Cav spot reports. Air Force bombers reported secondary explosions during many of these Arc Lights. ARVN ground forces in the area sometimes reported heavy damages as a result of the Arc Lights. On the other hand, Cav Scouts, during bomb damage assessment missions, rarely found any evidence of damage,

TAB E (Significant Operations, Pre-X-Day) to Appendix 3 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

90% of the time reporting negative BDAs. Whether the problem was with the accuracy of the original spot report, the accuracy of plotting the Arc Light location, or the inaccurate reporting of the Air Force, the ARVN ground forces or the Cav cannot be determined. In January the Troop uncovered a resupply road network extending from the Plei Trap area to enemy positions in the Kontum area. Good BDAs were obtained and it is felt that this discovery assisted immeasurably in the interdiction of supplies that would have otherwise been valuable in the impending attack on Kontum and prevented enemy exploitation of the already precarious situation there. Normal daily commitment for the Troop was 4 UH-1H's, 4 AH-1G's, and 2 OH-6A's.

4. 201st CAC which is located in Nha Trang continued to provide UH-1H support to the Province Senior Advisors of Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Lam Dong, Binh Thuan, Quang Duc and Tuyen Duc. In addition, aircraft were provided on a daily basis to CORDS Advisors in MR II, and classified missions were flown supporting PSCG. The majority of the missions flown by 201st CAC are C&C and VIP in nature, rather than the daily combat missions flown by other units. Normal daily mission commitment was 11 UH-1Hs.

5. Eagle Combat Aviation Battalion (Prov) area of operations consisted of the eastern portion of MR II and covered the area from southern MR I to the northern MR III border. Several times during the reporting period units from the Battalion were relocated to Pleiku Province and Binh Thuan Province (Phan Thiet) in support of activities in the western and southern portion of MR II. The Battalion was employed in the support of the 22nd and 23rd ARVN Division, Capitol ROK Infantry Division and the White Horse ROK Infantry Division and Binh Thuan Province.

a. H Troop/10th Cavalry daily provided a Cav package of 4 UH-1Hs, 4 AH-1Gs and 2 OH-6As for Cavalry operations in eastern MR II. During the first two weeks of November, the Troop was conducting daily reconnaissance missions for the 22nd ARVN Division in Binh Dinh Province. No significant enemy activity was reported during the month of November and flying was kept to minimum due to adverse weather conditions throughout the AO. On 5 December the Troop assets were divided, with half the team being sent to Pleiku while the

TAB E (Significant Operations, Pre-X-Day) to Appendix 3 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

other half continued its mission in Binh Dinh Province. On 11 December the Troop returned to Lane and supported the 22nd ARVN Division. Once again on 15 December the Troop was relocated to Pleiku to locate and engage enemy forces west of Pleiku. The Troop made two LRRP insertions west of Duc Co and completed several BDAs of Arc Lights. However, no significant large scale enemy movement was noted. The entire team returned to Lane on 20 December and continued working for the 22nd ARVN Division. In early January the Troop operations were hampered by continued poor weather. On 5 January, an LRRP team was inserted 50 miles west of LZ English in search of an American POW. Though the search was unsuccessful, the team did note increased enemy build-up to the north and west of LZ English. On 18 January 1973 the Troop was directed to furnish one Cav team to Binh Thuan Province to counter a suspected enemy threat in that area. Several large local force enemy units were found during the first week and successfully engaged by the Troop, naval gunfire and TAC air. On 27 January the team found several large enemy forces west of Phan Thiet and killed over 50 during several encounters. Friendly casualties at Phan Thiet included 1 aerial observer KIA and 1 pilot WIA on 26 January 1973. Meanwhile the team at Lane found the 18th NVA Regiment Headquarters two miles southwest of Tam Quan, which was destroyed by Tac air. All tactical operations ceased on 27 January at 1800 hours and preparations for standdown were begun. Throughout the entire reporting period H Troop/10th Cav inserted and extracted PSCG (LRRP) teams throughout MR II. Because of this mission, valuable intelligence was gathered for higher headquarters.

b. 129th AHC continued its assigned mission of providing logistical and tactical combat support to the Capitol ROK Infantry Division and the 22nd ARVN Division. Several small scale combat assaults were conducted in the An Khe Pass area but no contact was encountered. Insignificant operations occurred during the period largely due to the pending cease-fire. The unit also provided support for Binh Dinh Province, Qui Nhon Support Command, 17th CAG and various other units throughout the reporting period. Normal daily mission requirements were 12 UH-1Hs and 2 AH-1Gs.

c. 180th ASHC provided medium helicopter support for the entire MR II. The unit normally provided 3 CH-47s at Camp Holloway to support the western half of the MR. The majority

TAB E (Significant Operations, Pre-X-Day) to Appendix 3 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

of support provided by the unit was logistics support with approximately 65% for ROK forces, 35% for ARVN and US forces and 5% for units located at Lane AHP.

d. 60th AHC located at Ninh Hoa regularly supported the Whitehorse (9th) ROK Infantry Division also located at Ninh Hoa. The unit normally provided 6 UH-1Hs and 2 AH-1Gs daily. The majority of missions flown were C&C, resupply, and troop transport. On a limited number of occasions, the unit supported combat assaults by the 9th. There were ~~no~~ major combat actions in the 60th's AO during this reporting period.

6. 604th Trans Co began preparations for the retrograde of all OH-58 Helicopters in MR I and MR II on 1 November 1972. Problems encountered during retrograde operations included difficulty in obtaining 1010 preservative oil, tailboom attaching brackets, and cargo tie-down straps. Tailboom attaching brackets were obtained by coordinating with the 388th Transportation Company in Saigon and local manufacture. During retrograde operations of the OH-58s, night crews were established to aid in the retrograde operation. During this period, military and civilians worked overtime, including Sundays, to complete the retrograde project. The non-availability of cargo tie-down straps for securing OH58s inside SEA-LAND vans was resolved when it was decided that Air Force C-141 aircraft would be used for the shipment of 18 of 24 OH-58 aircraft. During this period, shipment of repair parts was greatly interrupted due to the transfer of all Air Force C-130 aircraft in Saigon to Thailand. Preparations were made on 20 November 1972 to establish a Keystone Aircraft Processing Point (KAPP) in the 604th Maintenance area. The plans included KAPPING the CH-47 special tools from the 201st Aviation Company as a trial run. Increased retrograde processing plus decreased Air Force SMAR flights during November 1972 led to a backlog of retrograded material awaiting shipment at the aerial port in Nha Trang plus no repair parts being delivered. Also, a courier was not available from Nha Trang to Saigon during much of this period, creating a problem with distribution. During the pre X-day period, huge quantities of avionics maintenance float equipment and other avionics related items were received from supported units as turn-in equipment. From 20 November 1972 to 8 December 1972, over \$226,000 of excess avionics equipment was turned in. By the end of November

TAB E (Significant Operations, Pre-X-Day) to Appendix 3 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

the KAPP yard was well established and awaiting disposition instructions from Saigon. A U-21 courier from Saigon was established on 6 December 1972, with flights on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays. Also during December, night crews were utilized to accomplish the special paint project in which selected aircraft in MR II were painted with infra-red suppressant paint. Planning for this operation began on 7 December, and painting went on from 26 December 1972 to 24 January 1973 when the project was stopped due to the impending peace treaty. A total of 12 UH-1H, 4 AH-1G and 1 OH-6A helicopters were painted during this special operation. During January, as a peace agreement seemed imminent, units began turning in their excess parts on hand. On 25 January, 16 UH-1Hs descended on Production Control with little prior notice to be painted and transferred to RJMC 4, RJMC 3 and the ICCS immediately. By 27 January, all aircraft had been painted with white crosses and stripes and transferred. There was some confusion from 25 to 27 January as to who was to receipt for the aircraft and what UIC Code to use on the issue of the aircraft.

POST X-DAY

7. During the deactivation period, 17th Group continued to provide support to the various RVNAF and FWMAF throughout MR II, although on a continuously declining basis. There were no major operations during this period. Both Air Cavalry Troops ceased operations on X-day. All armed helicopter flights ceased as of X-day. By X+41 support to ROK forces had ceased completely, and support to US forces in MR II had dwindled to two aircraft per day, plus whatever miscellaneous missions came about. 201st CAC was not deactivated on X+45 as planned, but was instead retained until X+55 for possible support of Operation HOMECOMING prisoner releases in South Vietnam. The most significant event of the post X-day period was the formation of three aviation detachments from the assets of 17th Group. These detachments, although formed from 17th Group assets, belonged to, and flew in support of, the International Commission for Control and Supervision and the Regional Joint Military Commission.

TAB E (Significant Operations, Pre-X-Day) to Appendix 3 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

8. 57th AHC continued to support SRAC and other units on a daily basis with aviation assets through X+52. However, on X+40, the 57th was officially deactivated and all remaining personnel and equipment transferred to the 201st CAC. These personnel continued to operate as an autonomous unit within the 201st. Missions were gradually reduced from an average of 14 per day prior to X-day to 4 missions on X+30 and 2 missions by X+40. All files were transferred to the records holding area on X+16, and all material no longer needed for reference was burned. The 57th deactivated on X+40.

9. 201st CAC continued to support province advisors on a diminishing basis through X+30 at which time province support ceased. On X+40 all remaining 17th CAG assets were assigned to the 201st. On this date, daily aircraft commitment averaged three aircraft. However, 201st had to have available 12 mission ready UH-1H aircraft and crews with which to support Operation HOMECOMING, if required. The unit deactivated on X+55.

10. 60th ACH continued to provide support to the Whitehorse ROK Infantry Division during the phasedown. By X+30 missions were reduced to two per day, and by X+36 to one per day. Also during this period, the 60th closed its installation at Ninh Hoa and redeployed to Nha Trang. This occurred on X+8. As a result of this move, 60th AHC was removed from the command and control of ECAB, and placed directly under 17th Group. The unit deactivated on X+37.

11. ECAB continued its support to both the Koreans and the ARVN 22nd Division during this period. CH-47 support to the ARVN ceased on X-day, as did any type of direct combat mission. Further C&C missions in support of combat operations were halted. All air cavalry missions ceased on X-day. ECAB was deactivated on X+31.

a. 129th AHC continued to provide needed support to the ARVN 22nd Division and the Capitol ROK Infantry Division. The 129th had the dubious distinction of being the only unit to sustain casualties during the cease fire period. On the morning of the cease fire, two hours after it had gone into effect, a 129th aircraft sustained small arms fire and 2 WIA's while flying through An Khe pass. A five hour per day blade time restriction was placed on all aircraft in order to

TAB E (Significant Operations, Pre-X-Day) to Appendix 3 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

conserve blade time. The unit continued to support 10 missions per day until X+8, when the mission load dropped to 7. On X+12 missions were reduced to six. By X+25 missions were down to 3 per day. On X+31, the 129th deployed to Pleiku due to the base closure at An Son. The unit deactivated on X+37.

b. 180th ASHC continued medium helicopter support for Free World Forces in MR II. The Whitehorse Infantry Division required two aircraft daily until X+5, one aircraft daily until X+10 and no aircraft after that date. The Capitol ROK Infantry Division required two aircraft daily until X+13, and one as required thereafter. During the period until X+10 the aircraft that supported the Whitehorse Infantry Division also supported Lane AHP by withdrawal of retrograde equipment and PLL to the 604th DSU at Nha Trang. After X+10 the aircraft were missioned to support Lane AHP as needed. CH-47's were also used to support Lane AHP for transportation of DEROS personnel to Qui Nhon and Phu Cat as needed. Also, the 180th detachment at Pleiku supported the US Forces in the Pleiku area by withdrawal of retrograde equipment and PLL to 604th DSU at Nha Trang and also by transportation of supplies from Nha Trang and Qui Nhon to Pleiku. On X+31, the 180th was transferred to Nha Trang upon closure of Lane Installation. The unit was deactivated on X+35.

12. 604th Transportation Co continued to provide normal direct support maintenance during the reporting period. The majority of their activity was concentrated in retrograde of equipment and turn-over of air combatant assets which will be covered in other sections of this report. Operations continued without any major changes through X+45. On X+45 a civilian contractor representative replaced the military COR. Central DSSA continued to operate a Forward Supply Point (FSP) at 604th with one warehouse to support RJMC and ICCS up to X+59. At that time, Air America was to be supported through the FSP. After X+44, 91 NHA personnel remained in the Nha Trang area. This was 49 in excess of the number required and these contract personnel were reduced accordingly.

TAB F (Vulnerability Chart) to Appendix 3 to Annex B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

UNIT	TYPE A/C	NOV		DEC		JAN 1-27		TOTAL	
		HIT	DEST	HIT	DEST	HIT	DEST	HIT	DEST
HHC 17TH CAG	UH1H	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
57TH AHC	UH1H	0	0	2	0	1	0	3	0
	AH1G	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0
H TRP 17TH CAV	UH1H	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
	AH1G	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
	OH6A	3	0	0	0	2	0	5	0
129TH AHC	UH1H	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	0
	AH1G	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
H TRP 10TH CAV	UH1H	0	0	1	1	1	0	2	1
	AH1G	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	OH6A	2	0	2	0	4	1	8	1
60TH AHC	UH1H	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	AH1G	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
180TH ASHC	CH47	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
201ST CAC	UH1H	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
604TH TC	UH1H	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL		6	0	8	1	12	1	26	2

TAB G (Ammunition Expenditures, Pre-X-Day) to Appendix 3 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>7.62</u>	<u>2.75</u>	<u>20MM</u>	<u>40MM</u>
NOV	84,898	5464	800	8460
DEC	123,004	5536	4356	10979
1-27 JAN	149,048	6405	2117	14026

TAB H (Aircraft Status as of 27 January 1973) to Appendix 3
to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>MOE/MTOE</u>	<u>ON HAND</u>
HHC 17TH CAV	UH1H	2	2
57TH AHC	UH1H	23	20
	AH1G	6	6
H TRP 17TH CAV	UH1H	8	8
	AH1G	9	8
	OH6A	10	8
EAGLE BN (PROV)	UH1H	54	50
	AH1G	21	18
	OH6A	10	7
	CH47	16	15
129TH AHC	UH1H	23	22
	AH1G	6	6
60TH AHC	UH1H	23	21
	AH1G	6	4
H TRP 10TH CAV	UH1H	8	7
	AH1G	9	8
	OH6A	10	8
180TH ASHC	CH47	16	15
201ST CAC	UH1H	20	20
604TH TC	UH1H	2	2
17TH CAG TOTALS	UH1H	109	102
	AH1G	36	32
	OH6A	20	16
	CH47	16	15

TAB I (Average Flying Hours and OR Rate) to Appendix 3 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

UNIT	TYPE	NOV		DEC		JAN		21-27 JAN	
		AVG HRS/AC	OR%	AVG HRS/AC	OR%	AVG HRS/AC	OR%	HRS/AC	OR%
HHC 17TH CAG	UH1H	60	89%	43	86%	35	98%	7	100%
57TH AHC	UH1H	58	84%	53	83%	49	74%	19	81%
	AH1G	46	77%	30	63%	30	67%	8	83%
H TRP 17TH CAV	UH1H	81	86%	56	87%	74	92%	15	83%
	AH1G	71	76%	56	73%	64	74%	10	77%
	OH6A	56	86%	35	88%	42	86%	9	96%
129TH AHC	UH1H	73	80%	73	78%	69	76%	14	78%
	AH1G	21	72%	26	72%	29	75%	12	71%
H TRP 10TH CAV	UH1H	65	80%	43	87%	50	82%	28	84%
	AH1G	38	56%	43	66%	43	71%	9	75%
	OH6A	26	67%	27	79%	37	65%	8	66%
60TH AHC	UH1H	51	91%	46	88%	59	88%	19	83%
	AH1G	22	85%	20	85%	24	92%	6	97%
180TH ASHC	CH47	45	68%	48	71%	50	72%	11	68%
201ST CAC	UH1H	51	85%	59	89%	57	88%	17	87%
604TH TC	UH1H	22	86%	25	89%	27	84%	4	98%

TAB J (Transfer and Retrograde of Aircraft (TOE)) to Appendix 3
to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

<u>DAY</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>RECEIVING UNITS</u>	<u>BALANCE</u>
X-day	UH-1H			102
X-day	CH-47C			15
X-day	AH-1G			32
X-day	OH-6A			15
X+2	OH-6A	15	604th TC (Retro)	0
X+2	UH-1H	2	17th CAG	104
X+3	CH-47C	2	388th TC (Retro)	13
X+3	AH-1G	20	388th TC (Retro)	12
X+4	UH-1H	16	RJMC III, IV and ICCS	88
X+6	CH-47C	1	388th TC (Retro)	12
X+7	AH-1G	8	388th TC (Retro)	4
X+11	UH-1H	1	604th TC (S5)	87
X+12	AH-1G	4	388th TC (Retro)	0
X+14	CH-47C	3	388th TC (Retro)	9
X+14	UH-1H	16	RVNAF	71
X+15	UH-1H	3	RVNAF	68
X+16	UH-1H	4	RVNAF	64
X+77	UH-1H	5	RVNAF	59
X+19	UH-1H	9	RVNAF	50
X+22	CH-47C	2	388th TC (Retro)	7
X+26	UH-1H	3	Air America	47
Z+27	UH-1H	10	RVNAF	37
X+27	CH-47C	2	388th TC (Retro)	5
X+30	UH-1H	1	Air America	36
X+31	CH-47C	1	388th TC (Retro)	4
X+35	CH-47C	4	388th TC (Retro)	0
X+37	UH-1H	6	ICCS, Pleiku	30 (1)
X+37	UH-1H	9	12th CAG	21
X+37	UH-1H	5	RVNAF	16 (2)
TOTAL (as of X+37)				148

NOTES: (1) Six UH-1H transferred to ICCS on X-day were subsequently transferred to Air America on X+37. Six additional aircraft were painted and transferred to ICCS from the 60th AHC.

(2) At X+37 16 each UH-1H remained in 17th CAG. These were transferred to VNAF by X+60.

TAB K (RVNAF Transfer from 604th TC Accounts) to Appendix 3
to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

<u>DAY</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ACCOUNT</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
X+14	UH-1H	S3, 5	15
	UH-1H	S2	7
X+16	UH-1H	S2	3
X+22	UH-1H	S2	2
X+26	UH-1H	S2	2
X+27	UH-1H	S2	2
X+31	UH-1H	S2	3
X+36	UH-1H	S2	3
TOTAL (as of X+37)			37

TAB L (Accident Statistics) to Appendix 3 to Annex B to
 USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

<u>ACCIDENTS</u>	
Operational	3
Maintenance	1*
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>3*</u>
<u>INCIDENTS</u>	
Operational	1
FOD	1
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>2</u>
<u>FORCED LANDINGS</u>	
Fuel Control Malfunction	1
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>1</u>
<u>PRECAUTIONARY LANDING</u>	
Hydraulic Failure	7
Chip Detector	5
Master Caution and/or Warning Lights	2
Compressor Stall	3
High Frequency Vibration in Engine	1
Contamination in Fuel Control Filter	1
Transmission Oil Pressure Loss	1
Fuel Control Malfunction	4
Hydraulic Servo Failure	1
Oil Cooler Fan Failure	1
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>26</u>
<u>AVIATION GROUND ACCIDENTS</u>	
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>2</u>

*REMARK: One accident during this reporting period
 had both operational and maintenance causes.

TAB L (Accident Statistics) to Appendix 3 to Annex B to
 USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

POST X - DAY

ACCIDENTS - None

INCIDENTS - None

FORCED LANDINGS - None

PRECAUTIONARY LANDINGS

Transmission Oil Loss	1
Hydraulic Failure	3
Engine Overspeed Due to Governor Failure	<u>1</u>
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>5</u>

<u>AVIATION GROUND ACCIDENTS</u>	<u>1**</u>
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>1</u>

GROUND ACCIDENTS

1/4 Ton Vehicles	3
3/4 Ton Vehicles	<u>1</u>
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>4</u>

**REMARK: One aircraft on being shut down from a pre-flight run-up, spun in the revetment striking the synch elevator and tail stinger against the revetment. There was no intent to fly.

TAB M (US Army Aviation Support Element, Regional Joint Military Commission III) to Appendix 3 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report


The following is a summary of the formation and operations of the detachment.

1. Organization - The Aviation Detachment in support of the Joint Military Commission for supervision of the Viet Nam cease fire was formed on 26 January 1973. The unit under command of Major Alan R. Todd, former executive officer of Eagle Battalion, was comprised of twelve officers and eight enlisted personnel. All personnel were drawn from H Troop (Air), 10th Cav and were chosen on the basis of highest qualification. Since the Unit furnished UH-1H helicopter, six aircraft commanders and six pilots were selected. An NCOIC, Technical Inspector, and six crew chiefs completed the team. With 24 hour notice, the team on the 27th of January picked up specially marked aircraft in Nha Trang and relocated from their home stations at Lane AHP, An Son, to Camp Holloway, Pleiku. During the stay at Camp Holloway, the unit was furnished quarters, mess facilities, given administrative and logistical support by the 17th CAG staff and by Headquarters and Headquarters Company. On 3 March 1973 the unit relocated to Team 21, II Corps Headquarters, Pleiku, where they remained until completion of operations and withdrawal on 30-31 March 1973.
2. Operations - The aviation element's principal support was to six Joint Military Commission Teams located at Phu Cat, Tuy An, Ninh Hoa, Ban Me Thuot, Hau Bon, and Kontum. On 29 January a courier flight was established to travel a circuit visiting every team site on a daily basis. Three other aircraft were prepared as standby everyday and frequently pulled miscellaneous missions. The average number of aircraft flown per day was two. An average of 12 aircraft hours was flown daily. Operational totals are listed as TAB D. These figures are applicable to the first 40 days operation within the total 60 day phase of operation.
3. Maintenance - Maintenance was satisfactorily performed by NHA civilian contract personnel. Six periodic inspections, one per aircraft, were performed usually lasting 3 to 4 days per aircraft. All intermediate inspections were performed in minimum time and did not detract from the mission ready status. A truly commendable performance beyond normal duty expectations was rendered by NHA personnel when the initial color

TAB M (US Army Aviation Support Element, Regional Joint Military Commission III) to Appendix 3 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

scheme of three white stripes for the fuselage and tailboom was deemed ineffective for identification, and protection. Changing colors from white to international orange and adding a stripe was the decision that came from higher echelons. Paint was brought in from Saigon at 1700 hours one evening, and the NHA personnel worked through the night to have sufficient aircraft available for mission requirements the following day. Their hard work and efficiency has contributed greatly to the success of this mission.

B-3-M-2



TAB N (US Army Aviation Support Element, Regional Joint Military Commission IV) to Appendix 3 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

The following summarizes the establishment and operation of the aviation element.

1. Organization - The advance party for the aviation element in support of RJMC IV arrived at Phan Thiet on X-1. The remainder of the party arrived on X-day. The detachment was commanded by CPT Harry Davis, former executive officer of the 201st CAC, and was composed of 9 officers and 7 enlisted men, all drawn from the 201st CAC. The detachment had 4 aircraft. Additionally, a team of 12 NHA civilian maintenance personnel were attached on X+2 in support of the team. The mission of the aviation element was to provide aviation support to RJMC IV throughout Tuyen Duc, Quang Duc, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Binh Tuy, and Lam Dong Provinces.
2. Operations - On X+2, the flight detachment took over Phan Thiet radio and assumed flight following responsibilities for the southern one-third of MR II. Between X-day and X+9 the detachment made various improvements on the Phan Thiet Airfield. One hangar was renovated to provide a maintenance area, the Phan Thiet tower was put into operation, and the PSP on the runway was renovated so that the airfield was once again usable by fixed wing aircraft. On X+12 contact was made by a helicopter team with PRG Elements in Binh Thuan Province at coordinates AN904358 without incident. On X+13, 36 PRG delegates were transported from AN768182 in Binh Thuan Province to Phan Thiet. On X+25 the various delegations were flown to the outlying sites of Bao Loc, Dalat, and Phan Rang. Support to RJMC IV continued until X+60. Operational performance figures through X+40 are contained in TAB D. The aircraft were utilized as follows; logistical missions - 30% of total time, liaison - 55% of total time, cease fire violation inspections - 5% of total time, DRV/PRG support - 10% of total time.
3. Maintenance - Aircraft availability from X-day through X+40 was 97.8%. The detachment had completed 4 PE's by X+40. Reasons for the high availability are as follows: all aircraft were relatively new, both civilian and military maintenance personnel were carefully chosen for the assignment, maintenance personnel had no extra duties, repair parts for the detachment had been given a high priority resulting in no

TAB N (US Army Aviation Support Element, Regional Joint
Military Commission IV) to Appendix 3 to Annex B to
USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

NORS time, and normally only three aircraft were flown per
day allowing a maintenance down day for each aircraft every
fourth day.

TAB O (ICCS Region III Flight Detachment) to Appendix 3 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

The following outlines the activities of the ICCS Flight Detachment from formation through X+40.

1. Organization - Prior to the announcement of a cease fire, a contingency plan had provided for the formation of this detachment. All personnel had been alerted prior to X-day and all aircraft chosen. On X+2, the detachment picked up its six aircraft and became operational. The detachment was commanded by MAJ William W. Holston, 17th Group's former liaison officer with SRAC Headquarters, and was composed of 13 officers and warrant officers, and 8 enlisted men. The 8 enlisted men included 1 NCOIC, 1 Technical Inspector, and 6 crew chiefs. All personnel were drawn from H Troop (AIR), 17th Cav.
2. Operations - From X-day through X+24 there was little of an operational nature for the detachment to do, due to the fact that the ICCS was slow in deploying to the various field sites. This period was used by the detachment to fly to the various outlying locations which would be utilized by the ICCS in order to familiarize the pilots with their area of operations. It also allowed time for the pilots to get proficiency flying time. As the ICCS teams began to arrive in Pleiku, the aviation detachment gave orientation rides to acquaint the members with the capabilities of the vehicle they would be using. From X+25 through X+31 ICCS teams were inserted into the following locations: Kontum, Cheo Reo, Phu Cat, Ban Me Thuot, Tuy An, Qui Nhon, Ninh Hoa, Nha Trang, Duc Co, and Ben Het. The actual insertions were completed without incident. However, an ICCS aircraft received a hit from small caliber ground fire while on a coordination visit prior to inserting the team into Ben Het. As a result of this and similar incidents throughout Vietnam on X+30, beginning on X+31 no further flying of ICCS aircraft was allowed without prior approval by ICCS Headquarters in Saigon. The irony of this situation is that ICCS HQ granted permission for flights into contested areas such as Ben Het and Duc Co, but refused permission for flights into uncontested areas. Overall, the total hours flown in support of ICCS Region III was well below operational capability. The limiting factors on hours flown were the late arrival of ICCS personnel and the restrictions on all ICCS personnel and the restrictions on all ICCS flights which went into effect on X+31. A summary of ICCS operational performance through X+40 is contained at TAB D.

TAB O (ICCS Region III Flight Detachment) to Appendix 3 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

3. Maintenance - Maintenance presented no problems. OR rates remained high, and maintenance support from NHA was excellent.

4. Lessons Learned

a. Observation: It was necessary to replace two enlisted personnel in the detachment for disciplinary reasons.

b. Evaluation: The NCOIC and the OIC of the detachment were not consulted on the selection of personnel. The two individuals in question were apathetic toward the mission of the unit, and their conduct was not in keeping with the high standards required for this duty.

c. Recommendation: All personnel be interviewed by the OIC and/or the NCOIC before selection. Particular attention should be paid to proven ability in the MOS, a desire to accomplish the mission under rigorous conditions, and a proper temperament to work with VIP's.

APPENDIX 4 (164th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to
USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

1. Purpose. To establish a record of activity by the 164th CAG during Pre-standdown, Standdown, and Withdrawal of the unit from the Republic of Vietnam, pursuant to directives received before and after termination of hostilities.

2. General: This report covers the period 1 November 1972 through 14 March 1973 inclusively.

a. Section 1: Significant Organizational Activities.

(1) Pre X-Day Phase (1 November 1972 - 27 January 1973):

(a) Personnel: Key and special category personnel for mission essential duties, critical to the standdown and withdrawal, were identified, briefed, and assigned those duties.

(b) Intelligence/security: The 164th CAG continued to provide personnel and equipment for their assigned sector of base security.

(c) Operations: Tactical and administrative missions continued during this period. Coordination was made with the DRAC Headquarters on required aviation support after X-Day.

(d) Equipment retrograde/turnover: All units conducted an inventory of all organizational and installation property and made general plans for turn-in of property. Certain non-aviation equipment was title transferred to the 4th ALC (ARVN) and hand receipted back to the US units.

(e) Logistics: All special category personnel and the Group S-4 held numerous meetings for planning purposes. Property books, issue functions, and unit supply activities were consolidated into a Central Issue facility.

(f) Transfer of control of air combatant assets: All units conducted extensive inventories of all assets and shortage lists were prepared. Items for retrograde were identified and movement control documents were prepared. Aircraft not to be retrograded were title transferred to VNAF, at Brigade level.

(g) Transfer of functions and reporting: There was no transfer of functions or reporting during this period.

APPENDIX 4 (164th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to
USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(h) Transfer of billeting, bases, installed property and equipment, and other real property: Planning was accomplished to implement the smooth transfer of post, camp, and station (PC&S) property and billets, by publishing a letter of instructions to the using units stating the standards of maintenance and police which would be met.

(2) Standdown Phase (28 January - 4 February 1973):

(a) Personnel: Rosters were prepared showing tentative departure dates of personnel by X-Day. Mission essential personnel were identified and DEROS extensions were requested. Transfer of personnel within the Group was effected to meet mission requirements.

(b) Intelligence security: The 164th CAG continued to provide personnel and equipment for their assigned sector of base security.

(c) Operations: On X-Day, C/16th ceased operations. Units began closing flight records, based on the schedule of personnel departures. The DRAC aircraft requirement was reduced to ten aircraft per day. The Four Party Joint Military Commission (FPJMC) and International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS) flight detachments began operations. CH-47 helicopter support was increased for MR IV and MR III to provide support for the ICCS and FPJMC.

(d) Equipment retrograde/turnover: Several non-aviation items of equipment were returned to the 4th ALC by all units, the majority being from Troop C (Air) 16th Cavalry (C/16th).

(e) Logistics: Provisions were made to turn in TA-50 and personal clothing and equipment to avoid last minute confusion. All personnel were encouraged to ship hold baggage. The Mess facility for C/16th was closed and the books were audited at 1st Aviation Brigade.

(f) Transfer of control of air combatant assets: Movement of OH-6A and AH-1G aircraft for retrograde was initiated. All UH-1 aircraft, assigned to C/16th, were transferred to the 18th CAC.

(g) Transfer of functions and reporting: No changes were made during this period.

APPENDIX 4 (164th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to
USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(h) Transfer of billeting, installed property and equipment, and other real property: Inventory of C/16th PC&S property was completed, preparatory to transferring the buildings to PA&E. Extensive work was done in area police and segregation of unserviceable material and trash.

(3) Withdrawal Phase (5 February - 14 March 1973):

(a) Personnel: The 164th CAG personnel strength continued to decline throughout this phase. The morning report strength of C/16th reached "0" and the unit was inactivated. On X+30, a hold was placed on all personnel movement by higher headquarters, but was later resumed through X+45. On X+45 (14 March 1973) the remaining personnel of the group were transferred to the 18th CAC to facilitate the complete de-activation of the group. The 18th CAC remained operational until X+55. All personnel remaining were cleared and placed on "TDY Enroute" until X+59. All records were closed and turned in through proper channels.

(b) Intelligence/security: The 164th CAG was relieved of Base Security requirements and replaced by Vietnamese Security Forces on X+10. The Army Support Element, Can Tho AAF assumed full responsibility for the Can Tho Base Defense.

(c) Operations: The Group continued to support the DRAC with ten aircraft per day through 27 February 1973. Mission requirements were then reduced to three aircraft per day for the DRAC support. CH-47 support was no longer required in MR IV. Plans were made to support any phase of Operation HOMECOMING through 14 March 1973. All flight records were closed and unit operations stooddown.

(d) Equipment retrograde/turnover: During this phase, the physical movement of all equipment was completed. The transfer and turn-in of all other items was also accomplished.

(e) Logistics: During this phase, property books were cleared and audited. All additional equipment was transferred to the Vinnell PC&S property books.

(f) Transfer of control of air combatant assets: All remaining aviation assets were turned in to the KAPP yard in Saigon; aircraft and tools were transferred to VNAF and Air America.

APPENDIX 4 (164th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to
USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(g) Transfer of functions and reporting: Reporting procedures were terminated with the close-out of all morning reports and air operations.

(h) Transfer of billeting, installed property and equipment, and other real property: The final transfer of PC&S property and billets was accomplished during this period.

b. Section 2: Commander's Observations and Recommendations -
FREDERICK E. COOPER III, LTC, AR.

(1) Pre X-Day Phase (1 November 1972 - 27 January 1973):

(a) Personnel:

Observation: Drawdown prior to the ceasefire and subsequent de-activation of military personnel compelled this Group to use military personnel in administrative and supervisory positions in the 611th TC while contract civilians were utilized to perform the aircraft maintenance.

Evaluation: The 611th TC functioned most efficiently under this system. Adoption of the system has additionally allowed for more soldiers to be reassigned outside the RVN, while the unit continued to accomplish the mission.

Recommendation: Adoption of this type organization for units in combat areas or areas where military strength ceilings are imposed, to include operational aviation units, will allow the Army to continue mission accomplishment while releasing soldiers to be reassigned elsewhere. The decrease in soldier mechanics, substituted by contract US civilians, would allow those assigned military men to be supervisors or in MOS's not suitable for contract.

Command Action: Referred to higher headquarters.

Observation: Based on the impending ceasefire, personnel replacements virtually stopped through the months of November, December, and January, yet units were forced to release personnel for DEROS as the elusive ceasefire date was not sufficient justification to extend said personnel.

Evaluation: Units of the 164th CAG were, at times, forced to operate at manning levels which were less than 60% of their authorized strength and many of the personnel were untrained. This had detrimental effects in the areas of safety, morale, and reduced aircraft availability.

APPENDIX 4 (164th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to
USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

Recommendation: That replacement of personnel continue in sufficient numbers to maintain an adequate manning level for mission accomplishment, or reduce missions commensurate to the number of personnel available. Give the unit commander more authority to retain or release personnel by name.

Command Action: The Group consolidated as many functions as possible; i.e., supply, motor pools, property books, etc., in order to better utilize the available personnel.

(b) Operations:

Observation: Classified, close hold, messages were received concerning the organization of special flight detachments which were to be operational on X-Day.

Evaluation: Both flight detachments (FPJMC and ICCS) could have been organized more efficiently had the security classification of this mission been less stringent. As handled, personnel assigned to these detachments were only vaguely aware of their mission or chain of command.

Recommendation: That a reduced security classification be utilized for messages and operations of this nature, particularly when the establishment and purpose of these organizations were released through the news media long before they were established.

Command Action: Referred to higher headquarters.

(c) Transfer of control of air combatant assets:

Observation: Last minute procedural changes in transfer of Project Enhance Plus equipment made hastily conducted inventories subject to error.

Evaluation: The intent and purpose of the transfer of aviation general support equipment to VNAF under Project Enhance Plus was clearly understood as outlined in the 1st Avn Bde LOI and OPLAN 215. However, on 25 January 1973 (X-3) a requirement was received to provide a list of this equipment, identified by FSN, nomenclature, and quantity considered appropriate for VNAF transfer to G-4, HQ 1st Avn Bde NLT X-1. If said equipment was not on this recorded list, then it would not be transferred under the provisions of Project Enhance Plus. This procedure was not indicated in any previous instructions nor plans made at this level. It required a last-minute, hurried inventory of this equipment to insure that it could be transferred as intended. The plans made and instructions received at this

APPENDIX 4 (164th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to
USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

level were to be effected as stated in the one mentioned LOI. This short suspense requirement was compounded by the fact that units were in the midst of reorganization to meet the requirements for personnel and equipment for future standdown operations and for aviation support of the FPJMC and ICCS.

Recommendation: Plans and coordination should have been made at the appropriate level of command to insure that the required lists were provided in advance. Accurate lists of this type of equipment actually on hand are difficult to obtain under normal operations. When urgent operational requirements exist, as happened during this period, it is even more difficult.

Command Action: Special teams were organized from the applicable units and briefed by the S-4 as to the action required. The lists were prepared and telephonically reported to G-4, 1st Avn Bde.

(2) Standdown Phase (28 January - 4 February 1973):

(a) Personnel:

Observation: Many of the personnel assigned to support the peace-keeping organizations never received briefings.

Evaluation: It was common practice for the chiefs of the special detachments to select personnel with little or no coordination with anyone, including the individual concerned. People were alerted to move on very short notice with no authority from Brigade or 527 PSC.

Recommendation: That personnel be identified and coordination effected with the parent organization and Brigade as a minimum.

Command Action: This group did not permit anyone to move until clearance was received from Brigade and the 527 PSC.

(b) Operations:

Observation: Much emphasis was placed on the special markings of the ICCS and FPJMC aircraft in order to distinguish them as noncombatant aircraft.

Evaluation: It was apparent that hostile forces were unaware of the purpose of these specially marked aircraft, not that it made any difference as later proven when one pilot of a FPJMC ship was fatally wounded on X-Day and an ICCS pilot was wounded on X+31. Other aircraft of these detachments were fired on between these two periods. Some of these problems can be attributed to the security classification of these units prior to their becoming operational.

APPENDIX 4 (164th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to
USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

Recommendation: That the purpose of such flight detachments be disseminated through all known means of communication and far in advance of their becoming operational.

Command Action: Referred to higher headquarters.

Observation: The markings of US aircraft and VNAF aircraft (helicopters) are such that the difference is negligible at any great distance.

Evaluation: Once the ceasefire became effective, specific instructions were issued as to the employment of US Army aviation assets in RVN, and utilization was strictly employed as non-combat support. However, the instructions were classified. Also, no provisions were made to mark the US assets so as to distinguish them from other helicopters owned by VNAF. Such markings could possibly have prevented the loss of a CH-47 helicopter on 16 February 1973 (X+19) which also resulted in four injuries and one death.

Recommendation: That the mission of US assets (non-combat) be disseminated through all known means of communication and that all aircraft be given large, distinguishing markings.

(c) Logistics:

Observation: Lack of communication and control with regard to unserviceable military equipment, property, and trash.

Evaluation: During this phase, the control of trash points and trash trucks was a real problem. Guidance had to be clarified with regard to what should be done with all of the unserviceable US government property that had to be policed up for disposal. Letters of instruction were published containing general guidance on the proper disposition of unserviceable US government property. Commander's guidance was issued on what to do with specific property.

Recommendation: That specific plans and guidance be effected to insure that trash points and trash trucks are controlled. Procedures must be implemented to insure that US property is not allowed to be burned or dumped into the local trash dumps to subsequently arrive on the black market.

Command Action: Unit trash points were closed and consolidated into one trash point per unit. Special teams were organized at the unit level to monitor trash points and sort US property and dispose of it in the appropriate manner.

APPENDIX 4 (164th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to
USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

Observation: Publication and dissemination of information pertaining to standdown operations.

Evaluation: During the pre X-Day time frame, there were many messages, LOI's, and plans written and published. All of this information received or published by the S-4 section was placed in a loose-leaf binder and separated by subject. This provided one central location for material to be researched and referred to as needed. Letters that were published by this headquarters went through normal distribution to units. In some instances, the intent and purpose of these instructions were confused with normal day-to-day operations. This confusion could have been eliminated if each message, LOI, or plan had been identified as a standdown procedure in case of cessation of hostilities in the RVN. A code word to identify these instructions and pieces of correspondence should have been designated and entered in the heading or subject portion of the correspondence.

Recommendations: That plans made and procedures set up for such a non-standard method of turning in or turning over equipment and property, as was accomplished in this standdown operation, be designated by a code word to be applicable to that operation only. That this code word be unclassified and placed in the heading or subject block of all correspondence pertaining to that operation.

(3) Withdrawal Phase (5 February - 14 March 1973):

(a) Personnel:

Observation: Strength accountability figures were based on morning report strength and not present for duty strength.

Evaluation: Numerous personnel reflected on the morning reports assigned strength were not physically present for duty. These personnel were on leave status (out of country), TDY, DTOC, and the hospital. Consequently, these personnel could not be dropped from the strength figures due to lack of orders. Shipping spaces had to be filled with present for duty personnel.

Recommendation: Personnel shipment should be predicated on present for duty strength rather than on assigned strength figures.

Observation: Too many inspections hampered unit performing mission of standdown.

Evaluation: During the standdown and withdrawal phase, unit missions were continually interrupted by numerous inspections.

APPENDIX 4 (164th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to
USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

These inspections could have been reduced in number and achieved the same or better results.

Recommendation: That all inspections be coordinated with higher headquarters and reduced in number.

3. Specific:

a. Section 1: Significant Organizational Activities.

(1) Personnel: Prior to the beginning of this reporting period, preparations were underway to initiate standdown operations upon notification of a ceasefire. Special Category personnel for mission essential duties critical to the stand-down and withdrawal of forces from the RVN were identified and assigned those duties. These personnel were briefed on the details and then allowed to formulate necessary plans applicable to their unit. Some of these key special action personnel included: 4th ALC Liaison Officer; Enhance Plus Project Officer; KAPP Liaison Officer; Newport Liaison Officer; PC&S Property Officer. All officer and senior enlisted assignment preference statements were submitted to the appropriate career branch. Personnel were also identified to form the FPJMC and ICCS flight detachments. On 28 January 1973 (X-Day) the strength of the 164th CAG was as follows:

<u>Officer</u>	<u>Warrant Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Total</u>
65	63	473	601

All units identified mission essential personnel that were to be extended past their DEROS. The personnel were notified and requests for extensions submitted. Personnel on leave or TDY status (R&R, Ordinary Lv, Emergency Lv) were identified. Summary Courts Officers were appointed to insure the personal affairs of these individuals were taken care of and copies of orders forwarded for reassignment. Rosters were submitted with X-Dates assigned for all personnel DEROS's, based upon projected turn-in of equipment and aircraft. Thirty-eight personnel were transferred from C/16th to the 18th CAC to complete personnel requirements for the FPJMC and ICCS flight detachments. Scheduling of personnel to depart was accomplished IAW higher headquarters' guidance as to the number of personnel per day.

All Unit Funds, as well as the domestic hire fund, were closed and turned in to Group Headquarters for audit prior to 8 February 1973. The status of these funds and minimum problems with turn-in,

APPENDIX 4 (164th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to
USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

can be attributed to the Annual General Inspection conducted in January 1973. This inspection enhanced the complete standdown and turn-in of all items of equipment.

Checks and cross-checks were set up to insure that all efficiency reports were submitted during clearing procedures. Other steps to insure smooth flow of personnel included: Consolidation of health and dental records, flight records, central turn-in facility for personal clothing and equipment; and a one-time 100% urinalysis prior to withdrawal. By X+30, the group strength had been reduced to:

<u>Officer</u>	<u>Warrant Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Total</u>
42	34	163	239

The morning report of C/16th was at "O" on 17 February 1973. Some personnel of the 611th TC, 774th Medical Detachment, and 345th Aviation Detachment (Div) were transferred to Headquarters Company, 164th CAG to facilitate clearing of their morning reports and deactivation of the units. All funds were cleared for turn-in after being audited by 1st Avn Bde.

On 14 March 1973 the 164th CAG was deactivated. Seventy-five personnel were still located at Can Tho for real and contingency missions. These personnel were assigned to the 18th Corps Aviation Company until X+55, at which time the morning report was zeroed and all remaining personnel were carried as TDY enroute.

(2) Intelligence/security: Prior to X-Day, the assigned security sector at Can Tho AAF was manned by personnel of C/16th. The duty officer was rotated throughout the group. The 18th CAC maintained responsibility for the internal security of the flight line. A great amount of effort was used to police the perimeter, removing all trash, expended brass, and the Claymore mines. All other equipment was left in place. On 6 February the Army Support Element assumed control and responsibility of this defense sector. The 18th CAC maintained responsibility of flight line security through X+45.

(3) Operations: Tactical and administrative missions continued from 1 November 1972 until 27 January 1973. The major operation underway at the beginning of this period was recovery

APPENDIX 4 (164th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to
USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

of a CH-47, which had been shot down by an enemy SA-7 missile the evening of 31 October 1972 (not covered in last ORLL). Seventeen US personnel were fatally injured and all bodies were recovered. Numerous SA-7 firings were reported during this period but no US assets were hit. Utilization of CH-47 assets was increased in order to prestock supply points for ARVN prior to the ceasefire. Preparations were made to remove US military and civilian personnel from the Delta. Rosters of all such personnel and their location in MR IV were updated, specific areas designated for emergency extraction, and a reconnaissance made of each area. Coordination was made with the DRAC headquarters on mission requirements after the ceasefire. During the reporting period prior to the ceasefire, seven OH-6A aircraft were downed by hostile fire resulting in one fatality and two personnel medically evacuated. By 27 January 1973, two additional flight detachments were formed to support the FPJMC and ICCS.

The effective date of the ceasefire was 0800 hours 28 January 1973. However, enemy initiated hostilities continued. At 0750 hours (X-Day, one 122mm rocket impacted on the south side of the airfield, damaging several buildings, one aircraft, and slightly wounding one US civilian (NHA). The FPJMC flight detachment began operation on this date also in specially marked aircraft. At 0945 hours (X-Day) an 18th CAC aircrew was operating a FPJMC aircraft when it was hit with small arms, automatic weapons fire. One US passenger was wounded in the leg, and the pilot received fatal wounds in the head. Non-combat support were the only missions flown on X-Day. C/16th ceased operations. The 18th CAC supported the DRAC with ten UH-1 aircraft per day and increased the CH-47 support to facilitate setting up sites for the FPJMC and ICCS teams. The AAE, located at the DRAC TOC, was physically moved into the 164th Group TOC on X+5. All missions were accepted, but only those approved by the DRAC G-3 were flown. Over a period of two weeks, this system reduced the daily committed aircraft to seven, with an average of 3.8 hours blade time per day per ship.

During the withdrawal phase, the 164th Group continued to support the DRAC with ten UH-1 aircraft daily (when needed). All CH-47 requirements were either in support of FPJMC or ICCS teams located in MR III or MR IV. On 16 February 1973, a CH-47 was shot down approximately three miles south of An Loc, RVN. ICCS equipment had been off-loaded just prior to the incident.

APPENDIX 4 (164th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to
USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

All crew members were injured and the crew chief subsequently died due to burns received in the crash.

Turn-in of CH-47 aircraft was completed. However, permission could not be obtained to transfer the UH-1's. Each RAC was tasked to retain sufficient assets for an Operation HOMECOMING mission. This requirement remained in effect until X+45. On X+30, the DRAC aircraft requirement was further reduced to three aircraft per day. This level was maintained until X+59.

(4) Equipment retrograde/turnover: Equipment was identified for transfer to VNAF and for retrograde. Special action officers were appointed in each unit and were briefed for handling each type of transfer as required. Prior to X-Day all equipment not to be retrograded were title transferred to VNAF or the 4th ALC (ARVN). Physical movement of this equipment to 4th ALC began on X-Day, initially by C/16th, and continued throughout all phases until the transfer was completed. All OH-6A aircraft were turned in to Newport by 1 February and turn-in of AH-1G aircraft was completed on 8 February 1973. CH-47 helicopters were released for turn-in as their mission was decreased. By 14 February, four had been turned in to Newport. On 16 February, one was destroyed by hostile fire while on an ICCS support mission and one was turned in. By 21 February, two more had been turned in and the remaining two were transferred to the 59th CAC in MR III. By X+45, all equipment (minus some air assets) had been turned in or retrograded. The remaining property book (18th CAC) was cleared by hand receipting the remaining helicopters to the section commander and a certificate of property book clearance issued to the unit by the 1st Avn Bde. Although disposition of equipment was one of the largest areas of the standdown, very few problems were encountered.

(5) Logistics: During the Pre X-Day phase, supplies were becoming more readily available through supply channels. This put units in a much better posture for the phase X+30 - X+45 when they would not be receiving supplies. The 164th CAG began consolidation of all supply operations into the Group S-4 in October 1972 and completed this action prior to 15 January 1973. This also facilitated the transfer of equipment and property to VNAF by only requiring instructions and coordination being made with a limited number of personnel. It also allowed for a much smoother operation of this non-standard turn-in procedure.

APPENDIX 4 (164th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to
USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

On X-Day, all repair parts requests for vehicles were cancelled and deadlined vehicles were the first items turned in. The consolidated supply formulated final procedures for the proper turn-in/turnover of all equipment and property. The necessary paperwork was prepared by the special action teams in the units and checked, verified, and documented appropriately by the supply clerks. The basic plan and function of the consolidated supply concept worked very well to insure that all equipment and property went to the proper activity or agency in accordance with the guidance and instructions from higher headquarters. A method of turn-in of TA-50 was established, and this was accomplished from X+5 - X+10 without problems due to the Central Issue/Turn-in Facility. All "C" rations and basic loads of ammunition were turned in by X+5.

The problem of segregation of serviceable/unserviceable US material from the trash points was greatly underestimated the first two days after standdown. Immediate coordination was made with the Vinnell Corp on disposition of this material and a LOI was sent to the units. Amnesty points were established within the units for all US material. This material was segregated and all serviceable items placed back into the system and unserviceable items moved to the retrograde yard. The numerous trash pick-up points were consolidated at one location. This material was separated to insure government material was not burned or hauled into the civilian community for resale purposes.

On 10 February, C/16th completed turn-in of equipment and their property book was cleared. Property books of the 611th TC, 345th Avn Det (Div), and 774th Med Det were cleared between X+28 and X+32. The property of Hq Co, 164th CAG and 18th CAC was cleared on 16 March. All property books were audited by the 1st Avn Bde HQ prior to release of the commanders.

(6) Transfer of control of air combatant assets: All UH-1 aircraft were title transferred to VNAF at Brigade level. Records of all aircraft assigned to C/16th were corrected and paperwork prepared for retrograde of OH-6A and AH-1G aircraft. UH-1 aircraft of C/16th were transferred to the 18th CAC on X-Day. An inventory of all TO&E line items was conducted and a shortage list was completed for each line item. This was followed by an inventory of post, camp, and station (PC&S) property. All items were tagged and a list by FSN was submitted to the consolidated supply. The aviation related tools

APPENDIX 4 (164th Combat Aviation Group) to Annex B to
USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

of C/16th and armament systems of all aircraft were processed through the KAPP yard in Saigon. Tool sets of the 18th CAC and 611th TC were transferred to VNAF in February and March 1973. Those tools necessary to support the ICCS and FPJMC aircraft were hand receipted back to NHA personnel. The 611th TC float UH-1's were the only aircraft transferred to VNAF prior to X+45. Those aircraft remaining on the 18th CAC property book were hand receipted to the user and the property book cleared by a Certificate from Brigade.

(7) Transfer of functions and reporting: Only three significant transfers of functions occurred during the stand-down. On 6 February 1973, the mess facility of C/16th was closed and responsibility for base security was assumed by the Army Support Element. On 17 February the 18th CAC mess facility was transferred to the 91st Composite Battalion. All reporting procedures terminated with the close-out of unit morning reports.

(8) Transfer of billeting, installed property, and equipment: One hundred percent inventories of all equipment and property were brought up-to-date and the necessary paperwork was prepared. Turn-in/turnover of all equipment and property physically on-hand was completed by the unit special action teams. All buildings were inspected and turned over to PA&E as they were cleared of personnel.

b. Section 2: Commander's Comments: See paragraph 2, Section 2.

Tab: A - JMC Aviation Detachment Tm 4

TAB A (JMC Aviation Detachment Team 4) to Appendix 4 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

1. Purpose: To provide information concerning significant activities of the Joint Military Commission Aviation Detachment Team 4 in support of the Joint Military Commission, Region VII.

2. General: On 26 January 1973, the 164th Combat Aviation Group was instructed to organize and equip a Provisional Helicopter Flight Detachment to support the Joint Military Commission, Region VII. The following synopsis is the actions taken by this unit in an effort to perform its directed mission.

a. Significant Organizational Activities:

(1) X-Day, 28 January 1973, for ease of identification the unit was given a radio call sign of "ZEBRA" and utilized standard military suffixes and individual identification numbers. The aircraft were painted with three white stripes on the tailboom and fuselage. Four aircraft were dispatched for liaison missions. During the course of the daily operations, three aircraft came under intensive enemy ground fire. One of the aircraft, (798), received numerous rounds in the cockpit, resulting in the pilot and one passenger receiving wounds. The pilot, WO1 Dal Pozzo, later died of wounds received during this action.

(2) X+1, 29 January 1973, the unit was given top priority for aircraft parts and equipment; however, this priority was not openly recognized and parts and equipment were still a major problem area at this time. The unit started organizing as a self-sustaining flight detachment.

(3) X+2, 30 January 1973, action was taken to replace WO1 Dal Pozzo. The unit's strength was completed with a total of 13 flight officers and nine enlisted men. Required equipment such as ground vehicles, mechanic's tools, and office equipment were still unobtainable.

(4) X+3, 1 February 1973, the unit received a message from JMC Saigon to change the color of the stripes on the aircraft to International Orange. A similar but somewhat different set of instructions was received through 1st Avn Bde channels. In all, the unit received four separate sets of directives pertaining to the painting of the aircraft.

(5) X+4, 2 February 1973, received another change in the painting of the aircraft. All six aircraft would have four

TAB A (JMC Aviation Detachment Team 4) to Appendix 4 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

orange stripes on tailboom and fuselage. All aircraft were painted by 0100 hours 3 February.

(6) X+5, 3 February 1973, unit was having difficulty with accomplishment of assigned mission, primarily due to receiving instructions from three separate headquarters - 164th CAG, JMC Region VII, and 1st Avn Bde.

(7) X+6, 4 February 1973, normal operations continued.

(8) X+7, 5 February 1973, one vehicle assigned to unit. The vehicle was found to be in very poor operational condition. Difficulties were encountered in identifying billets for the personnel, operations area, and maintenance area. All areas were designated in order to be retained by this unit after the Can Tho Airfield was turned over to the VNAF.

(9) X+8, 6 February 1973, normal operations continued.

(10) X+9, 7 February 1973, an aviation supply system had not been established as of this time, with the exception of avionics. Support received in this area was outstanding.

(11) X+10, 8 February 1973, several last minute changes in mission schedules were made.

(12) X+11, 9 February 1973, normal operations continued from this day until X+60/61. Problem areas were resolved on an individual basis.

(13) As the ICCS became established in its role, an additional requirement was to provide escort/following aircraft to ICCS aircraft to assist in the event of unexpected hostilities. All ZEBRA aircraft commanders were instructed to assist in any way possible.

(14) Medevac missions were performed as needed. With the exception of one late night medevac from Can Tho to Saigon, all missions of this nature were performed in Chau Duc Province, from the province town of Tri Ton.

(15) The detachment flew 660 accident-free hours in support of FPJMC; carried 38,080 lbs of cargo; 2,155 passengers; and provided medevac support for 24 persons through X+75.

TAB A (JMC Aviation Detachment Team 4) to Appendix 4 to Annex B
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

(16) The JMC Aviation Detachment stood down on
29-30 March 1973 and its personnel were withdrawn from the
Republic of Vietnam.

b. Commander's Comment - John C. Donahue, CPT.

Observation: Mission was stabilized and functioning
routinely.

Conclusions: None

ANNEX C (18th Military Police Brigade) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

1. Purpose. To discuss the significant activities and events associated with the redeployment of the 18th Military Police Brigade from the RVN.

2. General. This report describes the activities and actions of the 18th MP Bde and its subordinate units, as well as those of the Office of the Provost Marshal, HQ USARV/MACV SUPCOM, prior to and during redeployment from the RVN. The report covers the period 1 November 1972 thru 28 March 1973 and includes separate discussions where applicable on significant activities occurring in the standdown, withdrawal, and roll-up phases of redeployment. No attempt is made to delineate the dates on which each phase began and ended, since the majority of all activities overlapped throughout the entire redeployment period.

3. Section I - Significant Organizational Activities.

a. Personnel.

(1) Standdown phase. Subsequent to the completion of the final incremental standdown of US Forces in Vietnam on 31 October 1972 (Increment XIV), the 18th MP Bde was faced with a personnel shortage of approximately 10% of the authorized manning level. Military Policemen (MOS 95B) and clerical personnel (MOS 71B) were in shortest supply, and remained so throughout the standdown phase. The number of enlisted replacements programmed for the months of November and December 1972 and January 1973 was sufficient to make up the shortages; however, all of the replacements did not arrive as scheduled. While internal adjustments in the day-to-day operations of the units affected were necessitated by virtue of these shortages, no serious problems were encountered, nor was it necessary to curtail support provided the Area Commanders. Early releases of personnel scheduled for DEROS were sharply curtailed during the standdown phase, particularly in the shortage MOS's, but there was no indication that morale or mission effectiveness suffered as a result.

(2) Withdrawal phase. Personnel redeployments in the Bde were contingent upon the support requirements of the Area Commanders. No attempt was made to unilaterally impose reductions from this headquarters on support rendered the Area Commanders. Rather, coordination was effected through the Area Provost

ANNEX C (18th Military Police Brigade) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

Marshals with their supported headquarters and release schedules developed in agreement with all concerned. Initial adjustments were required upon formation of the US element of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission (JMC); however, the number of military policemen required to support that mission was well within the capability of the Bde to provide without seriously reducing other military police support to the Area Commanders. Additional emphasis on customs control and physical security operations during the withdrawal phase likewise taxed the resources of the Bde, but without serious consequences. A limited number of personnel scheduled for DEROS during the withdrawal period were identified as mission essential and were consequently involuntarily extended for that period of time in which their expertise and services were required. In most cases, the extensions imposed delayed their return to the US for only a few days and in no instance was anyone extended for more than 30 days beyond normal DEROS.

(3) Roll-up phase. The number of personnel required in certain areas of support during the last few days of redeployment fluctuated several times during withdrawal, primarily as a result of uncertainty surrounding the extent of support required for such missions as Operation HOMECOMING and security of the JMC. The release schedule for Phase Tiger, the last 15 days of redeployment, changed frequently, depending upon the progress being made in the release of POW's, additional requirements imposed upon Area Commanders, etc., resulting in considerable uncertainty throughout the bulk of the withdrawal phase. Once solidified, however, no further difficulties were encountered. Personnel with special skills required during the final days of withdrawal were transferred from departing units to units remaining in-country to preclude any loss in continuity of support. This procedure proved particularly effective in the case of confinement operations, serious incident reporting, and physical security. Military police were required in the Saigon area until the last day of redeployment to provide security for COMUSMACV, provide on-call military police patrol response, maintain a detention capability, and report serious incidents to higher headquarters.

b. Equipment retrograde/turnover. The procedures established in "Project Enhance Plus", wherein certain items of equipment were identified for retrograde and others for transfer to VNAF

ANNEX C (18th Military Police Brigade) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

proved to be particularly effective in accomplishing this portion of the redeployment mission. Turn-in/transfer documentation was prepared in advance so that accountability could be transferred immediately upon designation of the receiving agency or when the equipment was no longer considered mission essential. By clearing the property books and thereafter retaining required equipment on a hand receipt basis from GVN or US contractor operated supply facility, units were able to have their property books audited and destroyed well in advance of the unit inactivation/redeployment date. Property books were also consolidated by military region, further reducing the scope of the problem and expediting final clearance.

c. Intelligence/security.

(1) Intelligence. No significant impact on Bde operations was noted in matters of intelligence. Destruction of nonessential classified documents was accomplished throughout the redeployment period and no security problems were noted. Instructions received from higher headquarters for the forwarding of classified records were completely adequate and permitted orderly and timely purging of the classified files. Area Provost Marshals maintained a steady flow of police intelligence through established contacts with the National Police, Police Field Forces, and VNAF Military Police, resulting in several apprehensions of individuals engaged in theft of government property.

(2) Security. As anticipated, requirements for additional military police personnel to augment security forces at numerous activities/installations were received throughout the redeployment period. These requirements included such diverse missions as military police security for the Joint Military Commission, security of facilities identified for the International Commission for Control and Supervision, escorting large amounts of cash, convoy escorts, static security at sensitive facilities, and provision of VIP security for such dignitaries as the Vice President of the United States. At times the requirements for additional security personnel dictated the temporary reduction or suspension of other routine military police functions, such as discipline, law and order; however, no difficulties were encountered as a result of these intensified security operations. As soon as the high priority, short-term security missions were terminated, routine operations were once again resumed.

ANNEX C (18th Military Police Brigade) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

d. Operations. Military police resources in Vietnam were involved in a broad spectrum of operations throughout the redeployment period. Priorities shifted frequently, depending upon the requirements received from supported commanders and the resources remaining to do the job. Of special interest was the effect that redeployment had on the following military police functions:

(1) Discipline, law and order. The intensity of military police efforts devoted to the maintenance of discipline, law and order throughout the command was not significantly diminished during the period 1 November 1972 to X-Day on 28 January 1973. Steps were taken, however, during that period of time to prepare for increased efforts in such specialized military police activities as customs control, physical security, VIP security, and Operation HOMECOMING. In some instances, major efforts were expended on conducting combined raids in cooperation with National Police in high incident areas in an attempt to locate and apprehend any deserters who may have been hiding out in such areas. In all instances, the resources available to perform the myriad functions required were allocated proportionately in consonance with the priorities established and at no time were the military police support elements unable to provide the requested support. Flexibility became the hallmark of day-to-day military police operations, and responsiveness to requirements imposed in many cases on very short notice was literally immediate. As more and more military policemen redeployed together with supported elements in the field, the discipline, law and order function reverted to an on-call basis limited to responding to requests for assistance. No problems were encountered with this approach, however, since the reductions in support were closely tied to the release of the bulk of US Forces in each area.

(2) Physical security. The physical security of installations/facilities remaining in-country under US Government control subsequent to the withdrawal of all US Forces was a matter of considerable concern during the early phases of redeployment. The Defense Attache Office (DAO) assumed responsibility for contractual and physical security functions formerly performed by USARV/MACV SUPCOM. To insure that the physical security requirements of each residual installation/facility were properly identified, a list of all residual contractor operated facilities was obtained from various staff agencies and a schedule of inspections developed. A survey team

ANNEX C (18th Military Police Brigade) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

from the Physical Security Branch of the Office of the Provost Marshal, USARV/MACV SUPCOM then moved out into the field to conduct on-site inspections and provide comments and recommendations designed to serve as the basis for modifying existing contracts. As the surveys were processed, copies were provided the on-site physical security officer or other contractor representative, the parent or responsible staff agency, and the DAO. In those cases where additional security measures or personnel resources were needed to meet minimum security requirements, appropriate provisions were made for modifying the contracts and/or for required construction based on the findings and recommendations of the surveying officers. Consequently, the physical security surveys provided the necessary information with which to fulfill an on-going requirement even after all US Forces were gone. Technical advice and assistance on physical security matters were provided DAO through the Office of the PM, USARV/MACV SUPCOM throughout the redeployment period, resulting in a smooth transition from military to civilian security operations.

(3) Confinement. Confinement operations in-country were reduced in scope over a period of several months prior to commencement of redeployment and, on X-Day, the total prisoner population stood at 11. Engineer assistance was obtained to construct a temporary facility at Pershing Field in Saigon suitable for use as both a transient stockade and a detention facility to enable early closeout of the USARV Installation Stockade (USARVIS) at Long Binh. The responsiveness provided by the Engineers enabled the confinement functions of USARVIS at Long Binh to be transferred to Saigon ahead of schedule on 17 February 1973. On that date, two prisoners remained in confinement. The facility at Long Binh was then prepared for release to the GVN and formerly transferred on 22 February for tentative use as a National Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation Center. Qualified confinement specialists from USARVIS were relocated to the Saigon area to operate the transient stockade until the termination of all courts-martial in-country. The Pershing Field site retained the capability of detaining personnel throughout the redeployment period and proved to be completely adequate for the mission. No significant problems were encountered in confinement operations at any time during the redeployment period.

(4) Processing of AWOL/Deserters. Considerable speculation concerning the number of AWOL/Deserters that could be expected

ANNEX C (18th Military Police Brigade) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

to return to military control upon commencement of withdrawal of all US Forces from the RVN led to the development of detailed plans and procedures for handling the problem. Due to the lack of any concrete information on the number and probable location of individuals reported to be in an AWOL or desertion status from Vietnam, worst-case planning was accomplished to preclude any last-minute difficulties from developing. Initially, more than 1,600 individuals were listed on various rosters as being AWOL or in desertion status on morning reports of units in the RVN. A major coordination effort was therefore initiated with the US Army Deserter Information Point at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, during the period November 1972 to January 1973 to review the status of every individual on the rosters and purify the list, leaving only names of persons still absent. That effort reduced the list by approximately 50%. A Letter of Instruction concerning the administrative processing of AWOL/Deserters was then prepared and distributed to the field in advance of X-Day, outlining the procedures to be followed by apprehending military police personnel, the 90th Replacement Battalion (the unit to which all deserters were assigned), and other USARV staff elements concerned. Additionally, a USARV/MACV SUPCOM operations plan for handling large numbers of deserters surfacing after a ceasefire was published on 18 January 1973. As anticipated, however, the plan never had to be implemented since only a trickle of deserters were received. The procedures developed and the facilities available for processing AWOL/Deserters proved to be completely adequate and no difficulties were encountered in what was originally anticipated as a potential major problem area.

(5) Customs control. With the announcement on 26 October 1972 of an impending ceasefire, immediate steps were taken to train additional military police customs inspectors to cope with the anticipated increase of household goods/unaccompanied baggage (HHG/UB) at transportation facilities throughout the RVN. In anticipation of a negotiated settlement, the amount of HHG/UB processed during the month of November alone increased by 100%. To meet the additional workload, the number of customs inspectors was doubled and the working hours of the facilities were extended. Additionally, a Provost Marshal Customs Bulletin was developed and provided to each PM transportation facility and customs inspector. Designed to serve as refresher training, this document addressed the standards, policies, requirements, and

ANNEX C (18th Military Police Brigade) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

conduct of customs control activities at the HHG/UB facilities. Weekly checks of the HHG/UB facilities were made by USARV/MACV SUPCOM PM staff customs officers and each facility was visited by the Bureau of Customs Operations Officer and certified as acceptable by the Bureau. Certificates of achievement were also presented to each MP customs inspector by the Bureau of Customs in recognition of his efforts. Customs inspection of personnel departing the country by air as well as all air cargo was conducted by AF customs inspectors, while AG postal personnel inspected the mail. Customs control activities at Army-operated water ports had been discontinued due to standdown of the Joint Customs Group, and constituted a gap in the inspection of waterborne cargo and personnel. The lack of coverage for this short period created no significant problems since all shipments arriving in CONUS from RVN were inspected by Bureau of Customs agents prior to being released. The USARV/MACV SUPCOM PM staff customs officer, in coordination with Bureau of Customs representatives, conducted a special training session for customs inspectors, both military and civilian, at the water port at Newport. This helped insure that retrograde equipment and other cargo were free of contraband, thus reducing the customs burden at ports of debarkation. Further, it facilitated the transfer of customs inspection/examination responsibilities from military to civilian personnel during the final stages of withdrawal.

(6) Serious incident reporting. Serious incident reporting continued routinely throughout the entire redeployment period. While a steady decline in the total number of SIR's took place, incidents involving the theft of US Government property increased. Vehicle larcenies constituted the majority of these losses, with 5-ton tractors and 1/4-ton vehicles being the most popular targets. Robberies of persons, another problem area, occurred most frequently in the Saigon area, particularly in the vicinity of bachelor officer/enlisted quarters. The subjects in the vast majority of these cases were local nationals and relatively few were able to be identified and apprehended. Cases involving local national subjects were either transferred to GVN police agencies or closed when identification of the subjects was impossible to ascertain. Following the ceasefire, a concerted effort was made on the part of the Vietnam Field Office, 4th Region, US Army Criminal Investigation Command (VFO), to complete CID reports of investigation of serious incidents reported to Department of the Army. This enabled

ANNEX C (18th Military Police Brigade) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

the Serious Incident Report Section to close out almost all DA SIR's prior to standdown. On X+58 (27 March 1973), responsibility for submitting supplemental and terminal DA SIR's on those few cases remaining open was transferred to CINCUSARPAC and, concurrently, responsibility for reporting serious incidents occurring subsequent to X+58 was transferred to the DAO.

(7) Criminal investigations. While this command exercised no direct control over the activities of the Vietnam Field Office, 4th Region, US Army Criminal Investigation Command (VFO), the extent of cooperation and support provided by the CDR, VFO (LTC Siegel) and his staff left virtually nothing to be desired and assured that complete criminal investigative support was maintained in every area until all USARV/MACV SUPCOM forces were redeployed. Close and continuous coordination with the VFO staff and resident agents located throughout the country was maintained by this headquarters and the Area PM's, enabling all but the most complex criminal cases to be resolved prior to redeployment. Daily briefings of the USARV/MACV SUPCOM PM by LTC Siegel insured that the command was kept fully informed of the status of each case as it developed and at no time were any difficulties encountered.

e. Logistics. Unit supplies and equipment not considered mission essential were prepared for turn-in prior to X-Day. A 100% inventory of all unit property was conducted early in the standdown phase to preclude later difficulties in closing out or transferring property and records. Unit supply and maintenance personnel maintained close and continuous liaison with supporting logistical elements in each MR to insure uninterrupted support even after many of the logistical activities were transferred to civilian contractors. Shortly after X-Day, all excesses and selected accountable items were turned in, along with basic loads of Class I and Class V. The requirement for repair parts for vehicles was minimized by retaining the vehicles in best condition for operational missions and turning in the ones with mechanical deficiencies. Additionally, considerable emphasis was placed on the preventive maintenance program to further reduce the likelihood of mechanical breakdown. Supplies and items of equipment on-hand in the units were reduced in proportion to the declining troop strength and no major logistical difficulties were encountered.

f. Transfer of control of air combatant assets. Not applicable.

ANNEX C (18th Military Police Brigade) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

g. Transfer of functions and reporting.

(1) The remaining functions of the USARV/MACV SUPCOM Provost Marshal's office were scheduled to be transferred on X+50 to CDR, 716th MP Battalion (LTC Cottrell) concurrent with the inactivation of the 18th MP Bde. Since limited military police support to COMUSMACV and MACV Special Troops was required in the Saigon area subsequent to X+50 and no MP support was to have been required outside the Saigon area, it was felt that the CDR, 716th MP Bn could serve as PM, USARV/MACV SUPCOM during the final days of redeployment in addition to his normal responsibilities as PM, MACST and CDR, 716th MP Bn. The decision to retain the bulk of US Forces remaining in VN until the final list of POW's was received, however, resulted in the continued operation of the USARV/MACV SUPCOM PM office until the last day of redeployment, negating the requirement for transfer of PM functions to the 716th MP Bn. The 716th MP Bn retained responsibility for security of COMUSMACV, provision of discipline, law and order in the Saigon area on an on-call basis, operation of a detention facility, and the reporting of serious incidents. Qualified personnel were transferred from their former units to provide continuity of expertise in the specialized areas of serious incident reporting and the transfer of detained personnel. This procedure enabled the limited remaining staff of the 716th MP Bn to assume these functions with no difficulty. A three-man criminal investigative element was also retained in the Saigon area until all troops were redeployed to handle any criminal cases occurring during the final days of withdrawal. All property required by the residual elements during the last few days in-country was title transferred to either ARVN or residual US agencies prior to standdown and maintained on hand receipt until no longer required, at which time it was returned to the owning agency. Administrative actions, such as preparation of final morning report entries, were accomplished in advance to preclude any last-minute delays in closing the headquarters out, and no unforeseen difficulties were encountered.

(2) A limited number of PM functions were assumed by the DAO during the withdrawal phase. The administrative processing of AWOL/Deserters who turned themselves in or were apprehended by civilian or military authorities became a DAO function on X+40. Detailed instructions on the procedures required to evacuate deserters to CONUS for appropriate action

ANNEX C (18th Military Police Brigade) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

were provided DAO by this office and the USARV/MACV SUPCOM, AG. Additionally, updated copies of deserter rosters were provided to DAO, the American Embassy, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC), and the USARPAC PM to insure that the latest available information was in the hands of all agencies who might encounter deserter personnel. Procedures for telephonic confirmation from the US Army Deserter Information Point in Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana of the status of any military personnel who are recovered but do not appear on the deserter rosters were also provided to DAO to preclude delays in determining the status of such personnel. Although agreement was reached with DAO for assumption of responsibility for administrative processing of deserter personnel on X+40, the decision to retain the bulk of US Forces remaining in VN until the final list of POW's was received resulted in continued processing of deserters by the USARV/MACV SUPCOM PM and AG rather than by DAO throughout the entire redeployment period.

(3) To insure that the DAO was provided with an accurate picture of the physical security posture of all US Government contractor operated installations/facilities remaining in-country, copies of all physical security surveys conducted at those activities were provided DAO by this office. The findings and recommendations of the surveying officers were used as a basis for modifying existing contracts to upgrade the security and reduce the likelihood of losses from theft and pilferage. In the Saigon area, security of numerous compounds, BOQ's, BEQ's, and similar activities formerly provided by the 716th MP Bn became the responsibility of DAO on X+30. Local national guards were employed through contractors and trained on-site during a period of overlap to insure complete familiarity with their functions prior to assuming the responsibility on their own.

(4) The only residual function transferred to the USARPAC PM office was the preparation of supplementary and terminal serious incident reports on criminal cases transferred to CID elements in USARPAC for continued investigation. The USARV/MACV SUPCOM Deputy PM was placed on temporary duty to USARPAC HQ in Hawaii for the purpose of briefing the USARPAC PM and staff on the redeployment activities. The briefing was designed to provide the USARPAC PM staff with the opportunity to discuss any aspect of the redeployment operation as well as to leave them with written briefs covering every aspect of the

ANNEX C (18th Military Police Brigade) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

withdrawal. Frequent contact was maintained between the two offices throughout the withdrawal period and daily telephone calls were made beginning X+40 to insure that the USARPAC PM staff was kept fully informed on the progress of redeployment during the final days.

h. Transfer of billeting, bases, installed property and equipment, and other real property. As was the case with equipment retrograde/turnover, the procedures established to insure timely and orderly transfer of facilities were well thought out and easily executed. As agencies were identified to assume responsibility for the various facilities, offices, and selected items of post, camp and station property, transfer documentation was prepared, joint inventories were conducted, and accountability transferred to the gaining activity. Hand receipts were prepared to permit continued utilization of the facilities and equipment until the units/activities closed out. Transfer of the USARV Installation Stockade to the GVN for use as a National Alcohol and Drug Rehabilitation Center was effected with no difficulty whatsoever and the facility was received with much enthusiasm by representatives of the Vietnamese Ministry of Health.

4. Section II - Commander's Observations/Recommendations:
HENRY H. GERECKE, COL, MPC

a. Standdown phase.

(1) The planning guidance received in both the COMUSMACV OPLAN J215 and the USARV/MACV SUPCOM OPLAN 215 was, for the most part, exceptionally complete, thorough and well thought out. Despite the fact that much of the planning done was, of necessity, based upon assumptions that did not always prove to be valid, the vast majority of the procedures established in the original plans proved invaluable in implementing redeployment once the negotiations were completed in Paris. Modifications in the plans, particularly in the area of troop withdrawals, were anticipated all along and created no major problems in revising redeployment schedules. Procedures established to insure expeditious processing of awards, issuance of reassignment instructions, disposition of records, and similar administrative matters were particularly noteworthy and of inestimable value to both unit commanders and staff agencies as well. The confusion

ANNEX C (18th Military Police Brigade) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

created by the numerous changes in the postal service schedule, however, affected both personnel of the command and their correspondents in CONUS and was not in consonance with the concept of orderly redeployment.

(2) Although the vast majority of all potential problem areas associated with redeployment were identified early in the planning phase and procedures were developed to preclude any major difficulties, there were a limited number of unforeseen problems which required last-minute resolution. The first of these concerned the support of the Four Party Joint Military Commission (JMC). Due to the extremely sensitive nature of the peace negotiations, information on the amount of support which would be required by the US element of the JMC was kept extremely "close hold" at higher headquarters until public announcement of the agreement was made. Consequently, the JMC, which began operations almost immediately after the ceasefire went into effect, was literally authorized a "blank check" in obtaining the personnel, equipment and facilities required to become operational. Since a period of several days went by before some of the equipment could be provided by the GVN to support the JMC, US equipment was initially utilized in some areas to assist in bringing the JMC Teams to an early state of preparedness. The guidance received regarding assistance to be provided was "support now and straighten out the kinks later." Considerable effort was required, however, to resolve the problem of accountability of equipment after it had already been provided to the JMC. While procedures were eventually established to resolve the matter, an inordinate amount of time was required to pin down responsibility for relieving the units providing the equipment of their accountability. The severe security constraints under which the JMC had to be established created many such problems, particularly in matters requiring extensive coordination with other headquarters and agencies; however, it is recognized that the limitations imposed were necessary and completely unavoidable due to the political sensitivity of the ceasefire negotiations.

(3) A second unforeseen situation developed during the transfer of responsibility for logistical and other support activities from military to civilian agencies. Contracts awarded to civilian firms engaged in residual support functions did not, in most cases, contain adequate provisions for security of US Government property. For the most part, government contracts in VN were written at a time when US military personnel

ANNEX C (18th Military Police Brigade) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

were providing much of the security for government furnished equipment. Consequently, contractors were ill-equipped to assume responsibility for security upon disengagement of US Forces. Had this problem been identified earlier, much last-minute effort to develop security specifications for incorporation into contracts could have been avoided. In most cases, the contractors did not possess the in-house resources needed to evaluate their own security requirements, nor was there adequate manpower or technical expertise available at the Area PM level to overcome this deficiency. The approach taken to attack this problem was the formation of a task force of four qualified MP officers from the Physical Security Branch, USARV/MACV SUPCOM PM office, who were dispatched throughout the country to survey the residual sites and submit comments and recommendations for modification of the existing contracts to improve the level of physical security where required. This task force assisted greatly in reducing the magnitude of the problem, but would have been far more effective had the problem been identified and the inspections conducted much earlier.

b. Withdrawal phase.

(1) Considerable uncertainty surrounding the release of personnel during the withdrawal phase was created by several unexpected events. The delay in the release of the second group of POW's from North Vietnam led to modifications in the Operation HOMECOMING support concept, thus increasing the number of military police personnel required by Area Commanders. Later developments made it apparent that these additional personnel would no longer be required and the release schedules were again modified. As pointed out previously, MP support requirements for the JMC also changed frequently throughout the withdrawal phase, although no serious problems were created as a result of these changes. Personnel were anxious for assignment to any agency which might give them a potential opportunity for assisting in any way with the repatriation of US POW's. Each time a requirement for additional personnel was received, there were more volunteers for the assignment than were needed to fill the vacancies. The eagerness and enthusiasm shown for this aspect of the redeployment operation was both highly unique and extremely heartwarming.

(2) No significant administrative or logistical problems were encountered during the withdrawal phase. Unit inactivations

ANNEX C (18th Military Police Brigade) to USARV/MACV, SUPCOM
After Action Report

were accomplished ahead of the original schedule in many cases by transferring personnel from two or more units into one and by consolidating the administrative and logistical functions to the maximum extent possible. This technique resulted in considerable manpower savings and greatly reduced the administrative workload of the units concerned. As property books and unit funds were closed out or transferred, required audits were immediately conducted to expedite unit inactivations.

(3) The three separate PM Detachments of the Brigade (90th, 177th and 178th) were inactivated on X+15 (12 Feb 73) and the assigned personnel transferred to their supporting MP units. The 284th MP Company was inactivated on X+30 (27 Feb 73) after the USARV Installation Stockade was closed down. Personnel formerly assigned to that unit who were required to operate the newly established USARV/MACV SUPCOM Transient Stockade at Pershing Field in Saigon; provide security and escort guard service for the USARV/MACV SUPCOM Drug Treatment Center and the US Army Hospital, Saigon; and provide MP support to MR III were transferred to HHD, 18th MP Bde. The 483rd MP Platoon, located at Can Tho in MR IV, was the next unit to inactivate in-country on X+50 (19 Mar 73). The 615th MP Company at DaNang in MR I was inactivated in-country on X+50 (19 Mar 73). On that same date, HHD, 18th MP Brigade completed standdown. The unit colors were escorted to Oakland Army Terminal, California, for inactivation upon redeployment of the remainder of US Forces from Vietnam. The colors of the 560th MP Company, the unit in support of MR II, were mailed to Fort Monroe, Virginia, on X+55 (24 Mar 73) to replace an existing MP Company at that installation. The 716th MP Battalion was the last to leave, on X+58, (27 Mar 73), when its colors were escorted to Fort Riley, Kansas, to replace an existing MP Battalion at that installation. On the same day, the Vietnam Field Office, 4th Region, US Army Criminal Investigations Command was inactivated in-country. All open CID cases were forwarded to CONUS, along with the related evidence for continued investigation and processing.

c. Roll-up phase.

(1) MP missions, unlike those of many other supporting activities, were not capable of termination on a given date so that the units could devote their efforts solely to wrapping up and going home. Rather, unit operational capabilities remained in effect on a limited scale, while administrative and logistical personnel closed out the unit headquarters and transferred the remaining property and equipment. Certain military police functions, however, such as customs inspection of household goods and unaccompanied baggage, registration of weapons, and

ANNEX C (18th Military Police Brigade) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

routine patrol activities were either terminated entirely or placed on an on-call basis to permit maximum redeployment of personnel while concurrently retaining a response capability.

(2) The final 15 days of redeployment were characterized by constant change and uncertainty surrounding the release schedule for POW's. Each new development brought about yet another revision in the redeployment concept and completely nullified all original planning for the final phase. Rather than revise unit standdown/inactivation schedules, however, personnel required for continued support of Area Commanders were either placed on TDY to the Regional Assistance Commands en route to their new duty stations or were held in an in-transit status until they were redeployed. The remainder of the unit personnel were placed in replacement channels and held until redeployment resumed. This procedure allowed units to stand down and inactivate as scheduled. In the Military Regions outside Saigon, MP's assigned to the JMC were retained for security duties throughout the entire redeployment period, providing support until the very end. Since these individuals had been transferred to the JMC early in the withdrawal phase, the 18th MP Bde had no responsibility for their redeployment or support, thus eliminating any potential problems associated with the last-minute release of these personnel from the RVN. Finally, arrangements for turnover of the few remaining facilities, offices, and post, camp and station property were made well in advance of the final release dates for the roll-up elements, enabling a smooth, rapid turnover of all remaining property on the last day of departure. By the time the roll-up period came around, such procedures had been exercised so frequently that they became a matter of routine for the final contingent of personnel.

ANNEX D (US Army Engineer Group, Vietnam) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

1. Purpose. To provide details of significant activities relating to redeployment of the US Army Engineer Group, Vietnam (USARENGRGPV).

2. General.

a. The period of 10 November 1972 to 28 March 1973 was characterized by numerous changes. Flexibility and adaptability were also characteristic of this redeployment planning and execution period. The Engineer Group was in the final phases of Increment XIV which ultimately decreased military staffing to 100 spaces by 1 December 1972.

b. The Engineer Group Headquarters completed its relocation to Tan Son Nhut from Long Binh on 10 November 1972. By this time all of the region engineers had ceased functioning as a separate TDA element and were on the morning report of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, USARENGRGPV.

c. Personnel were assigned in the following general functional areas: Administration, contingency planning, facilities engineering support and provision of high voltage power, retrograde of high dollar value engineer equipment, real property management, and base transfers.

d. Upon redeployment of all Engineer Group personnel, residual functions were accomplished by the newly organized Engineer Branch, Army Division, Defense Attache Office. The USARENGRGPV was deactivated on 28 March 1973.

e. Details of specific activities occurring during the cited period are provided in the following paragraphs.

3. Significant Activities.

a. Reorganization.

(1) Based on the incremental drawdown of US forces, major reorganizations of the USARENGRGPV occurred in September and December 1972. The final organization resulted in a staffing of 100 military, 40 DAC's, and 950 local national personnel.

(2) In December 1972, the three engineer elements in Vietnam were reorganized into one organization. Planning for the

ANNEX D (US Army Engineer Group, Vietnam) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

post-ceasefire period and command management decisions brought about the consolidation of all engineer organizations and accompanying functions remaining in RVN. Representatives from the three cognizant organizations (MACV Engineer Advisory Division, MACDL-43, and USARENGRGPV) formed a planning group in October and November to work out the details. This consolidation of all MACV and USARV engineer resources resulted in the creation of the MACV Command Engineer position and the Engineer Branch, Army Division, DAO. The Engineer Branch DAO was transferred all responsibilities for engineer support to include such functions as facilities engineering and retrograde of engineer equipment.

(3) More details concerning reorganization are at Appendix 1.

b. Facilities Engineering (FE) Support.

(1) Facilities engineering support, the primary mission of the USARENGRGPV, that was provided after 10 November 1972 was severely reduced in scope. Base closures, redeployment, and relocation of troop units cultivated an atmosphere of change in which flexibility was the byword. The uncertainties associated with the ceasefire required more frequent and detailed analysis of job order requests. During the first week in November, for example, all minor new construction projects that had been submitted to the engineer for command approval were analyzed and continued or cancelled on the basis of the analysis. Normal FE support continued at all installations; however, in most cases, it was restricted to "breakdown" type services except in bases which had been identified as residual. The FE contractor was directed to establish a training program by 1 December 1972 which would insure ARVN's self-sufficiency in operating and maintaining the equipment being transferred with each base. The program included power generation equipment, water and sewage systems, and air conditioners. The FE contractor, through a contract modification, continued to provide FE services to VNAF until the appropriate training had been completed.

(2) The region engineers and their staffs reverted more to contract management and supervision as COR's. On 24 January 1973, however, the involvement of the region engineers increased again with the requirement to support the peace-keeping commissions (refer to paragraph e).

ANNEX D (US Army Engineer Group, Vietnam) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

(3) More details concerning FE support are at Appendix 2.

c. Transfer of Real Property.

(1) In the 6-10 November time frame, real property under control and management of the USARENGRGPV was transferred in title only to ARVN and Embassy/USAID. The system for title transfer was devised by a task force consisting of representatives from MACV, USARV, and the Engineer Group. Long Binh, once the largest US logistics complex in the RVN, was transferred in November 1972 and was a classic example of a well planned and executed base transfer action. After 10 November and through the end of February 1973, joint inventories were conducted which completed the base transfer action. At the beginning of the ceasefire, there were a total of 82 leases and 256 separate facilities. Approximately 70% of the leases were terminated and the balance transferred to the US Embassy/USAID and the DAO. Approximately 95% of the facilities were transferred to ARVN with the balance going to the US Embassy/USAID.

(2) More details concerning transfer of real property are at Appendix 3.

d. Retrograde of High Dollar Value Engineer Equipment.

(1) High Voltage Generators: In September 1972, a high voltage generator retrograde plan was finalized and submitted to MACV and ARVN JGS for concurrence. The finalized plan called for the systematic retrograde of high voltage generators and ancillary equipment at the maximum rate possible while still maintaining sufficient power resources for regional US and free world military forces, and projected VNAF base utilization. In several cases, commercial power connections and installation of low voltage generators were planned to allow for retrograde of all high voltage generators at certain installations. Since 1 November, 57 generators valued at over \$9.6 million have been retrograded (prior to 1 November 38 had been shipped). The current retrograde program scheduled to end in June 1973 will result in a total of 129 high voltage generators being shipped. The DAO will continue the retrograde of the remaining 34 generators.

(2) T-2 Power Barges: The T-2 power barges are World War II vintage tankers that have been modified and refurbished

ANNEX D (US Army Engineer Group, Vietnam) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

into floating power plants. The four remaining power barges in the RVN are the Kennebago and Tamalpais (Nha Trang) and the Caney and SeBee (Vung Tau). Just prior to the ceasefire, USARV coordinated with the Air Force on an AF-funded project to expand an existing VNAF power plant at Nha Trang, utilizing USARV furnished generators and ancillary equipment. This project is scheduled for completion on or about 7 May. Upon completion of the VNAF power plant extension, the Kennebago and Tamalpais will be moved from service. At Vung Tau, a commercial power hookup has been completed and the contractor (PA&E) is currently installing low voltage generators to accommodate frequency sensitive loads. Upon completion of the installation of the low voltage generators, the Caney and Sebee will be removed from service. The DAO Engineer will be responsible for disposition and retrograde of the power barges.

(3) In November 1972, there were actions underway to provide for retrograde of the five DeLong piers located in the RVN. One pier was located at Qui Nhon, three were at Cam Ranh Bay (CRB) and one was at Vung Tau. As a result of the announcement of the imminence of a ceasefire, the retrograde plan was modified. The piers at Qui Nhon were critical to redeployment of Republic of Korea Forces (ROKF). One of the piers (No. 5) at CRB was released for retrograde in December 1972 and, by 24 February 1973, had been dismantled and was enroute to CONUS via Singapore. The second pier at CRB and the pier at Qui Nhon are presently being dismantled by the Dae Lim Industrial Co., Ltd. of Seoul, Korea, and completion is scheduled for 5 June 1973. Sealand Corporation will dismantle the third and last pier at CRB beginning in June 1974. Alaska Barge and Transport (AB&T) began retrograde of the Vung Tau pier on 20 March 1973. The DAO Engineer is monitoring all remaining retrograde actions.

(4) More details concerning retrograde of high dollar value engineer equipment are at Appendix 4.

e. Support to the Joint Military Commission (JMC) and International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS).

(1) Planning guidance issued to this headquarters prior to X-Day did not include requirements to provide facilities engineering support to the JMC/ICCS. Between 24-27 February, requirements for support developed, which necessitated immediate response by the region engineers and their available workforce. Of necessity, the work had to be completed rapidly and the

I
ANNEX D (US Army Engineer Group, Vietnam) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

construction had to be functional and unsophisticated. Standards for construction were established by the group for each type facility (messhall, billets, conference room, latrine, etc.). The posture and flexibility of the USARENGRGPV were instrumental in obtaining immediate responses to requests for construction or renovation. With military, contractor, and local national personnel already strategically positioned, construction began within 24 hours after requirements had been identified. Within two weeks, all but two of the 14 region sites had been completed. Concurrently, concepts for upgrade of 52 JMC/ICCS team sites and 12 control points were developed and, as soon as specific requirements had been identified, construction and repair work began. Paramount in this critical work was a sense of urgency associated with each site. Equally as critical was the reporting system devised by the group for providing management information concerning the status of construction of these facilities to COMUSMACV and higher headquarters. Detailed information on each field site, relayed from region engineers, provided an up-to-date assessment of construction status and, ultimately, precluded amplification of any problems. Construction support for JMC/ICCS was divided into two phases: Phase I consisted of that work essential to make the site suitable for occupancy and included such work as plumbing, electrical and carpentry upgrade, and painting of new wood. Phase II work provided refinements such as partitions and similar minor improvements to afford added privacy and upgraded facilities. Phases I and II were completed for region headquarters by 5 March 1973. Phases I and II were completed for all region and team sites by 17 March. Of the tentatively identified 12 control sites, two were completed and six had begun by 5 March. Construction at all required unfinished sites will be continued by the civilian contractor (PA&E) under direction of the Engineer Branch, Army Division, Defense Attache Office.

(2) More details concerning support to the JMC/ICCS are at Appendix 5.

f. Facilities Review Board.

(1) The USARV Facilities Review Board (FRB) was established for the purpose of controlling funds being devoted to all significant minor new construction projects (over \$500). When it became apparent that a ceasefire was imminent, the Engineer

ANNEX D (US Army Engineer Group, Vietnam) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

Group began a periodic review of projects in order to impose even stricter controls on new construction. By 10 November 1972, projects had been identified for construction or immediate or short term cancellation. All approved projects and projects pending approval since the last formal meeting of the board were reviewed to determine appropriate disposition. As a result of the analysis and subsequent engineer recommendation, the CDR USARV/MACV SUPCOM's decision was as follows: Eleven projects in progress were continued, six projects in progress were discontinued, 38 approved projects not yet started were placed in a "hold" status, 15 projects pending submission to the FRB were withheld from submission, and 11 projects pending submission to the FRB were submitted for processing. Formal meetings of the FRB were suspended at the end of October. Subsequent projects requiring FRB approval were submitted to the Engineer, who processed the projects through a coordinated decision paper to the CDR USARV/MACV SUPCOM. All other projects were held for further review pending the outcome of peace negotiations. As a general rule, those projects which had carryover value for VNAF or those whose completion would significantly influence the safety and welfare of US or VNAF were approved for continuation. These procedures were suspended during the post X-Day support of the JMC/ICCS. Region engineers were given authority to perform the required work and simply maintain cost data concerning each project.

(2) More details concerning the FRB are at paragraph 4f.

g. Vietnamization.

(1) Although Vietnamization has been an on-going program for some time prior to 10 November 1972, the announcement of the ceasefire imminence in October 1972 caused a reevaluation of all efforts in training VNAF towards self-sufficiency. By the middle of November each of the five ARVN Area Logistic Commands (ALC's) and the CLC in Saigon had been contacted and asked to reevaluate training requirements for operation of vital engineer equipment primarily associated with utilities systems. Working with the region engineers and local government officials, training programs were developed consistent with the specified requirements. During the ensuing base transfer planning and execution phase, it became necessary to identify specifically which utilities systems would be transferred to ARVN and those that would not. It follows that complete base transfer became a function of ARVN's capabilities to maintain and operate the equipment being scheduled for transfer.

ANNEX D (US Army Engineer Group, Vietnam) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

(2) As a result of the meetings among the region engineers, ALC's and local government officials, and official correspondence initiated by the USARENGRGPV, an accelerated formal training program was begun on 1 December 1972. The concepts for these training programs were approved by the ARVN Chief of Engineers and the CDR Central Logistics Command. Programs of instruction developed by the contractor (PA&E) included operation and maintenance of low and high voltage power generation equipment and mechanical systems such as water and sewage distribution.

(3) At X-Day, all of these programs were on-going within each region and the training continues to progress. Completion of all programs is scheduled by the end of the 2d Quarter, FY 74. The length of the courses and the amount of detail presented is commensurate with the sophistication of the system. For example, it was determined that the program of instruction (POI) for high voltage generators would take approximately nine months to complete. On the low side, the POI for operation and maintenance of the sewage, and water treatment and distribution systems would vary from six to eight weeks.

(4) An on-the-job training program for operation and maintenance of low voltage generators was already in effect at the beginning of the standdown phase. This program of on-the-job training (OJT) was primarily associated with the Integrated Communications Sites (ICS) which were spread throughout the RVN. The Engineer Group was instrumental in revitalizing the interest of top VNAF officials in the ICS program. Planning conferences held just prior to the standdown phase resulted in the personal involvement of the CDR CLC.

(5) More details concerning the Vietnamization program are at paragraph 4g.

h. Map Supply.

(1) The map issue point operated by the US Army Engineer Group, Vietnam was formally opened in the 3d Quarter, FY 72, concurrent with closure of the map depot located in Long Binh. Prior to X-Day, there were approximately 865,000 maps on-hand at the map supply point. Of these, approximately 170,000 were either outdated or obsolete, and approximately 320,000 were in excess of established stockage levels and were retained at the direction of MACDI. The thinking was that outdated maps were

ANNEX D (US Army Engineer Group, Vietnam) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

better than no maps at all. When it became apparent that a cease-fire was imminent, a systematic destruction and retrograde program was established. Prior to X-Day, approximately 150,000 outdated maps were destroyed and approximately 40,000 excess maps which could not be transferred to VNAF were retrograded to USARPAC. During January approximately 20,000 maps were requisitioned and issued as compared to a previous monthly average of approximately 10,000.

(2) More details concerning Map Supply are at Appendix 6.

i. Standdown Phase.

(1) The engineer regions began to lose their identity concurrently with Increment XIV. Actual standdown dates for the regions and Engineer Group HQ are shown below:

Engineer region MR I	28 Sep - 5 Oct 72
Engineer region MR II	1-11 Nov 72
Engineer region MR III	15-22 Oct 72
Engineer region MR IV	1-11 Oct 72
HHC, USARENGRGPV	15-18 Mar 73

(2) Standdown activities in all regions entailed accomplishment of similar tasks. Since all of the regions were in the midst of supporting customers in various facilities engineering projects, they each had to disengage from their assigned projects. This was done on a selective basis because some of the projects (particularly those associated with the well-being of the troops) would not be cancelled. The recommendation of each region engineer was requested, obtained, and used in making the final determination as to which projects should be continued and those that should not. These recommendations all had the concurrence of the regional assistance commanders. Generally, those projects which offered some long term benefit to GVN and those affecting health, welfare, and morale of US, ROK and RVN troops were continued. Projects that had not started were evaluated in the same manner and started or not started accordingly. The plan for phaseout of the projects was presented to the CDR USARV/MACV SUPCOM and approved. With a decision made on disposition of the projects, the group then began planning on personnel changes, equipment turn-in, and general phaseout of military personnel. These and other details are provided at Appendix 7.

ANNEX D (US Army Engineer Group, Vietnam) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

4. Commander's Observations/Recommendations, Lessons Learned
RUSSELL L. LAMP, COL, CE.

a. Reorganization.

(1) Discussion: It was not until 28 December 1972 that the one engineer concept materialized. Before that time, there were separate command engineers for MACV and USARV and others scattered throughout subordinate commands (such as the Regional Assistance Commands) of these headquarters. Functional responsibilities were separate but, in most cases, could have easily been consolidated. Real estate management is a good example. Consolidation of the MACV, USARV, and USARENGRGPV real estate offices placed the managing and operating personnel in the same office, significantly reducing processing time for leasing and base transfer actions. Redundancy was eliminated in all functional areas, and increased efficiency and reduced response times were the ultimate results.

(2) Comment: Consolidation of separate engineer elements (and their functions) operating with reduced staffing into one organization was an overdue action. It would not have been too premature to combine the organizations 3-4 months earlier.

(3) Recommendation: In situations where similar organizations (which are assigned different functions) are located within the same geographical area, their force structure and staffing should be closely monitored and the organizations consolidated as soon as it is appropriate.

b. Facilities Engineering (FE) Support.

(1) Discussion: When the US troops began to redeploy, the quantity of engineer operational support missions dropped off and the Engineer Group assumed the responsibility for facilities engineering services throughout the RVN. Further redeployment of troops made it necessary to phase out troop support altogether and rely entirely on the FE contractor (PA&E) and Facilities Engineer Saigon (FES), a direct hire DA and LN civilian organization for FE services. FES had the mission of providing FE support for all leased facilities in the city of Saigon. All other FE services were provided by the contractor. Use of contractual FE services in built up base camp areas was effective and the concept should be continued. PA&E was very

ANNEX D (US Army Engineer Group, Vietnam) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

responsive and treated each change as a challenge and opportunity to excel. FES was an effective organization until it was phased out on 10 February 1973. It functioned more like a similar state-side organization because of the stable and consistent nature of work associated with leased facilities.

(2) Comment: The two primary methods of providing FE support were both beneficial, each serving its own specific purpose.

(3) Recommendation: That under like circumstances, similar contractor and direct hire civilian organizations be employed to provide FE services.

c. Transfer of Real Property.

(1) Discussion: Transfer of property was accomplished in two phases: First, there was the requirement to title transfer all property (except specific controlled and high dollar items) during the period 6-10 November 1972. During the ensuing period, on-site joint inventories were conducted to consummate the transfer action. No particular problems were associated directly with the inventories but in instances where the facilities became vacant and the designated gaining agency was not available for immediate occupancy, the facility was often stripped. Lighting and plumbing fixtures and communications and electric wire were removed in many cases overnight. Several such instances occurred before preventive measures (increased security) could be implemented.

(2) Comment: Provisions for security of facilities being considered for transfer must be included in base transfer actions. The owning agency should maintain appropriate security for the length of time necessary to assure property being transferred is not looted or stripped (notwithstanding the fact that on paper the property already has been transferred).

(3) Recommendation: That the parties incident to base transfers provide for adequate security to preclude costly looting and destruction of property. This should be discussed early in the planning stages of base transfer actions.

d. Retrograde.

(1) Discussion: Retrograde is normally discussed in terms of generators, power barges, and DeLong piers. The one

ANNEX D (US Army Engineer Group, Vietnam) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

common denominator that applies to all of these items is the inability to properly forecast and plan for their disposition. This was caused by changing requirements and, admittedly, was understandable under the circumstances. This statement simply illustrates the fact that the plans had to be flexible enough to allow for major changes without detriment to the overall retrograde program. To choose one drawback of the retrograde program is difficult since the program which involved equipment valued at over \$75 million was managed well. In the coordination and decision making process for choosing a contractor for the DeLong pier retrograde, it became apparent that there were far too many agencies involved with the process. There were too many agencies which showed "eleventh hour" interest in the program which over-complicated a simple procurement action.

(2) Comment: The high voltage generator and T-2 power barge retrograde programs had only minor problems, primarily associated with redeployment changes and funding questions pertaining to commercial and/or low voltage power. The DeLong Pier retrograde program simply had too many agencies involved in the contractor selection procedure. The fact that the bid package was written as a lump sum rather than itemized solicitation contributed to the problem. If the bid package had been written to obtain itemized bids, the retrograde package could have easily been parcelled out to the lowest bidder for each item. As it happened, there was a savings of over half a million dollars (based on the government estimate) by selection of a contractor who submitted an unsolicited lump sum proposal, but this was brought about by unique circumstances not likely to reoccur.

(3) Recommendation: That future requests for proposals (RFP's) for DeLong Pier retrograde require itemized, rather than lump sum, bids.

e. Support to JMC/ICCS.

(1) Discussion: Within a very short period of time beginning 24 January 1973, complete and functional administrative and billeting facilities had to be readied for the peace-keeping bodies established by the ceasefire protocols. Significant is the fact that this monumental task was preceded by no planning guidance. Site preparation ranged from no work at all (for leased hotel space and existing MACV or other compounds) to complete construction of buildings to house conference rooms,

ANNEX D (US Army Engineer Group, Vietnam) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

offices, latrines, showers, and billets. Redeployment plans all assumed that GVN, as the host country, would underwrite all costs and provide facilities for the JMC and ICCS. Instead, the US was called upon to provide, on short notice, whatever support was required to deploy these commissions to their operational sites.

(2) Comment: The JMC/ICCS support role should have been war-gamed beforehand. It was a mistake not to have done so but the mistake was less costly because there were adequate personnel mobilized and funds and materials available to support the requirement.

(3) Recommendation: That future requirements of this nature be subjected to "what if" exercises regardless of how remote the possibilities of direct US involvement are.

f. Facilities Review Board (FRB).

(1) Discussion: The FRB was designed to assure the USARV/MACV SUPCOM CDR that his ever-diminishing resources were being devoted to only the critical construction projects. The result was that the FRB screening process eliminated many projects which otherwise would have been a drain on already limited resources. The wisdom of the FRB process was even more apparent when during the JMC/ICCS construction crisis, there was money available for diversion. Other management actions enhanced the availability of funds at this crucial period but the FRB also had contributed significantly.

(2) Comment: The FRB played a vital role in the 10 November 1972-20 March 1973 time frame. The board was an effective method of controlling funds and other resources during this critical redeployment period.

(3) Recommendation: That a review board of this nature be established in all cases where rigid control of limited resources is required.

g. Vietnamization.

(1) Discussion: There are several key areas in which ARVN is being trained for self-sufficiency by PA&E. The training programs are not new, but announcement of the impending ceasefire

ANNEX D (US Army Engineer Group, Vietnam) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

in October 1972 revitalized emphasis on the programs. Training on sophisticated equipment such as the 500KW generators (including switch gear and other ancillary equipment) will be completed by the end of this calendar year. Training on equipment requiring a lesser degree of technical proficiency is scheduled for completion earlier than the power generator equipment date.

(2) Comment: The ARVN Engineers are rapidly developing into a capable force in subject areas which were heretofore little known to them.

(3) Recommendation: That the training of ARVN be continued until self-sufficiency in operation and maintenance of the transferred engineer equipment is assured.

h. Map Supply.

(1) Discussion: The USARV/MACV SUPCOM map issue point was operated by personnel assigned to the USARENGRGPV. Operational control of the map issue point was the responsibility of the Directorate for Intelligence, MACV (MACDI). The USARENGRGPV had no written or other responsibility for determination of stockage objectives or determination of which maps to stock and, in day-to-day operations, these matters did not present any real problems. There were many operational requirements which did overlap into the USARV staff which should have been MACDI actions. For example, emergency requisitions for maps which occurred after normal duty hours invariably were passed to the USARENGRGPV for action, and the actions were aggressively completed. It would have been a much better managed operation, however, if the personnel and the responsibility for operating the map issue point were assigned to the same organization (in this case MACDI).

(2) Comment: When the map depot at Long Binh closed, the responsibility for operation of the map issue point and the appropriate personnel should have been assigned to a single headquarters for better management.

(3) Recommendation: That this split of operational control and administrative control be eliminated when the geographical separation of the headquarters involved is not prohibitive.

ANNEX D (US Army Engineer Group, Vietnam) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

i. Standdown.

(1) Discussion: Standdown of engineer elements was a very smooth operation. No real problems developed and the mission of the Engineer Group was not adversely affected. This was no accident, however, because through all phases of the incremental drawdowns, sufficient operational US or US/LN forces were maintained in each military region to accommodate the construction requirements in the region. After the region engineers had stood their units down (by 11 November 1972), a mobile engineer platoon (operating out of Tan Son Nhut) and platoon-sized forces of LN personnel (supervised by US and LN personnel in each region) continued to provide critical FE support. These augmentation forces provided flexibility in the regions and the JMC/ICCS support required this flexibility.

(2) Comment: The age-old concept of maintaining a reserve force still applies. Maintaining an operational capability in each region, even after standdown of the regions, proved to be a prudent decision.

(3) Recommendation: That an operational capability under control of military personnel be maintained as long as practical in such dynamic situations.

j. Close Hold Planning.

(1) Discussion: A Campaign Planning Group (CPG) (sometimes called "close hold planning group") was formed consisting of selected representatives from each USARV headquarters staff element and major subordinate unit. The purpose of the planning group was to form a close-knit working and planning group to effect incremental redeployment of US forces from RVN. During November 1972, meetings were normally held on call. Later, during the last several weeks in February and the first two weeks in March, meetings were held on a scheduled basis daily and then twice weekly. The meetings were an effective means of disseminating information and, in most cases, were used as a vehicle during which staff requirements were handed out requiring quick responses. Generally, the requirements were put out in the form of "what if" exercises and engineer input was provided based on specified USARV parameters. For example, engineer input for Increment XIV staffing was provided based on guidance received during CPG meetings in October/November 1972. There was also a wealth of coordination effected during these meetings. Along with redeployment, many units and personnel

ANNEX D (US Army Engineer Group, Vietnam) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

were being relocated in-country because of tactical and security considerations. The logistical and manpower effort associated with some of these relocations was extensive. In the beginning (early November), it was difficult to get a firm fix on exactly which bases would remain as US residual. Surfacing these problems during the CPG meetings kept them in the forefront and, by the end of November, the situation was fairly stable. The engineers knew which bases were being retained and consolidated and, accordingly, could effect cost savings by withdrawal of contractor support and services.

(2) Comment: The CPG was an effective means of disseminating close hold information to the USARV staff and major commands. In several instances, information which was available at MACV or USARV was delayed in getting to the Engineer Group. In some cases, adjustment or elimination of contracted facilities engineering services could have been accomplished earlier resulting in added cost savings.

(3) Recommendation: A working group of this nature should be established to accomplish the in-depth planning and coordination associated with troop phase-out and redeployment.

k. Construction Priorities.

(1) Discussion: The method of establishing construction priorities for minor new construction (over \$500) initially omitted an essential element, the appropriate Regional Assistance Command (RAC). Being the zone/area coordinator, the RAC commander was most cognizant of what his overall construction requirements were and could assign priorities accordingly. Because of the ceasefire announcement, all projects were reviewed again by the Facilities Review Board during early November and knowing the precedences already established by the RAC's assisted greatly in this review.

(2) Comment: The project is simply that the RAC's are a vital part of the project approval chain and should always be included in it.

(3) Recommendation: That the RAC's be consulted in the project approval process and (in a ceasefire or similar environment) during project reviews when decisions are pending which will eliminate or defer projects for an indefinite period.

ANNEX D (US Army Engineer Group, Vietnam) to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

1. Use of TDY Funds.

(1) Discussion: During the 10 November 1972 to 28 March 1973 period specifically and also during FY 73 in general, a significant amount of individual travel between installations was required. Engineers, having responsibilities for base services throughout RVN, traveled between bases almost continuously without benefit of TDY pay. Other staff elements performing a lesser amount of travel, however, received reimbursement for some of their travel expenses.

(2) Comment: An equitable application of the travel regulations is required to insure all personnel are properly reimbursed for expenses incident to TDY.

(3) Recommendation: That a command-wide policy be established which encompasses all types of in-country travel performed by both military and civilians.

- Appendices:
- 1 - Reorganization
 - 2 - Facilities Engineering Support
 - 3 - Transfer of Real Property
 - 4 - Retrograde
 - 5 - Support to JMC/ICCS
 - 6 - Map Supply
 - 7 - Standdown


APPENDIX 1 (Reorganization) to Annex D to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

1. During the 10 November 1972 to 28 March 1973 time frame several significant reorganizations occurred within the USARENGRGPV. At the beginning of the period, the Engineer Group was organized as shown at TAB A. At this time each one of the engineer regions had a separate MTDA identification, with a separate morning report. As persons were drawn down into a 1 December 1972 programmed strength of 104 spaces, it was apparent that the separate MTDA's would be eliminated and that all Engineer Group spaces would be placed on one MTDA - that of HHC, USARENGRGPV. At the same time that the region engineer elements were standing down, a mobile engineer platoon was being formed at Tan Son Nhut. Personnel of the proper skills and retainability were earmarked in September and October and physically transferred immediately prior to standdown of their units. A subsequent reduction in December 1972 imposed by USARV resulted in a final MTDA authorization of 100 military, 40 DA civilians, and 674 local national personnel.

2. During the same time frame, there was an engineer planning group (organized in mid-October) which was formed in order to concentrate efforts to consolidate the engineer elements remaining in-country. Further, the mission of the group involved the development of an organization which would remain in-country after X-Day plus 60. The result of the study group's work was the organization shown at TAB B. The study group was comprised of personnel assigned to MACV Construction Directorate (MACDL-43), the Engineer Advisory Division, and the USARENGRGPV. All of these elements were phased out except the USARENGRGPV. The CDR USARENGRGPV became the MACV Command Engineer and retained his status as USARV/MACV SUPCOM Engineer and CDR USARENGRGPV. The USARENGRGPV was deactivated on 28 March 1973.

TAB: A - Engineer Group Organization
B - Reorganization of Engineers in Vietnam


US ARMY ENGINEER GROUP VIETNAM



**TOTAL 551
JULY 1966**

TAB A (Engineer Group Organization) to Appendix 1 to Annex D to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

REORGANIZATION OF ENGINEERS IN VIETNAM



D-1-B-1

COMMAND ENGINEER AND DAO CONCEPT — DEVELOPED DEC 72

TAB B (Reorganization of Engineers in Vietnam) to Appendix 1 to Annex D to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

APPENDIX 2 (Facilities Engineering Support) to Annex D to
USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

1. The primary mission of the Engineer Group shifted to FE support concurrently with the phase-out of major troop units in April 1972. In November 1972 there were basically two elements providing FE support: The contractor (PA&E) and a direct hire DAC and LN organization (Facilities Engineer, Saigon, commonly called FES).
2. In October 1972, PA&E became the sole contractor with the responsibility for country-wide FE services except in the city of Saigon where FES was responsible for FE services in leased facilities.
3. During the final redeployment phase, it became necessary to evaluate the two different service concepts. Because of the restriction on civilian and military spaces, it was apparent that the civilian personnel assigned to FES would be needed for the critical Defense Attache Office (DAO). The question then had to be resolved as to whether PA&E could absorb the mission of FES. This question was studied and as a result, it was recommended that PA&E be assigned the former FES mission and that FES be phased out on 10 February 1972. Individuals (DAC's and LN's) assigned to FES in most cases simply changed employers, while others restricted by space limitations or job qualifications could not be employed by the DAO.
4. Another type of evaluation was also beneficial during the redeployment phase. Earlier in the year (October 1972), the Group had established the Facilities Engineering Assistance Team (FEAT). The team, comprised of military and civilian technical and management experts in all aspects of FE support, visited base camp areas throughout RVN and, accordingly, during the redeployment phase, had a good feel for actual conditions of facilities in the field being turned over to ARVN. The FEAT visits also served to maintain a certain degree of quality control. The FEAT visits became a useful management tool and assisted in monitoring and evaluating contractor performance in addition to its stated purpose of increasing customer satisfaction. Prior to October 1972, facilities engineering contracts had been of the incentive award type, in which the contractor was awarded a fee based on evaluated performance. Although operation under a cost plus fixed fee contract requires closer and more professional review and analysis of the contractor, in order to maintain proper control, the cost savings achieved indicate that the cost plus fixed fee contract is the preferable method. The

APPENDIX 2 (Facilities Engineering Support) to Annex D to
USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

FEAT visits were a vital part of this review and analysis procedure and kept the contractor and the Group Commander up-to-date with essential FE matters.

5. In order that construction projects and FE support may be properly planned from concept through completion, it is necessary to provide plans and specifications built around the scope of each project. Construction standards are rigid guidelines and are beneficial in assuring adherence to cost restrictions. The standards cannot be so rigid that they do not allow for minor project enhancement changes. During the redeployment phase, particularly, there were numerous management changes which caused corresponding scope of work changes. The Engineer Group staff was experienced and had contingency plans which compensated for such changes with a corresponding adjustment of resources to match the new requirements.

6. Facilities engineering support, including high voltage power, was provided by the contractor. During the redeployment phase, the contractor had to keep abreast of base consolidation and base transfer planning so that services at these installations could be reduced or eliminated at the appropriate time. (In this respect, it is essential that the critical middle and top managers possess security clearances since during the planning stages, such information is rarely unclassified.)

APPENDIX 3 (Transfer of Real Property) to Annex D to USARV/MACV
SUPCOM After Action Report

1. Transfer of real property was a two-phase operation. Title transfers of the property were completed (on paper) during the period 6-10 November 1972 and the joint physical inventory of property was completed at each installation in the following 60-day period. The physical inventories were conducted by the losing and gaining agencies. During this period also, selected engineer high dollar value items were deleted from the inventory list (DATAPAK) of items to be transferred. The computerized inventory list of real property was not always up-to-date, causing minor problems in coordination initially. The gaining agency expected to be transferred all facilities shown on the data listing but in all cases the facilities or equipment listed were not actually on hand. These discrepancies were resolved among the parties concerned at each individual site.
2. As the occupants vacated the facilities, the doors were locked and the buildings were secured. In many cases, this minimum security was insufficient to preclude stripping the buildings of electrical and communications wire and electrical light fixtures. The contractor was required to provide added security in areas where vandalism was anticipated and, apparently, stripping was reduced to a minimum. Security is always a matter of concern and, in the future, security planning should be considered early enough to preclude stripping of facilities.
3. At several of the installations, there were minefields associated with the base transfers. The primary concern of the Engineer was to ascertain that when minefield locations were known or suspected, they were properly documented. In all such cases, known or suspected mined areas were visibly marked and the location and boundary pointed out to the gaining organization.
4. Beginning in early February, a Redeployment and Base Closure Assistance Team (RBCAT) began a series of visits to bases located throughout RVN. The purpose of the team was to insure for the USARV Commander that all areas and facilities being transferred were in a reasonable state of repair and police and to provide assistance to the units being visited as pertains to base closure. An engineer representative was included on the team and placed his emphasis on condition of facilities, status of real property, and minefield transfers.

APPENDIX 4 (Retrograde) to Annex D to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

1. High Voltage Generators.

a. In March 1972, a systematic analysis of high voltage generator assets in-country was begun, closely coordinated with MACV and RAAF. Based on the analysis, a final retrograde program was developed by the Engineer, approved by MACV, and implemented (see TAB A). By 1 November, only 38 of the generators had been shipped to Tooele Army Depot, Utah. The ceasefire talks placed added emphasis on the program and between 1 November and 28 March, 57 generators were retrograded. Shipment of the 500KW generators offered no real problems but the 1500KW generators required heavy lift cranes and heavy transport vehicles to be moved from their emplacement site to the port. These were critical items of equipment, and care should be taken to insure their availability when planning for shipment of the 1500KW generators.

b. Generators remaining to be retrograded are shown at TAB

B. Two factors have influenced the retrograde program:

(1) First, low voltage generators must be installed in order that the high voltage equipment can be removed.

(2) Secondly, connection of existing loads to commercial power is pending in some areas (such as Long Binh).

c. The Defense Attache Office is continuing retrograde program, and all generators should be shipped by 30 June 1973.

2. T-2 Power Barges: None of the T-2 power barges were moved during the 10 November-28 March time frame. Message traffic between DA, MECOM and USARV resulted in issuance by DA of interim disposition instructions (shown in basic report). Completion of the power barge retrograde is scheduled for June 1973.

3. DeLong Piers.

a. Planning for retrograde of the DeLong Piers was already underway by 10 November 1972. There were five DeLong Piers in RVN: One pier at Qui Nhon, consisting of four "A" type barges; three piers at Cam Ranh Bay, consisting of a total of four "A" type and six "B" type barges; and one pier at Vung Tau, consisting of seven "B" type barges. Original acquisition costs for the piers and associated components were in excess of \$60 million. A two-phase plan was developed for retrograde of the piers based on approved OPLANS.

APPENDIX 4 (Retrograde) to Annex D to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

b. In October 1972, the release dates for the piers were revised in consideration of changes to the ROKF redeployment schedule. Shortly thereafter, Alaska Barge and Transport Inc. (AB&T) submitted an unsolicited proposal for removal of Pier #5, Cam Ranh Bay at a cost of \$694,000. After a cost analysis, the engineers found a potential \$750,000 savings associated with the AB&T proposal, primarily in the tow costs to CONUS. Acceptance of the proposal was recommended to DA and the work was accomplished as an amendment to the existing Military Sealift Command contract MSC OT35(X).

c. Dae Lim Industrial Company was awarded the phase one contract on 8 March for \$289,000. Work began on 26 March and the piers will be ready for tow to CONUS by early June.

d. MSC has contracted with AB&T for retrograde of the Vung Tau Pier. Work began on the pier on 20 March and in early June the pier barges will be towed to Naha (Okinawa) or Subic Bay (Philippines).

e. USARV/MACV SUPCOM has obligated \$500,000 to the Navy Officer in Charge of Construction for the phase one contract. The original Navy request for contract funds was \$2.3 million, of which \$1.8 million was decommitted after contract award. The \$211,000 above the award price of \$289,000 remains committed to the Navy to provide for contract modifications and contractor claims. Funds in the amount of \$1.2 million for reimbursement of the MSC OT35(X) are being held on miscellaneous obligation documents at the Central Finance and Management Office in Hawaii. USARPAC will be advised to program \$1 million for FY 74 for the dismantling of Pier #4, Cam Ranh Bay in the event that Sealand Service Inc. does not retrograde the pier as they have proposed.

f. The DAO Engineer has the responsibility for conclusion of the retrograde actions.

TAB: A - High Voltage Generator Retrograde
B - Generators to be Retrograded

TAB A (High Voltage Generator Retrograde) to Appendix 4 to Annex D to USARV/MACV/SUPCOM After Action Report

<u>REGION</u>	<u>RETROGRADED TO DATE</u>	<u>CRATED, AWAITING RETROGRADE</u>	<u>TO BE RETROGRADED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
MR I	22	0	12	34
MR II	29	0	10	39
MR III	34	0	12	46
MR IV	10	0	0	10
TOTAL	95	0	34	129

TAB B (Generators to be Retrograded) to Appendix 4 to Annex D
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

DA NANG	12	3-1500KW GMC 6-700KW Schoomaker 3-600KW GE
QUI NHON	4	1500KW GMC
NINH HOA	3	500KW Schoomaker
NHA TRANG	3	500KW Schoomaker
LONG BINH	12	1500KW GMC
TOTAL	34	

APPENDIX 5 (Support to JMC/ICCS) to Annex D to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

1. Redeployment plans were developed by USARV and MACV in October and November 1972. The redeployment plans all assumed that RVN as the host country would provide facilities and logistical support for the JMC and ICCS. The JMC was comprised of military representatives of North Vietnam, Viet Cong, RVN, and the United States. The ICCS was comprised of representatives from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Indonesia, and Poland.

2. It was not until 24 January 1972, four days prior to the effective date of the ceasefire, that the USARENGRGPV was passed requirements to support these commissions. Each of the commissions would have a headquarters located at Tan Son Nhut and would also have seven regional headquarters spread geographically for control of the 26 (each) operational team sites. The total number of sites to be prepared is shown below:

	<u>JMC</u>	<u>ICCS</u>
HQ	1	1
Region HQ	7	7
Team Sites	26	26
Control Points	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>
TOTAL (80)	40	40

3. The initial planning centered around getting the two headquarters and 14 regional sites prepared. The concept was simply to use existing facilities when available; otherwise, facilities had to be leased or constructed.

4. Work was separated into two phases. It had been determined that a conference room, billeting, offices, mess, and latrine facilities would be required at each of the 80 sites. The US and RVN representatives remained in already established facilities. So, in all cases, construction for the JMC was related to NVA and VC requirements. To preclude random and arbitrary requirements from developing, the work was phased and standards were published. Phase I was that work necessary to provide beneficial occupancy in minimum facilities required (admin space, billets, conference rooms, latrines, showers, mess facilities). Phase II included construction designed for additional comfort and convenience. Examples of work accomplished during Phase II include: Partitions, drop ceilings, electrical upgrade, painting and application of dust palliatives in billet and administrative areas. By 5 February 1973, Phase I work had been completed for

APPENDIX 5 (Support to JMC/ICCS) to Annex D to USARV/MACV SUPCOM
After Action Report

the two headquarters and 14 region sites. By 18 February, 85% of the 52 team sites was completed through Phase II. By 17 March, Phase II work was completed on all headquarters, region, and team sites. The primary workforce was comprised of the contractor (PA&E), LN platoons which were supervised by US personnel, the US mobile engineer platoon and, to a minor degree, ARVN engineers. Materials and funds had to be diverted, obtained through normal supply channels, or purchased locally as the requirement dictated. By 5 March work had begun on all but four of the control points. In most cases, these sites had to be built from the ground up. Four control sites had been completed by 28 March and the DAO was monitoring and directing completion of the balance. The Viet Cong constructed two of the sites since the control points are on land controlled by them.

5. A daily status report was required from the region engineers between 1800 and 2000 hours. Data sheets were prepared on each site based on these reports, and a copy of these data sheets provided to key command and staff elements (COMUSMACV, MACV Chief of Staff, Chief US Delegation, FPJMC). As the sites were developed, plot plans were provided from the field and by the contractor, and photographs were taken to completely document the work accomplished. Daily briefings by the CDR, USARENGRGPV to COMUSMACV kept key staff elements advised of the current construction status and problem areas. This reporting process was very complete, and the engineers quickly became the recognized authority on the sites.

6. There were several minor problems associated with the construction.

a. Some areas were still insecure. Supplies were delayed and could not be transported except by airlift in one location. Several contractor employees were wounded by rocket fire while working on two of the sites.

b. Some delay was experienced in obtaining use of several USAID facilities. Each site had to be approved on a case-by-case basis.

c. The GVN (local government) did not always permit the VC and NVA to occupy available facilities, requiring time and funds to be spent on others.

d. Scope of work changed too often; however, the contractor and other workforces were flexible and met these changing demands.

APPENDIX 6 (Map Supply) to Annex D to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

1. By 28 January 1973, with the exception of a small reserve directed by MACDI, all obsolete maps had been destroyed and non-transferable excesses had been retrograded. Also, a large percentage of the maps that were required for post X-Day utilization had been requested and issued.
2. After X-Day, the following significant activities occurred:
 - a. Issue of approximately 1,000 maps by X+3.
 - b. Closing of the map issue point for all but emergency requisitions on X+3.
 - c. Destruction of the remaining outdated and obsolete maps by X+5.
 - d. Retrograde to Hawaii of all remaining excess maps that were nontransferable to VNAF (35,000).
 - e. Issue of approximately 6,500 maps to the ICCS (accomplished in one day).
 - f. Transfer of maps to residual US agencies:
 - (1) US DAO Cambodia - 63,000 maps (Cambodia).
 - (2) US DAO Laos - 15,000 maps (Laos).
 - (3) US DAO RVN - 15,000 maps (RVN).
 - (4) USAID RVN - 5,000 maps (RVN).
 - (5) MACDI - 10,000 maps (assorted).
 - g. Transfer of approximately 490,000 maps to the 1st Topo Bn (ARVN) by X+11.
 - h. Closure of the map issue facility and clean-up of the building were completed by X+12. Personnel assigned to the map issue point were programmed for redeployment in the first increment.

APPENDIX 7 (Standdown) to Annex D to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

1. The region engineer elements all had stoodown between the period 28 September-11 November 1972. Because the engineer troops were engaged in construction and repair projects, suitable disposition of this work was required. In addition, the normal tasks of turn-in of supplies and equipment, and redeployment or relocation of personnel in-country were required. Each of the region engineer elements had a separate MTDA and, accordingly, they each had to be closed out with force structure changes.
2. Construction materials and selected vehicles that were common to both the region engineers and contractors' requirements were offered to the contractor for use in provision of FE services (supplies and equipment were government furnished). Only those items which were authorized to the contractor (by his TDA) were offered in an effort to upgrade his equipment. Other equipment were disposed of through normal supply channels. An inventory of all construction materials and PLL was also provided the contractor (PA&E). Through coordination with the USARV Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG), arrangements were made to transfer these supplies and materials to the contractor. These actions were completed in all regions by 1 November 1972.
3. The region engineers, at the direction of the CDR, USARENGRGPV, maintained a local national workforce which was supervised by US military officers and NCO's. After the region engineers had stood down, the work which they had been doing was shifted to the LN platoon and the contractor. Because the region engineer's military personnel had been involved with operational support missions, such as bunker and revetment construction (a mission not previously performed by the contractor), additional contractor staffing was authorized in the form of a contract modification.
4. Personnel in the regions were assigned to HHC, USARENGRGPV by 11 November 1972. Increment XIV would require a military authorization of only 104 spaces (subsequently reduced to 100 spaces in December 1972). Recognizing the requirement for a complete restructuring of the Engineer Group, the staff set about to accomplish this task. A significant result of this force structure change was that all Engineer Group personnel and equipment were placed on one authorization document, the HHC USARENGRGPV MTDA.
5. The Engineer Group stoodown between the period 15-18 March 1973. It was essential, however, that critical staff functions

APPENDIX 7 (Standdown) to Annex D to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

continue until unit deactivation and redeployment. Such items as after action reports, efficiency reports, unit and individual awards, and routine correspondence continued as requirements. There was only a minimum amount of equipment (primarily weapons) on the unit property book and it was closed on 18 March 1973.

6. Since there would be on-going engineer requirements, the Engineer Branch, DAO was passed the responsibility for completion of these functions. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed transferring responsibility for such functions as facilities engineering support, retrograde of equipment, and real property management.

7. Based on USARENGRGPV OPLAN 215, personnel were scheduled for redeployment in four phases in the following quantities:

<u>Phase I</u>	<u>Phase II</u>	<u>Phase III</u>	<u>Phase IV</u>
(X-Day to X+15)	(X+15 to X+30)	(X+30 to X+45)	(X+45 to X+55)
22	28	35	15

The redeployment of personnel, however, was keyed to prisoner release and only the first phase was met. There were several changes caused by delays in release of US prisoners which resulted in alteration of the above figures.

8. The USARENGRGPV was deactivated on 28 March 1973.

ANNEX E (United States Army Health Services Group-Vietnam)
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this report is to record and critically evaluate the US Army Health Services Group-Vietnam (USAHSVCGPV) activities during the period 1 January 1973 and 28 March 1973 as the USAHSVCGPV prepared for and executed the inactivation/redeployment of its medical assets and services from the Republic of Vietnam.

2. GENERAL.

a. Section I: Significant Organizational Activities.

(1) Personnel:

(a) Strength Accounting: As of 1 January 1973, the assigned strength of the US Army Health Services Group, Vietnam, and assigned units was 852: 206 Officers, 35 Warrant Officers, 611 Enlisted. On X-Day (28 January 1973) the assigned strength was 736: 188 Officers, 39 Warrant Officers, 509 Enlisted. Unit redeployment schedules, prescribing day-by-day movement to transportation points, were published by Headquarters, USARV/MACV SUPCOM on the basis of proposed unit standdown dates and availability of transportation. To insure that subordinate units adhered to the redeployment schedule, telephonic strength reports were obtained on a daily basis throughout the period 28 January - 28 March 1973. Such a system enabled the commander and staff to maintain an up-to-date accounting of personnel assets at all times. The final departure date for personnel assigned to Headquarters, US Army Health Services Group, Vietnam was 28 March 1973.

(b) Awards: During the period 1 January - 28 March 1973, approximately 750 individual award recommendations were processed by the Personnel Division. The majority of these awards were approved by USARV in time for presentation prior to personnel departing Vietnam. In addition to individual awards, five recommendations for Meritorious Unit Commendation were submitted. They included the HHD, US Army Health Services Group, Vietnam; USAH, Saigon; 67th Evacuation Hospital; 95th Evacuation Hospital; and the 20th Preventive Medicine Unit.

ANNEX E (United States Army Health Services Group-Vietnam)
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(c) Assignment Instructions and Orders: Prior to the announced ceasefire, assignment instructions were issued by the officer branches in the Office of the Surgeon General on almost all officers. These assignment instructions were provided the servicing Personnel Service Companies (PSC), and upon announcement of the ceasefire, they began to publish orders. Periodic telephonic communication was maintained with the Office of the Surgeon General to obtain any changes to the previously announced assignment instructions. In most instances, changes were received in sufficient time to publish amendments to orders prior to the departure of personnel from Vietnam. In some cases, changes were received after personnel had already left country. This usually resulted from the transmittal of changes via mail rather than by telephone. With few exceptions the PSC's were responsive to the requirement for timely publication or orders. Assignment instructions on enlisted personnel were received from TAGO by USARV and were provided directly to the PCS's without coming through this headquarters. With the exception of those cases involving requests for ITT's, orders on enlisted personnel were provided in a timely manner.

(d) Other: Personnel replacements continued to arrive in the command up until X-day as requisitioned. Subsequent to that date, there were no critical shortages of officer personnel, and subordinate units were able to accomplish their missions with available assets, and at the same time meet established redeployment schedules. Eight Medical Corps officers were reassigned to the 527th Personnel Service Company to provide medical support to the Joint Military Commission throughout Vietnam. With one exception there were no critical shortages in enlisted personnel during the redeployment. Just prior to and after the ceasefire, the Urine Testing Laboratory experienced, due to ETS and DEROS, a large reduction in available laboratory technicians, MOS 92B. To alleviate this potential problem, ten 92B's were brought in TDY from Okinawa to work in the laboratory until the cessation of the urine testing program. These personnel departed Vietnam on 6 March 1973.

ANNEX E (United States Army Health Services Group-Vietnam)
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(2) Logistics:

(a) Retrograde: Upon notification of implementation of the ceasefire, subordinate unit equipment lists were screened against US Army worldwide requirements and medical items designed for retrograde were identified. Lists of the equipment so identified were returned to the units for action. During the withdrawal period, approximately \$113,000 of medical expendable supplies and \$212,000 of nonexpendable medical equipment were retrograded to USAMMAPAC.

(b) Turn-In to Keystone: All subordinate units were instructed in the proper procedures for the processing of equipment through Keystone processing points. Numerous messages that were received from higher headquarters augmenting Keystone procedures were disseminated to supply officers. Equipment that was turned in consisted of vehicles, weapons, typewriters, on-hand excesses and other TOE/TDA property not previously title transferred to RVNAF.

(c) Turn-Over RVNAF: Transfers of supplies and equipment to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces were made on an "as is/where is" basis and consisted of medical and post, camp and station property. All transfers of medical supplies and equipment were coordinated through the Military Region Medical Advisory Teams. These transfers provided needed supplies and equipment to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces logistical system which would otherwise have been required from off-shore sources. The maintenance of an accurate, legible audit trail to maintain visibility of assets transferred under these procedures was of primary importance.

(d) Turn-Over to AMEMB: Sufficient medical equipment to operate consulate dispensaries located at Da Nang, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, and Can Tho and 150 bed hospital facility operated by the Seventh Day Adventists in Saigon was transferred to the American Embassy from Health Services Group units located in these areas. Equipment lists for the dispensaries were formulated by the Medical Materiel Division and coordinated with the Medical Director of the American Embassy.

ANNEX E (United States Army Health Services Group-Vietnam)
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(e) Close Out of Property Books: A schedule of dates for all units to clear property books was published by USARV DCSLOG upon notification of the cease-fire. All property books, except the ones from Military Region I, were pre-audited by the Medical Materiel Division prior to the final audit to insure that all supporting documentation was present. Numerous changes in final clearance dates were necessitated by operational requirements requiring a change in unit redeployment or standdown dates. All changes were coordinated with the USARV property book auditor to insure that schedules were revised.

(f) Establishment of Supply Accounts: Due to the fact that USARV units throughout Vietnam had provided medical supply support to DOD contractors as well as the American Embassy, it was necessary that separate supply accounts be established at USAMMAPAC to provide support for these personnel. As a result of extensive coordination and evaluation five medical supply accounts were established. These accounts were in support of the Vinnell Corp; Pacific Architects and Engineers, Inc; Alaska Barge and Transport, Inc; American Embassy Regional Support Activity; and the American Embassy, Saigon. Subsequent to the establishment of these accounts, a number of training sessions were held with members of this headquarters and representatives from each of the five customers in an effort to acquaint them with Army supply procedures.

(3) Intelligence/Security:

(a) Security Inspection: On 16 January 1973 a security inspection was conducted by representatives from the MACV-Director of Intelligence staff covering all aspects of USAHSVCGPV security program. The inspection was extremely comprehensive and came at an appropriate time as it followed the merger of HQ, USAHSVCGPV's document register with that of the MACV Command Surgeon Office. At the time of the inspection, approximately 130 SECRET documents were under the control of the Custodian of Classified Documents. Although formal inspection report has not been received through channels at the time of this report, the exit briefing to the Commander by the inspection team indicated that the security program of the headquarters was satisfactory.

ANNEX E (United States Army Health Services Group-Vietnam)
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(b) Transfer of Documents: Commencing on X+30, CONFIDENTIAL records/documents were shipped in accordance with directions received by higher headquarters. On X+37 a 100% inventory of the SECRET records/documents was conducted and the documents and document register were shipped via registered mail closing the classified cage of HQ, USAHSVCGPV. Prior to shipment, downgrading and declassification actions were taken as appropriate. No TOP SECRET records were shipped by this headquarters as the TOP SECRET account was closed at the time of the merger mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

(c) Intelligence Sweep: On X+53 the 575th M.I. Detachment conducted an evacuation inspection of the office of HQ, USAHSVCGPV. The purpose of this inspection was to preclude the loss and/or compromise of classified material upon the disestablishment of the USAHSVCGPV. The inspection was conducted without incident.

(4) Operations:

(a) HOME COMING: USAHSVCGPV provided medical support to Operation HOME COMING during the period X to X+60. This support consisted of medical teams composed of a physician and a medical specialist and of Dustoff aeromedical evacuation as needed. After X+45 medical support to HOME COMING was reduced to only the medical teams as Dustoff phased out at X+45. The medical teams made a medical evaluation of each returnee medical evacuation to Clark AB. Following this, the returnees were moved by rotary wing air craft to the staging air field where they were immediately transferred to awaiting C-9 aeromedical evacuation aircraft for movement to Clark AFB. One U.S. civilian returnee chose to be hospitalized at USAH, Saigon, and remained there for three days undergoing tests before he was discharged. The medical support for Operations HOME COMING functioned smoothly and without incident.

ANNEX E (United States Army Health Services Group-Vietnam)
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(b) Drawdown of Medical Service: Medical support was provided U.S. personnel and FWMAF throughout the withdrawal phase to include hospitalization, evacuation, detoxification, drug testing, preventive medicine, veterinary, dental and medical materiel support commensurate with the declining overall troop strength until the withdrawal of all U.S. forces was completed. This drawdown was conducted in four increments of 15 days: Increment FOX (X - X+14), Increment WOLF (X+15 - X+29), Increment LION (X+30 - X+44), and Increment TIGER (X+45 - X+59). Essentially by the beginning of Increment TIGER, the USAHSVCGPV units had completed their standdown and transferred their medical support mission to the Joint Military Commission physicians and to the residual medical support system remaining in-country under the direction of the Medical Director of the U.S. Embassy. Key personnel from HQ, USAHSVCGPV, to include the Commander, USAHSVCGPV/USARV Surgeon/Command Surgeon MACV remained through X+59 to provide final coordination with MACV, USARV/MACV SUPCOM, JMC, ICCS, U.S. Embassy, Seventh Day Adventists, and DAO on medical matters.

(c) Joint Military Commission Support: On X-day with the establishment of the Four Party Joint Military Commission (JMC), medical support for the U.S. delegation of the JMC became an item of concern. In view of the locations of the teams (Hue, Da Nang, Pleiku, Phan Thiet, Bien Hoa, Saigon, My Tho, Can Tho), it was determined that US Army physicians would be immediately assigned to JMC locations which did not already have a US medical facility in the immediate area (Hue, Phan Thiet, and My Tho). As US medical units phased down, a U.S. Army physician was assigned to the remaining JMC locations (Da Nang, Pleiku, Bien Hoa, Saigon, and Can Tho). Throughout the redeployment period, these JMC physicians provided area medical support not only for JMC, but for other eligible US personnel in their respective areas.

(d) International Control Commission Support: As the International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS) became a reality, emergency medical support was provided by existing US medical facilities and US Army physicians assigned to the JMC. Assistance was provided by this headquarters to ICCS personnel reference available medical facilities, air evacuation procedures, medical supplies, and advice, when requested, on professional medical matters.

ANNEX E (United States Army Health Services Group-Vietnam)
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(e) Drug Program:

1 Urine Testing Laboratory: The Urine Testing Laboratory closed on X+30. Prior to then, an intensive campaign was conducted to insure that all personnel 28 years of age and under received a urine test within 60 days of DEROS as directed by DOD. Numerous messages were sent to major commanders advising them of the UTL closure and that following X+30, personnel reporting for DEROS who were 28 years or under would be required to have a Commander's Certificate in their possession stating they had had a negative urinalysis within 60 days of DEROS. Prior to X+30, all commands reported that target group personnel had received a DEROS urine test. Because of the increased workload brought about by the intensified testing and the shortage of 92B laboratory technicians assigned to the UTL, it was necessary to bring 10 92B laboratory technician into RVN on TDY from Okinawa. These personnel departed RVN on 6 March 1973. On X+35 the equipment of the UTL was prepared for retrograde to USAMMAPAC, Okinawa. Because of the failure of some commanders to provide their target group personnel with a Commander's Certificate after X+30, it was necessary for UTL personnel to remain at Camp Alpha until X+40 to check unit sweep records for a valid urinalysis. Those personnel who had neither a Commander's Certificate, nor a negative urinalysis were sent to the USAH, Saigon, or the 95th Evacuation Hospital for a clinical evaluation for drug abuse by a physician.

2 Drug Treatment Center: The Drug Treatment Center closed on X+40. Initial planning for the DTC was based on the assumption that a large patient load would be generated as a result of intensified testing. This assumption proved erroneous as only 216 Army, 80 Air Force and 16 Navy personnel in the target group tested positive. Staff requirements were reassessed on X+15 resulting in the departure of 16 personnel prior to X+30. At X+34 the Drug Treatment Center closed the ward it was occupying when the patient census reached zero. After X+34 personnel requiring detoxification were detoxified in Ward 3.

ANNEX E (United States Army Health Services Group-Vietnam)
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(f) ROK Support: Medical support was provided to the ROKF-V during their withdrawal from RVN. This consisted of hospitalization at the USAH, Saigon; emergency treatment in the 575th Dispensary and aeromedical evacuation. On 30 November 1972 MACV agreed to provide emergency medical support to ROKF-V beginning at X+24 for troops supported by 201st Mobile Army Surgical Hospital, Vung Tau and at X+35 for troops supported by the 102d Evacuation Hospital, Nha Trang and 106th Evacuation Hospital, Qui Nhon. On 26 Jan 73 the ROKF-V Surgeon notified USAHSVCGPV that it would be necessary to assume this support at X+16 (13 Feb 73). The 9th AEG, Clark AB flew special missions on two different occasions to clear out their hospitals prior to closure. However, it was still necessary to transfer 23 patients to the 21st ASF, TSN and 4 patients to USAH, Saigon on 13 Feb 73. This transfer could have been precluded by the ROKAF using their C-54 aircraft to evacuate these patients to Korea. Throughout the period the ROKF-V insisted that they could fly only one air evac mission per week and this from Saigon. Finally the ROKF-V agreed to fly their own in-country mission and one special mission. The ROKF-V reluctance to properly use their organic resources placed an additional and unnecessary workload on US medical and aeromedical resources.

(g) Consulate Dispensary: Medical service support to the residual United States personnel in Vietnam was the responsibility of the Medical Director American Embassy. To discharge this responsibility, he established 4 consulate dispensaries to provide area medical service. One each was established at Da Nang, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, and Can Tho. Generally these dispensaries were designed to support a population of 100 to 200 personnel on an outpatient basis and have the capability of providing primary medical care to include immunizations, sick call, and the treatment of minor disease and injuries. These dispensaries had very limited laboratory and pharmacy capability.

(h) Organization of DAO: The residual element remaining in Vietnam after X+60 was the Defense Attache Office (DAO).

ANNEX E (United States Army Health Services Group-Vietnam)
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

The Medical Service Element, Army Division DAO was authorized a total of 10 spaces. The breakdown of these spaces was as follows:

MEDICAL SERVICE ELEMENT

UNITED STATES PERSONNEL:

Medical Administrator	1
Project Officer	1
Inventory Management Specialist	1
Veterinarian	2

VIETNAMESE PERSONNEL:

Supply Specialist	1
Interpreter/Translator	1
Secretary	3

Within the Army Division of the DAO, there was a large group of Computer Sciences Corporation contractor personnel working at the RVNAF National Materiel Management Agency (NMMA). One person in this group was a medical inventory management specialist who worked under the technical supervision of the Medical Service Element. In reality the residual DAO organization was designed with an authorization of 11 personnel to perform medical service functions even though only 10 personnel were authorized within the Medical Service Element.

(i) Reorganization: On 26 January 1973, the medical units in Military Region II were separated from MEDDAC-Saigon and organized under the 67th Evacuation Hospital as MEDDAC Pleiku, a major subordinate command of USAHSVCGPV.

(5) Transfer of Functions:

(a) Hospitalization - Seventh Day Adventists: The USAH Saigon plant was transferred to the American Embassy Saigon. Health Services Group, with its MACV Command Surgeon's hat, was the executive agent coordinating a contract between the Seventh Day Adventist organization and the American Embassy to provide hospitalization services to residual United States personnel. Utilization of the American Embassy-owned hospital plant was a part of the contract.

ANNEX E (United States Army Health Services Group-Vietnam)
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(b) Outpatient Care - US Embassy/Seventh Day Adventists:
The outpatient care mission for residual US mission personnel was transferred to the US Embassy. In addition to the outpatient service provided in Saigon by the Seventh Day Adventist Hospital and the US Embassy Medical Unit, consulate dispensaries were established in Da Nang, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, and Can Tho. Initial staffing was provided by US Army medical personnel until their redeployment.

(c) Defense Attaché Office (DAO): The following Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) functions were assumed by the DAO Medical Service element personnel subsequent to X-day:

1 Monitoring of contracts for MASF funded local procurement of pharmaceuticals and veterinary inspection of all food contracts.

2 Developing and controlling the RVNAF MASF budget. This included persuading RVNAF medical service personnel to accumulate daily fund expenditure data with subsequent submission to DAO Medical Service Element personnel.

3 Validation of MASF supported requisitions submitted to United States supply sources.

4 Validation of RVNAF medical equipment requirements submitted for MASF support.

5 The coordination of offshore optical and medical maintenance support for RVNAF.

6. The medical regulating function for movement of patients within and out of RVN was transferred to DAO on X+45. Out-of-country air evacuation continued to be provided by 9th AEG, Clark AB. In-country air evacuation became the responsibility of Air America on X+30.

7 The off-shore medical training program monitorship was transferred to the Medical Service Element DAO on X+30.

ANNEX E (United States Army Health Services Group-Vietnam)
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

DAO's responsibilities include: Assessment of requirements, selection of candidates, submission of requests for training, monitoring of training and assignment of personnel upon completion of training.

(d) USARPAC - Tripler Army Medical Center: The Pay Patient Accounts and Patient Trust Funds of the remaining hospitals in Vietnam (67th Evac, 95th Evac and USAH-SGN) were closed and examined in-country prior to their transfer to Tripler Army Medical Center in accordance with guidance from the USARPAC Surgeon's Office.

(6) Transfer of Facilities: All medical facilities were transferred prior to either RVNAF or the U.S. Embassy prior to the ceasefire.

(7) RVNAF Advisory Activities:

(a) Recommendations for Strengthening the Organizational Structure of the RVNAF Medical Service:

1 In December 1972, the Command Surgeon was requested by the Director of Logistics, MACV, to make recommendations concerning the position of the RVNAF Surgeon General in a recommended staff organization for the Central Logistics Command (CLC). Recommendations included:

a That the Surgeon General should occupy a position in the Command Group at CLC, serving as principal advisor to the Commander, CLC, and the Chief of the Joint Staff on all matters pertaining to the health care of the RVNAF, in addition to commanding the units and activities of the RVNAF Medical Service.

b That the Surgeon General's staff organization remain as it is now with no separate staff agency at the CLC level.

2 In addition to the input to the Director of Logistics, it seemed appropriate at the same time to also address areas within the internal organizational structure of the RVNAF

ANNEX E (United States Army Health Services Group-Vietnam)
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

Medical Service which might be strengthened. A study was made and recommendations were suggested for possible re-organization. Major changes recommended were:

a A proposed reorganization of the current Cuc Quan Y (RVNAF Surgeon Generals Office) staff organization which grouped related functions, added staff sections for some functions not currently being performed, and in general attempted to provide a staff organization more responsive to the needs of the Surgeon General, and,

b Proposed changes in the command organization of the RVNAF Medical Service.

c A RAMMS (Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Automated Materiel Management System) Stock Control Division was proposed to assume those functions currently performed by the 70th Medical Base Depot.

d Proposals for strengthening the "Tri-Service" concept included the utilization of VN and VNAF medical service officers on the staffs of Cuc Quan Y and the Military Medical School. Recommended changes in the command organization included placing the station hospitals under the command of the Medical Group commanders, placing the small technical and independent units in the Saigon area under the command of Cong Hoa General Hospital, rather than reporting directly to Cuc Quan Y, and placing the Military Medical School under the command of the Surgeon General, rather than under the Central Training Command.

(b) Mid-Year Review of MASF Budget: The mid-year review of the RVNAF MASF budget was conducted at USARPAC during the period 22 January through 5 February 1973. The RVNAF developed requirements submitted for MASF support with a ceasefire situation follows:

ANNEX E (United States Army Health Services Group-Vietnam)
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

MEDICAL MASF REQUIREMENTS FY 73

<u>RCN</u>	<u>CATEGORY OF SUPPLIES</u>	<u>PROGRAM</u>
AB19	Medical Equipment (Initial)	\$ 444,000
BQ08	X-Ray Equipment (Attrition)	197,000
DN84	Chemicals	1,895,250
SW42	Books and Publications	50,000
SW43	Drugs and Surgical Dressings	19,224,000
SW45	Other Medical Supplies	2,233,000
SW46	Medical Chemicals	140,000
SW47	Medical Equipment (Attrition)	706,000
SW48	Mattresses	25,000
SW53	Repair and Rehabilitation	13,000
TE19	Laboratory Equipment (Initial)	46,000
TE26	X-Ray Equipment (Initial)	285,000
TG59	Laboratory Equipment (Attrition)	67,000
TY88	Local Procurement, Drugs and Dressings	700,000
TY89	Local Procurement, Other Medical Supplies	200,000
TZ47	Local Procurement, Chemicals	<u>300,000</u>
	TOTAL:	\$26,525,000

ANNEX E (United States Army Health Services Group-Vietnam)
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

Larger requirements were identified in the event there was no ceasefire and were available for presentation at the review. The Department of Army review approved the program covering the ceasefire requirements since the ceasefire was announced during the conduct of the review. This was the last review at which advisory personnel would participate. DAO Medical Service Element personnel in conjunction with RVNAF Medical Service personnel assumed the function of preparing and conducting future reviews.

(c) Transition from US to DAO: Three DAO civilian personnel arrived for temporary duty with the Medical Service Element immediately subsequent to the declaration of the ceasefire. An additional medical inventory management specialist, hired by Computer Sciences Corporation, to perform duty with the Medical Service Element also arrived. These personnel were able to participate in a lengthy overlap period with their military predecessors resulting in a generally smooth and comprehensive transition.

(d) In-country Procurement of Pharmaceuticals: One of the DAO Medical Service Element personnel was given the primary duty of managing the in-country procurement of pharmaceuticals program. This individual assumed management of an in-process program and traveled extensively around the Saigon area during the first week of his presence. This travel was accomplished to introduce the individual to the many personnel in RVNAF, GVN Ministry of Health (MOH), MACV Economic Affairs, USAID/PH, and the US Army Contract Administration Officer Vietnam (USACAOV) in order to acquaint himself with all the contact points and personnel involved with the program. The status of the program at the time of the function assumption by the Medical Service Element follows:

- 1 A total of 51 items were identified for the program.
- 2 MOH had the capability to test 20 of these items.
- 3 A \$1 million contract was being finalized by USACAOV for 15 items.

ANNEX E (United States Army Health Services Group-Vietnam)
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

4 Separate record control numbers have been established for local procurement amounting to \$1.2 million.

5 \$3 million of the FY73 MASF budget is targeted for local procurement.

6 Future increases in local procurement are limited by the production capability of industry and the testing capability of the MOH.

(e) Quality Control System: An in-store quality control system for use in the RVNAF depot system was developed and submitted to Cuc Quan Y.

(f) Field Advisor Team Members: On X-Day the advisory function of field Advisory Teams ceased and the team members were utilized to assist in the transfer of equipment to the US Embassy and RVNAF, the support of JMC and ICCS, the augmentation of USAHSVCGPV medical facilities, and the organization and activation of the consulate dispensaries.

(8) Administration:

(a) Audit of Funds: A total of 24 funds were audited after X-Day. They consisted of 16 Unit Funds, 4 Other Sundry Funds, and 4 Domestic Hire Funds. In order to save manpower and insure adequacy of audits, a centralized auditing system was established in this Headquarters which was used for all but a select few funds which were audited locally. Priorities for audit were based on the suspense dates established by higher headquarters. Custodians and/or responsible individuals were not permitted to depart the command until the final audit was completed.

(b) Disposition of Records: The disposition of records was carried out in accordance with guidance published by the USARV/MACV SUPCOM Adjutant General. This directive provided that all records would be frozen on X-Day and it also allowed files to be transferred without lengthy and time consuming

ANNEX E (United States Army Health Services Group-Vietnam)
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

documentation. The transfer of records was even further simplified by the establishment of records collection points in each Military Region and the Saigon area where all records were staged for shipment to Hawaii where the records were screened for determination of final disposition.

b. Section II: Commander/Surgeon's Comments on Lessons Learned - M.D. Thomas, COL, MC.

(1) Personnel:

(a) Strength Accounting: While a day-by-day withdrawal schedule for all subordinate units was published and monitored by this headquarters, it was difficult for those units outside the Saigon area to strictly adhere to this schedule. They were obligated to move personnel as transportation was made available by the Army Support Elements in their areas. This often caused problems in getting an accurate strength accounting. In general, units were able to stay within their movement quotas for any one increment.

(b) Awards: There were no major problems encountered in this area. The only way in which the processing of awards might have been enhanced would have been by the preparation of award recommendations in advance of the ceasefire and holding them in abeyance until the announcement, at which time they could have been rapidly processed.

(c) Assignment Instructions and Orders: Once officer assignment instructions were issued by the Office of the Surgeon General, it would have been much less of an administrative burden if changes had been kept to a minimum. The many and often last minute changes in assignments, and the associated amendments to orders, increased the workload of the already extremely busy Personnel Service Companies.

(2) Logistics:

(a) Retrograde: The logistical operations were a "first" in that they generally involved phasing out and

ANNEX E (United States Army Health Services Group-Vietnam)
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

not just phasing down. This presented a problem for disposition of large quantities of medical materiel. World-wide requirements for medical materiel were received from DA OTSG allowing screening of on hand assets for application against these requirements. Many of these requirements were satisfied resulting in substantial savings to the DA medical materiel management system through obviation of previously planned procurement of similar materiel. This world wide visibility of DA OTSG medical materiel requirements was of great assistance to the Command. Recommend this procedure be followed in future phase out operations.

(b) Turn-In To Keystone: Subordinate units processed other than medical equipment through Keystone processing points. Keystone was responsible for accepting this equipment for ultimate disposition and for maintaining auditable records. This procedure greatly assisted subordinate units in phasing out of operations. They were not frustrated by having to hold items on hand awaiting disposition instructions and were relieved from the laborious process of retrograding items while at the same time having to accomplish other phase out actions. Recommend a Keystone type procedure be included as a part of future phase out of operations.

(c) Turn-Over to RVNAF: RVNAF medical service was extremely cooperative and helpful during the phase out of medical service logistical operations. Their country-wide medical materiel deficiencies were identified and submitted to this command for screening against US unit assets. This substantially aided in the provision of disposition instructions to US subordinate units. RVNAF, in addition to facilitating the turnover of US equipment and supplies, provided medical service logistical support to the Command during the phase out period. For example, oxygen was supplied to the USAH Saigon on a routine replenishment basis and other support was rendered on a situational basis as requested.

ANNEX E (United States Army Health Services Group-Vietnam)
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(d) Establishment of Supply Accounts: Prior to X-Day, the Command provided medical materiel support to numerous small activities in country. This support had been provided from the Supply and Service Division, USAH Saigon. In order to insure continued support to these activities after X-Day, the Command operated as an intermediary for them with the US Army Medical Materiel Agency, Pacific located on Okinawa, Japan, to assist them in being established as authorized requisitioners of medical materiel. It is felt that the Command action substantially benefitted these activities, but was an unexpected additional workload that detracted from the Command's ability to accomplish more directly related phase out operations.

(e) Close-Out of Property Books: The pre-auditing of subordinate unit property books by the Command Headquarters proved to be extremely beneficial. This provided the units with advance knowledge of the USARV DCSLOG requirements and additionally provided them with a degree of certainty as to their property book accuracy. USARV DCSLOG was required to frequently change its audit schedule, therefore subordinate units were subjected to numerous changes in their audit dates. This pre-audit reduced the trauma accompanying the frequent changes. Pre-audits should be a part of future operational phase outs. One problem area which made the close out of property books more difficult than necessary was the early release of some of the units' property book officers. In a future redeployment action, commanders should ensure that property book officers are retained in the command until property books are cleared.

(f) Turn-Over to AMEMB: Subsequent to X-Day, the American Embassy established 4 consulate dispensaries and asked the Command to provide assistance in obtaining medical equipment. On-hand assets were screened and available equipment was provided. The effort required to provide this assistance was minimal and did not influence the Command phase out.

ANNEX E (United States Army Health Services Group-Vietnam)
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(3) Intelligence/Security:

(a) Security Inspection: The comprehensive nature and helpful attitude of the MACDI Security Inspection team was extremely beneficial to the HQ, USAHSVCGPV security personnel particularly in the matter of resolving differences between USARV/MACV SUPCOM and MACV security regulations.

(b) Transfer of Documents: The decision by higher headquarters to ship all classified records to a central point in Hawaii for sorting and disposition and the simplification of document shipping instructions was extremely helpful in insuring the orderly drawdown of this Headquarters and facilitating the disposition of classified documents.

(4) Operations:

(a) HOME COMING: USAHSVCGPV's participation in Operation HOME COMING was without incident. However, the handling of the one US civilian returnee who elected to stay in RVN for a few days after release presented some unnecessary problems. The problems of security and PIO coverage which fell on the shoulders of the USAH, Saigon could have been precluded. In future operations of this nature, civilian returnees who are permitted to drop out of the system in-country should immediately become the responsibility of the US Embassy. Those requiring hospital admission, other than for emergency medical care, should not be permitted to leave the system until they reach the Joint Processing Center off-shore.

(b) Drawdown of Medical Service: Due to the ample planning time prior to the execution of the ceasefire, X-Day found USAHSVCGPV poised to execute the redeployment plan on order. The only problems encountered during the execution period occurred as a result of shifting support requirements, changes in base/compound closure dates, and the availability of air transportation for both in-country travel and DEROS flights. As our medical units provided area support, local commanders were able to make on-site adjustments without compromising either the quality or availability of medical support. Ultimately as the drawdown was

ANNEX E (United States Army Health Services Group-Vietnam)
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

slowed to more directly parallel the release of POW's, two dispensaries were opened at Camp Alpha and the MACV Annex to provide medical support for the large concentration of troops in these areas who were awaiting redeployment. In addition, the USAH-Saigon continued to provide staff support to the Seventh Day Adventist Hospital in sufficient numbers to staff one ward for US military patients, a 24 hour emergency room service in the same ward, and an on-call surgical team. Throughout the redeployment period, flexibility was the key to all operations. The response of the medical units to the changes as they occurred was a tribute to their leadership and mission dedication.

(c) Joint Military Commission Support: The requirement for providing a physician with each JMC team posed no problem for the Group as in-country assets were available. Personnel were physically located with the teams upon activation (Hue, Phan Thiet, My Tho) or upon the closure of the US medical facility available in the team area (Da Nang, Pleiku, Bien Hoa, Saigon, Can Tho). Since JMC physicians provided area support to US personnel in their vicinity, this distribution of small aid stations provided continuous medical support throughout the country during the redeployment period.

(d) International Commission Support: No problems were encountered in providing ICCS support as this support paralleled support for the JMC and US personnel.

(e) Drug Program:

1 The Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program was seriously impaired in the final months by the failure of any one office at MACV to assume responsibility for all facets of the program. There was no central focal point at MACV to provide coordination, policy guidance, and direction to the component commanders or to maintain statistics on the program's effectiveness. Further, although the Army's program was monitored closely by Special Actions Division, DCS P&A, USARV/MACV SUPCOM, a similar agency was noticeably lacking for the Air Force, and Navy.

ANNEX E (United States Army Health Services Group-Vietnam)
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

2 It was initially felt that several hundred personnel would be identified as drug abusers upon DEROS. This projection was based on the best available statistical data. In order to handle the projected workload, the DTC was to remain at full strength and plans were developed to use Ward 8 at USAH, Saigon as an additional drug detoxification ward. The projection was, in actuality, too high as only 176 personnel required detoxification at the DTC. In future operations of this nature, consideration must be given to the desire of some drug abusers to go home clean. This desire obviously caused many to detoxify themselves.

(f) ROK Support: The medical support provided to ROKFV by USAHSVCGPV was brought about by the failure of ROKFV to accept responsibility for their own medical care. Original discussions with ROKFV medical personnel in September 1972 centered around their intention to phase out medical support concurrently with troop withdrawal. Their plan at that time would have resulted in only a minimal requirement for US medical assistance. However, on February 15, 1973, ROKFV unilaterally and unwisely stood down their hospitals and by their actions forced US medical units to assume this support. In addition, the ROKAF refused to increase the number of air evacuation missions to Korea resulting in many unnecessary days of hospitalization at the USAH, Saigon. The ROKFV actions in the withdrawal resulted in an unnecessary burden being placed on US medical facilities during a period when the US medical facilities were also trying to standdown. In any future operation all allied forces must be held responsible for their own medical support with only minimal, essential assistance provided by US military medical services.

(g) Consulate Dispensaries: These dispensaries were established primarily through the initiative of command military personnel. Requirements were identified in terms of personnel, physical plants, equipment and materiel. Where available, military assets were furnished to these dispensaries to include personnel during the phase down period. Establishment of these dispensaries did not adversely affect the Command's phase-down operations.

ANNEX E (United States Army Health Services Group-Vietnam)
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(h) Organization of DAO: The Medical Service Element of DAO was functionally organized and easily assumed it's planned mission. In retrospect, it was hampered by the absence of an administrative specialist to handle information distribution, other DAO organizational element inquiries, and to provide an information control center. Further, as the US redeployment neared its conclusion, it became more and more evident the presence of a Surgeon in Medical Service Element during the transition period of DAO (60-90 days) would have facilitated the establishment of the Medical Service Element by providing professional expertise and prestige in the coordination of policy with the Medical Director, US Embassy, Seventh Day Adventists, and RVNAF. Unfortunately the rigid space limitations imposed on DAO precluded the inclusion of both the Surgeon and the administrative specialist.

(i) Reorganization: The purpose of establishing MEDDAC Pleiku was to facilitate the command/control of the units in Military Region II (MR II) and reduce the span of responsibility for USAH-Saigon in anticipation of ceasefire operations. The decision proved to be a wise one as it enabled MEDDAC Pleiku to manage the medical support of MR II in a manner which was responsive to the local situation. Further USAH-Saigon was more able to effectively meet its responsibilities during redeployment. Finally, the Group benefitted by having direct lines of communications to the major medical units in-country.

(5) Transfer of Functions:

(a) Hospitalization - Seventh Day Adventists: The Seventh Day Adventists were extremely cooperative in the transition period of providing hospitalization. Their personnel worked side by side with Command personnel to insure continuity of operations and minimum disruption of services. The provision of hospitalization on a contractual basis was considered advantageous when compared to the alternative of continued United States investment in a physical plant, personnel, and equipment to support an unstable residual force. Recommend contractual support be considered for future similar phase outs.

ANNEX E (United States Army Health Services Group-Vietnam)
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(b) Outpatient Care - US Embassy/Seventh Day Adventists: Originally the Consulate Dispensaries were established under the concept that outpatient care would be available to all US personnel in the Da Nang, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, and Can Tho areas. The Medical Director, however, due to limited assets was unable to assume the responsibility for US contractors and this created some difficulties as the contractors were required to make independent arrangements for medical support. No problems of this nature were experienced in the Saigon area as the Seventh Day Adventists provided outpatient service for a fee.

(c) Defense Attache Office: Transfer of functions to DAO was greatly facilitated by the presence of TDY DAO personnel immediately subsequent to X-day. Of equal importance was the immediate acceptance by RVNAF medical service personnel of greater responsibilities in the management of their MASF budget. The relatively long phase out period of 60 days allowed incumbent/successor functional overlap and provided for detailed instruction and guidance for successors. This overlap period was a significant factor in functional transfer success and should be included in future such phase out operations.

(d) USARPAC - Tripler Army Medical Center (TAMC): The transfer of the Pay Patient Accounts and Patient Trust Funds to TAMC enabled USAHSVCGPV to close out its hospital administrative functions in-country. It is anticipated that the transfer of the MRO, USAH-Saigon, who is familiar with the funds and their problem areas, to TAMC will provide the "institutional memory" necessary to facilitate the management and ultimate termination of these funds.

(6) Transfer of Facilities: Since all facilities were transferred prior to the ceasefire, no problems were encountered which in anyway hampered the withdrawal. If any lesson is to be learned, it is that in a similar situation, a similar process should be followed.

(7) Phase-Out of Advisory Effort:

ANNEX E (United States Army Health Services Group-Vietnam)
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action report.

(a) Recommendations for Strengthening the Organizational Structure of the RVNAF Medical Service: Although the RVNAF Medical Service has experienced tremendous growth in size and capabilities over the past few years, there are several areas in the organizational and command structure which should be changed.

1 While the RVNAF Medical Service in theory operates under a "tri-service" concept, such is not always the case in reality. There appears to be a reluctance on the part of the VNN and the VNAF to use ARVN facilities which should support them under this unified concept. There also appears to be a reluctance on the part of the supporting ARVN activities to provide support to the medical facilities of the other two services. The same is true to a lesser extent for the Marine Hospital and the Airborne Hospital. In many instances these facilities have exceeded their capacity, yet they hesitated to transfer patients to ARVN station or general hospitals. Each individual service attempts to become self-sufficient at the expense of causing unnecessary duplication of already limited resources. The utilization of VNN and VNAF staffing at the Cuc Quan Y level and at the Military Medical School would be a step toward furthering the Tri-service concept.

2 The current command structure of the RVNAF Medical Service is centralized in nature in that all station and general hospitals report direct to the Surgeon General. While the Medical Group has been given command for the smaller activities within the Military Region, association with the station and general hospitals is limited to technical supervision only. If the Office of the Surgeon General is to continue to improve its mission of overall management of the medical service, further decentralization and a reduction in span of control is indicated. This can be accomplished by establishing an area medical support concept with all medical activities in the Military Region, except the general hospitals, being placed under the command and control of the Medical Group.

ANNEX E (United States Army Health Services Group-Vietnam)
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(b) Logistics: The logistical advisory effort at X-day was functionally categorized by US and RVNAF medical materiel management personnel into advisory functions to be transferred to RVNAF, functions to be transferred to the DAO medical service element, functions to be transferred out of country to other agencies, and functions to be deleted. Essentially, the residual advisory effort in medical materiel management is the minimum necessary to accomplish MASF budget control and to provide the interface with US supply sources. This low level of advisory effort is expected to continue as long as MASF support to RVNAF continues. Functions that continue to have US involvement through DAO Medical Service Element personnel are the MASF budget and in-country procurement of pharmaceuticals. Since these functions are directly concerned with utilization of US funds, it is recommended that control actions for these functions continue to remain with US personnel.

(c) Utilization of US Medical Advisory Personnel: Since the Commander, USAHSVCGPV controlled the medical advisors as Command Surgeon, MACV, these assets were used throughout the redeployment period to assist in establishing and staffing the Consulate Dispensaries for the post redeployment medical system throughout the country, in providing JMC/ICCS support at team sites, and in augmenting USAHSVCGPV medical facilities as needed. This unified effort on the part of all US Army medical personnel in-country was a decisive factor in the redeployment of the US military medical assets from Vietnam and the transition to a viable civilian medical system without interruption in the availability of quality medical support.

(8) Administration:

(a) Audit of Funds: During the course of the audits, it was discovered that five funds in USAHSVCGPV were still active though their units had been inactivated during the past year. Only after locating the necessary records and assets were the funds reconstructed and eventually terminated. Another problem in the final auditing was that procedural errors had been made and perpetuated from custodian to custodian over extended periods of time. The necessity to resolve this type of error could have been precluded

ANNEX E (United States Army Health Services Group-Vietnam)
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

had the responsible headquarters more closely supervised the funds by performing the required audits and instituting effective training programs for their custodians. All audits were satisfactorily completed and accepted by higher headquarters, and the funds were correctly dissolved within the time schedule prescribed by higher headquarters.

(b) Disposition of Records: The disposition of records was implemented according to the prescribed directives and, because of the in-depth pre-planning and the greatly simplified procedures, was completed without any problems being encountered. The elimination of the requirements to screen each individual file and to prepare extensive documentation greatly facilitated the expeditious transfer of records from all units, especially those units that were required to re-deploy within the first 15 days of the ceasefire. Additionally, the creation of collection points throughout RVN eliminated the rapid influx of several tons of parcels into the APO system. This also provided for the proper disposition of records without reliance on the mail service system from RVN.

APPENDICES:

- 1 - USA Hospital, Saigon
- 2 - 67th Evacuation Hospital, Pleiku MEDDAC
- 3 - 95th Evacuation Hospital, SMBL
- 4 - 4th Medical Detachment - VS
- 5 - 57th Medical Detachment - RA
- 6 - 237th Medical Detachment - RA
- 7 - 247th Medical Detachment - HA
- 8 - 345th Medical Detachment
- 9 - 575th Medical Detachment - MB
- 10 - 9th Medical Laboratory, Augmentation
- 11 - 20th Preventive Medicine Unit - SVC-FLD
- 12 - 38th Medical Detachment - HA

APPENDIX 1 (USA Hospital, Saigon) to Annex E to USARV/
MACV/SUPCOM After Action Report.

1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this report is to provide information concerning significant activities, observations and recommendations concerning the US Army Hospital, Saigon, and the Drug Treatment Center during "Operation COUNTDOWN" and the twenty-seven days preceding the implementation of this plan.

2. GENERAL. This report covers the period 1 January 1973 to 15 March 1973. Information contained herein relates to the deactivation of the units in paragraph 1. The phases stated in the following sections are considered to be functional phases and not time phases. The standdown phase pertains to the actual operations and/or curtailment of operations; the roll up phase concerns the transfer of properties, remaining functions, and disposition of records, and the withdrawal phase concerns the deployment of personnel.

a. Section I: Significant Organizational Activities

(1) Standdown Phase.

(a) Out-Patient Clinics/Subspecialty Services. In anticipation of a cease-fire, elective procedures were held to a minimum beginning 1 January. Originally, no personnel were to depart USAH, SGN until X+15. However, the hospital received short notice to release 50 personnel between X and X+3. This included the release of some subspecialists. As a result, effective X-day, all specialty clinics were closed and all elective procedures were terminated. The MACV Clinic remained operational until X+19, while the Vung Tau Clinic and Plantation Dispensary operated until X+19 and X+45 respectively. The hospital out-patient clinic, although closed for specialties, remained staffed to conduct sick-call and relieve the emergency room from the burden of a large influx of people. On X+30, the OPC operated sick-call from 0800-1200. On X-day the immunization clinic was moved to the emergency room. Also, between X+1 and X+22 an immunization team was stationed at MACV Annex (527th PSC) to screen records and give required immunization. The team operated from 0800 to the COB of the 527th PSC daily.

APPENDIX 1 (USA Hospital, Saigon) to Annex E to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(b) In-Patient Care: Effective X-day, the evacuation policy of the command changed from 30 to 10 days. This action, coupled with the curtailment of elective procedures, quickly reduced the number of inpatients to a figure compatible with personnel assets. As a result, Ward 6 and Ward 2 were closed on X+1 and X+20 respectively. The mission of providing in-patient care to the ROK forces was assumed on X+14. (Planning had anticipated a requirement of 10 beds). The first ROK patient arrived on X+23 and by X+27 there were 16 ROK in-patients, several requiring intensive care. Many attempts were made to evacuate them out of country, but all failed and they remained until X+30. Ward 6 was prepared to accept any returnees released by the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. On X+15, one POW (Civilian) was admitted to ward 6 and remained under observation for three days.

(c) Logistics: Effective X-day all routine requests to USAMMAPAC were stopped. Only emergency requisitions were processed. By X+2, all supply requisitions due in from USAMMAPAC were screened, resulting in a telephonic/written cancellation of the majority of items. USAMMAPAC responded and tried to even turn around some materials already in the "pipeline". The small amount of materials that did arrive after X-day were returned immediately if not needed. Effective X-day, property management section conducted intensive inventories of all property on hand at the hospital, MACV Clinic, Vung Tau, Can Tho and Plantation Dispensaries. The maintenance section likewise prepared all items of equipment for disposition (included equipment at all medical and dental treatment facilities in MR II, III and IV). During this entire period, the Supply and Service division continued to support all authorized customers with medical supplies to include the JMC/ICCS customers.

(d) Administration: In preparation for a cease-fire agreement, the hospital initiated actions to prevent an overwhelming volume of administrative actions in case of short notice. All awards, OER's and EER's were processed as far as possible; the Annual Medical Service Activities Report was drafted and finalized by 5 January; records normally scheduled for retirement in January were prepared and retired by the end of the first week in January; and

APPENDIX 1 (USA Hospital, Saigon) to Annex E to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After action Report.

all other personnel actions were handled as expeditiously as possible. It should be noted that these actions were also taken by subordinate units. Registrar activities were actually consolidated by combining the Joint Medical Regulating Office, and the Drug Treatment Center, Registrar Section with the main Registrar Office prior to X-day. Effective X-day, all routine personnel actions were terminated. Actions in progress at that time were filed in the individual's 201 file so action could be continued at the next duty section. Between X-day and X+15 awards, OER's and EER's were finalized the processed. They totaled over 400 awards, 125 OER's and 250 EER's. In addition to military awards, over 75 civilian awards for local national employees were processed. Associated with the loss of personnel, functional areas were combined. Plans, Operations, Training, and Security were combined with the Medical Company Detachment functions. Medical Company Administration was assumed by the headquarters while DTC administration was completely managed by the Registrar/Personnel sections of the hospital.

Effective 26 January the 67th Evac. Hospital, 575th Medical Detachment, and the 247th and 237th Medical Detachment were relieved from attachment to the USAH, SGN. This increased the efficiency of administrative actions between these units and USAHSVCGPV concerning Countdown Operations.

(e) Food Service: On X-day, Sunday Brunch, Night Supper and the ambulatory modified diet line were discontinued. Box lunches prepared and distributed at the supper meal were provided to replace the regular night supper. Effective X-day only hospital personnel, patients and other military transients were authorized dining privileges. All civilian contractor personnel were refused subsistence unless working for the hospital or as in-patients. Subsistence pick-ups and deliveries continued with no interruption.

(f) Drug Treatment Center: Prior to X-day, all 212 actions previously processed by the DTC were simply forwarded

APPENDIX 1 (USA Hospital, Saigon) to Annex E to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

to CONUS for action. Policy was also changed to reflect that first time identifiers could be air-evaced to CONUS instead of returning them to their unit. Exceptions were made to this policy in cases where the unit needed the individual returned; however, overall, this new policy worked well. The recidivist rate seen after 1 January showed a steady decline.

In anticipation of a large influx of drug abuse patients identified through DEROS testing, the DTC Staff remained unchanged until after X+26. Ward 8 was prepared to be utilized in the event admissions to DTC would surpass the beds available in Ward 9. Because of the low patient census, Ward 9 was closed on X+34.

(2) Withdrawal Phase.

(a) USAH,SGN: Prior to X-day personnel were given an adjusted departure date, annotated on a DPU roster and forwarded to the servicing personnel service company. Original plans were based on a zero strength loss until after X+15; however, on X-day the hospital was required to drop 43 personnel and by X+15 to drop another 6, bringing the assigned strength from 313 on X-day to 264 on X+15. During the period X+15 through X+30, 131 more personnel departed the command. The third increment, X+30 - X+45 saw the loss of another 46 personnel leaving a residual force of 87 who departed between X+45 and X+49.

Ten assigned personnel were on leave or R&R in CONUS on X-day. None were deemed mission essential. Reassignment orders were received on each and they were subsequently dropped from accountability by that authority.

One NCO on leave was sent back to RVN from the Oakland Staging Area. For some reason he was thought to be mission essential by DA.

One clerk, one cook and two physicians were reassigned to the 527th PSC for duty as members of the Joint Military Commission.

APPENDIX 1 (USA Hospital, Saigon) to Annex E to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

Extensive planning was accomplished by the staff in order to insure a delicate balance of professional and administrative personnel throughout the period that could effectively accomplish the mission. A general surgeon, internist and OR team were held until X+45. Departure days for some personnel were changed because of personnel problems, i.e., marriage processing, emergency situations and illness (air-evac). Troop morale remained relatively high during the period despite the uncertainty of daily operations.

Between X-day and X+45, all local national employees were separated as the reduction in force program took effect. The vast majority (109) remained employed until the hospital was turned over. In accordance with instructions received, these personnel were given two weeks additional pay in lieu of the standard two weeks termination notice. Every conceivable effort was expended to assist these employees in obtaining employment with the Seventh Day Adventists and other remaining employeres.

US Army Drug Treatment Center: Planning for the DTC was based on the assumption that a large patient load would be generated for this facility because of the increased unit sweep testing and the rapid DEROS of personnel. Thus the DTC assigned strength was to remain unchanged until X+30. Between X-day and X+15 several personnel were lost due to normal DEROS/ETS, emergencies, etc. When it became apparent that the patient census would not exceed a minimal staff, permission was received to drop some personnel. Between X+15 and X+30, 16 personnel departed, X+30 to X+45 saw the loss of 10 more and the remaining 11 departed on X+45.

(3) Roll-up Phase.

(a) Transfer of Properties: The disposition of supplies and equipment fell into three main categories: retrograde to CONUS or other off-shore depots, transfer to ARVN, and transfer to US Embassy (to remain in-place for use by the Seventh Day Adventists). Other disposition of little magnitude included issues/transfer to JMC/ICCS customers and RVNAF. Disposition by dollar value is shown below. This was accomplished during the period X-day to X+45.

APPENDIX 1 (USA Hospital, Saigon) to Annex E to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

	Expendable Medical Supplies	Non-Expendable Equipment	Tactical Equipment	Real Prop
RVNAF	\$ 99,349.00	\$ 85,000.00	\$320,00.00	None
Retrograde	\$101,158.00	\$112,248.00	None	None
US Embassy	\$484,000.00	\$379,415.00	None	5,500,000.00
JMC/ICCS	\$ 20,192.00	None	None	None

An audit trail and documentation of all transactions have been maintained and has been furnished and retired with the property books.

(b) Transfer of Functions: Following the determination that this facility would be turned over to the US Embassy, and that the Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) would staff and operate it, action to transfer the functions were coordinated between the SDA Administrator, this headquarters, and USAHSVCGPV. Beginning X-day, selected SDA staff personnel were given tours and briefings concerning the hospital's operations, activities and problem areas. On X+32 the SDA staff began integration with the USAH, SGN Staff. This included orientation of nurse, pharmacy, food service, administrative, supply, and security personnel. On X+45 the SDA staff took over full operation of the hospital and the remaining military personnel acted only as advisors until their departure on X+49. Medical regulating continued until X+45 when the US Embassy assumed this function.

(c) Disposition of Records/Funds: Effective X-day, all transactions concerning the Hospital Unit Fund and Other Sundry Fund ceased. All records pertaining to these funds were prepared for audit, audited by Health Services Group and officially retired by X+30.

Effective X-day, all clinical records were retired to the appropriate repository and by X+20, all hospital management records were boxed, labeled, and disposed of as required by UAARV Message 110100Z Dec 72. The Pay Patient Account discontinued billing on X-day, was audited and transferred to Tripler General Hospital on X+30. The Patient Trust

APPENDIX 1 (USA Hospital, Saigon) to Annex E to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

Fund ceased operating on X+30 and was likewise transferred to Tripler. The closing of these two activities allowed for the further consolidation of registrar activities by closing out the A&D section. Upon final disposition of all properties the documents and property books of the hospital were reviewed and accepted by USAHSVCGPV. All mail room records were turned over to the base post office on X+40 following the final mail room inspection.

b. Section II: Commander's Observation and Recommendations.

(1) Standdown Phase.

(a) Problems: Initial agreement was made for the USAH, SGN to provide 10 beds for support of ROK forces between X+30 to X+45. When the letter of agreement was written by the MACV Surgeon's Office (6 Dec 72), the dates for assumption of this mission were changed, without coordination of the hospital staff, to X+24 through X+45. The letter further stated that in-country and out-of-country air evacuation beyond the capabilities of ROK forces would be provided by MACV. Then, on X+10, USAH, SGN was notified that support of ROK forces would begin on X+14 rather than X+24. The first ROK patient arrived on X+20 and by X+27 there were 16 ROK patients in-house, several of them seriously ill. Even though many attempts were made to evacuate them out of country, it was impossible to effect any dispositions until the regularly scheduled flight (ROK) arrived on X+30. On X+26 an urgent request was received by the MRO, USAH, SGN, to move two ROK patients from Nha Trang to this facility. (One patient had been shot in the abdomen with an M-16 rifle and the other had a basal skull fracture). An urgent request to Clark AFB was turned down because of the individuals being non-US. It took 4 1/2 hours to get the patients transported to this facility (via a standard passenger U-21 flight), where they immediately underwent emergency procedures, which fortunately proved successful. During the period, some problems arose concerning release of information

APPENDIX 1 (USA Hospital, Saigon) to Annex E to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

to the Press Corps. This facility received one POW returnee and several patients wounded in action after the ceasefire. Obviously these situations were of intense public interest. MACV PIO showed little interest in intervening between the hospital staff and the press. Little official guidance was given, especially concerning the POW, because of his status as a civilian. Numerous correspondents arrived here, some stating that MACV PIO told them to come here, that the individual was a civilian and that MACV had no jurisdiction over him. The Embassy maintained control over the POW, but likewise, they were not available to intervene between the hospital and the press. This situation caused undue hardship and animosity between the press corps and staff members of this hospital.

Physical security of POW's and members of the Joint Military Commission also presented problems. Previously written plans for security support from the 716th MP Bn had been rescinded without notification to us. This required the hospital to provide security from internal resources (considered minimally acceptable) for both situations.

A major problem during the standdown phase was the lack of information provided the headquarters' staff of the hospital and complete exclusion of this headquarters as an operating entity. Examples of this were support of "Operation HOME-COMING" and support of the JMC. Personnel of this command were summoned to Health Services Group Headquarters and given missions and assignments and were briefed on their responsibilities while the hospital as a unit was given no mission or responsibility. Following commitment of these personnel to perform whatever function they were assigned, the hospital as a unit, was asked to submit an after action report on the operation when the hospital headquarters itself knew nothing of the requirements of the mission, what the personnel were supposed to do, or what they actually did.

(b) Recommendations: In the event that US Army Hospitals are committed to the proper care and treatment of 3d country armed forces such as the ROK forces, that other US agencies involved in the total care and evacuation of such patients, also are required to lend their support. The support of

APPENDIX 1 (USA Hospital, Saigon) to Annex E to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

the ROK forces' patients would have presented no problems if they could have been scheduled through the US air evacuation system, both in and out of country. Because this was not possible, several patients were held up to 10 days with no definitive type care provided either because they did not need it or it was beyond the capability of this facility. That it be the policy in the future, that the information office provide personnel, trained in press relations, to the hospital to handle press matters even if the subject is civilian. The assistance is not requested for the civilian as such, but for the benefit of the hospital staff, to relieve them of this non-medical responsibility.

That military police be made available to hospital authorities when required for security beyond their own capabilities. Also, that when contingency plans are changed, that they be appropriately staffed through the hospital, when the hospital is involved.

That when personnel of a subordinate unit are assigned a mission and expected to respond and perform that mission, that the headquarters of the subordinate unit be issued some type of information or instructions concerning its responsibilities as a unit.

(2) Withdrawal Phase.

(a) Problems: Plans, based on initial guidance as contained in COMUSMACV OPORD J215, USARV OPORD 215, and USAHSVCGPV OPORD 215, called for the continued full operation until X+15, at which time, due to the initiation of personnel losses, elective procedures, specialty clinics, MACV Troop Clinic and other operations would be curtailed. However, on 27 January (X-1) we were informed of the loss of 110 people that would occur by X+6. as stated above, all plans were revised drastically to include curtailment of operations fifteen days earlier than anticipated. Subspecialists and other personnel (50) departed by X+6, then another revision called for zero strength loss until after X+15. This resulted in more personnel available than were required to

APPENDIX 1 (USA Hospital, Saigon) to Annex E to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

perform the operations not yet curtailed. This overstaffing caused considerable boredom to remaining personnel.

Constant changes to the members of personnel allowed to depart Vietnam and the revision of X-day rosters, caused much personnel unrest. Communication between higher headquarters, servicing agencies and this hospital seemed poor. Continued contradiction arose on vital points such as dates to sign in at Camp Alpha versus X-days; formats and requirements for awards; whether to count people not returning from leave, or those departing air-evac (medical means) in loss strength against those actually scheduled to proceed to Camp Alpha; and obtaining reassignment orders, especially on in-country transfers. Additional requirements such as the ROK mission, and the staffing of Plantation Dispensary with a physician as well as corpsmen, made matching personnel figures (authorized strength by X-dates) with required missions a difficult task.

(b) Recommendations: That in the future, withdrawal of troops be more flexible as to scheduling them out of country. Once figures were agreed upon for the number of personnel to leave during each increment, there was no way to change the schedule even though mission changes were made. Many personnel could have departed sooner than they did because the withdrawal schedule was not flexible enough.

That scheduling of troops out of country be more flexible and mission oriented. In the early phases of the withdrawal, scheduling was done without consultation with the affected unit. This did improve in later increments but again, numbers to be moved on certain days appeared to be more important than mission performance and schedules were very inflexible.

(3) Roll-up Phase.

(a) Problem: Prior to X-day, instructions were received that all consumable supplies would be left in place for the US agency taking over the hospital. Following X-day, the plans were changed and supply was ordered to retrograde \$101,158.00

APPENDIX 1 (USA Hospital, Saigon) to Annex E to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

worth of consumable supplies and issue \$99,349.00 worth of consumable supplies to ARVNAF. This mission was unplanned and required many man hours of unprogrammed labor to pull the supplies, post the stock record cards and deliver the supplies to the ARVN Depot or pack them for retrograde.

The retrograde and transfer of property was an extremely difficult operation with instructions as to disposition of property changing almost daily. Although the original plan called for a minimum of equipment to be retrograded, it was a major problem for this unit to get it from units as far away as Pleiku, Nha Trang, and Can Tho. Although deadlines for the receipt of this equipment were established, they were not followed. In addition, the FRAT machines and equipment from the Urine Test Laboratory were scheduled for shipment on X+36. Personnel were scheduled, trucks were laid on, a Sealand trailer was obtained and all was ready for the packaging of this delicate equipment. On X+31 the hospital was notified that the equipment could not be processed for shipment until further notice. Personnel were required to stand by, and at 1630 hours, X+34, the processing and shipment of the equipment was approved. Personnel were required to work 16 hours on Sunday to get the equipment ready to ship by Monday morning. Indecision and frequent changes from the published plan were a major source of frustration for the personnel of this command.

This headquarters received several conflicting instructions concerning turnover of property. For example, all equipment from Plantation Dispensary to USAH, SGN was scheduled for turnover to the US Embassy on X+32. On X+31 instructions were received to turn several items of equipment over to the ICCS for use by the Canadian contingent, even though the property was already listed on the transfer document for turnover to the Embassy and promised to the 7th Day Adventists.

The two major problems in the maintenance area were scheduling inspections of medical equipment at outlying units and arranging for transportation to get to these units. Scheduling of technical inspections of equipment was done by the MACV Surgeon's Office and the Medical Maintenance Section, USAH, SGN, was notified when to inspect the various units. Transportation was extremely difficult to obtain and when the team arrived to inspect the equipment, they were not expected and the unit was not prepared.

APPENDIX 1 (USA Hospital, Saigon) to annex E to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(b) Recommendations. That published plans not be changed unless critically necessary. The frequency of the changes and the numerous delays in implementing the published plans indicated a lack of foresight and undermined the confidence of the personnel in the command structure.

That in the future, operations of this type should have communications stressed and instructions issued should be more formally coordinated.

APPENDIX 2 (67th Evacuation Hospital, Pleiku MEDDAC) to Annex E to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this report is to provide significant information pertaining to the redeployment of personnel, the turnover of equipment and facilities to RVNAF, and the concurrent provision of health care during the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Military Region Two, Republic of Vietnam.

2. GENERAL. This report covers the period beginning 28 January 1973 through the completion of the roll-up phase, 29 March 1973 (X-day through X+59).

a. Section 1: Significant Organizational Activities. On X-2, (26 Jan 73), the 67th Evacuation Hospital was reorganized into the Pleiku MEDDAC with the following units being assigned: 247th Medical Detachment (RA), 237th Medical Detachment (RA), and 575th Medical Detachment (MB). As of X-day, three major organizational activities were delineated: 1) Assessment of troop locations and strength, and probable routes of standdown deployment indicated the need for establishment of dispensaries at Qui-Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay. 2) Coordination of Medical support withdrawal with the incremental decrease in U.S. Military Troop strength in Military Region Two, and 3) the support of POW release (Operation HOMECOMING) within the Second Region Assistance Command.

(1) Personnel: Effective X-day, all AMED personnel reverted to the operational control of Pleiku MEDDAC CMDR/SRAC Surgeon (minus Avn Bde). It was felt that the number of AMED personnel, assigned and attached, were sufficient to staff all facilities (including the two additional dispensaries) within MR II without augmentation. At the conclusion of total mission, all personnel were redeployed to CONUS from the 247th Med Det by X+15, the 237th by X+33, the 575th by X+50, the Qui-Nhon Dispensary by X+40, the Cam Ranh Dispensary by X+46 and the 67th Evacuation Hospital by X+50. One MC officer and one 91C40 were reassigned to JMC and remained until the conclusion of that mission.

APPENDIX 2 (67th Evacuation Hospital, Pleiku MEDDAC) to Annex E to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(2) Equipment/Retrograde/Turnover: The turnover of equipment supplies and facilities was begun early in the standdown phase. Joint inventories were conducted with ARVN counterparts and lateral transfer accomplished. All equipment and facilities necessary to continue operation were then assumed temporarily on hand receipt until cessation of mission.

(a) Prior to X-Day: (11 Nov 72) Turned over 2 1/2 ton trucks (3), 1/4 ton trucks (4), M-16 rifles (63) to ARVN and signed back on hand receipt.

(b) X+15: Encore Dental Units (4) and compressors (2) retrograded to Saigon (6 Feb 73).

(c) X+15: Turned in 45 cal pistols (20), Typewriters (13), adding machine (1) and Flag, US (1) (6 Feb 73).

(d) X+15: Turned in 3/4 ton trucks (2) to LSA (8 Feb 73).

(e) X+15: Transferred rest of medical equipment and PCS Equipment to ARVN (9 Feb 73).

(f) X+15: Emptied Medical Supply warehouse and Motor Pool.

(g) X+39: Per joint inventory with RVNAF, hand receipts were cleared.

(3) Intelligence/Security: All classified documents were destroyed IAW appropriate AR's on X+38 and properly witnessed and recorded.

(4) Operations: Inasmuch as medical support would be required throughout the withdrawal of U.S. Military cessation of mission was coordinated with the closure of U.S. Military installations in Military Region Two. Because of variance in the actual time of installation closure, some local re-deployment of medical personnel was required. With closure of Lane/An Son, remaining personnel of 237th Med Det moved to Camp Rivers, Qui-Nhon. Closure of the 67th Evacuation

APPENDIX 2 (67th Evacuation Hospital, Pleiku MEDDAC) to Annex E to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

Hospital Compound in Pleiku at X+39 required redeployment of personnel to MACV Team 21 and the establishment of a dispensary operation there to provide medical support through X+59. The following operations was considered significant enough to enumerate:

- X-Day: One M.C. (3100) and two 91B40's (from MACV Advisory Teams) deployed to Camp Rivers/Qui-Nhon Dispensary.
- X+4: Two 91B40's deployed to Installation Cam Ranh Bay Dispensary with direct support provided by the 575th Med Det at Nha-Trang.
- X+6: The 237th Med Det assumed the mission of air evacuation for MR II south from the 247th Med Det which began roll-up and deactivation to be completed NLT X+15.
- X+15: The 247th Med Det completed its incremental redeployment to CONUS.
- X+30: The 237th Med Det ceased operation. Contractual arrangements were accomplished with Air America to provide fixed wing air evacuation. Rotary wing support was provided by on-site ICCS and JMC helicopter.
- X+39: The hospital at 67th Evac Compound was closed and the dispensary operation at MACV Team 21 Compound initiated and staffed by JMC personnel. The dispensary at Camp Rivers was closed and the three attendant personnel deployed to Camp Alpha.
- X+41: The 575th Med Det terminated mission, remaining personnel providing interim medical support through the Nha Trang Embassy Dispensary.
- X+46: The Dispensary at Cam Ranh Bay terminated mission and the two attendant personnel were deployed to Camp Alpha.

APPENDIX 2 (67th Evacuation Hospital, Pleiku MEDDAC) to Annex E to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

X+1 through X+45: Operation HOMECOMING was supported by two medical teams from the 67th Evacuation Hospital. Dust-off support was provided by the 237th Med Det through X+30 and by fixed wing Air America and Rotary wing JMC and ICCS thereafter.

As the extent of the medical support mission permitted, personnel were gradually withdrawn throughout Military Region Two and transported to Camp Alpha. Movement of personnel was dependent upon coordination of in-country transportation with terminal flight facilities from Saigon to CONUS. It was felt that available medical resources were adequate and that deployment and utilization sufficient, resulting in outstanding medical care being provided throughout the redeployment of U.S. Military personnel from Military Region Two.

(5) Logistics: To integrate transportation of patients and supplies within the MEDDAC, as well as to support OPERATION HOMECOMING, two medevac ships and crews were deployed to Pleiku. Subaccounts for medical supply were initiated for all subordinate units and dust off helicopters utilized to transport supplies and at the same time for coordination of medical operations. The final order of emergency supplies was requested 25 Jan 73 from USAH Saigon. At X+39, all remaining expendable supplies were transferred to ARVN and all narcotics destroyed.

(6) Transfer of Functions and Reporting: At X+41, the mission of the 575th Med Det was assumed by the Embassy Dispensary at Nha-Trang. At X+39, the function of the 67th Evacuation Hospital was assumed, in part, by the JMC Dispensary, MACV TM 21.

(7) Transfer of Buildings, Bases, Installed Property and Equipment and Other Real Property: Prior to X-day, (November 1972) all hospital buildings were inventoried, turned over to ARVN and hand receipted back. At X+39, all hand receipts were cleared and buildings turned over to RVNAF.

APPENDIX 2 (67th Evacuation Hospital, Pleiku MEDDAC) to Annex E to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(8) Other: Prior to X+39, all funds were audited, remaining monies properly disposed and records retired. Files and records were disposed and/or retired IAW appropriate AR's.

b. Section 2: Commanders Observations and Recommendations - David G. Hall, LTC, MC.

(1) Personnel: Considerable unrest amongst the enlisted personnel was evident when assigned departure dates were revised because of operational or transportation variations. It was difficult to keep the troops fully informed because of the time and distance factors between the 67th Evacuation Hospital and the primary source of information, i.e., USAH-SVCGP-V. Troop morale would have been higher had it been possible to deploy more personnel to Camp Alpha and CONUS during the period X+15 to X+34, when a considerable decrease in overall workload was experienced at the same time that the Clubs, Craft Shops, etc. were offering less in the way of off duty entertainment and the town of Pleiku was off-limits.

(2) Equipment Retrograde and Turnover:

(a) The only equipment retrograded were four Encore dental units and two compressors. This was accomplished without difficulty. C

(b) Considerable difficulty was experienced with the turnover of medical equipment and post camp and station property to RVNAF. This headquarters was informed by USAHSVCGP-V to turn over all medical equipment and PCS property to two RVN Medical Units located at Pleiku. This turnover was accomplished by lateral transfer to the units concerned and hand receipting back the items to be used until X+39. The buildings owned by the 67th Evac Hospital were signed over to the two RVN Medical units and one RVN Signal unit at X+39 per joint inventory on that date. The problem encountered was due to an understanding on the part of the RVN Signal unit that all PCS property located in the buildings they signed for would be turned over in-place with the building. By X+39, all PCS property located in subject buildings had already been removed by the RVN Medical unit which had signed for the property. The Commander of the RVN Signal unit expressed considerable displeasure in the fact that the buildings he was accepting contained no PCS

APPENDIX 2 (67th Evacuation Hospital, Pleiku MEDDAC) to
Annex E to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

property. He also stated that there would be a complete investigation of the matter by the RVNAF IG. The SRAC G-4, who was supervising the turnover of the Compound, stated that it was also his understanding that all medical property books would be turned over to RVNAF Medical units. The problem between the RVNAF Medical unit and the Signal unit was not resolved, but since the 67th Evacuation Hosp was in receipt of a DA Form 3161 (From the RVNAF Medical unit) all property and buildings were cleared on X+39. The turnover of all buildings and equipment could have proceeded more smoothly had more specific instructions been issued to the RVNAF units, particularly if medical unit property books (PCS property) were to be turned over differently than in other units.

(3) Intelligence and Security: Security of buildings and supplies became an increasing problem when troop strength declined and RVNAF troops were allowed on the compound to accomplish pre-joint inventory inspections. The problem was alleviated by quartering U.S. troops in each of the critical standdown and withdrawal phases, a major problem also existed in the security of supplies and equipment secondary to high local needs and demand. Recognition of our imminent withdrawal brought innumerable requests for medical supplies, equipment, and movable facilities from Province Hospitals, ARVN Medical installations and newly arrived medical personnel attached to the Joint Military Commission and the ICCS. In addition, highly profitable sales of medical supplies reported possible on the local economy made physical security of such items of highest priority.

(4) Operations: The only problem encountered in the operational area was due to the fact that the Pleiku MEDDAC was established on 26 Jan 73, only two days prior to X-day. This was not sufficient time to define administrative and supply channels which became very critical on X-day. Due to the full cooperation of the USAHSVCGP-V, staff, medical operations were accomplished as efficiently as possible under the circumstances.

APPENDIX 2 (67th Evacuation Hospital, Pleiku MEDDAC) to Annex E to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(5) Logistics: No significant problems were encountered in the area of logistics. The two dispensaries established at Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay were equipped and supplied from existing resources, utilizing Dust off helicopter to transport most supplies. Poor telephonic communication and a very slow (7 to 14 day) distribution system caused considerable time and effort to be expended in order to communicate with and transmit important documents to Saigon.

(6) Transfer of Functions and Reporting: No problems were encountered. The transfer of the 67th Evacuation Hospital's function to the JMC Dispensary at MACV TM 21 was one NCO, 91C40 to JMC on X+39. The transfer of the functions of the 575th Med Det to the Embassy Dispensary in Nha Trang was carried out with no difficulty.

(7) Transfer of Buildings and Installed Property; No significant problems were encountered.

(8) Other: During the latter portion of the roll-up phase following termination of supply input and cessation of surgical and holding facilities, it became obvious that large numbers of people in the Central Highland area had become dependent upon US Military medical facilities. These included American civilians employed by PA&E, Federal Electric, and many other American corporations, as well as vietnamese civilians and Montagnards. With cessation of mission, it became distressingly evident that these people had access to essentially no medical support of any kind. Following stand-down of the Dust off units, no certain liaison could be documented with Air America, assuring emergency air evacuation of critically ill patients. Attempts to confirm this presumed contractual arrangement were fruitless. Military U-21 aircraft were utilized for medical air evacuation when the occasion demanded.

APPENDIX 3 (95th Evacuation Hospital - SMBL) to Annex E
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this report is to provide a narrative and chronological account of events leading up to and the subsequent departure of the 95th Evacuation Hospital from the Republic of Vietnam. It will also analyze selected problem areas and recommend solutions where applicability to future hospital closings appears likely. The standdown portion will include those actions taken prior to and shortly after X-day while the withdrawal and roll-up portion will discuss those actions occurring shortly after X-day until closure of the hospital. There is some overlap in these phases as many actions proved difficult to delineate between specific phases.

2. GENERAL. The 95th Evacuation Hospital gradually reduced its patient care capabilities and ceased to operate on 9 March 1973. Specific planning actions were taken in accordance with USARV/MACV OPLAN 215, HSVGP OPLAN 215 and USASE OPLAN 215. The period covered by the report is from 1 January 1973 to 9 March 1973. Actions, as outlined in Annex D, USAHSVCGP, OPLAN 215 were taken with no significant problems being encountered.

a. Significant Organizational Activities.

(1) Standdown Phase.

(a) Personnel.

1 As of 1 January 1973, the authorized strength of the 95th Evacuation Hospital (RA) was 97, with a manning level of 96, and an assigned strength of 93. As of X-day, 28 January 1973, the unit strength was 95 personnel due to normal assignment gains. On 28 January, Operational Plan COUNTDOWN was activated and by this plan normal DEROS dates were adjusted at a level so as to bring the hospital to a strength of 37 on X+30. The original release date roster was modified somewhat during the period X+1 through X+21 due to an accelerated withdrawal plan. The final list was drawn up which left a total of 37 personnel in the unit as of X+30. Of this number, 16 were officers and 21 were enlisted.

APPENDIX 3 (95th Evacuation Hospital - SMBL) to Annex E
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

2 Personnel records and reports were handled in a normal manner at the end of calendar year 1972. End of year reports were submitted, while 1971 and 1972 records and files were screened for proper disposition. On X-day, all records and files were frozen in place and plans were activated for shipment beginning on X-day, 28 January 1973, and finishing by X+30, in accordance with USARV/MACV SUPCOM Msg 110100Z Dec 72. Recommendations for awards for service were submitted by X+2 to Commander, US Army Health Services Group, Vietnam and for achievement by X+15. On X+6, civilian personnel were notified of their release dates based on the phase down of patient care. Efficiency reports to be indorsed or reviewed by US Army Health Services Group, Vietnam were submitted on X+18.

3 Hospital files, as well as the files for the 571st Medical Detachment (RA) were turned in to the Records Management Office MRI on X+16 (13 Feb 73).

4 Personnel Strength Indicated Below:

- a 1 Jan 73 - Strength 93
- b 14 Jan 73 - Strength 91
- c 28 Jan 73 - X Day - Strength 95
- d 4 Feb 73 - X+7 - Strength 83
- e 11 Feb 73 - X+14 - Strength 80
- f 18 Feb 73 - X+21 - Strength 67

(b) Equipment Turnover:

1 At X-90 a complete inventory of the hospital was conducted. This inventory included medical, TO&E and PCS equipment. Several discrepancies in the existing records were found and based upon this inventory, corrections were made.

APPENDIX 3 (95th Evacuation Hospital - SMBL) to Annex E
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

2 Instructions were received at about X-80 to transfer selected items of equipment to the 711 Medical (ARVN) depot. These items were transferred in accordance with instructions received by message. They were retained by the hospital, but on a hand receipt rather than on the property book.

3 By X-60 the medical equipment which was to be retrograded was determined by Supply and Maintenance Division, Health Services Group. At X-50 an additional list of items which could be retrograded depending on condition and existing requirements, was given to the hospital.

4 The disposition of the remaining equipment was determined. All PCS and remaining medical equipment was to be turned over to the VNAF in place. The withdrawal schedules of retrograded equipment was determined by the Chief of Professional Services, the Chief Nurse, and the hospital Commander. They established specific increments for releasing the equipment based essentially on the phase down schedule and the anticipated requirements.

(c) Intelligence/Security.

1 There was very little intelligence activity of significance to the 95th Evacuation Hospital during this period. Emphasis was placed on the security aspect during this phase. The classified document container was screened and action taken to downgrade or destroy classified documents prior to X-Day. On X-Day remaining classified documents were left status quo.

2 Physical security of the hospital facility to include the medical supply warehouse, troop billets, motor pool, and officer quarters area was gradually increased as X-Day approached and increased even more after X-Day. The Staff Duty Officer and Staff Duty NCO increased their prescribed physical security checks to four during the hours of darkness. Nursing service as well as other hospital personnel were advised to maintain an increased vigilance of medical equipment and medical supplies in their areas of responsibility.

APPENDIX 3 (95th Evacuation Hospital - SMBL) to Annex E
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After action Report.

(d) Operations.

1 During the standdown thru the roll-up phase the 95th Evacuation Hospital was charged with providing medical, surgical and dental service for military personnel remaining in MRI. After X-Day the services were tapered down while still maintaining essential coverage. All of the milestones to take place on X-Day as listed in Annex D to USA Health Services Group, Vietnam OPLAN 215 were complied with as were the other milestones throughout the entire period.

2 On 14 February 1973, the optometry clinic was closed when the optometrist departed and arrangements were made for pick-up of previously ordered spectacles. A message was sent on 16 February 1973 to the Commander of the US 7th Fleet and Fleet Air Support Unit at DaNang advising as to what services would be available at the hospital and until when. All civilian contractors were likewise advised when services other than emergency care would no longer be available.

3 On 3 February 1973, the dispensary located at Camp Eagle was closed. In conjunction with this, a small treatment facility was opened in the CORDS compound in the city of Hue to provide medical assistance to US military in Hue (FRAC Forward) as well as to members of the JMC and subsequently to members of the ICCS. This facility was initially staffed with a Medical Corps Officer, a 91B20, and an ARVN medical technician. The facility was staffed, equipped, and supplied from hospital resources.

4 A second dispensary was established in the CORDS compound in the city of Da Nang. This facility was established to provide medical support to the US Consulate in accordance with instructions received from Health Services Group. It had to be operational NLT X+30, however, it was ready to treat patients by X+22. This facility was staffed initially by a Medical Corps Officer and a NCO from the hospital. The NCO was allowed to depart two weeks after the dispensary became fully operational. It was equipped and supplied from hospital resources.

APPENDIX 3 (95th Evacuation Hospital - SMBL) to Annex E
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

5 All PCS equipment at the Da Nang Air Base belonging to the hospital was transferred to the VNAF on X-3. Additionally 58 line items of medical equipment were inventoried and title transferred to the VNAF dispensary. At Camp Horn the procedures were similar and the recipient was the 1st ARVN Logistics Command.

(e) Logistics.

1 The disposition of the Medical Supply Account AT87FK was determined by Health Services Groupat X-85. It was decided that all items with the exception of certain non-standards, would be shipped to the 711 ARVN Medical Depot. Non-standard items with a dollar value of \$300.00 or more were retrograded to Okinawa. This was accomplished by X-65.

2 Since X-Day was not known, shipping documents DD Form 1348-1's were typed minus the quantity so that they would be ready on X-Day. These documents were typed between X-75 and X-65.

3 It became apparent that the stock record cards did not accurately reflect the quantities in the warehouse. An inventory was conducted between X-50 and X-20 so that the records could be properly reconciled. New items which were discovered during the inventory were picked up on stock record cards. Shipping documents were then prepared for the new items.

(f) Transfer of Functions and Reports. There was no transfer of function during this period.

(g) Transfer of Buildings and Installed Property.

1 The hospital was notified by the Air Force that all buildings and installed property would be transferred to the VNAF.

2 This title transfer was accomplished by the Air Force at about X-85.

APPENDIX 3 (95th Evacuation Hospital - SMBL) to Annex E
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(2) Withdrawal and Roll-Up Phase.

(a) Personnel.

1 OER's were signed and returned by US Army Health Services Group on X+26 and were forwarded to Personnel Service Center, Da Nang (Prov) for final disposition on X+27.

2 Of the remaining 67 personnel, 30 were scheduled to depart by X+30 bringing the unit down to an assigned strength of 37 IAW the OPLAN. Of the remaining 37 personnel, 24 were scheduled for departure by X+40, the standdown date of the 95th Evacuation Hospital (SMBL).

3 Personnel Strength Indicated Below.

a 25 Feb 73 - X+28 Strength 38

b 04 Mar 73 - X+35 Strength 22

c 09 Mar 73 - X+40 Strength 0, unit deactivated.

(b) Equipment Retrograde/Turn-Over.

1 Between the period X-25 and X-3, TO&E items which were no longer mission essential were either returned to the ARVN depot from which they were hand-receipted or turned-in to the Keystone processing point. Due to a change in policy it became necessary to recoup eight line items originally transferred to the VNAF on the PC&S document and turn these items into Keystone. This was accomplished by submitting a letter to the VNAF Chief of Supply and then coordinating these actions through the Air Force Advisory Team.

2 On X+1 medical equipment which had been designated available for retrograde at this time was packed and shipped to Okinawa or turned into Property Disposal Office depending upon the condition code.

APPENDIX 3--(95th Evacuation Hospital - SMBL) to Annex E
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

3 The disposition of the remaining medical equipment was changed somewhat from the original plan. As previously mentioned 58 line items were title transferred to the VNAF dispensary. The remaining items, minus those needed to establish a Consulate Dispensary, were title transferred to the 711 ARVN Medical Depot, then subsequently hand-receipted back to the VNAF who eventually would be occupying the facility.

4 By X+26 the only items remaining were 10 line items which were on hand receipt from the ARVN Depot.

5 The remaining items of medical equipment which had to be retrograded were processed so that they could be shipped immediately upon their release by the hospital.

6 Contractor owned equipment was returned to the contractor. This equipment included a keypunch machine and a paging system.

7 The final property book inspection was held at X+40 after the last hand receipt had been cleared.

(c) Intelligence/Security.

1 During this phase, there was little change in the intelligence activity. It was still minimal relative to the hospital. On 19 Feb 73 an inventory of all classified documents was taken and all documents on hand were properly prepared and shipped to the designated records centers in accordance with pertinent directives.

2 As withdrawal of personnel increased, physical security problems also increased. Remaining personnel were periodically briefed on the importance of each individual being security conscious. Additionally, as fewer and fewer patients came to the facility during the hour of darkness, all doors to the facility were fitted with hasps and locks with the exception of the main entrance which was left open since there was always someone at the front desk.

APPENDIX 3 (95th Evacuation Hospital - SMBL) to Annex E
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(d) Operations:

1 A message was sent out on 26 Feb 73 to all military and civilian units and agencies in MRI advising of the X+40 standdown of the 95th Evacuation Hospital and further advising as to the medical facilities that will still be in operation after the hospital closes.

2 Coordination was effected with the Da Nang Air America operations officer regarding in-country medical evacuation after the standdown of the 571st Medical Detachment (RA), Information pertinent to this was disseminated to the dispensaries in Hue, Da Nang and Camp Horn as well as CORDS, and U.S. Consulate representatives. FRAC HQ and the 11th Combat Aviation Group were also advised.

3 The dispensary at Camp Horn was beefed up somewhat in anticipation of the closure of the hospital. Three beds were placed in the dispensary to enable that facility to maintain a small emergency holding capability.

4 Support of the urine collection team at the Camp Horn outprocessing center ceased as of X+30. The team was being supported by two 95th Evacuation Hospital Medical Technicians as agreed upon.

5 Preventive Medicine and Veterinary services were provided until DEROS of the Preventive Medicine Officer and Veterinarian. Emergency Dental Service was provided until the hospital closed on X+40.

(e) Logistics.

1 On X-day all customers were notified to increase their stockage levels of supplies because as of X+14 only bone fide emergency requests would be accepted.

2 On X+15 the 711 ARVN Medical Depot provided personnel to assist with the movement of the account to their depot.

APPENDIX 3 (95th Evacuation Hospital - SMBL) to Annex E
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

All the medical supplies were shipped by X+24. This was accomplished by packing the supplies into conexes then moving them to the 711 ARVN Medical Depot by contract trucks.

3 All outstanding requisitions were cancelled by Health Services Group on X+10, with the exception of IPG I. These were checked for their validity and up-graded to 02 priority. On X+45 all of these requisitions not yet filled were cancelled by Health Services Group. Any emergencies were filled from in-country assets, or if not available and the need sufficient, placed on 03 priority from Okinawa.

(f) Transfer of Functions and Reporting. The Air Evacuation mission was transferred from the 571st Med Det (RA) to Air America contract service (See After-Action Report 571st Med Det (RA)).

(g) Transfer of Buildings and Installed Property.

1 The Air Force Advisory Team was notified of the final closing date of the hospital. The team then contacted the VNAF and established a time and date to effect the turn-over of the facility.

2 The VNAF made an inventory of selected items and were satisfied with the completeness of the property.

3 After completing this they became responsible for the hospital and its contents.

(h) Other.

1 Medical Records.

a All medical records were boxed alphabetically. Current records (January - March 1973) were sent to our repository: Tripler General Hospital, APO SF 96438 in March 1973. All former records were retired to St Louis, Missouri to include US Military and Civilians. Records for Third Party Nationals were sent to their appropriate agency.

APPENDIX 3 (95th Evacuation Hospital - SMBL) to Annex E
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

b Vietnamese medical records were sent to the local provincial Hospital.

c There were no current POW files or medical records.

2 Administrative Records (Registrar).

a Administrative files - Admission and Disposition Sheets, Beds and Patient Report, Morbidity Report, Out-Patient Report, Hospital Report of Death, were sent to USAMEDCOMV for retirement by that office.

b. The Patients' Trust Fund checkbook was at zero balance as of 11 November 1972 and closed out that date. There was \$361.78 on deposit for outstanding checks at Chase Manhattan Bank on 22 December 1972. Funds still on deposit were transferred to Finance and Accounting Office, Unclaimed Money Account. A terminal audit was conducted in preparation of transferring the fund to Tripler General Hospital, APO SF 96438.

(c) The Pay Patient Account was brought up to date on 28 January 1973 with thirty and sixty day delinquency notices sent to open accounts. Upon completion of the 90 day period for outstanding accounts, they were turned over to Finance and Accounting. The PPA was transferred to Tripler General Hospital via the USAH, Saigon upon completion of the terminal audit by HQ, 95th Evacuation Hospital.

(d) All correspondence on Line of Duty Determination has been answered or will be answered when the Line of Duty file has reached the repository hospital, Tripler General Hospital. Second requests were forwarded to USARV Casualty per normal procedure. Line of Duty correspondence was brought up to date. The Inpatient Data Processing System was also up dated. The last transmittal number was 11-73. This transmittal was sent to Medical Command on 9 March 1973. There were adequate registrar personnel to standdown the registrar section, and the operation proceeded smoothly.

APPENDIX 3 (95th Evacuation Hospital - SMBL) to Annex E
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

b. Commander's Comments.

(1) Standdown Phase.

(a) Personnel.

1 Turbulance expected with the rapid rotation of assigned personnel was very minute due to prior planning and X-Day rosters having been previously submitted to Personnel Service Center - Da Nang. Even as the submitted rotation roster was adjusted, no loss of mission effectiveness was encountered.

2 Of the five requests for ITT's submitted by personnel assigned to this unit after X-Day it should be noted that USARV AG received only one of the requests. The others could not be located at the 518th PSC or at HQ, USARV. In the future, consideration should be given allowing request for ITT's to by-pass the local personnel shop and be sent directly to the responsible agency in an effort to expedite these requests.

3 During this phase of the OPLAN there was a RIF of 19 civilian employees which was easily absorbed due to the prior planning that had been accomplished.

(b) Equipment Retrograde/Turn-over.

1 Disposition instructions for major items of equipment were received and acted upon allowing adequate time for proper planning by the hospital.

2 Instructions for medical equipment although later modified by Health Services Group allowed the hospital to properly control its resources until closure.

3 A very flexible policy concerning retrograde medical equipment allowed the hospital to choose in some instances whether or not the equipment would be retrograded. This was extremely beneficial from the hospital's point of view.

APPENDIX 3 (95th Evacuation Hospital - SMBL) to Annex E
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(c) Intelligence/Security. During this phase, there were periodic intelligence updates at the weekly commander's conference. The update concerned primarily information on POWs who would be involved in "Operation HOMECOMING". Although several potential release sites were mentioned as well as various number of prisoners to be released, very little hard intelligence regarding "Operation HOMECOMING" was transmitted to the hospital. This is not to say that the hospital was left out of the picture, rather that it seemed that little definite intelligence data was available. It was felt the OPLAN 190 was definitely adequate to handle the various contingencies that were expected.

(d) Operations. It was initially anticipated that the hospital would remain operational until X+59, however, as events developed this was revised downward until the X+40 date was settled upon. With the residual assets in MRI, adequate coverage could be provided by the Camp Horn dispensary. During this phase the command's main emphasis was on planning a smooth drawdown by which the hospital could divest itself of personnel and services and still be in a posture to provide routine and emergency care when necessary, until the hospital ceased operation on X+40. This period witnessed the closing of the dispensary at Camp Eagle and the establishment of two dispensaries, one in Hue and the other in Da Nang. It was decided to equip and supply the dispensary in Hue with resources from the Camp Eagle. Items and Medical Supplies that could not be obtained were taken from the 95th to Hue. Coordination was effected amongst the hospital, the dispensary physician the senior advisor in the area as well as CORDS and Consulate personnel. The extensive coordination was the key to a smooth transition of Medical Support from Camp Eagle to Hue. JMC and ICCS personnel were made aware of the scope medical resources available locally and also what was available in the way of back-up support. Support from the senior Army Adviser proved to be most beneficial.

APPENDIX 3 (95th Evacuation Hospital - SMBL) to Annex E
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(e) Logistics.

1 Supporting activities such as Engineer, Maintenance and Transportation continued to operate with very little reduction in their capabilities. This gave the hospital a high degree of flexibility in its planning.

2 Disposition of the medical supplies was established early allowing the hospital to adequately plan for its needs as X-day was announced.

(f) Transfer of Functions and Reports. Not applicable.

(g) Transfer of Buildings and Installed Property.

1 The decision to turn the hospital facility over to the VNAF with all equipment remaining in place greatly enhanced the mission of the hospital. The hospital was able to plan to be operational until the final turnover.

2 The in place turnover of the hospital's equipment allowed the hospital to operate with only a slight reduction in overall capabilities. Essential equipment which had to be retrograded was retained until after closing the hospital while some other retrograde items were sent just prior to the final roll-up.

(2) Withdrawal and Roll-Up Phase.

(a) Personnel.

1 Of the remaining personnel only those required for mission accomplishment were kept after X+30. With the early rotation of personnel the already decreased administrative workload was even less. During this phase of the OPLAN there were no personnel actions processed due to limited manpower and equipment resource available at each level of command.

APPENDIX 3 (95th Evacuation Hospital - SMBL) to Annex E
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

2. During this final phase of the OPLAN the remainder of the civilian personnel were released in two increments. The first increment being X+30 when 5 were released from duty with the remainder of them being released on closure of the hospital at X+40.

(b) Equipment Retorgrade/Turn-Over.

1. Equipment turn-over through Keystone proceeded smoothly. A change in the Keystone contract required the contractor to do most of the clean-up work on vehicles. This was a great help as this work was very time consuming and the number of available personnel was rapidly decreasing.

2. The transfer of the medical equipment went smoothly although the decision to establish a Consulate Dispensary caused some delay. Once the equipment for the Consulate Dispensary was determined the transfer of the remaining medical equipment proceeded without complications.

3. The PCS property was transferred to VNAF but then eight line items had to be recalled and turned into Keystone due to a change in policy. Items of PCS property which could not be title transferred should have been specifically defined in the basic OPLAN in order to avoid any possibility of confusion. I do recommend this for further operations of this nature.

(c) Intelligence/Security. Security of the facility, equipment, and supplies during this phase become more and more astute. However, the security awareness concept instilled into the hospital personnel seemed to be the most effective way to combat theft. As the Local National hires realized the hospital was closing, their attempted thefts increased. All personnel were instructed to challenge anyone in the hospital area or billets who were not recognized. This and a close coordination with the Air Force Security Police gate guards contributed significantly to lessen the theft problem. The Air Force also provided a walking guard periodically in the area. Although his presence may have been

I

APPENDIX 3 (95th Evacuation Hospital - SMBL) to Annex E
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

something of a deterrent, the value of the walking guard was questionable. It is recommended that in all continued endeavors of this nature that the most effective means of preventing thefts-in addition to locks, barriers, and security checks by the AOD or NCOD - is to instill a "security awareness" into the personnel assigned to the hospital.

(d) Operations.

1 This phase saw a loss of personnel from the hospital assets that of course, had an effect on the services provided by the hospital. However, by extensive prior planning the hospital was able to drawdown considerably yet still retain a strong nucleus which was able to provide comprehensive medical, surgical, and dental care until the hospital actually closed completely. Careful planning in this area coupled with a close scrutiny of the skills of the personnel remaining until last is imperative and strongly recommended. Backward planning (i.e. determining what MOS and personnel will be required at the very end and work back from there) is recommended for future endeavors of a similar nature.

2 Once the final standdown date of X+40 was established for the hospital, it was of great importance to get the word out to all potential patients as soon as possible. In this way, everyone (military as well as Department of Defense and contractor paid civilian) was informed as to when service would be terminated. It was found that by advising personnel as soon in advance as possible of the drawdown and standdown of the hospital, many misunderstandings were averted.

3 In establishing the consulate dispensary, it was soon discovered that if the opening target date of X+30 was to be met, the military would have to take the initiative. The civilian efforts seemed not to be very strongly directed and with little sense of urgency. Consequently, we seized the initiative and had the dispensary in operation by X+22. The listing of equipment for the facility provided by Health Services Group was adequate with only a few minor embellishments to localize the list of equipment for this area.

APPENDIX 3 (95th Evacuation Hospital - SMBL) to Annex E
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After action Rerpot.

4 The 571st Medical Detachment (RA) stooddown effective X+30. After this date, in-country Medical Evacuation responsibility was assumed by Air America under a contractual agreement. Here again, the need for close coordination so that all potential users of helicopter or fixed wing evacuation were aware of how to obtain the means of evacuation was essential. A listing of names, phone numbers, radio frequencies, etc to contact for air evacuation was given to those concerned parties. Further coordination was effected when the hospital stooddown so that the operations personnel at Air America realized that the Camp Horn dispensary personnel would be responsible for coordinated aeromedical evacuation in lieu of the 95th Evac Hosp until their departure when Camp Horn closed. Any coordination required with the USAH, Saigon would be carried out thru the dispensary.

(e) Logistics.

1 The availability of contractors to perform vital services greatly enhanced the capabilities of the hospital. It allowed the hospital to standdown without degrading the mission. The movement of all of the medical supply by contract trucks was particularly efficient and effective and strongly recommended.

2 Medical supply although having to ship all of its stocks to the 711 ARVN Depot was able to provide effective support until the final closure. The procedure of increasing the hospital's operating stock was a very effective method of ensuring adequate supplies.

(f) Transfer of Functions and Reports. See After Action Report 571st Med Det (RA).

(g) Transfer of Buildings and Installed Property.

1 The co-operation of the Air Force Advisory Team was a significant factor during the turnover of the facility. The team was able to provide the needed liaison and rapport between the hospital and the VNAF.

I

APPENDIX 3 (95th Evacuation Hospital - SMBL) to Annex E
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

2 The turnover was accomplished smoothly and without any complication.

(h) Other.

1 The availability of a repository for the medical records was a significant factor because it allowed the records to be sent to an active medical facility. In the future, if questions arise concerning these records then they will be able to be answered by personnel at Tripler General Hospital.

2 The availability of certain administrative records such as the line of duty file will also be a definite asset in the future.

3 Disposition of narcotics. All of the narcotics in the 95th Evacuation Hospital and its supporting dispensaries were inventoried and accounted for. When narcotics were destroyed, witnessed destruction statements were prepared. The remainder of the narcotics that were no longer needed were shipped to the US Embassy in Saigon in accordance with instructions received from Health Services Group. No problems were encountered in this area.

4 The planning guidance and procedures provided for in the Implementation of COMUSMACV OPOD 215, USARV OPOD 215, and USAHSVCGPV OPOD 215 were considered adequate. There obviously were some areas not covered by the guidance but these were areas that required local coordination with area headquarters, i.e. FRAC, USASE, MRI and supported units. The guidance provided included specific directives and procedures yet allowed for desired flexibility at the local level. Nothing can be recommended that would improve the means of guidance that was provided.

5 The final turnover date of the hospital to the VNAF was a subject that had to be worked out locally since we were dealing with both the USAF and VNAF. The hospital was located in the "Gunfighter" compound of the Air Base. The Base Commander, because of security and other considerations, wanted to turn the entire compound over to the VNAF at one time. The Air Force preferred an early turnover date, however,

APPENDIX 3 (95th Evacuation Hospital - SMBL) to Annex E
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

it was agreed upon by all parties to turn the entire "Gun-fighter" area, to include the 95th Evacuation Hospital over to VNAF control on the morning of X+41. In this way the medical coverage provided by the hospital would extend over the period for which we had planned. A small Air Force dispensary would be maintained at the Main Compound until all Air Force personnel withdraw from the base. Consequently continuous medical service was provided at the Air Base at all times. Additionally, the 11th CAG maintained a flight surgeon and a small dispensary until X+60 to provide medical support to Army flight personnel and other personnel in accordance with its capabilities.

6 Once again, the key to a successful turnover of the facility was attributed to early and continuous coordination with all parties concerned.

APPENDIX 3 (95th Evacuation Hospital - SMBL) to Annex E
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

CALENDAR OF EVENTS

I. STANDDOWN PHASE.

- X-30 - PIR submitted with projected X-dates for personnel assigned to the hospital.
- X-25 - Began turning in non-mission essential TO&E items.
- X-20 - Draft Recommendations for Awards prepared.
- X-3 - Completed turning in non-mission essential TO&E items.
- X+1 - Seven personnel shipped.
Recommendations for Awards handcarried to US Army Health Services Group, Vietnam.
Retrograde medical equipment turned in for shipment.
- X+3 - Three personnel shipped.
- X+5 - OERs and EERs in draft form.
Consolidated Unit Fund Closed.
DOHIF closed.
Movie account closed.
Four personnel shipped.
- X+6 - Dispensary at Camp Eagle closed.
RIF papers submitted to Civilian Personnel Office and notices sent to civilian employees on release dates.
- X+8 - Two personnel shipped.
Last awards handcarried to US Army Health Services Group, Vietnam.
- X+10 - Outstanding requisitions for supplies were cancelled.

APPENDIX 3 (95th Evacuation Hospital - SMBL) to annex E
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

- X+11 - Records boxed for shipment.
- X+12 - Reviewed contingency plans on personnel shipment schedule.
- X+15 - Paid first Local National RIF payroll. Began shipment of medical supplies to 711 ARVN Medical Depot.
- X+16 - Two personnel shipped. Records for 95th Evacuation Hospital (SMBL) and 571st Medical Detachment (RA) turned into MRI Records Management Officer.
- X+17 - Optometry Clinic closed.
- X+18 - Four personnel shipped. OERs handcarried to US Army Health Services Group, Vietnam.
- X+19 - Three personnel shipped. Time sheets on Local Nationals submitted.
- X+20 - Last day for submission of ITT Request. Three personnel shipped.

II. WITHDRAWAL AND ROLL-UP PHASE.

- X+22 - Consulate Dispensary operational. Paid second Local National RIF payroll. Classified documents shipped by registered mail to Hawaii. Safes turned in.
- X+26 - OER's signed and returned by US Army Health Services Group, Vietnam.
- X+27 - OER's for 95th Evacuation Hospital (SMBL) Officers submitted to Personnel Service Center Da Nang (Prov) for posting to service members records and submission to Department of the Army.

APPENDIX 3 (95th Evacuation Hospital - SMBL) to Annex E
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After action Report.

- X+28 - Thirteen personnel shipped.
- X+30 - Paid third Local National RIF payroll.
- X+31 - Published revised release date roster for remaining personnel.
- X+32 - Received orders assigning MC officers to JMC Da Nang and JMC Hue.
- X+33 - OER's for 571st medical Detachment (RA) indorsed, reviewed and forwarded to Personnel Service Center, Da Nang (Prov) for posting to service members records and submission to Department of the Army.
- X+33 - Two personnel shipped.
- X+34 - Three personnel shipped.
- X+35 - Ten personnel shipped.
- X+38 - One person shipped.
- X+40 - Final property book inspection completed.
Twenty-one personnel shipped.
Unit Strength 0.
Unit INACTIVATED IAW General Order Number 30,
HQS, United States Army, Pacific, APO San
Francisco 96558 dated 31 January 1973.

TAB A - 571st Medical Detachment - RA

TAB A (571st Medical Detachment - RA) to Appendix 3 to Annex E to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

1. PURPOSE. This report is submitted in accordance with the instructions outlined in Appendix 2 to Annex N to OPLAN USARV/MACV SUPCOM 215-THUNDERBOLT.

a. Significant Organizational Activities - This segment broken down into Standdown and Withdrawal-Roll-Up Phases, describes major unit activities in preparation for an actual standdown of the unit.

b. Commander's Comment - This segment of the report briefs the reader on problems, lessons learned, and recommendations that the Commander feels are applicable to the report. They are submitted in order to provide basis for better planning and execution during a similar action in the future.

2. GENERAL. This report will cover the unit activities from 1 January 1973 until official standdown of the unit, 28 February 1973. Activities and planning both prior to and after X-Day (28 January 1973) are discussed. The 571st Medical Detachment, for the purpose of this report, defines "Standdown Phase" as 1 January 1973 to 11 February 1973 inclusive. "Withdrawal Roll-up Phase" is defined as 12 February 1973 to 28 February 1973 inclusive.

3. OPLAN USARV/MACV SUPCOM 215-THUNDERBOLT was the primary source of planning guidance. Planned activities and personnel releases were adjusted as accelerated schedules of withdrawal were received.

a. Significant Organization Activities.

(1) Standdown Phase.

(a) Personnel.

1 As of 1 January 1973, the authorized strength of the 571st Medical Detachment was 48, while only 35 personnel were actually assigned. As of X-day, 28 January 1973, the unit strength was down to 34 personnel due to normal DEROS activity. On the 28 January, Operation Plan THUNDERBOLT

TAB A (571st Medical Detachment - RA) to Appendix 3 to Annex E to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

was activated and by this plan normal DEROS dates were adjusted and personnel were released to bring the unit to half strength by X+30. Prior to X-Day, a tentative X-day release plan for all members of the unit was drawn up by the Unit Commander and submitted for approval to our next higher command when formal notification of X-day was received. The release dates were changed and reorganized during the period X+1 through X+14 due to an accelerated withdrawal plan, until the final list was drawn up which left a total of 26 personnel in the unit as of the end of "Standdown Phase".

2 Unit records and reports were handled in a normal manner at the end of the calendar year. End of the year reports were submitted, while 1972 records and files were screened for proper disposition. On X-Day, all records and files were frozen in place and plans were activated for shipment of all categories, commencing on X-Day and finishing by X+30, as prescribed by USARV/MACV SUPCOM MSG 110100Z 72.

3 Personnel Actions Indicated Below:

- 01 Jan 73 - Unit strength 35.
- 13 Jan 73 - Unit strength 34 due to reassignment of one individual.
- 28 Jan 73 - X-Day, unit strength 34.
- 04 Feb 73 - X+7, reassignment loss one individual, unit strength 33.
- 08 Feb 73 - X+11, reassignment loss one individual, unit strength 32.
- 09 Feb 73 - X+12, reassignment loss one individual, unit strength 31.
- 11 Feb 73 - X+14, reassignment loss five individuals, unit strength 26.

(b) Equipment Turnover. Selected items of TOE equipment of this unit were turned over to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and the remainder were turned in via Keystone Pelican

TAB A (571st Medical Detachment - RA) to Appendix 3 to Annex E to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

procedures. The ARVN turnovers started 15 November 1972, and were finished on 19 January 1973. This procedure consisted of title transferring selected items to ARVN assets and then hand receipting them back to the US unit to be used until no longer needed. The remainder of the unit's equipment was turned in to US supply channels via Keystone processing centers. Disposal of aircraft will be covered in paragraph f, Transfer of Air Assets, and will not be mentioned further in this paragraph.

(c) Intelligence/Security. Because of the nature of the mission of this unit, very little emphasis was placed on the intelligence aspect. Adequate security measures were taken to secure all classified documents pertaining to the standdown and associated activities. Confidential instruments such as SOI's and CAC sheets, used in conjunction with some missions, were constantly monitored by means of a signout sheet utilized by unit aviators.

(d) Operations. Complete fulfillment of the unit's mission never waived during the time period covered by this report. Prior to X-Day, the unit functioned under normal operating procedures. Adequate medical evacuation coverage was insured in MRI by providing alert crews at the home site, Da Nang Air Force Base, and at a field site, located at Camp Eagle, southwest of Hue. Contingency plans were formulated, using THUNDERBOLT time tables as guidelines for the standdown of this unit beginning with X-Day.

On 3 February 1973 (X+6) the field site at Camp Eagle was terminated because the medical team at that location relocated to the city of Hue. This gave us our complete complement of men and aircraft at Da Nang. Communication lines for medical evacuation missions were excellent, as always, and the entire MRI had our services available to them.

(e) Logistics. Logistical support was provided for this unit by Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE), Vinnell Corp, and the 277th Supply and Services Battalion. PAE and Vinnell were civilian contractors and ran DS maintenance for all but aircraft and supply, for all but automotive and aircraft parts, respectively. Vinnell Corp's Self Service

TAB A (571st Medical Detachment - RA) to Appendix 3 to Annex E to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

Store was open with fully stocked shelves until approximately X+15 when they had to ship out nearly all items due to large losses from thievery. Vinnell accomplished all DS maintenance on vehicles, weapons, commo, and office equipment at its China Beach location.

(f) Transfer of Combatant Air Assets. As of 1 January 1973, the unit had four aircraft. This did not change through Standdown Phase.

(g) Transfer of Functions and Reports. Not applicable for Standdown Phase.

(h) Transfer of Building and Post, Camp and Station Property. The 571st Medical Detachment (RA) occupied two buildings on 11th CAG compound and one office and hanger space on the flightline. Post, camp, and station property was all laterally transferred to RVNAF on 26 January 1973, but retained by the using US unit until no longer needed.

(2) Withdrawal-Roll-Up Phase.

(a) Personnel - The remaining 26 individuals were scheduled to depart by X+31, the standdown date of the 571st Medical Detachment (RA) for DEROS and reassignment. The unit went to half strength on X+18 in accordance with the OPLAN. This unit's files were boxed and sent to the next higher command, the 95th Evacuation Hospital, on X+15 for combined shipment to the Records Holding Center. Pertinent unit history files were sent by Health Services Group to Fort Carson, Colorado, where this unit redeployed at zero strength on X+31.

Personnel Actions Indicated Below:

12 Feb 73 - X+15, records and files shipped.
15 Feb 73 - X+18, Reassignment loss eight individuals, unit strength 18
28 Feb 73 - X+30, Reassignment loss 18 individuals, unit strength 0, unit redeployed to Ft Carson.

TAB A (571st Medical Detachment - RA) to Appendix 3 to Annex E to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report.

(b) Equipment Turnover. As items were no longer needed and the actual physical transfer of the items was accomplished, the US hand receipt was brought to a zero (0) balance and kept as it was required to clear the property book during final audit. The major items selected for ARVN title transfer were 2 1/2 ton trucks, AN/VRC-36 radios, and M-16 rifles. These title transferred items were as before mentioned, completely physically transferred by 19 February 1973 (X+22). The remaining items on the Property book were all turned in by 23 February 1973, X+26, with the exception of helicopters which will be discussed in paragraph f. Major items here were 3/4 ton trucks, organizational aircraft maintenance "B" set, and basic load of ammunition. All were turned in via Keystone except for the ammunition which was turned in to ARVN.

(c) Intelligence/Security. Beginning on X+25, all items with unit designations were either burned or painted over. All rooms were prepared for inspection by painting over all names and call signs. When the last aircraft was turned in, all maps, SOI's, and CAC sheets were destroyed. Every effort was made to keep rumors at a minimum and when facts were available for distribution, unit personnel were the first to be informed. Every member of the unit was adequately debriefed prior to his departure from the unit.

(d) Operations. By X+15, mission load was at a new low with the withdrawal of and standdown of the United States military forces and this allowed us a gradual reduction in both men and aircraft while still keeping mission ready. The gradual reduction is discussed under PERSONNEL. The unit was given a warning order on or about 17 February 1973, to have ready one aircraft for possible employment in Operation HOMECOMING. Adequate planning had already been complied with well in advance of its issuance. Overall mission readiness was not affected.

(e) Logistics. Vinnell ran Class I supply from which we drew C-Rations for the last two weeks. Automotive maintenance from Vinnell was adequate although from approximately X+15 on, they had no parts to fix 1/4 Ton and 3/4 Ton trucks.