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OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED

HEADQUARTERS II FFORCEV

PERIOD OF 1 NOVEMBER 1970 - 30 APRIL 1971

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HEADQUARTERS, THIRD REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND

APO San Francisco 96266

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1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. Command,

(1) During the reporting period there were no major changes in the command group.

(2) During the reporting period there were seventeen major changes in the staff of II FFORCEV:

(a) On 11 November 1970 Colonel George F. Otte, Jr. became Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Rose.

(b) On 15 November 1970 Lieutenant Colonel Nicola Di Nardo became Headquarters Commandant, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Efraim S. Garcia.

(c) On 22 November 1970 Lieutenant Colonel Nathan C. Vail became Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, replacing Lieutenant Colonel John R. Witherell.

(d) On 28 November 1970 Colonel William R. Todd became Chief, Special Liaison Section replacing Colonel Robert H. Bartelt.

(e) On 1 December 1970 Colonel James C. Barnes became Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, replacing Colonel David A. Beckner.

(f) On 2 December 1970 Lieutenant Colonel Clarence M. Mendenhall became Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, replacing Lieutenant Colonel David G. Haggard.

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(g) On 5 December 1970 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Mullins became Commanding Officer, 2d Civil Affairs Company, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Curtis A. Brewer.

(h) On 10 December 1970 Lieutenant Colonel Frank H. Chamberlin became Staff Surgeon replacing Lieutenant Colonel John M. Stoebner.

(i) On 10 December 1970 Lieutenant Colonel (CHAP) Philip A. Cabasino became Deputy Staff Chaplain replacing Lieutenant Colonel (CHAP) Marcos M. Cabreira.

(j) On 19 December 1970 Lieutenant Colonel Shapleigh M. Drisko became Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Osborne.

(k) On 21 January 1971 Lieutenant Colonel Van D. Holladay became Deputy Provost Marshal replacing Lieutenant Colonel Willie L. Jones.

(l) On 1 February 1971 Colonel John P. Cooper became Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, replacing Colonel Raymond G. Rennebaum.

(m) On 1 March 1971 Colonel Billy M. Vaughn became Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, replacing Colonel George P. Tilson.

(n) On 10 March 1971 Lieutenant Colonel Harry H. Collier became Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Clarence M. Mendenhall.

(o) On 23 March 1971 Lieutenant Colonel John W. Mantooth became the Inspector General replacing Lieutenant Colonel William E. Taylor.

(p) On 7 April 1971 Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin E. Doty became Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Nathan C. Vail.

(q) On 12 April 1971 Lieutenant Colonel Milburn O. Cox became Headquarters Commandant replacing Lieutenant Colonel Nicola Di Nardo.

(3) During the reporting period there were twenty-one significant changes in II FFORCEV Artillery and 23d Artillery Group:

(a) On 5 November 1970, Colonel John P. Cooper became Executive Officer, II FFORCEV Artillery, replacing Lieutenant Colonel William T. Green.

(b) On 5 November 1970, Captain Maurice D. Adams became S-1, II FFORCEV Artillery, replacing Major Victor F. Keefe.

(c) On 6 November 1970, Lieutenant Colonel William T. Green became CO, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Myron J. Longmore.

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(d) On 12 November 1970, Lieutenant Colonel Neil A. Menzies became S-1, II FFORCEV Artillery, replacing Captain Maurice D. Adams.

(e) On 24 November 1970, Lieutenant Colonel Graham W. McIntyre became CO, 5th Battalion, 2d Artillery, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Richard T. Lambert.

(f) On 30 November 1970, Lieutenant Colonel Malvern R. Whitaker became CO, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Rodney G. Parrish.

(g) On 1 December 1970, Major Bertram B. Dales became S-4, 23d Artillery Group, replacing Major S. Joseph Mangano.

(h) On 8 December 1970, Colonel Leslie R. Forney Jr. became Deputy Commanding Officer, II FFORCEV Artillery.

(i) On 8 December 1970, Lieutenant Colonel Warren A. Samouce became AFSCORD, II FFORCEV Artillery, replacing Lieutenant Colonel James E. Greene, Jr.

(j) On 16 December 1970, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Soberick became S-3, II FFORCEV Artillery, replacing Lieutenant Colonel James L. Reagor.

(k) On 18 December 1970, Lieutenant Colonel Roland B. Rogers became CO, 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Jesse B. Doss.

(l) On 18 January 1971, Colonel Leslie R. Forney, Jr became Deputy Commanding Officer, 23d Artillery Group.

(m) On 18 January 1971, Lieutenant Colonel Neil A. Menzies became S-1, 23d Artillery Group, replacing Captain Warren R. Althaus.

(n) On 18 January 1971, Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Opel became S-2, 23d Artillery Group, replacing Major Maxwell L. Haydon.

(o) On 18 January 1971, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Soberick became S-3, 23d Artillery Group, replacing Major Eugene S. Lynch.

(p) On 18 January 1971, Lieutenant William E. Hollowell, Jr, became S-4, 23d Artillery Group, replacing Major Bertram B. Dales.

(q) On 18 January 1971, Major Eugene S. Lynch became AFSCORD, 23d Artillery Group.

(r) On 26 February 1971, Major Maxwell L. Haydon became S-2, 23d Artillery Group, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Opel.

(s) On 26 March 1971, Lieutenant Colonel Albert E. Wolfgang became CO, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, replacing Lieutenant Colonel George G. Mays.

(t) On 7 April 1971, Major Bertram B. Dales became S-1, 23d Artillery Group, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Neil A. Menzies.

(u) On 17 April 1971, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Rametta became CO, 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Nolan M. Sigler.

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b. Personnel, Health, Morale, Safety and Discipline.

(1) The morale of the command remained at a satisfactory level.

(2) On 1 December 1970, II FFORCEV assumed awards authority for 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Sep), and on 19 January 1971, awards authority was assumed for the 23d Artillery Group. The awards and decorations processed, approved, and issued by this command are as follows:

<u>AWARDS</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Silver Star	2	6	1	2	5	5	21
DFC	5	5	3	3	3	4	23
Soldier's Medal	1	6	2	8	7	9	33
Bronze Star 'V'	8	18	34	21	83	37	201
Bronze Star	272	290	436	291	665	338	2292
Air Medal 'V'	7	13	10	10	7	6	53
Air Medal	81	69	219	139	420	44	972
ARCOM 'V'	9	9	47	45	93	109	312
ARCOM	921	1096	1773	819	2286	647	7542
Purple Heart	5	0	68	5	0	68	146
	1311	1512	2593	1343	3569	1267	11595

(3) The overall assigned strength of II FFORCEV declined gradually during the 2d Quarter and then rapidly declined during the 3d Quarter as more units stood down and the strength of the headquarters was reduced to facilitate an orderly transition to Headquarters, TRAC. The following is a review of the strength posture as of the cutoff dates for the last three reporting periods:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>
31 Jul 70	553	77	6778
31 Oct 70	612	72	6224
30 Apr 71	328	51	3361

(4) During the period, II FFORCEV and OPCON units showed a decrease in military man-days and mileage due to the standdown of units. In comparison to the 2d Quarter, during the 3d Quarter there were approximately 1,000,000 man-days and 1,000,000 miles less exposure reported. There was a decrease in the military injury rate and the Army motor vehicle accident rate during the 3d Quarter, FY 71. This reduction has been achieved under difficult conditions. Many duties must be performed under hazardous conditions such as the turn-in of ammunition, explosives, and weapons. Instructions were issued to commanders to indoctrinate all personnel in safety procedures and, where possible, to either remove or control the hazardous working conditions encountered during standdown operations. This kept accidental losses of manpower and materiel to a minimum and resulted in a decrease of accidents from all causes during the 3d Quarter, FY 71. For comparison purposes, statistics

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for the first three quarters, FY 71, are listed below. (Statistics are based on 1,000,000 miles driven and 1,000,000 man-days of exposure.)

ARMY MOTOR VEHICLE	1st QTR, FY 71	2d QTR, FY 71	3d QTR, FY 71
ACCIDENT RATE	6.2	7.7	6.2
MILITARY INJURY RATE	64.3	45.3	44.2

(5) The status of the Pioneer House Drug Rehabilitation and Education Center is as follows:

(a) Pioneer House Drug Rehabilitation and Education Center has suffered several serious staffing problems. The dominance in the staffing of ex-heroin users led to a lack of confidence in the personnel by units utilizing the Pioneer House Rehabilitation Center. Counsellors had to be dismissed for improper conduct; one counsellor was apprehended for selling narcotics; and other ex-user counsellors were transferred from the Pioneer House staff because they no longer were performing in an acceptable manner.

(b) The concept of a non-medical facility staffed with concerned, junior enlisted men, medical technicians and ex-drug users has developed and is feasible. The Pioneer House is now under the supervision of a specially selected company grade officer.

(c) The need for rehabilitation centers has been proved by the admission of over 600 heroin users since the Pioneer House was established.

(d) The drug education program continued. The need for different presentations to junior enlisted men, NCO's and Officers was recognized and appropriate lectures were developed by the various members of the staff.

(6) During the period the following indicates the status of discipline, law and order in the Command:

(a) Quarterly statistics for the 3d Quarter FY 71, indicate that offense rates for II FFORCEV assigned, attached, and OPCON units showed a decline in most cases from 2d Quarter statistics.

(b) The drug offense increase can be attributed to improved efficiency in detecting drug abuse by unit commanders and Military Police. A continuous program to limit access to drugs and discourage their use has met with success. With support of US Military Police, ARVN Military Police and Vietnamese National Police, dealers are being apprehended and drugs confiscated. This is a continuous campaign and should show even better results in the 4th Quarter.

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(c) The most significant decrease was in traffic offenses. This reduction is directly related to increased police enforcement campaigns conducted throughout MR 3 using US Military Police, ARVN Military Police and Vietnamese National Police. The enforcement campaigns were begun in November 1970. The effectiveness of traffic enforcement campaigns is reflected in the decrease in traffic violations, accidents, and fatalities.

(d) II FFORCEV Assigned, Attached and OPCON Quarterly Offensive Rates Per Thousand for the four most recent reporting periods are:

	4th QTR (FY) 70	1st QTR (FY) 71	2d QTR (FY) 71	3d QTR (FY) 71
Larceny	6.5	6.1	6.3	3.5
Assault	1.6	1.3	1.3	1.0
Blackmarket	2.4	1.2	2.2	.1
Drugs	4.4	3.7	5.3	7.1
Traffic	25.14	26.72	15.38	6.1

c. Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

(1) Intelligence aspects of tactical operations conducted in the II FFORCEV Tactical Area of Operational Interest (TAOI) are discussed in the Operations Report - Lessons Learned submitted by units under the operational control of this headquarters.

(2) Current Intelligence:

(a) At the beginning of the reporting period, the Current Intelligence Division was responsible for the G2 Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and the Intelligence Collection Program, and exercised staff supervision over the Interrogation of Prisoners of War Section, 219th Military Intelligence Detachment. In addition, in mid-November the G2 Targets Division was reorganized and placed under the Chief of the Current Intelligence Division.

(b) The G2 Targets' primary function continued to be the development and evaluation of targets for B-52 strikes. With the decrease in B-52 strikes during the reporting period, emphasis was placed on the development of targets for the FSCE and TASE. The division continued to maintain and develop an extensive visually displayed data base of enemy installations, including bunkers, base camps, fighting positions, tunnels and trench lines. In addition, enemy activity, intelligence reports, agent reports, ground sensor returns and airborne sensor returns were displayed. The data base was color-coded by week, and each type of information was noted by symbols. Data was also maintained in a permanent cardfile. The data was utilized in developing targets and in justifying targets to MACV. The responsibility for the data base was transferred to Order of Battle Branch, Operations and Plans Division, in April 1971.

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(c) The targeting of higher priority targets by MACV resulted in the continued decrease in B-52 targets allocated to II FFORCEV. During the reporting period, targeting continued with emphasis on enemy headquarters, supply areas, and staging areas within Cambodia, all of which posed a threat to Military Region 3. II FFORCEV received a total of 49 strikes for the period, all of which were within Cambodia. Of the 49 targets struck within Cambodia, 39, or 79.6%, were in support of Operation TOAN THANG 1-71.

(d) During the reporting period, the Current Intelligence Division, in cooperation with the Liaison Officer, 3d Battalion, 525th Military Intelligence Group, produced a daily summary of significant agent reports received. The summary informed the ACofS, G2, of enemy movement, supply, subordination, strength, and intentions as reported by clandestine agents. The information reported by agents was constantly evaluated by the Order of Battle Branch and by correlating the reports with actual happenings. Evaluation of the agent reports enabled the agencies which employed the sources to determine agent reliability and to decide which sources should be retained. In April 1971, in a reorganization of the G2 Section, the 3d Battalion, 525th Military Intelligence Group Liaison Officer was relocated to the Order of Battle Branch so that agent reports could be utilized to the fullest extent possible.

(e) The Current Intelligence Division was also responsible for insuring that all necessary Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR) were published and levied on the appropriate collection agencies. In addition, the Current Intelligence Division coordinated the collection of intelligence on specific targets and informed subordinate units which SICRs were current by publishing a quarterly II FFORCEV SICR Registry which indexed all SICRs by number and by collection agency.

(f) In fulfilling its responsibilities under the II FFORCEV collection effort, an intelligence collection plan for dry season operations was written and distributed during January 1971. The collection program was designed to place greater emphasis on enemy activities at all levels, to support dry season operations against enemy units in MR 3 and Cambodia.

(g) In April 1971, the Current Intelligence Division assumed the additional task of compiling the HQ, II FFORCEV/SR ADVISOR, III CORPS, INTSUM. For the first time, an expanded INTSUM was produced which combined US and ARVN activity in MR 3 with ARVN activity in Cambodia, thereby providing a more accurate compilation of enemy activity in the II FFORCEV/III CORPS TAOI.

(h) In April 1971, interrogators from the Interrogation of Prisoners of War Section, 219th Military Intelligence Detachment, were reassigned to the Order of Battle Branch in order to provide each OB team with an interrogation capability.



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(3) Operations and Plans:

(a) The reorganization of the G2 Section mentioned above resulted in the dissolution of the Production Division and the re-establishment of the Operations and Plans Division, encompassing the Analysis and Order of Battle Branches. The Division provides the division chief with the necessary resources to prepare estimates, assessments, studies, briefings and special articles as needed. During III Corps Operation Eagle in December 1970, this division was responsible for virtually all phases of intelligence.

(b) The Analysis Branch was responsible for preparing and presenting the daily all-source intelligence briefing and oral and written all-source intelligence assessments, and for evaluating collateral material received from the Order of Battle Branch. Additionally, the Analysis Branch prepared the Daily Intelligence Summary (DISUM) and wrote the weekly assessment for the Periodic Intelligence Report (PERINTREP) published by the Order of Battle Branch.

(c) The Estimates Branch was replaced by the Asst G2 Estimates, who was responsible to the division chief for the preparation and presentation of intelligence estimates, assessments, studies and briefings based on input from, and close coordination with, the other divisions of the G2 Section. Estimates Branch was also responsible for intelligence targeting, and prisoner of war rescue operations. The Estimates Branch and, later, the Asst G2 Estimates, was also responsible for the G2 input to the II FFORCEV Combined Campaign Plan, the semiannual Operational Report - Lessons Learned, and the Quarterly Review of Enemy Base Areas.

(d) The Order of Battle Branch was responsible for the collation and evaluation of tactical and strategic order of battle information and continuously interpreted and evaluated changes in enemy organization, logistics, composition, strength, disposition and tactics. To better accomplish this mission, the Branch was reorganized in April to form four Order of Battle teams, each incorporating an OB technician, an OB specialist, an imagery interpreter, an interrogator and a translator. Each team was assigned areas of responsibility and assumed all functions related thereto. The Research and Statistics Division was incorporated as a team in the Order of Battle Branch during the April reorganization. The section continued to provide data on enemy personnel and logistical losses as reported by OPCON units and ARVN III Corps in their daily intelligence summaries and as consolidated and tabulated by the section. This and other data was used by the Order of Battle Branch in its weekly publication of the II FFORCEV PERINTREP which, in addition to providing a weekly update on enemy order of battle, contained timely and informative articles on significant enemy developments and trends in Military Region 3 and Cambodia.

(4) Counterintelligence/PHUNG HOANG:

(a) Counterintelligence operations within MR 3 during the reporting period were highlighted by the implementation of the DONG KHOI Campaign. The first phase began on 10 February and involved simultaneous attacks on VC/VCI targets throughout all districts in MR 3 by Territorial, PRU, National

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Police, ARVN and FWMA Forces. Enemy losses were doubled and terrorism was cut in half during this campaign. Valuable experience was gained in planning large scale simultaneous operations, and the results further supported accumulating indications of enemy weaknesses and pacification successes in MR 3.

(b) Counterintelligence operations by the 219th MID in the vicinity of Headquarters, II FFFORCEV, generated 73 intelligence reports during the past six months. Of this number, 100% had a validity rating of possibly true or higher by user agencies; 82% were judged to be timely in nature; 72% disclosed information reported for the first time; and 68% were rated of moderate or higher usability. Due to the withdrawal of US combat units within MR 3, increased emphasis was placed on re-targeting the sources against VCI.

(c) Terrorist incidents reported in MR 3 varied considerably during the reporting period. The following table shows statistics for the high and low weeks compared to the weekly average:

	<u>High Week</u>	<u>Low Week</u>	<u>25 Week Average</u>
Incidents	56	20	38
Persons Killed	52	4	15
Persons Wounded	81	9	26
Persons Abducted	76	3	20

The above weekly averages show a decrease in the number of incidents and persons wounded. There was a slight increase in the average number killed while the average number abducted increased 100% over the last reporting period.

(5) G2 Air:

(a) Missions flown during the reporting period totaled 1279 RED HAZE, 296 SLAR, and 443 AERIAL PHOTO. Of the totals, 588 RED HAZE and 173 PHOTOGRAPHIC missions were flown by the US AIR FORCE. The Army accounted for the balance of 683 RED HAZE, 296 SLAR, and 270 PHOTOGRAPHIC missions. 341 YO-3A missions were also successfully completed by the US ARMY during this period.

(b) Patterns of RED HAZE within MR 3 were detected along the SAIGON River Corridor. No other significant patterns were noted within the Military Region. In the adjoining areas of Cambodia, RED HAZE concentrations were consistently detected within and around the CHUP Rubber Plantation, near the MEKONG River in the vicinity of CHHLONG (V), and around SNUOL (V). The most significant pattern noted for the period occurred during the last week of March and throughout April. RED HAZE groupings were detected along the banks of the CHHLONG River, and extended approximately 200 meters into the jungle on either side.

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(c) SLAR-detected movement was generally light and scattered throughout the majority of the reporting period, with numerous movers being detected on the many waterways in LONG AN (P) and GIA DINH (P). Night visual reconnaissance of these areas indicates that enemy movement cannot be distinguished from friendly activity because of the dense population of those areas. An increase in movement has recently been detected in the areas north and west of the military region border. The sudden increase in movement is believed to be a direct result of the enemy's stepped-up resupply effort prior to the wet season. No pattern to this movement has been established, as movers have occurred on nearly all lines of communication, both primary and secondary. During this period, numerous sources have consistently reported traffic on Highway 13 from SNUOL (V) to KRATIE (C). A study of these reports revealed that the majority of the traffic, approximately 70%, was traveling between 2200-0330 hours. SLAR was employed in that area on a nightly basis during that time period with limited success.

(d) DAY VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE was extensively employed throughout Military Region 3 and within the areas of interest in Cambodia. The O-1 was used in searching pre-planned target areas, as well as known and suspected enemy infiltration routes. Photographs were obtained with maximum success in support of the ARVN dry season campaign in Cambodia. Spot targets were checked to update information already on hand, and to confirm or further complement various agent and source reports.

(e) NIGHT VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE was conducted using the YO-3A Quiet Aircraft. During the reporting period the aircraft was employed within MR 3, primarily in BIEN HOA (P) and LONG AN (P). Recently, the YO-3A has been employed along the western border of the military region and into northern PHUOC LONG (P). An average of three missions per night have been flown in the military region during the period. The YO-3A is considered to be a definite asset to the overall surveillance and reconnaissance effort in Military Region 3.

(6) Radio Research: The 303d Radio Research Battalion continued to provide timely and sustained support for the combat operations of II FFORCEV. A direct support unit provided radio research support to each US division and separate brigade or regiment, and immediate tactical reports were provided down to brigade level. The 303d Radio Research Battalion was responsive to the requirements of this command. Specifics on support furnished are not provided due to classification.

(7) Weather Support:

(a) Detachment 32, 5th Weather Squadron (USAF), provided staff weather support for planning and operations of units assigned to II FFORCEV. This included climatological studies, extended forecasts for operational planning,

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and daily briefings to the major staff offices within the tactical operations center. Operational support at division level was provided by Operating Location B, of this detachment, at PHUOC VINH (through 31 March 1971) and Operating Location C at CU CHI (through 25 November 1970). Combat weather teams at PHU LOI, DI AN, SONG BE, and MACE provided support to brigades and major aviation units.

(b) The major forecasting problems during this period were concerned with forecasting the restriction of early morning visibilities during the period of November through March, and the distribution of thunderstorms in the military region during the month of April. These are discussed separately:

1 By the first of November, the northeast monsoon was fairly well established in this area. Under relatively cloudless skies, dust and smoke from burning fields combined to limit the visibility, especially in the early morning hours when winds were at their minimum. As time progressed, this haze layer increased to a depth of more than 10,000 feet. Aerial missions were hampered by this restriction, but few were aborted. Experience and an increased emphasis on pilot reports produced accurate forecasts throughout the January-March period.

2 In April, transition to the southwest monsoon was well under way. Though climatology indicated only 4-7 days with thundershowers during this month, experience indicated that thunderstorms were actually an everyday occurrence somewhere in the military region. Close coordination between G2 Air and Detachment 32 allowed the scheduling of air missions at a time of day when convective activity was at a minimum.

(c) The most significant problem developing in this period was the continuing reduction of weather reporting stations in this area. With the standdown or relocation of Army units, five supporting stations were closed. This was partially offset by training Pathfinder personnel and advisors to ARVN Ranger units to take limited weather observations. A problem yet to be resolved is the regular and timely receipt of these reports. Another significant source of information has been through pilot reports.

#### (8) Enemy Situation:

(a) General: The Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) remained the supreme political and military headquarters directing all North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong activities in the southern half of the Republic of Vietnam. Military units continued to be subordinated to the Headquarters, South Vietnam Liberation Army (SVNLA), or to one of the various military regions within GVN Military Region 3. Divisional units in Cambodia were engaged in stabilizing operations designed to secure base areas and supply routes from Laos, as well as maintaining their presence in the face of the ARVN Dry Season Campaign. Enemy activity within MR 3 was characterized by avoidance of contact with allied units, counter-pacification efforts, and anti-Vietnamization operations requiring a minimum of personnel and equipment expenditures. During the period several larger main-force units were reorganized or deactivated and their personnel assigned to local-force units.

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(b) Enemy Unit Effectiveness:

1 At the end of the reporting period, there were three enemy main-force divisions, one independent main-force infantry regiment and one artillery regiment operating in Cambodia along the Military Region 3 border, targeted against the Military Region. Within the region, there were three main-force infantry regiments and two main-force artillery regiments operating against US, RVNAF and FWMA forces. In addition, there were two independent main-force infantry battalions, two main-force sapper and two independent main-force artillery battalions in Cambodia, while there were thirteen infantry, two sapper, one artillery and one anti-aircraft independent main-force battalions within the Military Region. These figures do not include enemy forces targeted solely against Khmer Republic forces or units held in a "possible" status within the Military Region. The average strength for a main-force combat (infantry and sapper) battalion at the end of the period was 111, varying from 20 to 270. The local-force combat battalions' strength averaged 79 men and varied from 35 to 135.

2 Significant changes in enemy organization were noted during the reporting period and are indicated below.

a COSVN directives on increased sapper activity within MR 3 and the increase in this type of operation in February through April has led to a new evaluation of the organization and role of the Sapper High Command, also known as the 429 Sapper Group. In addition to the currently held 7, 8, 9 and 10 Sapper Battalions, information received from three PW's and documents indicates that three additional sapper battalions are in existence, probably designated 13, 14, and 15.

b After the merger of SR 2 and SR 3, several units were resubordinated because of a lack of personnel or reorganization of AOs. The major change was the deactivation and resubordination of the 1 NVA Infantry Regiment. Three of its battalions were absorbed into the AN MY NVA MF Infantry Battalion and District LF units. Other changes consisted of the redesignation of the 128 Artillery Battalion to the LONG AN Artillery Battalion, and the deactivation of the 308 VC MF Infantry Battalion, whose personnel were absorbed into district LF units.

c During the period, the 2 QUYET THANG MF Infantry Battalion was dropped from Order of Battle holdings as having been deactivated along with the previously confirmed deactivation of the 1 QUYET THANG Battalion. Currently, only the 4 GIA DINH Sapper Battalion remains of the QUYET THANG Regiment.

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d The 268 VC MF Group, previously believed to be a reorganization of the 268 VC MF Infantry Regiment, now appears to be a single battalion reorganized as early as July 1970. The 3 Battalion probably provided the nucleus for the new 268 VC MF Infantry Battalion, while the 1 and 2 Battalions of the Regiment may have been divided among the 101 NVA Infantry Regiment and SR-1 local-force units.

e During June 1970, the 10 VC MF Artillery Battalion was absorbed by the 8 VC MF Artillery Battalion. This reorganizational trend continued in January, when it was confirmed that the 8 and 9 VC MF Artillery Battalions had merged into the 89 VC MF Artillery Battalion, with an area of operation in the vicinity of the HO BO Woods.

f Although at the end of the reporting period the 4 DONG NAI NVA Infantry Battalion was still held as an active battalion of SR-5, there have been a number of reports that the battalion has disbanded and its personnel are acting in support of district, village and hamlet forces. Documents, prisoners and Hoi Chanhs during the period December 1970 to April 1971 have provided indications of the merging of two of the battalion's companies, and finally of dissolution of the battalion.

g The reorganization of the 275 VC Infantry Regiment into the 275A and 275B Regiments has been previously reported. The 275A Regiment became the nucleus for the BINH LONG Group, formed in August 1970 near KAMPONG THOM, Cambodia. Also subordinate to this headquarters were the newly formed 207 VC Infantry Regiment and portions of the 27 Recon Battalion, 5 VC Infantry Division. In early November 1970, the 174 VC Infantry Regiment, 5 VC Infantry Division, moved west of the MEKONG River and the 272 VC Infantry Regiment, 9 VC Infantry Division, was placed under the operational control of the BINH LONG Group between December 1970 and January 1971. The 174 VC Infantry Regiment returned east of the MEKONG River in February. The Group has the apparent mission of recruiting Cambodian nationals, in an effort to alleviate the manpower shortage on the Cambodian front and maintain the area under Communist control. Current information on the 207 VC Infantry Regiment indicates it may have been deactivated or absorbed by the 174 VC Infantry Regiment. The 275A and 275B Regiments have been redesignated the 205 and 203 NVA Infantry Regiments, respectively.

3 The following tables indicate enemy personnel and materiel losses during the reporting period. The figures presented include the results of ARVN operations in Cambodia.

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a Overall personnel losses inflicted by allied forces:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>HC</u>	<u>VCI</u>
November	1041	128	180	3
December	1364	146	71	3
January	1185	111	133	12
February	3537	125	41	0
March	3686	91	18	0
April	2449	78	16	5

b VC/NVA logistical losses inflicted by allied forces:

	<u>US</u>	<u>ARVN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Individual Weapons	1441	2679	4120
Crew Served Weapons	33	392	425
Small Arms Ammunition (rds)	370573	9403	379,976
HMG Ammunition (rds)	7325	1200	8525
Grenades	1379	1145	2524
Mines	518	1620	2138
Bangalore Torpedoes	2	0	2
B-40/41 Rounds	3491	863	4354
240mm Rockets	0	0	0
122mm Rockets	0	15	15
107mm Rockets	3	0	3
120mm Mortar Rounds	7	0	7
81/82mm Mortar Rounds	1451	126	1577
60mm Mortar Rounds	269	65	334
75mm Howitzer Rounds	78	6	84
57mm RR Rounds	29	0	29
Explosives (lbs)	1954	107	2061
Rice (tons)	183.78	38.42	222.20
Salt (tons)	10.41	0	10.41
Medical Supplies (tons)	.016	0	.016
Foodstuffs (tons)	60.85	0	60.85

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4 The following tabulation shows the number and combat effectiveness of enemy main-force units traditionally targeted against MR 3 as of 31 October 1970 and 30 April 1971. This tabulation does not include enemy units classified as possibly present in or near MR 3. In order to obtain a measure of conformity in evaluating enemy unit effectiveness from period to period, the system employed previously is continued here. Recognizing that much information about enemy units is based on subjective reporting and analysis, the combat effectiveness rating makes use of four simple criteria: the strength and enemy activity of the unit, estimated availability of materiel support, and a subjective evaluation by the order of battle analyst. The table below indicates the scaling system used.

EVALUATION SYSTEM

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>WEIGHT</u>
Strength (x=strength)	
x $\geq$ 80%	2
x $\geq$ 40%	1
x < 40%	0
Enemy Activity	
Frequently active	2
Occasionally active	1
Infrequently active	0
Materiel Support	
Readily available	2
Generally available	1
Not generally available	0

An enemy unit's rating is determined by adding the appropriate weights for each category of evaluation. Additionally, the order of battle analyst may weigh the resulting evaluation by plus or minus 1 if he feels such action will provide a truer overall combat effectiveness evaluation for a particular unit. If the result is two or less, the unit is rated "not combat effective." A total of 3 or 4 is evaluated as "marginally combat effective," and a total of 5 or higher results in a rating of "combat effective." Basing unit combat effectiveness evaluations on a constant scale permits a more valid comparison of the enemy's overall combat effectiveness over extended periods.



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## COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS (31 October 1970/30 April 1971)

<u>Units</u>	<u>Combat Effective</u>	<u>Marginally Combat Effective</u>	<u>Not Combat Effective</u>	<u>Total</u>
Inf Regts	0/2	11/9	1/0	12/11
Arty Regts	0/0	3/3	0/0	3/3
Sapper Regts	0/0	1/1	0/0	1/1
Inf Bns	0/1	10/8	6/5	16/14
Arty Bns	0/0	10/9	1/0	11/9
Sapper Bns	0/3	9/8	5/1	14/12
Recon Bns	0/0	1/1	0/0	1/1

## (c) Summary of Recent Activity

1 Level of Enemy Activity: From the low level of enemy initiated activity reported for the period August-September 1970, a general increase has been noted during this reporting period. During April 1971 the level of activity reached that reported for May-July 1970. The average number of incidents for November through January 1971 was 224 per month, while that for February through April was 367. The largest number of incidents in any one 24 hour period was 33 on 6-7 April, compared to 15 on 3-4 September, the high for the previous reporting period. The daily average number of incidents for the last reporting period was 7.0, that of the first half of this period 7.3 while that of the latter half was 12.4. This increase is the result of two different factors. The smaller, general increase reflects the stabilization of the enemy situation during the wet season in Cambodia and the continued counter-pacification and anti-Vietnamization activity within the Military Region. The higher rate of February through April reflects the enemy's reaction to the ARVN Dry Season Campaign in Cambodia and his determination to maintain his base areas and logistical lines there.

2 Enemy Divisional Units: During the reporting period, the 5 VC, 7 NVA and 9 VC Infantry Divisions operated in Cambodia against FANK and ARVN forces in the KAMPONG CHAM, CHUP, DAMBE and SNUOL areas. The 9 VC Infantry Division, initially operating with units on both sides of the MEKONG River, was targeted against FANK forces in the KAMPONG CHAM area until Operation Eagle by ARVN forces relieved pressure along Route 7 west of KAMPONG CHAM. For a brief period in January, both the 271 and the 272 VC Infantry Regiments were identified in western War Zone "C", on interdiction operations. The division then took on the mission of defending logistical installations in the CHUP and met with heavy losses from contacts with ARVN forces following the initiation of the Dry Season Campaign in early February. The 7 NVA Infantry Division moved from the KREK-MEMOT area into the area along Route 75 near DAMBE to assist the 9 VC Infantry Division in driving ARVN forces out of the CHUP area during this campaign. The 141 and 165 NVA Infantry Regiments had been assigned the mission of interdicting Route 7 and harassing

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northern TAY NINH (P) in the November-January period. In mid-February the 209 and 165 NVA Infantry Regiments relocated into the DAMBE area, while the 141 NVA Infantry Regiment followed in late February to interdict Route 75. The 7 NVA Infantry Division met with limited success in disrupting the consolidation of ARVN forces along Route 7 after an ARVN airmobile operation into the CHHLONG area. The two divisions retain the mission of forcing the ARVN task forces out of Cambodia and bringing the area back under Communist control. The 5 VC Infantry Division continued its mission of protecting logistical installations around SNUOL and interdicting Routes 7 and 13. The E6 VC Infantry Regiment suffered numerous losses in contacts with ARVN task forces in the area, and reports have been received that the Regiment has moved east to an area north of BU DOP for the purpose of taking on replacements and possibly conducting operations in northern BINH LONG (P). The 174 VC Infantry Regiment was last contacted west of the MEKONG River in December, and has remained out of contact since moving back into the 5 VC Infantry Division area of operation in January, when a PW reported it northeast of MEMOT. The BINH LONG Group, identified in November and December, has continued its mission of interdicting Routes 6 and 7 west of KAMPONG CHAM, disrupting FANK units, and recruiting Cambodian nationals in an attempt to alleviate the manpower shortage on the Cambodian front.

3 Enemy Units Within Military Region 3: Activity in MR 3 continued at a low level throughout most of the reporting period, as the enemy continued to rely upon local forces and guerrillas rather than main-force units to overcome personnel and materiel shortages and defeat the pacification program. In SR-1, the 101 NVA Infantry Regiment remained the only regimental-sized force. A refitting and retraining phase was accomplished during the early part of the reporting period, when the regiment deployed north of SR-1. Its subsequent return to the MICHELIN/BOI LOI area has coincided with an increase in enemy activity in the area. Its 9 Battalion was particularly active against Rome Plow operations in the TRANG BANG area in April. Recent contacts have shown that regimental elements are aggressive and well trained. The former 268 VC MF Infantry Regiment of SR-1 has now been confirmed as a battalion-size unit. In LONG AN Subregion, after the merger of SR-2 and SR-3, several units were resubordinated due to a lack of personnel. The major change was the deactivation of the 1 NVA MF Infantry Regiment. LONG AN Subregion units have been engaged in anti-pacification activities and, more recently, transportation of supplies along the BO BO Canal and AN NINH infiltration corridors while main-force units attempt to remain out of contact. In SR-5, counter-pacification activities, such as occasional attacks by fire and ground probes, were continued by local force units, supported by remaining personnel from the DONG NAI Battalions. Major main-force units under control of Military Region 7, the 33 NVA and 274 VC MF Infantry Regiments and the 74 NVA Artillery Regiment, have shown increased willingness to engage allied units and to sustain contacts when engaged, indicating the limited success of their resupply and retraining missions of the past quarter. These units, most notably the 33 NVA Infantry Regiment, employ the Shadow Supply System due to a lack of available external supply sources, particularly for foodstuffs. Training among these units probably emphasizes, in accordance with COSVN directives, sapper training and local force support.

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4 Conclusion: The effect of ARVN cross-border operations during the last reporting period, the threat of renewed operations and the actual renewal of cross-border operations in December and February have concentrated the attention of COSVN and major SVNLA units on Cambodia. Enemy forces in MR 3 have been relegated to an economy-of-force role while conducting training in sapper, local-force and guerrilla operations. The enemy is trying to maintain his present position, while at the same time supporting political efforts to revitalize the war effort within MR 3. The enemy's objectives of defeating Vietnamization and GVN pacification, and eventual political control of South Vietnam, remain the same.

(d) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Assessment:

1 The enemy is capable of:

a Launching sapper attacks at a limited number of selected points throughout MR 3, especially near KATUM and in northern BINH LONG (P). This capability is particularly limited in LONG AN Subregion.

b Conducting coordinated battalion-sized attacks on installations in BINH TUY (P), MR 7, SR-1, western War Zone "C", and against RVNAF forces operating in Cambodia, as well as against Cambodian installations and units.

c Conducting small scale ground attacks against the periphery of the CMD and against a limited number of selected points throughout MR 3.

d Conducting attacks by rocket, mortar and direct fire heavy weapons on a limited number of selected targets in MR 3 and Cambodia. He can increase the intensity and frequency of his attacks, to a limited degree, against major population centers.

e Intensifying LOC interdictions and ambushes throughout MR 3 for limited periods of time.

f Continuing the present level of terrorist, sabotage and assassination activities in the CMD and populated areas of MR 3.

g Avoiding contact for limited periods of time, contingent on the extent of allied efforts and operations.

h Conducting propaganda, subversion, espionage and political efforts throughout MR 3.

i Positioning main-force units in SR-1, SR-4 and SR-5, well forward toward the periphery of the CMD, to support local force efforts to subvert the population.

j Detecting changes in the dispositions of allied forces and developing limited knowledge of allied intentions through a sophisticated intelligence organization.

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## 2 Vulnerabilities:

a The enemy situation in MR 3, at present, requires that the enemy depend, in varying degrees, on the local populace for financial support, concealment, and food. In some areas, this dependence is nearly complete due to an almost total lack of resupply capability, resulting from friendly interdiction of his LOC. The extended supply lines and the base areas which support them have been seriously disrupted by allied operations. As a consequence, throughout the region, and particularly in LONG AN Subregion, the enemy must now either produce his food and supplies or procure them locally, since the severely restricted resupply system must be dedicated to those items that cannot be obtained locally, i.e., weapons, munitions and some medical supplies. This dependence renders the enemy particularly vulnerable to psychological operations which could remove or reduce the support of the populace. Current enemy efforts to reestablish his base areas should be particularly vulnerable to both visual and sensor detection.

b Enemy supply activities in SR-1 and SR-5 are especially susceptible to interdiction on major rivers and highways. Enemy units currently operating in the MICHELIN Plantation area, notably the 101 NVA Infantry Regiment and the 35 VC Artillery Battalion, are supplied with food via routes which are vulnerable to interdiction at crossing points on the SAIGON River. Enemy forces operating in the areas S of the SAIGON River receive munitions resupply from the BO BA TAY area of Cambodia, and are susceptible to interdiction along the VAM CO DONG and Highway 22. SR-5 enemy forces, the 1, 2, and 4 DONG NAI VC Infantry Battalions, transport a large proportion of their munitions along routes from War Zone "D" which could be effectively interdicted by allied operations on or near the SONG BE River. Furthermore, if additional check points were to be established along Route 349 and other lines of communication into the area, they would seriously threaten BINH MY as a main source of supply.

c In MR 7, the enemy food supply system has previously been concentrated in the BINH SON and VIET CUONG Plantations. Shutting off these centers of food supply through cordon operations has forced the enemy to resupply from villages along Routes 15 and 2 and to utilize the Shadow Supply System along Route 1, drawing supplies from SAIGON and throughout MR 7. MR 7 forces rely on War Zone "D" for munitions supplies. These are transported along supply lines which are vulnerable to interdiction operations concentrating on points where the lines cross Route 1 and the DONG NAI River.

d As in MR 7, the greatest vulnerability of the enemy in MR 6 is his logistical system. The 33 NVA Infantry Regiment and enemy local forces of MR 6 are supplied by the MR 7 Rear Service Group. The enemy's supply routes follow the major lines of communication in LONG KHANH and BINH TUY (P). Intensive allied security checks along the routes from SAIGON and PHAN THIET to enemy base areas or enemy-controlled hamlets could severely hamper enemy supply efforts. Munitions supply routes are vulnerable to interdiction along Highway 20 near DINH QUAN and along the small trails and rivers in the northern

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section of LONG KHANH (P) and BINH TUY (P), where bicycles, litter bearers and sampans bring munitions to resupply points and base areas.

### 3 Assessment:

a Cambodia: The continued existence of the Khmer Republic poses a serious problem for COSVN by creating a two-front situation for the enemy. SVNLA and KHMER ROUGE forces continue to operate throughout much of the Republic, concentrating on route interdiction and maintenance of local political control. COSVN has directed some effort to the training of KHMER ROUGE forces. However, regardless of the amount of effort the enemy does expend in Cambodia, his object still remains the control of South Vietnam. Consequently, it is likely that the enemy will utilize the upcoming wet season to stabilize his operations in Cambodia, with emphasis on logistical and base area operations and improvement of working relationships with KHMER ROUGE forces. He can be expected to train these forces to take a major role against FANK forces, and to prepare his divisions for future operations. The enemy is unlikely to commit his forces to ground attacks in Cambodia unless the ARVN embark on operations which threaten his caches or base areas.

b Military Region 3: With the 5 VC, 7 NVA and 9 VC Infantry Divisions committed in Cambodia during the next quarter, enemy activity in MR 3 can be expected to follow the guidelines of COSVN Resolution 14 by increasing emphasis on guerrilla warfare. Activity may be highlighted by continued activity in SR-1 involving elements of the 101 NVA Infantry Regiment, the 268 VC Infantry Battalion and the 89 VC Artillery Battalion. The 274 VC Infantry Regiment and 445 VC Infantry Battalion may increase activity in their respective areas of operation. Portions of the divisional units may attempt to re-enter the Military Region for limited operations. Activity throughout the Military Region will probably be characterized by small attacks by fire and the use of economy of force tactics by the enemy. The pacification program is the target of terrorist and propaganda activities, and will continue to be targeted in conjunction with other enemy actions. Also possible is an increase of military activity in order to influence or disrupt the October National Elections or to increase pressure for a political settlement through acceptance of a coalition government.

### d. Operations, Plans, and Training.

#### (1) General

(a) II FFORCEV OPCON units continued to participate in Campaign Toan Thang (Phase IV), and Toan Thang 1-71. Toan Thang (Phase IV) emphasized the deployment of ARVN units along and across the Cambodian border, while US units operated in the interior of MR 3. During Toan Thang 1-71, which began on 4 Feb 71, ARVN units are conducting offensive operations along the border and in Cambodia, while US units are operating inside MR 3. II FFORCEV units employed airmobile, cordon and search, and ground reconnaissance operations against specific enemy units and enemy infiltration and supply routes. The

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redeployment of three major US combat units, the 25th Inf Div, the 1st Cav Div (-), and the 11th ACR (-), required numerous, successive adjustments to be made in the boundaries of assigned areas of operations. These adjustments had no adverse effects on operations. Continued progress was made toward pacification and development, as well as in the upgrading and training of GVN forces. There were no major engagements during the period, but a continued erosion of enemy forces by small unit operations was evident.

(b) Friendly losses in MR 3. Significant results of Free World Military Assistance Force (FWMAF) participation in operations during November 1970 through April 1971 were 192 FWMAF killed (148 US, 15 Australians, and 29 Thais), and 1314 wounded (1041 US, 82 Australians, and 191 Thais).

(2) Summary of Combat Operations. Combat operations conducted by US units OPCON to II FFORCEV are discussed and summarized in the Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by the units.

(a) The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The division continued to participate in Campaign Toan Thang (Phase IV) and Toan Thang 1-71. The 1st Cavalry Division's mission was centered on the interdiction of enemy lines of communications, location and evacuation of caches, support of the Government of Vietnam (GVN) pacification program, operations in coordination with Republic of Vietnam (RVN) forces, and the neutralization of main force and rear service units. The 1st Brigade continued operations in support of the division's mission in Long Khanh Province and War Zone "D" until it stood down for redeployment on 24 March 1971. The 2d Brigade operated in northern and central Phuoc Long Province, with emphasis on coordinated operations with RVN forces against enemy lines of communications until it stood down for redeployment on 12 March 1971. The 3d Brigade operated in eastern Long Khanh and Binh Tuy Provinces to support the division's mission, with emphasis placed on resource denial along QL-1 and curtailment of enemy infiltration into southern Long Khanh and Binh Tuy Provinces. The 2-11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) was OPCON to 3d Brigade. When the 2d Brigade stood down, its area of operation was assumed by the 5th ARVN Division. When the 1st Brigade stood down, its area of operation was divided between the 5th ARVN Div and the 3d Brigade. The 3d Brigade was organized as a separate unit on 30 March 1971 and became OPCON to II FFORCEV on 10 April 1971. On 14 April 1971, OPCON of the 1st Cavalry Division (-) passed to USARV.

(b) 25th Infantry Division. The 25th Inf Div continued to participate in Campaign Toan Thang (Phase IV) until the Division, minus its 2d Brigade, stood down and redeployed from RVN during Nov-Dec 70. The 2d Brigade then participated in Campaign Toan Thang (Phase IV) in its area of operation east of Saigon in Phuoc Tuy, Long Khanh, and Bien Hoa Provinces. The 2d Brigade was activated as a separate unit on 8 November 1971 and was placed OPCON to II FFORCEV on that date. The areas of operation for the 1st and 3d Brigades were turned over to the 5th and 25th ARVN Divs on 1 November 1970, after which temporary areas of operation were negotiated for final unit field operations and to provide for security of Dau Tieng and Cu Chi base camps. The 1st Brigade

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moved to Camp Frenzell-Jones and began standing down on 2 November 1970. The 3d Brigade began its standdown on 3 November 1970 at Cu Chi. OPCON of the 25th Inf Div (-) passed to USARV on 25 November 1970. The 2d Brigade, organized as a separate brigade, continued to operate in its assigned areas of operation until it stood down for redeployment in April 1971. The brigade conducted small unit ground operations in coordinated and combined operations with RTAVF, the 1st ATF, and Territorial Forces. Primary emphasis was placed on operations against the 274th NVA Regiment. OPCON of the 2d Brigade passed to USARV on 6 April 1971.

(c) 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. The 11th ACR continued to participate in Campaign Toan Thang (Phase IV). The regiment (minus 2d Squadron) was OPCON to II FFORCEV until the regiment (-) stood down on 7 February 1971. During the period, the regiment (-) continued operations in Binh Duong, Bien Hoa, and Long Khanh Provinces. Emphasis was placed on operations against the VC UI forces, the 274 VC Regiment, the VC SR-5, and the Dong Nai Battalions. Operations were characterized by combined operations with Territorial Forces, reconnaissance missions, Rome Plow security, resource control operations, and interdiction of enemy supply routes. During the period 2 November 1970 through 31 December 1970, D Troop, 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry was OPCON to the regiment. When the regiment (-) stood down, its areas of operation were transferred to 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div, and to 1st Cav Div (AM). The 2d Squadron, 11th ACR, continued to operate in southern Binh Tuy Province, OPCON to 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM), until 16 April 1971. Because of the increasing enemy threat in the Saigon River Corridor, the squadron was first moved there and placed OPCON to CG, 25th ARVN Div, in order to conduct security operations in the Ho Bo - Boi Loi Woods area. Subsequently, on 26 April 71, the squadron was placed OPCON to Hau Nghia Province for conducting land clearing operations in the area.

(d) 1st Australian Task Force. The 1st ATF continued to participate in Campaign Toan Thang (Phase IV) in its assigned area of operation in Phuoc Tuy Province. The two battalions, along with the armored cavalry squadron, conducted reconnaissance and ambush operations throughout the province. The 1st ATF conducted combined operations with Regional and Popular Forces as part of its overall Territorial Forces upgrading program. On 1 Nov 70, the 8th RAR was airlifted from Nui Dat to the HMAS Sydney by CH-47s for return to Australia without replacement. The 3d Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) replaced the 7th RAR on 1 April 1971. The period was generally characterized by small and scattered actions by the battalions operating in various independent areas of operations. On 15 December 1970 at 2110H hours, an element of the 2d RAR, while in an ambush position 7km south of Blackhorse (YS 435965), contacted an unknown number of enemy. The ambush resulted in 9 enemy KIA, and 2 small arms captured. On 31 December 1970, at 0350H hours, B Co, 7th RAR, while in an ambush position 4.5km southeast of Xuyen Moc (YS 6568), contacted

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an unknown number of enemy. The action continued sporadically until 0700H. The action resulted in 21 enemy KIA, and 13 small arms and 1 radio captured. On 5 January 1971, at 0900H, B Trp, 3d Cav, while on an operation 3km southeast of Dat Do (YS 4860), captured 5 enemy hiding in a bunker, and also captured 3 small arms. On 5 January 1971, 3d Cav, while in an ambush position 2km north of Dat Do, contacted four enemy. The results of the contact were 3 enemy KIA, 1 PW (WIA) and 1 small arm captured. On 16 January 1971, at 0700H, B Co, 7th RAR, while in an ambush position 6km southwest of Dat Do, contacted an unknown number of enemy. The results were 5 enemy KIA. On 22 January 1971, at 1846H, an ambush patrol of the 2d RAR in position 7.5km south of Blackhorse, contacted 6 enemy. The ambush resulted in 4 enemy KIA, 1 PW (who later died of his wounds) and 4 small arms captured. On 31 January 1971, at 2020H, C Co, 2d RAR, on ground operations contacted an estimated 8 enemy. Enemy returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons fire. The results of the contact were 4 KIA and 1 small arm captured. On 25 March 1971, at 0718H, B Co, 2d RAR, while on a ground operation 20km north of Nui Dat (YS 435680), engaged 5 enemy with claymores and automatic weapons fire. The results of the action were 3 enemy KIA and 3 small arms captured.

(e) Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force. The RTAVF continued its participation during the period in Campaign Toan Thang (Phase IV). The force conducted ground operations against the 274th NVA Regiment including: interdiction of enemy routes of supply and troop movements, search and clear operations, cordon and search operations, and participation in the GVN pacification program. The period was characterized by small and scattered contacts. On 5 December 1970, at 1418H, a Hoi Chanh from the C207 Local Force unit led elements of E Co, 2d Bn, 1st Bde, to a bunker complex 2km north of Binh Son (YS 210936). The company contacted 2 enemy in the bunkers. The results of the action were 2 enemy KIA and two small arms captured. On 5 January 1971, at 1150H, E Co, 2d Bn, 1st Bde, while on ground reconnaissance 1.5km northeast of Binh Son, engaged an unknown number of enemy in bunkers. Small arms and automatic weapons fires were exchanged. The company was supported by tactical air strikes. The results of the action were 5 enemy KIA, and 2 Thai KIA. On 8 January 1971, at 1915H, C Co, 2d Bn, 1st Bde, while in an ambush position .5km north of Binh Son, engaged an unknown number of enemy. The results of the contact were 5 enemy KIA and 1 PW. On 24 January 1971, at 0750H, a road security element of G Co, 2d Bn, 1st Bde, engaged 5 enemy 5km south of Bearcat (YT 1600). The results were 2 enemy KIA and 2 small arms captured. On 5 February 1971, at 0640H, B Co, 2d Bn, 1st Bde, in an ambush position 2.5km west of Binh Son, engaged an unknown number of enemy with small arms and automatic fires. The results of the action were 7 enemy KIA and 2 small arms captured. On 8 April 1971, at 2300H, C Co, 2d Bn, 2d Bde, had a mechanical ambush located 8km southeast of Binh Son detonate. Area was swept at first light. The results were 7 enemy KIA and 2 small arms captured. On 15 April 1971, at 0820H, C Co, 3d Bn, 1st Bde, while on a ground operation 13km southeast of Bearcat, contacted an unknown number of enemy. The results of the contact were 5 enemy KIA. On 16 April 1971, at 1400H, Ranger Team 1 on a search operation 5km south of Binh Son, engaged an unknown number of enemy. The team was supported by artillery, light fire team, and tactical air support.



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There was sporadic contact until 1805H. At that time a sweep of the strike zone was made by the Ranger team. During the sweep, contact was re-established with the enemy force. B Co, 2d Bn, 2d Bde, then reinforced the Ranger Team. The results of the contact were 4 enemy KIA and one weapon captured. On 19 April 1971, at 1035H, B Co, 3d Bn, 1st Bde, while on a ground operation 9km northeast of Binh Son, engaged an unknown number of enemy who were in bunkers. The results of this action were 15 enemy KIA and 3 small arms captured.

(3) Chemical: This Headquarters developed a field expedient flame munition to supplement the Air Force tactical fire bomb. Designed to be used in the Dry Season against area targets, the flame bomb was highly successful in burning off the ground cover and destroying booby traps.

(a) The munition consisted of thickened fuel in a 55 gallon drum with a WP igniter and spin-armed fuze. The fuze lanyard was used to wire the fuze-igniter assembly to the top of the drum. The best results were obtained when the fuzes were wired as tightly as possible during the early morning. When the heat from the sun expanded the drums, the wire tightened further and held the igniter firmly in place. Whenever a drum was left overnight, it was necessary to rewire it before use.

(b) Sixteen drums could be loaded in a CH-47 fitted with roller racks, as shown in TC346. To maintain the proper center of gravity, all munitions were positioned in the center of the helicopter.

(c) The safety of the crew and aircraft was the greatest concern during a flame drop. All of the rules in the applicable TM's concerning flame fuels were followed. Once the munitions were loaded in the aircraft, tie-down straps were used to keep the barrels in place; also, personnel working near the open tailgate were required to wear safety harnesses.

(d) Target areas normally had a one-kilometer safety buffer zone on each side and at the start of the target line. A two-kilometer zone was required at the end of the target line, because of the possibility of late drops. The buffer zone had to be clear of all friendly troops, villages, and occupied structures in order to avoid injury to friendly personnel and civilians. As an added precaution, a representative of the responsible ground unit was in the C&C helicopter to mark the target on the ground and grant clearances.

(e) A flame bomb mission required a minimum of four aircraft: one CH-47, one Command and Control (C&C) helicopter, and two gunships. The C&C ship performed visual reconnaissance of the target area and marked the target line with smoke. As the CH-47 began the final approach to the target, the bombs were moved to the tailgate of the CH-47. For safety and control, six bombs were the maximum number dropped on each pass. Drops were made from 2500 feet above ground at 70 knots. The impact with the ground burst the drum and exploded

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the fuze-igniter, lighting the fuel. Wet or soft ground sometimes caused duds, but these were usually ignited by the secondary fires of other bombs. Dispersion was controlled by varying the time interval between drums being pushed from the helicopter.

(f) The flame bomb was successful when it was employed to exploit the secondary fires produced. The bombs were capable of initiating fires over large areas and detonating booby traps; however, the results varied with the ground cover. The maximum fire spread was obtained when the ground vegetation in the target area contained thick, dry, underbrush or was secondary growth, and when the winds were properly exploited.

(g) The flame bomb cannot be used effectively to replace the tactical napalm air-strike. Experience showed that some ground commanders attempted to use the flame bomb against pinpoint and non-flammable targets, but with little success.

#### (4) Air Operations

(a) Resources: The following non-divisional resources of the 12th Aviation Group (Cbt) were under OPCON of II FFORCEV during all or part of the reporting period.

##### 1 Helicopters

- 8 Assault Helicopter Companies
- 2 Assault Support Helicopter Companies (Medium)
- 1 Assault Support Helicopter Company (Heavy) (-)
- 2 Air Cavalry Squadrons
- 1 Aerial Weapons Company
- 1 Aerial Field Artillery Battery
- 1 Aviation Company (Corps)

##### 2 Airplanes

- 1 Reconnaissance Airplane Company (+)

(b) At the end of the reporting period, five of the eight Assault Helicopter Companies continued to provide an average of 2,160 hours of support time per month. The average daily allocations per unit per month are as follows:

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	Combat Assault (CA) Packages 4 slicks & 2 gunships CA days/month	General Support Helicopters slicks/day
--	--	---

(1) III Corps	41	12
(2) RTAVF	10	1
(3) USARV TNG GP	5	2
(4) RSSZ	6	$\frac{1}{2}$
(5) TRAC	-	$\frac{3}{4}$
(6) 303d RR Bn	-	$\frac{1}{2}$
(7) CORDS	-	7
(8) 3/17 ACS	-	6 C&C

(c) Since the last reporting period, one Assault Helicopter Company without gunships was gained from the 1st Cav Div (AM) on 10 April 1971. Two other Assault Helicopter Companies stood down for inactivation, one on 1 March 1971 and the other on 1 April 1971; a third Assault Helicopter Company was transferred to MR 1 on 1 February 1971. Companies were usually allocated daily as follows:

2 companies, each providing 6 General Support slicks; one Combat Assault half package composed of 1 C&C, 3 slicks, and 2 gunships; and one special mission requiring 2 gunships.

2 companies, each providing 6 General Support slicks; and one Combat Assault half package, composed of 1 C&C, 3 slicks, and 2 gunships.

1 company providing 3 General Support slicks and 6 C&C ships.

(d) The total number of aircraft OPCON to II FFORCEV during the reporting period decreased from 438 to 386. The 12th CAG has met the 20 percent reduction goal, relative to FY 1970 employment rates in UH-1 equivalent hours, in every monthly reporting period.

#### (5) Force Structure.

(a) During the reporting period, Headquarters, II FFORCEV, planned for its merging with the United States Army Advisory Group, III Corps. The new headquarters would advise and assist the III Corps Headquarters, and would command US/FWMA forces under its control. The proposed JTD for the new organization was submitted to MACV on 12 March 1971. The merging of the headquarters began on 1 April 1971 and was completed on 30 April 1971, when the United States Army Advisory Group, III Corps, was redesignated as the Third Regional Assistance Command (TRAC). The color of Headquarters, II FFORCEV, was furled in preparation for the redeployment with a color guard detachment to Fort Hood, Texas.

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## (b) Gains:

2d Bde, 25th Inf Div	8 Nov 70
265 FA Det (Radar)	8 Nov 70
268 FA Det (Radar)	2 Jan 71
269 FA Det (Radar)	1 Feb 71
264 FA Det (Radar)	16 Feb 71
2-11 ACR	7 Mar 71
267 FA Det (Radar)	16 Mar 71
3d Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM)	10 Apr 71

## (c) Losses:

1 25th Inf Div:

2-34 Arm (-)	1 Nov 70
2-14 Inf	2 Nov 70
2-22 Inf	3 Nov 70
66 Inf Plt (-)	4 Nov 70
7-11 FA	4 Nov 70
4-9 Inf	5 Nov 70
44 Inf Plt	6 Nov 70
2-27 Inf	7 Nov 70
3-13 FA	9 Nov 70
F Co, 75 Inf (Ranger) (-)	11 Nov 70
2-77 FA (-)	11 Nov 70
15 PI Det	11 Nov 70
3-4 Cav (-)	16 Nov 70
25 Avn Bn	17 Nov 70
4-23 Inf (Mech)	18 Nov 70
65 Engr Bn (-)	18 Nov 70
125 Sig Bn (-)	18 Nov 70
725 CS Bn (-)	19 Nov 70
HHC, 1 Bde	20 Nov 70
25 Med Bn (-)	20 Nov 70
25 MI Co (-)	21 Nov 70

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1-5 Inf (Mech)	27 Mar 71
A Btry, 1-8 FA	27 Mar 71
3-22 Inf	6 Apr 71
B Btry, 1-8 FA	6 Apr 71
225 Spt Bn	9 Apr 71
HHC, 2 Bde	13 Apr 71
18 MH Det	13 Apr 71
20 PI Det	13 Apr 71
532 Sig Co	13 Apr 71
554 MP Plt	16 Apr 71

4 1st Cav Div:

5-7 Cav	1 Mar 71
B Btry, 1-30 FA	1 Mar 71
A Btry, 1-77 FA	1 Mar 71
62 Inf Plt (-)	1 Mar 71
184 CM Plt	1 Mar 71
D Trp, 1-9 Cav	5 Mar 71
1-8 Cav	7 Mar 71
B Btry, 1-77 FA	7 Mar 71
37 Inf Plt	7 Mar 71
B Btry, 2-20 AFA	8 Mar 71
171 Trans Det	8 Mar 71
B Co, 8 Engr Bn	11 Mar 71
HHC, 2 Bde	12 Mar 71
2-7 Cav	13 Mar 71
B Btry, 2-19 FA	13 Mar 71
HMB, 1-77 FA	13 Mar 71
C Btry, 1-77 FA	13 Mar 71
A Btry, 1-30 FA	17 Mar 71
1-5 Cav	19 Mar 71
A Co, 8 Engr Bn	19 Mar 71
C Btry, 2-19 FA	19 Mar 71
25 Inf Plt	20 Mar 71

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HHC, 1 Bde	24 Mar 71
HHC, 8 Engr Bn	24 Mar 71
HHC, 2-19 FA	24 Mar 71
HHC, 1 Cav Div	25 Mar 71
HHC, 1 Cav Div Arty	25 Mar 71
HHC, 2-20 AFA	25 Mar 71
E Btry, 82 FA	26 Mar 71
564 Trans Det	26 Mar 71
15 Med Det	26 Mar 71
2-12 Cav	27 Mar 71
H Co, 75 Inf (-)	27 Mar 71
HHC, 11 Avn Gp	27 Mar 71
HHC, 1-30 FA	29 Mar 71
C Btry, 1-30 FA	29 Mar 71
191 MI Co (-)	29 Mar 71
11 Avn Co	30 Mar 71
150 Trans Det	30 Mar 71
42 PI Det	3 Apr 71
15 S&S Bn (-)	3 Apr 71
27 Maint Bn (-)	4 Apr 71
273 FA Det (Radar)	5 Apr 71
545 MP Co (-)	10 Apr 71
13 Sig Bn (-)	10 Apr 71
15 AG Co (-)	11 Apr 71
15 Trans Bn (-)	13 Apr 71
HHC & Band, 1 Cav DISCOM	14 Apr 71

5 II FFORCEV.

1-27 FA	1 Nov 70
246 FA Det (Radar)	1 Nov 70
257 FA Det (Radar)	1 Nov 70
9 FA Det (Radar)	10 Nov 70
248 FA Det (Radar)	10 Nov 70

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258 FA Det (Radar)	19 Nov 70
259 FA Det	19 Nov 70
HQB, II FFORCEV Arty	18 Jan 71
HQB, 8-25 FA	18 Jan 71
53 Sig Bn (-)	1 Feb 71
<u>2-35 FA</u>	4 Feb 71
265 FA Det	13 Mar 71
5-2 ADA (-)	1 Apr 71
I Btry, 2-29 FA (SLT)	1 Apr 71
29 Cml Det	7 Apr 71
517 Engr Det	7 Apr 71
7 MH Det	7 Apr 71
16 PI Det	7 Apr 71
44 APU	20 Apr 71

6 12th CAG:

54 UAC	1 Jan 71
173 AHC	1 Feb 71
HHC, 269 Avn Bn	1 Mar 71
118 AHC	1 Mar 71
68 AHC	31 Mar 71

(6) Training.

a. II FFORCEV assigned and OPCON units continued to conduct individual and unit proficiency training and to provide specialized "on-the-job training" (OJT) to ARVN units in MR 3. Special emphasis was placed on the mission of upgrading Territorial Forces through special individual and unit training courses, and on joint combat operations. See Operation Report - Lessons Learned reports from OPCON units for detailed discussions of training conducted.

b. See paragraph 1g(3)(a) for a discussion of the methods used to upgrade the effectiveness of the Territorial Forces.

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e. Logistics

(1) Program and Projects

(a) RAR Program for M114A1, 155mm Howitzers

As a result of a maintenance conference held with representatives of G4, II FFORCEV, 23d Arty Gp, and 29th CS Gp, a Repair and Return program for 155mm howitzers was initiated. Under this program, 155mm howitzers were inspected and all required repair parts requisitioned. When the required parts were received, a float howitzer was issued and the scheduled howitzer was job ordered into the DS shop. The howitzer was again thoroughly inspected and all required maintenance was performed. Upon completion, the howitzer was returned to the unit and the float returned to the maintenance activity. This program enabled the artillery unit to have all of its howitzers inspected and repaired on a regular basis. The use of maintenance floats preserves the artillery units' capability while the equipment is being repaired. This program has resulted in an extremely low deadline rate for M114A1 howitzers within II FFORCEV.

(b) Maintenance Improvement Program

A Maintenance Improvement Program was initiated to improve the overall materiel readiness status of II FFORCEV units by developing a closer working relationship between supporting and supported units. This program has been conducted through a series of maintenance conferences. The first was held on 18 December 1970 with maintenance personnel from II FFORCEV assigned and attached units. Topics discussed included "Keystone" turn-in procedures, roadside spot-check inspections, vehicle safety, and procedures for requisitioning spare parts and critical repair parts.

(c) Project Limit

This program was implemented within II FFORCEV assigned and attached units for those selected items of equipment and material which are under rigid control by USARV. Within II FFORCEV, the control was implemented by a letter from this headquarters that was based on projected requirements by all units and allocations received from Saigon Support Command. Controls have been removed from sheets and pillowcases. The main items still being controlled are barrier materials, bunker materials, plywood, and poncho liners. The Project Limit letter will remain in effect until such time as further reduction of resources available is directed by USARV or control is lifted, whichever occurs first.

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(d) CONEX Control Program

This program was established in a continued effort to return the maximum number of CONEX to the transportation system. USARV established turn-in goals for II FFORCEV to reduce the number of CONEX being used for essential storage. II FFORCEV units have supported the turn-in program to the maximum extent possible, and have produced results that surpassed the goals established by USARV.

(e) Excess Equipment "Free Turn-in" Program

This program, initiated by USARV in July 1970, terminated 28 February 1971. The total II FFORCEV accomplishments under this program were 64,525 Class II, VIII, and IX items valued at more than \$17,000,000 turned in. These turn-ins resulted from excess equipment, reduction in current operating allowances, and termination of temporary loans.

(f) Signature Headcount System

This system, established by AR 30-1, was initiated in II FFORCEV on 1 December 1970. The purpose is to maintain closer accountability of government rations. The system affected all field ration messing facilities to include those units subsisting in support base camps, but did not include fire bases. There were no significant problems.

(2) Ammunition

(a) Ammunition items in short supply continued to be managed through the use of Available Supply Rate (ASR) allocations to ensure equitable distribution of available ammunition to all II FFORCEV units.

(b) During the reporting period, the number of conventional munitions under Available Supply Rate control was:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>MONTH</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Nov	28	Feb	19
Dec	22	Mar	19
Jan	19	Apr	19

(c) During the standdown of major units, coordination was made with Saigon Support Command for furnishing surveillance inspections and EOD personnel at the standdown site. Serviceable and unserviceable ammunition were separated. The unserviceable ammunition was destroyed at the site, thus eliminating the cost of transporting it back to the Supporting ASP.

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(3) Transportation

(a) United States Air Force C-130/C-123/C-7A sorties flown from the Common Service Airlift System in support of II FFORCEV are summarized in inclosure 6.

(b) II FFORCEV had eight dedicated C-7A aircraft during the reporting period. These were allocated as shown:

4 1st Cav Div  
3 II FFORCEV Arty  
1 III Corps & MR 3

(c) The amount of airlift required by II FFORCEV units declined during the reporting period. This was due to the drawdown of units and to the reduced intensity of conflict.

(4) Base Transfer

(a) In keeping with the Improvement and Modernization Program and realignment of US units, turnover of major bases as well as minor bases and fire support bases progressed in a satisfactory manner during the reporting period.

(b) Major bases transferred were:

1 Camp Mallard (Duster) was transferred to the 3d ARVN Armored Brigade on 7 December 1970. It consisted of 63 facilities valued at \$195,987.

2 Cu Chi base camp was transferred to the 25th ARVN Div on 15 December 1970. It consisted of 2,739 facilities valued at \$7,616,000.

3 Phase III of the transfer of Lai Khe base camp to the 5th ARVN Div was completed on 21 December 1970. It consisted of 370 facilities valued at \$312,000.

4 Dau Tieng was transferred to the 25th ARVN Div on 15 November 1970. It consisted of 243 facilities valued at \$47,800.

5 Graham Browne Compound was transferred to Binh Long Province on 30 January 1971. It consisted of 21 facilities valued at \$154,000.

6 Engineer Compound was transferred to 18th ARVN Div on 12 March 1971. It consisted of 40 facilities valued at \$108,764.

7 Pohl Compound, Duc Hoa, was transferred to the Ministry of Education on 13 January 1971. It consisted of 54 facilities valued at \$344,040.

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8 Husky Compound was transferred to the 52d Regt, 18th ARVN Div, on 12 March 1971. It consisted of 156 facilities valued at \$319,100.

2 Camp Ogle was transferred to the 18th ARVN Div on 9 March 1971. It consisted of 84 facilities valued at \$205,780.

10 Phase I of the transfer of Di An base camp to the Vietnamese Marine Corps was completed on 5 March 1971.

11 Phuoc Vinh base camp was transferred to the 5th ARVN Div on 14 April 1971.

12 Camp Price was transferred to the 3d Ar Bde on 26 April 1971.

(c) Minor bases and fire support bases transferred or closed were:

1 FSB Redleg (XT678305) of the 25th Inf Div was transferred to the 5th ARVN Div on 2 November 1970.

2 FSB Tennessee (XT583333) of the 25th Inf Div was transferred to the 8th ARVN Regt on 2 November 1970.

3 FSB Kien (XT523416) of the 25th Inf Div was transferred to the 5th ARVN Div on 7 November 1970.

4 FSB Snider (XY696175) of the 25th Inf Div was transferred to Phu Hoa District Forces on 14 November 1970.

5 FSB Gemini (YS143856) of the 25th Inf Div was closed on 28 December 1970.

6 FSB Lisa (YT515055) of the 25th Inf Div was closed on 28 December 1970.

7 FSB Black Diamond (XT973081) of the 20th Eng Bde was closed on 17 January 1971.

8 FSB Beverly (YS443866) of the 25th Inf Div was closed on 1 February 1971.

9 FSB Nance (YS127894) of the 25th Inf Div was closed on 1 February 1971.

10 FSB Stu (YS118956) of the 25th Inf Div was closed on 1 February 1971.

11 FSB Henderson (YT184119) of the 11th ACR was closed on 10 February 1971.

12 FSB Bandit II (YS988840) of the 11th ACR was closed on 10 February 1971.

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13 FSB Rivara (YS988840) of the 11th ACR was transferred to Binh Tuy Province on 13 February 1971.

14 FSB Sunday Punch (YU396467) of the 1st Cav Div was closed on 26 February 1971.

15 FSB Audie (YU435294) of the 25th Inf Div was closed on 27 February 1971.

16 FSB Snuffy (YU336362) of the 1st Cav Div was transferred to the 97th ARVN Ranger Battalion on 1 March 1971.

17 FSB Rivers (YS101874) of the 25th Inf Div was closed on 3 March 1971.

18 FSB Barbara (YS538971) of the 25th Inf Div was closed on 5 March 1971.

19 FSB Betty (YU245289) of the 1st Cav Div was transferred to 5th ARVN Div on 7 March 1971.

20 FSB Cheryl (YT665176) of the 1st Cav Div was closed on 8 March 1971.

21 FSB Asper (YT487123) of the 25th Inf Div was closed on 10 March 1971.

22 FSB Apache (XT733247) of the 1st Cav Div was closed on 11 March 1971.

23 FSB Buttons (YU150070) of the 1st Cav Div was transferred to Phuoc Long Province on 11 March 1971.

24 FSB Heidi (YT516056) of the 25th Inf Div was closed on 12 March 1971.

25 FSB Custer (YT028348) of the 1st Cav Div was closed on 13 March 1971.

26 FSB Leopard (YS399994) of the 25th Inf Div was transferred to the 3d Bn, 1st Bde, RTAVF, on 22 March 1971.

27 FSB Schwartz (YT381991) of the 25th Inf Div was transferred to Long Khanh Province on 23 March 1971.

28 FSB Joan (YT393125) of the 25th Inf Div was closed on 26 March 1971.

29 FSB Marisa (YT411219) of the 25th Inf Div was closed on 26 March 1971.

30 FSB Charley (YT390260) of the 20th Eng Bde was transferred to Long Khanh Province on 5 April 1971.

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f. Psychological Operations and Civic Affairs.

(1) Psychological Operations. During the reporting period, Psychological Operations (PSYOP) were conducted in support of tactical operations, pacification, redeployment of US military forces, and special campaigns.

(a) Tactical psychological operations. Tactical Psychological Operations were conducted in support of the Wet Season Strategy from 1 November to 31 December 1970 and in support of the Combined Campaign Plan for 1971 during the remainder of the reporting period. PSYOP objectives included maintaining maximum psychological pressure on enemy forces, Viet Cong families, and civilians under VC control. Psychological operations promoted disaffection, induced rallying and surrendering, and lowered morale and combat effectiveness of main force units. Psychological operations were also directed at the Vietnamese population to create a psychological wedge between enemy local forces and the populace. The civilian population was encouraged to identify, locate, and report members of the VC Infrastructure and to induce them to rally. Emphasis was placed on decentralized operations, exploitation of enemy vulnerabilities, and face-to-face communications with the civilian populace.

(b) Pacification psychological operations. Pacification psychological operations were conducted in support of the 1970 Self-Defense and Self-Development Plans and the 1971 Community Defense and Local Development Plan. These operations were designed to increase the public awareness of GVN pacification programs, develop greater confidence in the GVN's growing effectiveness, and increase participation in pacification and development programs among the indigenous populace.

(c) Psychological operations in support of redeployment. With the incremental redeployment of US military forces from Vietnam, psychological campaigns were executed to parlay these redeployments into psychological advantages over the enemy by concentrating on enhancing the GVN's image as a proud and independent government increasingly capable of standing on its own two feet. G5, II FFORCEV, initiated a Territorial Forces Popularization campaign designed to enhance the image of Regional and Popular Forces in the eyes of the people and to bolster the morale of the RF/PF units. In addition, a special family of posters, leaflets, and handbills were developed to psychologically prepare the Vietnamese population for the withdrawal of US units from an active combat role in MR 3.

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(d) Special campaigns. Special psychological campaigns were conducted as follows:

1 Rome Plow operations. In conjunction with each major land clearing project, a special PSYOP campaign was conducted to publicize the benefits to be obtained by the local population in terms of added security and more available land for cultivation. Over 150,000 leaflets were disseminated in local areas in support of these campaigns. Face-to-face communications and ground broadcasts highlighted the campaigns.

2 Resource denial operations. Special leaflets concerning anti-taxation and VC supply themes were developed and disseminated in areas of heavy VC taxation and extortion. These operations were targeted on areas of lumbering activities, due to the high incidence of VC support and taxation among woodcutters.

(e) Level of effort. In support of these operations, over 300 million leaflets were disseminated in MR 3 by OPCON units, 9th Special Operations Squadron (SOS), and 112th VNAF Squadron. The combined aerial and ground loudspeaker efforts of OPCON units and support from the 9th SOS exceeded 3100 hours of speaker time.

(2) Civil Affairs. The major thrust of civil affairs during this reporting period concentrated on the Vietnamization of military civic action, continued support to province advisory teams, and improvement in the Community Relations program.

(a) Military civic action. With the redeployment of US military forces, increased emphasis was placed on completing military civic actions already underway and encouraging ARVN units to assume responsibility for future projects. Likewise, only short term, high impact projects which could be completed in 90 days were initiated. A total of 191 projects were completed during the period. The major Civic Action project continued to be medical assistance to civilians. During the period, 53,161 civilians received medical care from MEDCAPS conducted by OPCON units. The high of 13,483 patients in 372 MEDCAPS in November, compared to the low of 5,352 patients in 90 MEDCAPS in April, reflected the downward trend caused by withdrawal of US forces.

(b) Province support. The 2d Civil Affairs Company continued its support and assistance to Province Advisory Teams throughout MR 3. At the beginning of the period, a platoon was attached to each Province Team and to the Municipal Team at Vung Tau. During the period, the platoon at Vung Tau was withdrawn due to the completion of the pacification in that area. In April, the platoon at Tay Ninh was withdrawn due to lack of material support. The major emphasis by the 2d Civil Affairs Company was on aiding local populations in helping themselves through their own Vietnamese agencies.

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(c) Community Relations. Despite occasional, isolated incidents, there was no clear evidence of a serious breakdown in US/Vietnamese relations in any part of MR 3 during the period. Good relations between US personnel and the Vietnamese were due to the dramatic and highly visible contributions made by US forces in providing security and stability to the region. Considerable goodwill was generated by a plethora of Civic action projects carried out by US units. With the withdrawal of US forces and the potential loss of goodwill as a by-product of past contributions, emphasis was placed on initiating a positive and deliberate program to maintain good relations. Community Relations Councils were organized at all installations where the troop populations exceeded 600 men. These councils served as a forum to discuss community relations problems and to recommend positive programs to foster friendship.

g. Civil Operations and Rural Development Support

(1) General. The period was one of several great challenges. Foremost was the untimely death of the illustrious General Do Cao Tri at the height of the Cambodian offensive, and the assumption of command of III Corps and Military Region 3 by General Nguyen Van Minh, who retained responsibility for Saigon and the Capital Military District. The period saw the 1970 Pacification Campaign come to a successful conclusion. The period also saw the beginnings of the 1971 Campaigns - both Pacification and Presidential. Finally, the period was marked with a significant increase in the security responsibilities of the Territorial Forces as Free World Forces departed and ARVN fought in Cambodia. This was highlighted by ARVN battalions being placed OPCON to the Province Chief of Phuoc Long and one US squadron, 2/11 ACR, being placed OPCON to the Province Chief of Hau Nghia - a most significant first in this region. Lowering of the US profile, including CORDS personnel, began in earnest.

(2) Pacification and Development.

(a) Rural development, especially the economic aspects, progressed during November, while enemy activity remained low throughout the region. The 1970 Supplemental Pacification and Development Campaign began on 1 November, and it was conducted as a special campaign to achieve fully the 1970 goals and to create a bridge across to the 1971 campaign. Rice harvesting, lumbering and increased employment in the rubber plantations highlighted the rural economy. The dissenters in the cities kept a low profile, but their activities portended a future of unrest.

(b) The year ended with reasons for optimism as the Supplementary Pacification and Development Campaign provided additional impetus to progress. An especially noteworthy achievement in land reform occurred as the Land-to-the-Tiller program moved forward to 20,000 hectares distributed toward an end of February goal of 28,300 hectares. Territorial Forces were more than holding their own as kill ratios showed improvement. The significant influence the Commanding General, III Corps and MR 3, and his staff were having on getting Vietnamese officials in the field involved in their programs was encouraging.

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(c) January of 1971 was a nervous month, as the annual speculation about possible enemy attacks during Tet was fed by enemy rumor propaganda. However, the period passed with few enemy incidents. Planning for 1971 became the other main preoccupation of RVN officials at region and province, with the results suggesting that US advisors in many functional areas would be redundant in the near future. Although the year-end doldrums of previous years were not apparent, the beginning of the year did show a marked decrease in vigor in the PHUNG HOANG and Chieu Hoi programs. Nevertheless, the momentum generated throughout 1970 carried over into January, and significant progress continued. The Vietnamese officials in MR 3 were beginning to look to the new year and its challenges with more confidence and self-sufficiency than had been observed in past years. Typical of this confidence was the professional quality of 1971 planning displayed by commanders and staffs at region and in most provinces.

(d) During the month of February, MR 3 was engaged in a multiple effort to complete the four-month Supplementary Pacification and Development Campaign, prepare for the implementation of the 1971 campaign, and to conduct Operation Dong Khoi (Start Together). Phase I of Operation Dong Khoi (10-24 February 1971), which involved simultaneous attacks on VC/VCI targets throughout all districts in MR 3 by all available forces, highlighted the activities of the month. The VC/VCI were forced to react to RVN tactics, with the result that enemy losses were doubled and terrorism was reduced by 50 percent. Development programs reflected gradual progress as the Supplementary Campaign drew to a close.

(e) During the month of March, Dong Khoi, Phase II, kept enemy local forces off-balance and further reduced enemy capabilities to conduct operations. This caused the rural areas to remain quiet while MR 3 ARVN units were committed in Cambodia. Additionally, the operation proved that Territorial Forces are capable of operating in the field for extended periods of time without extensive air support and other US assistance. The "Formidable Five" study was initiated to focus attention and resources on the five most insecure districts in MR 3 - Trang Bang, Phu Hoa, Long Thanh, Xuan Loc, and Dat Do, where the influence of the Communists is deeply rooted.

(f) Phase III of Operation Dong Khoi achieved moderate success during April. It was characterized by improvements in planning and targeting of the VCI over Phase I and II, and vigorous efforts to eliminate small enemy base areas. Also, economic activity continued to improve during the month, as it had throughout the reporting period.

### (3) Territorial Security.



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(a) Training. Five 15-man Vietnamese Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) were formed and trained during this reporting period. MTTs supplement the unit refresher training program for Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF). Training of RF/PF units was initiated on 8 February 1971. The MTTs are adequately trained and conduct effective instruction. US training of RF/PF was expanded by assigning training sponsorship to four additional companies of the 1st Cav Div (AM) on 18 January 1971. Five US companies trained six RF companies and 380 PF platoons for a total of 8788 personnel during the period 1 November 1970 to 15 March 1971, when the program terminated. The training was tailored to the requirements of the individual units. Marksmanship, tactics, mine and booby trap detection and neutralization, leadership and motivation were emphasized in the training. The First Team Academy, 1st Cav Div (AM), conducted three 10-day classes for PF platoon leaders. During the period 1-28 February 153 PF platoon leaders were trained. The First Team Academy also trained approximately 25 Vietnamese Mobile Advisory Teams (VMAT) and 10 FWMAF MAT personnel from each province during March and April on mine and booby trap detection and neutralization. A four-hour in-place training course was conducted for each RF company by MATs. The program is continuing for PF platoons. Fifty-nine VMATs were formed, trained, and employed within MR 3. These VMATs can effectively train PF, Peoples Self-Defense Force (PSDF) and, to a limited extent, RF units. They are concentrating on village and hamlet defense and the training of PSDF. FWMAF MATs were reduced from 136 teams to 109 during this period. The three ARVN division training centers within MR 3 initiated a refresher training program for RF units, as well as expanding the leadership training for RF officers and NCOs.

(b) Operations. The most significant territorial operation during this period was the Dong Khoi (Start Together) Operation. This campaign employed over 60 percent of the available territorial security forces against enemy targets. Included in the objectives of the operation were improved coordination for cross-boundary operations between subsectors and sectors, integration of all intelligence agencies, and employment of all forces available to the sector (Regional Force/Popular Force/Peoples Self Defense Forces/National Police/National Police Field Force and Provincial Reconnaissance Units) in simultaneous coordinated operations against the enemy. The initial concept of this operation required the sectors to base operational plans solely on their organic forces and resources. This approach was necessary to prove to the Territorial Forces that they had the necessary training, equipment, manpower and ability to find, engage and destroy the enemy.

(c) Logistics. During the November 1970 to April 1971 period the logistics system experienced moderate improvement. Equipment and supply shortages still existed as a result of limited funds and the lower priority afforded RF/PF. The shortages were compounded by increased ARVN and RF/PF operations during the period. However, shortages did not impair seriously the mission of the RF or PF.

(d) Organization.

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1 During the reporting period the first increment of territorial artillery was deployed in MR 3. A total of seven sector Artillery Command Sections and twenty-six territorial artillery, two-gun 105mm howitzer platoons were deployed in seven provinces: Tay Ninh, Long An, Bien Hoa, Binh Duong, Binh Long, Phuoc Long, and Hau Nghia. Territorial artillery deployment produced two important results. Nearly three battalions of division artillery were released from the territorial support role for mobile operations in the clearing zone and in Cambodia. In seven provinces the Sector Commander's AO was, for the most part, covered by his own territorial artillery platoons. Finally, the Province Chief had an artillery officer assigned to his staff and a permanent organic fire support coordination center within the Sector Tactical Operations Center.

2 During this period, five RF battalion headquarters were inactivated, three from Gia Dinh Province and two from Bien Hoa Province. The activation of three new battalion headquarters, one each in Hau Nghia, Tay Ninh and Binh Duong Provinces, provided a total of six RF battalion headquarters in MR 3. Five new RF group headquarters were activated, replacing the inactivated RF battalions. MR 3 is now authorized 71 RF group headquarters.

(e) PSDF. The continuing pressure of organization and training goals caused a serious problem. Low level leadership was forced to either show improvement in achieving these goals or suffer the wrath of their superiors. This pressure caused inflated statistics that provided a misrepresentation at the national level where decisions were made based on the reported strength and development of the PSDF program. Two courses of action were taken to correct this situation.

1 Complaints from subordinate headquarters were solicited and forwarded to the higher echelons when justifiable. At the same time, accuracy in reporting procedures was emphasized.

2 A PSDF survey designed to compare achievement statistics at the various levels of command was directed. Based on the results of this study, factual data will be available to verify the complaints. The purpose of these corrective action measures is to re-evaluate the present administration of the PSDF program. It is expected that the re-evaluation will result in re-directed emphasis on other aspects of the PSDF program that will enhance, rather than degrade, the program.

(4) Chieu Hoi.

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(a) The number of returnees totaled 1,319 for the period 1 November 1970 to 30 April 1971. The returnee classifications were: military 593; political 407; others 319. The returnee breakdown by province and autonomous city was: Bien Hoa 135; Binh Duong 126; Binh Long 50; Binh Tuy 78; Gia Dinh 68; Hau Nghia 247; Long An 97; Long Khanh 90; Phuoc Long 176; Phuoc Tuy 38; Tay Ninh 160; Vung Tau 12; and Saigon 42.

(b) The decline that started in June 1970 continued throughout this period. The rate is now approaching the all time low which was experienced during the 1968 Tet offensive. The two main reasons for the decline were reduced military operations and a diminishing VC population.

(c) The Ministry of Chieu Hoi initiated the Ve Nguon (Return to Origin) Campaign on 4 December 1970, and it was terminated on 28 February 1971. The campaign was designed to appeal to the VC through various propaganda media. In spite of vigorous execution of the campaign, the returnee rate continued downward.

(d) There were 183 prisoners of war granted Hoi Chanh status. All were given political orientation at the Regional Chieu Hoi Center. On 19 March 1971, 133 of the ex-POWs were released and 50 requested admission to, and were accepted by, the vocational training center.

(e) The Chieu Hoi National Training Center graduated 623 students from classes in carpentry, automotive mechanics, housewiring, plumbing, driving and tailoring. Currently there are 935 students enrolled in these classes.

(f) The Ministries of Chieu Hoi and Interior promulgated a circular on 18 February 1971 placing seven-man Armed Propaganda Teams (APT) under the operational control of District Intelligence Operations Coordination Centers (DIOCCs). It is too early to evaluate the program; however, it is receiving emphasis by the RVN and advisors. It appears at this time that the program will be effective.

(5) Development.

(a) During the last of 1970, some of the early plantings of the high yielding varieties of rice reached maturity and were harvested. Expansion of the percentage of the total rice land planted to the high yielding varieties continued, and an acceleration of this expansion was evident in the second crop of the 1970-71 growing season. The new varieties, IR-20 and IR-22, have been enthusiastically accepted and seed multiplication was accomplished to such an extent that there should be no shortage of this choice seed for next year.

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(b) Experimental planting of grain sorghum produced varied results. Some plots produced exceptionally well, while others were failures. Failures are being analyzed and there is every indication that grain sorghum can be produced profitably. Farmer acceptance of sorghum can best be described as cautious. Unfortunately, lack of knowledge and improper cultural practices resulted in reduced crops. Programs and procedures have been initiated that will correct some of these problems, and knowledge and experience gained will be utilized next planting season.

(c) Progress was made in fulfilling the self-government goals. Participation in local government was strengthened through the election of village and hamlet governments which operate in 99 percent of all active villages and hamlets in the region. The personnel strength of village and hamlet governments continued to be good, with 99 percent of authorized village and 96 percent of authorized hamlet positions filled.

(d) The Rural Development Credit Program was introduced in November 1970 as a new facet of Village Self-Development designed to provide financial loans to rural citizens. These loans were to provide financial assistance for income-producing projects. The funding of public utility projects was continued on a grant basis. Villages, through their Village Councils, were given the option to participate in the Rural Development Credit Program for 1971. Many villages decided to participate, while others, more interested in public utility projects, refused to set aside funds for the credit program.

(e) Progress continued at a satisfactory rate on road construction and upgrading programs, although the effort available from US engineer units was reduced by the standdown of four and one-half engineer battalions during the period.

(f) On the lines of communication (highway) program, 98 percent of the 1970 goal was completed by 1 April 1971. US engineer units continued to work on the 1970 project (QL 20) with an estimated completion date in August 1971. No 1971 LOC projects were undertaken by these units. US contractors are continuing work on QL 15, HL 232, and the North Capital Bypass. They have also made new 1971 starts on QL 1 (Bien Hoa to North Capital Bypass) and on QL 13 (Phu Cuong to Saigon). The ARVN engineer units are continuing their 1970 project on QL 1 (Gia Ray to MR 2/3 border).

(g) The 1970 secondary road construction program planned goal of 172 km was completed by March 1971, and the 1971 program was 15 percent complete by 30 April.

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(h) The tactical roads program executed by TRAC and III Corps Combat Engineer units made excellent progress during the period. The upgrading of LTL 13 across Tay Ninh and Binh Long provinces and into Phuoc Long province is being accomplished by a joint effort of ARVN and US engineer forces. The ARVN engineer forces will continue to work on the project through the rainy season, with the US engineers expected to complete a small remaining portion during the next dry season. ARVN engineer forces have completed the upgrading of a large portion of their tactical road projects in Long An Province.

(i) One of the important efforts toward rural development has been to bring potable water supply to villages and districts where there was previously little or none available. The RVN National Water Supply Directorate has made great strides in promoting a system whereby villages and hamlets share in the cost of constructing or rehabilitating water systems. The response to this has been good. Village authorities have shown an interest and have generated local enthusiasm. This has contributed not only toward better health but also toward building better community spirit. In some cases, however, projects have not been based on the most practical engineering approach. To correct this, National Water Supply personnel, along with US advisors, continued to conduct on-the-job training for Vietnamese in the techniques of deep water well drilling, construction, maintenance, deep-well turbine pump installation, water distribution systems, trouble shooting in the field and management support. During the period this program resulted in six water systems completed in Long An Province and twenty-two deep water wells completed throughout MR 3.

(j) The Land-to-the-Tiller Law was promulgated on 26 March 1970. The implementing RVN Decree was issued on 5 June 1970. Training began for province and village personnel in July and land distribution began in August 1970. In November, two significant actions were taken. First, a representative from the Ministry of Land Reform was made responsible for the program in MR 3. The representative was delegated sufficient authority to take corrective action on the spot on many problems. The technical improvements in the province land affairs operations were significant. The second action taken was the appointment of an advisor at each district and in each province, who would exercise advisory responsibility for Land Reform. These two actions, plus command emphasis, have made a success of this new program.

#### h. Artillery

(1) General. Units of II FFORCEV Artillery and 23d Artillery Group continued to provide heavy and medium artillery coverage throughout MR 3. The majority of heavy artillery units were deployed along the Cambodian-Vietnam border to support ARVN cross-border operations. The remaining heavy and some medium units were deployed in Long Khanh, Binh Tuy, and Phuoc Tuy Provinces to provide support to 1st Cav Div (AM), 2d Bde (PROV) (Sep), 25th Inf Div, and the 1st ATF. One medium battalion was deployed in Long Khanh, Binh Tuy, and Phuoc Tuy Provinces in a territorial artillery support role.

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(2) Tactical Developments. Current locations of 23d Arty Gp units are shown at Inclosure 9. Heavy artillery coverage for MR 3 is portrayed graphically at Inclosure 10.

(a) Cross-border fires in support of ARVN operations continued to be a primary mission of II FFORCEV Arty and 23d Arty Gp during the reporting period.

(b) The reporting period was again characterized by frequent repositioning of artillery in order to provide the required support for maneuver units. A constant state of readiness insured that all tasks were effectively and expeditiously accomplished.

(c) HQ, 23d Arty Gp, moved its headquarters from Phu Loi to Long Binh, RVN, on 18 January 1971. HQ, II FFORCEV Arty, was inactivated and its mission was assumed by 23d Arty Gp.

(d) Task Organization of 23d Arty Gp effective 18 January 1971:

HQB, 23d Arty Gp  
7-8th FA  
2-12th FA  
6-27th FA  
2-32d FA  
2-35th FA  
5-42d FA  
5-2d ADA  
6th FA Det (Radar)  
264th FA Det (Radar)  
265th FA Det (Radar)  
277th FA Det (Radar)  
278th FA Det (Radar)  
234th FA Det (Radar)

(e) During the reporting period, two self-propelled medium battalions, 1st Bn, 27th Arty, and 2d Bn, 35th Arty, were redeployed. A third battalion, 5th Bn (AW) (SP), 2d Arty, completed drawdown on 27 April 1971. This unit is scheduled for final redeployment in June 1971. Battery D (MG), 71st Arty, was reassigned to 23d Arty Gp as a separate battery on 1 April 1971. The primary missions of this battery are to provide perimeter security at 23d Arty Gp fire support bases and escort convoys throughout MR 3.

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(3) Intelligence

(a) AN/MPQ-4A Countermortar Radar (CMR).

1 The six AN/MPQ-4A radar detachments assigned to II FFORCEV Arty at the beginning of the reporting period were inactivated during November 1970.

2 Two AN/MPQ-4A radars remain in MR 3. (See Inclosure 11)

(b) AN/TPS-25A Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR)

1 Operational effectiveness. The AN/TPS-25A Radar continued to be successfully employed in MR 3. During the reporting period a total of 5696 hostile sightings were reported; of these sightings, 1991 were engaged by artillery fire.

2 Radar Locations. During the reporting period there were 14 relocations of the AN/TPS-25A radars for improved ground surveillance coverage of critical areas of MR 3 and portions of Cambodia. The priority for coverage has been to the Cambodian border area and approaches to Saigon. The location of the 10 AN/TPS-25A GSR's in II FFORCEV as of 30 April 1971 is depicted at Inclosure 12.

3 Location. During the period there was one relocation of the CSR III. As of 30 April 1971, this radar is located at Fire Support Base Langvard (vic XT075895).

(c) Integrated Observation System (IOS).

1 On 22 March 1971, 23d Arty Gp received two IOS. Crew training by NETT commences on 24 March 1971. The systems were deployed on 27 March 1971 and 3 April 1971.

2 Operational Effectiveness. By the end of the reporting period the IOS had only limited success in target detection; however, the equipment is considered to have excellent potential. As more experience with the operation and employment of the equipment is acquired, the effectiveness of the IOS is expected to increase.

3 IOS Locations. Integrated Observation Systems were deployed at Fire Support Bases Blue (vic XT285290) and Katum (vic XT333903).

(4) Survey.

(a) Extension of Survey Control. During the reporting period, II FFORCEV Arty survey personnel established 9 fourth-order survey control points within MR 3.

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(b) Control Point Recovery. During the reporting period, II FFORCEV Arty survey personnel successfully recovered 22 survey control points. Seventeen points were found to be destroyed.

(c) Survey Quality Control. The II FFORCEV Arty Survey Quality Control Team visited five artillery battalions of II FFORCEV Arty in an effort to evaluate the ability of each battalion's survey section to accomplish its mission. Reports were submitted to each battalion for information and appropriate corrective action.

(d) 23d Arty Gp survey capability. Since the inactivation of II FFORCEV Arty, the sole remaining survey capabilities of 23d Arty Gp are in the assigned battalions.

1 Four AN/TPS-25A radar detachments were reassigned to 23d Arty from the 164th Avn Gp:

- a 268th FA Det (Radar), effective 2 January 1971.
- b 267th FA Det (Radar), effective 16 March 1971.
- c 269th FA Det (Radar), effective 1 February 1971.
- d 264th FA Det (Radar), effective 16 February 1971.

2 Two AN/TPS-25A radar detachments within II FFORCEV were inactivated during the reporting period:

- a 265th FA Det (Radar), on 13 March 1971.
- b 273d FA Det (Radar), on 13 April 1971.

(e) Improvement of Radar Effectiveness.

1 Radar Quality Control Inspection Team. In a continuing effort to upgrade the operational and maintenance standards of radar detachments in II FFORCEV, a Radar Quality Control/Inspection Team, consisting of a qualified radar Warrant Officer and a maintenance technician, conducted inspections of 17 AN/TPS-25A radar sites and six ANMPQ-4A sites. II FFORCEV Arty personnel conducted all of the AN/MPQ-4A inspections and seven AN/TPS-25A inspections.

2 In an effort to improve the operational level of radar generators, II FFORCEV Arty established a consolidated radar generator PLL/maintenance shop in January 1971. The operation has proven successful and 23d Arty Gp is continuing the program.



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(f) Camp Sentinel Radar (CSR) III.

1 On 7 February, after a short period of crew training by a new equipment team (NETT), 23d Arty Gp deployed a CSR III, an experimental ground surveillance radar.

2 Operational Effectiveness. During the period 8 February - 30 April 1971, a total of 303 hostile sightings were reported; 210 of these sightings were engaged by artillery fire.

1. Communications.

Significant changes in communications in support of II FFORCEV operations during the reporting period are outlined below:

(1) On 1 November 1970, a twelve-channel VHF system was established between Plantation and Di An in support of the 11th ACR. This support included common user voice, sole user voice, and teletype communications.

(2) On 2 November 1970, courier service was implemented to Camp Frenzell-Jones in support of elements of the 25th Inf Div.

(3) During the period 3-22 November 1970, photographic and public address support was provided to redeploying units of the 25th Inf Div located at Camp Frenzell-Jones.

(4) On 8 November 1970, radio teletype support was furnished to 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div, Forward CP at Xuan Loc.

(5) On 12 November 1970, all Hurricane telephone service to the command group, II FFORCEV, was discontinued. This eliminated redundant means of communications in consonance with the Communications Austerity Program.

(6) On 18 November 1970, all remaining circuits in support of 25th Inf Div at Cu Chi were consolidated on one twelve-channel VHF system and the other system was deactivated.

(7) During the period 22 November - 8 December 1970, a mobile MARS station was operated at Cu Chi in support of the remaining elements of the 25th Inf Div.

(8) On 26 November 1970, radio teletype support at Cu Chi was discontinued.

(9) During the period 3-7 December 1970, public address support was provided to redeploying units of the 25th Inf Div at Cu Chi.

(10) On 5 December 1970, the last multi-channel VHF system from Plantation to Cu Chi in support of the 25th Inf Div was discontinued.

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(20) During the period 21-31 January 1971, the sixty circuits remaining on seven multi-channel VHF systems operated by 53d Sig Bn (Corps) were individually replaced by parallel Corps Area Communication System (CACS) circuits operated by 2d Sig Gp, 1st Sig Bde. When all circuits on a 53d Sig Bn system were replaced, that system was deactivated.

(21) During the period 22-24 January 1971, public address support was furnished to Bearcat in support of RTAVF ceremonies.

(22) During the period 1-3 February 1971, the communications control facility operated by 53d Sig Bn at Plantation was taken over by 39th Sig Bn, 2d Sig Gp, 1st Sig Bde.

(23) On 3 February 1971, a II FFORCEV Forward TOC was established at Tay Ninh East. The FM and single sideband radio teams previously committed were reinforced with a radio teletype team. The entire light signal contingency team was therefore committed. In addition, two dedicated sole-user voice circuits were installed from Plantation to Tay Ninh East and a special air courier was flown from Tay Ninh East to Sanford Army Air Field by 74th RAC. This air courier was met by a special II FFORCEV motor courier.

(24) On 10 February 1971, all wire, cable and patch facilities formerly operated by 53d Sig Bn were assumed by 39th Sig Bn. This included the Hurricane switchboard and all wiring and telephone instruments associated with it, the Plantation Base Camp defense wire net, the 1A1 telephone key system and loudspeaker-intercom system in II FFORCEV Command Building, the Hurricane Patch Facility, and all public address requirements.

(25) On 11 February 1971, a new regulation, jointly written by inspectors from 303d Radio Research Battalion, II FFORCEV, and USARV, was promulgated to all OPCON units. This regulation furnished standards and guidance for personnel engaged in the fabrication, assembly and operation of tactical communications and cryptographic facilities in II FFORCEV.

(26) On 5 March 1971, all communications support to the 11th ACR at Di An was discontinued due to redeployment of the unit.

(27) On 5 March 1971, all communications support for 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div, was reterminated from Xuan Loc to Camp Frenzell-Jones due to relocation of the unit.

(28) On 15 March 1971, all FM radio requirements were transferred from 53d Sig Bn to HQ, II FFORCEV. This was accomplished by attaching an FM radio section, composed of thirteen men plus equipment, to the II FFORCEV Signal Office.

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(29) On 20 March 1971, radio teletype support to the 1st ATF at Nui Dat and the RTAVF at Bearcat was discontinued. This eliminated redundant means of communications in accordance with the Communications Austerity Program. These units continue to be served by common user teletype service.

(30) On 22 March 1971, AUTOSEVOCOM service to the 18th Div Combat Assistance Team at Xuan Loc was discontinued.

(31) On 23 March 1971, a II FFORCEV forward communications center was established at Tay Ninh East. This communications center was used to pass FLASH messages concerning ARVN cross-border operations in Cambodia.

(32) On 25 March 1971, all communications centers, MARS and radio teletype missions were assumed by 39th Sig Bn from 53d Sig Bn.

(33) On 28 March 1971, AUTOSEVOCOM service to the 5th Div Combat Assistance Team at Lai Khe was discontinued.

(34) On 30 March 1971, all communications support for 1st Cav Div (AM) was reterminated from Phuoc Vinh to Bien Hoa due to relocation of the unit.

(35) On 31 March 1971, the sole user voice circuits from 5th, 18th and 25th Divs CATs were reterminated from III Corps TOC in Bien Hoa to Hurricane switchboard. Advisors in the III Corps TOC were provided two long locals off Hurricane concurrently with this retermination.

(36) On 1 April 1971, II FFORCEV established a station in the III Corps Command Net (FM secure).

(37) On 7 April 1971, all communications support to 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div, was discontinued due to redeployment of the unit.

(38) On 10 April 1971, the 5th, 18th and 25th DCATs entered the II FFORCEV radio teletype Operations and Intelligence Net. In addition, the land line teletype circuits were rehomed to the II FFORCEV main communications center via Long Binh and Phu Lam relays.

(39) On 10 April 1971, the 3d Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM), took over all communications support formerly provided 1st Cav Div due to redeployment of the division.

(40) On 10 April 1971, the 53d Sig Bn went to zero strength.

(41) On 24 April 1971, a new Air/Motor courier schedule was implemented to include DCATs and Province Senior Advisors throughout MR 3.

(42) During the period 28-30 April 1971, public address support was provided to Headquarters, II FFORCEV, for the Color Furling Ceremony.

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j. Information.

(1) During the reporting period, three issues of "The Hurricane" were published, two being quarterly issues and the third being the final issue. They emphasized Pacification and Vietnamese culture in Military Region 3. There were feature articles ranging from the Vietnamese Ao Dai to the press in Vietnam. The last issue carried reprints of early magazines.

(2) The August 1970 issue of "The Hurricane" was chosen as the number 1 magazine in the 1970 USARV Journalism Award competition. In world wide competition "The Hurricane" was rated number 2.

(3) The Information Office continued to prepare and send press and hometown releases to newspapers. There were 71 press releases and 32 hometown news releases during the period.

(4) The radio/TV section continued to prepare a daily press clipping book and present a nightly round-up of national and international news to the Commanding General and his staff during the evening briefing.

(5) The Information Office continued to conduct press update briefings for civilian news media. Briefings featured the regular briefers from G-2, G-3, and CORDS, presenting an update of the MR 3 situation. Attending the briefing for the past six months were 65 press representatives. Briefings were received extremely well and relations with the press remained excellent during the reporting period.

(6) During the period 525 photo assignments were arranged and completed.

k. Engineer Support.

(1) General: Engineer support during this period included a wide range of combat and operational support missions. The major effort was expanded on construction of fire support bases for heavy artillery units, airfield rehabilitation and the Tactical Roads Program. Most significant during this period was the completion of FSB's Blue, Lanyard II and Katum. FSB Lanyard II was the first "model" fire support base. Major rehabilitation of Katum Airfield and significant work at Thien Ngon, Loc Ninh and Bu Dop was accomplished in preparation for Dry Season operations. Facilities to support helicopter operations were constructed at Tay Ninh, Thien Ngon and Katum.

(2) LOC Program: The 159th Eng Gp, ARVN engineers and the civilian corporation RMK-BRJ were engaged in restoring principal roads in MR 3. The 159th Eng Gp has completed their work on QL-1 and TL-2A/LTL-1A and is 93% complete on the QL-20 project. RMK-BRJ is 73% complete with its project on QL-15.

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(3) Tactical Road Program: Work was begun on the Tactical Road Program in December 1970, and as of 30 April 1971, 384 km of road have been completed. This includes TL-4 from Tay Ninh to Katum, Route 309 from FSB Buttons to FSB Snuffy, Routes 333, 334, 335 and 336 in Binh Tuy Province and work on farm-to-market roads in Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces.

1. Inspector General.

During the reporting period, the Inspector General completed five inspections and conducted three investigations.

m. Staff Judge Advocate.

(1) During the reporting period, personnel of the Staff Judge Advocate Section continued to make visits to the subordinate units in the field to provide legal assistance and guidance in the handling of military justice matters.

(2) Seven general courts-martial and four BCD special courts-martial trials were conducted during the period reported.

(3) The Office of the Staff Judge Advocate continued to provide legal support for post, camp, and station functions.

(4) Claims processing remained at a high level during the period.

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2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned - Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(1) Legal Requirements.

(a) Observation. Unit Commanders were unfamiliar with legal requirements for searches and seizures.

(b) Evaluation. During the period November 1970 - January 1971, the number of drug offenses for which charges were preferred increased rapidly. Unit Commanders, however, were not prepared to handle this type of case, nor were they familiar with legal requirements for searches and seizures. Additionally, few individuals had enough experience with drugs and drug influenced behavior to detect the drug usage in their units. Search and seizure pamphlets were published for the edification of unit commanders and guidelines for processing drug cases were developed. This reduced the time consumed in the average case of 60-80 days to approximately 40 days. The establishment of a laboratory facility at Long Binh in April 1971 is expected to further expedite the disposition of these cases.

(c) Recommendation: A continuing education program must be prepared, as well as review and publication of reference material on a recurring basis, to insure that unit commanders remain knowledgeable.

(d) Command Action: Letters of instruction on search and seizures and on the processing of drug cases were distributed to all commanders. They are periodically up-dated and re-distributed to insure that all commanders are kept current.

(2) Narcotics.

(a) Observation: Aggressive prosecution of marijuana users tended to increase heroin use.

(b) Evaluation: Marijuana cases were tried to the exclusion of other types of drugs primarily because marijuana is easier to detect and more difficult to hide than the narcotics. Aggressive prosecution of marijuana offenses, however, tended to increase heroin use, since the latter drug is more difficult to detect, and marijuana users switched to heroin to avoid discovery. Emphasis has now been placed on the detection and elimination of narcotics users rather than users of marijuana. This should continue to be the approved policy until the hard drug usage is under control.

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(c) Recommendation. Every effort must be made to stamp out the use of hard drugs. Use of marijuana must not be condoned, but users should not be aggressively prosecuted until hard drug usage is under control.

(d) Command Action. Since the use of heroin has increased, marijuana is less actively pursued. Emphasis has been placed on the detection and elimination of narcotic users.

b. Intelligence.

(1) Radar Generators.

(a) Observation. Excessive AN/TPS-25A non-operational time was experienced due to generator failure.

(b) Evaluation. It had previously been recommended that increased emphasis be placed on operational and organizational maintenance for all generators serving as power sources for radar sets. This recommendation remains valid; however, the operational results of increased emphasis on organizational maintenance was insignificant.

(c) Recommendation. That a consolidated radar generator PLL/maintenance section be formed at parent unit level to perform organizational maintenance of radar detachment generators.

(d) Command Action. A consolidated radar generator PLL/maintenance section has been established at Group level.

(2) Integrated Observation System (IOS).

(a) Observation. Vision difficulties with the Night Observation Devices (NOD).

(b) Evaluation. At those fire support bases where smudge pots are burned at night to illuminate the perimeter, it was discovered that the heat waves generated by the fire causes extreme distortion of vision when one is looking through the NOD. It was also discovered that where artificial illumination, such as electric lighting, is used to light up the perimeter, vision is not adversely affected.

(c) Recommendation. That prior to employing the IOS, consideration be given to the means of artificial illumination being employed along the perimeter.

(d) Command Action. When considering the employment of the IOS, the type of artificial illumination at fire support bases is a factor.

(3) Targeting Procedures.

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(a) Observation. With increased emphasis on the management of artillery ammunition, improvement was needed in targeting procedures.

(b) Evaluation. Expanding the amount of information available to the target analyst was paramount to improving targeting data. Extensive efforts were made to ensure that all intelligence available within the II FFORCEV Headquarters was routed through the target analysts. The net results of these efforts was that the volume of intelligence information available to the target analysts was doubled. However, many intelligence reports provided merely a grid and a radius of accuracy to indicate enemy presence in a circular area. Because this radius reported was generally greater than 250 meters, no discrete target could be developed from these reports. Consequently, the individual reports were of little benefit to the target analysts. However, an analytical approach was developed to collate the various reports of enemy information to obtain a density chart reflecting the most probable location of the enemy.

(c) Recommendation. That maximum emphasis be placed upon the channeling of all available intelligence information to the target analysts, who can refine this information to ensure that discrete targets are developed, thereby preventing large expenditures of ammunition without adequate justification.

(d) Command Action. The Fire Support Element maintains close liaison with intelligence agencies to ensure that all available intelligence information is routed through the target analysts.

#### (4) Cross-border Visual Reconnaissance

(a) Observation. Untimely response to enemy Cambodian activities detected by USAF and reported through USAF channels, plus the almost sole use of unobserved artillery cross-border fire, required employment of an improved VR program.

(b) Evaluation. In order to capitalize on intelligence reports, engage lucrative targets as they are detected, and conduct subsequent reconnaissance of nightly unobserved fires, an expanded VR program was authorized. An additional benefit of the program was that it enabled the target analysts to recommend an area for effective employment of the VR aircraft on the next day, using the information from messages relating to the current day's cross-border observations.

(c) Recommendation. A cross-border VR program throughout RVN should be established and vigorously pursued in order to improve the ability of the artillery to provide more timely and effective cross-border support. This will greatly assist ARVN operations in Cambodia.



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(d) Command Action. The cross-border VR program has been expanded to include all light observation planes available within MR 3 for cross-border flights. The aviators or the air observers are required to check into a flight following net located at the forward TOC to transmit in-flight spot reports, initiate calls for artillery fire, or request helicopter gunship or TAC Air support.

(5) The YO-3A/INFANT Teams

(a) Observation. The YO-3A Quiet Airplane can vector the INFANT helicopter to the vicinity of a sighting.

(b) Evaluation. The YO-3A and INFANT are compatible as a hunter-killer team. By having the INFANT trail the YO-3A by approximately five kilometers, the YO-3A is able to detect a target, illuminate it with the infrared designator, and call in the INFANT. The INFANT, with its infrared capability, can readily identify the area and engage the target on its first pass.

(c) Recommendation. That the YO-3A and INFANT should work together as a hunter-killer team utilizing their compatible infrared systems.

c. Operations.

(1) Cross-boundary operations within the Military Region must have maximum coordination.

(a) Observation. Primary reason for lack of success in cross-boundary operations in the Dong Khoi Operation was poor coordination between districts/sub-sectors and between provinces/sectors.

(b) Evaluation. Cross-boundary operations planned and conducted by sectors failed if they were not coordinated with the ARVN divisions and FWMAF which had AO's within provinces that included the area in which the cross-boundary operation was to take place. Two overlapping but separate operations were conducted, in some instances, without command coordination.

(c) Recommendation. A combined command group should be set up for each cross-boundary operation.

(2) RF operations lasting for a period of two to three days are most productive.

(a) Observation. During the Dong Khoi Operation, statistics showed that troops reached a peak on a cycle of 2-3 days.

(b) Evaluation. The RF/FF reached a peak after three days because of logistical support and physical limitations. Analyses for 34 days (Phase I and II) of the Dong Khoi Operation clearly shows this trend of peaking on the third day.

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(c) Recommendation. Extended operations involving RF/PF should be conducted for a period not to exceed three days, with a two-day standdown for rest and resupply.

(3) Outposting degrades PSDF effectiveness.

(a) Observation. Once PSDF take up a fixed defensive position, it is very easy for the VC to target the position and prepare detailed plans for its reduction at a time of their own choosing.

(b) Evaluation. On 3100N December 1970, an estimated 10 VC attacked an outpost manned by PF and PSDF personnel. Twenty personnel were killed and fourteen weapons lost before a reaction force could provide assistance. The successful attack on this outpost by a force half the size of the defending force could not have been achieved if basic security precautions had been followed. The PSDF were lulled into a false sense of security by occupying the outpost. The basic concept of the PSDF program requires the PSDF to conduct roving patrols and operate close-in ambush points in order to provide early warning of VC entry into a hamlet or village area, so that RF and PF forces can react in time to deny the VC incursion. No such system of PSDF employment existed in the example cited.

(c) Recommendation. Emphasis must be placed on utilizing the PSDF in a mobile, early warning-type role, avoiding the mistake of placing the PSDF in outposts.

(4) Combined Fire Support Coordination Center (CFSCC).

(a) Observation. Since most of the CFSCC personnel are relatively new and their activities to date have been limited, there is a definite need for continuous improvement of their capabilities.

(b) Evaluation. The recently established CFSCC's execute clearance of fire procedures and plan countermortar/counterrocket programs. Instances of a CFSCC massing fires of territorial artillery, ARVN artillery, and US artillery have been rare. Efforts have been made to improve the capabilities of the CFSCC. In particular, combined inspection teams with officers from III Corps, III Corps Advisory Team, and HMB, 23d Arty Gp, have visited all CFSCCs within MR 3. These visits have resulted in increased emphasis on the importance of these installations, III Corps has made important strides in developing the CFSCC toward full effectiveness. A full Vietnamese training program for CFSCC and the territorial artillery platoons is needed, since the development of CFSCCs throughout MR 3 is essential to the security of the area. As US units continue to redeploy, and as ARVN units range wider in their efforts to defeat the VC/NVA threat, the primary responsibility for coordinating artillery support for the security of the populated areas in MR 3 will rest with the CFSCC. Because adequate artillery will not be available in the foreseeable future to simultaneously support the numerous

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organizations that require fire support, the CFSCC must become the coordinating agency that maximizes the effectiveness of the artillery within each sector, be it US, ARVN, or Territorial Artillery.

(c) Recommendation. Efforts should be directed toward the development of an effective Vietnamese mobile training team, assisted by US artillery as required, which will ensure that each CFSCC attains the operational status and expert ability to provide the full range of fire support coordination for its sector.

(d) Command Action. Two courses of instruction on fire support coordination have been conducted for US Artillery liaison officers and US artillery advisors. A continuing effort is being conducted to upgrade ARVN Artillery fire support coordination at the sector level.

(5) Artillery and Air Strike Warning Control Center (AASWCC).

(a) Observation. AASWCC's are equipped from the organic resources of the units tasked with the additional requirement of providing high-quality personnel to operate these centers.

(b) Evaluation. The two objectives of the AASWCC are: (1) to warn aircraft of artillery fire and airstrikes within or adjacent to the AASWCC's sector; and (2) to provide an emergency communications channel for special high priority aircraft operations and aircraft with an inflight emergency. The personnel and equipment for these essential installations are provided from within the TOE resources of artillery units. Although the units are effectively able to operate an AASWCC, this arrangement is less than satisfactory. Because of the proliferation of helicopters and increasingly competitive demands for use of air space by the artillery, Air Force and Army aviation, extensive requirements for this type of installation can be expected in future combat environments.

(c) Recommendation. A small TOE cellular unit containing all necessary personnel and equipment to operate an AASWCC should be developed. These units could then be attached to US artillery units and deployed as needed. Serious consideration should be given to the development of CONUS-conducted training programs for AASWCC operators.

(d) Command Action. Request for MTOE have been submitted by ARVN to authorize the necessary personnel and equipment to operate AASWCC before the ARVN assume responsibility for these operations.

(6) Employing FA Firing Batteries in Split Configurations.

(a) Observation. Scattered enemy activity, numerous requirements to support widely separated maneuver forces, and the multiple mission assigned to 23d Arty Gp, occasionally demanded that a firing battery be employed as two separate elements.

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(b) Evaluation. Batteries were split only out of tactical necessity when there were no other means to support the scheme of maneuver. When required to split, batteries normally made internal organizational changes, such as increasing the number of personnel in the FDC. This resulted in stretching the battery's supply, maintenance, administrative, and supervisory capabilities. With the reduction in the number of US units in MR 3 and the continued ARVN offensive operations, the occasions which dictate the necessity to adopt the split battery configuration can be expected to increase.

(c) Recommendation. Artillery firing batteries within RVN should be organized and equipped to operate as two independent, separated firing elements for extended periods of time.

(d) Command Action. MTOE updates incorporate equipment and personnel changes to facilitate split configuration operations.

d. Organization. None.

e. Training. Mine and booby trap training.

(1) Observation. Mines and booby traps continued to be the most effective weapon employed by the enemy against Territorial Forces within MR 3. To counter this threat an aggressive training program was conducted during the past two months.

(2) Evaluation. Approximately 35 FWMAF and Vietnamese MAT personnel from each province attended the Booby Trap Training Center at the First Team Academy, 1st Cav Div (AM). A four to five-man training team was formed in each district. Following this instruction, a four-hour training course on mine and booby trap detection and neutralization was conducted for each RF company. This program is continuing for PF platoons. Training is only part of the solution in reducing casualties from mines and booby traps. Command and control and operational techniques are perhaps even more important than training. Excessive casualties often result from too rapid movement and bunching up of personnel on operations.

(3) Recommendation. Mine and booby trap detection and neutralization training should continue to be emphasized in the in-place training program. Vietnamese leaders should be encouraged to employ proper mine and booby trap detection and neutralization procedures on all operations. This is especially important in known booby trapped areas.

f. Logistics.

(1) Initial issue of TOE equipment.

(a) Observation. Initial issue of TOE equipment was the only major difficulty encountered during the activation, training and deployment of the first increment of territorial artillery.

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(b) Evaluation. The status of major items of equipment was reported to the corps artillery headquarters by the division artillery headquarters before deployment and by the sector artillery command sections after deployment. However, the automatic initial issue of equipment does not require follow-up or status reporting through the logistical system. Since there is virtually no coordination between the tactical artillery headquarters and the logistical headquarters, shortages of mission essential equipment were not acted upon.

(c) Recommendation. It is recommended that, for future activation, training and deployment of territorial artillery, a common equipment status reporting system for mission essential items be established for tactical and logistical headquarters. It is further recommended that procedures be developed for tactical follow-up action in case of non-receipt of mission essential initial issue TOE equipment.

(2) Utilization of dedicated USAF C7A aircraft.

(a) Observation. The assignment of one (1) enlisted man per dedicated USAF C7A greatly enhances the utilization of these aircraft.

(b) Evaluation. The mission of the enlisted NCOIC is to monitor all cargo and passengers being transported by the aircraft. This individual flies the mission daily and is responsible for proper loading and off-loading. Additionally, he is a contact man between personnel in the remote fire support bases and the base camp resupply areas. Total tonnage of supplies and numbers of personnel carried increases when a member of the unit being served rides on the airplane.

(c) Recommendation. That an NCO be assigned to each dedicated C7A on a permanent basis to represent the responsible commander.

(d) Command Action. An NCO has been assigned on a permanent basis to each dedicated C7A aircraft.

(3) Transportation of ice cream and other perishables to isolated field locations.

(a) Observation. There is no issue-item currently available which will permit the satisfactory transportation of perishables, particularly ice cream, to the field locations.

(b) Evaluation. Ice cream issued for field units invariably melts between time of issue and arrival at the field location. Field expedients have been devised from "blood boxes", and styrofoam containers; however, these are extremely bulky and are obtained only by "scrounging".

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(c) Recommendation. That a satisfactory container be developed to be used for transporting ice cream, (and other frozen or perishable items), from supply bases to company/battery sized forward areas. This container should be both air and ground transportable.

(d) Command Action. None.

(4) Facilitation of unit stand down/redeployment.

(a) Observation. That unit standdown/redeployment is greatly facilitated if specific project officers are assigned to control processing of actions such as reports of survey, liaison with depot turn-in agencies, and movement of personnel.

(b) Evaluation. These project officers readily become experts in their respective fields and expedite the actions from start to finish.

(c) Recommendation. That future SOP's/OPLAN's/directives relative to standdown/redeployment encourage the use of unit project officers for specific actions such as reports of survey, turn in of equipment or movement of personnel.

(d) Command Action. Units on standdown/redeployment are directed by this headquarters to appoint officers for areas of interest indicated above.

g. Communications.

Communications Support of Redeploying Units.

(1) Observation. Redeployment of a major OPCON element requires increased communications support from higher headquarters.


(2) Evaluation. To relieve the organic communications element of a redeploying unit, the signal support unit of higher headquarters will be required to increase its support of that unit. This is especially true in the areas of public address and photographic support.

(3) Recommendation. That supporting signal units be prepared for a substantial increase in commitments in the initial stages of a subordinate element's redeployment operations.

h. Materiel. None

i. Other. None

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
ROBERT F. CARRELL  
LTC, AGC  
Adjutant General

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13 Incl

1. II FFORCEV Order of Battle
2. II FFORCEV Troop List
3. II FFORCEV Area of Operations
4. Close Air Support
5. B52 Strikes
6. C130/C123 Sorties
7. Enemy Organizations in MR 3
8. Disposition of Enemy Forces
9. Artillery Unit Locations
10. Heavy Artillery Coverage
11. Location of AN/MPQ-4A CMR
12. Location of AN/TPS-25A GSR
13. Artillery Task Organization

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AVHDO-DO (Undated) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam  
for the Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 19 JUN 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,  
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310


1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned  
for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, II Field Force  
Vietnam.

2. Reference item concerning "Transportation of ice cream and other  
perishables to isolated field locations," page 62, paragraph 2f(3):  
Nonconcur. Air and ground transportable containers for perishables  
already exist:

<u>CUBE</u>	<u>WEIGHT</u>	<u>FSN</u>
16	120	7330-961-0924
32	205	7330-947-7571
66	350	7330-961-0922

However, the above containers are STOP SEE items. Present procedures  
call for transportation of perishables in styrofoam containers with  
dry ice. The procedure works when dry ice is available and the  
supported isolated units return the containers for future use. Unit  
has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
CEDDES F. MACLAREN  
CPT. INF.  
Acting Asst Adjutant General



GPOP-FD (undtd) 2d Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, II Field Force Vietnam for period  
ending 30 Apr 71, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 28 JUL 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

*M. L. Mah*

M. L. MAH  
2LT, AGC  
Asst AG

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LINE	UNIT	PROVINCE	STATION	COORD	CONTROL HQ
1	II FFORCEV	Bien Hoa	Long Binh	YT 051111	MACV
2	3d Bde (SEP) 1st Cav Div (AM)	Bien Hoa	Bien Hoa	YT 014144	TRAC
3	1-7th Cav	Long Khanh	Mace	YT 628111	3d Bde (SEP) 1st Cav Div (AM)
4	B/1-9th ACT	Bien Hoa	Bear Cat	YT 165000	3d Bde (SEP) 1st Cav Div (AM)
5	1-12th Cav	Long Khanh	Sherman	YT 216369	3d Bde (SEP) 1st Cav Div (AM)
6	2-8th Cav	Long Khanh	Fontaine	Ys 804953	3d Bde (SEP) 1st Cav Div (AM)
7	2-5th Cav	Binh Tuy	Evelyn	YT 901119	3d Bde (SEP) 1st Cav Div (AM)
8	1-21st Arty (105T)	Bien Hoa	Bien Hoa	YT 014144	3d Bde (SEP) 1st Cav Div (AM)
9	229th Avn Bn	Bien Hoa	Bien Hoa	YT 014144	3d Bde (SEP) 1st Cav Div (AM)
10	2-11th ACR	Bien Hoa	Frenzell-Jones	YT 070120	Hau Nghia Province
11	D Trp/3-17th Air Cav	Long Khanh	Mace	YT 628111	3d Bde (SEP) 1st Cav Div (AM)
12	11th Air Cav Trp	Bien Hoa	Frenzell-Jones	YT 070120	3/17th ACS
13	HQ, 23d FA Gp	Bien Hoa	Long Binh	YT 051112	TRAC
14	5-2d Arty (40mm AWSP)	Bien Hoa	Frenzell-Jones	YT 070120	23d FA Gp
15	D-71st Arty (MG)	Bien Hoa	Frenzell-Jones	YT 070120	23d FA Gp
16	7-8th Arty (8"/175 SP)	Bien Hoa	Frenzell-Jones	YT 070120	23d FA Gp
17	2-12th Arty (155T)	Binh Duong	Phu Loi	XT 860158	23d FA Gp
18	6-27th Arty (8"/175 SP)	Binh Duong	Phu Loi	XT 850140	23d FA Gp
19	2-32d Arty (8"/175 SP)	Binh Duong	Phu Loi	XT 850150	23d FA Gp
20	5-42d Arty (155T)	Bien Hoa	Frenzell-Jones	YT 070120	23d FA Gp

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<u>LINE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>CONTROL HQ</u>
21	12th Cbt Avn Gp	Bien Hoa	Long Binh	YT 059118	TRAC
22	11th Cbt Avn Bn	Binh Duong	Phu Loi	XT 860158	12th Cbt Avn Gp
23	74th Recon Apl Co	Binh Duong	Phu Loi	XT 865155	11th Avn Bn (Cbt)
24	128th Aslt Hel Co	Binh Duong	Phu Loi	XT 860159	11th Cbt Avn Bn
25	<u>187th Aslt Hel Co</u>	Tay Ninh	Tay Ninh	XT 178521	11th Cbt Avn Bn
26	222d Cbt Avn Bn	Bien Hoa	Bear Cat	YS 145982	12th Cbt Avn Gp
27	117th Aslt Hel Co	Bien Hoa	Long Binh	YT 068113	222d Cbt Avn Bn
28	240th Aslt Hel Co	Bien Hoa	Bear Cat	YS 145982	222d Cbt Avn Bn
29	B/229 Aslt Hel Co	Bien Hoa	Bear Cat	YS 168998	222d Cbt Avn Bn
30	273d Hvy Hel Co (-)	Bien Hoa	Long Binh	YT 075072	222d Cbt Avn Bn
31	145th Cbt Avn Bn	Bien Hoa	Long Binh	YT 050105	12th Cbt Avn Gp
32	25th Avn Co (CORPS)	Bien Hoa	Long Binh	YT 050105	145th Cbt Avn Bn
33	213th Aslt Hel Co	Binh Duong	Phu Loi	XT 860159	145th Cbt Avn Bn
34	242d Aslt Spt Hel Co	Binh Duong	Phu Loi	XT 863159	145th Cbt Avn Bn
35	A/2-20th AFA	Bien Hoa	Long Binh	YT 068111	145th Cbt Avn Bn
36	3d Sqdn/17th Air Cav	Binh Duong	Phu Loi	XT 865155	TRAC
37	A Trp/3-17th ACS	Binh Long	Quan Loi	XT 820905	3-17th ACS
38	B Trp/3-17th ACS	Binh Duong	Phu Loi	XT 865155	3-17th ACS
39	334th Aerial Wpns Co	Binh Duong	Phu Loi	XT 860159	12th Cbt Avn Gp
40	F Trp/4th Cav	Binh Duong	Lai Khe	XT 785380	3-17th ACS
41	PURPOSELY LEFT BLANK				
42	1st Sqdn/9th Air Cav	Bien Hoa	Di An	XT 902062	3-17th ACS
43	A Trp/1-9th ACS	Bien Hoa	Di An	XT 902062	1-9th ACS
44	C Trp/1-9th ACS	Bien Hoa	Di An	XT 902062	1-9th ACS
45	CMAT	Gia Dinh	Saigon	XS 847915	TRAC
46	RTAVF HC	Bien Hoa	Bear Cat	YT 160000	TRAC

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Downgraded at 3 year intervals  
Declassified after 12 years  
DOD DIR 5200.10 Applies

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<u>LINE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>CONTROL HQ</u>
47	1st Bde HQ	Bien Hoa	Bear Cat	YT 160005	RTAVF
48	1-1 Inf Bn	Bien Hoa	Leopard Mian	YT 395994	RTAVF
49	2-1 Inf Bn	Bien Hoa	Bulsak	YS 207933	1st Bde RTAVF
50	3-1 Inf Bn	Bien Hoa	Pratiab	YT 218048	1st Bde RTAVF
51	2d Bde HQ	Bien Hoa	Bear Cat	YT 155020	RTAVF
52	1-2d Inf Bn	Bien Hoa	AC Vasin	YS 261802	2d Bde RTAVF
53	2-2d Inf Bn	Bien Hoa	Sirin	YS 274858	2d Bde RTAVF
54	3-2d Inf Bn	Bien Hoa	Tanee	YS 279934	2d Bde RTAVF
55	RTAVF Div Arty	Bien Hoa	Bear Cat	YT 165000	RTAVF
56	1st 105mm Bn	Bien Hoa	Bear Cat	YT 167007	Div Arty RTAVF
57	2d 105mm Bn	Bien Hoa	Bear Cat	YT 166002	Div Arty RTAVF
58	4th 155mm Bn	Bien Hoa	Bear Cat	YT 166005	Div Arty RTAVF
59	Armd Cav Sqdn	Bien Hoa	Bear Cat	YT 166005	RTAVF
60	Sig Bn	Bien Hoa	Bear Cat	YS 162998	RTAVF
61	Engr Bn	Bien Hoa	Bear Cat	YT 161006	RTAVF
62	Lt Avn Co	Bien Hoa	Bear Cat	YT 154015	RTAVF
63	HQ 1st ATF (SEP)	Phuoc Tuy	Nui Dat	YS 433667	TRAC
64	2d RAR	Phuoc Tuy	Nui Dat	YS 433667	1st ATF
65	3d RAR	Phuoc Tuy	Horsehoe	YS 494624	1st ATF
66	2d SAS Sqdn	Phuoc Tuy	Nui Dat	YS 436676	1st ATF
67	C Sqdn, 1st Armd Regt	Phuoc Tuy	Nui Dat	YS 445664	1st ATF
68	A Sqdn, 3d Cav Regt	Phuoc Tuy	Nui Dat	YS 429669	1st ATF
69	12th PD Regt RAA (105T)	Phuoc Tuy	Nui Dat	YS 437665	1st ATF
70	1st PD Sqdn RAE	Phuoc Tuy	Nui Dat	YS 437665	1st ATF

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69

Downgraded at 3 year intervals  
Declassified after 12 years  
DOD CIR 5200.10 Applies

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<u>LINE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>CONTROL AG</u>
71	17th Const Sqdn RAE	Phuoc Tuy	Hui Dat	YS 433680	1st ATF
72	104th Sig Sqdn	Phuoc Tuy	Hui Dat	YS 433668	1st ATF
73	161st (Indep) Rec FLT	Phuoc Tuy	Hui Dat	YS 443682	1st ATF

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1117

Downgraded at 3 year interval  
Declassified after 12 years  
DOD DIR 5208.10 Applies

## II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM TROOP LIST

As of 30 April 1971

OPCON UNITS

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
3d Bde (Sep), 1st Cav Div (AM)	10 Apr 71	Bien Hoa
2d Sqdn, 11th ACR	6 Mar 71	Frenzell-Jones
12th Avn Gp	15 Mar 66	Long Binh
CMAT	25 Mar 70	Saigon
1st ATF	24 May 66	Nui Dat
RTAVF	22 Jul 68	Bearcat

TENANT UNIT

61st Med Det	25 Jun 66	Long Binh
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
ASSIGNED UNITS

HHC, II FFORCEV	10 Jan 66	Long Binh
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ATTACHED UNITS

23d Arty Gp	30 Apr 71	Long Binh
303d RR Bn	8 Jun 66	Long Binh
101st RR Co	1 Apr 70	Long Binh
2d CA Co	30 Apr 71	Long Binh
9th Trans Co (CAR) (-)	30 Apr 71	Long Binh
16th Sig Det	30 Apr 71	Long Binh
219th MI Det	30 Apr 71	Long Binh
552d MP Co	30 Apr 71	Long Binh
Det 32, Weather Sqdn	1 Oct 66	Long Binh

As of 30 April 1971



STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT  
1 November 1971 - 30 April 1971

1. (C) FAC Controlled Sorties in MR 3 and adjacent Cambodia by:

	Subtotal	Total
USAF/RAAF	2207	
VNAF	8501	10,708

2. (C) FAC Controlled Sorties in Support of III Corps Forces by:

USAF/RAAF	1121	
VNAF	8481	9602

3. (C) FAC Controlled Sorties in Support of II FFORCEV OPCON Units by:

USAF/RAAF	1086	1116
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4. (C) Distribution of FAC Controlled Sorties in Support of:

III Corps	9622	
25th Inf Div	100	
1st Cav Div (AM)	747	
RTAVF	145	
1st ATF	40	
11th ACR	46	10708
II FFORCEV	8	

5. (C) Radar Controlled (Combat Sky Spot) Sorties in Support of:

III Corps	4	
1st Cav Div (AM)	77	
1st ATF	14	
II FFORCEV	6	101

6. (C) Results (As Reported by USAF FAC's to III DASC)

KBA (Body Count)	108
KBA (Estimated)	47
Structures (Destroyed)	602
Structures (Damaged)	61
Bunkers (Destroyed)	3175
Bunkers (Damaged)	412
Sampans (Destroyed)	24
Sampans (Damaged)	11



B-52 STRIKES IN MR 3  
1 NOV 71 - 30 APR 71

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
II FFORCEV	Cambodia	49

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
STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
USAF C130/C123/C7A SORTIES  
1 NOV 70 - 30 APR 71


UNIT	TACTICAL EMERGENCY	EMERGENCY RESUPPLY	COMBAT ESSENTIAL	PRIORITY #1	TOTAL
23d Gp	—	—	7	1819	1826
1 ACD (AM)	30	24	239	274	567
11 ACR	—	—	—	197	197
25 Div	—	—	—	42	42
31 Eng	—	—	—	4	4
5 SFGA	—	—	—	29	29
12 CAG	—	8	39	18	65
173d Helo	—	—	24	—	24
TOTAL	30	32	309	2383	2754

Total Short Tons: 10,347.9\*

Total Passengers (PAX): 6422


\*Includes PAX Weight





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# ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE, MR 3 INFANTRY REGIMENTS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Artillery Unit Locations  
as of 30 April 1971

HQ, 23d Artillery Group (Plantation XT 051111)

HQ, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery (Phu Loi XT 805160)

Battery A	<u>FSB Trung Lap</u>	XT 590215
Battery B	<u>FSB Katum</u>	XT 333903
Battery C	<u>FSB Lanyard</u>	XT 075895

HQ, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (Phu Loi XT 805160)

Battery A	FSB Bu Dop	XU 974291
Battery B		
8" platoon	FSB Wade	XU 733084
175mm platoon	FSB Haymaker	XU 685228
Battery C	FSB Haymaker	XU 685228

HQ, 7th Battalion, 8th Artillery (Camp Frenzel Jones YT 971123)

Battery A	FSB Olesen	YT 655068
Battery B	FSB Blue	YT 259291
Battery C	FSB Happy	YT 002435

HQ, 2nd Battalion, 12th Artillery (Phu Loi XT 805160)

Battery A		
	FSB Donna	XS 848999
	FSB Judy	YT 660039
Battery B		
	FSB Bu Dop	XU 974291
	<u>FSB Sherman</u>	YT 217368
Battery C	FSB Katum	XT 333903

HQ, 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery (Camp Frenzel Jones YT 065123)

88

Battery A

FSB Michalle YT 283099

FSB Nancy YT 560381

Battery B


FSB Joannie ZS 004984

FSB Sylvia ZS 015327

Battery C

FSB Carmen YS 438589


FSB Friendship YS 531785





CAMBODIA

II F FORCE V III CTZ AREA OF OPERATIONS  
PHUOC LONG  
**LOCATION OF  
AN/MPQ4A CMR'S**




CAMBODIA

11 FFORCEV  
PHUOC LONG

SHI CTZ AREA OF OPERATIONS .

LOCATION OF  
AN/TPS 25 GSR'S



## TASK ORGANIZATION

## 7-8th Arty

A Btry 2T-8" Olesen, GSR 1-21 FA  
 B Btry 3T-8", 1T-175 Blue, CSR 25th ARVN D/A  
 C Btry 2T-8", 2T-175 Happy, CSR 25th ARVN D/A

## 2-12th Arty

A Btry 3T Donna  
 3T Judy, GSR 1-21 FA  
 B Btry 3T Bu Dop, GSR 6-27 FA  
 3T Sherman, GSR 1-21 FA  
 C Btry 6T Katum, GSR 2-32 FA

## 6-27th Arty

A Btry 2T-8"  
 2T-175, Bu Dop, GSR 5th ARVN D/A  
 B Btry 1T-8" Wade  
 2T-175 Haymaker, GSR 5th ARVN D/A  
 C Btry 2T-8"  
 1T-175 Haymaker, GSR 5th ARVN D/A

## 2-32d Arty

A Btry 2T-8" Trung Lap, GSR 2d How Btry  
 B Btry 2T-8"  
 2T-175 Katum, GSR 18th ARVN D/A  
C Btry 2T-8"  
 2T-175 Lanyard, GSR 18th ARVN D/A

## 5-42d Arty

A Btry 3T Michelle  
 3T Nancy, DS Long Khanh Prov.  
 B Btry 3T Joannie  
 2T Sylvia, DS Binh Tuy Prov.  
 C Btry 4T Friendship GSR 1st ATF  
 3T Carmen, DS Phuoc Tuy