$C O N T$


op ERATIONAL PEPORT LESSONS LEARNED
CONFIDENTIAL

SUNJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Lermed, 3rd Drigacle (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CS FOR-65 (RB)

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THRU: Commending General
    Third Regional Assistence Commend
    ATTN: MACTR-G3
    APO San Francisco }9626
TO: Assistrnt Chief of Steff for Force Development
    Department of the Army
    Washington D.C. }2031
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1. (C) Doerctions: Significent Activities.
a. Mission: During the reporting period the irisece was located in an area of operations which included ell of Lone Khenh and Dinh Tug Province and portions of Lien Hos and Fhuoc Try Provinces in $\mathbb{R}$ m 3, and Lem Dong Province in MR-2. The size of the AO ringed from 3500-3000 square miles and was the largest $A 0$ ever assigned to a Brigare in Vietnam. The 3rd Erigede's missions were:
(1) Destroy the enemy forces in the AO with priority to the 33rd NVA Regiment.
(2) Attack the enemy command and control system with priority to Hq MR -7.
(3) Neutralize the enemy logistical system.
(4) Support the 1971 GVN Community Defense and Local Development efforts with emphasis on sinh Thy and Long Khenh Provinces.
(5) De prepares to execute assigned contingency plans.
b. General:
(1) The period of 1 Ney to 31 October 1971 saw no significant changes in the area of opera ions or the alignment of forces of the brigade.

AVDAGT-DOT


SUBJECT: Operation Report - Les on Leerneci, 3rd Irisade (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RS CS FCR-65 (RS)

A 500 sq mile section of Lem Dong Province MR-2, was acquired on 1 August and terminated on 31 October. This AO was worker by 1-12 Cav during this period end yielded sisnificent caches of flour.
(2) On 1 October, the Brigade was assigned responsibility for portions of Phuoc Thy Province which were vacated by the 1st Australian Task Force as it prepared to withdraw from RVN.
(3) Enemy activity within the Brigade's area of operations remained at a low level during the reporting period as enemy meiji and local force units avoided contact.
(4) The Brigade continued to provide Drigede assets to territorial and ARVN Forces in an effort to upgrade their combat effectiveness. Several very successful combined operations were conducted which were supported by Cav lift end combat support aviation assets. The territorial forces have steadily improved in the are, particularly in the Kuen Doc District.
c. 1st $3 n_{0} 7 t h$ Cav Operations:
(1) Mission: During the period 1 May 1071 through 31 October 1971 the 1st Infantry Dettelion, fth Gevelry w es assigned the mission of finding end destroying enemy forces, interdicting: enemy lines of commandcation, locating and destroying/evecueting enemy caches, ane assisting insofar as possible in the Vietnemization program.
(2) Execution:
(a) From 1 ing $=14$ Hay the battalion deployed in Long Khenh province south of Tai Char Chan (southeast of Yuan Loo) with the commend post located at Forward OperatinG Base (FOL) Mace and was targeted principally against the Sd Battalion, 33d NVA Regiment, elements of MR 7 headquarters, end locel VG forces.
(b) From 15 May -12 June the battalion deployed north of Hui Che Chen (northeast of Xuen Hoc), targeted egeinst the same enemy forces. The command post remained at Me ce, end Fire Support Ease Fur (Y T54ふis4) was opened to provide artillery coverage of the area of operations.
(c) From 13 June - 20 July the battalion returned to its former area of opertions south of Tui Cha Chan in response to intelligence that indicated redeployment of the energy. FSD Furs was closed on 14 June, end the commend post remained at Mace.


## :a <br> AVDACTODCS <br> SUDJECT:

(d) Irom 29 July - 23 Aluust the bettalion deployor: in eastern War Zone D, Farseted against the Oist Recx Service Group. The conmend post reloceted to Fire Suppost Dase Cherles (TT407543), and miniafSI Connel we:s opened (TJ31562d).
(e) From 24 Ausust - 31 -August tise battelion deployee in vestern War Zone $E_{\text {, }}$ tris geted against rear serviee activities and elements of SR-5 in adiation to maintaining a posture of readiness to executo OPLAN Rome Eagle (A). The comend post wes established at Fire Suport Dase Sherman (YT21E375).
(f) On 1 September the bettilion agein deployed to its former aren of operetion south of Nuj Chua Chan, targetec ageinst the 3d Dattalion and the headquenters of the 33d NVA Reginent, elements of MR-7, enc locel VC forces. The battelion comend post wes agein established at poi Nece, end mini-FSD Hall (YS623993) wes opened.
(2) Sianificent Events for May:
(a) 06003451 L at YT 669024 observed two incividuals. Engeged and received $15 \mathrm{rds} h k-47$ fire. Eneny aveded IW. 1i pursued. Pink Term on station engeged and killec one ind. PT received GAF. Reported ecitionsl two indiv KDH .
(b) 0612202 D at YS599992 found ceche with one Thompson submechine gun with 4 magazines, 2 SKS , Whas on 3 X 4 bemboo pletform 2 ft off the ground, 50 meters from trail, camouflaged with brush. Whs condition: rusting, in place est one yer.r.
(c) 06124520 at YT669029 found rucksack, 2 weterproof bacs, 4 pr trousers, $2 \mathrm{c} s \mathrm{v}$ shirts, 1 GI poncho liner, 1 GI monsoon sweater, 2 pr socks, 4 pkg tea, 1 can crean, 3 toothbsushes, 2 bers soap, 1 fountein pen, 1 towel, 7 strips of rubber, 1 roll geuze, 1 tube toothpeste, 1 chepstick, 1 spoon, 1 rice bowl, 4 ft elastic strip, 2 dish towels, 1 plastic helmet, $11^{n}$ switchblede, 1 pr eyeglesses, 1 , cig lighter, 1 sewing lat (VN), 1 . GI Canteen cup, 1 pr blsck underwecr, 1 GI rein jecket, 1 netal pot $5^{\prime \prime}$ diameterm4 ${ }^{n}$ deep full of cooked rice, 1 package dried fish, 9 lbs rice, 1 pkg dócuments (est 3:1bs), no body and no weapon. Recent use in area est 3 deys."
(d) 06144530 at YT663019 found small ceche cont 30 small sandbags of polished rice-101bs eech, 1 sal motor oil, 2 cel cookine oil ("Doneted by people of the US"); all founc inside cave ( $5 \times 5 \mathrm{hole}$ ) in side of hill.
(e) $070745 \mathrm{C}(-)$ e.t YT557007 while tricinc up cleymores found thet 02 were missing. Wise hed been cut ebout $2^{\prime}$ from the blesting caps. Ind who took CMS cime through trip flare defense.

## AVDAGT-DOT

SUTTECT: Oporational Report
$\therefore$ Gevalry Division (fimolile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CS FOR-65 (R3)
(f) $071204 \mathrm{C}(-)$ spotted 01 indiv to $N$ and engeget with 91 mm . Revd return SA fire. Unknown results.
( 6 ) 071805 C ( - ) heera movement NE of their loc (YN567007). Sent out patrol with nes finding. At 1835 spotted 02 ind $15-20$ meters $E$ of their loc wearing black PH's. En init fire, M60 ret fire. En eved unk direction.
(h) $091015 \mathrm{~A}(-)$ et $Y 5607972$ hed contact with VC/iNA scuadd (est 3-5 ind). En welked within 20 meters of NDP. CP engeged with mits resulting in 01 VC KIL, 1 peck end 1 wan cepturec. 1 VC pulled frag gren resulting in 01 US WIA. Weapons cap was AK-47 with full mag. Inside pecis was civ clothing, hamock, poncho, flour, cooking uten, fleshlight batteries; no cocuments.
(i) 1509502 D at YS530939 obsr $5-6$ ind coming out of woodine moving E-W. Eng with SA: ind eved $H$. All ermed with $A K-47$ 's, possibly 1 or 2 cerbines; all dressed in bleck clothing. Results: 01 en KIA, 1 AI- 47 cep. En ret fire with $1=-40$ end SA Firc.
(j) $1610102 A$ cointect at YTG12249. Ens 3-4 ind movine NWS with CMM and SA fire. Res: 1 , VC KIA, 1 hir-47 cep with full mag. Inc! hed a pack with rice end hermock.
(k) 2115203 contect at YTs03253 enemy initieted. Fossibly 7-3 ind with small arms end 2-3 CMM. En evad N, 3i ret fire, Reaults: neg en ces. 3 US FIA. 3 A also found 4 bunkers, 2 picnic tebles, 1 bunker armanged as a classroom. Also found 6 oz docs, 1 VC CMi wire, 2 pr new NVA boots, 1 pr shower slippers, 2 pr trousers (blue and black), 3 shirts (blue, black, grey), 1 cooking site with $\delta$ pots.
(1) $2312502 A$ et YT595262 fnd 12 bkrs $0 \times 4$ with $3^{1}$ OHC, 1 bkr 20 X 20 with $3^{1}$ OHC. Ekrs had huts built on top. 20 oz docs dise in aree, 1 well $3 \times 3 \times 25^{\prime}$ deep with runninis weter in bottom, 2 pans $6^{\prime \prime}$ deep $24^{\prime \prime}$ diemeter, 2 pr bleck underwerr, $1 \mathrm{bra}, 1 \mathrm{pr}$ NVA books, 1 blue shirt, 2 pr bleck pents, 2 pr HCM slicks, 2 Srow shirts $3 \times 4$ (one with shelf undernerth), 1 smake house $3 \times 0 \times 10$, 50 pieces of cut firewood, 1 poncho, 4 beskets $10^{\prime \prime}$ diemeter, 2 pens with 2 libs cooked rice, 1 cloth be.f cont polished rice, 2 GI metel centeen, 2 latrines, 1 teapot, 3 dishes, 1 classroom CX 10 X , $\frac{2}{2} 1 \mathrm{~b}$ rock salt, 1 gal soyboen oil, 1 shoel, 1 ges oil lemp, 1 Ib medical supplies, 1 mess hell 15X6.
(m) 25104520 vic YT 543146 hed PSID ectivate end heard novt. Sqt in emb psn blew 2 CMi, had more movenent end ajain blew 2 CMM . Jegan receiving rtn fire fron 1 AK-47. Jegen recon by fire, 1 NVA VIA shoutint "Chieu Hoi" capt. Fnd enother $A K-47,2$ oz cocs, poncho, 1 photo, 2 jectes poems, songs, 1 letter, 1 rice receipt.


SUSJECT: Operational Renort - Lessons Learned, Ord Dricade (Senarate) 1 st Cavalry Division (Esmolile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CS FOR -65 (i ns)
(n) 25123510 vic YT 510221 reva SA fire from 03 ind. Eng with SA. Fid 2 blood trails, 2 M carbines (soc cong), 1 rucksack, 2 full 30 md carbine mas. Tracker teens inserted to follow blood trail. Peck cont 2 hammocks, 3 VC ponchos, 2 lee soap, 1 tube toothpaste, 3 lbs uncooked rice, 2 shirts, 1 pr penis, 1 mosquito net, 1 US flashlight with 2 docs inside.
(o) 201205 1D at YT 513234 fid 1 MT, 1 SK, 3 pr black Us, 1 bottle ink, VC flag, 3 medals, 1 gutter string, 1 US pistol belt, 2 lbs docs (incl large map); docs in good conc, win poor cont. No recent use.
(p) 281510 1D at YT 512234 fid 1 booby-trepped 5-Gal cen with 25 frags, pressure pull release on side of trail. None hurt. Also fac' 1 Singer sewing mach, 1 transfusion kit, 1 letter. Frags were hand mede and old; other items in fair condo.

## (4) Sinnificent Events for June:

(a) 020530 FSD Purr (Y T550133) reva att by fire consisting of 4 rds Gram and 3 rds 540 from SW. Suspected firing psi at YP540180 ens with direct fire arty (beehive), UAm, AFA, First light sweep of area disc $4 X 02 \mathrm{~mm}$ mortar craters 35 meters $S W$ of perimeter, $2=40$ craters 20 meters $N \mathbb{E}$ of perimeter. 1340 rd exploded $S W$ perimeter wire. lie filly cos, unk en loss.
(b) $021450 \mathrm{D}(-) \mathrm{YT} 52166$ obs 5 ind with blk PUs, $1 \mathrm{AK}-47,1 \mathrm{D}-40 \mathrm{RL}$, carrying litter patient. EnG whore, rec ret SA and 40 fire. Results: 1 heavy blood try, 1 KIA (litter patient).
(c) 030001 3D at YT 603170 had AA detonate while in $\operatorname{DDP}$. First light ck disc 2 en -KIA. Wi had been moving NW. 1 AK-47 pt, 1 fld exped flashlight, 1 US flashlight, 2 oz docs.
(d) 0306303 C et YT 572163 obsr 3 ind (with bleak PUs, pecks, end AK -47) Eng with orG, ret SA fire, confect broke inmed when en evade $E$ end $S$. Check of area indic 10-20 indiv. 1 en KIA, 1 pack cont note written in crayon, $1 \mathrm{AK}-47$ mag with $30 \mathrm{rds}, 50$ loose $i \mathrm{~K} \cdot \mathrm{rls}, 1 \mathrm{pr}$ blk pants, 1 blk shirt, 5 lbs rice, 5 lbs salt, 1 US belt, 1 picin, 2 lbs tea, 1 bottle US insect repellent, 2 roll como wire, 1 carves ruck.
(e) 091200 4 advanced and oise 1 indiv in blur. Eng with org, rec hoy vol SA fire finest sql size en force. Results: 3 US TIT, uni en losses.
(f) $1711004 D$ vic YT 527033 while on fad ron heard move. Set up hasty cmb . En eng with SA enc 3540 rcs , possibly 5 rcs 60 m mortar. Est 15-20 en in bor complex 30 reters navy. Results: 1 US KIA, 2 US WIA, ink en loss.
(G) 100500 D end D vic YT 527033 while attempting to sweep bur complex

## 5

 Cevelry Division (A mobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CS FRT -65 (R3)
disc on 17 Jun were en ci by est co size en fee in blurs envoy 30 meters away. En SA and Chis fire ret with org, SA. EFA, arty, PT, Air Strike supported. Sporadic content continued until 0.15 when fol foes pulled beck for arty, $\mathrm{a} / \mathrm{s}$ and medevac. Several on $w / b 1 k J_{s}$ and $A K-47$, rice, fresh fruit obs, Contact resulted in 2 US KIA, 4 US WIA, ink en losses.
(h) 221150 E Ran vic Y 5535995 while in ambo pan obs 2 ind with civ clothes encl. Sin unify, fld exped pecks, end AK -47 moving $\mathrm{E}_{\text {. }}$. Ind move through kill zone with neg en. 1 ind returned, stopped 30 meters $E$ of floc. Heard voices of undet no indiv to $W$. Ens w/ CMM w/ neg ret fire. Fly moved up and disc 3 en KIA. Wins and wallets had been taken from bodies, Contact resulted in 3 en KIA, 3 rucks w/5 40 rots, 3 CC oren, 2 fld exp greens, 6 NVA hammocks, 2 NVA shovels, 1 NVA canteen, 1 US 1-ct canteen, 15 lbs potatoes, 75 lis rice, 10 lbs cooked rice, 10 lbs benenes, 5 lbs cooling aten, 16 lbs mixed clotining, 2 first aid dressings, $150 \mathrm{AK}-47 \mathrm{rds}, 12$ lbs personal items, 1 booby trip firing mech, 2 handsaw blade, 1 Ib doc.
 w/org w/ret AK-47 fire. Contact broke when en eve E. Res: 1 en KIA, 1 AK47 rifle, $2 \mathrm{AK}-47$ meg, 1 US map, bag w/15 cans C rations contr. Also find $2 \times 55 \mathrm{gal}$ drums diesel fuel.
(j) 23114040 vic 17514032 while in ambo pan obs 2 indiv 30 m NE. Paly yelled for ind to Thieu Hoe; indiv hit gid and tried to evade. Eng w/org; 1 ind ever, 1 en WIA. Waite plastic helmet, div papers, 600 WV, end cutting tool cpr.
(k) $2406354 C$ vic $Y S 547990$ while preparing to move from NDP to site of $A A$ dot, eng by unk SEF SOm NNE w/hvy vol SA and 10-15 i540 eng whore Sporadic cont until 0715 when en ever NNE. Res: 2 US VIA, 1 en KIA. Opt doc ident en as mir C9, 3/33d.
(1) 231355 GD ic YS563964 while on me recon disc old sapper training area with 4 lanes (vines used to simulate wire) and sirulateci bk mede of sticks, leaves, and mud. ing, recent use.
(5) Sjmificent Events for July:
(a) $031415 \mathrm{D}(-)$ vic YT627039 rove on init hoy vol 340 and SA fire from USEF; ret with org. Res: 2 US KIA, 4 US WII, 1 en KIA.
(b) $0413203 \& 4 C$ vic YT625025 while on ind ran here nov of ink nr ind to the $W$ move $N$ through brush. Fell estab hasty perimeter and obs approx 5 ind 15n. NW. Eng with org rec ret SA fire. En eva N. Res: 2 look tres leading $N_{0}$.

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(6) Significent Events for Aurust:
(a) 0611302 A vic YT 340651 while on gnd ren obsr 3 ind with green pants, 1 white shirt, 2 derk shirts, 5 m N ; eng. W/org and rec rtn SA fire. En evad No Neg results.
(b) 0611402 A vic YT34 3651 during search of cont eree disc 1 Umhepe bkr 2 K 4 X 9 with $12^{\prime \prime}$ OHC. 2 picnic tribles 10 X 4 , 2 benches insice. On $6^{\prime \prime}$ $\mathrm{N}-\mathrm{S}$ trl leadins fmble stepped on trip wire det CMM, Results: 1 US KIA, 2 US WIA.
(c) 0613252 A vic cont area while moving fwa to cont seerch of erea det unl type mine resulting in 2 US WIA.

## (7) Significent Events for September:

(a) 06120025 vic YS556946 while on gnd ren were ens by $2-3$ ind 100 m at az of 300 decrees from their pon. En eng $w / A K-47$ full auto. Ret fire w/ ors. Pk Tm, RASH, erty sptc. Gont broke 1210 when en evad NW. Res: 1 US WIA, unl en losses.
(b) 06131040 vic YT635965 on OP ousr $1-2$ en 30 m SV anp:orching psn. OP eng with oris, neg rtn fire. In evad E. Unk en losses.
(c) $141545 \mathrm{~B}(-)$ vic YT325555 while in resury yosture ent $\mathrm{w} / 2 \mathrm{rds}$ B 40 and SA by USEF loc 6On NW. Ret fire w/org. En eved N and NW. Res: 1 US IIIA, unk en losses.
(d) 141900 AA vic YS674965 while in IDP obsr 75-100 ind 100 m mov W . Eng w/E1nim wheg rin fire, En evad unk cir. AifA, flare ship sot.
(3) Simifieent Events for October:
(a) 0117302 C vic YS549989 disc 2 bkrs. Searched with neg findings. Continued $W$ and disc 3 bkrs and 2540 rkts. Obsr 02 ind 150 m E mov SE. EnE w/Ors, rec ret SA, NG, J2mm morter. En eved unk dir. Res: 1 US KIA, 2 en KIA.
(b) 071230 E Ren vic Y 5547963 while in day helt psn hed AA det 25 m W. Eng w/org, rec ret AW fire. En evad unl dir. Res: 1 en KIA.
(c) 101045 A vic YS 50644 obsr 4 ind ( $3 \mathrm{mile}, 1$ fem) nove SE. Ens. W/ org, neg ret fire, Res: 1 en (fen) VIA (POW). En mecieveced.
(d) 1116302 A vic Y5501951 while on gnd ren dise 6 sticks 121 tall w/ "Vn cut in top and cleynore we strung to form a. 300 desree circle. Circle was 10' ciemeter and believed to be fld emed entenne.

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13 November 1971
SUBJECT：Operational Report－Lessons Learned，Bra Lrigecle（Separate），Mst Cavalry Div ion（Airmobile），Period Ending 31 October 1971，RCS CS FOR－65（RY）
（e） 1515202 A vic YS522942 here movement 75 m SW．Eng w／org，rec ret SA fire．En eved ink dir．Unk en losses，no fall as．
（f） 271117 D end C Co et FSL Me ce rec SA fire fm 2 ind $w /$ blk clothing， 100 m NW of perimeter．Ret fire w／org．Pk Tm sped．Res：no fly as，ink en losses．
（g） 300915 C Co vic YS500971 while on gid ran hard voices to W．Check of area revealed several indiv in tent．Eng w／SA and AW．Rec run SA／AW and 140 fire．En evad in lunk dir．PT，AFA，AFFAC，arty，A／S，medevac sped． Contact resulted in 1 US RIA， 3 US WIA，ink en losses．（Subseçuent ron of bur complex revealed heavy blood smears．）
（h） 3110253 A vic YS57196 while on gid ran via NDP disc $12^{\prime \prime} \mathrm{NE}-\mathrm{SW}$ HP try and obsr 1 indiv $\mathrm{w} / \mathrm{grn}$ clothing and HCM sencels 50 m aver move SW ．Eng w／org wines run fire．Herd voices approx $200-300 \mathrm{~m}$ IE，Res：neg fay es， punk en losses．

## d．Sst Bn （AM）12th Cay Operations：

（1）1位sion end Are e of Operations：During the period 1 May－ 31 October 1971，the 1／12 Cevelry conducted tecticel operations of platoon， company，end battalion size against the enemy．During thais period the princry mission was to close with and destroy the enemy，with secondary missions to disrupt his lines of supply and communications，to deny him the sanctuary of isolated base carps，end to sever his control over local ponuleted axes．In this regard the $1 / 12$ Cavalry operated over FSD Peace and FSD Katum in Try Ninh Province on the west，and North to FSD Katie in War Zone D and FSD Power Ridge in Lem Dong Province．The battalion conducted operations from seven separate major PSIs and from a host of mini－beses．
（2）Significant Events for May：
（a） 051100 while on a ground recon at YT 245286， $1 / \mathrm{C}$ discovered a 10 in wide trail with recent use in the last 40 hours．They also found 4 75 mn RR rounds in canisters with CC markings．The rounds had been in place approx 3 days and were in good condition．
（b） 081210 at YT 158495 1／A discovered $\mathcal{E}$ bunkers erst of FSE Katie．The bunkers were 6－9 months old and appeared to have had nepali dropped on it in the lest 6 months． 11 mortar rounds were discovered along with 1000 nonelectric blestinc caps end various weapons nerts．
（c） 101145 at YT 125495 2／C found 4775 mm RR rounds northwest of FSD Katie．The rounds were packed in cosmoline in showing canisters and ware in good condition．

AVDAGT-DOT


SUDJEGT: Operational Renort - Lessons Leemed, 3rd Ericoce (Se erete), 1st Gavelry Division (Aimoille), Ferioc. Encin: 31 October 1971, RCS CS PCR-65 (R3)
(d) 111240 et $\mathrm{YT} 1055051 / \mathrm{A}$ found 16 bunkers end 4 huts with recent use in the lest 24-36 hours At YT147495 2/A found 5 huts and murnerous sleeping positions, but there was necetive recent use. $4 / \mathrm{A}$ discovered 25 bunkers, 300 VC pinea ple reneces, 000 nonelectricel licsting ecps, 3 liss of cun nowder, and a 250 lb lathe with motor. This ares. l lso hed negetive recent use.
(e) 231200 at YT1 $204934 / \mathrm{D}$ discovered $4975 \mathrm{~mm} R \mathrm{R}$ rouncs, 5 d2mm morter rounds, 560 mn IT rounds, 375 CC grenedes, 100 AK rounds, 150 NH 07.52 mm linked rounds, $100 C$ AL rines, and 5 US 105 mn fuzes. The rounds had been in place about 6-s months.
(f) 261600 at YT 305209 while on ground recon, $3 / \bar{\nu}$ found a cemfire with hot coels and footrints of 12 incividuels. A 10 dey old greve conteining one femele was elso discovered.
(g) 271030 at YT310205 3/5 discovered 5 Lunkers with overherd cover and were engege by snell arms fire with 1 US WIA. $2 / D$ also found 4 bunkers and bloodstcined documents.
(h) 201035 at YT306214 2 , found a bunker complex with the help of a Visur 1 Tracker Dog Teem. E' bunkers, 2 AK- 47 merzines, che 12 blasting caps were also discovered. One inciviual with eris-/7 was ooserver fleeing to the north. At YT310205 at $12153 / 5$ found a trill and 120 Ibs rice, 2 lb pepper, 1 SKS, 54 9mri rounds, 5 ei clecnin, fluicis, 40 los of fet, and 1 transistor redio.
(i) 301600 a.t YT239239 3/C found 22 bunkers, 4 of them with recent use. A. suspected clascroon wes elso found with 2 cut eway -40 wereeds and 2 dut awey 75 in rocket verieeds. 3/2 found eyrox 100 lbs lenenas end a few $A K-47$ rds. 3 new U.S. 81 mm rounds were elso found.
(3) Significent Events for June:
(a) 030605 while in NDP e.t YT275256, E-Recon Fletoon encered 5 indiv NE of FSH Pet with negtive retum fire. A blood treil wes ciscovered but enemy cesualty results were unlmoun. The Trecker Dog Tri lost the blood trl.
(b) 101415 at IT493179 2/A found 12-15 bunkers with overheed cover. 2/A wes ence;ed with small cris with ne, tive friencly casuelties end unlnow en losses.
(c) 140830 at XT173344 W-Recon platoon cetoneted on Mi26 Fres grenade booby tra, resultine in 1 VN (TCS) KIA and 1 US WIA.
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(d) 161145 at YT 470196 A Co was engeged with 60 cm porter and anal arms fire. Fire was retumed and $4 F A$ and arty support was called. in. Results: 1 enemy KMAFA and 1 heavy blood trail discovered.
(e) 210000 at $Y T 550240 \mathrm{D}$ Co, engaged 3 indio with negative return fire Results: 1 en KIA.
(f) 221130 at YT4 40265 E-Recon pit engaged 2 enemy and received return fire. Results: 1 enemy KIA and 1 blood trail. A tracker tm vas inserted with negative results. 1 SKS and 1 K 54 pistol were also found.
(g) 271105 at YT509235 C Company discovered a cache containing 10 lbs beans, 50 lbs rice, 35 lbs salt, $1 \mathrm{SKS}, 1 \mathrm{M}-1$ carline, 2 bandoleers with 140 rounds of 5.56 ur , 1 transistor radio, end 5 lbs of wax.
(h) 201030 at YT 544224 2/A enceged 6 indiv and received small arms fire and $\mathrm{E}-40$ rocket fire in return. Results: 3 US TIA. 1 cervine and a small amount of small arms emo captured.
(4) Sienificent Events for July:
(a) 001245 at YT509169 1/D engaged 3 inciv with nece.tive return fire. Results: 1 enemy KIA, $1 \mathrm{D}-40$ rocket launcher and $2 \mathrm{~J}-40$ rockets captured. 3/E discovered $\delta$ bunkers, 30-35 sleeping positions, and a recently used trail. 1/L found 2 bunkers end 3 huts; one of the huts was a messhall and one was an aid station. 250 lbs rice, 10 lbs corn, 5 lbs salt, 5 lb sugar, and $\delta \mathrm{lbs}$ of medical supplies were captured.
(b) 101630 at YT 494152 B Company found 23 bunkers, 3 kitchens, and 3 huts; many of them were still under construction.
(c) 142205 at YT 504262 D Company engaged one craft on a streani near FSD Pecos. The craft sustained heavy denage and one individual was observed fleeing.
(d) 201000 at YT 566526 EmRecon lt hoard VN voices and engaged 3 indiv and received return shell arms fire. Enemy losses were unknown; however 40 bemock positions, 10 cooking sites, 3 bunkers, 5 fighting positions, 1 smell docking area, 1 scamper, 20 or pants, 50 NVA shirts, 20 iNA ponchos, 20 Its rico, 20 los flour, 2 Panasonic radios, and other misc items were found.
(e) 220730 at YT 40゙44 $2 / 5$ found a hut and 40 sleeping positions with recent use in the last 24 hours.
(f) 271050 at YT 719606 1/C herd voices end engaged 4 indiv, receiving small arms fire in return. Results: Negative friendly cesuclties end 1 enemy KIA. Several blood trails, 130 lbs of flour, 90 lbs of salted fish, $1-40$ rocket launcher, and smell quantities of foodstuffs and ammo were discovered.
(5) Significant Events for August:
(a) 011000 at YT 492504 2/D found 27 bunkers, many of them caved in, that had been used in the past 20 days.
(b) From 3-5 August elements of 1-12 Cav uncovered 4 significant caches near PSi Roundrock which have yielded 1 ton of salt and nearly 11 tons of American flour. The average tine in place for flour and salt was one to three weeks. The food caches were off the ground and covered with VN and US ponchos and canvas tarpaulins. All of these finds were located along a well maintrained NW S truck road/treil, which Inks the area of J95. Headquarters with the Shadow Supply System nick-up points along Qi-20. A convent engaged 4 indiv end received ne active return fire, Results: 3 enemy KIA. Later in the day A company found a seriously wounded INA soldier who was Inedevaced to FRi Mace. Interogetion indicated the his mission was to derry supplies for RSG MR -7.
(c) 071200 Near $F S$, Roundrock 10 bunkers were discovered by $C$ company and E-Recon platoon with recent use.
(d) 081215 at YT 704501 3/C engeged 1 individual with unlonown results. 7 bunkers ( 5 still under construction) and 200 lbs of nixed Na and civilian clothing were found. Two heavy blood trails were also discovered.
(g) 091300 at $Y_{1} 5925771 / \mathrm{C}$ discovered 24 bunkers and 24 huts that had been use b prox 150 indiv in the nest 2 wks . At YT 63 5555 E-Recon found 7 bunkers the heed been used by 100-125 indiv in the lest 5 days.
(h) 121630 at YT6C7730 1/D found 6 bunkers and 6 huts built in the lest 5-7 drys. 1 enemy K arty 7 days a 0 was also discovered.
(i) 141430 at YT 633537 D Company found 2 hootches containing 5000 lbs of flour and 759 lbs of silt.
(j) 151335 et YT 634530 D Company discovered various truck parts including 2 axles, 3 transmissions, and assorted tie rods end springs in place about one week.
(k) 161900 at YT 6 66530 D Company found an adcitionel 5 tons of flour in huts; the flour was two feet off the ground and was in place from $1-3$ months.

## AVDAGT-DOT

13 November 1971
SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, 3rd Irigecle (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, ROS CS FOR -65 (R3)
(1) 181745 at YT679539 $1 / 1$ discovered a recently used sapper training area. One messhell and one classroom cepeble of holding 40 individuals were also discovered. 3/C engaged and killed one enemy nee FSD Timbuktu, YT703693 at 1535.
(m) 190930 at $\operatorname{YT} 682548$ I Company found 1 US $2 \frac{1}{2}$ ton truck with several bullet holes in body. The vehicle was covered with bamboo and, canvas and had been in place about 1 month. $1 / 2$ found 7500 lbs of flour covered with NVA ponchos at 1100 at YT630539.
(n) 221445 near FSD Roundrock D Company found $7 \frac{1}{2}$ tons of flour covered with NA ponchos aid 2 feet off the ground. The flour had been in place from 2-5 months.
(0) 230930 at $\mathrm{M} 6675401 / \mathrm{w}$ found another 3 tons of cover flour, near FSD Roundrock.
(p) 241330 at $176345433 / 1$ found 3 more tons of flour covered and stored on 2 foot platforms. The flour had been in place for $1-2$ months. 75 lbs of potatoes were discovered by 3/D near FSI Timbuktu after a brief contact with 3 individuals.
(q) 250930 at $Y T 6795431 / \frac{1}{1}$ found $6 \frac{1}{2}$ tons of flour near FSD Roundrock. It was covered and had been in place for $3-4$ weeks.
(6) Significant Events for September:
(a) 011610 at YT C00725 D Company received small arms fire and 1 LPG round. Results: 2 US WIA. Unknown enemy losses.
(b) 021215 et Yi794717 E Company while in $\varepsilon$ defensive position blowing a bunker complex, were engaged with $2 B-40$ rounds and a heavy volume of small arms fire by 7 NVA's. Results: 3 US WIA end unknown enemy losses.
(c) 041510 at YT 790714 A Company was engaged by sniper fire while on NDP. Results: 1 US KIA and unknown enemy losses.
(d) 030950 at $\operatorname{YT} 732715$ 1/i ene ged 10-12 indiv and received return small arms fire. Results negate ie friendly casualties enc 1 enemy KIA. Ie ter 1/D engaged 1-2 indiv attenting to dreg away a body. Results: 1 en KIA.
(e) 101500 YT 777695 E-Recon discovered 30 bunkers and 35 huts with waterproof thatched roofs. 5 Ihs of medical supplies wore also found.
(f) 259700 at YTV77713 i Company led by a Hoi Chanh, discovered a ceche contsining 234 rifle Erencdes, 1.30 cel MG, 4 M-1's, 1 SKS, 3 French meusers, $1 \mathrm{M}-3 \mathrm{~A} 1 \mathrm{sub} \mathrm{lig}, 10$ boxes 30 cal anm ( 500 rds ), 17 ceses CKC amo ( 8500 rds ), 7.75 RR rouncis and 6 CC grenedes. The cache hed beep in plece approx 3-6 months.
(g) Fron 26m30 Septenber, i Compeny operated at FSD Pece, (YT071383) receiving approx 11182 mm morter rounds causing 1 US IA, 1 KC KIA, and 3 KC WIA.
(h) The Tay Ninh Operetion commenced 23 September when the bettelion was elerted to provide a rifle comneny for security to en artillery FSD elong the Cambocien border. Within a few hours this mission wes chened to provide security for $t_{10}$ FSN's. Immediately, the consmies were reorgenized for the combet sumport capability. On 24 Sep a second rifle comeny was inserted into $F S i=\tilde{P}_{\text {ece }}$, end the originel rifle compeny wes reconsolide ted on FSD Ketum. On 20 Sep $\varepsilon$ s pert of TF Garry $0_{\text {wen }}$ the $1 / 12$ Cavelry was alerted to conduct a relief operction of $F S_{\text {S }}$ Ketum. On 30 Se , the battelion ( - ) conducted an airmobile asseult into FSD Lecysmith end fron there provided equick reection force to the main force winch comrised elements of the $2 / 11 \mathrm{ACR}$. The relief was completed on 1 Oct and the Iettelion returned to its nomal AO.
(7) Significant Events for October:
(a) Detween 1 and 21 October, A, $I$, end C Comeny elements received over 200 morter rounds and small anounts of $R R$ and rocket fires while supporting operetions in Tay Ninh province at FSE Pace (ficolici3).
(b) 101510 D Compeny found 3000 Ibs of flour neer FSI Roundrock YT677524.
(c) 261025, A Compeny engaged 3 indiv neer FSD Katie (YT164449) while setting up NDP. Results: Negative friendly casualties encl 1 enemy KIA.
(d) On 25 October elements from 1-12 discovered 33 bunkers and small amounts of supplies near FSD Katie.
(e) 291210 at YT157443 C Compeny's point men detoneted a booby trap and the main body detonated enother booly trep. Results: 1 US KIA and 5 US WIA.
(f) 301250 et YT157440 C Comeny ciscovered 10 bunkers containing 80 lbs of blenk cerbon sheets, a cuifle bae w/femele clothing, end a Russien flag. The items hed been in plece approx 3-4 days.
e. 2nd in 5tin Cav Opertions:

## CONFIDENTIAL

13 November 1971
SULJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, 3rd Dricade (Severete), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS GS FOR -65 (R3)
(1) Mission: During the period 1 May to 31 October 1971 the 2 d Dn , 5th Cav (AM) concocted ground and airmobile operations from six fere support bess (FSD) to locate end destroy headquarters MR -7 end elements of the 33d NVA Regiment.
(2) Execution: From 1 May until 23 July the battalion operated from FSD Evelyn in an area Generally east of Evelyn.: The mission was executed by assigning area of operations (AO) to exch company. The comment AO's were designed to exploit the best available intelligence workable et the time assigned. A company normally searched for enemy and caches within their AO for 15 days unless new intelligence required the assignment of new $A 0^{\prime}$ s. hater 15 dey operation in an $A O$ the company was normally moved to a fire base where it trained, defended the fire base, and assumed the reserve mission. From 26 July to 31 Oct the battalion operated from FSD Mace in the are generally north and south of lice. The concent of operations was similar to the concept used the previous 3 months. During the entire period the enemy avoided contact when possible.
(3) Significant events for May:
(a) 041030 at YTO 35081 D Con any discovered a. 20 bunker complex and a small cache which included 1 radio receiver, vie pious food stuffs, $12-15$ vials of medicine, assorted pots and pens, $100-150 \mathrm{ik} \mathrm{H}^{1}{ }^{\prime} \mathrm{s}$, and 1122 mm launching device.
(b) 110930 at YT 958106 the Recon ply engage 3 enemy, resulting in 1 US WIA and negative enemy assessment.
(c) 121000 CO D at YT917126 on 12 My engager 2 enemy who fled SW, Co D followed and engaged 7 enemy spotted in a base camp area with negative results. Found in the comp were 5 bunkles of foodstuffs, various items of clothing, 1 carbine me azine, 1 grenade, 2 trip flares, 1 N-16 cleaning kit, 25 lbs of rice and approximately 2 lbs of documents. The same day at YT GC7158 Co D spotted 2 enemy leaving a bunker complex; they were engaged by cobra gunship, artillery and smell arms. Results were $5 \mathrm{VC} / \mathrm{NVA} \mathrm{KIA}$ and 10 rucksacks, 4 oz documents, 10 first eld pouches, 200 lbs of rice, fresh fish, 1 ID card, 1 men cease end a hand drew map of Tan Sinh captured.
(d) 141240 at YT gठ2162 Co D discovered a 5 bunker complex, movement to $S E$ was engaged by small arms, greneces, and cobra gunship resulting in a heavy blood trail to SE.
(e) 151015 at Mr 979123 Co A was engaged by 1 enemy with 1 M79 round. Fire was returned, results were 1 US UIA, no energy casualties.

SUEJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, Ore Brigade (Senerate) 13 Never 1971 Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CS FCR-65 (RS)
(f) 171414 at YTCO3172 Co D discovered a cache of one bottle of wine and 200 lbs of rice covered with 2 NVA ponchos.
(g) On 27 May the bettelion opened FSD Jay (YT66230) and became operational at 1400 hrs .
(h) 200845 at YT 773262 Co had an automatic ambush active ted resulting in 3 NVA KIA and 1 NVA WIA captured. A small quantity of rice, 3 D-40 rockets, $1 \mathrm{AK}-47,2$ rucksacks; 3 R $G$ charges and various items of clothing were also cepturec. The same dey at YTCO7279 Co D located a 10 bunker complex and found 1 rucksack of clothing and $\delta \mathrm{lbs}$ of documents.
(i) 300945 at YT 304276 Co D encased 4 enemy resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 NSA $O W, 1$ AK-47 and 1 carbine captured.
(4) Significant Events for June:
(a) 010740 at $Y T 304276 C_{0} D$ had an automatic ambush activated by 2 enemy resulting in 1 heavy blood trail. At YTE'15243 Co A discovered a cache 2 feet above round which included 2 My carbines, 2 M 1 rifles 112 Ga shotgun, 4 SKI's, 1 Cal .45 pistol, 1 shiner scope, 2 LS gleynores, 1 case AK ammo, 1 case SKS and M1 ammo, 1 cess 146 mo, 5 US smoke grenades, 30 rounds cal . 45 ammo, 6 claymore wires, 2 j- 40 boosters, $11 \mathrm{M}-16$ magazines 312 Ga shells, 1 D 40 round, 1 claymore clacker and 5 Gl of Grease.
(b) 021400 at YTCOO258 Co A had an automatic ambush activated accicientally by rain resulting in 2 US injured.
(c) On 5 June the battalion moved a jump CP from FSD Evelyn (YT902118) to FSD Purr (YT766238) and closed FiSt Jay (Y T766230), by $1535 \mathrm{hrs}$.
(d) 071640 at YT 490157 Recon engaged 6 enemy with small arms and claymores resulting in $2 \mathrm{NVA} K I A$ end $2 \mathrm{AK}-47$ captured.
(e) 081000 at YT 501150 Recon spotted movement in a bunker complex and engaged with claymores and grendel. A Cobra gunship was requested and took GAF as did the Command Control (CC) shin. An airstrike was placed on the complex. Co jj searched the conifer end found 2 VC KIA and captured 1 pistol belt, sone grenades, and -40 boosters.
(f) 091100 att YT 4971C5 A/1-12, OPCON to $2-5$ Cen wens ambushed by estimated pit size enemy force using smell arms end is 40 's. Results were 4 US VIA, 1 NVA KIA, and $1: 40,1$ g mm rooter round and 1 peck captured. Later at YT497107 they found 2 pecks containing $1-40$ round, 160 mm mortar round, some AK-47 rounds, a smell amount of rice and rerijuene.

## AVDAGT- DOT

## Confidential

rt - Lessons Leerned, 3rd Brigede Operation Report - Lessons Learned, 3rd Drigede (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CS FOR -65 (R3)
(g) 110915 et YT 494151 Co I requested cobra gunships when they spotted movement in a bunker complex. A search revealed 1 NW A UTA who was captured and an enemy fleeing to the SW who was engaged with smell arms and gunship. Also spotted and enceged 6 other NVA resulting in 5 IVA KI.
(h) 130940 CoD et YT 506140 found 1 NVA KIA about two days earlier. At 1830 at YT473200 Co D engaged 2 enemy; a few minutes later they received $10-12$ 60 mm mortar rounds. Artillery was celled and small aras fire directed into the area, results were 3. US WIA and 2 IVA KIA.
(i) 140055 at YT 472202 CO D was engaged by small arm and jomoresulting in 3 US WIA initially. Firing resumed each time recovery of the wounded was attempted. Aerial field artillery (AFA) was employed. Contact continued sporedicly throughout the dey resulting in 5 US KIA, 12 US III, end 9 NSA KIA. 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA were the result of a short artillery round which fell into the FOS site. At 2300 hrs Ease Defense spotted a beacon SW of FSD Evelyn (X T902118), it was enceged with mortars and Arty and disappeared, simulta neously, movement was detected by radar in the trash dump and engaged with li79. Movement ceased.
(j) 151015 at $1474202 \mathrm{Co} . C$ was engecec by small arils, claymores, and 6 rds of mortar fire while atterpitne to retrieve the bodies of Co D's contact of the preceding dey. AEA was caller cir exr strilse was placed on the tinker complex, results were 17 US VIA, 1 US MA, and 2 NVA KIA. Co B at YT 463216 engaged $\delta-10 \mathrm{NVA}$. Cobra gunships were called and took GAF. Results were 2 IVA KIA.
(k) 161145 at YT470196 A/1-12 was engaged by smell $\varepsilon$ ri, grenade and mortar fire. Fire was returned with organics, AFA end an airstrike was called, Search of the area produced a" 4 bunker complex, 1 pair US: jungle boots, 1 pair ARVN boots, 1 B-40 rocket, 1 M 60 sling, a map of Saigon and 1 INA KivA.
(1) 171600 CO D at Y Y 474200 found 1 NVA body, 1 GI canteen, 1 knife and 160 mm morter round. Co $C$ at XT 474202 located a 25 bunker complex containing $5 \mathrm{~B}-40$ rounds, $1 \mathrm{M}-16$, $1 \mathrm{Mep}, 1 \mathrm{AK}-47$ magazine and 3 bodies in graves, 1 KIA and 2 KLA .
(m) 200940 at YT 471196 Co C found 2 rice coaches containing 800 lbs of rice.
(n) On 22 June the jump CF was moved from FSD Furl (Y T551134) to FSD Gail (YT654154).
(o) 221400 Co $E$ et YT 605179 he en automatic ambush ectivetec' resulting in 1 NV KIA.
(p) 260900 at YT 613195 Cobra Gunships encecod 1 NVA resulting in 1 IVA KpH. CS FOR-65 (R3)
(5) Sinnificent Events for July:
(a) 051610 at YT722100 Cobra gunships engaged 1 IVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA.
(b) 101400 at YT909147 Cobre gunships enceged 2 NVA, en eir strike was placed in tine area resulting in 4 NVAKDH .
(c) 170925 at ims 58090 Co Digaged 3 NVA resulting in 2 NVA KIA and 2 grenades ce:tured.
(d) 2113\% at YTC05202 Colve gunships engeged. 2 NVA resulting in 2 NVA KLH.
(e) On act uly FS Evelyn (YTg02113) wes closed and the battalion CP moved to FS: Mace (YT626112).
(6) Significent Events for August:
(a) Construction Wegen on FSS Wishart (YT5 4185 ) 3 August.
(i) 0610.'0 at YT-771118, Go A found 1. NVA body and 1 AK-47. Recon at YT501164 engeged 3 eneriy, fire wes returned vith ne ertive cesurlties.
(c) 051300 at YT574201 Co i contured 1 M16 recazine, 1 AK-47 rangazine, $700 \mathrm{M}-16$ rounds, 15 Ibs flour, 12 DA30's, 1 trinsistor radio and a small amount of various iters of equipment.
(a) 120000 at YT5 66204 Co i found 1 MT2 LAW, 25 lbs rice, 2 US claymores, 30 reds K54 awn , he ras $\mathrm{K}-47$ armo and 2 oz documents. Co $C$ at YT54323d found 1 ruck ssit, i Licon FSSH, 400 lbs rice and $\delta$ oz of documents.
 in one bloos ar .
(i) is 1020 at $\mathrm{YT}_{4} 0162$ Co C received $15-20 \mathrm{rds}$ of 82 mm with negative results.
(G) 250550 at $Y$ Tr 57596 Co Afcund 3 claymores daisy cheined around a tree, 1 box of nonmectrical bracting ceps, end 6 lbs of $C 4$ in a $P Z$ area. A truck convoy was ambushed at YT 432301 resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA. Cobre gunshis engeged with unknown enemy assessment.
(b) Sn:030 et YT492152 Co is found end destroyed 1 LAW and 20 lbs selt.
(7) Sindificent Events foinentember:
 Cevelly Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CS FORm65 (R3)
(a) 021700 at $Y 7483207$ Co C loceted 50 bunkers end found 1 Chinese radio (Unser) end 1 woidontificd netal hox.
(b) 071340 e.t YT496219 Co $C$ encesed 3 enemy resulting in 1 VC WIA PON.
(c) 081400 at YT568152 Cobra Gunships engaged 8 VC resuiting in 2 vC KII. Cobra gunships also spotted a 100 bunker complex et YT555152. Co D, at YT595245 found e ceche including 1 M carbine, 5 vises, $60-100$ smoke grenece fuzes, 4 anvils, 2 M79 stocks, 1 drill press, $44-40$ rounds, verious tools, 71 grencdes, 19 D 40 fuzes, 4 pecks conjer sulfete, 160 mm fuze, 1 gas mask, 19 lbs mert, 1 lb medical supviles, 1 ermo can of blesting cens, 200 ft time fuze, 13 betteries, 9 aK rounds 3022 cel rounds. 1 RXG Leuncher, 1 M 60 bolt, 40 M 6 rounds, 1 roll det cord, 1 amo cen of rivets end documents.
(d) 131345 a.t YT5030 244 Co D found 300 lbs rice.
(e) 201500 at YT57013今 Co L enge.ged by small arms, Ba 40 end claymore. Fire was returned end Cobre unshins celled. Results were 1 US KTA, 5 US WIA and 3 enemy KIA.
(f) 281530 at YT580135 Co 2 found 1 AT Grenede end 17.62 rifle in an 3 bunker complex.
(8). Simificant Events for October:
(a) 020955 et YT4 91199 engeged 5 enemy sitting around a bunker. Results were 5 NVA KTA end 2 K 54 pistols, 1 AK -47 , 1 M cerbine, 2 Swedish K SM6's, 1 Russian fleg and 4 ruck secks containing various clothing, meiicine, rice, and 15 libs of documents.
(b) 031030 CoC at YT490193 found 60 lbs of rice, 1 trpewriter and 10 megezines of M 16 emmo. Co A at YT4 $\$ 56177$ loceted a 15 bunker complex and found 2 bicycles, 2 US helmots, 2 syringes, 1 RPG, 1500 lb bomb used as water container, on oven and 20 AK magraines.
(c) 061300 at YT498186 Co A found a ceche above ground conteining 4 chicom cleymores, 2 Vietnamese tyje shape cheres, end 1 walkie telkie.
(d) 000900 Co A at YT500192 found a cache above ground containing 2 sandbegs, ecch of rice and fl our.
(e) 101430 Co C at YT470195 found an ebove eround ceche conteinine 100 1 bs of rice end $50-75$ bege of noodles. At YT 500192 Co C found 1 SKS, 1 MH carbine, an unknown type of Chinese autonetic weron, 5 shovels, and 2 saw bledes leyine on the ground.

AVDAGT~DOT
Report - Lessons Leernec, 3rd Lrize (Se iovember 197 Coviror Division (Aimoile), Pemioc Enin. 31 Octoper 1971, RCS CS FOR-S5 (R3)
(f) 111100 CoC ct YT 499199 found 40 los of rice, 0.100 1t beg of corin, 20 lbs of sugcr, 1 civ radio, 1 typewritcr, 1 gellon soybeen oil anc. assorted mericrl supilies.
(g) 14045 et $\operatorname{YT} 494195$ Co $C$ found e chicom orenceie end 1 chicom mine laying on the eround.
(i) The bettalion noved a jump CP to FSD Wishert (YT504105) end returned to FSL Mace (YT625112) on 23 October.
(i) The bettilion mover e jump CF to YT156269 on $25^{\circ}$ Ootober.
(j) 260915 ct YY 540359 a US convoy wes embushei. by enemy using smell ems. Results were 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA.
(k) 271130 the bettelion jump CP moved from Yr150209 to FSD Shemen (YT210375). FSE Nece (YTS26112) reportec. receiving smell ams fire from 2 indiv 100 meters $W$ wi the perimeter. They were encered by MP's and evaled.
(1) 290820 the bettelion CP returned to FSE Mece (YMG2S112). A gonvoy
 cms. Fire wes ruturned with cuce 50 's ene smell ams. There were no cesurlties.

## f. 2nd Dettion, Stio Cevelry Opertions:

(1) Mission enc Ares of Onertions: $2 / 0$ 's nission, lise the rost of the infentry bettelions, wes to fin? ence destroy the enery forces ene his supy ceches ane essist in Viotnemizetion. The are of opertions for nerrly the entire perior consistec of the northern slopes of the ini ie mountein complex tereeted agcinst eloents of the RSG of MR-7. Oper tions were ilso concucted north of GI-1 in Irse Arec. 305; this erec housed elements of HC, 1st, ent ?nd In's, 33rd NVA Reginent.
(2) Significint Eronts for My:
(a) 021410 e.t YTC $610713 / 0$ found 10 reccntly constructer huts, numerous tebles, fire sites, coconut crusling blocks, end nunerous empty C-Retion cons. The area wes loctor in thicle im rove sithe capacity for $20-25$ individuals.
(3) 037520 E-Recon ct YT7S200C, NW of FES Font-sine, onceged 4 indiv with unlmown results. Cepture docwnents inciceted tint they were members of the RSG.
(c) 041545 at YT501930, E-Recon hed AA etoneted resultin in 2 fem le eneny wounced ane cotured. PW told KCS that they e ne fron hosvitel south of Nui Le where VC were uncer trectment PN evce to Vece of died of vouncs. Results: 2 en KIA.

## AVDAGT-DOT

13 November 1971
SUEJECT: Opertion Renort - Lessons Lerrned, 3rd Iricece (Seperete), 1st Gavilry Division (Airmobile), Perioc Encince 31 October 1971, RCS CS FOR-65 (H3)
(d) 111645 et YS 816975 2/D wes engeged $\mathrm{W} / \mathrm{SA}$ and returner fire. Pk Tm end AFA collec. Results: 1 US WIA end untnown en losses.
(e) 121010 et YSS1597s C Comeny found 500 lb dried fish end 10 pr brown plastic senacls. Cache wes used in lost 2 crys. D Comeny at YT77002 1315 cisc. 3 en KIA, $3 \mathrm{AK}-47^{\prime} \mathrm{s}$ dest. and 100 lis com end 40 lbs flour scattered in crer of preplannec. $\mathrm{A} / \mathrm{S}$ conductec 29 Avril.
(f) $4411302 / \mathrm{C}$ et YSci5975 eng smell en force with rT spt. Results: neg foly ces. 1 en IIIA. At 1200 the PT eng 2 Inciv. Results: 1 en Kirio 10 lbs clothine, 600 los rice, 5 lbs tobecco, 5 lbs plestic bes, end 10 liss crepe pener wore ceptured.
(g) 150900 at YS\$45050 1/C founc 10 mo old ceche site necr e stream bec. Cont 1500 IUs selt, 15 Ibs brown sugcr, 20 lbs rice flour; end a smell enount of rice.
(i) 261610 at YTS45853 EmRecon founc e. 10 bunker corplex with huts built on top, 1 cless room w/sleepine positions, and snell rmounts of meìicel supulies.
(3) Significint Events for June:
(c) 061225 ct YS547956 B Conpeny, while in crabush pen eng cpprox 16 inciv. Pr Tm otsr: 2 en KIA.
(b) 071530 at YS542963 E-Recon en 3 indiv results: 1 en KIA, and 1 blood trail disc. $1 \mathrm{AK}-47$ end smell enat of clothin ence emo capt.
(c) 210745 EmRecon c.t YI 795010 were encried by $10-15$ eneny ind returned fire with ore, AFs, erty, enc FAC. Results: 3 en KIA, $2 \mathrm{AK}-47 \mathrm{I} \mathrm{s}, 1 \mathrm{M}-16$, 1 Nm 79 , and 96 liss of food cept. is Conpeny at 1525 at YT792036 eng 1 indiv w/AFA resulting in 1 on KIA.
(d) 260835 at YT7coosis 2/A enc 4 indiv with PT, arty, and FAC. Results: 1 en KIA. 6 bunliers were elso found. At $14,054-5$ indiv vere ens by PI and FAC. Results: 1 en KIA, 3 blood trails enc drag mirks.
(e) 270330 at YSci46947, D Comeny founc 3000 lbs flour, 250 Ibs rice, 200 libs sclt, 3 sowins mech nos, 280 liss cloth in bolts, 100 pr unfin, trousers, and smell at of meny other misc items.
(f) 284215 a.t YS84́O45 D Compeny found 700 Ibs rice ence 200 Ibs selt unier brush coverec w/ponchos.
 night before SA . 3 AK-47's vere also copturec. At 1115 D Co founc. 4 tons of flour \& 72 Ibs of yeast.


SULJECT: Opertion Report - Lessons Iermec, 3rd Iricice (Seperete), 1st Cevelry Division (Aimobile), Period Encing 31 Cctover 1971, RCS CS FCR-65 (R3)
(h) 301100 ct Yr $7760691 / \mathrm{s}$ found 25 sunkers with OHIC user in the pest 24 hours.
(4) Simjeficnt Events for 'July:
(a) 031245 nt YŞ20965 D Comeny enc one indiv. Results: 1 PW. PW stated he ves c. squed ldr. Wis mission wes to provice fooc. for VC Iong Khenh HQ.
(b) 001115 et YT7780 22 A Compeny found e. 200 kkr complex in good condition w/recent use in lest tro veeks.
(c) 141005 while on bese defense at FSL Femninc (YT750987) rec 1 xe sniper fire. Returned fire with oim mortre and 106mi Rr. Results: 11 US WJA.
(d) 231700 e.t Yr 737007 C Compeny dis 20 klrs enc 20 huts. Recent use in past 10 hrs .
(5) Si-nificent Events for Auput:
 1st Co , 2nd In , 33 rc NVA Rest. Irce carm wis loceto in vic of rui Onc.
(b) 071030 while in $\operatorname{IDP} 3 / 5$ ong 5 indiv ct Yre 06057 . Rec'c. ret SA chel j-40 rkt fire. 4 Fh anc. FAC spt recic. Rosults: 1 WW fron 5th Co, 33 NVA Rect on resungly risn.
(c) 131640 ह.t FSi Silver (YTOZS042) rec, 7 rols 6omm ntr fire. Results: 3 US VIIA.
(c) 171100 e.t YTS15071 C Compeny cisc epmrox 75 blers w/OFC enc. Huts on top. 2Iso founc 4 clescroons $\mathrm{w} / 2$ rows of thles. Arer cprox 900 n in lenth w/recont use in lest 3 nonths.
(o) 251050 et YTc02127 2 Comprny isc oprox 40 bkrs, 3 kitchesn, 130 cepecity clessroon, and $\hat{0} 0$ wire caclen tross w/recent use.
(6) Significcnt Eyents for Sentogler:
(a) 141305 at Yr 709079 A Comp ny anc 1 inciv $w /$ ne: return fire. Pr and AFA collec. Secrch of ero isc 2 lurs.
(b) 191050 at $177691423 / 5$ set up a hroty embuch anc ene 2 inciv rec rotum Sif fire. Recults: 1 en KIA ni 1 hesvy blood trl. Nof friendily ecs.

## AVDAGT-DOT

Confidential
13 November 1971
SULJECT: Operction Reoort - Lessons Lecrnec, 3rc Irisade (Seperete), 1st Cavelry Division (Airmolile), Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CS FOR-65 (R3)
(c) 241040 at HT 783070 A Compeny was eng by SA ence All by 6-10 indiv.

(c) 261700 c女 YS731934 E-Recon eng 3 inciv. w/neg ret fire. T, AFA enc erty surortei. Results: NeG friencly ces. 2 en KIA $3 \triangle K-47{ }^{\prime} \mathrm{s}, 1 \mathrm{I}-40 \mathrm{Rkt}$, 5 Vim 79 rds, enc. a small ent of med supplies were captured.
(e) 270550 at YTrs3074 A Compeny disc. 15 bunkers. Tables and neps of provinces and FSD. Smell ants of supplies were also found.
(7) Simificont Events for October:
(e.) 031040 a.t YT786084 A Co was enc w/4 SOm morticr ris. PT, AFA, FAC, end erty snt rec. Results: 3 US WIA, 1 en KL Arty.
(b) 101045 D Co e.t YTr777095 found 9 blrs , 3 kitchens, 1 clessroom, 2 letrines end wood cerved mock-up of helicopter. Dkrs vere living and fighting type.
(c) 131050 C Co at YT7550今9 found $16 \mathrm{bkrs} \mathrm{w} / \mathrm{tunnels}$ between 6 blirs . Also disc 1 D -40 KL end 2 graves.
(d) 162135 at YSS47987 E-Recon enç 5 indiv enc. rec ret $S A / A N$ fires, AFA, flere, and arty suryortce. Results. 4 en KIA. Nee friencly ces.
(e) 211600 et YSG18925 C Compeny wes eng by 1 inciv w/SA. Felys ret fire. Results: 1 US KIA, 1 en Ki Pk Tin.
(s) $220 \% 40$ et YSOT1929 2/D was enc $\mathrm{w} / \mathrm{SA}$ and $3 \mathrm{Mr}{ }^{\prime} \mathrm{s}$. FClys ret fire. PT, AFA, end FAC supported. Fesuits: 1 US WIA.
(G) 291300 at YS 8079252 and $3 / D$ disc, 13 blars. Also founc 940 mn ris. $520 \mathrm{~mm} \mathrm{rcs} .31 \mathrm{oc-4}$ and small amts of food and mecicel supplies.

## G- Go. H (Renizers) 75th Inf (Am) Opertions:

(1) Mssion enc Erecution: During the reportin: period, Compeny E (RAIGER) contirued to provice lons renge reconnciss nce end surveillence for the 3d Dee (Sej), 1st ACD. Renfer Fetrols continued to be ceployer accordine to current enemy activity with the emphesis boing pleced on the recovery of documents end positive i'entificetion of enemy routes of movenent. During this reporting period Co $I$ (RAMGER) employe 110 petrels of whech 70 ande sightings of enemy personizel resulting in 60 encicenents. These encegements yielded $94 \mathrm{VC} / \mathrm{NVA} \mathrm{KIA}, 13$ deteinees, 101 indivicuel wecpons, epmoxintely 150 its of cocunents. For the perioce there were not eny Rencer KIf or WIA.

AVDAGT DOT
13 Noverber 1971
SUTJECT: Operction Report - Lessons Lecrneत, 3rd Dri ecie (Seperete), 1 st Cavelry Division (Ajmobile), Period Encing 31 Octoler 1971, RCS CS FCR-65 (R3)
(2) Sjenificent Events for May:
(a) 061340 at YT590225 Rencer petrol 42 wes noving ilone a Ne-sil trail when the atrol herre voices 50 m to their iw. The petrol moved. NE 35 m and observed 9 inciv; 4 sitting et e teble end 5 st-ncing. They wore bleck PH's c.nc. one AK-47 w.s observec leaning eceinst the trible. At 1350 hours 1 indiv cerrying a $A K-47$ becen to move towers the petrols locetion. The petrol ence.e? the inciv with smell erms fire resultine in 1 enemy KIA. The petrol then engeged the renining indiv with small arms fire end received hocvy return
 LIues enc: e. section of AFA from $\mathrm{C} 2 / 20 \mathrm{C}, \mathrm{V}$. The petrol then observec two incividucls Sy 40 m 1 comin; a. $\mathrm{E}-40$, the other en AK-47. The pitrol engeged the individuels with small arms enc' recotvec ne cetive rurn fire with the indivicucls evecin, to the SW. Contect broke at 1355 hours with negrive friencly cousilities. At, 1430 hours the blues were inserted end noved towercs the petrols locetion. At 1445 hrs with the blues end petrol lin'ed upe svocp of the contict wes mede finding: 1 enery KTA, 1 AK-47, 1 . 45 C C.I nistol, 1 SKS, 1 Germen sten, 4 D- 40 rounds, numerous cens of fooc, 7 NVA Poncho's 1 neir sencles, 1 set of NA Kheki, 2 lus of pills, essortec? toothbrushes, rezors and soan, ent 3 livs of cocurnonts. At 1500 hours the patrol enc blues moved SSV 600 m to YT5 57220 end wero extrecter by D1/9 Cov.
(b) 001400 t. y patrol observe? 6 inclivicuels novinc west on the trin. The in ivicucls were wer rinj wen fetiges, cerring AK-47's, pecks ene web jer. When the indiv were front of the petrols locetion the patrol then ettanta? to heve the infovicuils surrencer. The enemy ime iatly raised their wecpops and sti rtec? to envece. The potrol enecee the individucls with claymore mings and smoll erms fire toing hecvy return fire in return. (Approx - 180 res) tie petrol recuostad e. pink tera from $51 / \mathrm{C}$ Cav, $\mathrm{I} / / \mathrm{C}$, Cav blues, end e section of AFA fron $02 / 20$ Cev. Contret broke at 1410 hrs with negetive exiencly ceusilities. At 125 hrs the lues vere inserted into the cont ct erge end linled with the $p$ trol. A sweep of thentict cree was then merid fincire: of enery KIAIs, $7 \mathrm{AK}-47^{t_{s}}$, 1 hervy blooc. ticil leadin: vost, 9 pecks contrininí rice ( 225 lbs ), 2 poncho's and assortec person'l equimiont. Also $1 \frac{1}{2}$ lis of cocunents were founc. The blues thon followe? the klood treil west wile the petrol was extrictec by licGuire Rigs a.t 1550 hrs.
(c) 140845 e.t YT310217 Renger Pe.trol 75; wile monitoring e NE-SW trail the petrol observe three in jutuels rovine se the treil. The etrol observed thet the indv vere ormin. $\min 47$ 's. At DC46 hrs the petrol engeged. the indiv with cleymore mines ae and ers, receivin; corox 30 round of
 a section of $\operatorname{IFf}$ fron $\mathrm{C} 2 / 20 \mathrm{C}$ av. Tho otrol then mover into the contret area. end enceced the eroe futher with frement tion crene"cs. The petrol then observed 1 inciv thet apor ree wounce hicine bohind a tree. Thi netrol wes tien engeged with 3 =-40 rds. The returnec fire witil mill erms. Contect broke e.t 0905
CONFIDENTIAL
hrs with negative friendly arcuitics The petrol then moved into the contact cree foin end four: 1 enemy KIA, 1 AK-47, 3 megezines ( 80 rounds), 1 US flashlight, pistol belt, and 1 quart canteen cover, 1 set of DATA boots, 1 WA poncho, ane 1 hammock, They also observer 2 blood trails lecce west. At 0940 hrs the blues were inserted end at 1045 hrs linked up with the patrol. At 1100 hrs the petrol end blues follower: th: blood trails west 25 m end found 3 AK-47 megezines ( 90 round) enc one set of chest web Ger. The petrol then observed 1 india west 10 m . The petrol captured the indiv enc. found hin to be wounder. First aid was administered end medivec requested. After the indio weiss given first, aid the Kit Carson Scout with the petrol west tole by the POW the $\varepsilon$ bunker complex consisting of 3 bunkers wes located in the vicinity of YT 316233 and that 29 indiv were their armed with $26 \mathrm{AK}-47^{7}$ 's and 2 - $-40^{\prime} \mathrm{s}$. At 1200 hrs the petrol, blues end FOW moved. N 300 m to YT 309219 were et 1225 hrs the POW we evecuntoce. At the some location e tricker teem we insortoc The patrol, blues, fond trackers then moved SW 2700 m to YT 279204 where et 1450 hrs they were extracted with negative further findings.
(d) 161630 at YT 306221 Ranger Ti 71, while setting un ambush on a. NE -SW trail c. security element to the petrous SW 15 m observed 1 indio SUV 10 m erred with e. carbine. Tho. security element an ado the individual with smile oms fire and received negative return fire, The petrol requested a pink tm from $\mathrm{L} / / \mathrm{S} \mathrm{C} \mathrm{Cv}$ end e section of AFA from $\mathrm{C} 2 / 20 \mathrm{Ce} . \mathrm{v}$. The petrol then moved into tile content cree enc found 1 enemy KIA, 1 SKS combine, 1 magazine ( 11 r's), 1 green shirt, 1 prim treen shorts, 1 set of Ho Chi iginisencels, cadi 1 Infighter. At 1730 irs the petrol moved WSW 1700 m to YT 295215 and att 1800 hrs were extracted by i 1/g Gev.
(e) 211000 at YT 550002 Ranger Petrol 76, wile monitoring e. Edo trill the patrol observed four indiv moving to the east on the try. They all wore black bents and green shirts,curyini; undetermined types of weapons. The petrol encage the individuals with claymore nines and smell arms fire, toking nestive return fire. The patrol requested a pink trim $\pm 1 / \mathrm{S}$ Gev and a section of AFA from C $2 / 20 \mathrm{Cev}$. The petrol mover into the contract area and found 4 enemy KIA's, 2 Russian subnechine ins, 1 SKS enc to sewing mr chines. At 1100 hrs the petrol was extracted. by $21 / \mathrm{C}$ Gev.
(f) 221015 ft YSS64952 Reneger Petrol 76, while monitoring e Eur trill the petrol observed two inciviculs moving to the west on the trial. The petrol observed the inciv armed with $A K-47^{\prime}$ s. At 1016 hrs the petrol enc re? the indiv with claymore nines chic smell cams fire toking negative rotum fire. The patrol moved into the contact rarer end found: 3 energy $K I A, A K-47^{\prime}$ s, 7 magazines ( 200 rials), 3 pecks, full, 2 ios of cocunents were found. At 1130 irs the petrol was extrectoc by it $1 / 9 \mathrm{Cev}$.
(3) Significant Events for June:
(a) 041140 YT 510242 Rener Ptrol 74, Wile monitorins $\varepsilon$. N-S tril the prol ofserve 4 in'iv cme. with AK-47's moving south on the trail. At
 recojvin: opproxituly 5 rouncs of return fire. The potrol recueste? c. pink
 the Dluos were insorte? ene et 1240 hrs linked un with the pitrol to mede e swoep of the cont ct revis. They founc: 4 en KTA's, 3 AK-47, $1 \mathrm{M}-16$, $8 \mathrm{AK}-47$
 shell rnount of cocuments. Three of the KIA's wore reen frtious, the other Dlecls Wh. At 1330 hrs the petrol ond blues mover WiW 300 m to YT516243 and at $1 / 00 \mathrm{hrs}$ were extrectes hy 1/9 Gev.
(b) 041400 et 50033 Patrol 76, while ch ckinc a tril junction of a NW
 trail to the $S$. Tho inciv wes olserve. cerrin; e. Ar-47. At 1401 hes the petrol encece the ineivicul with small ars fire cm? roceive ne etive roturn fire. The petrol recuesto? ? pial tecin from $1 / / 9 \mathrm{C} V \mathrm{~V}$ ? a s ction of AFA fron C2/20 C.v. The petrol nove. into the contret eree enc. foun': 1 en KIA, 1 AKm47, 3
 norsomal equip on e smely anount of cocunents. The Kit was wer rine bleck
 wes extrected by MoGuire Ricely -1/9 Cev.
 junction the petrol observe". 5 in iv erityinc: AK-47's movin south on the lowin. ri. At 1301 hre the perol onwor the in iv's with cleyrore mines en : cmill cris fire, tekin no tive roturn fire. To pirol recueste a Pink
 hrs the bl ues inserte en? linle? up with the petrol. A check of the cont ct

 of whe ciest vel er. At 1405 hrs the netrol in "lues were extrecte, et IT $655051 \mathrm{WJI} / \mathrm{Cl} \mathrm{C}$.
(1) 21040 -t YSC59971 Frtrol 76, while monitorin e ins lo in roce the petrol olsurv 3 incive cerryin $k=-47$ 's novin' to the north of the roce. At 1041 hrs the trol en cer the incivi urls with cleymore minos rn: mell cris firn, trin nétive rotum fire. The otrol recuested o pink tern
 prtiol checke. out the cont ct cror m. foun: 3 onery IFIn, $1 \mathrm{AK}-47,1 \mathrm{AK}-50$, 1 K 54 pistol, 3 pecrs cont ini miscellencous ecuigent, clothin, an food, on? 61 lhs of ocurconts. fill thre were we rine miro. ble one reen shirts, one with Ho Chi kin senlos. one with bitaboots ene the other with GI boots.
 up. At 1200 has tho blucs en petrol wove? 400 ra to $\mathbf{Y} 665071$ ens. ot. 1425 hrs wero entrectu? 1/s Cev.

## AVDAGT-DO

## Confidential

13 November 1971
SUIJECT: Oper tion Report - Lessons Learner, 3rd Drigaie (Sepercte), 1st Cevelry Division (Airmobile), Perioc. Encin:; 31 October 1971, RCS CS PTR-65 (R3)
(e) 230830 at YS 840958 Ren er Petrol 71, while monitoring a. EwW treil the petrol observec two inciv one crivinc. Al-47 movine to the west on the trl. At 0831 hrs the petrol encied the inciv with cliymore mines an" snoll erms, tikinc, necetive return fire. The prtrol recuested a pink term from D1/G Cav, Ly/C Dlues, and e. section of AFA from C2/20 Cov. At 0910 hrs the blues were insertor enc e.t 0930 hrs linked up wh the petrol to coneruct a sweep of the cont ct nrec fincin: 2 en KIA's, 1 AK-47, 3 AK-47 mezezines ( 90 rls ), 1 K 54 pistol, 1 neçazine, ( 5 rds ), 1 set chest web gerr, 1 aistol blet (U.S.) 1 frek contrinin; miscelleneous clothine enc food. Also $\frac{1}{2}$ lb cocuments were found. At 1010 hrs the petrol and blues moved. W 50 n enc at 1015 hrs were extricte? by $\mathrm{DI} / 9$ Cev.
(f) 241505 et YT532229 Petrol 75, while monitorine a E-W trl the petrol
 to the west on the trl. At 1507 hrs the petrol observe? three more incliv cocrying $A K-47$ 's movin: west on the treil. At 1508 hrs the pe.trol encrec the inciv with cleymore miens one smell ems fire tckin, ne otive return fre.
 AFA from C2/20 C.V. At 1515 hrs the retrol checke? the contret arer nd found 3 enery KIA's, 3 AK -47 's, 7 AK-47 megezines ( 200 reis), 3 mocks contrininc. miscelleneous fooc, personnel equipment anc $\frac{1}{2}$ Ib of cocuments. All three were werin: Green fetioues and Ho Chi Minh sandels. At 1540 hrs the blues were insertec anc linlec $u_{F}$ with the petrol. At 1040 iurs the patrol and blues noved. SE 100 m to YT5 $5322 \delta$ en. c.t 1750 hrs were extrectes by D1/9 Cev.

## (4) Sirnificent Events for July:

(a) 071010 at YS794013 Petrol 73, while monitorine: 2 NW-sE ronc, the petrol observec on ostartid 10 inciv some acryincak-47's movine: SE on the rd. At 1011 hra the petrol entrec. the inciv with cleymore mines enc smell arms fire tcking negetive return fire, the petrol recuested e pink tm from i1/9 Cev, $51 / 9$ blues, nd a section of AFA from C2/20 Ccv. At 1035 hrs the blues were inserted and linked up with the petrol. At 1040 hrs the arteol end blues checked the cont ct arer fincin; 7 enery KIA's, 6 AK-47's, of AK-47 neyezines ( 200 rds ) 5 pecks contrininc miscellencous clothinc, nersonnel ecuipment, foo:, and $\frac{4}{2}$ ib of cocuments. The indiv were wer rinc 2 minture of green shirts, bleck pents, ent civilion clothing. At 1130 hrs the petrol encl bluos noved NE 100 m to YS759014 ane et 1245 hrs were extricte? by D 229 Ccv.
(b) 220735 tt YT73610g Rencer Petrol 77, while monitoring a. N-S road, the petrol observec two inciv crrryine unknown types of werpons movin to the $S$ on the road. At 0736 hre the petrol engege the ine'iv with cleymore mines ane smell erms fire, tebin newtive ruturn fire. The prtrol recuested e pink tha from M1/16 Cav. At 0755 the pretrol checke the conte ct crec and found 2 en KIA's, 1 en WIA, 1 Russien submechine un, 3 mr,azines ( 50 ris), $\frac{1}{2}$ lb of documents, 2 US pistol belts, 2 centeens with covers (US). The oatrol anninisterec first cic on the eneny WIA. At 0850 hrs the POW was extrectec by $c$. mecivec bircl. At 0900 hrs the petrol moved SE 300 m and e.t 0930 hrs were extrected by H1/16 Gev.

AVDAGT~DOT
13 Novembur 1974
SUEJEGT: Oper tion Roport - Leswons Lecrne., 3rr. Drionce (Sencrate), 1st Ccvelry Division (Aimobile), Perio. Enin 31 Octobor 1971, RCS CS FOR-65 (r3)
 observe? 2 inciv orming $K=47^{\prime}$ s movin: NW on the tril. At 1106 the patrol encegel the inciv with clemore mines one smoll cms fire tikine nejetive return fire. The petroz resuestoe a pink teen from $11 / 16$ C.v. At 1135 hrs the petrol checke.: the controt rmi found 2 en KTA, 2 AK-47's, 6 meszines ( 100 ris), 2 poncho's (US), 2 pistol belts (US), 1 peck cont-inin: miscelleneous personnel ecuipment, fooc, 3 oz cocuments. One in ivicurl wes rorin. bleck prats, freen shirt, anc. Ho Chi Minl snedels, while the otier hec ereen pents, rey shirt, ence pine ponc sencels. At 1250 hrs the petrol move? Su 300 m to YTo18994 and c.t 1320 hrs they were extr ctec. by $\mathrm{H} / 16 \mathrm{C}$ C.v.
(a) 280030 at Y 541239 Petrol 76, while nonitoring $a$ iWhSE re the petrol observe, one in iv movin; St on the re. The inciv wes emryingr V-1 cerije. The petrol enceo the incivicucl with cleymore mines. The petiol rervest d c. ink trif fron $\mathrm{H} / 16 \mathrm{Cev}$. At 0335 hrs the petrol observes 1 intiv movin into the contact arec corrying a li-1 cribine. The bretrol engeged the indiv with smell cmas fire tolcin. nertive return fire. At 0840 hrs the pritrol checked tic contect crer onc. found 1 en KIA, 1 Nm 1 certine, 1 ne ck with 25 lbs of rice insice, $1 \mathrm{M}-1$ crrine meszine (10 res), cua one blood tril lecing NE.
The KIA wore bleck pents, Green shirt, Green het, anc ping ponc senicls. At
 1 mozezine (10 ris), 1 pocle contrinin; 2 flectis hts (US), tro herrocks, 2 ponchos (US) 2 oz cocuments an fur le clothin. it 0,05 his the netrol moved INE 200 n to YT 541241 where it 1000 hrs tioy were extrector by M1/16 Cev.
(e) 291100 et YT5 570170 Fetrol 73, wile nonitorins e. E-W tril, the netrol observe? one in iv cerryine en AK-47 movin to the erst on the trl. At 1101 tho petrol enw $\}$ the in iv with clemore minos ne smell cris fire receiving
 lus the petrol checine the contect aree in. Sound 2 eneriy KIA's, 1 AK-47, 3 me ranes ( 90 ras ), 1 Czuch verbon, 1 magozine ( 30 rcs ), 2 pistol belts (US), 2 contions (US), 1 pel continine personn-l ecuiownt, foon, nce anow ib of cocments. fit 115 hre the etrol mover. NW 300 m to 17570171 where at 1300 his were extrectoe w. 1/16 Cov.
(f) 291600 t $\mathrm{Y} S 56945$ Petrol 72, while on roun roconnesence, observed 25 incivi urls 420 m of their loction. They wore we rine mixu? color clothing, 10 cerrie? wewons, 15 e rrin, ects enc. sever lith pith helmets. The petrol

 petrol ohserve? 3 in iv 20 m of tore loction. The petrol requesten two sections of AFA fron $F / 79 \mathrm{CV}$. At 1640 hrs the prtrol wnge? the indiv with smell rxms. At 1655 ins the petrol chocko the contretrres anr foun 1 enemy KIA, werrinc bleck pents, rey shirt en 0 Chi Minh sincls, 1 AK-47, 1 set of NVA chest web er $r$, 3 AK-47 merzines ( 90 ris) 2 7. peck filled with flour (105 10s). The petrol mover Ie 25 m en foun 1 lo; tillo, with 9 prels contrining
 hrs they wore extrecte? by D 229 Co.v.

SUDJECT: Oper tion Report - Lessons Lecrne?, 3ri. Mriccie (Senerate), 1st Covelry Division (Ammile), Perio: Entine 31 October 107, RCS CS TOR-65 (R.3)
(G) 311550 at YTC00017 Petrol 77, while nonitorin: 6 ims tri the petrol herr? movemont con? olserve? 2 inciv in 1 m of their loc tion. Doth in iv carried AK-47's. The patrol enceced the indivicuals with eleymore mines and smell arms fire anc recolve sonctic smell exas fire in return. The potiol recuestode pink tarth from $\mathrm{H} / 1 / 6 \mathrm{C}, \mathrm{v}$ ence a section of APh from $\mathrm{F} / 79$ Cav. At 1730 hrs while ciecking out the contect aree the patrol ocme under firo from smell ryms. The patrol retumed firc with cont-ct breckinc frmeinetcly enc. rusultine in one enery KIA, 2 US WIA, (very sli ht). The petrol nove ceeper into the cont ct arec me founc nother enemy KIA, 3 blood trls, 2 AK-47's, $2 \mathrm{AK}-47 \mathrm{mr}$ mines (empty), end one empty peck. At 1000 hrs the petrol move? W 300 m to YI797017 where e.t 1820 they were extrected by H $1 / 16$ Cev.

## (5) Significent Events for Auzust:

(c) 041935 et YT640615 Rencor Petrol 75, while monitorin escapen cocleine site the petrol obscrved 3 Indiv 20m wost of the dockinc site. At 1950 hrs the petrol observec 20 nore inividuels errive ct the coching site. All the indiv ourrie AK-4's, rucksecks, chost wh cer, rinc were resson in bleck or creon uniforms en werin; Ho Chi Min' scmecis. Three of the inciv vere femrle. At 2015 hrs the petrol observec. throesompens arrive at the dockin; site cerring two incivicurls in occh scmpen. The Kit Cerson Scout with the patrol overie re the in?iv tolrine an? translatce as thet thirty people would
 the SONG DING SAI river, The lest scmen left the petrols locetion s.t 2230 hrs ,

On 050230 the patrol heres voices ene movement of coprox $\delta$ inciv conine fron the $\mathbb{E}$ anc stoppinc et the cockin; site. The indiv renr.ined c.t this loction until 0530 then left movine south. At 0800 the petrol crossed the streem and founc a Nu treil, enother cockin: site, slecpina ereas one comp fire pits. At 1000 the petrol set up to monitor the erec. At 1030 the petrol observa one scmer novin: iE wh one incivicurl in it. The sabon circled the cocline crer then herdec beck the wry he come. At 1945 hrs the yetrol observe? 8-12 indiv comin, from the south into the iociinemren. The mojority of the indiv corryins pecks end AK-47's. At 2015 ins the petrol hecre $e$ uncetermined size force move into the doclines sitc. The petrol coulc herr trjhing and observed 12 of arotios beinc smoked within his arabush site. at 2030 hrs the petrol recuester a flere shio one two sections of EFA from F/79 Ceverith the airomft on station at 2045 hrs the petrol encreac the enery with claymore mines and $h n c$. arences. At 2150 hrs the patrol wes extrected by McGuire Rics by D229 Cav.

On 06 Au ust the petrol end $\mathrm{H} / 16$ Cev Diues were inserted into the contect exec. fintinc: 4 enery KIA's, 3 AK-47's, 1 Czeck asscult rifle, 2 proars, 2 sets of chest wob Cerr, 9 AK-47 megrzines ( 270 res), 1 Czeo megezine, ( 30 res), 2 liss of cocuments and a 5 crilon con contcininj crs an oil. The petrol and blues clso foun numerous ree marks which incicetc? thet some of the KIA's hed bocn drecer off. From the petrols fincines they estimeted there were 20-30 indivicurls in the contect.

AVDAGI-DOT


SUJJET: Opurtion Report - Lessons Learne', 3re Erime (Sencrete), 1 st Ceviry Division (Aimolile), Perio? Enin; 31 Octoder 197, RCS CS FOR-65 (R3)
(b) 051300 et YT5072.9 Prtrol 71 while nonitorinj $\approx$ IS tril the petrol olservec three indivemaind $A K-47^{\prime}$ s movine to the north. At 1301 hrs the petrol encer. the inciv with claymore mines an? small cims fire trinc licht return fire. The netrol recuested e pink tem from $1 / 16$ Cev ene e section of AFA from $\mathrm{F} / 79 \mathrm{Cev}$. . Contect broke ot 1305 hrs with ne At 1430 hrs the blues were inserter en linlie? up with the petrol to swep the contict crer. The sweep found: 4 en KIA's, two AK-47's, tro AK-47 mazines ( 60 res) 4 packs and two blood trils. Also $\approx$ smell amount of cocuments were cepture. At 1530 hrs the pitrol ene Llues noved E 200 m to YT $56922^{\circ}$ where e.t 1500 hrs they were extrected by E1/16 Ccv.
(c) 0 01630 et YT640620 Petrol 76, while monitorinc e. N-S tre il the petrol observe 1 inciv crryince AK- 47 novinc to the south. At 1831 the petrol engece the inciv vith cleymore mines. The petrol recuestod a pink tera from D 229 Cev. ft 1915 the petrol check the contect crec one found $1 \mathrm{en} \mathrm{KIA}, 1$ AK-47, 3 AK-47 megczinos ( 90 res), 1 set chest wob ger, one 2 oz cocuments. The inciv wore lectr PH end Ho Chi Minh sencols. At 1920 hrs the petrol moved 100 m to YT 644020 enc. ct 1930 hrs were eatrictes by D229 Cev.
() 110750 a.t Yr'721673 Pctrol 73, while monitorin: $c$ E-W treil the petrol observec two in"iv with $H-47$ !s movin; west on the treil. At 0751 hrs the petrol encece? the incivicusls with al anore rinas. The potrol recuestec. a pink tern from D22C. The petrol then obsorve: 1 intiv novo into the contect croc. The petrol onecer the inciv with smoll or s fire tith notine return fire. At 0030 irs the prtrol move into the contect reer cne four 2 en KIA, 1 en ITA, $2 A K-47^{\prime} \mathrm{s}, 2 \mathrm{AK}-47$ negezines ( 60 r s ), 3 pels contrinine foof, cloting, persomel equiment, ane 4 I's of cocunents. The petrol tre ted the WIA enc recuester a nedcric. At 0930 the ne ivic evicurter the wounce? encry solijer. At 1000 hrs the petrol movo. SSE 100 to $7 T 726635$ ne e.t 1030 hrs the petrol wes extrected by D229 Cev.
(e) 151100 ot 77757 trol 75 , wile monitorins $\varepsilon$ E-W trl tho petrol observed 1 inive with on AK mine ust on the trl. At 1101 the patrol onceced the inciv mith clavore nines. The petrol recuested e. ink tean fron D229 Cev. At 1130 the petrol chec'ee? out tho co tret sree enc found: 1 en KTA, 1 AK-47 with meazine ( 30 rcs ), pack contrinin; 20 Ios of flour, 2 Ibs of cocuments, en? personncl clothine. At 1145 the prirol moved W 300 m to YT 741672 and at 1250 hrs wore extrectoe by D229 Gev.
(f) 181125 st YT702601 Fitrol 74, while nonitorinc: F 涊-SW tri, the patrol obsorver 1 in ive rryini on AI-47 novin. NE on the trl. At 1126 the trol encere" the in iv ith clayme mines. The petrol recueste? a vint term from D229 Cev. At 1120 hrs the petrol her re novenent SW 20m an? oncoce the area with smell orms fire rocoivin: light roturn fire. Cont ct brole et 1130 with negtive frienily cosurltics. The pink Team on stition observe? a. bunier comlox SW 300 m from the petrol. At 1230 hrs the "trol check? the cont ct
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 SUBJECT: Oper tion Report - Lessons Lerrner, 3rd Dricede (Sepercte), 1st Cavilry Division (Airmobile), Perio? Encine 31 October 1971, RCS CS FOR-65 (R3)arec. enc founc. 3 eneny $K I A^{\prime} \mathrm{s}$, 2 AK-50's, 1 AK-47, 9 AK-47 nacezines (150 reds), ene? 3 sets of NVA chest wet Cecr. All KIA's wore black prats, ureen shirts, enc. Ho Chi Minh sendels. At 1245 the petrol noved IE 1000 m to YT715613 then SE 1000 n to Y 7719605 were et 1410 hrs the petrol wes extrected by D229 C v.
(S) 201200 et YT111329 Petrol 77, while monitorinc $\%$ 他-SW trl, the petrol observec 2 inciv 10 n SW of the petrols loction. Doth inciv were werine creen shirts eni bleck pents. One heci e Breen het, AK-47, pistol belt, conteen, poncho, enc first aic pecket. The other incliv wore e ten het, en? wes cerrine only a beyonet. The indiv with the beyonet wes followin: the petrols cleymore wirus. The petrol enegec the indivicucls with cleynore minos enc. smell arms fire recoivine anrox $30-40$ rounds in return. The witrol rocuested a ank term from $\mathrm{H} / 16$ Civ. At 1300 hrs the pr.trol checked the contect area and found 2 enery $K I A^{1}$, 1 AK-47, 1 beyonet, 02 mesczines (10 res), enc 3 oz of documents. At 1320 hrs the patrol moved SU 200 n to YT 11023 end a.t 1333 hrs the petrol was extr ctod $\mathrm{By} \mathrm{m} / \mathrm{m} / 16 \mathrm{C} . \mathrm{v}$.
(h) 270930 at YS 816943 Petrol 73, whic on Groun reconneisscnce the petrol heard voices to their $N 35 \mathrm{~m}$. The petrol then observe? 1 indiv movinc: NNW to SSE. The indiv was werrin bleck FH's cne cerrinc e prel. The petrol remeined at this locetion to further monitor the sices and movement. The petrol wes eble to detecttle smell of fooc' cookin; ene herre feirle voices. At 1030 hrs e pink term from $1 / 16$ Cev arriver, on stetion on? the petrol movec toweres the voices. The petrol mover E 20ma end engege? the chery with smoll crms. The petrol then nove? brel to their originel locetion while the pink teems encegec the aren. At 1230 hrs the $\mathrm{H} / 16 \mathrm{Cav}$ Elues were inserted s. nto the area ond linked up with the peirol. A sweep of the contect rree found 2 en KIA's, 1 SKS rifle, 75 lbs of foo? stuffs, 75 lbs of clothing, 1 lb of cocuments end 10 Ibs of meicel equipment. The two KIA's were wecrine bleck pents em brown shirts with Ho Chi Minh sencels. At 1445 hrs the metrol end blues moved SSE 400 m to YS819939 and et 1530 hrs were extrected by $\mathrm{T} / 16 \mathrm{C} . \mathrm{V}$.
(i) 271045 a.t YT407647 Petrol 74, while monitorine FSD CTARLES, (closec), the petrol observec 2 inciv $150 \mathrm{~m} 5 W$ of the netrol. At 1100 hrs when the indiv were 15 m from the petrols loction, the potrol cnocel them with cleymore mines and smell arms fire. The patrol observec 2 other inive evede SE. The patrol recuestec a pink term from D229 Cev. At 1130 hrs the protrol checked the contect crea ane founc: 2 en KIA's, $1 \mathrm{SKS}, 1$ troncde (US), 9 re's of SKS ammo, enc. 1 sen? bece full of food stuffs thet hec. been nolice? up from the FSD. One KTA vore ilf ck pents, T-Shirt, enc. Ho Chi linh sencels. The other indiv wore bleck pents, jun le fetigue shirt end Ho Chi Minh sencols. At 1150 hrs the petrol wes extrectec: from FSD CHERLES.
(7) Sim ficent Events for Sontomber:

AVDAGT-DOT


SUDJEC: Operetion Revort - Lessons Lecrnec, 3 rc Drigace (Seperete), 1st Covelry Division (Amobile), Perioc Enine 31 October 19TM, RCS CS FOR-65 (R3)
(a) 011725 te YS637966 Petrol 70, while on cround reconneiscmace the petrol found a. bunter complax consistin of 16 bunkers. Eight were ( $5 \times 804$ ), while the other oight were ( $8 \times 10 \times 4$ ). AI? *ic. 3 to 4 ft of orc. While checkinc the complox out the petrol founc, 400 Ins of flour, 100 lbs of polisher rice, 50 lbs of various clothing, 3 peirs of brts Soots, 5 dirs of ehover shoes, 1 modic bit, 1 dciry, 30 libs of wran broci, and mutarous cookinc utonsils. The complex ren We 100 m to a small strem. The entire arec. show her vy recont use in tio lest 5 hrs by $10-20$ incivicur ls. At 1010 hrs wife moving throu the comlox the netrol obsorved 2 Inciv to their $N 20 \mathrm{~m}$ movin to the ocst. At 1015 hrs the prol engece. the incivicusls with one evecing south. The petrol requestec a pink term from $71 / 16 \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}} \mathrm{v}$. At 1830 hrs the patrol checked the contict crec out sinc found 1 enemy KIA, 3 oz of documents, 1 I- 40 leuncher with rocket. The in iv wes weerind a Green uniform end tho Chi Minh sencels. At 1835 hrs the $2 x . \operatorname{trol}$ moved NW 300 nin to YS635967 and et 1850 hrs vere extracted by $\mathrm{F} 1 / 15^{\prime} \mathrm{Cav}$.
(3) 041230 ct YT551242 Petrol 71, wile on roun reconnessicnce encountered c. mell stroct, on the other sice of vhich the petrol herr voices ene cutting of an uncturnine number of incivicuels. The petrol movet beck 30 m and set up to monitor the erce. The netrol et 1405 ins oiserve ci-10 indiv in whet appered
 che chest web ear, but nocotive wons vere visolle. Tho prol requested a nink term from $1 / 16 \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{c}} \mathrm{v}$ ene a soction of Art from $\mathrm{F} / 79 \mathrm{C}$ C. v . At 1415 brs with the arcreft on strtion the petrol encoue the cut ct crec with smans fire and M-79 firc. At the sed time tho dircrirt on stition en acen the area with ther orgenic vecpons. The petrol renortes leevy hoverient ane her wit roturn fire es the arereft continue to owenc its l ocd on the tercet. At 1500 hrs the grtroi moved into the contect ree enc observe 1 inciv ith e AK-47 in o. bunler. The petrol encoct the inciv with sacll cris resultin in 1 cnovy KIA, 1 Air-47. The inciv ws verine bleck vents, Oruen shirt onc Wo Cij Minh sencils with a pistol Delt, poncho, conteen, rnd hone knife, en: one $A K-47 \mathrm{meg} z i n e$ ( 30 ats ). Tho jetrol continuer? to chect the compur oun $40-50$ preks. At this tine the petrol recuested D229 Cev Blues. Continuin to chock the eren the prol found $20-30$ pistol belts (US, INA, HONEMDE), $1 \mathrm{~K}-54$ istol with holster, $30-90$ mortor rounds for
 rouncs of AK ermo; 75 Iis of vericus clothing, $5-10$ Ins of cocunents, cne numerous toiletriticle kits. The trol clso foun? $250-300 \mathrm{lbs}$ of flour, 300400 lbs of polishe? ree, 6 bejs of inceious rece, 70 libs of sclt, 70 lbs of ncile buh, 50 lbs of cooke irer, 6 ler e cooling pots intrenchin tools (US), 2 pieks, $30-40$ plestic poneho!s, $5-10$ centoen cups (US \& NVA). The bunker complex consistec of 15-20 bunkers ( $0-10$ intect), ( $8-10$ bein rebuilt), ( $10 \times 6 \times 4$ with $2^{1} 0 \mathrm{OC}$ ). At 1330 hrs D229 blues were linleer up with the petrol end es much es possible of the co turec ecuinment ws comie? out. Duc to derkess it wes necessery to lecte some bohine. "At 1500 hrs the petrol' and

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On 05 September 1971, the Torm Lecier end Assist-nt Term Lecier vere inserted beck into the erer to link un with a line comp ny and cll caticles oryture? were eve curtoc. a.t this tine.
(c) 071555 ct $Y T 616227$ Pitrol 73, while monitorinc: c NWESE roc: observed 2 inciv, 1 comyim; an AK-47 novinc. NW, At 1556 hre the oetrol engrcer the inciv with cleymore mines. The prtrol recuestec a pink tern from D229 Cev. At 1530 hrs the extrol checke? the cont ct aree ene foun?: 2 eneny KIA's, 1 AK-47, 1 M-1 ceritine, 1 K-54 pistol enc. approx $40 z$ of cocuments. Doth indiv wore bleck pents, Green shirts en pin; ponc sencels. At 1750 hrs the petrol moved N 25 m and wes extractec by D229 Cav Dr McGuire Ris.
(d) 071330 at YT568144 Patrol 72, while monitoring iNmSE trail observec 2 inciv carryinc AK-47's rovin to the NW. At 1331 hrs the petrol enercer the inciv with cleymore mines. The retrol requeste? $c$. ank term from D'2c Cov. At 1355 hrs the petrol checke? the cont ct crer ond found 2 enemy KIA's, 2 AK $-47^{1} \mathrm{~s}$, $2 \mathrm{AK}-47$ necezines ( 60 ra ), 2 precks contininc $1 \frac{1}{2}$ lbs of fooc enc. 2 los of clothin: At 1420 hrs the petrol nove? SE 400 m to YT 571141 where at 1445 hars they were exturctoc. $b_{i}$ D22C Cc.v.
(e) 151300 at YTS04300 Petrol 72, while monitorine a. NNE-SSW trail the petrol observec two inciv one carryin: an AK-47 movin, to the SSW. At 1301 hrs the petrol encicjec. tho incivicucls with cleymore mines. The ptrol recuested c. pink term fror: D229 Cav. At 1315 irs the natrol checker the contre arer anc foun? 2 enery Ki's, $1 \mathrm{AK}-47$, $1 \mathrm{~K}-54$ pistol, $2 \mathrm{AK}-47$ negezines, 60 rds, $2 \mathrm{~K}-54$ megezines ( 10 ris), 1 chicom crencde, two pecks contcinins 30 lis of fooc stuffs, $S$ lus of clothing, 1 pistol belt, enc approx 1 Ib of cocuments. Doth En"ivicuels wore bleck PH's rad HCM scnclis. At 1340 hrs tie netrol movec SW 200 m to YT 604298 where ot 1400 hrs they were oxtrected by D229 Cav.
(f) 161245 et YS72994 Pitrol 71, while monitorine a E-W rocd, observed four inciv ocrrying $-\operatorname{lin}^{\prime \prime}$ moving to the ecst. At 1246 hrs the petrol engeged the inciv with cleymore mines. The petrol requestec? $\varepsilon$. pink team from $9 / 16$ Cev. At 1305 hrs the petrol checker the conte et eree end found: 1 eneny KIA, 1 AK-47, 3 AK-47 macezines ( 90 rcis), 1 pistol belt, cnct 1 prek conteinint 40 1 oose AK- 47 rounc's, 10 lbs of fooc' stuffs, personel clothing, and 3-4 lbs of documents. At 1400 hrs the patrol noved W 50 m whare a.t 1440 hrs they were extrcetod by $21 / 15$ Cr.v.
(e) 181000 at YT5 56291 Patrol 72, while monitorinc e MLSE roed observed 4 inciv with weorons movin to the SE. At 1001 hrs the petrol enced the indiv with cleymore mines. The petrol recuestecl o pink tecm from D220 Cev. At 1030 hrs the petrol checlece. the contect arec enc found: 4 eneny KIA's, $1 \mathrm{M}-2$ corbine, 1 AR-47, 1 K 54 pistol, 1 browinc 9 mm pistol (Cene iien), $3 \mathrm{M}-2$ megrzines, ( 15 rls ), $3 \mathrm{AK}-47 \mathrm{meg} \mathrm{zines}(50 \mathrm{ras}$ ), 2 K 54 mercines ( 17 rds ),

AVDAGT-DOT


13 November 1971
SUSJECT: Oper tion Report - Iossons Lecmed, 3re? Driccie (Sepercte), 1st Cavelry Division (Aimobile), Perio? Enine 31 Cotober 1971, RCS CS FORG65 (R3)

2 browine gur mezenes (10 res), 3 pats conteinin; 4 lis of jersonel clothing, 40 lbs of fooc. stuffs, 1 civilicn redio, 6 lasting ceps mith short tine fuze, 2 chicon treneces, 20 Ioose rouns of $K 54 \mathrm{cmm}, 4$ oz of cocunents, 4 centeens (US), 1 conteen (US), 1 cooling pot, sevarcl ectin utensils. All Krats hec on bleck pents with mixec colorec shit's. At 1100 hrs the netrol moved NW 100m to YT504293 where they werc extrectec at 1130 hrs by D22S Ce.v.
(h) 251225 et YT654037 Petrol 7\%, while monitorine a E-W roed the petrol obscrver 2 inciv with AK-47's movine to the west. At 1226 hrs tie petrol encegec the initiv with cloymore mines one smell cms fire. The petrol requestoc. a pink tem from $\mathrm{H} / 16 \mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{c}} \mathrm{V}$. At 1245 hrs the protrol checked the contect cree enc found 1 enemy KIA, $2 \mathrm{AK}-47$ 's, $2 \mathrm{AK}-47$ megezines ( 50 recs ), 1 hone Groncde (US), 1 wellet contrinin 3 os cocumonts, anc a blooc tril lecding west. At 1400 hrs the patrol mover. \& 200 m to YT 661030 where they vere extrected c.t 1500 hirs by $11 / 16$ Cev.
(ङ) Sinificnt Events for October:
(a) 031330 at YT 551230 Petrol 76, while setting up en entush on NESW/ N-S trill junction the socurity elenont to the $S 10 \mathrm{~m}$ observed 5 inciv with werpons movinc town's the petrols location. The sccurity elanent engeced the inaiv with snoll crms with the ineiv ev ine east an? west. The petrol
 srec ene found 1 enemy KTA, 1 AK-47, 2 procks contrinine 100 ycs of couble stran electricil wire with blestine cens, militery an civilcin clothine, rnc. 2 lbs of Jocuments, clone vith twoflčitits Also 2 hervy lood trils ene one licht kiood tril evedine vest, south, enc eest. At 1400 hrs the petrol novec. S 100 m to YT551229 where they were extrectec by D?29 Cav.
(b) 100915 ct VSC55053 Petrol 74, wile noitorinc a inss roce the petrol observo: 2 inciv, one ccrrine an AK-47, movinc to the Se. At 0515 hrs the potrol ent, the inctuins with cleynore mines ene sall cras fire with ne ative return fire. The $p$ trol recuested $\varepsilon$ pinl tean from $1 / 95 \mathrm{C}, \mathrm{v}$. At 0945 the pitrol nove nto the contect ree and found: 1 enery KIA, 1. AK-47, 3 meczines ( 90 ris); 1 pistol bcIt (US), 1 fleshlicht (US), 1 hamock, 1 poncho, 1 amo pouch, and 1 peck contring 10 lis of vacus clothing, 1 pair HCM Scmels, C oz of cocuments, 1 Cnm rownine pistol (Cenecien), 1 frouncloth, 4 oz of fooc stuffs, 1 drining cu, 1 billfoln, toilet crticles, hoto album, and sever 1 miscelleneous itens. At 1015 hrs the petrol moved Why 200 m to YSS53954 where et 1030 hrs they were oxtrectec by $\mathrm{H} 1 / 16 \mathrm{Cev}$.
(c) 131150 at Trict 3922 trol 77, whilo on roun roconnessiance the petrol foune a. Vims trl with he:vy recent use. The petrol then observed 1 ruckseck on the trl. At 1200 has the petrol observe? 1 jnciv movin to the south on tic treil. As they observer this in ivicull they spotte? cnother inciv if 15r: The otrol ensce? with snoll ras encl receivic. hervy return

## AVDAGT-DOT

Confiontial
13 November 1971
SUDJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Lerrnoc. 3r? Drifere (Seperate), 1st Cavelry Division (Airmobile), Perion En'inc 31 October 1871, RCS CS FOR-65 (R3)
fire fron the $N$, SE, cn? NW. The petrol recueste. e. pink term from $H 1 / 16$ Cov , $\mathrm{H} / 16$ Dlues, end e scetion of AFA from $\mathrm{F} / 79 \mathrm{Cev}$. The petrol observed movement of 5 indiv evering NW. At 1300 hrs the blues were inserter an' linke? up with the patrol. A sweep of the cont ct crec founc: 1 Cre mirk, 1 bloo'y poncho, 6 pecks contoinine, 33 Ibs of ricc, seven enns of soricen oil, 5 lbs of swoet oot toes, n ? 4 bes of unknown foo? stuff. At 1410 hrs the netrol rove? SE 100 m to YTE14921 en? were extrected o.t 1430 hrs by H1/16 Cav.
(1) 211210 ct YST75923 Petrol 74, while monitorins a. E-W ro . the petrol olserver 3 inciv to the ecst. At 1210 hr the protrol en e? t!o in iv with cleynore mines. The octrol recelver epprox 10 rouncs of smell rims fire fron 1 in iv W 50m. The patrol oniceec the in iv with smell rrms fire. The in?iv crope his werpon en' evere west. The $x$ ot ol recuestu? $s$ pinls tern from $11 / 16$ Ce.v. At 1235 hrs e check of the contcet erce foun: 3 enomy KIE $\mathrm{I}_{\mathrm{s}}, 1 \mathrm{AK}-47$ $1 \mathrm{meczine}(18 \mathrm{r} \%$ ), 3 pecks contrining 25 l : s of rice, 20 lbs of soli: fuel, ond 1 conteen. Two of the KIA's were feacle werrinc bleck pents, biue shirts,
 At 1245 hrs the pe trol move? E 200 m to YS 777923 where rt 1255 hrs they vere extreotec: by $\mathrm{H} / 16$ C.v.
(e) 300927 at YT595303 Petrol 77, while monitorine o. NS treil, observe? 10 in'iv moving south on the trl. At 0930 hrs the patrol ence. the in? iv with claymore mines on? smill erms fire. The eneny eveded NE. A pink teen fron D-229 Gev wes requested an? erriver on stition at 0935 hrs , anc? encered the contect arec. with organio werpons. At 1030 hrs the petrol movel into the contret aree end observed 2 eneny KIA's, 2 packs, and 2 AK-47's. At 1045 hrs the petrol ofme uncier hervy smail ams fire from the Nepprox 20 m cwey. At 1050 hrs the petrol evecel 575 m ene set up in Cefensive posture while the pink term anfecec the suspecter? enemy locetions with orernic werpons. At 1120 hrs the petrol move? beck into the contcct eree end found 1 KIA, 1 peck contrining extre clothing fooc stuffs, M-16 meaczines (New), 1 flashlight (US), 1 lensetic compass (US), and $1 \frac{1}{2}$ lbs of cocuments. They ciso foun? Crec merks and e hervy blood treil lecing $\mathbb{E}$. At 1200 hrs the petrol mover NE 300 m to YT596302 where ct 1230 hrs they were extrecter? by D229 Gev.

## h. 1st Bn. 21st Artillery Oneretions:

(1) MISSION: The 1st Erttelion, 21st Artillery, enc supporting artillery provice.. fire support to 3 Drigace (Sepercte) meneuver forces within the Dricie's essigne? area of opertions.
(2) EXECUTION:
(a) The jettelion's or enic letteries continue? their helitucl essocietion with the Lri e? 's meneuver bettrions enhencin; the coor inction recuire? for irect supnort ertillery fires:

SUIJECT: Oner.tion Renort - Lessons verrner:- (Separnte), 16 t Cavelry Division (Aimobile), Perios En in'; 31 October 1971, RCS CS FOR-65 (R3)

A $1 / 21-2 / 5$ Cev
E $1 / 21-1 / 7 \mathrm{CEv}$
C $1 / 21-2 / 8 \mathrm{Cov}$
D $1 / 21-1 / 12 C_{c v}$
(b) Mcrium anc hervy artillery suphort continue? to be provice? by 23c Artillery Group assets. Upon completion of the 20 Ir.ttelion, 12th Artillery, (155 T) sten ${ }^{\text {PI }}$ om in Aucust 1971, C Dattery, 5th Bettelion, 42e Artillery we.s essignce a reinforcing role to this Dattrlion, sicnifiennty incrersine cveilable fire support flexibility.
(i) Eettery F, 79th Aericl Fielc Artillery continued to reiniorce the
 circreft.
(a) During the reportin; period the intt-lion continue its primry mission of cirect su ort to 3c Driecie (Sep) opertions trreter accinst the 33r. NVA Reciment, HQ MR-7, HQ SR-5, the 81st Recr Service Group in Wr Zone D, ond enemy locil force elements within the AO. Early My found Dettery A supyortini the 20 Wett-lion, 5th Cevelry, operating in westerm Binh Tuy Province end ecstern Lonc Khenh Province ajeinct elements of the 33rd NVA Regiment. Dettery D supported the 1 st Bn , 7th Covalr, in their operations north and south of FSD Mace against the 33rd NWA Rogiment end elements of Ba Long Province. Eattery $C$ continued its fire support of the 2 d D , 3th Cevalry in the Nui Be Mountrin complex end in Dese Area 305 agoinst HQ, MR-7. Dettery D was supportine the 1 st En , 12th Cavelry, in an area of operations on the axis FSS Shemen (YT2136) - FSD Ketie (YT1249).
(e) SiGnificent shifts of operctioncl arees of the meneuver bettclions resulter in Dettery A displecing to en rrec. supporter by fire from Firo Supm port Beses Gril chi Joy in June. Dettery C clso Cisplecer? with the infentry to Fire Support Incos Joffrics and Hell in June. Bettery D departed Wor Zone D in Junc ene nedo ascrias of quick fire bese occupations betweon Fire Support Drsos Drizos, Peos, Dol Rio, Goil, and again Pecos.
(f) July wes a sigificent nonth for the Bettelion in that it sew a severe turnover of criticcl persomol in a roletively short period of tirce. On 16 July, LTC Jack L. Kecton ascumu commend from LTC Carl E. Vuono. Durm ing the followin; two wock porion, tho Latt lion Exccutivo Officer, S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4, biniunition Officor, Mintenence Officor, Erigede LNO. scnior Dettelion FDO Cn' two Iett-Iion LNO's rator cuc to DEROS. A proportional number of senior MCO's on onlista? positions accor to the crein of the Dattrlion's oxporionco. The oclibor of the nowly essignot personnol ene their Cosirc to excel wes ovidont be the spo 3 in which tho Dettelion procrossod in continuing ite fire surwort niscion.
(G) Agrin, oncry ectivity in Wer Zono D result in Eettcrios E ni? D Sispl cin to firinc jositions north of tho Doni; Niri Rivor, Dattory i nove' to FSA Chrlos cIon, with clonents of e nowly ecuire rcinfo cine no iwn bettcry, C Enttory, 5th icttion, 42 Artillory ( 155 Town). Sutsccuontly on ed itioncl light fire support brso (mini-biso) wis ost lishod et FSD Conncl. Dettory D occupion FS Juritor on? split helf tho Iettory to FSE Round Rock. Continuce onory retivity north of Roun? Rock rcsultc? in Inttery D closin FSD Juitor one ocupyinc onow Zatrlion Firo Enso c.t FSE Tirbultu. Incrocsen ectivity of tho $33^{\circ}$ NV: Rotinent on tho amporine Victnemeso oloctions rosulto. in Eettory E returnin to onorto south of Mui Chur Chen whore $1 / 7$ Gev forcos scroone? Ions the 0 storn enproches to Xurn Loc. Dettoiy $C$ and $2 / \hat{0}$ Gev continu to oncr to in ioso Arc 305, we the Dettrlion Firo Dasc wrs moved from FSN Fenn no to FSL Jefforios on 15 Au ust.
(h) Of sienificenco in Soptonber wes the Eett lion's perticirction in the Tesk Force Gerry Owon Iission to relicvo the besoico. FSN K turn in Toy Ninh Province. On 29 Septen or the Dettrlion T C CP Coploye? to Tey Ninh Wost follow ' by Dettory I an? F Dettory, 79th AFh. Durin tho onsuin, throc ary opor tion the THC CP coorineto? tho fires of Eettery , C. Jowitzor Jattery ( - ) of the $2 / 11 \mathrm{LCF}$, en $\mathrm{F} / 79 \mathrm{LFL}$. Of perticuler sicnifjernco wes tho ni ht in
 orinctod ficle ertillory, comil ficll ertillory, end fleroshipe rosultod in constint survillence or fires clong the roec. from K tuin to Tey Minh during the ovening of 30 Soptonbor. Iettery $\dot{Z}$ wrs rile to comploto the oper tion by concuctin; fize wing move by C-130 from Tay Ninh to Xurn Loc, provicing velurtle trinin; exporienco to new bettory personncl.
(i) Sinnificent oper tions in Octoper resulter fron intolli once pethered concornin: probllo onery loctions botweon FSD's Shormin an? Ktic. In reection to this intelligence, the $2 / 5$ Covelry ene the $1 / 12$ Gevelry wore combet essculto? Into the eroe on 26 October following is prepertion of teret erocs by AFA, TAC Air, En? ficle ertillery, 011 of which were coor inct an controlle" by this Eattilion. Durin; the evenin; of 26 October on the mornine: - of 27 Octobor, 1338 roun's of 105 mi , en? 210 round of 155 mm rmunition wore omonioc on tricot rers by A $1 / 21(-)$, i $1 / 21(-)$, D $1 / 21$, ene? C $5 / 4$ ? ( - ) cll of whon were cirlifted to the operetion cler errly on 26 October. On 29 October the $2 / 5$ Covelry wis oxtricto? fron their $A 0$ neer FSE Sherrin end lencod et Dien Hor. They then convoyi? to Dinh Gurn to bogin secreh rin dostroy operctions in thet crer. In orcor to support thoscoperctions, A 1/21 (-) wh mever from FSD Shomen to Rock POL Foint, en? I $1 / 21$ ( - ) we moved from FSE Shermen to FSS Nency, both noves being med on 29. Octobor. On thet seme C y C 5/42 ( - ) wh to $\because$ from FSL Shermen to FSD Hec. D $1 / 21$ reminod rt FSD Krtic to support oncretions of the $1 / 12$ Covelry in thoir 10 south of ESD K-tic. Cavi Iry Division (Aimobile), Porio? En in; 31 Octo'or 1971, RCS CS FOR-65 (A3)
(j) Expen itures for the bettilion for the perioc Mey 71 to October 71 cro lista? Lelow:

COMTACT ACQURED COUMTRRIRES PREPEFATIOMS SFECILL FURFOSE OTEER
$23,454 \quad 986 \quad 122 \quad 13,995 \quad 19,934 \quad 1,450$

## i. FIrttory (AFA), 79th Artillory Ooor tions:

(1) orgerizition:
(a) F Eattory wos assime to 229th Ass ult Iclicoptcr Dattrlion for cininistretive purposes rnd to 1st Eatt lion 21st Artillery for opertionel control on 15 June 1971. Prior to this tine F iettery ws essi noe? to 1st Entt lion 21 st Artillory for both Artillory for both acninistrotive rn? operctionel control.
(b) The unit sosiuntion wes chnce? 1 July 1971 from Eettery C, 2nc? Inttilion 20th Artillory, 1st Cev Iry Division (AM), ADO SF 96490 to F Eettory (AFA) 79th Artillery, 1st Covelry Division (AM), $A=0 ~ S F 96490$.
(2) Mission: The nission of F Ie.ttory, 7Cth krtillory is to provine coriel fiel retillery fire sugort to tho menuever forcos of the Irisre. In the performence of this mission $F / 79$ roinforees or roplecs other fire supnort eveilelo to the riere. The bettery mey io cosi no? eny of the stenderd ficld rrtillers tecticel missions of eenerd suphort reinforcing, reinforcin; or irect suport. A quick fire conmuic tion chennol throuch the Lriede extillery olononts hes boun coteblishe? to fecilitete ropi? rosponse, stencre rissions inclu?o:
( $($ ) Fire mission: A fire mission is my mission rocuirin cirect fire suport of tros in contect, lownec circrift, US or ARVN besis uncor morter, rocket, or scpper etteck, or eny o ther mission rucuiring instint response rnc close-in fires. Evary flyoblo circreft in F Jatte: y 79th Arty is on 24 hour stmelby for ASAP missions of this type.
(b) No icel oveurtion Mission: A section is on crll on c. 24 hour $e$
 or sick personnel from the fjul?. A two ship soction is employe. Ono ship rorins in orbit ot iltitu 'o wile t.o scon? ship follows tho he eve ship into position, mine ti hat orits onc. st yin; constently ilert for onomy fire lirecte? et the hovering reneve.
(c) Escort: Any 3re De ircreft or fli it of aircreft flyinc in arecs
 sinde AH-1G to rovile sicurity fron hostile fire. A soction of two ship ney

## AVDAGT-DOI

CONFIDENTIAL
13 Mbverica 1971
SUDJECT: Operntion Revort - Lessons Leernod, 3r? Iri ?e (Semerte), ist Cevilry Division (Airmobilo), Perio? En"ine 31 October 1971, RCS CS FCR-65 (R3)
be essine: is the mission or siturtion ictetoc. The circreft or section is in oont ct with, uncer the control of, en resonsille to only the cirm creft of flifit of eirereft they ere coverin.
(a) TOT/PIcnnc: Fires: F Atry arereft are fuoguently onployen effectively in erers of reporter onemy troop concentretion. UsinC CS W, enc/or flechettc rockets, plenne' fires incorporetor with surpriso en? molility prove effective in isrupting sunply lines ondhocicqurtors cotivities. These fires iscourf $\mathrm{c}_{0}$ the enony from attonptin: eny retivitios involvine lrce concontr tions of troops an? equinment.
(e) Sonscr Missions: F Ltry is teske? rily to rovi!e one circreft to escort end cover e UH-1H arcrift oquippo vith olectronic sonsin ecuipment. The UH-1H is usurlly essicne? eress where thoy hrve boen no rocont ollic? rown oper tions. The sensin: ecuipnent oen pinpoint orocs whore the enery is livinc anc workinc. The F itry circeft nevictes for loth rircreft ene? raleys mexirun rec: outs to tho res oncible bettrion. Informetion there? by this termmy times detetes the futuro roves of the resonsible units. The F Dettery circreft will clso encec lucr tive ter gots founc by the UIl-1H.
(f) Groundair Plens: Much of the flying cone 5 Fitry circreft is in iroct support of $3 x$ Lie conert esseults. A soction is scrembed few minutes rior to the insortion on briefe. in tho dir by the controlline extillery LNO on tie rission plen, loction of friondly elonents, an? the fires ruquirce from the section. The section is usurlly directec to provice a one rinute rocket prep of the lon'ing zone imnecietely prior to lift circreft touchrown an" to remin overhece in contect with tho crount controller until the entirc insertion is complete. The section is in contrct rith, unier the control of rne responsible to tho crtillery LNo until given en end-of-rission the completion of the inove.
(3) Allied overctions: Allica opertions cre comon in the 3rce Lde AO, whon rny sínificent opertions are initictec, the Austrolion Arny, the South Vietnenese Arry, or the RTAVF noy rociuest and reciove cunship support by F Itry.

## (3) Stetisticel De.ts:

(a) Amrunition Expen'jtures:

| (Mey) |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2.75 rockets |  |
|  | 101 b | 3310 |
| 171 b | 2013 |  |
|  | Flechettes | 222 |
|  | CS |  |
|  | WP | 42 |
|  | 7.62 mm rouncs | 39,150 |
|  | 40 min rouncs | 6,350 |

AVDAGT-DOT


SULJECT: Opertion Report - Lessons Icrmen, 3rd Irterie (Seperte), 1 st Coviry Division (Aimotile), Perioc. Enctnc. 31 Octover 1971, PCS CS FOR-65 (R3)


ADMACT-DOT CONFIOENTIAL 13 Hoverrlor 1991
 Cevilry Division (Airmobile). Perior Enilnc 31 Octoboy 1971, RCS CS FORE ( 5 ( F )
(b) Surveillenee:

| (M.y) | NONE |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| (Jun) | Enory KLH | 9 |
|  | Iunkers destroyec. | 2 |
| (JuI) | Inery KLH | 2 |
|  | Lunkers Cestroyed | 1 |
| (Aug) | Enery Kir | 1 |
|  | Dunkers Destroyed | 1 |
| (Sep) | Enery Km | 2 |
|  | Junkers Dostroyed | 3 |
| (0ct) | Enery Kily | 13 |
|  | Lunkers destroyoe: |  |

(4) Si:nifiecnt Oporetions:
(e) On 30 Ny 71, ct iric m639012, one section of AFA was sermbled with 100 percent flechettes to expend on e pre-pl-mnoe terget. Expenio?: 152 flcchettes; Io, ceen: $03+20$ hours; Fesults: Negrtive surveillence w.s reported to this unit.
(b) On 7 Jun 71, at urid y 7 593275, one section of AFA scrimbled on a fire mission. Exponced: 340101 b rookets, 10 Ged : $04+00$ hours; Results: 1 lunker, $3^{18} 4^{\prime}$ 'estroye?.
(c) On 8 Jun 71n at zrid YT501152, two soctions of AFA scremblo on $e$. fire mission. Expence.: 129-101b rookets; logbec: 06t10 hours; Results: two (2) enery KLH.
(c) On 9 Jun 71 , th Crid 75504 , two seotions scrabiled on e firc
 Results: one (1) enemy DDH,
(e) On 13 Jun 71, at GIta YTLS21 one section of AFA sermbled on $c$ fire mission. Expondou: Siol01b rockets; Lossed: $03+00$ hours, Results: one (1) Kif.
(f) On 14 Jun 71 , it ric YT475206, three (3) sections of AFA were sormbled on e. fire mission. Expenced: 1420101b, 300-172b rackets; Loseed $04+50$ hours; Results: two ( 2 ) eneny $\mathrm{KCH}_{4}$


(g) On 16 Jun 71, t Tric YM470195, two sections of AFA were scrmbled: on c fire mission, Expenced: 55-101b rockets; Lo iee 04+50 hours; Results: two (2), onemy KiH.
(h) On 29 Jun 71, at iriciyTh7020, three (3) sections of AFA were scrubled on e fire mission. Exponded: 66-101b, 74-171b rockets; logel: $07+50$ hours; Results: 1. bunker, 4'X6' cestroye?.
(i) On 1 Jul 71, at oric YT779097, one section of HA wes scremblea on e. firo rission. Expencea: $35-101 \mathrm{~b}, 22-17 \mathrm{hb}, 43-\mathrm{CS}$ rockots, Ioşed: $03+30$ hours; Results: 1 bunker, $4^{\prime} \times 6$ ', destroyed.
(j) On 10 Jul 71, e.t Grid YT985146, one section of AFA wes scrembled on r Ground to cir mission. Expencer: 32-101b, 24-171b rockets; LoGsec: 02t 20 hours; Results: Two (2) $\mathrm{KLH}_{\text {. }}$
(k) On 28 Aug 71, ct Grid YT410040, one section of AFA. Wes scrembled on C. Ground to rir fire mission, supportine troops in contect egrenst VC in bunkeis. Expen?er: 36-101b, $32-171$ b rockets; Loyect: 03t10 hours; Results:

(1) On 4 Sen 71 , et Gria YT5 5245, two sections of AFA were scrmbled on 2 fire mission. Expencec: $126-101 \mathrm{~b}$, 62-171b rockets: Louged: $13+50$ hours; Results: one (1) KIE; threc (3), ह'X10', estroyec.
(m) on 15 Sep 71, one aircrift covered a sniffer aircreft firint on a traget, Eypendea: 10-101b, 10-171b rockets; Logged: 03+00; Results: one (1) energ KDF.
(n) On 21 Sep 71 , et wic YS463921, e totci of three section were scremblec. to cover AfivN troops in contret with e. Ier ce eneny force. Expender: 114-101b, 93-171b rockets: Logeed: $27+05$ hours; Results: One (1) enemy KiH, hervy blood tr ils founc et first light.
(o) On 21 Sep 71 , at Gric YS544057, e totrl of six sections were screrbled to cover Austrilien troops encried in hervy contect with NVA Trps. Exiencled: 137-101b, 133-171b 10-flochetts rockets; Logee:: $25+00$ hours; Results: (Necritivo Surveillence)
(p) On 29 Sep 71, F Lettery doloye? four sections, lone with ops and meint pers to Tiy Ninh West in suryort of 3 re Le (Sep), 1st Cev Div (AM) Trsk Force Gerry Owen. The Inttery!s dircreft che pers were et. Thy Ninh West set up and oner tionel approx two hours prior to tho sche: ule? close tine of 1300 hrs . A section wis scrablee to FSL Soce, which wes trkin; Jemm morter fron the The soction sothe? the morter tube in the ed e of a tree line enc encrec the position. An anti-circreft position was spottec. an silm enced with HE cne flechotte rockets. Expenced: $66-101 \mathrm{~b}$, 51-171b, 32-flechette


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CONHIUENTAAL
13 November 1971
SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, 3rd Brigade (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Fetid Ending 31 Oct 1971, RCS CS FORm 65 (R3)
(q) On 30 Sep 71 an additional section, was deployed from Bearcat to Try Ninh West making a total of 5 sections where the OPORD called for only three sections. During the day F Battery aircraft provided continuous coverage over the convoy as it deployed from Thy Ninh West to FSB Katum, F Battery also provided numerous sections escorting $\mathrm{CH}-47$ and $\mathrm{UH}-1 \mathrm{H}$ aircraft resupplying and remenforcing FSB Ladysmith, FSB Katum and elements along the road from Thy Ninh West to FSB Katum, A special interdiction mission requiring three sections of $F$ Battery aircraft was planned for the night of 30 Sep 71. Due to the 100 per cent availability of $F$ Battery's aircraft and 5 sections being on station at lay Ninh West the mission was changed to include the additional two sections. The mission was to put down suppressive fires along TL4, NW, of Nui BA Den north to FSB Katum, except where designated as no fire zones because of friendlies in the area: at five prearranged times during the night a section of AFA was scrambled and at the mission commander's decision and after receiving clearance from the ground commander: for blanket clearance, laid down interdictive fires: During the mission two sections of AFA received ground to air fire which was immediately silenced. Expended: 239-101b, 36m 171b, 145-flechette rockets; Logged 19+40 hours; Results: 2 ground to air positions silenced. No friendly position was subjected to indirect fire or ground attack while $F / 79$ elements were in the air. This is the first time AFA has ever been used successfully in an extended interdiction mission
 target area in this operation.
(r) On 1 oct 71, F Battery flew continuous cover over the convoy as it left FSB Katum enroute Thy Ninh West. Task Force Gary Owen completed its mission approximately 1900 hours and $F$ Battery received an order to return personnel and equipment to Bearcat. F Battery had maintained $100 \%$ aircraft and crew avail. ability throughout the entire operation.
(s) From 2 Oct 71 to 40 cit $71 \mathrm{~F} / 79$ logged two sections each day at Pay Ninh West in support of TRAC operations. The Battery also provided one section to remain overnight on 2 and $30 c t$. During this period $F / 79$ provided numerous escorts for $\mathrm{CH}-47$ helicopters working in the $40, \mathrm{~F} / 79$ also providedidirect fire support for ARW elements in the field.
(t) On 3 Oct 71 elements from $F / 79$ were given the mission to extract wounded ARVN personnel from a position 8 kilometers SW of FSB Thien Non, Dustoff attempts had been attempted all that day and had been aborted each time due to intense ground to air fire and ground combat. With $F / 79$ provide ing command and control, plus 4 AH-1G's a task force of 4 additional AH-1G's from other units and two dustoff helicopters formed and launched at 1645, with a mission complete at 1745. Logged: 02+20; Expended: 190-101b., $150-171 \mathrm{~b}, 120$-fleshette rockets, $2000 \mathrm{rds},-7.62,400 \mathrm{rds}-40 \mathrm{~mm}$; Results: 7 friendly WIA Medevaced, negative enemy fire received by Medevac aircraft,

(u) On 4 Oct 71 at grid YT 063169, three sections of AFA were scrambled on a ground to air fire position. Expended 230-101b, 18-171b, 36-flechette rockets, Logged 06+00 hours; Results: 3 enemy KBH.
(v) On 11 Oct 71, four sections of AFA were scrambled to cover a single UH-1H VIP flight. This was the FOW exchange mission flown into Cambodia to release an NVA officer on Highway 7, 15 kilometers south of KRECK. Expended: None; Logged $27+40$ hours; Results: (POW mission accomplished)
(w) On 12 Oct 71, two sections were scrambled to the Tay Ninh area to provide cover for ten lift ships tasked with the direct exchange of companies at FSB Face, along the border. One AH-1G, while covering a smoke ship, received intense .51 cal ground to air fire. The aircraft caught fire, crashed and burned. The crew survived with minor injuries. The position was locsted, fired upon, and silenced. The exchange of companies was completed with no further incidents.
(x) From 12-15 Oct $71 \mathrm{~F} / 79$ again provided 2 sections daily to support TRAC operations out of Tay Jinh West, with section remaining overnight on 12-14 Oct 71. Sections were erployed on $\mathrm{CH}-47$ escorts and troops in contact. Expended: $90-101 \mathrm{~b}, 2000 \mathrm{rds}-7,62,220 \mathrm{rds}-40 \mathrm{~mm}$, Logged: $35+30 \mathrm{hrs} ;$ Results-effective fire support $A R V N$ ground elements and an escort missions successfuily completed.
(y) On 13 Oct 71, at grid Ya 8192, a section of AFA was scrambled on a Pink Team report of enemy personyel in the open and firing from a bunker complex. Expended: 60-101b, 50-flechette rockets; Logged: $2+40$ hours; Results: 3 bunkers destroyed.
(z) On 14 Cct 71, at the western access of Bearcat Army Heliport, a total of five sections were scrambled on a bunker complex being used by the enerny. Expended: $167-101 \mathrm{~b}, 23-171 \mathrm{~b}, 31$ flechette rockets, 2000 rounds 7.62 $\mathrm{mm}, 400-40 \mathrm{~mm}$; Logesd: $19+15$ hours; Results: 3 enery $\mathrm{KBH}, 4$ enemy WBH, all 5 bunkers damaged or destroyed.
(aa) On 15 Oct 71, a fire team from F/79 escorted a comrand and control helicopter and a $\mathrm{CH}-47$ from Tay iinh West to fire base Alpha, 4 kilometers east of Krek, Cambodia. The assigned rission was to extract a downed UH-1H. The $\mathrm{tH}-1 \mathrm{H}$ was not recovered due to improper rigging and the task force returned to Tay Ninh west. Expended: None. Loged: 03+15. Results: Only one round of 82 mm mortar and no small arms fine was encountered during the extraction attempt.
(bb) On $220^{0} t 71 \mathrm{~F} / 79$ provided 3 sections to provide cover for a 3 rd Brigade airmobile force firal extracting a company from $1 / 12$ at first light from FSB Pace. F/79 provided gunship coverage for 2 flights of 5 ships each and a smokeship, plus an iFA section over FSB Pace for the entire operation.

Expeneed: None. Logged: 7+15; Results: No friendly aircraft received fire during this successfully completed operation.
(cc) From 22 through 24 Oct $71 \mathrm{~F} / 79$ provided $t_{\text {wo }}$ sections daily in support of RTAVF operations in the Bearcat - Yuan Lock AREA. F/79 provided escort and AFA coverage during this period. Expended: 60-101b, 28-fleshette rockets. Results: Negative fire taken by friendly ground elements was suppressed.
(dd) On 29 Oct 71, $\mathrm{F} / 79$ committed a section to support ARVN ground elements in contact vicinity of FSB Blackhorse. Expended: 74-101b, 30-171b, 38-fleshette rockets; Logged: 08+00 Results: 7 enemy KBH.

## j. 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion Operations:

(1) Mission: The mission of the 229th AHB was to provide tactical mobility for combat troops, supplies, and equipment for the Sra Brigade during the conduct of combat and airmobile operations. The mission of this unit was expanded during this reporting period to include providing aviation support for the airmobile brigade (Separate), artillery battalion headquarters and other units without organic aircraft; providing pathfinder support as directed; providing medium lift helicopter support; providing security for airmobile forces; providing aerial field artillery rocket fire support, and to perform reconnaissance and provide security for designated major combat elements.
(2) Execution: The execution of the battalion's primary mission and the additional missions as described in paragraph (1) above, were facilitated through the augmentation of this battalion's assets by the assignment of one (1) air cavalry troop, one (1) general support platoon, one (1) aviation platoon (Pathfinder), one (1) assault support helicopter company, and one (1) aerial field artillery battery. Additionally, Company D (Atrial Weapons) of the 220 th AHB was restructured, utilizing assets within the assigned units, so that it now performs the mission of an air cavalry troop. An infantry platoon, draw from brigade assets, was assigned to this company. This reorganization was effected in order to increase the surveillance capabilities of the brigade, and better enable it to conduct operations in its relatively large area of operations. Operational control of the two air cavalry units (D/229 and H/16th Cav) was given to the brigade S-2. These units maintained ITo teams at the Brigade TOC in order to be responsive to the needs of the S-2 in the gathering of intelligence information, performing visual reconnaissance, inserting ranger teams, and providing additional security for selected its. Operational control of $F$ Battery, 79th artillery (ArA) was given to the brigade artillery officer for coordination of fire support plans in support of brigade operations. Full utilization of this units capabipities was exercised through the assignment of such missions as landing zone preparation, escort of troop carrying helicopters, direct fire support of
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units in contact and those missions directed in support of all brigade operations.
(3) Discussion and analysis of significant events:
(a) The conversion of D Company 229th AHB from an aerial weapons company to an air cavalry troop was initiated on 24 June 1971 and completed prior to 1 July 1971. In mid-July the unit completed the training of the necessary infantry, air crews and maintenance personnel, which enabled it to assume the mission of an air cavalry troop. This training included special training of air crews in the performance of visual reconnaissance and air cavalry tactics, as well as the training of maintenance personnel in order to maintain the new types of equipment which the unit received.
(b) On 20 September 1971, H Troop/16th Cavalry was deployed in support of the 1st Royal Australian Task Force, elements of which were in contact with a large enemy force. This operation lasted three days during which H Troop located the major forces of the enemy and was instrumental in bringing conventional artillery, aerial artillery, and air strikes to bear against them. Subsequently the enemy forces broke contact and cleared the area.
(c) On 29 September through 1 October the battalion moved the operational assets of F Battery, 79th Arty, D Company 229th AHB, and a Company 229th AHB to Thy Ninh RWN for a special combat operation. The 229th AHB was in direct support of Task Force Garry Owen and was given the mission to evacuate the beseiged outpost of Katum that was located near the Cambodian border. The battalion provided 767 hours of $\mathrm{OH}-6 \mathrm{~A}, \mathrm{CH}-47$, UH -1H, and AH-1G aircraft hours with no accidents or incidents. Additional specific details are included in the "After Action Report" Operation Katum (10 October 1971).
(d) On 11 October, elements of the 229th were deployed to a forward operating base to link up with personnel who were to release an NVA prisoner. At a set time and date the prisoner was transported by UH-1H to a field location and released. Further details of this action are included in previous classified reports.

## k. 501st Engineer Company (Combat) Operations:

(1) Missions; To provide combat engineer support for the 3rd Brigade (Sep), 1 st Cavalry Division (AM) by accomplishing general and special tasks. Some examples of assigned missions are demolition, fire support base construction, $P Z$ and LZ construction, boating operations, water supply and airfield maintenance, mine sweeps and base development.
(2) Execution:
(a) Assigned missions are accomplished by the combat engineer platoons augmented by equipment support from the light equipment platoon. Configential

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SUBJECT: Cperation Report - Lessons Learned, 3rd Brigade (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 Oct 1971, RGS CS FORm65 (R3)
(b) Combat Enginecr platoons are in direct suport of the infantry battalions. The platoon leader functions as the Battalion Engineer. Control of the brigade's engineer assets rest with the brigade engineer and the $C 0$ of the 501st Engineer Company.
(c) Sixteen new and eighteen old fire support bases were opened. 1 st platoon in support of 2nd Inf Bn, 8th Cav, constructed 9 FSB's. 2nd platoon in support of 1 st Inf $\mathrm{Bn}, 7$ th Cav constructed 5 FSB's. 3rd platoon in support of 1 st $\operatorname{Inf} \mathrm{Bn}$, 12 th Cav constructed 14 FSB'S. 4th platoon in support of 2 nd Inf En, 5th Cav constructed 6 FSB's. The Combat Engineer platoons provide demolition support of the battaljons. Each platoon maintains a six man rappel aualified PZ cutting team on 30 minute notice at the battalion fire bases.
(d) Ninesweep operations are conducted frequently during road resupply of fire bases and reopening of old fire bases.
(e) Fire bases which can be reached by road are constructed with nonairmobile assets. The airmobile eouipnent is reserved for those areas which cannot be reached by road. Difficulties with parts and maintenance dictate this deployment policy.
(f) Base development work is done when operational requirements permit, every effort is made by the Brigade Engineer to have non-brigade assets committed to base development projects.

## (3) Significant Events:

(a) 10 April 71 - Company C, 8th Engineer Battalion was augmented by an additional combat engineer platoon and a light equipment platoon in order to provide adequate support to the 3rd Brigade (Sep), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).
(b) April - June 71 - The relocation of the Brigade headouarters from FSB Mace to Bien Hoa caused considerable renodeling of FSB Nace. The work included building a new berm, a new rearm point, a new refuel point, new guard towers, and new wire barriers. Considefable upgrading of the drainage system was completed. Nany difficulties were encountered because sufficient planning had not been carried out. Priorities of tasks were not set because no single person was charged with overall responsibility for the project. Another problem was the availability of engineer support; the requirements to provide field support to maneuver battalions which of ten left FSB lace without sufficient support. Non-Brigade engineers could have provided better support.
(c) May 71 - 1st Inf Bn , 7 th Cav opened FSB Furs in an old rice paddy. The sight was chosen because engineer assets were a critical shortage. Considerable difficulties were experienced because the base was under water most of the tine. Insufficient reconnaissance was made before selection of the site. A new technique for stabilization of artillery pieces vas developed for the muddy conditions.
(d) May 71 - The and Inf Bn, 5th Cav opened FSB Jay in one day. It stands as the most rapid res once by C Company, th Engineer $\mathrm{B}_{\mathrm{n}}$ for construction of a new base. Notification of the company was mate at 1100 hrs ; the first engineer equipment arrived at 1400 hrs ; the base was fully operational by 1700 hours. The operation went rapidly because of close coordination between the Brigade Engineers, the Brigade 53 and TRAC to get the heavy lift helicontors to move the airmobile equipment in less than three hours.
(e) June 71 - Engineer equipment support was provided to MACV Advisory Team \#87 at Vo Dat for the construction of one fire support base, three CP's and a POL point. Close coordination was made between the senior advisor and the engineer company commander. The operation went smoothly and was completed in four days rather than five.
(f) June 71 - Fire support base Pecos was opened by the 1st Inf Bn, 12th Cav. The base was built on a open field with three feet of clay over a gravel base. Construction woes difficult be cause of the mud. Once a drainage system was established, the base dried out conpletly. The gravel subbase aided the drainage significantly 。
(g) 30 June 71 - Company C, eth Engineer Battalion was redesignated as the 501st Engineer Company (Combat).
(h) Sept 71 - Task Force Gary Owen participated in the with drawal of U.S. elements from $F S S$ Katum. The task force was called upon to conduct a road march. The 501 st Engineer Company was initially asked to provide an engineer platoon. The committed infantry battalion did not take the platoon. The 501st Engineer Company was later required to provide and emplace a 38 foot M4T6 dry span across a blown culvert. The task was completed with difficulty because the requirement had not been anticipated and the staff was not knowledgeable of the availability, transportation and emplacement of bridges. Close coordination between the staff and engineer is indicated for future operations.

1. 525th Signal Company Operations: During the reporting period this organization changed unit designation. It was designated Detachment 9 (Signal Company) when the 1st Cavalry Division stood down. On 1 July 1971 it was redesignated the 525 th Signal Company.

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(1) Vision; Provide constant communications support throughout the 3rd Ede (Sep) area of operation.
(2) Execution: This unit provides FM and VHF communication to all of the battalions. Due to the wide expanse of the area of operation this entails one communication relay site on Nui Chaw Chan.
(3) Significant events:
(a) VHF communications experienced complete loss of primary and reserve power on Dui Chaw Chan on 5 September 1971. Approximately 1300 the primary source of power, a 30 KW generator, malfunctioned and stopped working. Within the next forty-five minutes the four reserve 10 KW generators were started and each one malfunctioned, for different reasons. VHF communications for the entire 3rd Ede area of operations was down. The 525 th Signal Company possessed two operational 10 KW generators at the Bien Moa site. AA\&E was notified of the situation and a request was made for a helicopter to lift the generators to NCC. The S-3 Officer was informed of the situation and immediately produced a helicopter to fly the generators to Nus Chan Chan. VHF communications were quickly restored.
(b) On 25 September 1971, the 525 th Signal Company provided one jump team to FSB Katum. The purpose was to provide an $\mathbb{N}$ voice nonsecure net between $1 / 12$ at Katum and Mien Koa. This mission was established when the $1 / 12$ was called upon to support the 23rd Artillery at Katum. On 24 September 1971 the 525th Signal Company was alerted by Brigade S-3 to have one AM jump team ready for departure to FSB Katum within one hour. The afternoon of 25 September the $A$ jump team departed Bin Moa for Katum. at approximately 1530 hrs of the 25 th $A N$ voice communications was established from Katum to Bien Moa and constantly maintained until the jump team was pulled out of Katur on 1 October 1971.
(c) From 29 September 1971 through 2 October 1971 the $F M$ section was called upon to provide a jump CF to Thy Ninh. The FN section was to provide three radio nets of communication, one secure and two nonsecure, from Thy Ninh to Bien Hoar. Six radio operators, one NCOIC and an OIC for commuications were sent from the 525th Signal Company. They were to establish the three FT nets at May Ninh; and retrains capability for the three FM. nets to communicate to Been Ho a via an automatic relay to be positioned at Nus $\mathrm{Ba}_{\mathrm{a}}$ Den. The commitment was accomplished very successfully because of the availability of sufficiently trained personnel and adequate equipment.
(d) From the period 12 through 15 October 1971 the 525 th provided an $\mathbb{N}$ jump CP to Ta y sinh. Purpose was to provide one secure net and two nonsecure net voice communications for the Thy linn area and back to Been Moa. The 525th Signal Company was tasked to provide FY communications for the Thy Ninh area and from Thy Ninh to Bien Hos. Communications for the three

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Fin nets from Pay Ninth to Been Moa were to be provided via an automatic retransmission rack placed a top Nus Ba Den. On approximately 7 October 1971 the 525 th Signal Company was notified that it would be providing communicalions support for another jump CP to Thy Ninth. Three FM voice nets would be required: one secure and two non-secure. These would be used to comminate within the Thy sinh AO and back to Been Hoe, On 12 October the jump CP left for Thy Ninh with the required communications personnel and equipment. Upon arrival at Pay sinh the Task Force Commander necessarily changed the requiremints for signal support. The afternoon of 12 October FM communications were established as well as four channel VHF (provided by the pst Signal Brigade) from Thy Ninh to Been Moa. The 525 th received a call from the Bode Signal officer requesting non-secure voice communications. The evening of 12 October the 525 th received a request from Nay Ninth for additional radio equipment and a 3 KW generator. The morning of 13 October the signal CIC for the jump called and stated the task force commander recuested secure teletype communications be sent to Thy Ninh. This was sent the morning of the 13 th. The afternoon of the 13 th comm center was up and operational.
2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations

## a. Personnel Inofontry Replacements

(1) OBSSZVATICI: In-country transferees with less than 60 days to DEROS have been assigned to tactical units as replacements in critical shortage MOSs.
(2) EVALUATICN: Replacements with less than 60 days remaining in-country are of little value to tactical units operating in the field. The problem is particularly acute in shortage MOSs (egg., Infantrymen and combat medics) for line companies because the replacements are mable to become fully intgrated into the unit before they must return to the rear to DERGS. The impact upon the unit is a degradation of unit integrity and lack of confidence in the soldiers concerned.
(3) RECANEDATICN: That personnel managers at all levels insure that replacements have sufficient time remaining in-country to be of benefit to the units to which they are reassigned.

## b. Intelligence:

(1) Electronic Intelligence:
(a) Observation: Electronic gadgetry is over relied upon by American forces in Vietnam. Too often it is the only means used for collecting informmotion. This gadgetry inclures Red Haze, SLAR, Sniffer, Sensors, and URS's.

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(b) Evaluation:
(1) Red Haze is generally flown at night after the enemy has doused his evening fires and before he has started his morning fires. Red Haze seems to be unable to detect personnel through the jungle canopy. This is very understandable since it was designed to detect such things as vehicles and tanks. Its use, especially in the middle of the night does not seem applicable to the conditions in easter m MR III.
(2) SLAR seems also to be ineffective in that it works on the Doeppler effect and cannot penetrate the jungle. The only practical use of SLAR in eastern MR III is to survey the rivers where the rules of engagement make it particularly difficult for American forces to engage the enemy.
(3) Sniffer is used constantly largely due to its availability. However, it has not yet provided truly accurate intelligence. Twice responding to particularly intense sniffer readouts the results were totally negative.
(4) Sensors have proven somewhat effective in determining enemy use of various areas or his non-use of these areas. However, their short life span detracts from their effectiveness and considerably increases the cost in terms of man-days spent on implanting the sensors and in securing the implant team. Such sensors as PSID's too frequently give false activations. For this reason units have lost confidence in them.
(5) URS's are relied upon very heavily for information concerning the enemy location and disposition. With certain enemy units the URS's are invaluable indicators; however, other enemy elements seem to avoid transmitting from their actual location. Still other enemy elements very infrequently transmit at all.
(c) Recommendations: It would seem that certain actions could be taken to improve the accuracy and timeliness of information acquired by electrical means. Red Haze, for instance, could be flow at hours when the enemy is most likely to have his fires lit - early evening and early morning. Sensors are still in their initial stage of development. Further development should aim at fewer false readings and a longer life span.
(2) District or Province Intelligence Operations Centers:
(a) Observation: Presently these are not being adequately supported by American forces who operate in these Centers' area of interest.
(b) Evaluation: American forces presently are required to evacuate all material and documents through American channels to CDEC and GVEC. Generally, these documents are reproduced and sent to the GWN Province concerned. However, it would seem far more efficient for the documents to go straight Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 Oct 1971, ACS CS FOR-65 (RS)
to either the DIOC or the GWN Province intelligence personnel. At either of these locations American liaison teams from the American units involved could be established. These teams would not be advisors but purely liaison groups. By such a method both the GTN and Americans could study the same documents without the necessity of reproduction. also, there is at present a lack of communication between the GWN intelligence personnel and their American counterparts in US units. Such liaison teams could help increase mutual respect and the free flow of information. At present this mit must deal directly with the Provinces through informal channels. This system does not provide a continuous flow of information and leads only to minimum trust on the part of both the Americans and Vietnamese because these contacts are so infrequent and mutual trust does not have the opportunity to develop.
(c) Recommendation: That American Liaison teams for intelligence be established et either Province or District level. That all material and documents captured by American forces be brought first to these combined intelligence centers for exploitation by both $G V I$ and American personnel.
c. Operations:
(1) Bunker Destruction:
(a) CBSERVATICN: The use of C-4 explosive for destruction of enemy bunkers does not provide sufficient damage for the cost involved.
(b) EVALUATION: A more efficient and less expensive method for destruction of enemy bunkers was developed. The 40 pound cratering charge containing amonium nitrate (cost: $\$ 15.00$ per charge) was found to be more effective than $\mathrm{C}-4$, (cost: 2.02 per $1 \frac{1}{4} \mathrm{lb}$ block) in destroying bumpers. The charge breaks the logs and destroys the hole while $\mathrm{C}-4$ only cuts the logs.
(c) ECONENDATION: That cratering charges be used for destruction of enemy bunkers.
(2) Stabilization of Artillery pieces:
(a) OBSERTATICN: The M102, 105 mm Howitzer is unstable when employed on muddy ground. Stabilize the pad with N8A1 matting.
(b) EVALUATICN: The flooring of a gun pit with M8A1 matting (PSP) was completed. The stabilization stakes were driven through the matting. Firing was conducted with no shifting of the piece.
(c) RECCN EMDATICN: That N8A1 matting be used as flooring in gun pits under muddy conditions.


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(3) LZ Preparation Fires:
(a) CBSERVATION; A combat assault landing zone preparation by AFA employing flechette rockets permits greater surprise, faster insertion of ground troops, and effective variance of standard insertion procedures to confuse the enemy.
(b) EVALUATICN: Primarily because no adjustment of tube artillery is required, the element of surprise is enhanced by an AFA preparation. It has been found that the command and control helicopter can mark the LZ with smoke, insure that the flight leader has an accurate identification of the LZ and the wind direction, and then begin the actual insertion within a few minutes without having any helicopters in the immediate vicinity of the LZ for a prolonged period of time. The flechette rockets provide highly effective coverage of the area around the LZ. This technique contributes to operational security by varying the standard pattern of preceding a combat assault by tube artillery adjustment (with the command and control ship orbiting near the LZ) and preparation.
(c) RECO NENDATION: That units occasionally employ AFA flechette LZ preparations, particularly in those instances when speed is a factor.
(4) CI sweeps of FOBs:
(a) CBSFRVATICN: The use of CI teams significantly reduced the number of security violations and denied the enemy the use of abandoned US materials.
(b) EVALUATICN: The presence of trained CI personnel on a FSB at the time of closing provided the F'SB commander with additional trained eyes to assist him during the crucial period of final closing. The use of trained personnel accompanied by untrained unit personnel provided a training vehicle that was most effective under actual field conditions.
(c) RECCIIENDATION: That all units closing either FSBs or permanent installations utilize trained CI personnel during the final phase of their stand down.
(d) COMMAND ACTION: The requirement will continue to exist within the structure of the MID.
(5) Use of 1 SS personnel in direct support of in intelligence activities.
(a) OBSERVATICN: Well trained NSS personnel, with their power of arrest and interrogation, are a distinct asset when directly assigned in support of a US MID.
avdact Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 Oct 1971, RCS CS FCR-65 (R3)
(b) EVaUMATIC: Although this is a relatively new program, the preliminary results indicate that it will provide better counterintelligence coverage and at the same time, reduce the amount of illegal drug traffic on the base.
(c) RECONRDDATION: That other US intelligence units in support of US tactical elements conduct liaison with their local MSS agency for similar support.
(d) COMAAND ACTION: Continued supervision of the complete program and liaison with MSS.
(6) Airborne Personnel Detector:
(a) OBSERVATION: The APD could be a useful method to employ in the search for aircraft that have been lost over areas covered by dense vegetation.
(b) EVALUATICN: Since the APD operates by sensing changes in particle concentrations in the air, it could be an effective means for searching for downed aircraft by picking up the dust and debris that is scattered by the craft at the crash site or by picking up smoke particles if the plane is still buming or smoldering. The search operation with the sniffer would have to be employed ithin a few hours after the aircraft accident, however.
(c) RECOMGIDATICN: That the APD be employed in the search for missing aircraft.

## d. Qrganization:

(1) Engineer Squad Organization:
(a) OBSERVATTCN: Bngineer squads under 5-217TP501 do not have an assistant Squad Leader.
(b) EVALUATICN: It has been found that the squad operates less effectively without a Sergeant (E-5) Assistant Squad Leader. Squad Leaders are unable to divide their squads into two effective work parties.
(c) RBCOMMRDATIONS: That Sergeant (E-5) MOS $12 B 40$ be substituted for one combat demolition specialist ( $\mathrm{B}-4$ ) MOS 12 B 30.
(2) Organization of Chaplain Section:
(a) OSSERVATTON: Organization of the Chaplain Section for a Separate Brigade should be tailored to the operational situation.

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(b) EVALWATJOT: The stencord mococure in what Irigide Chaplans Provice roligious coverege as a tean working out of the Brigece Hecdquarters does not function well in e. Vietnan enviroment. The large area of operam tions and the lerge nuber (8) of cheplains assigned rake it dinficult for the Brigede Cheplain to meinten deily contect ond thus reatuces the effectiveness of centrally administered and controlled religious coverage.
(c) RECONEDAHMOT:

1 The clecr atteincle religious coverage objectives for the Brigade be establisher and acceptod by all Chaplains and Comenders.

2 That arsistat Erigede Chaplains be cticched to both meneurer and support beticlions. Syecicl instructions in cech atteching orcer assign rasponsibility for adcitional basic religious group (Protestent or Ronen Cetholic) coverage to bettalions whose ctteched Cheplein is of chother besic religious soup.

3 Thit ar preperction procedures be asteblished in winch eech assistent brigade cheplain is retec by the $C O$ or $X O$ of the bettelion to wich he is attached.
(d) COMAND ACTION - AIl of the above rocomendations heve been inplemented in the 3ra Brisede (Sep).
c. Trening: Pilot trining.
(1) Obsorvction: Pilot trining must bu a constent process of coherent, consistont effort. Insuring the avajlebility and professionelism of top cuality pilots ane aircreft comanders is a prinary mission of this unit.
(2) Eveluation: To prevent any deficiencies in aviator training a cohesive and constcntly updeted treining progran, involving ell availc.ble personel end resources must be kept in effect.
(3) Recommendetions:
(a) Thet this unit continue to mantain pilot training end progress records on eech pilot and that these logs be rovieved by the CO and the treining officer regulerly and by all circreft connenders efter eech dey's flight.
(b) Thet this undis cirerit comandors continuc to nect informaly weekly to review pilot prosioss and recvilucte the unit treining nrogrcin.
(c) Thet the policy of assigning ocon pilot on cercitt comender as a "sponsor", tho privary source and mitor of his treining, bo continued.

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## f. Logistics: Log Day

(1) Observation: LZ construction kits should be utilized in preparing Log Pads.
(2) Evaluation: Nost of the daylight hours of Log Day are lost and a considerable expense is incurred through the use of $\mathrm{CL}_{4}$ in preparing a Log Pad. In addition an LZ construction kit consisting of: three axes, one chain saw, three bush axes, and five machettes would produce a safer log pad due to the lack of wood splinters with planned placement of fallen trees.
(3) Recommendations: An LZ construction kit be dropped into the company once the LZ is determined. This kit can be returned to the company rear on the resupply helicopter.

## g. Commurications:

(1) Aircraft FV Radios:
(a) Observation: Aircraft currently assigned are eçuipped with two types of $F M$ radios, either the $A N / A R C-131$ with a transmitting power of 17 watts or the AN/ARC-54 radio with a transmitting power of $\frac{1}{2}$ watts.
(b) Evaluation: The increased range prorided by the $A N / A P C-131$ radio greatly enhances the communications capability of all aircraft. In addition, it will accept (X-mode) secure traffic without modification while the $A N / A R C$. 54 radio recuires the application of MWO \#11-5821-244-3012 prior to operating in the secure mode.
(c) Recomendation: That all aircraft be converted to the $A N / A R C-131$ radio.
(2) Signal Nirrors:
(a) Observation: Use of smoke grenades may compromise unit location.
(b) Evaluation: It is possible that noise of a smoke grenade may compromise a unit's location. Such smoke may be observed by the enemy on high ground in the area.
(c) Recormendations: Signal Mirrors should be used to mark friendly locations when applicable. Concurrently positive communications must be established with the aircraft or the friendly element being contacted. If not feasible, it is then recommended that the tape be removed from the bottom of the smoke grenade to recuce the noise level when discharged.

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## h. Material:

(1) Organic Transportation:
(a) $035 \mathrm{RVATIN}:$ The airmobile engineer company is not equipped for moving its heavy equipment by road.
(b) EVALUATICN: Reliance on non-organic road haul means for movement of heavy ecuipment has of ten resulted in clelayed engineer support for Brigade reauirements which can be reached by road. Provision for organic transportation would improve engineer response.
(c) RECCIMNDATION: That the Separate Brigade Combat Ingineer Company be given at least 2, 10-ton tractors and 1, 25-ton low bed semi-trailer.
(2) Factory parts:
(a) OBSTEVATICI: Another problem area which has recently been developing is in the cuality of some factor components. These components have been arriving at the unit level with the maximum allowable tolerances already evident in these component life.
(b) EVALUATICN: If a factory component is tested and found to have present in a new condition, the maximum tolerances allowable for safe flight, then the part cannot be expected to stay within tolerance for the entire forecast component life.
(c) RECONTERDATION: That the quality control element inform the manufacturersof the problem developing, and reguest higher standards be set for new parts to insure maximum component life.
i. Other: Construction of culvert/bunkers.
(a) OBSSRVATION: Culvert/bunker construction does not provide adequate protection if there is no overhead cover between bunker and blast wall.
(b) EVALUATION: From experience on FSS Pace it was noted that 82 mm rounds were falling between culvert/bunkers and the blast walls.
(c) ZECOINEDDTICNS: That overhead cover be constructed between the blast wall and the culvert/bunker utilizing two pieces of joined perforated steel plates (PSP) then sandbagged.

AVDAGT-DOT CS FOR-65 (R3)

FOR THE CMMANDER:

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16 Incl:
TAB A: Task Organization
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TAS F: Aerial Surveillance
TAB G: Intelligence sctivities
TAB H: Training/Combat Developments
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TAB J: Information Activi位es
TAB K: Provost Narshal. A*tivities
TA3 L: Surgeon Activities
TAB M: Logistic Activities
TAB N: Fire Bases Opened/Closed
TаЗ 0: S5 Activities
TAB P: Chemical Activities
TAB Q: FIRST TEA: Area of Operations
DISTRIBUTION
Special
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2 - CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPCP-DT, APO 96558
3-CG, USLRV, ATTN: AVHDO-DO, APO }9637
4 - CG, TRAC, aTTN: NACTR-G3, APO }9626
1-CG, 1st Cavalry Division (TRICAP), Ft Hood, Texas
1 - CG, 3rd Bde (Sep)
1 - DCO-A, 3rd Bde (Sep)
1-DCO-B, 3rd Bde (Sep)
1 - KO, 3rd Bde (Sep)
1- CO, BHAG
1 - S1, 3rd Bde (Sep)
1 - S2, 3rd Bde (Sep)
4-S3, 3rd 3de (Sep)
1- S4, 3rd Bde (Sep)
1 - S5, 3rd Beie (Sep)
- ea. Special Staff Section, 3rd Bde (Sep)
1-CO, 2nd Bn (AN), 5th Cav
1-\infty, 1st Bn (aN), 7th Cav
1-\infty, 2nd Mn (AN), 8th Cav
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DISTRIBUTICN (Cont)
Special
1-C0, 1st Bn (AM), 12th Cav
5-CO, 215th CS Bn (SPT)
3-CO, 1st Mn, 21st Arty
1- ${ }^{0}$, 501st Engr Co
$1-\infty, 525$ th Sig Co
1 - CO, 191st I I Co
1-C0, 220ti Am Bn (Comp)
1 - Combat Training Center
2-14th Mil Hist Det
$1-60, F$ Btry, 79th Arty
$1-\mathrm{CO}, \mathrm{H} \mathrm{CO}, 75$ th Rangers
1-34th Inf Platoon (SD)
3rd Bde (Sep)
$2 / 5$ Cav
$1 / 7$ Cav
$2 / 8$ Cav
$1 / 12$ Cav
$1 / 21$ Arty ( + )
F/79 Arty (AFA)
34 Inf Plat (SD)
Co H, 75th Ranger
229 Aun Ba (Comp)
501 Eng Co
525 Sig Co
MI Det
215 th CS Bn (Spt)

SUPPORTING ARTILLERY
A (-)/5-42 Arty (155) (GS) (POF Long Khanh)

B (-)/5-42 Arty (155) (GS) (POF Binh Tuy)
C/5042 drty (155)(GSR 3rd Bde Arty)


TAE C: Enery Orior of Dettle es of 312400 October 1971

## TNIT

1. (C) 33ra NVF Re inent ITQ
c. 1st in .
b. $2 n c$ In.
c. $3 r^{\circ}$ In.
2. (C) $\mathrm{SR}-5$ ITC
3. (c) $\mathrm{NR}-7 \mathrm{HQ}$
4. (C) 814th Rery Service Group HQ
5. (C) Recr Servico Group, MR-7
6. (C) I- Lon: (P) HQ

FROLAELE LOCATION AS OF 31 OCTOUER
SW of FSS HALL (YS 6299)
N of FS: WISHART (YT 57M8)
E of Dinh Quan (V) (YT 5637)
NE of Cen My (H) (YS 5390)
Wostern Wer Zone D
Erse Arec 305 (YT 7402)
Northern Wer Zone D
Nui Le (YS 8709)
Easc firee 305 (YT 7402)

SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Leamed, 3rd Brigade (Separate), is Cavalry Divsion (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 Oct 1971, RCS CS FOR-65 (R3)
TABD: Operation Zesults (Bnemy Personnel and Equipment Losses) as of 312400 October 1971.

## ENEM Y LOSSES FOR MAY

|  | 团 | 3 ZDD BDE |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| (1) | En Killed | 55 |
| (2) | PW | 4 |
| (3) | HC | 1 |
| (4) | IC | 25 |
| (5) | CD | 6 |
| (6) | Thelas | 0 |
| (\%) | 1wnact/che) | 43/0 |
| (3) | Os (act/che) | 1/0 |
|  | Fice (Tons) | 1.229 |
| (10) | Salt (Ton) | 1.027 |
| (11) | Com (1bs) | 0 |
| (12) | Fiour (Tons) | 0.123 |
| (13) | Sugar (lbs) | 40 |
| (14) | Fed Sup (lbs) | 49.28 |
| (15) | 82 mm rds | 6 |
| (16) | 81 mm rds | 3 |
| (17) | 60 mra rds | 15 |
| (18) | 75 mm RR rds | 100 |
| (19) | B 40 rds | 10 |
| (20) | Grenades | 1406 |
| (21) | SA rds | 2883 |
| (22) | AT lines |  |
| (23) | AP Fines | 62 |
| (20) | Expic IIbs) | 823.6 |
| (25) | Blast caps | 2315 |
| (25) | Verictes | 1 |
| (27) | Currency | 922 |
| (28) | Plastic (Ibs) | 503 |
| (29) | Canvas (lbs) | 50 |

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ENEMY LOSSES FOR JLNE

| (1) En Killed | 3RD SDE |
| :--- | :--- |
| (2) PW | 106 |
| (3) HC | 1 |
| (4) CD | 0 |
| (5) IC | 5 |
| (6) Unclas | 11 |
| (7) IW (act/che) | 0 |
| (8) CS (act/che) | $44 / 18$ |
| (9) Rice (Tons) | $0 / 1$ |
| (10) Com (1bs) | 1.742 |
| (11) Salt (Tons) | 4 |
| (12) Flour (Tons) | 0.632 |
| (13) Sugar (lbs) | 11.355 |
| (14) Med Sup (lbs) | 30.00 |
| (15) 122mm rkt | 33.76 |
| (16) 82mm rds | 1 |
| (17) 6Omm rds | 1 |
| (18) B-40 rds | 1 |
| (19) 40 mm rds | 18 |
| (20) Grenades | 9 |
| (21) SA rds | 38 |
| (22) AP Nines | 5883 |
| (23) AT Mines | 3 |
| (24) Cloth (lbs) | 5 |
|  |  |

## ENEM Y LOSSES FOR JULY



AVAGT_DOT SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lesserrs vearneu, गer brigaut (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (dirmobile), Period Ending 31 Oct 1971, RCS CS FOR.65 (R3)

## ENEMY LOSSES FOR AUGUST

|  |  | 3RD BDE |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| (1) | En Killed | 49 |
| (2) | En PW | 2 |
| (3) | HC | 1 |
| (4) | CD | 4 |
| (5) | Unclas | 0 |
| (6) | IW (act/che) | 26/0 |
| (7) | CS (act/che) | 1/0 |
| (8) | Rice (Tons) | .312 |
| (9) | Corn (lbs) | 135 |
| (10) | Flour (Tons) | 55.851 |
| (11) | Salt (lbs) | 2.00 |
| (12) | Med Sup (lbs) | 315.34 |
| (13) | 105 mm rds | 1 |
| (14) | 81 mm rds | 2 |
| (15) | 75 mm rds | 3 |
| (16) | 60 mm rds | 1 |
| (17) | 12. gmm rds | 100 |
| (18) | B-40 rds | 3 |
| (19) | Grenades | 12 |
| (20) | SA rds | 1724 |
| (21) | AT Mines | 4 |
| (22) | AP Nines | 9 |
| (23) | 82 mm fuses | 150 |
| (24) | Vehicles | 1 |
| (25) | Explo (lbs) | 10.50 | Cavalry Division (Airmobile); Period Ending 31 Oct 1971, RCS CS FCR-65 (R3)

ENEMY LOSSES FOR SEPTE ARER

|  |  | $\frac{\text { 2RD }}{3 D D}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| (1) | En Killed | 48 |
| (2) | En PW | O |
| (3) | HC | 0 |
| (4) | CD | 0 |
| (5) | IC | 0 |
| (6) | Unclas | A |
| (7) | IV (act/che) | 2917 |
| (8) | CS (act/che) | $4 / 1$ |
|  | Rice (Tons) | . 298 |
| (10) | Flour (Tons) | . 690 |
| (11) | Corn (lbs) | 81.00 |
| (12) | Salt (Tons) | . 056 |
| (13) | Med Sup (lbs) | 30.45 |
| (14) | 122 mm rkt rds | 5 |
| (15) | 82 mm mort rds | 89 |
| (16) | 75 mm RR rds | 7 |
| (17) | 60 mm mort rds | 27 |
| (18) | $\mathrm{B}-41 \mathrm{rds}$ | 1 |
| (19) | $\mathrm{B}-40 \mathrm{rds}$ | 84 |
| (20) | M 79 rds | 7 |
| (21) | 12.7 rds | 1045 |
| (22) | Grenades | 357 |
| (23) | SA rds | 20657 |
| (24) | AP Nines | 4 |
| (25) | Explos (lbs) | 12.50 |
| (26) | Blasting Caps | 281 |

## ENEMY LOSSES FOR OCTOBER

3RD EDE


# ADSGTDCT CON:゙iノENJTML 13 November 1971 <br> SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, 3rd Brigade (Separate), Ist Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 Oct 1971, RCS CS FOR-65 (R3) 

TAB E: Weather and Terrain

1. Terrain: The terrain in the Third Brigade $A 0$ is generally flat in central

Long Khanh and Binh Tuy provinces although parts are rough and mountainous.
Long Khanh ( $P$ ) north of the Dong Nai River (War Zone D) is heavily vegetated, uninhabited, and is very rough terrain. The remainder of Long Khanh ( $P$ ) in the $A C$ is generally flat and moderately vegetated. The dominating features of that area are Nui Chau Chan, a cone shaped mountain, and the area of the La Nga River which includes several tributary streams and ridge lines. Northern Binh Tuy Province includes rice paddies and mountains. The rice growing area of Binh Tuy (P) includes an extensive populated area and the La Nga River which produces the largest rice harvest collected anywhere in MRIII. Nui ong, to the southeast of the rice bowl, is the highest point in RR-III at 1300 meters. Northeastern Binh Tuy ( $P$ ) is covered by rough hills and mountainous terrain and is largely uninhabited. Southern Binh Tuy ( $P$ ) is a sparsely vegetated coastal plain broken up by several mountains to the south of 2-1: Nui Nay Tao, Nui Be, Nui Nhon. $\mathbb{L}-1$ is the main highway in the southern half of the AO going in an east - west direction and J-20 is the main highway in the northerm half of the AO going in a northeast - southwest direction parallel to the Dong Nai River.
2. Weather: a. During the ronth of May, the weather pattern was typical of the normal southwest monsoon. Wind flow was mainly from the southeast to south and isolated thunderstorms were reported throughout MR3. Usually these thunderstorms began to build about 1400-1600 and by 1800 nearly all areas reported thunderstorms. Only in very isolated cases had the thunderstorms lasted beyond 2400. Haze was present on some mornings, but visibility was normally not restricted to less than 5 miles anywhere except at Phu Loi. Temperatures ranged from lows in the mid-70's to highs in the upper 90's. Average rainfall for the area was about 2 inches per week at the beginning of the month and nearly 6 inches per week near the end of the month.
b. June showed the southwest monsoon at full strength. Aftermoon and evening thunderstorms and showers occurred nearly every day of the week. With precipitation almost everyday, visibilities in the morning have been restricted by fog and haze from $2-5$ miles; by afternoon visibilit increased to over 7 miles except in showers or thunderstorms where it was rarely better than 2 miles. Surface winds ranged fron $5-20$ knots and temperatures ranged from lows in the 70's to highs in the 90 's. Average rainfall per week was approximately 4 inches.
c. Typhoons dominated the weather scene in July. Typhoons moved through the South China Sea on an average of 1 each 5 days. Once the storms entered the South China Sea, weather over southern RVN became cloudy with rain for a period of $2-4$ days. Temperatures ranged from lows in the 70's to highs in the 90 's with approximately 2 inches of rain per week.

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d. August showed a return of the normal seasonal southwest monsonnal flow. Weather was fairly consistent with light groundfog and haze restricting visibilities in the mornings to $3-5$ miles in most areas. Temperatures and rainfall were much the same as in the previous two months.
e. A regular daily weather pattern was followed throughout the month of September. Patchy early morning ceilings were based between 500 and 1000 feet with visibilities occasionally restricted to $1-2$ miles in ground fog. Normal visibilities remained at 3 to 6 miles. These low conditions normally dissipitated by 1000 hours, leaving skies which were scattered variable broken at 1500 - 2000 feet. Isolated rainshowers and thunderstorms were in the area from 1400 to 0200. Temperatures ranged from lows in the 70 's to highs in the mid-90's. Rainfall averaged about one inch per week.
f. In October, the weather patter underwent a marked change as the monsoonal trough moved slowly southward. Each day was almost a carbon copy of the previous one. liming fog and stratus clouds, and the resultant low ceilings and visibilities, which generally occurred between 0600-1000, gave way to scattered to broken cumulus clouds and unlimited visibilities which lasted until 1400. Then as the maximum heating hour was reached, widespread rain and thundershower activity occurred. This pattern remained fixed until, finally, the monsoon moved far enough south to permit the first signs which announced the arrival of the northeast monsoon. These are clear to partly cloudy skies and drier, less humid air. The northeast monsoon began to show its effects toward the end of the month. Rainfall averaged about 2-3 inches per week with temperatures remaining nearly the same as the previous month.

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SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, 3rd Brigade (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 Oct 1971, RCS CS FOR-65 (R3)
TAB F: Aerial Surveillance

1. OBSERVATION:
a. Red Haze:
(1) Missions Requested: 201
(2) Vissions Granted: 176
(3) Mission Aborted: 50
(a) Weather: 37
(b) Sensor Malfunction: 4
(c) Others (Veg Arty, Clearance, A/C Failure, etc): $\Theta$
(4) Missions Flown: 126
(5) R/O's: 144
(6) R/O's per Missions: 1.1
b. SLAR:
(1) Wissions Requested: 201
(2) Nissions Granted: 170
(3) Missions Aborted: 17
(a) Weather: 5
(b) Sensor Malfunction: 12
(4) Missions Flown: 153
(5) R/O's: 101
(6) R/O's per mission: . . 66
c. Sniffer:
(1) Missions Requested: 201
(2) Missions Granted: 145
(3) Missions Flown 145
(4) Boxes Cancelled: 32
(5) Boxes Cancelled per mission: .45
(6) R/0's: 1371
(7) R/O's per mission: 9.05
d. Y03A:
(1) Nissions Recorded: 60
(2) Missions Aborted: 23
(3) Missions w/Sightings: 20
(4) Targets Engaged: 13

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SUBJECT:
Operation Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Deane, Jut Draaue (Separate), 1 st CS FORm 65 (R3)
2. EVALUATION: Of the first 3 assets, Sniffer provided the greatest yield/output ratio. Red Haze and SLAR proved to be generally ineffective over jungle terrain during the monsoon season. Reaction to both SLAR and Red Haze R/O's was practically nonexistent. They were used only to develop patterns of enemy activity; however, the high mission abort rate (especially in the case of Red Haze) made it difficult to fly continuous nightly coverage over a given area and hence pattern analysis was invalid. Sniffer was provided with gunship escort and thus was able to react quickly to heavy $\mathrm{R} / \mathrm{o}$ and/or sightings. The lack of highly sophisticated equipment seems to have reduced its aborted mission rate in comparison with Red Haze and SLAR. It generally seems better adapted to counter insurgency warfare than Red Haze and liaR.
b. The effectiveness of YO3A is difficult to judge. Statistics seem to indicate a poor record; however, they do not reflect the fact that during the period of 1 April 1971 to 15 August 1971 the aircraft gradually lost its night vision devices to maintenance and towards the end of this period became nothing more than an $0-1$ with a silent engine. When the aircraft did fly with night vision devices performing properly it had significant sightings and was generally effective.
3. RECCHMEDATICNS: a. Red Haze and SLAR should be used against a more convential tripe enemy under more favorable conditions of terrain and weather. If they are used for developing patterns of enemy activity, they should be allowed to fly over the sene area for extended periods of time and not jumped from place to place.
b. Sniffer missions should play a greater part in the intelligence collection program due to its dependability and flexibility. Heavy readouts should be acted upon quickly and decisively.

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F-2
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1. 191st MI Activities: a. During Julv 1971 a program was instituted which provided counterintelligence (CI) teams to each fire support base (FSB) commander during the closing of the FSB. The mission of the CI team was to insure that no GLASSIFIED information was left at the FSB and that CLASSIFIED information was properly handled during movement from one FSB to another. The CI team was organized from organic assets of the MID and transporation to the FSB was provided by the Brigade S-2. CI inspection check-lists were prepared and provided to each major maneuver element of the Brigade prior to the initiation of the CI inspection program. The concept of operations was to insert the CI team within two hours of the final closing of the FSB to assist the commander during the final stages of closing. The CI team checked all areas of the FSB to include billets, storage areas, briefing facilities, tactical operation centers, garbage sumps, latrines and the perimeter. During the initial series of inspections some information of value to the enemy was found; however, on the spot corrections were made and subsequent inspections discovered little or no information of intelligence value to the enemy left on FSB's. An unexpected benefit accruing from these inspections was the discovery of material items such as batteries, ammuition, canteens, ponchos and similiar gear that had been left on the FSBs. Most of these items were no longer of tactical value to the US elements, but they did have value to the enemy. Denying him the use of these items probably increased his reliance on his own logistic system.
b. Liaison visits with the Vietnamese Counterintelligence Service, the Nilitary Security Service (NSS), resulted in the assignment of four MSS agents directly to the IIID in September 1971. This is the first tine that MSS personnel have been directly assigned to a US combat unit in the Republic of Vietnam. Additionally, two female MSS agents were hired through the Civilian Labor Office in the capacity of female strip-searchers. Although the primary mission of the NSS personnel is to prohibit the entry of enemy agents inserted among the Local Nationals employed on Bien Hoa Army Base, these personnel are also utilized in a drug suppression role. As MSS has the power of arrest, controls the security investigations of all Vietnamese Nationals and has trained interrogators, their effectiveness in both CI and drug suppression is expected to weed out enemy infiltrators and to limit the amount of drugs brought on to Bien Hoa Army Base. It was determined that the rost effective utilization of the NiSS personnel would be derived by having them physically located on the base at all times. This resulted in the establishment of a combined office and billet for the team. all fixtures and furniturewere provided from organic MID assets, however, water and latrine facilities were provided by the Pacific Architects and Engineers Corporation. The NSS team provided its own vehicle with the agreement that POL support would be provided by the Brigade. Administrative support, messing, commimications, laundry and general housekeeping support is provided by the IID. Sile benefits arising from this action have been increased rapport with a counterpart agency, detailed intelligence briefings
on intelligence matters as seen by the Vietnamese, the detailed interrogation of Vietnamese drug/criminal offenders apprehended on the base, and the assurity that offenders are prosecuted under Vietnamese law.
2. The following are statistics for the Sensor Platoon Operations from 1 May - 31 October 1971:
a. Total number of sensors in field as of:

| 1 May | 1 June | 1 July | 1 August | 1 | September |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 197 | 182 | 193 | 155 | 60 | 103 |

b. Number of implant missions per month:

| May | June | July | August | September | October |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 5 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 5 |

c. Number of sensors put in field per month:

| May | June | July | August | September | October |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 13 | 6 | 29 | 35 | $\ldots$ | 45 | 29 |
| a. Number of sensor activations | per months: |  |  |  |  |  |
| Nay | June | July | August | $\cdots$ | September | October |
| 14 | 12 | 12 | 34 | 55 | 86 |  |

e. While there was a decrease in the number of sensors in the field, there was a significant increase in the number of activations each month.
f. This indicates that both recent implants have been in more lucrative locations, and that the monitor station has improved the quality of its sensor monitoring operations.
3. 34th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) (IPSD) and 62nd Infantry Platoon (Combat Trackers) IPCT:
a. NISSION; The mission of the 34 th IPSD, to include the mine dog section, and the attached 62nd IF CT is to support the Brigade's ground tactical units by detecting and giving early warning of enemy presence, enemy caches, booby traps and mines, and tracking the enemy in order to reestablish contact.

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SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, Ord Brigade (Separate), dst Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 Oct 1971, RCS CS FCR-65 (RB)
b. EXECUILO: This mission is carried out on a continuing basis, assisting the ground tactical units in accomplishing their own missions with a minimum amount of casualties and loss of equipment.
c. DISCUSSION MID ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS: This unit does not conduct separate operations, but does contribute significantly to those activities of the ground tactical units. Results of this support for the period concerned are listed below. Use of dogs in previous wars resulted in an estimated sixty-five percent fewer casualties in units with dogs attached. It would not be presumptous to assume the same is true in this instance, to make no mention of the valuable intelligence and enemy supplies found.
d. Handlers KIA: $\begin{array}{rr} & 0 \\ \text { VIA: } & 3 \\ \text { MIA: } & 0\end{array}$
e. Dog KIA: 1

WIS: 1
VIA: 1
f. Missions:
(1) Search........................................ 638
(2) Ambuch...,.................................... 24
(3) Recon,.......................................... 60
(4) Outpost............................................... 4
(5) Roach lleaitg............................. 42
(6) Pevinetry Petrol.......................... 12
(7) Days Tea ir Field not used........ 69
(8) Combat Inacier Missions................ 13 TOTAL. . . . . . 862
g. Results of Scout Dog - Combat Tracker Teams:
(1) Enemy KIA: 10
(2) Enemy WIA: 1
(3) Enemy PW: 1
h. Scout Dog Alerts:
(1) Warming of enemy ambush occupied bunker, sniper, or tunnel: 14
(2) Warming of enemy booby traps, caches, mines, or unoccupied base camp, bunker or hootch: 132.

## 1. Brigade Training:

a. The First Team Combat Training Center (CTC) conducted individual training for all incoming replacements. A total of 7135 United States Officers and rem underwent training during the reporting period in such diverse courses of instruction as Replacement Training, Combat Leadership Course, Mines and Booby Trap Training, and Bunker Refresher Training. In addition CTC presented instruction to 172 ARVN soldiers in Mines and Booby Trap Training.
(1) Sniper school: 13
(2) Combat Leadership Course: 140
(3) Mines and Booby Trap Training: 1735
(4) Replacement Training: 4898
b. An "Attack on a Bunker Complex" course was initiated in May 1971. This training included a live fire exercise on how to attack a bunker complex utilizing the organic fire support of the Brigade. The training was conducted as a platoon size problem since this was the size unit most frequently used in actual contact. This training gave the individual soldier a ground level view of some of the problems he would encounter, ie., thick vegetation prohibiting movement and difficulty in sighting the enemy. A total of 375 troops received this training.
2. Non-Brigade Training Programs and Schools. Utilization of USARV schools by the First Team is as follows:
a. UH-1 IF/SIF: 8
b. OH -6A IP/SIP: 13
c. AH-1G IP/SIP: 6
d. Radar Operator: 10
e. Radar Maintenance: 7
f. PLI: 15
g. AH-1G Helicopter Repair: 7
h. $\mathrm{OH}-6 \mathrm{~A}$ Helicopter Repair: 6

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SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, 3rd Brigade (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 Oct 1971, RCS CS FORL65 (R3)

1. UH-1 Helicopter Repair: 4
j. CH-47 Helicopter Repair: 5
k. T53-L13 Engine Repair (UH-1): 12
2. T55 Engine Repair: 3
m. T63 Fngine Repair: 9
n. Technical Inspector: 13
O. Aviation Supply: 10
p. Armanent AH-1C (Officer): 4
q. Armament aH-1G (EM): 8
3. Combat Developments:
a. The only item presently under evaluation is the Waterproofing Kit for the $A N / P R G-25$ and $A N / P R G-77$ radio handsets.
b. During the reporting period the Brigade also tested a Claymore Triggering Device. This triggering device was developed to replace the many field expedients used to adapt the claymore to a mechanical ambush. Evaluation colcluded that the device would of ten be detected before it was triggered, so the device was $r \in j e c t e d$ for standard use by the First Team. Also, the amount of pull required to trigger the device using a trip wire was excessive.

TAB I：S1Activities

1．IRTGADE STREMGTH REOFT：


2．CASULITY STMTSICS：


3．REMISTIETS AND EMTENSTONS：


4．DIIISTED ROHOTOAS STATISTIOS：

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Cevalry Division (Amobile), Feriod Encing 31 Oete a : 771 , RCS
CS FORM.S (RJ)
5. ATAFDS AND DECORETIO S:

## VALOR ANARDS MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT

| Dronze Ster vith "Vi | 25 | 67 | 57 | 19 | 27 | 45 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| dir loosl with "Vu | 12 | 19 | 16 | 5 | 30 | 5 |
| ARCOIT with "V" | 22 | 47 | 39 | 15 | 29 | 4 |

## ECHEVETIT ATMRDS

| Lronze Stir | 361 | 343 | 394 | 300 | 293 | 536 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Air Meral | 375 | 350 | 534 | 420 | 414 | 544 |
| ARCOi | 250 | 230 | 237 | 215 | 153 | 231 |
| Purple Herrt | 41 | 35 | 36 | 34 | 33 | 33 |

6. RRA UTIIIISTION:


| HAWAII | 204 | $13365 \%$ | 191 | 152 | $74 \%$ |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| SYDIEY | 142 | $221155 \%$ | 177 | 163 | $92 \%$ |  |
| FAMEKOK | 136 | $14910 \% \%$ | 119 | 108 | $51 \%$ |  |
| FOGKONG | 93 | $119124 \%$ | 136 | 104 | $75 \%$ |  |
| TIIEI | 34 | $37100 \%$ | 40 | 32 | $60 \%$ |  |
| TOTAIS: | 609 | 659 | $100 \%$ | 663 | 559 | $64 \%$ |


|  | JUL |  |  | ${ }^{\text {AUG }}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| HhMAII | 189 | 142 75\% | 160 | 134 | 84\% |
| SYDEY | 142 | 165 115\% | 123 | 118 | 96\% |
| Dhickok | 113 | $12.2108 \%$ | 122 | 105 | 87\% |
| hCIG KONG | 104 | $13.125 \%$ | 74 | 53 | 72\% |
| TATEI | 45 | $63150 \%$ | 33 | 31 | 94\% |
| TOTALS | 593 | 624 105\% | 512 | 442 | 86\% |
|  | SEP |  |  | OCT |  |
| FTMAII | 170 | 159 94\% | 102 | 111 | 100\% |
| SYDIEY | 172 | 157 \%7\% | 132 | 134 | 101\% |
| LAIGKOK | 161 | 152 94\% | 117 | 105 | 96\% |
| HONG KOG | ¢2 | 57 105\% | 106 | 69 | 84 |
| Tales | 40 | 41 103\% | 34 | 39 | 115品 |
| TCTALS: | 625 | 60697\% | 497 | 479 | 2\% |

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\begin{aligned}
& \text { Operation Report - Less By MNARA Date } 2 \text { ( } q / 3 \text { (Separate), dst } \\
& \text { cavalry Division (Airmowxor, rexivu } \\
& \text { GS FORm65 (R3) }
\end{aligned}
$$

TAB J: Information Activities

1. Press Releases. The Press Section released 179 editorial and pictorial features and news stories to civilian and military news media. These releases were distributed as follows:

Total Released Total Distribution

| Stories w/o pictures |  | 59 | 885 |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Stories w/pictures |  | 41 | 615 |
| Pictures who stories | Total | $\frac{79}{179}$ | $\underline{1085}$ |
|  |  |  | 2585 |

2. Media Liaison Activities. 24 accredited press representatives of news media visited the Brigade during the period 1 May 71 to 31 Oct 71. They represented the following media:
USARPAC
Westinghouse
NBC
USARV
N.Y. Times
ABC
US News \& World Report
Tokyo News
US Army Hometown News Center

DASPO<br>Time/Life<br>Profile Magazine<br>Time Magazine<br>Chicago Daily News<br>ABC-TV<br>Stars \& Stripes<br>Newsweek<br>AP

3. Home Town News Release Program. The following releases were forwarded to the Home Town News Center for distribution to civilian news media:

## Printed Release 日

| May |  | 236 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| June | 372 |  |
| July | 344 |  |
| August |  | 328 |
| September |  | 219 |
| October |  | $\frac{151}{1650}$ |

4. Command Information Guidance. Subjects for Command Information are contained in quarterly Command Information Guidance from FACV, USARV, and Brigade Information Offices. Information is disseminated in Command Information classes, Fact Sheets and Officer Calls. Commanders choose from a variety of recommended subjects according to the needs of their unit. NACV subjects for 1 st and and quarter FY 1972 are: Geneva Conventions, Defensive Driving, Drug Abuse, Black Market, Voting Obligations,
5. OSTAL ACTAVTTS:
6. A comerison of the business concucter by 1009549 by nonth is incicter Welow:

TVE OF UUSITSS
Monoy Orcer Scles:
Stery Stocks:
Fost ce Netor Stocis:

| MAY | JUN | JUL |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\$ 302,494,53$ | $\$ 330,895.09$ | $\$ 31,013.91$ |
| $\$ 7,605.00$ | $\$ 7,522.00$ | $6,067.00$ |
| 0 | 0 | 0 |
| $\$ 14,0460$ | 13,350 | 14.073 |

Receiving Diructory Sve:
$\$ 14,946$
13,350
14.073

TYPE OF EUSTESS
Money Orcier Srles
Sten Stocks:
Postege Meter Stocis:


Totel Fieces of $\begin{aligned} & \text { ricil }\end{aligned}$
Receiving Direciory Sve: 17,273 i5.2\% 10.220
b. Totel business conuctor durins the entire yerion:

Money Orcer Scles: $62,102,002.90$
Stomp Scles: $937,495.00$
Postace Neter Seles: 0
Total Directory Sve: $\quad 91,336$
CO. AER REPORT:


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SUBJECT: Operation Report - Les By MNARADate 12 \$/ 13 November 1971 Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 Oct 1971, RCS CS FOR -65 (R3)

US/Vietnamese Relations, and Drug Identification \& First Aid for the Drug abuser. USARV subjects are: Weapons Safety, Supply: An Individual Responsibility, Customs Control, Drugs, Driving in Nam Versus US/Vietnames Relations, the USARV Drug Problem, and Your Discharge and the Consequences. 3rd tate (Sep) recommended topics are: "The Modern Volunteer Army, Prevention and' Control of Verrereal Disease, Human Relations-Race, Your Personal. Affairswhe Power of Attorney, Maintenance and Supply Dicipline, Relationships with the Vietnamese People, Motor Vehicle Maintenance, Special Services, Prohibitions in Mailing Contraband Home, Uniform Standards when Departing Vietnam and Use of Personal Checks in Vietnam.
5. Brigade Publications. The Garry Owen, the Brigade 's Bi-weekly newspaper is prepared at Bin Moa Army Base, type set and laid out at His MACV, then sent to Stars \& Stripes in Japan for printing and then shipped to their office in Saigon. Distribution to 3rd Ede, 1 st Cav is accomplished, through the Bide's APO at Bien Hos. This office was directed to submit copies of our last two issues of the Garry Owen to the Office of Chief of Information, Washington, for evaluation. The first evaluation has been received and it has been rated excellent in all areas evaluated. The fall edition of the Brigade's First Team Magazine is now being printed in Taiwan. A representative from the Information Office was sent to Taiwan to coordinate and approve the printing of this issue. He has returned and the magazine is due in RVN in late November. an information booklet has been put together and given to GTC for distribution to new arrivals. The First Team Combat Certificate is being printed in Taiwan and will be shipped with the magazine.
6. Photographic Laboratory Activities. During this period the Information Office has taken over the signal photographic mission. Photographic support covered the following areas: Photos for the Garry Owen and First Team Magazine, photos released to news media (listed under item 1, fifteen copies of each picture are released), photos for Brigade His (since September, much of this has been accomplished by attaching a photographer to protocol). Misc. photos for passports, chain of command, soldier of the month and hometown news releases. Photographic film and supplies have been a critical area with few requisitions being filled. Currently a request through HHC supply to the Inventory Control Center in Long Sinh has been submitted along with a request for supplies. This has been verbally approved, but photographic supplies are in critically short supply throughout RVN. The Information Office has tripled its photo processing capabilities since August which has resulted in increased production of both photos released and input to the editor of the Garry Owen.
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Contrijmintin 13 November 1971
SUBJEOT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, 3rd Brigade (Separate), 1 st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31 Oct 1971, RCS CS FOR uT (R3)
TAB K; Provost Marshal Motivities

1. During the period 1 May 1971 through 31 October 1971, the Office of the Provost Marshal processed a total of 1,281 offenses.

Crimes of violence and crimes against property........... 269
Miscellaneous Offenses.................ptróo......................443

TOTAL. , ......... 1281
2. Breakdown of offense statistics:
a. Crimes of Violence and Crimes Against Property, 269; Murder 1; Forcible Rape 2; Aggravated Assault 7; Burglary and Housebreaking 4; Larceny (over $\$ 50.00$ ) 235 ; Auto Theft 15 ; and Robbery 5.
b. Miscellaneous Offenses, 443; Simple Assault 28; Larceny (under \#50. m ) 83; Wrongful Appropriation 1; Fraud 2; Narcotics 134; Dangerous Drugs 13; Marijuana 61; Blackmarketing 4; Counterfeiting and Currency Manipulations 3; AWOL (Reported) 70; AWOL (Apprehended) 25; and other minor offenses 19.
c. Traffic Law Enforcement 569; Speeding 152; Reckless Driving 29; other Miscellaneous Violations 398.
4. It appears that except for the drop in marijuana rate ( 169 last period) all other reductions are a result of decrease in population at $B H A B$ and a settling down of the Brigade after the Division standdown.

## 1. Medical Operations

a. Administration
(1) Occasionally the Brigade has experienced difficulty in keeping wounded prisoners of war in US medical channels long enough to complete the necessary interrogation. This problem developed because of the policy of the 24th Evacuation Hospital to evacuate POW patients as soon as possible to Vietnamese medical channels. Arrangements have been made with the 24th Evacuation Hospital to keep selected patients for longer periods of time. Priority and routine patients will be kept at the medical company's clearing station in Been Hog.
(2) There have been several instances in which the disposition of remains of deceased personnel has been a significant problem. The 3rd Brigade, Tactical SOP has been revised to eliminate this problem.
(3) For a separate Brigade engaged in active combat, four medical evacuation helicopters are not sufficient to always give the support needed.
(a) The average availability has been 86 , revealing that only three helicopters have been available due to scheduled and unscheduled maintenance (ie. periodic and intermediate inspections, battle damage and mechanical failures). A maximum of three georgaphically separate urgent missions can be performed at one time in the present area of operations. any contingency for a simultaneous and separate operation cannot be properly supported, thereby negating the aeromedical evacuation support of the airmobile concept.
(b) The use of properly equipped "borrowed" helicopters as backup support has been tried twice, with an unsatisfactory minimum delay of fortyfive minutes in accuiring the helicopter before it could be equipped with hoist and medical supplies. Another thirty minutes travel time was required to put the aircraft "on station" for actual support.
(c) Not all helicopters are properly rigged or wired for use of the hoist equipment. A minimum of fifty nom-hours is required to rewire a helicopter to accept the hoist.
(d) The required hazardous exposure of aeromedical helicopters has proven that unscheduled maintenance on battle-damaged but salvagable aircraft greatly magnify the need for more aircraft as instantaneous and continued support for the wounded. As a minimum six aircraft are needed in the air ambulance sectionfor a separate brigade to provide the necessary support.

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b. Nedical Statistics and Reports: Field $M^{M}$ dical cards and aid station log books provide the source material for all recurring medical reports. This data, wen combined with specific information fro the 24, th Evacuation Hospital, reflects the health status of the command. Although this data collection system is well esigned, implementation in the field has been a significant problem. The major impediment to accurate medical data has been the rapid tumover of trained medical personnel within the battalion sized units of the Brigade. An ongoing education program in the preparation of medical reports has been established by the Brigade Surgeon's Office.

## c. Medical Care:

(1) The medical company has supported 2 clearing stations (race and Been foal) since its inception in april. The normal workload at each station renuires 2 medical officers at mien How and one at lace. However, most combat casualties are treated at FSB lace and, in the event of a mass casualty station, the meical coverage is inadequate. To provide back-up, the medical officers from the clearing station at Bier ho a will be airlifted to FSB Mace at the first sign of a mass casualty situation.
(2) Thy Ninh Operation: The operation in the Pay Ninh area derionstated the speed and efficiency with which an airmobile clearing station can become operational. All equipment was airlifted in conexes except for one vehicle. The clearing station was fully operational one hour after arrival in Toy Ninh West.
d. Personnel: Medical treatment facilities throughout the Brigade have had to function below authorized strengths. Priority has bern given to the maneuver battalions to insure adequate coverage for the rifle companies. This has necessitated suspension of the policy of rotating medics after 6 months of field duty to the rear aid station. Further, selected individuals have been trained by Battalion Surgeon's to function as field medics. The medical company with its additional functions of staffing two clearing platoons and the mental hygiene center has been maintained above authorized strength.

## 2. Preventive Medicine Activities:

## a. Malaria:

(1) The total malaria rate for the months of May and June 1971 remained relatively constant ranging from 57.1 to 53.0 . This was somewhat higher than expected, and resulted from the unusually high rate of vivas malaria ( $64.4 \%$ of total cases). lost of these cases occurred in individuals reassigned from field its to the rear area in March and April. It was felt that these individuals were infected in the field but did not become $i l l$ until they were assigned to the rear area where malaria discipline was
lax. This distribution of vivax malaria disappeared in mid June 1971 as a result of the stability of the population in Mien Moa and the exhaustion of this susceptible population of reassigned personnel.
(2) There was a significant increase in malaria during the month of August (incidence rate: 107.8). This increase is somewhat more than the normal increase expected during the rainy season. The persistent finding of at least $50 \%$ of the cases being vivax has continued and undoubtedly accounts for this excessive incidence. This is explained by a $2 \%$ urine sample obtained in July which revealed that only $30 \%$ of 3 rd Brigade Personnel were taking the C-P tablet regularly. Renewed command emphasis in the form of a command letter, visits by Brigade Surgeon, and unannounced urine chlorequine testing has been implemented.
b. Diarrheal Disease: Diarrheal disease continues to be a major cause of morbidity. The vast majority of these cases are mild and rarely require hospitalization. There are occassional small outbreaks throughout the commend but specific organisms have not been identified. It is imperative that a high level of sanitation be maintained in all food service facilities and potable water sources. In addition, the troops must be warned frequent ly of the high risk of contracting disease by eating or drinking at unauthorized establishments.
c. Venereal Disease: Venereal disease, particularly gonorrhea, contines at epidemic proportions. There are approximately 175 cases of ganorrhea within the command each month. It has been difficult to obtain reliable statistics on this disease. Most of the cases originate. in Mien Moa, Vang Tau, and Saigon. This disease has become a difficult disease to treat in Vietnam and resistance to antibiotics such as penicillin is common. The troops must be frecuently informed of the potential seriousness of this infection and urged to exercise discretion in the seleation of their sexual contacts and to use mechanical prophylaxis.
d. Hepatitis: There vas a significant increase in hepatitis in July and August (incidence rate 12.5) b lay of these cases resulted from close contacts with earlier cases. Control measures including renewed command emphasis on sanitation and increased surveillance of messing and water facilities have been implemented.


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TAB M: Logistics Operations

1. OPERATICN AL HIGHIGHTS:

## 1

a. During the period 1 May 1971 to 31 October 1971, the 215 th Composite Service Battalion continued to support the 3rd Brigade (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in all operations. Combat service support provided by the 215th to the First Team included all classes of supply, maintenance (to include aircraft), medical services, evacuation of captured enemy material, technical assistance visits, and retrograde of excess equipment. In addition, training was provided in rigging and slingout procedures, aeronedevae with hoist and jungle penetrator, and class I resupply, Combat service support coordinated by the 215th CS in included explosive ordnance disposal and transportation. The support was provided from the Brigade Base Camp at Mien Moa and from forward locations at Forward Operations Base lace, Fire Support Bases Tanh Linh, Rock, and Phuong Lam.
b. Due to the generally secure "green" road retwork of Highways, QL1 and $\mathbb{Z L}-20$, that trisects the 3 rd Bee area of operations, locating forward bases with hook pads next to rain supply routes is an easy task. This is evidenced by FOB Mace, FOBs Jefferies, Rock, and Phuong Lam. The location of these bases has helped in saving expensive blade time. Everything is prerigged at base camp and convoyed to forward base camps where it is then hooked out to other forward bases. This not only saves blade tine, but reduces handling of the equipment after the initial loading. This also helps to reduce the number of riggers needed at multiple small bases.
c. Rearm/refuel points were reopened and closed at Phuong Lam, and closed at Tanh Linh. Support for air operations is now being provided through facilities located at Mien Koa and FOB Mace, In addition, mini refuel points are used at Fire Support Bases (FSB) as required. A refuel point was also opened and closed at Thy Ninh (West); this along with existing facilities supported operations of Task Force Garry Owen in that area of operations (AO).
d. The Brigade Transportation Office coordinated the requirements for wheeled vehicles and fixed wing aircraft needed for troop and equipment moves. The Army Aviation Element (AAE) coordinated rotary wing aircraft requirements in the brigade 10 . The use of ground lines of communication (LOC) far moving supplies, retrograding cargo and moving units was particularly significent. Ground transportation was used to move supplies as far forward as possible. From there, $\mathrm{CH}-47$ 's lifted the supplies to their destination.
e. The more significant constraints on supply operations were shortage of 5 -ton tractors for hears hauling requirements, a reduction in vehicular support provided by supporting units, and extremely limited quantities of barrier materials and lumber in country.

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f. The 3rd Brigade (Sep) continued to monitor the Authorized Stockage List (ASL) of supplies to determine if items no longer met retention criteria. Items were continuously retrograded with the bulk of them being retrograded in July when 1140 class II and class IX items at a value of approximately $\$ 600,000$ were retrograded. At the end of the period, all lines on the ASL were demand supported.
g. Sling-out operations were conducted from Sandy Pad at Bien Moa, FOB Mace, La Naga and Fhuong Lam. These operations were controlled by personnel from the 215 th CS Bn.
h. On 18 Nay 1971 all equipment and supplies essential to establish Fire Support Base King and a refuel/rearm point at Ham Tam were loaded. This was done from three locations. The 4 th Terminal Command convoy started from Bien Hoa and picked up the remaining equipment and supplies enroute at Forward Operations Base Mace and Fire Support Base Fanning. After securing the area, the airlift of prerigged equipment began going into FSB King. This was the initial test of roving prerigged cargo as far forward by ground transportation and then having $\mathrm{CH}-47$ helicopters pick up the load directly off a vehicle cargo bed or stake and platform semitrailer. The POL and rearm points were set up at Ham Tam. The location had been picked by the Brigade S-4 and was approximately 200 meters long and 125 meters wide in a sandy area. There were eight personnel to run the operation. The POL point consisted of two 10,000 gallon JP-4 begs with six refuel points, four for UH-1H and two for CH-47. The point was closed on the third day due to the inability to control blowing sand which was a hazard to safety for everyone in the area.
i. The 215th CS Bn was prep red to install a refuel point at Try Ninh West with a 20,000 gallon JP-4 capacity. The RIV had a 100,000 gallon JP-4 point in operation. At 2200 hrs , 28 September 1971, a deployment order was received and the advance party arrived at lay Ninth West the next day. The advance party, among others, included the Forward Service Support Element CIC and NCOIC. The FSSE OIC coordinated billeting, FSSE location and motor pool. Upon inspection of the existing ARTN PCL points, the points were found to be inadequate. Using parts from the contingency POL system the $\mathbb{R}$ N facility went from the initial six points operational to 15 points operational. All were operational by 1 October 1971. By direction of TRAC G4 the contingency FOL system was installed. Liaison with the ARUN POL advisors facilitated the replacement of the cannibalized parts used on their system. The withdrawal phase began at 2200 hrs , 30 September 1971. It began with coordination of five wing aircraft through the Brigade Transportation office for extraction of personnel and artillery from Thy Nih West at $2300 \mathrm{hrs}, 30$ September 1971. Ground transportation was coordinated to extract the FSSE. Helicopter operations brought personnel and equipment into Say Ninh jest from Katum and FSB Ladysmith. Five sorties accounted for 104 personal to Vang Tau, 292 to Vo Dat, and 35 personnel and three 105 mm howitzers to Yuan Loco.
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1. Civil Affairs: Because of the Vietnamization program civil affairs operations were accomplished under the approval and direction of Vietnamese authorities. Towards the end of the reporting period emphasis was placed in IEDCGP operatiors in the Brigade and Vietnamese medical persomel are beginning to be phased into the program. The 55 has initiated paperwork to establish a Civil AffairsmSYOP Fund which will be used to support the Bien Hoa Mental Hospital, orphanages, and other worthy projects as their needs beoome known. The 55 created a Reaction Assistance Team in order to avert military/civilian confrontations. The team's function is to be at the scene as soon as possible after an incident occurs to insure the civilians concerned that the case will be fairly investigated, the reby avoiding possible demonstrations on the part of the civilian population against the US forces. On 29 October 1971, the team was put to its first test when a convoy of the $2 / 5$ th Cav caused some demage and injury while traveling along QJil. The rapid deployment of the team and its fine performance maintained good American/ Vietnamese relations by precluding the possibility of civil confrontations resultirg fror the incident, and in so doing set the precedence for similar teams to be established at battalion level.

## 2. Psychological Operations:

a. General: FSYOPS, as during the last renorting period, continued to support the 3 rd Brigade tactical operaticns br eroloiting enemy vulnerabilities. Aircraft of the US Air Force gth Sipecial Operations Sauadron supported the Brigade with 425 hours, 25 minutes of broadcasts and by dropping 56,045,000 leaflets.
b. During the reporting perio erphasis was placed upon using up the old leaflet stockage and crating new leaflets in order to obtain greater results from our leaflet arm. In Septerner, leaflets were made to exploit
 locations of NVA units to $=$ amg those personel of the disastrench has stricken their homeland. Fran "Tjood leafles campate" "s stín aprogresso In Cotober coordination was mace with waF to suppore the 30 dengade in conjunction with the 9 th Sporit Cperations Squapu, ay so Detober, the maneurno hattalions began to filize their lue: stioal helicopter, whenever possibin, to support themsans in the PSY: program, he battaico S5's have been end.uasea to become mas active in the PSICP program durin: the period and in resonse to this encuragent there has been much improment in the recent performance of the natalion 55's. In Betember a Loudspaker Team (HB Team) was attached to the 3re Ecigade from the 7th Fsychological Operations Battalion. This tear is presently being deplowed to the maneuver battalions on a weekly rotational basis. A request for 4 ad itional Loudspeaker Teams and 1 Audio.visual Team was recently submitted to TSARV. This additional support will enable the maneuver battalions to have frll-time loudspeaker assets.

## $\mathrm{C}-1$


c. Enemy Units targeted:
(1) 33rd NVA Regiment
(?) 74th NVA Artillery
(3) 274 th VC Regiment
(4) HQ Ba Long
(5) $\mathrm{HO} 3 R 4$
(6) $\mathrm{H} Q \mathrm{U}_{-1}$
(7) HQ MR7
(8) Bien Tan HQ
(9) Xuan Loc Party HQ
(10) Dinh Cquan Hz
(11) HQ MRG
(12) J-95 Ho
(13) HQ SR5
(14) 814th RSG
(15) $3 S G M R 7$
(16) 81st RSG
(17) 12th RSG
(18) H-60 Transportation
(19) C-119 Transportation
(20) C-10 Transportation
(21) V-17 Transportation
(22) Cuan Thuan Grerillas
(23) C4 Recon

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(24) C4 Artillery
(25) K-8 Heavy Weapons Company
(26) DT-9 Dispensary
(27) K-76 Hospital
(28) K-11 Hospital
(29) 2302 Ordnance Factory
(30) Postal Transportation, SR5
(31) C4 Purchasing \& Recuisitioning Company
(32) Finance \& Econony Section, MR7
(33) Finance \& Economy Section, Hoai Duc
(34) Doan 8 Political Training Team
(35) Current Affairs Section, Kuan Loc
(36) Lam Dong Ho
(37) VC Local Forces
(38) Vontagnards
3. Lue Luong 66 (Kit Carion Goouts):
 renorting period.
b. During the period 36 socxts were temazed a; foriown
(1) 23 . Substandar prome
(2) $9-\mathrm{ANL}$
(3) 3-Drug Abuse
(4) 1 -redical reasons
c. Four KCS were killed in action during ground operations.

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TABP: Chemical Activities

1. General: During the reporting period, 1 May - 31 October 1971 Brigade Chemical and the 26 th Chemical Detachment continued chemical support acttivities for the Ord Brigade (Separate). FIRST TEAM chemical personnel contined to support the Brigade in the following areas: Airborne Personnel Detection, CS employment, flame weapons employment, chemical subjects training and inspections; preliminary coordination was conducted with higher headquarters to conduct herbicide spray operations along selected base perimeters.

## 2. Operational Highlights:

a. The Airborne Personnel Detector (Sniffer) operators have located a great number of garden plots and numerous bunker complexes and hootches while conducting sniffer missions. A sniffer team was also sent to the Phillipines on 1 C August 1971 to assist in the search for a missing light aircraft. The downed aircraft has found before the team could become operational, however.
b. Personnel of the 26 th Chemical Detachment supervised the instalration and maintenance of fougasse emplacements along the Bien Hoad Army Base Greenline and perimeters of selected fire support bases.
c. All 3rd Brigade replacement personnel received informative classes on flame field expedients, XM2O2 incendiary rocket and launcher system, bunker use restriction bombs (BURBs), l'aintenance of protective masks and riot control masks, and a rask confidence exercise. Chemical personnel continued to make technical inspections and pre-IG visits to 3 rd Brigade units upon request.
d. 26th Chemical Detachment personnel continued to prepare and issue bunker use restriction bombs ( 3 VYBs ), a field expedient designed to contaminate enemy bunkers with persistent $C S$, to the maneuver battalions. On 20 September 1971, a shipment of 2,300 pre-packaged BURBS produced by Vietnam Labortory Assistance Program Army (ILAFA) was received.
e. In early September 1971, Department of Army approved the use of herbicides to clear fields of fire along the perimeters of US installations and fire support bases. Coordination has been affected with higher headquarters and chemical personnel from the FIRST TEM are prepared to begin operations when the requests submitted to higher headquarters are approved. Cavalry Division (Airmobile); Period Ending 31 Oct 1971, RCS CS FOR-65 (R3)
3. Operational Totals:
a. Sniffer missions conducted: 268 with 953 significant readouts.
b. Fougasse installed: 105.
c. Replacement personnel trained: 2,451
d. BURBs issued: 655,
e. Technical inspections and pre-IG visits: 42.
f. Perimeters requested for spray with herbicide: 3 .
g. E158/:22 CS Canister Clusters dropped: 60.
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1 August 71 - 6 October 71
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