

FOR OT UT 692094 (19 Aug 69) AGDA (M)

Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Cavalry SUBJECT: Division, Period Ending 30 April 1969 (U)

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BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

ROBERT E.

1 Incl

Colonel, ACC Acting The Adjutant General

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DEFARTINE OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, 1ST C VALRY DIVISION (AIR*CBILE) ATC San Francisco 96490

AVDAMH

15 April 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Feriod Ending 30 April 1969 $RCS CSFCR_{65}$ (RI) (U)

TIRU: Channels

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development Department of the Army Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION I: CITRATIONS

1. (C) OF ERATIONS

a. GENERAL

(1) The reporting period covers the initiation of the following operations:

(a) Operation CHIYENTE SARRE (commencing 4 Feb 1969)

(b) Operation TOAN THING III (commencing 17 Feb 1969)

- (c) Operation TILAS WIDGE (commencing 18 Mar 1969)
 (d) Operation MONTANA SOCUT (commencing 29 Mar 1969)
- (e) Operation MCTTAMA RAIDER (commencing 13 Apr 1969)
- (2) The following operations were concluded during the reporting period:
 - (a) Operation TO/N TH/NG II (terminating 16 Feb 1969)
 - (b) Operation MN/JO WIRHCRSE (terminating 29 Mar 1969)

 - (c) Operation JTL/S WIDGE (terminating 2 Apr 1969)
 (d) Operation SHERIDAN SIGRE (terminating 2 Apr 1969)
 (e) Operation MORTHAL SCORT (terminating 12 April 1969)

(3) During the reporting period, the 1 ACD completed the extremely successful Operation TOAN THING II. Initiated on 12 November 1968, the mission of the Operation in its basic format was to eliminate and reduce the energy threat in the TAOR by setting out to crush 4 NVA divisions and elements of a fifth operating along the more than 100-mile section of the lower Cambodian border. Final cumulative results of the Operation were:

(a) US: 279 KIA, 1,711 WIA

(b) Enemy (NV./VC): By US: 2,896/207 KIA, 37/9 PW, 461/0, detainees, 9/6 returnees, 20 defendants, 596 individual weapons; 187 crew-served weapons, 1,287 mines and booby traps, 4,873 grenades, 751,401 small arms rounds,

9,581 large caliber rounds, and 383.84 tens of rice. (4) On 1 February 1969, the Division's 1st Bde Headquarters was located at TAY NINH (XT 158513), and controlled 1/8 Cav, 2/12 Cav, 2/8 Cav, operating in the western Sheridan Sabre 40, aprth of TAM NINH CITY. Task force CLASSIFIED BY

SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

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Duke, a two company force, continued operations in AO Navajo Warhorse. Second Bde, with headquarters at QUAE LOI, employed the 2/5 Cav, 5/7 Cav, and 2/2 Moch (CTCCN), west of AN LCC vicinity of the FISHHCCK (XT 6090). Headquarters, 30 Bde at QUAN LOI exercising command over 1/5 Cav, 2/7 Cav, 1/12 Cav, and 1/505 Bn (IBN), stretched east from OUAN LCI to block enery infiltration vicinity of Serge's Jungle Trail. The following Free World Military Armed Forces served with the Division during the reporting period: 11th ACR; 1/505 Bn (ABN); 2/505 Bn (ABN); 3d ARVN Abn Bn; 3d ARVN Marine Bn; 34th, 35th & 36th ARVN Ranger Bn's. During the first part of February elements of the Division initiated operations in AC Chevenne Sabre, northeast of Bien Hoa, closing out that portion of Sheridan Sabre cast of CUAN LOI. By 8 February the 3d Brigade was situated in the new AO and operating to inhibit suspected enemy novement toward Rich Hoa. During the middle of March a major adjustment of forces took place as the Division began moving from the Navajo Marhorse 10: 2d Brigede Headquarters moved to the south near the grescent and Michelin plantation area. On 18 March OFERATION ATLES WEDGE, a combined effort with 1st Inf and 25th Inf Divisions was initiated vicinity of the Michelin Rubber Flantation. By the end of March, 1st Bde had turned over the Nevajo Warhorse AC to units of the 25th Infantry Division. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, placed CPCCN to the Division on 12 April, granted the Division additional fire power, mobility, and reaction capability, and signaled the start of OPERATION MONTANA RAIDER. The Cavelry Regiment operated in the Crescent Area west of the Michelin Flantation initially, and then operated southwest of LZ J/KE at THON LE CHON. Operations in the Sheridan Sabre AO terminated in mid-April and by 19 April the 3d Brigade had begun operations in an AO south of the FISHMOCK. By the and of the reporting period the brigades of the Division were deployed from the Cambodian border on the west to the vicinity of AN LCC on the east, in the Sheridan Sabre AC. The 11th ACR continued OFER/TION MONTANA RAIDER in areas on the Division's eastern boundary. The 1st Bdc at TAY NINH was comprised of 2/5 Cav, 2/8 Cav, and the 2/12 Cav; L/I KHE was the Headquarters of the 24 Brigade with 1/5 Cav and 5/7 Cav (PCCN; the 3d Brigade at OUAN LOI controlled 1/7 Cav, 1/12 Cav and the 36th ARVN Ranger Bn; the 11th ACR operated with their 1st and 2d Squadrons and 2/7 Cav CTCCM.

b. 1st Brigade Operations:

(1) At the beginning of the reporting period the 1st 9de was operating in the western portion of the Shoridan Sabre 10, with LZ's WHITE (XT 455623), GRANT (XT 386623), and ST BERRA (XT 274680). A reduced (C in the Mavajo Marhorse area contained LT MLROD (XT 339846), occupied by Task Force Duke. Duke was comprised of a jump CF and two companies of 1/8 Cav. On the 8th of Tebruary the 1/5 Cav completed their move from LZ TLENT to the new LZ DALIX (AT 523568). This nove extended the influence of the Division castward and blocked energy infiltration routes north of the Michelin Rubber Flantation. GURLFION TIGER LOYAL, a contingency mission, was activated in response to the ground attack on DAU TIENG during the early morning hours of 23 February. Elements of the 1/5 Cev. deployed in the Northwestern Michelin to block enemy routes of erress. On 24 February the 1/8 Cav (-) moved to an expanded AC Navato and opened LZ TYDY (XT 440072). On the 25th the 2/5 Cav was released by the 24 Bde to be committed to Warhorse and open LZ TERRI (XT 421168). By the 26th of February the brigade was disposed with three battalions in the s withorn tier of Sheridan Sabre and two battalions positioned in Navajo Warhorse.





During the middle of March the 1/505 Bn (AM) replaced the 1/8 Cav on LZ TRACY, and by the end of the month Navajo Warhorse was under control of the 25th Inf Division, and the brigade's two battalions, 2/5 Cav and 2/8 Cav, occupied LZ's JTSS (XT 188717) and ST B/RE/RA (XT 274660). The 1/5 Cav, 1/8 Cav, and 2/12Cav, had been placed CFCON to the 2d Bde to consolidate the eastern part of the Division AC. On 2 April, the 2/12 Cav was returned CFCON to 1st Bde. For the remainder of the month the battalions continued operations with the 2/5 Cav and 2/8 Cav redirecting efforts north to occupy fire bases IKE (XT 338719), and C/RCLIN (XT 278788), respectively.

(2) The 1st Brigade participated in OFERATION TCAN THANG II and TCAN THANG III in AO's Navajo Warhorse I and II located along the Cambodian border in HAU NGHIA Province, and AO Sheridan Sabre (now called Montana Scout) located to the north of TAY NINH CITY. In February, the 1st Brigade captured over 190 tons of rice along with 3.5 tons of salt. The month of March netted armunition caches totalling 20 tons and was highlighted by two ground attacks on LZ (RAMT, with a cost to the enemy of 217 KIA's and 2 FW's. The Brigade made very light contact in April as the enemy attempted to regroup his forces for a suspected summer offensive. During the month several large bunker complexes were destroyed along with a regiment-sized hospital. The Brigade clso captured or destroyed over 77 tons of rice and 2.5 tons of salt. Cumulative results for the 1st Brigade during the reporting period included; enemy (NVA/VC) 962/27 KIA, 27/2 FW; 354 weapons captured, 88,895 small arms ammo seized, 2250 grenades, and 70 pounds of documents.

c. 2nd Brigade Operations:

(1) The 2d Bde occupied LZ's JAKE (XT 625813), DCT (XT 562854), and RITA (XT 499804) in the area of the FTSHHCCK at the beginning of the reporting period. The 2/2 Inf (Mech) was CTCCN and provided road security and a strong reconnaissance-in-force capability within the rubber plantations. The 3d MVN Abn employed south of the FISHHCCK, was replaced on 5 February by the 3d .RVN Marines. During the second weak of February, the bright assured control of the 3d Bde portion of Sheridan Sabre AC, and received (PCON of the 2/505 Bn at LZ ODISSA (YT 063754). The Bn moved from ODESSA to JOE on 11 February to provide a blocking force for the ARVN Marines along the Saigon River. On 14 February, the 2/505 returned to it's parent unit and closed LZ JOE. The 35th Ranger Bn arrived at QU/N LCI on 12 February, was employed north of SONG BE for a one day operation to exploit a 1/9 Cav contact, and then on 14 February replaced the 34th Rangers on LZ DOT. On the 16th, the 3d Marines were extracted from the field and air-lifted to LCC NINH with one US artillery battery to thwart a suspected enemy threat in that area. Several days later the Marines left LCC MINH and returned to interdict the Saigon River infiltration routes. On 8 March the unit air-lifted to ST BARB RA, and was placed OFCON to the 1st Bde. is a reaction to the enemy offensive of 23 February, the 5/7 Cav was deployed to LZ BUTTCNS (YU 140070) to protect the Frovincial Copital at SONG BT. The next day, LZ's RITA and DOT were closed, and the 2/5 Cav, 35th ARVN Rangers were placed OPCCN to the 1st Bde and 3d Bde respectively. Ch 12 March the brigade headquarters moved to LAI KHE, releasing the 5/7 Cav to control of DIV. RTY as a Fhuoc Vinh defense bn, and 2/2 Inf (Mech) to parent unit control. On the 15th, 1/5 Cav, 2/8 Cav and 2/12 Cav in southern Sheridan Sabre 1C were placed CFCCN to the 2d Bdc. The 1/8 Cav returned from Navajo Warhorse on 17 March and reoccupied LT WHITE (XT 455624). The 5/7 Cav joined the 2d Bde on 30 March and responded LZ JOE (XT 629663). On the second of

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April, LZ GRANT and 2/12 Cav returned OPCON to the 1st Bde, and from that time until the end of the reporting period, the brigade operated from LZ's WHITE, DCLMY, and JCE to the north of the Michelin Rubber Flantation.

(2) The results of the 24 Brighde's participation in (TERTION TO/N THANG II from 1 February through 16 February 1969 saw 574 MVA KE, 39 VC KIA, 477 small arms weapons and 141 crew-served weapons captured, 413,621 small arms rounds and 3045 large caliber rounds seized, and 51.4 tons of rice destroyed. The 2d Brigade's involvement in CTERATION TEAM THANG III from 17 February through 30 April 1969 saw 573 NVA KIA, 73 VC KIA, 104 small arms weapons and 41 crew-served weapons captured, 69,599 small arms rounds and 5518 large caliber rounds seized, and 19.8 tons of rice destroyed.

d. 3rd Brigade Operations:

(1) The 3d Brigade was disposed along a line of firebases in the southern tier of Sheridan Sabre AC occupying ELE NCR (XT 016736), JILL (XT 955-908), C/RCL (YT 058888), CDESSA (YT 063754), and June (YT 137788). On 3 February, brigade jump CT and 1/12 Cav moved to Bien Hoa to prepare for deployment into the Cheyenne Sabre AC. This move was designed to thwart suspected encuy movement toward population centers. By 5 February the Brigade CF was firmly established at Bien Hoa, 1/12 Cav occupied LZ CDDY (XT 139313), and 2/7 Cav operated from LZ LIZ (YT 241345). The Brigade continued operations with two battalions in portions of the Cheyenne Sabre AO establishing LZ LCIS (YT 129229) and occupying LTL (YT 212128) on 22 February and 5 March respectively. The 35th Ranger Bn began operations in the southern part of Cheyenne Sabre on 25 February. On 12 March the 1/7 joined the 3d Brigade and initiated operations from LZ LCIS. The 3d mobile strike force became heavily engaged with a large enemy force east of the brigade's AC on 23 March. On the 25th, the force was placed OFCON to the 3d Brigade to facilitate supporting and assisting the unit; on 26 February the 5/7 Cav was moved to LZ KATE (MT 306255) to reinforce the 3d mobile strike force. On 30 March the 5/7 discontinued operations and was placed CFCCM to the 2d Brigade. The following day the 3d mobile strike force was released CFCCN to the 3d Bde. From 15 to 19 April the Brighte moved from Cheyenne Sabre to an AC south of the FISHACK. By 22 April the Headquarters at OUP LCI controlled the 1/7 Cav, L3 THYLLIS (XT 537806); 1/12 Cav, LZ JAKE (XT 625813); and the 36th Ranger Battalion, LZ KIM (XT 570763). A three company task force was sent to LCC MINH to reopen LZ KELLY (XU 734081) on 29 April. This action was in response to suspected enery activity. At the termination of the reporting period the brigade operated with two US battalions and one ERVN Ranger battalion. One 3 company task force with one non-organic mech company (TCCN was disposed near LZ KELLY.

(2) Total energy losses accounted for by the 3d Brigade in GFR/TICN CHEYENNE SABRE as of 31 March were 532 NVA KIA, 26 VC KIA, 7 PV, 193 individual weapons, 12 crew-served weapons, 12,980 pounds of rice, 33 mines, 2 booby 1 traps, 281 grenades, 46,373 rounds of LCA and 1,281 rounds of HCA ceptured, and 18 detainees interrogated.

c. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment:

(1) On 12 April the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was placed OCCN to the Division and began deployment from Bien Hoa to DAY TIENG. On the 13th the 1/8 Cav (-) became OTCON, and OTER/TICN MONTANA RAIDER was initiated as the Regiment thrust into the crescent area northwest of DAU TIENG. This portion of MONTANA RAIDER lasted until 19 April at which time the unit returned





to DAU TIENG for a maintenance standdown. On the 22nd of April, the 11th AGR moved from DAU TIENG to AN LOC, and on the 24th initiated operations in the northeastern portion of the Division AC approximately 15 kilometers south of the FISHHOK. On 26 April the 2/7 Cav was placed OFCON, and at the end of the reporting period the Regiment was operating with 2 organic squadrons and an airmobile battalion.

f. 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Operations:

(1) The 1/9 Cav continued to provide general support to the Division and conducted operations for the briggdes on a mission basis. The Squadron was organized primarily with one troop supporting each briggde; A Troop with 1st Briggde, B Troop with 3d Briggde, and C Troop with 2d Briggde. Due to fast moving and fluid situations, it was necessary at times for the units to augment other troops or alter the normal alignments. Screening and reconnaissance missions, bomb damage assessment, securing downed aircraft, and economy of force measures continue to be the routine missions performed by the 1/9 Cav. During the reporting period A Troop was located at TAM NINH; B Troop at OUAN LOI through 17 March, at LONG BINH through 19 April, and at OUAN LOI; C Troop at PHUCC VINH; and D Troop (Ground) at OUAN LOI through 12 March, and at THUCC VINH.

(2) Cumulative totals for 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Operations for the 3-month period saw 722 NVA KIA, 3 FW, 68 individual weapons and 13 C/S weapons captured or destroyed, and 32.8 tons of rice demolished.

g. Division Cumulative Results:

(1) Results of operations from 1 February to 30 April 1969:

Energy: Killed - 2,788; Frisoners of War - 61; Individual Small (rms and Crew Served Weapons captured or destroyed - 1,117; Friendly: Killed - 301; Wounded - 1,785.

h. Combat Support Elements Operations:

(1) Division Artillery: Submitted separately

(2) 11th Aviation Group:

a. Major Operations

(1) TOAN THING II

(2) TOAN THING III

b. General: The 11th Aviation Group continued to provide general, tactical, and logistical support for divisional and non-divisional units in III CTZ. B Company of the 227th AHB relocated on 16 Mar 69 to Di An providing better support to units in the southern portion of the Division area of operations. All major installations in the Division area of operations received numerous indirect fire attacks during the reporting period.

c. Tactical Operations

(1) TOAN THING II 7 Nov 68 - 16 Feb 69: The 11th Aviation Group continued to support this III Corps operation during the reporting pericd. The 227th and 229th AHB's provided company-size combat assaults daily. Other forms of support from 11th Group included logistical resupply, command and control, psyops, medevac, and Night Hawk/Blue recon rissions. The 228th ASHB was responsible for successfully relocating 1st Brigade'fire bases during this Operation.

(2) TCAN THANG III 17 Feb 69 - Fresent: TCAN THANG III began during and continued through the reporting period. This Operation encompassed the annual Tet Offensive. The 227th and 229th AHB's gave aviation support to large reaction forces daily. Increased night support was given with emphasis placed on interdiction of enemy movement. Night combat assaults were conducted in southern portions of the Division area of operations. All facets





of 11th Aviation Group support increased under TOAN THANG III during the Tet Offensive. After Tet subsided, 11th Group supported 3rd Bde relocation from Bien Hoa to Quan Loi.

d. Air Traffic control elements of 11th Aviation Group reported the following air traffic at Division Base airfield for the months of February, March, and April 1969:

(1) VFR

| , | W Day 19998 | <u>R/W Night</u> 12631 | <u>F/W Day</u> 8328 | <u>F/W Night</u> 908 |
|-----|----------------|---------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| (2) | 1871 | 1.0001 | | , |

(3) During the reporting period, both GCA and NDB approaches were flight checked and certified.

Statistics for Reporting Teriod 1 Feb - 30 Apr 1969

| | Sorties | Cargo | Fax | Hours |
|---------------|---------|------------------------|--------|-------|
| AH-1G/UH-1B/C | 7169 | $\overline{N/\Lambda}$ | N/A | 4356 |
| UH-1H | 94414 | 4025 | 108618 | 27298 |
| CH-47 | 17785 | 24919 | 51243 | 6913 |
| Сн-6л | 6837 | 32 | 2356 | 2332 |

(1) Hits Fly: 42; (2) Hits No Fly: 8; Destroyed: 4

(3) 13th Signal Battalion: Operations: Significant Activities: a. Operation SHERIDAN SABRE: Communications installed in support

of this Operation were reported in the CRLL ending 31 January 1969. b. NAVAJO WARHORSE I, II: Additional communications installed

in support of this Operation were:

(1) One 12 channel trunk group was provided from Thuce Vinh to Tay Ninh.

(2) AN/MRC-112 four channel systems were installed from Tay Ninh to LZ's TETRI and TRACY in support of 1st Brigade operations.

c. CHEXIENCE SABRE: This Operation was conducted in its entirety during the reporting period. Communications to support tactical operations in the Cheyenne Sabre AC were established as follows:

(1) One 12 channel system from Camp Gorvad to Bien Hoa in support of the 3rd Brigade.

(2) FM radio retransmission facility provided at Fhuoc Vinh to link 3rd Brigade Forward at Bien Hoa with rear elements remaining at Quan Loi. 3rd Brigade FM nets, B-1 and B-2 were relayed through Fhuoc Vinh until all elements of the 3rd Brigade were relocated to Bien Hoa.

(3) FM radio personnel and equipment were provided at Bien
 Hoa to augment the 3rd Brigade's organic capability in order that they could operate simultaneously in the Cheyenne Sabre and Sheridan Sabre AO's.
 (4) One AN/MRC-112 four channel system from:

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d. MONTINA SCOUT:

(1) 1st and 2nd Brigades commenced operations in the Montana Scout AO on 29 March 1969. Communications installed for SHERIDAN SABRE were augmented as follows:

and the state (a) One 12 channel system was installed from Camp Gorvad to Lai Khe in support of the 2nd Brigade.

(b) FM retransmission sites were established on NUI BA DXN and LZ DCLIX to enable the 2nd Brigade to communicate with its battalions west of the Razorbacks.

(c) A MRC-112/GRC-163 four channel system was installed from Tay Minh to the following locations in support of the 1st Brigade:

1 LZ JESS 2 LZ CAROLYN

(2) The 3rd Brigade displaced to Quan Loi on 19 April 1969 and assumed responsibility for the northern portion of the Montana Scout AO. Communications installed in support of 3rd Brigade tactical operations were:

(a) An FM retransmission station was established at Camp Sorvad to link the 3rd Brigade Forward at Quan Loi to rear elements at Bien Hoa. The Brigade non-secure command net was relayed until all elements displaced to Quan Loi.

(b) AN/MRC-112 four channel systems were installed from Quan

Loi to:

1 LZ FHYLLIS 2 LZ JAKE

e. MONTANA RAIDER I, II, III: This Operation was initiated on 13 April 1969 with the 11th ACR conducting RIF operations in the expanded Montana Scout AO. Fhases I and II were conducted with the 11th ACR CP at Dau Tieng; the CP relocated to Quan Loi for the conduct of Phase III. Communications support was furnished as follows:

(1) Two AN/MRC-112 systems were installed from Camp Gorvad to Dau Tieng during phases I and II.

(2) Circuits were obtained from the corps area system between Camp Gorvad and Quan Loi during Thase III.

(4) 8th Engineer Battalion: Operations: Significant Activities:

a. During the reporting period, the majority of the 8th Engineer Battalion's effort was directed towards support of the 1st Cavelry Division in Operations TOAN THANG II, CHEYENNE SABRE, SHERIDAN SABRE, NAVAJO WARHORSE II, TCAN THANG III, and MONTANA SCOUT. Engineer efforts in III Corps continued ~ to be directed at improving or renovating base camps in Tay Ninh, Fhuod Vinh, Lai Khe, and Quan Loi to accommodate the Division's aviction resources. Although most of the actual construction work was done by non-divisional resources, all coordination was effected through the 8th Engineer Battalion. Nearly all divisional engineer effort expended during this period can best be classified as direct combat support. In addition to normal minesweep, demolition, and other engineer support provided to units in the field, the battalion constructed or improved 18 fire bases for the Division, including 5 fire bases in a 4-day period in late April. All elements devoted maximum effort toward preparation for the maintenance inspections.

b. Headquarters and Headquarters Company remained at Phuoc Vinh during the reporting period, In all operations, HHC supported the line companies by placing construction equipment and water points OFCON to them. The three line platoons of HHC were also involved in various construction tasks in the development and maintenance of the Division base camp at Phuoc Vinh.



Significant projects completed includes aircraft maintenance areas for the 227th AHB and 228th ASHB, fields of fire in the Orange, Red, White, and Brown Sectors, and an aircraft control tower for THE FIRST TEAM VIF pat. Additionally, considerable effort was expended on improving the drainage in Camp Gorvad. On 12 February, work was completed at the Montagnard Refugee Camp in Song Pe; over 3.5 kilometers of access roads and streets were constructed and 60 acres of land were cleared for garlens and houses. On 11 April, work was initiated to upgrade the abandoned Prek Klock airstrip (XT267788) to C-130 capability. The first C-130 landed on 28 April.

c. Company A supported the 1st Brigade during this reporting peried. The base camp was located at Tay Ninh during the majority of the reporting period. The majority of base camp development and maintenance work was done by non-divisional enginear resources. One squad was committed to provide technical assistance in SEA Hut construction to the 229th AHB in Dau Tieng. Direct combat support included daily demolition and minesweep teams in support of infantry units. New fire bases TRACY, TERRI, DOLLY, IKE; CARCLYN, and JESS were opened by A Company surported by airmobile dozers, backhoes, and water points OPCON from HHC. In Tay Ninh, limited construction projects to improve 1st Brigade unit areas were completed on a mission request basis. On 25 March, one platoon of A Company displaced to Bien Hoa to aid in constructing the Division Training Center. This platoon remained in Bien Hoa at the close of the reporting period.

d. Company B remained in direct support of the 2nd Brigade with its CF in Quan Loi until 12 March. On that date, the Company displaced to Lai Khe to co-locate with a forward CF of the 2nd Brigade. Work in both locations was directed at constructing new company areas and aiding 2nd Prigade units in area improvement projects. Work continues on limited construction projects at the close of the reporting period. On 1 April, one platoon of B Company displaced to Bien Hoa to aid in construction of the Division Training Center. This work was completed on 22 April. On 17 April, one platoon of B Company displaced to Camp Gorvad to become the general support platoon for the Division. This platoon remains at Camp Gorvad at the close of the reporting period and is currently engaged in drainage and construction of the EM club. Direct combat support included daily nine sweep and demolition support to infantry units on the ground, to include elements of the 11th ACR during the period 11-22 April. Fire bases JOE, WHITE, and JUNE were reopened and rehabilitated during this period. On 24 April, B Company constructed a new fire base, LZ JAMIE.

e. Company C remained in direct support of the 3rd Brigade with its OF in Bien Hoa during most of the reporting period. On 16 April, the CT lisplaced to Quan Loi in conjunction with a 3rd Brigade move. Limited general support was provided to 3rd Brigade units during the reporting period as C Company continued to provide massive combat support, to include daily minesweep and denolition support, to 3rd Brigade maneuver battalions. The main' company effort was directed at opening new fire bases, and on two occasions, two new fire bases were constructed on consecutive days. Fire bases JAKE, KELLY, and KATE were reopened or rehabilitated during the reporting period. New fire bases CINDY, LIZ, LCIS, and FHILLIS were reopened by C Company supported by airmobile dozers, backhoes, and water points GEON from HHC. One platoon of C Company was committed as the Division general support platoon in Camp Gorvad, during the period 5 March - 17 April. On 25 March, one platoon of C Company was committed to aid in construction of the Division Training Center in Bien Hoa, and that platoon remains in Bien Hoa at the close of the reporting period.





f. The engineer effort expended during the reporting period by non-divisional engineer units has been siginificant. Both the 588th Engineer Battalion in Tay Ninh and the 31st Engineer Battalion in Fhuoc Vinh and Quan Loi responded quickly with massive construction efforts in order to upgrade new base camps in III Corps. Considerable earth work was required to expand hardstands for revetment, maintenance and flyway areas. Construction support by these two battalions continues on a mission recuest basis. On 17 April, the 31st Engineer Battalion completed matting the Camp Gorvad C-130 parking aprox and airstrip with M8A1 steel matting. Work was continued on construction of twelve fixed-wing revetments, a 21 bay ASF, a perimeter road for Camp Gorvad, and a new aircraft maintenace/revetment area for the 15th Medical Battalion. This unified effort and "Can Do" attitude exhibited by non-divisional engineer troops added immeasurably to the overall effort. It freed elements of the 8th Engineer Battalion from general support missions, thereby greatly increasing the quantity and quality of direct combat support rendered to each of the three brigades.





2. (C) Significant Activities

a. General: See peragraph la.

b. Significant activities occuring in Operation SHTRIDAN STREE, NAVAJO W'R-HORSE, CHEYEN'E SATRE, MONTANTA SCOUT, MONTANA RAIDER, and ATLAS WIDGE during the reporting period;

(1) 7 Feb: Company A, 2d Bn, 12th Cav was conducting operations vic XT:38872 and discovered a large rice and ammunition cache. The cache included 54,000 pounds of rice, 50 B-41 rockets, 20 B-40 rockets, and 15 57mm rounds.

(2) 9, 10, and 11 Feb: The 3d ARVN Marines, under OPCON of the second Brigade, was operating in vic XT 544719 when they discovered a large cache. The Marines consequently captured 105,600 AK-47 rounds, 111 122 rocket warheads, 10 oversize 122 rocket warheads, 1,380 chicom grenades, 198 82mm mortar rounds, 216 B-40 rockets, 348 60mm mortar rounds, 37 60mm mortars, complete, 22 107mm rocket launchers, 66 107mm rounds, 22 RPD machineguns, 7 RPG rocket launchers, 25 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, 74 7.62mm sniper rifles, 137 AK-47 weapons, 15 anti-aircraft guns, and 10 tons of assorted ammo and equipment.

(3) 10 and 11 Feb: Company D, 2d Bn, 8th Cav, was operating near XT 3173 and found a total of 126,000 pounds of rice stored in 200 pound bass.

(4) 12 Feb: Aircraft from Company B, 1st Sodn, 9th Cav, were recomming and received intense ground to air fire from several locations in the area of YU 045145. The firing continued and one LCH was shot down resulting in 3 US missing in action. Three other aircraft flying in the same area, at various times during the day, were also engaged with small arms and automatic weapons fire. In an attempt to locate the three missing personnel, Air Cavalry Infantrymon were inserted in the area. Their search was unsuccessful, but before the infantrymen were extracted, they encountered an enemy unit resulting in 8 NVA being killed in action. After the troops were extracted, the area was engaged with organic airmobile weapons, artillery, and air strikes which resulted in an additional 66 NVA being killed in action. Leter, the bodies of the three missing personnel were recovered by elements of the 35th Ranger Bn.

(5) 15 Feb: In an area 1 kilometer east of Nu Ba Dien Mountain, A Troop, 1st Sodn, 9th Cav, encountered heavy enemy contact after an ECH-west-shot down. The Aero Rifle Platoon was inserted to extract the crew and secure the aircraft. During the extraction of the rifle platoon, the lift helicopters received heavy small arms and B-40 fire. Two lift ships were hit and subsecuently crashed and burned. A troop suffered 5 KIA's, and 18 WIA's during the brief encounter, which was followed by an immediate B-52 strike. A ground raid followed the air strike which resulted in a negative assessment of enemy casualties.

(6) 19 Feb: C Troop, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav, located an enemy base camp at YT 238368. Eight enemy were killed by helicopter gun fire and organic weapons. Seven more enemy troops were killed by artillery. Following the barrage of artillery, the C Troop Aero Riile Platoon was inserted and destroyed the enemy base camp. Their efforts led to an additional 6 NVA KIA and the seizure of numerous small items of equipment.

(7) 22 Feb: A Scout Helicopter from C Troop 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav, spotted a suspected enemy cache site at VT 122568. The fero Weapons Flatoon immediately engaged the area with organic weapons. Results showed 12 NVA KIA, 12 bicycles destroyed, and over a ton of rice destroyed.

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(8) 23 Feb: The enemy began an offensive characterized by standoff attacks, large scale ground attacks, and by fire. The following 1st Cavalry installations and units were attacked by fire: TAY NINH, LZ ELROD(XT 339846, LZ ANDY (XT 8291), LZ RITA (XT 499803), CAMP GORVAD, LZ DOT, and Company A, 1st En, 12th Cav. The results of these attacks were 5 US killed and 76 wounded in action. LZ GRANT (XT 387623), repelled a ground attack which was initiated at 0330H, killing 16 of the enemy and capturing 2 others. Friendly losses consisted of one killed in action and 7 others wounded.

(9) 25 Feb: At 1155H, Company C 2/2 Mech, which was OPCON to the 2d Ede, and Company C, 1st En, 5th Cav encountered and attacked a bunker complex vic XT 553482. Their action resulted in 25 NVA killed, while US forces had 11 men wounded in action.

(10) 25 Feb: At 1545H, C Troop, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav spotted 30 individuals wearing black and green clothing at VT 100279. The Troop Commander called for artillery and an air strike while his men fixed the enemy with organic weapons. The combined firepower killed 23 NVA and set off numerous secondary explosions.

(11) 26 Feb: At 0120H, Company C, 1st En, 5th Cav made contact with a large enemy force in bunkers vic XT 556475. Company A, 1st Bn, 5th Cav and Company C, 2d Bn (Mech), 2d Infantry OPCCN, reinforced the engaged unit and the combined effort resulted in 150 bunkers being destroyed and 46 MVA killed. There were 15 US troops wounded in the encounter.

(12) 26 Feb: At 1705H, Scouts of C Troop, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav began a series of engagements with enemy troops located in a bunker complex at YT 110785. Air strikes were requested and these engagements caused 10 secondary explosions. Results of the encounter revealed 23 NVA killed and there were no friendly casualties.

(13) 27 Feb: Company A, 2d Bn, 7th Cav experienced a series of contacts with an enemy force well fortified in bunkers at YT 092267. The battle raged for 4 hours with Company A, 2d Bn, 7th Cav sustaining light casualties while the enemy had 34 men killed in action.

(14) 8 Mar: The 2d Bn of the 12th Cav, located at LZ Grant (XT 387623), received a large scale ground attack supported by a heavy volume of supporting weapons. The attack began at 0030H and the enemy broke contact at 0615H. During the encounter, 157 NVA wore killed, 2 prisoners were taken, 23 individual weapons, and 10 crew served weapons were captured. Friendly forces had 13 men killed and 39 others wounded.

(15) 9 Mar: Company B, 2d En, 5th Cav was occupving a night ambush position in AO NAVAJO WARHORSE vic XT 349154, when they made contact with an enemy battalion size element. The insuing battle cost the enemy 36 lives while US forces had 14 men killed and 31 others wounded.

(16) 9 Mar: Company B, 2d Bn, 7th Cav, made contact with an enemy company size force located at bunkers at YT 255210. Company B sustained light casualties and killed 15 enemy troops.

(17) 10 Mar: At XT 545884, B Troop; 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav spotted approximately 30 NVA dressed in new uniforms, with web gear and AK-47 rifles. The men appeared to be located in a resting area. B Troop employed ARA and air strikes to inflict maximum casualties. The action resulted in 7 NVA being killed by helicopters, 7 NVA killed by air strikes, 4 killed by ARA, and there were several blood trails leaving the area.





(18) 11 Mar: During the night, 2d Bn, 12th Cav, who were located on LZ Grant (XT 387623), was attacked by an estimated enemy battalion. The enemy unit employed a ground unit supported by mortar and rocket fire resulting in 15 friendly troops being killed and 27 others receiving wounds. The battle lasted from 0145H to 0330H with 62 enemy being killed and 2 prisoners being captured.

(19) 17 Mar: At 0143H, Company E, 1st Bn, 7th Cav was occupying a defensive position vic XT 058206. An estimated 2 platoon enery size force overran the OP and penetrated the perimeter. In their attack, the WA had 20 men killed, while friendly forces had 10 killed and 14 wounded.

(20) 17 Mar: At 0325^H, Company E, 1st Bn, 7th Cav, located at LZ Lois (YT 129229), was attacked by an enemy force estimated to have been 2 reinforced companies. The enemy struck during the hours of darkness, using heavy mortar fire, B-40 rockets, and sapper attacks. A fierce battle ensued resulting in heavy US casualties and 12 enemy troops killed.

(21) 21 Mar: Company A, 1st Bn, 5th Cav was operating in the northern portion of the 2d Bde AO when they found an arms cache. The cache included 24 K-47's, 4 AK-50's, and 20 SKS's. In the same area, the unit also discovered 60 bunkers and the bodies of 70 NVA who had previously been killed.

(22) 22 Mar: Aircraft from C Troop, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav made scattered contacts in the 2d Bde AO resulting in 21 NVA being killed in action.

(23) 24 Mar: Company A, 1st Bn, 5th Cav ambushed an unknown enemy size force at XT 572658. The results of the encounter wore 9 NVA killed and 4 HV. taken prisoner.

(24) 2 Apr: A Troop, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav was inserted to locate a helicopter that had been recently shot down vic XT 233774. While working in the area, the Aero Rifle Platoon found and destroyed a 25 foot long bridge that crossed a stream at YT 238794. At 1120H, the unit entered an enewy base camp which had a number of well concealed bunkers with overhead cover and cook stoves. At 1130H, while working in the same area, the unit found and destroyed 2 15x20 foot structures and located several new graves. The unit also destroyed eight tons of rice. Later, at 1400H vic YT 223792, the platoon was pinned down by heavy enemy fire. With the assistance of an air strike and ARA, contact was broken resulting in 4 NVA KIA. The platoon continued on and found another bunker complex at XT 221791. The unit found in this area, food, clothing, hand grenades, and several documents. The documents were confiscated and the platoon was later extracted at 1625H.

(25) 5 Apr: The C Troop, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav Scouts at XT 438642 spotted 15 NVA and engaged them with rockets and air strikes resulting in 11 NVA KIA.

(26) 13 Apr: The 11th ACR Acro Rifle That on was sent to conduct bomb damage assessment vic XT 4755. The unit, while in this area engaged an enemy force. Company A, 1st Bn, 11th Cav was deployed to reinforce the platoon and quickly made sharp contact. The engagement increased in intensity and Company C, 3d Bn, 12th Cav and Company C, 1st Bn, 8th Cav were sent into the area to reinforce the two already engaged units. The action resulted in 15 US soldiers being killed, 17 others wounded; and 7 NVA were killed. (27) 18 Apr: At 1000H, A Troop, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav, called for an air

(27) 18 Apr: At 1000H, A Troop, 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav, called for an air strike at XT 407760. The air strike caused one large secondary explosion, uncovered two underground mess halls that were 20x30 feet with 12 wooden tables





in each. One office building, containing desks, and filing cabinets, 9 billets with bunk beds, and numerous bunkers were also uncovered. After the air strike at 1500H, the A Troop Aero Rifle Platoon was inserted to search the complex, but the unit found the area too intensive to fully exploit it and requested assistance. By 1535H, the friendly forces realized they had discovered a large NVA hospital complex. After finding 31 tons of rice and numerous medical supplies, the decision was made to remain in the area overnight. By the following afternoon, the Aero Rifle Platoon and the reaction force, Company B, 2d Bn, 5th Cav, had collected two laundry bags of documents, several chicom grenades, Claymore mines, books, propaganda documents, and additional medical supplies. The remainder of the afternoon was spent making an LZ so all the equipment could be evacuated. The Aero Rifle Platoon was extracted at 1711H on 19 April.

(28) 18 Apr: At 0840H an LOH from the 11th ACR, spotted and engaged an individual vic XT 433600. The aircraft, in the process, developed mechanical problems and had to make a forced landing. Tm B 1/11 moved to secure the aircraft and established contact with an enemy force in bunkers. Th A 1/11 was then committed to reinforce the already engaged unit. The engagement resulted in 80 enemy soldiers KIA while friendly forces had suffered 6 KIA and 28 WIA.

(29) 21 Apr: Company C, 5th Bn, 7th Cav at XT 566694 made contact with an unknown size enemy force. The following day, during a sweep of the contact area, the company found 7 graves and the remains of another NVA making a total of 8 NVA being killed.

(30) 27 Apr: At XT 468724, Tm B 1/11, found a weapons cache which contained 179 bolt action Chinese carbines, 1 M-60 machinegun, and 1 50 cal machinegun.

(31) 29 Apr: At XI 416792, Im C 1/11 engaged an energy force in bunkers and Company A, 2d Bn, 7th Cav, and M 3/11 were called to reinforce the engaged unit. This contact resulted in 57 NVA being killed and 25 US troops being wounded.

(32) 30 Apr: Company D, 5th Bn, 7th Cav at XT 565733, received mortar, B-40, and small arms fire during the early morning hours. Later in the day, the unit swept the area and reestablished contact with an estimated enemy company size force. Scouts from C Troop, 1st Sodn, 9th Cav, Bde Scouts, ARA, and air strikes were called in support of Company D. This action resulted in 6 NVA being killed in action.

(33) 30 Apr: Tm M 2/7 received B-40 fire from an enemy force at XT 419790. The resulting battle killed 19 NVA while 5 US troops were WIA.



SECTION II: LESSONS LE RNED

1. Personnel: None

2. Operations:

a. Aerial Loudspeaker AEW-ABS-4:

(1) Observation: The 1000-watt aerial loudspeakers without portable frames are hard to handle, slow to load into helicopters, and easily damaged.

(2) Evaluation: The Division PSYQP Section tested mounting the AEW-ABS-4 loudspeaker on both wooden and aluminum frames. The aluminum frame was harder to make, but proved to be lighter and more durable than the wooden one. The Division adopted the aluminum frame and made three. In early April 1969, a UHIH Melicopter was shot down and crashed. The AEW-ABS-4 survived the crash.

(3) Recommendation: The 1000-watt AEM-ABS-4 loudspeaker should be equipped with an aluminum frame to facilitate ground and aerial handling and to protect the equipment.

b. Use of Artillery Smoke:

(1) Observation: A delicate situation is often encountered in the field when an element gets pinned down by enemy in bunkers and can't attack or withdraw without accepting heavy casualties. This situation becomes even more difficult when some or many of those pinned down are already casualties. To move in either direction, they need fire support. The range at which these contacts take place (often 15-30 meters) eliminates tube artillerv for close support. ARA can be used no closer than 30 meters without running the risk of additional friendly casualties. In addition, ARA is ineffective against bunkers, although the psychological effect of a screaming airborne fire spitter can be of some value for a short time.

(2) Evaluation: In a tested case it was found that the almost forgotten smoke screen can be very effective in facilitating either a continuation of the attack or withdrawal. The 105mm base ejection smoke round has been used successfully in this role to break contact when all other normal means have been used unsuccessfully. The unit is allowed to withdraw in good order, retrieving its dead and wounded without receiving further casualties. In one case, 30 rounds were found to be sufficient but this can be varied depending upon prevailing winds and terrain.

(3) Recommendation: Whenever the nature of contact precludes the use of close-in tube artillery or ARA fire support, the use of a smoke screen can perform the valuable function of allowing an engaged friendly unit to regroup, deploy, and/or maneuver. A certain risk is involved because to obtain the desired effect, the rounds must be adjusted so the pols fall within the friendly element. If a pod hits a man, it can cause a casualty but it is extremel unlikely that anyone would be killed if he had his helmet on. However, the cannister can kill regardless of the helmet status. The chances of a cannister or nods hitting friendlies is smaller still, but it is a risk which must be considered. Compared to bringing ARA closer than 30 meters, the risk is negligible. Base plate fragments are also negligible and not worth consideration. This method has been proved effective and the decision rests with the commander with respect to specific employment.

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c. Preliminary Defenses of Landing Zones:

(1) Observation: Often, it is not possible to construct complete perimeter defenses on a new LZ in one work day due to time limitations or shortages of protective devices.

(2) Evaluation: Recent experiences on division LZ's indicate that improvised materials, already available on the new LZ, may well prevent or at least give earlier warning to an impending enemy ground attack.

(3) Recommendation: Bangalore torpedoes can, in the initial stare of an LZ, be used to clear fields of fire and supplement night defenses. Placing bangalores in areas to be cleared and firing them at random during the night will serve to keep the enemy off balance and clear fields of fire at the same time. Makeshift bangalores can be made by packing C-4 into eight-foot pickets and wrapping them with barbed wire. These can then be employed in addition to or in lieu of bangalores. Trip flares should be placed in bands outside the perimeter wire with safe lanes rather than solely wihin the perimeter wire. The lanes should be constructed to allow infantry units leaving the LZ freedom of movement without setting off employed warning devices. Makeshift fougasse/flares can be constructed by placing diesel or fougasse in 105mm brass and igniting them with trip flares. These dovices will provide illumination for periods up to 30 minutes.

d. Carrying of CS grenades by the individual soldier for breaking contact or naneuvering against bunker complexes:

(1) Observation: Most bunker complex contacts are begun by a unit unsuspectingly walking into a well-camouflaged and densely foliaged bunker complex.

(2) Evaluation: Usually the first three men of the point squad of a platoon or platoons are automatically hit and pinned down if not immediately KIA. Action such as this occurs anywhere from 10' to 20' from the initial bunker, thereby making maneuver quite difficult without risk of further cesualties.

(3) Recommendation: By having each soldier carry one CS grenade, as soon as contact is established at close range and in bunker complexes, CS can be hand thrown without waste of time, thereby enabling the unit to gain momentary maneuver superiority to assault. The point must be made aware that immediately upon contact, the agent should be utilized to overwhelm the enemy before he can react with his own counter-measures.

3. Training: None

4. Intelligence: None

5. Logistics:

a. Timely Response to a Fast Moving Tactical Situation:

(1) The method of operation within the Airmobile Division requires a rapid deployment of men and materials to establish a strong battelion fire support base from which the rifle companies will operate. There are often times when a decision to open a fire support base will be made and executed with less than 24 hours lead time.

(2) In order for the logistical system to react to these requirements, there must be a prepositioning of the amount of material needed to provide the infantry establishing the base and the supporting artiller overhead cover, a tactical operations center, and sufficient wire to encircle the base with one triple concerting fence on D-day. There must also be an amount of Class IV

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material readily available to sustain the strengthening of the base defense on D+1 and D+2. Experience has shown that the following list of materials is needed as a minumum:

| ITEM | UI | $\overline{\mathrm{OIX}}$ | ITEM | <u>UT</u> | <u>etta</u> |
|-------------|------------------|---------------------------|--------------|---------------|-------------|
| Concertina | CL | 420 | Lumber | | |
| Barb Wire | \mathbf{RL} | 18 | 22122161 | BF | 2560 |
| Ficket 81 | \mathbf{E}_{A} | 1110 | 3X12X161 | BF | 9600 |
| Ficket 6' | EA · | 666 | 6X6X201 | BF | 4800 |
| Ficket 3' | E/. | 666 | 6x8x20 ' | BF | 1600 |
| Sandbags | HD | 500 | 8X8X201 | BF | 6420 |
| Culvert 72" | EΛ | 320 | | | |
| Culvert 60" | | • | Mails | | |
| | | | 16 D | LB | 100 |
| Chain Link | | | 30 D | \mathbf{LB} | 200 |
| Fence | \mathbf{RL} | 20 | 60 D | \mathbf{LB} | 200 |
| | | | 8" Spike | LB | 100 |
| MSAL Met | BD | 10 | 7" Spike | LB | |

The above BOM will provide the following:

Bn TOC: 20'X20' Arty FDC: 10'X14' Aid Station: 12'X12'

30 Perimeter Bunkers: 8'X8!

Overhead cover for: 2 Inf Cos, Arty Btry and Cmd & Control Elem.

With these standard materials, the unit is provided a fair amount of flexibility as to what can be built to meet varying requirements and situations.

(3) Recommendation: Using the above figures as a guide, each brigade should requisition through the OPCON battalions an amount of material sufficient for the establishment of two (2) fire support bases. These materials should be broken down into 7,000 pound loads and positioned for immediate use in establishing fire support bases dictated by the tactical situation.

6. Organization: None

7. Other:

a. US Economic Relationship to Local Community:

(1) Observation: When the Division arrived at its new AO, maintaining rapport with the local populace was difficult. The hamlet adjacent to the base camp had been on limits to US personnel for previous units. These units employed local civilians to perform personal and unit services as maids and KP's. 1st CLV policy placed the town "off limits" and restricted civilian employment to daily hire. Local Vietnamese resented the new policy.

(2) Evaluation: The reasons for the 1st CAV policy were explained to the people. Citizens learned that the town had to be cleaned up and that the Division did not want to give them a false economy. After about two months,

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the Division adopted a policy which lessened the economic recession of the town. Laundries, gift shops, and eventually restaurants were placed on limits to US personnel from 1200 to 1830 hours. Businesses catering to the needs of the Vietnamese were encouraged. The economy appeared to stabilize around the needs of the community with a limited dependence on US personnel.

(3) Recommendation: When moving to a new area, the US unit should send a Civil Affairs representative in advance to evaluate the local economy and provide advance liaison with local officials. This will help minimize adverse effects caused by policies which effect the local economy.

b. Reinforced anchoring of tactical wire at Forward LZ Log Pads:

(1) Observation: On many LZ's, keeping tactical wire in place around log pads is extremely difficult due to excessive ground winds caused by rotorwash from heliconters.

(2) Evolution: Losso wire presents serious hozoris to aircraft as well as people on the ground whence caught in blowing wire.
 (3) Recommendation: The number of engineer stakes used in normal spans

(3) Recommendation: The number of engineer stakes used in normal spans of triple standard concerting should be doubled. This will stabilize the fence and significantly reduce the hazard to personnel and aircraft.

c. Firebase Construction:

(1) Observation: On several occasions, the soil at firebases has been extremely hard, and in some cases, too hard to work with either the C.SE 450 or D6B dozers used on firebases.

(2) Evaluation: It is necessary to construct sumps, ASP's, defensive positions, and personnel shelters on Division firebases with equipment organic to the Engineer Battalion.

(3) Recommendation: Fifteen and forty pound cratering charges should be used to significantly lossen the hard, dry, clay soil found in the Division area of operations. This was successfully accomplished at L7 Rita. Employment of explosives must be made in the early phases of construction, however, as once artillery is emplaced, demolition activities must be curtailed to preclude accidents setting off the artillery shells.

SECTION III: HQS, DA'SURVEY INFORMATION

Escape, Evasion and Survival: MONE



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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969

FOR THE COMMINDER: 32 INCL C. E. DCYLE TEB A: Task Organization CFT, CFT TAD B: Weather and Terrain TAB C: Enemy Activities ASST AG TAD D: __erial Surveillance TiD E: Intelligence Activities TAS F: Training/Combat Developments TAB G: Tersonnel Roster TAD H: G-1 Activities TAD I: Division Strength TAB J: Casualty Statistics T.D K: Replacement Reports TARL: Unit Listings TAB M: Reenlistments and Extensions TAB.M: Enlisted Fromotion Statistics T.D C: Awards and Decorations TID D: Special Services TIB Q: R&R Frogram TAB R: Fostal Activities TAB S: Army Emergency Relief TAB T: VIF Visits TAB U: Information Activities TLD V: Judge Myocate Activities TAB W: Irovost Martial Activities TAD X: Finance Activities TAB G - Y and TAB AF wd Hq, DA TED Y: Chaplain's Activities T.D Z: Surgeon's Activities T/B M: Inspector General Activities. TAB AB: Logistics THE AC: Civil Affairs TL3 D: Isychological Operations TAB AE: Chemical Activities T.T.F: Fire Mase Construction

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AVFBC-RE-H (15 April 69) 1st Ind SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 13 JUN 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APC 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-DF, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -Lessons Learned of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) for the period ending 30 April 1969, with the following comment: Reference para 5a(3). The concept of prepositioning construction and barrier materiel is considered sound. However, the bill of materials recommended is estimated to weigh 238 short tons for each brigade. Therefore, it would be considered advantageous to centrally position fire support base kits at the Division Support Command to avoid the extraordinary transportation requirements needed to move them in the event of relocation of the brigade trains.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

B. G. MACDONNLD JLJ, AGC Asst AG



AVHGC-DST (15 May 69) 2d Ind SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Inding 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 2 5 JUN 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning Aerial Loudspeaker AEW-ARS-4, section II, page 15, paragraph 2(a); concur. The aluminum frames fabricated for the AEW-ARS-4 Aerial Loudspeaker equipment add stability for the protection of this equipment. Unit involved will be advised by this headquarters to submit an EIR.

b. Reference item concerning Timely Response to a Fast Moving Tactical Situation, section II, page 15, paragraph 5(a); concur. Materials required may be obtained through normal requisitioning. Materials will be provided based on the established priorities and the availability of material. No further action required.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. D. WILSON 1LT, AGC Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn: lst Cav Div (Ambl) II FFV



GPOP-DT (15 Apr 69) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)
for Period Ending 30 Apr 69, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 29 JUL 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

CPT, AGC





SUBJECT: Operational Report for Ourterly Ferial Ending 30 Arril 1969 TAB A: Task Organization Task Organization a. 1st Air Cavelry Division HHC, 1ACD 1/9 Cav 62d Inf Flat (Combat Trackers) Sth Engr Bn 13th Sig Bn 1st Fersonnel SVC (FRCV) Bn Co E, 52nd Inf (LRF) 545th MF Co 26th Chem Det 184th Chem Flat 371st Radio Research Unit 191st Military Intelligence Det 583rd Military Intelligence Det 14th Military History Det 42nd Fublic Information Det Special Security Det Det 31, 5th Weather Sqdn (AF) b. 1st Pde 2-5 Cav 2-8 Cav 2-12 Cav c. 2nd Bde 1-5 Cav 5-7 Cav d. 3rd Rie 1-7 Cav 1-12 Cav TF DUKE D/1-8 A/1-7 C/2-2 Mech 36th Rngr Bn e. Div Arty 1-8 Cav (-) HHB, Div Arty 2/19th Arty (105) 2/20th Arty (ARA) 1/21st Arty (105) 1/30th Arty (155) 1/77th Arty (105) E Btry, 82nd Arty (AVN) f. 11th ACR TF 1/11th ACR TF 2/11th ACR TF 2-7 Cav A/1-8 g. 11th Avn Gp 18 T HHC, 11th Avn Gp 227th Aslt Hel Bn 273rd Hvy Hel Co 478th Hvy Hel. Co

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Feriod Ending 30 /pril 1969 TAB A: Task Organization (Cont):

229th Aslt Hel Br 11th GS Co h. Division Support Command HHC & Band, Div Spt Cud 15th S&S Dn 15th Med Bn 15th Trans Acft Maint Bn 27th Maint Br

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 TAB B: Weather and Terrain

1. Operations THOAN THANG II & III

a. The terrain in the Division AO is generally flat. Some portions of Tay Ninh are rice and marshlands while the north and east are forested. Binh Long Province is flat with dense forests in the north and forests mixed with rubber plantations in the south. Phuoc Long Province consists of a rising plain to the west and a mountain range in the northeast. The province is generally heavily vegetated, primarily with multicanopied forest. Four rivers, the Vam Co Dong, the Saigon, the Be, and the Dong Nai, flow through the LACD AO. These rivers present an obstacle to ground movement due to their depth and steep banks. There are three prominant land masses in the area; Nui Ba Den, The Razor Back, and Nui Ba Ra.

b. Weather:

(1) During the month of Februarv the weather continued to be under the influence of the Northeast Monsoon, becoming a more stagnant air mass which caused a reduction of visibility. Haze, fog and smoke became prevelant during the early morning hours. March was also dominated by the northeast "onsoon, although overall flow was weaker and less organized than that of February. Maze and smoke were again a dominant feature, with the usual afternoon scattered cumulus clouds developing into thunderstorms on 3 days during the month. During the month of April it became most evident that the Northeast Monsoon was giving way to the Southwest Monsoon. Afternoon temperatures were high and therefore high Density Altitudes resulted. There was a noticeable decrease in early morning fog. On several mornings strato-cumulus clouds were evident by 0800 hours and by 1300 hours had lifted and developed into cumulus. During the last week of this warm dry month, thunder storms end rain showers dominated the entire AO.

(2) Maximum Temperatures: February - 99°, March - 103°, April - 107°.

(3) Minimum Temperatures: February - 64°, March - 70°, April - 71°.

(4) Relative Humidity: February - 70.0%, March - 69.5%, April - 71.0%.

(5) Rainfall: February - 0.09 inches, March - 1.35 inches, April - 1.44 inches of precipitation.

(6) Maximum Density Altitudes: February - 3310 feet, March - 3616 feet, April - 3692 feet.

(7) Minimum Density Altitudes: February - 620 feet, March - 1050 feet, April - 1205 feet.





SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 TAB C : Enemy Activities

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1. The first 17 days of February saw the conclusion of Thoan Thang II. During the three months of this operation, the 1st Cav killed 2896 NVA, 207 VC, captured 596 individual weapons, 187 crew-served weapons, 751,400 rounds of small arms ammunition, 9581 large caliber rounds, 383.8 tons of rice, and 10,477 pounds of salt.

2. Operations remained rather light in the first two weeks of February. Cn 3 February THE FIRST TEAM initiated operations in AO Cheyenne Sabre with light contacts. The number of contacts increased as the month wore on. On 2, 4, and 7 February approximately 138,000 pounds of rice were found in bunker complexes and under brush camouflage. The 2/8 Cav and 2/12 Cav were responsible for these finds, operating in an area northwest of Base Area 355.

3. On 9 February, the 3rd VN Marines at XT 544719 discovered one of the largest weapons caches of the Vietnam War. Included in the find were 216 32mm morter rounds, 161 122mm rocket warheads, 10 oversized 122mm rocket warheads, 66 oversized 107mm rockets, 3 82mm mortars complete, 37 60mm mortars complete, 132 AK-47 rifles, and 106,600 AK-47 rounds.

4. On 11 February, C 2/7 Cav at YT 1028 came in contact with an enemy battalion, receiving small arms, automatic weapons, and B-40 fire. The enemy was engaged with artillery and air strikes resulting in 39 WA killed.

5. On 12 February, at YU 0451 B 1/9 Cav aviation elements came under heavy 50 caliber machine gun fire resulting in 2 OH6A aircraft downed and destroyed, with 3 US killed and 1 US wounded. Artillery and TAC air engaged the enemy resulting in 66 enemy killed.

6. At 0001H on 17 February, Operation Thoan Thang III officially began.

7. On 23 February, coordinated attacks by fire and limited ground probes launched the enemy's 4th Offensive. These attacks were sprung against most of THE FIRST TEAM'S Fire Support Bases resulting in light friendly casualties and damage. Contact with main force units in the Michelin Rubber Plantation increased.

8. At XT 5548, 1/5 Cav elements together with C 2/22 Mech Inf made contact with an unknown-sized enemy force on 26 February. Friendly elements received small arms, automatic weapons and B-40 fire during the 5 hour contact which resulted in 52 enemy KIA and 16 US WIA.

9. During the 4th Offensive, ground-to-air firings also increased throughout the Division's AO. During the first seven days of March, operations throughout the 1st ACD's AO were characterized by light, scattered contacts with enemy forces. On 8 March, LZ GRAMT (XT 385626) came under indirect fire and ground attack by the 1st Battalion, 95th VC Regiment with contact continuing throughout the early morning hours. As daylight hours approached, the enemy withdrew leaving behind 157 dead and 2 POW. There were moderate US casualties. Four days later, LZ GRAMT received another ground attack from a reinforced enemy



SUEJECT: Operation Report for Cuarterly Feriod Ending 30 April 1969 TAB C · Enemy Activities (Cont)

battalion. Again the enemy withdrew, this time leaving behind 100 HVA bodies and 2 POW's. US casualties were light.

10. Between these two attacks, elements of the 1st ACD fought a savage battle with a reinforced enemy battalion in the vicinity of the Angel's Wing (XT 349154). Friendly platoon-sized ambush elements initiated the contact and the enemy assault became disorganized. The enemy withdrew into Cacbodia leaving behind 34 NVA killed and numerous blood trails. There were heavy friendly casualties in the ambush elements.

11. During the remainder of March, elements of the 1st ACD working north of and in the Michelin Plantation had several sharp battles with platoon and company sized enemy forces in bunker complexes. There was an increase in aircraft firings that was particularly noted in the BAU DAI WCCOS AREA located northwest of NUI BA DEN and north of the Michelin Rubber Plantation along the Saigon River. On several occasions, elements of the Division and the 1st Battalion (ADN), 505th Infantry (OPCON) found ammo caches in the vicinity of LZ TRACY (XT 437073). The caches were found along the banks of canals burried in watertight metal containers just under the water line. All ammunition was in good condition and evacuated.

12. During the last three days of March, an extended battle occurred between SKYTROGPERS and an enemy battalion as a new fire support base was opened northwest of NUE BADEN (XT 186718). Contact remained light to heavy during the three-day period with the enemy defending a heavily used bunker and trail notwork. Seventy-nine enemy were killed with light US casualties.

13. During the month of April, operations throughout the 1st ACD AO were characterized by moderate to heavy contact with pletoon and company-sized enemy elements in heavily fortified bunker complexes. These contacts saw heavy enemy resistance, necessitating large quantities of artillery and TAC Air to route the enemy. Friendly casualties ran from light to moderate and the enemy body count was low due to the enemy having the opportunity to remove his dead.

14. On 18 April, elements of the First Cay (AM) together with elements of the 11th ACR (OPCON), made contact with a large enemy force in a bunker complex at XT 433600 with contact lasting throughout most of the day. 'US casualties were light and a sweep of the contact area revealed 80 enemy bodies.

15. On 29 April, the 1st ACD and the 11th ACR made renewed contact with a large enemy force in a bunker complex at XT 416792 and again the enemy evaded leaving behind 57 NVA bodies. US casualties were light.

16. During April several large enemy rice caches were found throughout the THOAN THANG III AO. More than 206,000 pounds of rice were uncovered with some of the larger caches located in the following areas: XT 313737 - 24,200 pounds; XT 31757 - 8400 pounds; XT 217823 * 13,000 pounds; XT 410763 - 31,000 pounds; XT 428748 - 14,400 pounds; XT 3717705 - 22,800 pounds; and XT 516685 - 6000 pounds. All the rice was either distributed to refugees, evecuated, or destroyed.



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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 TAB D : Aerial Surveillance

1. Mission Statistics for the period 1 February - 30 April 1969:

| MISSION TYPE | SCHD/COMP | RESULTS |
|--|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| IR SLAR PHOTO PHOTO (Hand Held) | 543/508 180/176 182/164 2/2 | 25,000 (approx) 3,673 |

2. General Comments: There were no significant effects on operations due to weather. Maintenance was not a significant problem except for infrared missions in February when 20 missions were cancelled due to sensor malfunction.

3. IR: During the quarter 93.7% of the missions were completed. 35 missions were cancelled, 22 due to sensor malfunction, 6 due to aircraft nonavailability, 5 due to over-exposed film, and 2 due to weather.


4. SLAR: During the period 97.8% of the SLAR missions were completed. There were 2 missions aborted due to sensor malfunction, and 1 due to aircraft non-availability. One mission was diverted to support the 25th Division who was in a major contact.

5. PHOTO: 90.1% of the photo missions were completed during the quarter. There were 6 missions cancelled by the originators, 4 missions were cancelled by G-2 Air as no longer required and 6 missions are outstanding.



SUBJICT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 TAB E: Intelligence Activities

- (1) Counterintelligence (CI) Operations
 - (a) Background Investigations
 - (1) Cases on hand at beginning of reporting period: 2
 - (2) Cases received during reporting period: 18
 - (3) Cases closed during reporting period: 17
 - (4) Cases on hand at end of reporting period: 3
 - (5) Cases processed past suspense dates: 0
 - (6) Leads completed: 65
 - (b) Security Services
 - (1) Announced security inspections: 15
 - (2) Courtesy inspections and checks: 34
 - (3) Unannounced security checks: 1
 - (4) Unannounced sanitary fill checks: 12
 - (5) Fingerprinting: 92
 - (6) Tech services (locks, combination changes, etc.): 30
 - (c) Liaison contacts
 - (1) Local GVN Officials: 1085
 - (2) Military Officials: 3522
 - (3) Other Intelligence units: 1968
 - (d) Blacklist Personalities screened: 0
 - (e) Interrogations: 23
 - (1) NVA: 4
 - (2) VC: 19
 - (f) Brightlight Reports: 7
 - (g) Collections





SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 TAB E : Intelligence Activities (Cont)

(1) Overt

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- (a) Spot Reports: 512
- (b) Translations: 0
- (2) Covert (casual): 0
- (h) Personnel Security Actions
 - (1) Number of Validations: 1120
 - (a) TOP STORET: 71
 - (b) SMCRET: 1049
 - (2) Interim Clearances granted: 143
 - (a) Interim TOP SECRET: 121
 - (b) Interim SECRET: 22
 - (3) Cryptographic access granted: 0
 - (4) Requests for USAIRR checks submitted: 186
 - (5) Local Files completed: 6180
 - (6) Request for BI submitted: 11
 - (7) Request for NAC submitted: 54
- e. (FOUO) IPW
 - (1) Detainees: 271
 - (a) PW's: 63
 - (1) NVA: 55
 - (2) VC: 8
 - (b) Returnees: 11
 - (1) NVA: 9
 - (2) VC: 2
 - (c) CD: 18
 - (d) IC: 179
 - (2) Documents: 520 Batches (1,259")

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3US.TCT: Operational Report for Quirterly Feriod Ending 30 /pril 1969 T/B F: Training/Combat Developments

1. Division Training:

a. The 1st Cavalry Division Training Center at Rien Hoa conducted individual training for all Division replacements. During the quarter, 642 officers and 5233 enlisted men received a three-day course of instruction.

b. The Combat Leaders Course growuled 179 personnel in grade E-3 through E-5 during the period despite the relocation of the training center from An Khe to Dien Hoa. The 10-day FOI provides training for combat experienced junior EM who have demonstrated potential to become sound, section and fire term Leaders. Subjects stressed air cav tactics, map reading, communications, weapons training, medical training, and leadership.

c. The Kit Carson Scout Course graduated 18 personnel during the period. The object of the training is to provide a well trained scout to every rifle squad and reconnaissance platoon in the Division. The training includes division tactics, care and operation of US equipment, English, and the mission of a Kit Carson Scout.

2. Training from Non-Divisional Units: The following school guotas were fillet: Aviation Schools - EM 102 Aviation Schools - OFF 5 Jungle Survival Schools 6 Recordo School 8 Signal School 28

3. Combat Developments: The following projects were completed in the quarter: a. Fortable Maintenance Lamps: The lamp is a small fluorescent light which is used to increase the efficiency of night aircraft maintenance. Test results indicated that the lamp is only partially effective.

b. Ballistic Blankets: The blankets are used in cases where revetments are not available or as a temporary protection during maintenance, rearming and/or refueling. The blankets segmed to be useful, however, they did not receive any fragmentation hits, therefore an evaluation of the blankets ballistic characteristics was not possible.

c. Variable Type Body Armor: The armor was designed to give extra protection to personnel on duties where the extra weight will not interfere with operational requirements. Test results indicated that the increased protection offset the disadvantage of the extra weight.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Querterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 TAB Z: Surgeon's Activities

- 1. Submitted are the complete and final statistics for the stated period.
- 2. Medical

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a. Disease and injury statistical data:

| (1) | Non-battle injuries | 197 |
|-------------|------------------------------------|-----|
| (2) | Disease | 639 |
| (a) | Malaria | 149 |
| 1 | Vîvax | 59 |
| 2 | Falciparum | 87 |
| 2 | Unkn own | 3 |
| (b) | FUO | 189 |
| (c) | Psychiatric cases | 92 |
| (d) | Other | 433 |
| (3) | Remaining in hospital (In-country) | 245 |

b. Discussion of Disease:

(1) Malaria cases: A total of 149 cases of malaria occurred in personnel of this Division from 1 Feb to 30 Apr 69, inclusive. Of them 59 (39.5%) cases were due to <u>Plasmodium vivax</u> and were caused in most U.S. Forces by failure to take the weekly chloroquine-primaquine pill.

(a) The malaria incidence was as follows:

| UNIT | FEB | MAR | APR | <u>T OT AL</u> |
|-------------|-----|------|-----|----------------|
| HHC 1st Bde | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1/8 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 5 |
| 2/8 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 6 |
| 1/12 | 15 | 8 | 5 | 28 |
| HHC 2nd Pde | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1/5 | 5 | 7 | 3 | 15 |
| 2/5 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 9 |
| 2/12 | 10 | 4 | 2 | 16 |
| HHC 3rd Bde | 2 | 0356 | 1 | 3 |
| 1/7 | 13 | | 0 | 16 |
| 2/7 | 13 | | 4 | 22 |
| 5/7 | 12 | | 2 | 20 |



SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 TAB Z : Surgeon's Activities (Cont)

| UNIT | FEB | MAR | APR | TOTAL |
|------------|-----|-----|-----|-------|
| Div Arty | 2 | σ | 0 | 2 |
| 1/9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| í.vn Gp | 0 | 0 | O | 0 |
| Spt Cmd | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Sig Bn | σ | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Engr En | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| HHC Div | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| LRRP | 2 | 1 | σ | 3 |
| 15th Admin | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 545 MP | 0 | Ο | 0° | O |
| TOTAL | 84 | 41 | 24 | 149 |

(b) The malaria rate has decreased since the last reporting period, 1 Nev 68 through 31 Jan 69. This decrease is due to the dry senson which now prevails in the III CTZ.

(2) Other selected diseases of importance are as follows:

| Immersion Foot | 0 | |
|-----------------------|----|--|
| Heat Exhaustion | 13 | |
| Poisoning | 0 | |
| Animal Bites | 2 | |
| Hepatitis | 14 | |
| Dengue Fever | 0 | |
| Infectious Meningitis | σ | |
| Scrub Typhus | 0 | |

c. IRHA: From 1 Feb 69 through 30 Apr 69, the 15th Medical Battalion treated a total of 1156 U.S. Army personnel who were IRHA. Of these, 593 admitted and 563 were CRO.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 TAB AA: Inspector General Activities

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| Requests for Assistance | 208 |
|-----------------------------------|-----|
| Complaints | 6 |
| Total Cases | 214 |
| Annual General Inspections | 19 |
| Investigations | 5 |
| Non-appropriated Fund Inspections | 20 |

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SURJECT: Operational Report for Cuarterly Feriol Ending 30 April 1969 T.B AB: Logistics

1. During the reporting period, the 15th S&S Bn (AM) continued to support the 1st Cav Div (AM) throughout Operations TOAP THING II and TOAP THING III. Operations were conducted from its base area at Dien Hoa Army Dase with forword support platoons at Fhuoe Vinh, Tay Ninh and Ouan Loi. The 15th S&S Dn provided THE FIRST TEAM with class I, II, III, IV, V and CI VII supplies with the exception of repair parts, medical supplies, and cryptographic materials. AES Company assisted units of the 1st Cav Div (AM) in preparing 28,636 tons for sling out operations, for a total of 7210 sorties. During the reporting period there was no change in the organization of the 15th S&S Dn which remains: Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Company, Supply Company, and AES Company.

2. Supply and Services:

| a subjudy carrison toop. | |
|--|--------------------------------------|
| a. Class I - (Note 1 applies) | |
| (1) <u>Issue by type ration</u> | |
| Type Ration | Quantity for Reporting Feriod |
| "a" Rations | 170 Tors |
| "B" Rations | 1215 Tons |
| "C" Rations | 1,719,551 meels |
| LRRP Rations | 72,380 meals |
| (2) Issue of Ration Supplements | 3 |
| Item | Quantity for Reporting Date |
| Ice | 5852 Tons |
| Sundry Facks | · 373 Tons |
| Ice Cream | 41,017 Gels |
| b. Class II & IV (Note 1 applies) | |
| Received | 3714 Tons |
| Issued | 1796 Tons |
| c. Class III Issues - Figures rep | present issues at Ouan Loi, Dien Hoa |
| and LZ's provided with fixed-wing resur | |
| not maintained at common user bases such | n as Tay Minh and Lai Khe.) |
| Item | Quentity for Reporting Teriod |

| Item | Quantity | for | Report ing Teriod | |
|-------|----------------|-----|---------------------|--|
| JP-4 | | | 2,670;500 cols | |
| AVGAS | | | 53;300 gals | |
| MCGAS | | | 607,170 mals | |
| ".F2 | | | 837,000 mols | |
| | - · · · | | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | |


d. Class V (Figures reprosent only anno procured through MAO units not serviced directly by local 1st Log ASP's.)

| | Feb-Mar-Apr |
|--------------------|-------------|
| Issues | 11,794 Tons |
| Inspections/Visfus | 42 |

e. Food service activities include 124 formal and informal inspections during the reporting period as compared with 94 during the previous period. Continued improvement in mess operations throughout the Division was noted.

Note 1: Figures represent all known issues to 1st Cavalry Division.





1. Fopulation and resources control:

a. Refugees: The Division assisted the GVN in the relief of about 8000 refugees during the reporting period.

(1) The 8th Engineers completed construction of the Montagnard relocation hamlet of Nu Bu Nho in early March. The families were moved from temporary quarters at the Song Be refugee camp to their new village.

(2) Approximately 5000 persons were made temporarily homeless in Phuoc Long Frovince by the February Offensive. The Division assisted province officials by transporting rice and nuoc mam from other areas for distribution to the war victims.

(3) The Division also continued support of 41 refugee families living in the Fhu Giao District headquarters compound. Funds were furnished to buy materials for the construction of homes, which were built by the refugees themselves. Resettlement was complete by the end of April.

(4) In conjunction with Tay Ninh Frovince officials and other FMMAF, the Division gave support in the form of clothing and commodity transportation to approximately 100 families made homeless by an anno dume explosion at Tay Ninh.

b. Rice distribution: The 1st Cavalry Division (AM) captured a total of 445 tons of rice during the quarter. Whenever the tactical situation permitted, units turned over rice to the GVN for distribution. In one operation, 27 tons of rice were transported by UH-1 to Tay Ninh; from there by fixed wing to Quan Loi, and then by CH-47 to Song Be for emergency relief of the food shortage there.

2. Civic action:

a. The Division continued surport of GVN projects throughout the AC. The major obstacles to civic action were the lack of people in the areas of operation and the frequent moves of all units. During the period, seven schools, one orphanage, one hospital, one FF compound, and one market place were supported. Total expenditures from the CA/PSYMAR fund amounted to 1,061,2958VM.

b. Frojects of particular importance were:


(1) IR8 (Miracle Rice) demonstration plots were rlanted in the area near the Division base camp. This is the first step in a project which when completed could make the area self-sufficient in rice production and add approximately 17 million piasters to the local economy.

(2) The 191st MI Detachment conducted 90 hours of English classes for approximately 180 students at schools in Phuoc Vinh and Quan Loi.

(3) The An Tuc Dispensary project at An Khe, which was started in 1965 and has continued to receive support from division units, was completed in early April. The 86-bed hospital with a staff of 12 Vietnamese serves a population of 78,000 people in the An Khe area.

(4) The renovation of the Tay Ninh Orphanage, a project conducted jointly by the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), 25th Infantry Division and FHILC/G was completed in March. The living conditions of 86 orphans were improved by adding a new kitchen and latrine facilities and refurnishing the rest of the orphanage complex.

(5) The Division furnished another combined effort project in Tay Minh,





SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Feriod Finding 30 Arril 1969 TAR AC: Civil Affairs (Cont)

the construction of a 25 classroom girls high school. The project is now 50% complete.

c. During the period, the Division held 55 MEDCUS treating 5542 patients. d. Commodities distributed anounted to 15,942 pounds of construction

material, 17,185 pounds of food (excluding captured rice), 590 nounds of clothing, and 860 pounds of health and sanitation items.



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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly, Period Ending 30 April 1969 TAB AD: Fsychological Operations

1. General: At the beginning of the quarter, as THE FIRST TEAM moved to combine major elements of four enemy divisions, the Division expanded it's PSYCP activities. As part of the expanded PSYOP program, under the guidance of Division G5, the Brigade's S5's simultaneously operated against the 5th VC Division in War Zone D, 7th NVA Division along the Saigon River Corridor, 1st NVA Division in War Zone C, and the 9th VC Division along the Angel's Ving. In conjunction with these operations, FSYOF was used in three important area denial operations, designated BOATS WINNER I, BOATE WINNER II, and TOTANINK. In all, FSTOr was aggressively employed in six provinces and across a 4500 square mile AO. The enemy's Winter/Spring Offensive reached a peak when 5th VC Division elements attacked and failed to seize Rien Hoa City. Capitalizing on this energy military defeat, the 1 ACD mounted a four phase "sychological Counteroffensive Campaign. In April, with the 11th ACR CTCON to THE FIRST TEAM, Division G5 executed an intensive acrial and ground psychological operations campaign, first against elements of the 1st NVA Division and later against the 7th NVA Division. Supporting the ground elements of MONTANA RAIDER were three HB ground loudspeaker teams and one aerial loudspeaker team.

2. Support:

a. The 5th Special Operations Squadron (USAF) supported the 1 ACD PSVCF effort with leaflet drops and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts. Using both U-10 and C-47 aircraft, 34,086,000 leaflets were dropped in pre-planned target areas specified by THE FIRST TEAM. Loudspeaker appeals totaling 90 hours were broadcast to selected target audiences.

b. The 6th FSTOP Battalion located at Bien Hoa provided general support with personnel, equipment, advice, and media. The battalion furnished one liaison officer and three HB loudspeaker teams, one HE audio visual team, a mobile advisory team for a period of four weeks, and additional personnel during MONTANA RAIDER ground operations.

c. 1 ACD Brigade HB FSYOP teams operating from Division UH-14 helicopters broadcast 517 hours and dropped 54,499,825 leaflets. Brigade operations include weekly pre-planned and daily planned target areas and quick reaction exploitation.

d. To improve the division's PSYCF capability, G5 obtained the following additional equipment: 2 polaroid cameras, 2 tape recorders, 50 seven-watt megaphones, one MSQ 85 vehicle mounted movie system, and three aluminum frames to support airborne loudspeaker systems.

e. The Division FSYOF section improved it's knowledge of enemy units. Two intelligence specialists were added to the PSYOF section. Coupled with closer coordination with G2, these specialists assisted in compiling intelligence dossiers and targeting specific enemy. Enemy vulnerabilities were listed for exploitation. A Propaganda Development Committees was formed within the G5 section. This committee developed psychological material to demoralize the enemy and promote the GVN image. The residual effect of the Division's PSYO effort was reflected most directly by the 5th VC Division as it moved along infiltration routes from Cambodia to it's attack departure point near Bien Poa City. The Division leap frogred brigade elements to maintain FSYOF contact and to reduce the enemys desire to fight. On the third day of the fight in





SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1969 TAB AD: Fsychological Operations (Cont)

Tan Hiep village, outside of Bien Mos, 46 5th VC Division soldiers were induced to surrender by loudspeaker appeal.

f. Chieu Hoi Campaign: 1 ACD Fsychological Operations successes were reflected by a growing increase of Hoi Chanhs (returnees) throughout III CTZ. As the Division moved into different and challenging areas of operations, the target audiences were introduced to day and night psychological operations. For the quarter, 110 Hoi Chanhs returned to GVN authority within THE FIRST TENT AO, 11 Hoi Chanhs returned to Division elements and 55 PW's surrendered.

3. Kit Carson Scouts: G5 assumed primary staff responsibility for the KCS program ten days before this reporting period began. As a result of the Division move from I to III CTZ, KCS strength had been reduced to 47 personnel. Many of these 47 were dissatisfied with their new environment and appeared to have low morale. A significant percentage of scouts were discharged from the program for administrative or disciplinary reasons. Concurrently, an intensified recruiting and training program was conducted. Vietnamess and Montagnard scouts were selected from NVA/VC returnees at Chieu Hoi centers in Song Pe, An Loc, Thu Coung and the National Center in Saigon. Initially vouchered for 100 scouts, the Division requested and received approval to bring KCS up to 200 during FY 69. During the cuarter, the Division Training Center moved from An Khe to Bien Hoa without halting the training effort. The 1 ACD maintained a four week KCS training course, the longest course given by any division in Vietnam. As of 30 April the Division had 94 scouts in training or assigned to units in the field. Two scouts were killed and three wounded during the cuarter.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Femiod Ending 30 April 1969 TAB AE: Chemical Activities

1. Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities

a. GENERAL: During the reporting period 1 February 1949 - 30 'pril 1969, Division Chemical along with the 184th Chemical Flatoon and the 26th Chemical Detachment conducted chemical support activities for the 1st Cavalry Division (AM). A sharp increase in chemical support activity took place.

(1) Cn 1 February, the 26th Chemical Detachment's first bunker contamination team contaminated 30 bunkers with persistent CS. Additional teams were placed on an on-call basis to contaminate bunkers, tunnels and trails for units of THE FIRST TEAM.

(2) With the finding of large enemy rice caches, a method of effectively burning rice was established by chemical personnel. On 11 Febrary, 30 tons of captured rice was burned by 1st Brigade chemical personnel using the kiln method, with Napalm as the flame medium. The rice completely burned in approximately 24 hours.

(3) On 11 April, the 184th Chemical Flatoon made an experimental drop of 3 each 55 gallon drums of Napalm on a bunker complex. The results were excellent with each drum covering an area of 40 meters in diameter. Two successive drops were made of 15 drums each on 13 and 15 April, again with excellent results. The drop on 13 April produced one secondary explosion in the vicinity of XT 2583.

b. GPERATIONAL TOTALS: Totals for the reporting period includes most, but not all of the wide variety of chemical support given THE FIRST TEM.

> <u>CS DRUM DROFS</u> 39 Missions for 80,480 pounds of CS

SNIFFER MISSIONS

FOUGASSE INSTALLED 339 55 gallon drums

E-158 MISSIONS 169 Funitions Dropped

NAPAIM DROPFED 33 55 Gallon Drums

BUNKARS CONTAMINATED

RICE BURNED

78 Tons ,

na An San An An

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Feriod Ending 30 April 1969 TAB AE: Chemical Activities (Cont)

> INSECTION MISSIONS 21 Missions 2,310 Gallons of Malathion

FLAME O BRATIONS ON FIREMETER AT CANT GORVAN 42,000 Square Deters •

GAS CHAMBER FXCTRCISES

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MASK INSPECTIONS



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| 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES | 12. SPONSORING MILITART ACTIVITY |
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| N/A | OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C 20310 |
| 13. ABSTRACT | |
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