HEADQUARTERS
1ST SCUADREN 9TH CAVALRY
1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (ANDHOBILE)
AME 96490

-- V. Ar.S--3

18 April 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Squadron 9th Cavalry for Period Ending 30 April, RCS CSFOR - 65 (AL)

TO: Commending General
1st Cavalry Division (AM)
ATTN: AVRACT-DT
APO S. F. 96490

SECTION II LESSON LEARNED

I Personnel: None

II Operations:

A. Right Bank Operations:

- (1) Observation: Occassionally belicopters are utilized in conjunction with night observation devices for the purpose of reconsissance and interdicting energy movement along trails.
- (2) Evaluation: This technique of reconnaissance is of limited value and elso costly. It is difficult to observe from air to ground during the hours of darkness even with illumination. Optical devices are relatively ineffective at night unless they are provided with an emage stabilization device. Further, other than on high speed trails, the enemy will seek cover upon hearing helicopters at night.
- (3) Recommendations: That helicopters not be utilized for night recommaissance unless the aircraft is equipped with image stabilized night observation devices and then only along high speed routes where there would be little likelyhood of the energy detecting the aircraft.

B. Aviation Support

provide close in sup or: to ground waits engaged in contact with the enemy.

(2) Evaluation: Air Cavallry is not designed to provide close in support. Close in support from reconsalisance units frequently results in friendly casualties due to the ungency of the required first to aurport the combat action. Air Cavalry personned have not provided the necessary training to be preficient in close support operations.

76

2-/2

AVDARS-3

18 April 1969

ODENICT: Operational Report of 1st Squadron 9th Cavalry for Pariod Ending 30 April, RCS CSFOR - 65 (RL)

(3) Recommendations: That Air Cavalry operations be limited to reconnaissance missions. For close in support Air Cavalry should be utilized to screen the flanks, rear, and front of the action. Close in weapon support should be provided by trained personnel, the ARA and Air Force.

C. Deception

- (1) Observation: Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols are inserted into varying types of terrain.
- (2) Evaluation: On occassion this insertion is observed by the enemy, defeating the purpose of the mission. False insertions have proven to deceive the enemy in open terrain and to be of little importance in dense jungle terrain.
- (3) Recommendation: That false insertions either prior to the actual insertion or following it, or both, be performed when inserting the LRHF'S into open terrain false insertions can be quite deceptive but set patterns for deception should be avoided.
 - D. Utilization of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol
- (1) Observation: LRRPS are utilized in close proximity of maneuvering rifle companies which has the ultimate result of their being reduced to combat patrols.
- (2) Evaluation: The primary function of the LREFS is to gather intelligence concerning the enemy where his operations are continuing on a normal basis.
- (3) Recommendations: That the LERES maintain twice the range of an 81mm morter in separation from the nearest friendly unit. At that distance the enemy should continue to operate on a normal routine. Basis and will not change his status because of the preximity of treeps.

III Training: None

IV Intelligence: None

V Logistics: None

VI Organization: None

VI Cther: Home

JAMES M. PETHESON LTC, ARTOR Commanding