Combat Airborne Operations
By the 11th Pathfinder Company (Airborne/Provisional),
1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in the Republic of South Vietnam
Background – The 11th Pathfinder Company (Airborne/Provisional) of the 11th Av i a t i o n Group, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) conducted 12 combat parachute jumps during the Vietnam War. In each case these jumps involved the infiltration of a small Pathfinder element into a non-secure area for the purpose of selecting and/or clearing a landing zone (LZ), providing navigational assistance, and terminal guidance to Army aircraft during day or night air assault operations. Several of these jumps were conducted at night. During the testing of the Air Assault concept from 1963-65, the 11th Air Assault Division’s Pathfinders were instrumental in the development of tactics and techniques for the conduct of day and night airmobile operations that became the hallmark of the 1st Cavalry Division. The Pathfinders’ parachute infiltration proficiency in support of airmobile operations were at a high level when the 11th AAD became the 1st Cavalry Division on 1 July 1965 and deployed to Vietnam the following month. The primary reasons for conducting parachute infiltrations were the desire to maintain operational secrecy and/or achieve tactical surprise, and/or the lack of a cleared LZ for the following airmobile forces. The 1st Cavalry Division purposely did not publicize these operations at the time to maintain operational security. The following summarizes these operations:
24 December 1965
Situation: Since mid-October, the 1st Cavalry Division had concentrated operations in the area south of Pleiku in the vicinity of the Plei Me Special Forces camp and in the la Drang Valley close to the Cambodian border. However, aerial sensors had indicated significant enemy activity and infiltration routes southeast of Pleiku in the mountain chain south of the Mang Yang Pass. This was a prominent infiltration route from the Central Highlands to the main rice growing area to the southeast near Cheo Reo and Dong Tre. The Division had not operated in this area and planned to insert six-man MACV SOG (Studies and Observation Group) long range patrol consisting of Special Forces officers, NCOs, and indigenous personnel to determine enemy activity in the area (note: At that time the Division had no organic long-range patrol capability).
Concept of operations: Operational security and secrecy were prime considerations in determining how these patrols would enter the objective area. Thus, the decision was made to infiltrate at night a four-man Pathfinder element to locate and establish a night landing site for the insertion of a SOG patrol 21 hours later. The Pathfinders would be extracted from the area by the aircraft used to land the patrol. The SOG patrol would operate in the area for 3-5 days unless earlier discovered.
Execution: After operational planning, rehearsals at An Khe, and aerial recon of the area, a large open area was selected for the DZ. A laager area for the mission aircraft and radio relay site was established at Plei Do Lim Special Forces camp about 10 miles WNW of the objective area. The aircraft (2 UH-1Ds and 2 UH-1B gunships) would remain on standby there after the drop. A rifle company quick reaction force was on call at An Khe. After chow and a final mission brief at Plei Do Lim the aircraft and team moved back to Hollaway AAF to refuel and prep for insertion. A UH-1D from Company A, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion piloted by CPT Emroy Gehlson and CWO-2 Gayle Bishop transported a four-man team consisting of Captain Richard D. Gillem (team leader and jumpmaster), SSG Rowe Attaway, SGT Max Bennett and SFC Jim Jones (a SOG NCO) was onboard with 1LT John Valcourt along as static safety officer. He was the interface between the jumpmaster and the pilot and would pull the team’s parachute static lines back into the aircraft after the team jumped. The plan was to depart Holloway Army Airfield at Pleiku and parachute at 0300 hours near a suspected Viet Cong base area about 35 miles southeast of Pleiku in the vicinity of Kong Nhou Mountain. At 0315 hours all jumpers made smooth exits close together, but none could see other jumpers in the air. After a short 8 or 9 second descent all jumpers made noisy tree landings in a hardwood forest.
Weather conditions: clear, wind calm, no moon.
Jump aircraft: UH-1D; drop speed: 50 knots; jump altitude: 800 feet; T-10 parachutes with reserves.
Insertion techniques – The tentative drop zone (DZ) had been selected from aerial photos and confirmed by high-speed low-level overflight by the team leader in an OV-1 Mohawk two days prior to the operation. The flight route to the drop point was flown on the day prior to the operation by a flight of two UH-1Ds at 1500 feet altitude with the team and static safety officer aboard. The flight continued beyond the objective area to give the appearance of a routine transit of the area then returned to Pleiku by a different route. The flight was monitored by Pleiku radar, and the radar operator prepared a plastic template of the flight route with checkpoints and timing for overlay on their radar screen during the operation. During insertion, one UH-ID (with running lights on) flew the route at 1500 feet under radar control. The drop aircraft flew with no running lights at 800 feet and visually maintained its position directly under the higher aircraft. The jumpers were all seated in the left door of the helicopter and would exit the aircraft on a pre-determined time count after turning onto the drop heading from the final aerial checkpoint. Takeoff from Hollaway Army airfield outside Pleiku was scheduled for 0245 hours with about a 20 minute flight to exit point for the jumpers. However problems started immediately after the flight got airborne at 0245. When the flight lead contacted Pleiku radar and told the radar operator to begin tracking the flight on the previously prepared plastic route overlay. The radar operator that he had no knowledge of any route overlay because he was a replacement for the normal operator who was sick. The flight lead then told the radar operator in no uncertain terms to FIND THE $%#$%& OVERLAY , and he then put the formation in an orbit overhead while the radar operator searched. After several minutes the overlay was located, placed on the radar screen and the flight began its planned outbound track. Although there was no moon, the night was clear, and long-range visibility at jump altitude was fairly good. However, as the flight turned onto the final leg of the route it was immediately apparent to the jumpmaster that the aircraft were much too close to the Mang Yang mountain chain. It is unknown what cause the apparent overflight of the checkpoint at which the flight was to turn onto the final jump heading. The darkness prevented identifying any features on the ground, but the jumpmaster directed the flight lead to make a very slight course correction which hopefully would put the flight back on the approximate soutbound track and begin countdown to the exit point.
Actions on the ground – Despite the low jump altitude and radar guidance all jumpers had missed the planned DZ. Vegetation in their drop zone consisted of medium height hardwood trees, medium height grass, and moderate to thick brush underneath. Each jumper later commented about how much noise they made crashing down through the tree branches, but none heard other jumpers. Each next unstrapped and checked their weapon carried on top of their reserve parachutes, then hung quietly in their harness for a couple of minutes to see if their arrival had caused any excitement in the area. On the surface the night was so dark that the jumpers could not see the ground beneath their feet, but they were not far off the ground. Nevertheless team members were able to get out of their parachute harnesses and rally on the team leader in about 15 minutes. However, they were unable to recover their parachutes from the trees in the darkness. The team leader then checked in with the jump aircraft and radio relay to report that the team was safely on the ground and assembled. The team then went into a “hide” position on the side of a steep hill to lay low until first light. After a quiet couple of hours, first light arrived and the team made radio contact with the radio-relay site at Plei Do Lim Special Forces camp. Shortly afterward the team discovered they were not alone in the objective area. The first indicator was a crowing rooster, followed soon after by a bugle call (reveille?). In order to pinpoint their location, the team leader requested an overflight ASAP of the area by the drop aircraft to pinpoint their location. While waiting for the aircraft to arrive in the area, each team member took one “green hornet” amphetamine capsule to ensure they were sharp for whatever was to come that day. The helicopter soon revealed that the team had landed about 350 meters from their original intended DZ, but the source of the seemed much closer. As the team carefully reconnoitered the area during the early morning they encountered several recently used campsites, shelters, and bunkers along with a camouflaged two-meter wide “high-speed” trail with numerous fresh footprints in the mud. They also heard the sound of wood being chopped, and observed through binoculars a group of unoccupied thatched roof huts across a small valley. No enemy personnel were spotted, but it was obvious that the objective area was occupied and unsuitable for the close insertion of long-range patrols. It was also clear that it was only a matter of time before the team’s parachutes were discovered hanging in the trees. The decision was then made to terminate the mission and extract the team. The team then began carefully moving north away from the enemy activity to locate a suitable single-ship LZ for the extraction. With help from the jump aircraft, about noon they foun an open and fairly level space on a hillside covered with waist-high grass and several small trees. It would accommodate a single UH-1D if a few trees could be cut, but they also found unoccupied bunkers at each corner of the LZ. Three team members were assigned trees to cut with rope saws from their survival kits and low crawled through the tall grass to their respective trees. As the team leader contacted the extraction helicopter and two accompanying UH-1B gunships by radio and pin-pointed his position in the LZ with a signal mirror, he detected movement by a blue-clad individual about 40 meters off the LZ. It was apparent that the parachutes had been discovered in the trees and a tracker was on their trail. With the UH-1D on long final for pickup, he reported visual contact and requested fire support. The gunships sprinted ahead and fired rockets on three sides of the LZ while the selected trees were cut to clear the landing area. As the gunships maintained their overwatch, the UH-1D flared into the LZ and briefly touched down as the team ran to the aircraft and dove aboard. The pilot quickly picked the Huey up to a hover, turned it 180 degrees and made a maximum power take-off back along the approach route. There was no apparent ground fire during the pickup. The team flew to the Plei Do Lim Special Forces camp about 10 miles away to linkup with supporting radio relay personnel. Then returned to the 1st Cavalry Division’s base camp at An Khe for debriefing by G-2 personnel. During the debriefing, it was not made clear what had caused the flight to miss the intended DZ by so far. Did the substitute radar operator mistakenly allow the flight to overfly the turning point. The operator made no comment when the flight made the course correction to the west requested by the jumpmaster, and it was known that the DZ was large enough to accommodate a slight course correction. Later discussion with Air Force representatives indicated that the radar operator might have had difficulty accurately tracking a single UH-1D (the high aircraft) at a 35 mile range and 1500 foot altitude, but the problem had not arisen earlier with the flight of two helicopters, and remains unresolved. However, it is clear that if the flight path had been 300-400 yards further to the east, the team might have overflown and landed very close to the enemy camp. Several days later an all-SOG recon team was air-landed at last light some distance away from the suspected camp and patrolled the area for two days to determine the extent of enemy activity. We later heard that the patrol had requested an emergency extraction on the third night because a tiger had quietly slipped into the team’s ‘hide site’ in the middle of the night and nudged a Nung trooper asleep in his hammock. The tiger escaped unhurt, but the team wanted OUT immediately.
10 November 1966
Situation: An enemy force of unknown size was believed to be operating in an area about 12 miles north of the 1s Cavalry Division base camp at An Khe. There were no friendly units in the area.
Concept of operations: Infiltrate by parachute a six-man Pathfinder element into LZ HANOVER (BR 426613), a non-secure-area, about 12 miles north of An Khe, conduct a hasty ground reconnaissance, provide limited security, and establish a helicopter LZ for assault elements of the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry that would land 15 minutes later and conduct operations to locate and destroy the enemy force.
Execution: The Pathfinder team consisted of Captain Benjamin C. Buckley (team leader and jumpmaster), 1LT Luther L. Sanders, 1LT Ivan D. Dummitt, SGT Benjamin Villareal, CPL Frank D. Holder, and PFC William Krehnbrink. The DZ was a small dirt trail surrounded by dense vegetation consisting of elephant grass, brush, and trees up to 20 feet tall. The DZ had been selected during a previous aerial reconnaissance. The drop aircraft departed the 1st Cavalry Division base camp at An Khe at 0745 hours. A static jumpmaster was used in the aircraft for safety purposes and to permit the team leader to concentrate on enroute navigation. After exiting the aircraft at 0800 hours, all jumpers landed from five to fifty meters from the trail without incident.
Weather conditions: unlimited visibility, scattered cloud cover, wind from the NW at10 knots.
Jump aircraft: UH-1D; drop speed: 50 knots; jump altitude: 900 feet; T- 1 0 parachutes with reserves.
Actions on the ground – The team quickly assembled on the trail, conducted a hasty reconnaissance, cleared obstacles, set out a “T” for the lead aircraft, and established radio contact with the infantry battalion commander and inbound flight leader. The first four assault helicopters landed at 0813 hours. There was no enemy contact, and the Pathfinder team was extracted by helicopter at 0920 hours and returned to the An Khe base camp.
6 December 1966
Situation: Three or four bands of Viet Cong, numbering about 40 men each, had been raiding and terrorizing friendly villages southeast of LZ OASIS (ZA130250) and north of the Plei Me Special Forces camp (ZA 165060). The 1st Cavalry Division had been conducting Operation Paul Revere IV in the Pleiku area since October 1966 with a brigade task force consisting of the 2nd Brigade along with attached units. The brigade command post was located at LZ OASIS. There were no friendly units in the objective area.
Concept of operations: Infiltrate by parachute a six-man Pathfinder team into LZ Tackle (ZA 206230) to conduct a hasty reconnaissance, clear and mark the LZ, and establish control for the landing 15 minutes later of a reinforced CIDG company with Special Forces advisors. The LZ was near a suspected VC assembly area.
Execution: The Pathfinder team consisted of 1LT Charles B. Fitt (team leader and jumpmaster), Sgt Barry J. Crites, PFC Ronald L. Lunde, PFC John Gillaspie, PFC William F. Lannigan and PFC Hector V. Lozoya. The terrain in and around the DZ was covered with bushes and small trees four to eight feet tall. A static jumpmaster was used in the aircraft to permit the jumpmaster to concentrate on enroute navigation. The team staged from the Plei Me Special Forces camp, and the plan called for a gunship to fly over the DZ and mark the area with a smoke grenade for the following drop aircraft. The gunship would then orbit north of the DZ to provide on-call fire support. At 1000 hours the Pathfinder team exited the aircraft. The low jump altitude partially offset the effect of the high winds and all jumpers landed fairly close together.
Weather conditions: Clear, 18-20 knots wind from the NE.
Jump aircraft: UH-1D; drop speed: 50 knots; jump altitude: 500 feet; T-10 parachutes with reserves.
Actions on the ground – Once on the ground the team quickly assembled; made a hasty reconnaissance; established communications with the gunship, inbound flight leader, and the infantry battalion commander; and cleared and marked the LZ to accommodate four UH-1Ds in diamond formation. They also set up an HRT-2A radio homing beacon to assist the inbound flight leader in locating the LZ. The CIDG company began landing at 1018 hours in four-ship increments. Once the CIDG company was on the ground and assembled the Pathfinders were extracted and returned by air to LZ OASIS. An after-action review concluded that from a 500-foot jump altitude at a slow drop speed a reserve parachute would be useless in the event of a main parachute malfunction. Unless it was necessary to jump from that altitude to achieve required landing accuracy, 800-900 feet should be the minimum jump altitude for future operations. NOTE: This jump was conducted from an actual altitude of 450 feet due to enemy sniper activity in the area.
16 December 1966
Situation: Elements of the 2nd VC Regiment were suspected to be located within the Soui Ca Valley or in the surrounding mountains. The VC frequently came to the village of Long Dinh at the mouth of the Soui Ca valley to buy food. The 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, located at LZ HAMMONDS (BR 878540), would conduct a night air assault into the Soui Ca Valley and move to then establish a blocking position further up the valley. The DZ was located near the mouth of the valley and consisted of rice paddies surrounded by hedgerows and a few scattered huts with a river to the east. There were no friendly units in the vicinity.
Concept of operations: Infiltrate a Pathfinder team by parachute into LZ Taylor (BR 813603) to establish a night LZ for Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry that would land 30 minutes later. The primary consideration for infiltrating Pathfinders at night and not employing an artillery preparation or illumination on the LZ was to achieve operational surprise. However, artillery fires and illumination were available on call.
Execution: Several days were available for operational planning and coordination. Pathfinders and pilots conducted an aerial recon and dress rehearsal. The Pathfinder team consisted of 1LT Luther L. Sanders (team leader and jumpmaster), SSG James R. Martin and CPL Carl L . Weaver. The team staged from LZ Hammond, departing at 2015 hours. The pilot of the jump aircraft used a radar vector and the jumpmaster used visual checkpoints for enroute navigation. The team jumped at 2030 hours and landed fairly close together.
Weather conditions: No moon, scattered clouds, light wind from the north.
Jump aircraft: UH-1D; drop speed: 50 knots; drop altitude: 800 feet; T-10 parachutes with reserves.
Actions on the ground – Immediately upon landing they quickly assembled, conducted a hasty recon of the landing zone using a starlight scope, and established communications with the inbound flight leader and the infantry battalion commander. They quickly set up a four-ship LZ using a lighted tee for the lead aircraft and single lights for the landing point for each of the other aircraft. They also set up a glide slope indicator for the lead aircraft of each four-ship lift formation and employed an SE-11 light gun for long-range visual signaling. These same signaling devices were used for all subsequent lifts. At 2055 hours the first assault helicopters landed. The company completed their landings and assembled without enemy contact on the LZ. The Pathfinder team was then extracted at 2115 hours.
27 January 1967
Situation: The coastal area around Dam Tra O Lake (BR 980820) about 10 miles southeast of Bong Son was known to be an enemy infiltration area. Elements of the 18th VC Regiment were also thought to be in the area. The 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, located at LZ Uplift (BR 920753), was planning an operation around Dam Tra O Lake. The DZ was located on a large sandy spit between the lake and the South China Sea. It consisted of rolling sand dunes and scattered brush. The village of An Hoa was located near the DZ.
Concept of operations: Infiltrate by parachute an eight-man Pathfinder team into LZ MOON (BR 985852) to recon the area and establish a night landing zone for an airmobile assault by Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry. Aerial rocket artillery (ARA) and tube artillery were on call. The decision was made to infiltrate Pathfinders ahead of the assault echelon because of the danger of landing helicopters in formation at night on rolling sand dunes and the desire to achieve surprise.
Execution: The mission was received at 1200 hours and executed at 2000 hours on the same day. Preparation for the operation included an overflight of the DZ by the team, and rehearsals of the plan for assembly and actions on the LZ. The Pathfinder team consisted of Captain Benjamin C. Buckley (team leader and jumpmaster), 1LT Charles B. Fitt, ILT Ronald B. Flynn, SGT Barry J. Crites, SGT Richard C. Cunningham, CPL Roger C. Moak, PFC David K. Flick and PFC Ronald C. Lunde. The team departed LZ UPLIFT at 2000 hours. Navigation to the DZ was by radar vector and visual checkpoints. Aerial rocket artillery helicopters were orbiting several miles north of the DZ on call, and tube artillery fires were preplanned and on call. As soon as the jumpers exited the aircraft at 2015 hours, small arms and automatic weapons fire erupted from the village below. As the team slipped toward their planned landing zone, the first jumpers on the ground returned fire to cover those still in the air.
Weather conditions: Clear with a full moon; 3-5 knots wind from the north.
Jump aircraft: UH-1D; drop speed 50 knots; jump altitude: 900 feet; T-10 parachutes with reserves.
Actions on the ground – Assembly on the ground was delayed and reconnaissance limited because of emeny fire, but each Pathfinder moved as quickly as possible to their preplanned positions on the LZ. The team leader established radio contact with the inbound flight leader and infantry battalion commander as the team began to place out navigational aids. A standard five-light “T” of MX-290 lanterns supplemented with strobe lights and a glide slope indicator were emplaced for the lead aircraft with single landing lights marking the touchdown points of other aircraft in the formation. At 2038 hours the landing lights were turned on and the first aircraft landed at 2040 hours. Because of sporadic enemy fire and blowing sand, the aircraft were directed to land in two-ship sections at 15 second intervals. There were no casualties or aircraft hit by the enemy fire. The ARA aircraft soon after engaged and destroyed a squad-size enemy force attempting to escape by boat across Dam Tra O Lake. One Pathfinder remained on the LZ to accompany the infantry company on their sweep and the rest were extracted on the last helicopter. The after-action review of this operation determined that the 900-foot jump altitude resulted in too much exposure in the air for jumpers and too large a landing pattern on the ground.
February through July 1967
Background: During the period, elements of the 11th Pathfinder Company conducted seven different parahute infiltrations in support of airmobile operations in the vicinity of Phan Thiet on the South China seacoast. Task Force 2-7 consisting of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry with supporting elements was conducting Operation Byrd in the Phan Thiet area under the direct control of II Field Force Vietnam. The primary reasons for infiltrating the Pathfinders were tactical surprise and the need to clear and prepare an LZ for assault helicopters. The size of the Pathfinder elements in these combat jumps varied from three-man to eight-man teams. Due to previous experience at DZ Moon, the small DZs used, the drop altitude for these jumps varied from 500 to 600 feet. Those altitudes precluded the effective use of a reserve parachute, but the slow aircraft speed was very unlikely to cause a canopy inversion or a blown panel in the parachute. The drop aircraft were UH-1D helicopters and the drop speed was normally 50 knots to provide the required landing accuracy. None of the DZs were prepared by artillery or gunship fire, and all the missions except one involved insertion of Pathfinder elements by parachute ahead of a helicopter assault. In some cases the LZs were secured, cleared and marked in as little time as 10 minutes before the helicopter insertion. Four jumps were conducted during daylight hours, and sniper fire was encountered on two of them. On the daylight jumps, a UH-1B gunship preceded the drop aircraft over the DZ by two minutes and dropped a smoke grenade. This enabled the inbound jumpmaster to align the drop aircraft and pick an exit point that would maximize the landing accuracy of the team because steerable parachutes not available. However, even the 500-foot jump altitude did not always guarantee that all jumpers would make it onto the small DZs. When possible, a radio communications check with the drop aircraft, gunships, and assault force filight leader was made by the team leader as they descended by parachute. The provided a timely on-the-spot report of the situation in and around the LZ. The one exception to normal employment of the Pathfinders occurred on 6 March 1967. An eight-man team led by 1LT Flynn parachuted at night into a DZ with the mission of establishing an ambush near the DZ/LZ until a rifle company closed into the area on foot later in the day for extraction by helicopter. However, the rifle company enroute to the LZ was diverted to assist an ARVN unit in contact and the Pathfinder team was extracted later.
Five of these seven jumps were led by 1LT Ronald B. Flynn, whose Pathfinder team was attached to Task Force 2-7. Additional details on these combat jumps are provided below:
5 March 1967
Situation: Viet Cong units were operating out of the foothills to the north of Phan Thiet, conducting squad and platoon-size combat operations in the built-up areas 40-60 km inland from the South China Sea.
Concept of operations: A pathfinder team led by 1LT Ronald B. Flynn was attached to Task Force 2-7, consisting of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry with supporting elements. The Task Force was conducting Operation Byrd in the Phan Thiet area under direct control of Il Field Forces Vietnam. To achieve surprise, engage VC elements in the area, and cut them off from their bases, a tactical decision was made by Task Force 2-7 to infiltrate by parachute a four-man pathfinder team into a drop zone located at AN 862447, a non-secure area, about 35 km north of Phan Thiet. This pathfinder team would then conduct a hasty ground reconnaissance, provide limited security, and establish a helicopter LZ for a company size ARVN unit which would land 20 minutes later. The ARVN would then conduct operations to locate and destroy any enemy force.
Execution: The pathfinder team consisted of 1LT Ronald B. Flynn (team leader and jumpmaster), SGT Widrig, CPL Locke, and CPL Callum. The DZ was a dry rice paddy amidst some brush which masked the area somewhat. A UH-1B gunship preceded the drop by 2 minutes, made a treetop pass over the DZ, and dropped a smoke grenade to mark it. This enabled the jumpmaster to align the UH-1D drop helicopter for the jump and make any final adjustments for wind. The DZ was selected to avoid built up areas, but still insert ARVN forces quickly without tube artillery, aerial rocket artillery, or gunship preparation of the landing zone to enable them to conduct a search and destroy mission to trap VC elements attempting to withdraw to their base camp. The drop time was 0900 hours.
Weather conditions: Unlimited visibility.
Jump aircraft: UH-1D; drop speed was 50 knots; jump altitude 600 feet; parachutes: T-10s with reserves.
Actions on the ground – There was no enemy contact on the DZ. A “T” was emplaced after a safety check for wind direction and trees around the LZ. Communication was established with the flight leader of the air assaulting ARVN force. After the ARVN company landed at 0930 hours and moved out in search of VC elements, the pathfinder team was extracted at 1000 hours back to LZ BETTY at Phan Thiet airfield. Due to the surprise achieved by the insertion of a team of pathfinders without any fire suppression of the drop zone, the ARVN company was able to close quickly with VC units in the area. The TF 2-7 Commander approved a standby mission for the next day to utilize the pathfinder team in a similar capacity.
6 March 1967
Situation: Several squad-size VC units were operating north of the airfield located at AN796066 within LZ BETTY, west of Phan Thiet. VC elements routinely probed the perimeter of the LZ at night. Company C, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry was conducting a search and destroy sweep from east to west approximately 4 km north of LZ BETTY to kill or capture VC elements moving back to their bases. An ARVN company on the right flank to the north was conducting a similar operation. Company C went to ground in a hasty defense at dusk on 5 March. At first light the next morning the search and destroy operation was to continue.
Concept of operations: A four-man pathfinder team, augmented with four parachute riggers to increase local security, would be infiltrated by parachute under the cover of darkness the morning of 6 March to establish a helicopter landing zone for the extraction of Company C. They would conduct an area reconnaissance, mark the LZ with a standard “T” using VS17 air ground recognition panels, and establish an ambush oriented to the east in the event any VC, driven by Company C, entered their landing zone area. An extraction site for Company C was selected at AN732104. At 1400 hrs on 5 March the pathfinder team leader conducted an aerial reconnaissance of the route west down the sea coast from LZ BETTY to identify a prominent terrain feature for turning inland and marking the timed route to the drop zone. NOTE: One of the parachute riggers making thia jump was Juan Carlos Gonzales. Shortly thereafter, he transfer to the 11th Pathfinder Company and remained with the unit until April, 1968.
Execution: The pathfinder team consisted of 1LT Ronald B. Flynn (team leader and jumpmaster), SGT Widrig, CPL Locke, CPL Callum, and four parachute riggers attached to TF 2-7. The UH-ID drop aircraft lifted off from LZ BETTY at 0445 hours and proceeded west along the shoreline, masked by the cliffs west of Phan Thiet. An enemy tracer round missed the drop helicopter as it approached the checkpoint to turn inland on the drop azimuth. As the aircraft turned to the north numerous campfires were spotted on the ground above the shoreline. The DZ was an open area free of brush determined by the timed overflight the day before, and confirmed by a map recon.
Weather conditions: Dry, with limited visibility due to the time of the drop.
Jump aircraft: UH-1D; drop speed was 50 knots; jump altitude 500 feet; T-10 parachutes with reserves.
Actions on the ground – The team jumped at 0500 hours, assembled quickly and established communication with the drop helicopter which was returning to LZ BETTY. Communication was also established with Company C to confirm the link up plan at the pickup zone. A “T” was emplaced, and team members were positioned to provide local security with the majority of the firepower oriented to the east in the event any VC being driven ahead of Company C entered the area. At 0900 hours Company C was diverted to the north to assist the ARVN company on their flank which was engaged in a firefight with a platoon size force of VC. At 0930 hours the pathfinder team, with the riggers, was extracted from the area without contact and returned to LZ BETTY.
13 March 1967 – First Jump
Situation: Squad size VC units were reported operating 20 km north of Phan Thiet. Villages were being harassed at night, with the VC withdrawing in the morning to the foothills in the north.
Concept of operations: Infiltrate by parachute a seven-man team into a drop zone vicinity AN 842312 to conduct a hasty reconnaissance, clear and mark a landing zone, and establish control for a helicopter air assault of Company C, 2-7 Cavalry scheduled to land 20 minutes after the pathfinder drop. Because of the necessity for surprise, and the proximity of the drop zone to villages between the VC and their sanctuary north of Phan Thiet, there was no planned tube artillery or aerial rocket preparation of the drop zone. A UH-1B gunship would mark the drop zone with a smoke grenade and remain on call in the air west of the DZ in the event of enemy contact during the parachute infiltration.
Execution: The pathfinder team consisted of 1LT Ronald B. Flynn (team leader and jumpmaster), SGT Widrig, CPL Locke, CPL Callum, PFC Bostic, PFC Emmons, and PFC McManus. The drop zone was a large relatively dry patch work of cultivated fields surrounded by high brush. The drop aircraft lifted off from LZ BETTY at 0600 hours and the team jumped at 0630 hours. There was no enemy contact on the ground, but the drop aircraft took an enemy small arms hit in the fuselage after the pathfinders exited the aircraft.
Weather conditions: Unlimited visibility, scattered cloud cover.
Jump aircraft: UH-1D; drop speed 50 knots; jump altitude: 600 feet; parachutes: T-10s with reserves.
Actions on the ground – Despite the low jump altitude, the size of the team caused a 200 meter dispersion of jumpers on the drop zone, but the pathfinders assembled quickly in the center of the DZ and established communication with the flight leader of the air assault. A “T” was emplaced, and team members were positioned to provide local security until the first elements of the air assault arrived in the LZ at 0700 hours. Company C then moved out to make contact with the VC elements moving north. The pathfinder team was extracted from the area by helicopter at 0730 hours and returned to LZ BETTY. Two of the team members were then attached to other air assaulting companies of TF 2-7. A new member was added to the team which then remained on a standby status at LZ Betty throughout the day, in parachutes, prepared to support further search and destroy operations against VC elements attempting to flee to the north of Phan Thiet.
13 March 1967 – Second Jump
Situation: Squad size VC units were withdrawing to their base camps 80 km northwest of Phan Thiet. The VC had been harassing and killing villagers in the built-up areas north of the city. A ground platoon of C Troop, 1st Battalion, 9th Cavalry Squadron was on standby to exploit any success and reinforce any decisive engagement between units of TF 2-7 Cavalry and the VC.
Concept of operations: Infiltrate by parachute a six-man team into a drop zone in the vicinity AN 870456 to conduct a hasty reconnaissance, clear and mark a landing zone, and establish control for a helicopter air assault of a ground platoon of C Troop, 1st Battalion, 9th Cavalry which was to follow 15 minutes after the pathfinder drop. Because of the fluidity of the tactical situation, and to minimize civilian casualties, no tube artillery or aerial rocket preparation of the drop zone would be fired. A UH-1B gunship would be used to mark the drop zone and remain on call in the air west of the DZ to respond and suppress any VC that might engage the pathfinder team or the air assaulting platoon on the LZ.
Execution: The pathfinder team consisted of 1LT Ronald B. Flynn (team leader and jumpmaster), SGT Widrig, CPL Locke, CPL Callum, PFC Bostic, and PFC Moore. The drop zone was a large uncultivated clearing surrounded by high brush. The drop aircraft lifted off from LZ BETTY at 1300 hours. The team jumped at 1330 hours, there was no enemy contact on the drop zone.
Weather conditions: Unlimited visibility, scattered cloud cover.
Jump aircraft: UH-1D; drop speed 50 knots; jump altitude: 600 feet; parachutes: T-10s with reserves.
Actions on the ground – The pathfinders assembled quickly in the center of the DZ, and established communication with the flight leader of the air assault. A “T” was placed and team members were positioned to provide local security until the first elements of the air assault arrived in the LZ at 1340 hours. The ground platoon of C Troop moved out to make contact with any VC elements moving north. Within 30 minutes the platoon was engaged with several squad-size elements of VC, killing seven of the enemy. The pathfinder team remained on the LZ for an hour to support a possible air assault for reinforcements, but since this was not needed, they were extracted from the area by helicopter at 1445 hours and returned to LZ BETTY.
27 July 1967
Situation: A squad size VC unit was reported operating 20 km northeastof Phan Thiet, near the village of Ap Long Hoa. During the day, VC were harassing and killing civilians in the area then hiding at night.
Concept of operations: Infiltrate by parachute a four-man team into a drop zone vicinity AN 918291 to conduct a hasty reconnaissance, clear and mark a landing zone, and establish control for a helicopter air assault of Company D, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry following 20 minutes after the pathfinder drop. Because of the need for surprise, and the proximity of the drop zone to the village between the VC and their sanctuary north of Phan Thiet, no tube artillery or aerial rocket preparation of the drop zone would be fired. A UH-1B gunship would mark the drop zone with a smoke grenade two minutes ahead of the drop then remain on call in the air east of the DZ in the event contact was made with any VC during the parachute infiltration.
Execution: The pathfinder team consisted of ILT Ronald B. Flynn (team leader and jumpmaster), 1LT Mel Liss, SGT Cunningham, and PFC Dollins. The drop zone was an open area of cultivated fields. The drop aircraft lifted off from LZ BETTY at 1030 hours. The team jumped into DZ DARLA at 1050 hours.
Weather conditions: Unlimited visibility, no cloud cover.
Jump aircraft: UH-1D; drop speed 50 knots; jump altitude: 600 feet; parachutes: T-10s with reserves.
Actions on the ground – Earlier in the morning TF 2-7 helicopters had received small arms fire from the area of the drop zone, but there was no enemy contact on the ground during the jump. The pathfinders assembled quickly in the center of the DZ, and established communication with the flight leader of the air assault. A “T” was emplaced, and team members were positioned to provide local security until the first elements of the air assault arrived in the LZ at 1100 hours. Company D moved out to make contact with VC elements withdrawing to the north. The pathfinder team was extracted from the area by helicopter at 1120 hours and returned to LZ BETTY.
Operational Considerations – The primary reasons for infiltrating the pathfinders were tactical surprise and the need to clear and prepare the LZ for the assault helicopters. The size of the Pathfinder elements in these combat jumps varied from three man to eight-man teams. Due to the previous experience at DZ MOON and the small DZs used, the drop altitude for these jumps varied from 500 to 800 feet. The drop aircraft were UH-1D helicopters and the drop speed was normally 50 knots to provide the required accuracy and minimal dispersion of jumpers on the DZ. None of the DZs were prepared by artillery or gunships, and all missions except one involved the insertion of Pathfinder elements by parachute ahead of a helicopter assault. In some cases the LZs were secured, cleared, and marked in as little time as 10 minutes before the helicopter assault. Four jumps were conducted at night, and scattered fire was encountered on two of them. On the daylight jumps, a UH-1B gunship preceded the drop aircraft over the DZ by 1-2 minutes at low level and dropped a smoke grenade. This enabled the inbound jumpmaster to align the drop aircraft and pick an aerial exit point that would ensure the team would land on the DZ because steerable parachutes were not available. However, even a 500-foot jump altitude and a 50-knot drop speed did not always guarantee that all jumpers would make it onto the small DZs. Further, that altitude essentially precluded the effective use of a reserve parachute in the event of a main parachute malfunction. On some infiltrations, the team leader was able to make a radio communications check with the drop aircraft, gunships, and assault force as he descended by parachute. This provided a timely on-the-spot report of the situation in and around the LZ. The one exception to the normal parachute employment of the Pathfinders occurred on 6 March 1967. An eight-man team led by 1LT Flynn parachuted at night into a DZ with the mission of establishing an ambush near the DZ/LZ until a rifle company closed into the area later in the day for extraction by helicopter. However, the rifle company enroute to their location was diverted to assist an ARVN unit in contact. The Pathfinder team was then extracted.
Team Size, Composition, Weapons, and Equipment – In all cases the size of the team was based on the situation and the mission. These factors, in turn, dictated the amount and the type of equipment carried. At least two AN/PRC-25 radios with extra batteries were a given in all cases. However, night operations also required sufficient MX-290 battery powered lanterns to mark a tee and landing points for aircraft, an SE-11 light gun, a visual glide slope indicator, and, on occasion, an HRT-2A non-directional radio homing beacon and a starlight scope. This additional equipment required extra men to ensure individual jumpers were not overloaded, and could quickly move cross-country on foot if necessary. The size of the planned LZ also was a factor in team size. The bigger the LZ to recon, clear and setup, the more men were required to do the job quickly and secure (or at least outpost) the area. Team weapons normally were limited to M-16 rifles, .45 caliber pistols and grenades (fragmentation and smoke), but on the initial operation the team armament consisted of three M-3.45 caliber submachine guns with silencers, four .45 caliber pistols, and an M-79 40mm grenade launcher, in addition to smoke and fragmentation grenades. Machetes were the primary tools used for clearing an LZ. On two operations the teams contained two officers in addition to the team leader. This was done to give these extra officers training as jumpmasters for future operations, but once on the ground they performed normal team member duties as required by the mission.
Summary – The ability of the 11th Pathfinder Company to effectively conduct day or night parachute infiltrations permitted the 1st Cavalry Division’s airmobile forces to operate around the clock and land in areas that were inaccessible to helicopters without first being cleared. This allowed the Division’s forces to achieve tactical surprise by inserting forces at a time and place unexpected by the enemy. Positive Pathfinder guidance and control also greatly enhanced aviation safety. It is noteworthy that despite the hazardous conditions no aircraft were lost or damaged during these operations, nor was any Pathfinder injured in the jumps or wounded. Beginning in early 1966 the 11th Pathfinder Company also perfected techniques for the conduct of night airmobile operations using a combination of Air Force or artillery flares and Pathfinder lighting, and several highly successful night assaults were accomplished using these procedures.
I certify that the information provided above concerning the operation in December 1965 is true to the best of my recollection. The information concerning the operations in 1966 and 1967 was provided by Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired) Benjamin C. Buckley and Brigadier General, U.S. Army Reserve (Retired) Ronald B. Flynn from copies of official documents in their possession. Colonel (then Captain) Buckley was Commander, 11th Pathfinder Company during that period, and BG (then 1LT) Flynn was a Pathfinder Team Leader in the unit.
Richard D. Gillem, Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired)
29 March 2010